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THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


iiate  District 


A 
TREATISE   ON   THE    LAW 

OF 

CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE 


INCLUDING 


THE  RULES  REGULATING  THE  PROPER  PRESENTATION 

OF    EVIDENCE   AND    ITS    RELEVANCY;   THE 

MODE  OF  PROOF  IN  PARTICULAR 

CLASSES    OF   CRIMES 


COMPETENCY  AND  EXAMINATION   OF  WITNESSES 


WITH   FULL  REFERENCES  TO  THE   DECISIONS 


SECOND  EDITION 


BY 

H.   C.   UNDERHILL,   LL.   B 

OF  THE   NEW  YORK  BAR 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 
1910 


T 
1916 

Copyright  1898 
THE  BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY 


Copyright  1910 

BY 

H.  C.  UNDERHILL 


THE    HOLLENBECK    PRESS 
INDIANAPOLIS 


PREFACE 

The  general  conditions  involved  in  a  consideration  of  the  law 
of  criminal  evidence  are  substantially  the  same  as  twelve  years 
ago  when  the  First  Edition  of  this  work  was  published.  The 
author  therefore  trusts  that  he  may  be  pardoned  for  quoting  at 
length  from  the  Preface  of  the  First  Edition. 

"The  existing  law  of  criminal  evidence  is  almost  wholly  the 
product  of  the  judiciary  of  England  and  America  during  the  last 
hundred  years.  The  disadvantages  by  which  the  accused  was  op- 
pressed during  the  earlier  periods  of  English  criminal  jurispru- 
dence inaugurated  a  process  of  judicial  legislation  which  evolved 
a  series  of  extremely  technical  rules.  These  rules  mitigated,  in  a 
large  degree,  the  severity  of  the  law,  and  frequently  enabled  an 
accused  person  to  establish  his  innocence.  The  advance  of  educa- 
tion and  of  humane  ideas  which  has,  during  the  present  century, 
etYected  so  radical  a  reform  in  our  criminal  law  to  the  advantage 
of  the  accused,  has  obviated  the  necessity  for  these  rules. 

''The  rules  of  modern  criminal  procedure  have  been  conceived 
in  a  liberal  spirit,  and  such  safeguards  are  still  thrown  around  the 
accused  as  enable  him  to  defend  himself  with  much  greater  ad- 
vantage than  he  could  possess  if  he  were  defending  a  civil  action. 
But  the  state,  as  well  as  the  prisoner,  has  rights  in  criminal  pro- 
ceedings, and  it  has  been  my  aim  to  define  these  rights  as  far  as 
possible. 

"I  have  endeavored  to  present : 

''First.  A  concise,  but  comprehensive  and  systematic  treat- 
ment of  those  fundamental  doctrines  of  the  law  of  evidence 
which  are  exclusively  invoked  in  the  trial  of  crimes. 

"Second.  Those  rules  and  principles  of  the  law  of  evidence, 
which,  while  not  confined  in  their  application  to  criminal  trials,  are 
very  frequently  under  consideration  during  such  proceedings. 

"The  relevancy  of  particular  classes  of  facts  and  the  mode  of 
proving  them  are  considered. 

iii 


<.U^  IiQ  -2. 


IV  PREFACE. 

*'In  the  preparation  of  this  work  I  have  confined  myself  to 
a  presentation  of  the  rules  and  principles  of  the  law  as  I  have 
found  them  stated  in  the  cases  which  have  been  decided  by  the 
courts  of  last  resort. 

"The  general  rules  of  proof  constituting  the  body  of  the  law  of 
evidence  are, so  well  settled  as  to  obviate  their  discussion  in  detail 
in  this  work.  The  main  difficulty  in  judicial  proceedings  is  to  de- 
termine when  and  to  what  extent  general  principles  are  applicable 
to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  particular  cases.  The  solution 
of  this  difficulty  is  to  be  found,  first  in  ascertaining  what  the  facts 
and  circumstances  are,  and  next  in  determining  how  the  general 
principle  claimed  to  be  applicable  has  been  applied  in  analogous 
cases." 

In  this  Second  Edition  the  author  has  endeavored  to  cite  all  im- 
portant cases  which  have  been  decided  since  the  publication  of  the 
First  Edition  and  thus  bring  the  work  down  to  the  date  of  going 
to  press.  In  the  preparation  of  the  First  Edition  nearly  nine 
thousand  cases  were  analyzed,  examined  and  cited,  and  several 
thousand  have  been  added  to  this  number  in  the  present  edition. 
The  sections  of  the  original  text  have  been  rewritten  and  enlarged 
and  many  new  sections  have  been  added  as  developments  in  the 
law  have  made  such  changes  necessary.  The  total  addition  to  the 
text  is  considerably  over  two  hundred  pages. 

In  order  to  make  the  book  more  useful  to  the  practitioner,  cita- 
tions are  given  not  only  to  the  official  State  Reports,  but  also  to 
the  L.  R.  A.,  the  American  Decisions,  the  American  Reports,  the 
American  State  Reports  and  to  the  Reporter  System. 

1367  Broadway,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y.  H.  C.  Underhill. 

September  10,  1 910. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE  AND  REASONABLE  DOUBT. 
SECTION.  PAGES. 

1.  Neccssit)^  for  rules  of  evidence  in  judicial  proceedings 1-2 

2.  Elements  of  probability  and  improbability  as  affecting  the  proof  of 

facts  and  circumstances 2-3 

3.  The  character  and  mental  capacity  of  a  witness  as  relating  to  the 

credibility  of  his  testimony 3-5 

4.  The  motive  of  the  witness  to  misrepresent 5-6 

5.  Concurrent  or  corroborative  testimony 6-7 

6.  Circumstantial  evidence — To  sustain  conviction  must  exclude  every 

rational  hypothesis  except  that  of  guilt 7-i- 

7.  Circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  corpus  delicti  in  trial  for  homicide.  12-14 

8.  Distinction  between  civil  and  criminal  proceedings  as  regards  rele- 

vancy and  manner  of  proof 14-16 

9.  The  weight  of  evidence — Rules  in  civil  and  criminal  cases  distin- 

guished— Reasonable  doubt 16 

10.  Difificulty  of  defining  reasonable  doubt 16-17 

11.  Demonstration  and  belief  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  distinguished.  17-18 

12.  Attempted  definitions  of  reasonable  doubt 1&-21 

13.  Precaution  to  be  employed  in  defining  reasonable  doubt 22-24 

14.  Doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  applicable  to  misdemeanors  as  well 

as  to  felonies 24-25 

15.  Reasonable  doubt  in  the  mind  of  one  juror 25-26 

16.  Statutory  changes  in  rules  of  evidence  and  modes  of  procedure 26-27 

i6a.  Number  of  witnesses  required  and  positive  and  negative  evidence..  27-30 


CHAPTER  H. 

PRESUMPTIONS  AND  BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 

17.  The  presumption  of  innocence — General  rule 31-33 

18.  The  presumption  of  innocence  accompanies  the  accused  until  a  ver- 

dict is  rendered 33-34 


VI  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

19.  Presumption  of  chastity  of  female,  of  continuance  of  life,  etc.,  con- 

flicting with  the  presumption  of  innocence 34-35 

20.  Presumptions  from  infancy 35-36 

21.  Certain  facts  which  the  courts  are  presumed  to  know 36-39 

22.  Burden  of  proof  and  presumption  of  innocence  distinguished 39-40 

23.  Burden  of  proof — General  rule  casting  it  upon  prosecution 40-43 

24.  Burden  of  proving  a  negative — Facts  peculiarly  within  knowledge  of 

party  alleging  them 43-44 

24a.  Constitutionality  of  statutes  regulating  the  burden  of  proof 45 


CHAPTER  III. 

EVIDENCE  BEFORE  THE  GRAND  JURY. 

25.  Ex  parte  character  of  evidence  before  the  grand  jury 46-47 

26.  Legal  and  proper  evidence   only  receivable — Effect   of   basing  in- 

dictment on  incompetent  evidence 47-51 

27.  The  accused  as  a  witness  before  the  grand  jury 51-52 

28.  Sufficiency  of  evidence  before  the  grand  jury 52 

29.  Contempt  of  witnesses  before  the  grand  jury 52-53 

30.  The  indictment  is  not  evidence 53 


CHAPTER  IV. 

VARIANCE  AND  PROOF  OF  THE  VENUE. 

31.    Proving  the  substance  of  the  offense — What  variances  are  material.  54-55 

S2.    Proof  of  essential  particulars  of  persons,  time  and  place 55-56 

T,^.    Variance  in  names — Idem  sonans 56-57 

34.  Variance  in  proving  species  or  genus  of  animals 57-58 

35.  Proving  the  venue — Judicial  notice  of  general  geographical  facts. . .  58-59 
;^6.    The  venue  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence — Proof  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt  not  required 59-6i 

;^7.    Proof  of  venue  in  forgery  and  crimes  committed  in  retirement 61-62 


CHAPTER  V. 

PRIMARY  EVIDENCE. 

38.  Definition  of  primary  evidence 63-64 

39.  Primariness  of  witnesses — Proof  of  handwriting 64-66 


TABLE   OF    COXTENTS.  vii 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

40.  Evidence  which  is  required  to  be  in  writing 66 

41.  Statutor}'  requirements  as  regards  evidence  of  certain  facts 66-67 

4ra.  The  necessity  for  showing  loss  or  destruction  of  the  writing 67-69 

42.  Notice  to  produce 69-70 

43.  Writings  whose  existence  and  contents  are  in  issue — Impeachment 

by  contradictory  writings 70-7 1 

44.  Primary  evidence  of  collateral  facts 7i-74 

45.  Exception  in  the  case  of  proving  general  results 74-/6 

46.  Proof  of  records  and  official  appointments 76-77 

47.  Physical  condition  of  personal  property 77-7? 

48.  Incriminating  articles — Weapons,  clothing,  etc 78-81 

49.  Inscriptions  on  bulky  articles 81-82 

50.  Photographs  as  primary  evidence — Personal  identity 82-85 

51.  Accuracy  and  relevancy  of  photographs 85-P6 

52.  Paintings  and  drawings 87 

53.  Real  evidence — Inspection  by  jurors 88-90 

54.  Compelling  accused  to  submit  to  inspection  or  to  stand  for  identi- 

fication    90-9- 

55.  Mode  and  effect  of  identifying  evidence 9^-95 

56.  Identification  of  the  voice 95-96 


CHAPTER  yi. 

THE  ACCUSED  AS  A   "WITNESS. 

57.  Statutory  competency  of  the  accused 97-9? 

58.  The  accused   is  not   compellable  to  testify   against   himself — His 

credibility    99-101 

58a.  Evidence  obtained  by  searches  legal  and  illegal 101-104 

59.  Mode  of  examining  the  accused 104-105 

60.  Cross-examination — Incriminating  and  disgracing  questions 105-107 

61.  Examination  as  to  prior  imprisonment,  etc 107-11T 

62.  Statutory  limitation  of  cross-examination  to  relevant  matters.  ..  .  111-112 

63.  Mode  of  cross-examination 112 

64.  Privileged  communications  on  the  cross-examination 113 

65.  Conclusiveness  of  answers — Impeachment  by  other  witnesses....  113-114 

66.  The  bad  character  of  the  accused — When  admissible  to  impeach 

him    114-1T5 

67.  Commenting  on  the  failure  of  the  accused  to  testify 115-11/ 

68.  Exclusion  or  withdrawal  of  comments  on  failure  to  testify — Fail- 

ure to  call  other  witnesses,  or  to  testify  to  incriminating  facts. .  117-119 

69.  Accomplices  defined — Province  of  court  and  jury ■  119-122 

70.  Accomplices  when  jointly  indicted — Witnesses  for  each  other 122-124 

71.  Accomplices  as  witnesses  for  the  state 124-126 


Vlll  TABLE   OF    COXTEXTS. 


SECTION.  PAGES. 


Immunity  of  accomplice  when  testifying  for  the  state 126-127 

73.  Credibility  and  corroboration  of  accomplices 127-129 

74.  Extent  of  corroboration  required — It  must  be  of  material  facts..    129-132 
The  nature  of  the  crime  as  a  test  of  corroboration — Sufificiency 

of  corroboration 132-134 


/- 


/o 


CHAPTER  VII. 

CHARACTER  OF  THE  ACCUSED. 

76.    Character  defined — The  accused  may  show  good  character I35-I37 

"J"/.    Specific  traits  only  relevant — Character  of  associates 137-139 

78.  Bad  character — When  admissible 139-141 

79.  Effect  and  operation  of  evidence  of  good  character 141-142 

80.  Good  character,  though  never  conclusive,  may  acquit  if  it  creates 

a  reasonable  doubt 143-145 

81.  jMode   of  proof — Irrelevancy  of   personal   opinions — Derogatory 

rumors  in  rebuttal 146-147 

%2.    Specific  evil  acts — Relevancy  of 148-149 

83.  Remoteness — Character  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  crime 149-150 

84.  The  grade  and  moral  nature  of  the  crime 151 

85.  Disposition  is  irrelevant 151-152 

"^6.    Number  of  witnesses  to  character 152 

86a.  Instructions  as  to  the  character  of  the  accused 152-153 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

PROOF  OF  OTHER  CRIMES. 

9^7.    General    rule    regarding    evidence    of    crimes    other    than    that 

charged  in  the  indictment 154-156 

88.  Connected  or  intermingled  crimes  forming  parts  of  one  whole...   157-161 

89.  Evidence  of  other  offenses  to  show  specific  intention  or  guilty 

knowledge 161-163 

90.  Relevant  evidence  not  inadmissible  because  indirectly  proving  or 

tending  to  prove  another  crime — Dissimilar  crimes  united   in 
motives    163-167 

91.  Identity  of  means  employed  in  several  crimes — Identity  of  ac- 

cused       168-169 

92.  Sexual  crimes 169 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  ix 


CHAPTER  IX. 

DECLARATIONS   WHICH   ARE  A   PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST^. 
SECTION.  PACES. 

93.  Scope  and  limit  of  facts  and  declarations  forming  a  part  of  the 

res  gestce 170  -174 

94.  Necessity  for  approximation  of  unity  in  time,  place  and  motive 

prompting  the  declarations 174-175 

95.  Declarations  must  explain  and  illustrate  the  main  transaction...  175-176 

96.  Contemporaneous  character  of  the  declarations 176-177 

97.  Interval  for  consideration  or  taking  advice 178-180 

98.  Mental  and  physical  conditions  as  influencing  the  declarations. . .  180-182 

99.  Admissibility  for  the  accused — Relevancy 182-183 

TOO.  Declarations  uttered  prior  to  the  crime 183-18-! 

lor.  Declarations  by  bystanders  and  third  persons 184-186 


CHAPTER  X. 

DYING  DECLARATIONS. 

102.  Definition — Religious   element 187-189 

103.  Consciousness  of  nearness  of  death  as  shown  by  the  declarant's 

language    189-193 

104.  Sending   for  legal  or  spiritual   advisers,  nature   of  wounds  or 

other  circumstances  showing  a  consciousness  of  approaching 

death    I93-I95 

105.  Period  intervening  between  the  statement  and  the  death 195-197 

106.  Dying  declarations  not  admissible  to  prove  all  crimes I97-I99 

107.  Dying  declarations  distinguished  from  those  which  are  a  part  of 

res  gestce 199-200 

108.  Opinions  contained  in  dying  declarations  are  not  admissible....  200-202 

109.  Must  refer  to  the  res  gestce  of  the  homicide 202-203 

no.    Mode  of  proof,  credibility,  relevancy  and  weight ,  203-206 

111.  Declaration  is  admissible  in  its  entirety — Contradictory  or  un- 

truthful  character 206-208 

1 12.  The  form  of  the  declaration 208-21 1 

113.  Declarations  by  signs — I\Iental  condition  of  the  declarant 211-212 

114.  Dying  declarations  made  by  children 212 


^  TABLE   OF    CONTEXTS. 


CHAPTER  XL 

CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  GUILT. 
SECTION'.  PAGES. 

115.  Facts  showing  a  consciousness  of  suilt 213-214 

116.  Falsehoods  by  accused  or  suspected  persons 214-216 

117.  Demeanor  subsequent  to  crime 216-218 

1 18.  The  flight  or  attempted  escape  of  the  accused 218-222 

iig.    Explanation  by  accused  of  his  flight  or  attempted  escape 222-225 

iiga.  Declarations  which  are  self-serving  are  rejected 225-226 

120.    Resistance  to  arrest 226-227 

I2T.    Fabricating  or  suppressing  evidence 227-229 

122.  Silence  under  accusations  of  guilt 230-232 

123.  Attendant  circumstances  explaining  motives  and  reasons  of  si- 

lence     232-234 

124.  The  accusatory  assertion  or  question 234-237 


CHAPTER  XH. 

CONFESSIONS. 

125.  Definition  and  classification 238-241 

126.  Voluntary  character  of  confessions 242-245 

127.  Burden  of  proof  to  show  voluntary  character 245-247 

128.  Circumstances  under  which  confession  becomes  involuntary....   247-249 

129.  Confessions  made  while  under  arrest 249-251 

130.  Effect  of  cautioning  the  accused 251-254 

T31.  Confessions  under  oath 254-256 

132.  Confessions  taken  at  the  preliminary  examination 256-258 

133.  Mode  of  proving  confessions  made  at  the  preliminary  examina- 

tion      259-261 

134.  Confessions  of  persons  associated  in  a  conspiracy 261 

135.  Artifice  or  deception  used 261-263 

136.  Confessions  by  intoxicated  persons 263-265 

137.  Admissions  receivable  though  involuntary 265 

138.  When  facts  discovered  admit  parts  of  an   involuntary  confes- 

sion      266-267 

139.  Confessions  procured  by  persons  in  authority 267-269 

140.  Confession  need  not  be  spontaneous 269-271 

141.  Confessions  made  by  signs  or  gestures 271-272 

142.  Confessions  of  treason -7^ 

143.  Confessions  made  by  young  children 272-273 

144.  Judicial   confessions — Plea    of   guilty 273-276 


TABLE    OF    COXTEXTS.  xi 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

145.  Confessions  of  persons  not  indicted 276-277 

146.  The  value  of  confessions  as  evidence 277-279 

147.  Mode  of  proof — When  corroboration  is  required 279-281 

147a.  Credibility  of  confession  and  use  of  in  favor  of  the  accused. . . .  281-283 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

ALIBI. 

148.  Definition  and  character  of  alibi — Burden  of  proof 284-286 

149.  Distance  and  period  of  absence 286-288 

150.  Relevancy  of  evidence 288 

151.  Impeaching  the  alibi — Defendant's   declarations 288-289 

152. ,  Reasonable   doubt 289-290 

153.    Cautioning  the  jury 291-295 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

EVIDENCE  OF  INSANITY  AND  INTOXIC.\TION. 

154.  Mental  capacity  to  know  right  and  wrong  as  a  test  of  insanity.  .  296-297 

155.  Uncontrollable  impulse  and  insane  delusions 298-299 

156.  Presumption  of  continuance  of  insanity 299-300 

157.  Burden  of  proof  to  show  sanity  and  insanity 300-302 

158.  Proof  of  insanity  beyond  a  resonable  doubt  not  required 303-304 

159.  The  character  and  range  of  evidence  to  show  insanity 305-306 

160.  Evidence  showing  the  appearance,  conduct  and  language  of  the 

accused  after  the  crime — Evidence  of  insanity  in  family  of  ac- 
cused      306-308 

161.  Non-expert   evidence 308-310 

162.  Non-expert  must  relate  in  evidence  facts  on  which  his  impres- 

sion is  based — Degree  of  knowledge  required 310-312 

163.  Expert  evidence — What  constitutes  an  expert — Physical  exami- 

nation of  accused  to  ascertain  sanity 312-316 

164.  Evidence  of  voluntary  intoxication — When  irrelevant 316-317 

165.  Insensibility  or  insanity  from  indulgence  in  intoxicants  may  be 

shown     317-318 

166.  Evidence  of  intoxication  as  bearing  on  a  specific  intent,  or  on 

premeditation  318-320 

167.  Mode  of  proving  or  disproving  intoxication 320-321 

168.  Morphine   habit 32i 


Xll  TABLE    OF    CONTEXTS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS. 
SECTION.  PAGES. 

i6g.  Foundation  of  the  doctrine  and  classification  of  communications  322-324 

170.  Executive  communications  and  transactions 324-325 

171.  Communications  to  police  officials 325-326 

172.  Communications  to  attorneys  at  law 326-327 

173.  Communications  made  by  or  to  the  agent  of  the  attorney 328-330 

174.  Character  and  date  of  the  communications 330-332 

175.  Communications  made  in  contemplation  of  crime 332-33S 

176.  Permanency  of  the  privilege — Waiver 335-337 

177.  Writings,   when  privileged 337-33^ 

178.  Communications  to  spiritual  adviser 338-340 

179.  Communications  passing  between  medical  practitioners  and  their 

patients    340-343 

180.  Death  of  the  patient — Purpose  of  the  communication — Contem- 

plated  crime 343-344 

181.  Communications  made  during  an  examination  to  detect  or  ascer- 

tain   sanity 344 

182.  Secrecy  of  telegrams 344-345 

183.  Indecency  of  the  facts  to  be  proved 345-346 

184.  Privileged  communications  between  husband  and  wife 346-347 

185.  Husband  and  wife  as  witnesses  in  criminal  proceedings 347-349 

186.  Statutory  competency  of  husband  and  wife 349-350 

187.  Confidential  communications  between  husband  and  wife 350-353 

188.  Husband  or  wife  of  co-defendant  as  a  witness  for  or  against 

his  associate  in  crime — Testimony  of  husband  or  wife  on  trial 

of  a  third  person  tending  to  criminate 353-354 

189.  Valid  marriage  is  necessary 355 

190.  Privilege  as  relating  to  the  evidence  of  judicial  officers 355-357 

191.  Privilege  as  relating  to  grand  jurors 357-359 

192.  Statutory  regulations  of  the  competency  of  grand  jurors 3S9-36o 

193.  Evidence  of  traverse  jurors 360-361 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

EVIDENCE  OF  FORMER  JEOPARDY. 

194.  Plea  of  former  conviction  or  acquittal 362 

195.  Record  of  former  trial  in  evidence 362-364 

196.  Essential  facts  to  be  shown 364-365 

197.  Identity  of  crime  and  person 365-366 

198.  Criminal  judgments  as  admissions 367 


TABLE   OF    CONTEXTS.  xiii 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE  COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES. 
SECTION.  PAGES. 

199.  Definition  and  formal  requirements  of  the  oath 368-369 

200.  When  witness  may  afifirm 369-370 

201.  Religious  belief  of  the  witness 370-372 

202.  Insanity — When  disqualifying  a  witness Zl^-ZIT) 

203.  Mode  of  proving  insanity  of  witness ZTh-Z7A 

204.  Deaf  mutes  as  witnesses 374-375 

205.  Children  on  the  witness  stand 1 375-378 

206.  Incompetency  of  witnesses  caused  by  conviction   of   infamous 

crime    378-379 

207.  The  pardon  of  the  convict — When  restoring  competency 379-380 

208.  Mode  of  proving  pardon — Parol  evidence 380-381 

209.  Statutory   regulations    removing   the    incompetency    of    persons 

convicted  of  crime 381-383 

210.  Statutes   construed 383 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES. 

21 1.  Direct  examination — Leading  questions 384-386 

212.  When  leading  questions  may  be  asked  on  the  direct  examina- 

tion     386-388 

213.  Forgetful  witness  may  be  asked  leading  questions 388-390 

214.  Questions  put  to  the  witness  by  the  court 390-392 

215.  Judicial  remarks  upon  the  demeanor  or  credibility  of  a  witness 

during  his  examination 393 

216.  Answers  must  be  responsive 394 

217.  Refreshing  the  memory  of  a  forgetful  witness  by  memorandum.  394-397 

218.  Character  of  the  memorandum  employed  to  refresh  the  memory.  397-398 

219.  Purpose  and  importance  of  cross-examination 398-399 

220.  When   right  to  cross-examine  is  lost — Cross-examination  con- 

fined to  matters  brought  out  on  direct 399-402 

221.  Cross-examination  to  test  credibility 402-405 

222.  When  answers  to  questions  involving  collateral  matters  asked 

in  cross-examination  may  be  contradicted — Hostility  or  friend- 
ship towards  the  accused 405-407 

223.  Re-direct   examination 407-410 

224.  Recalling  witnesses 410-41 1 

225.  Exclusion  and  separation  of  witnesses 411-414 


XIV  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

226.  Refusal  to  testify 414-415 

22~.  Interpreting  the  language  of  the  witness 415-416 

228.  Improper  reception  of  evidence  by  the  jurors 416-418 

229.  View  by  the  jurors — Discretionary  power  of  the  court 418-419 

230.  Purpose  of  the  view  is  to  afford  evidence 419 

231.  The  right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  during  the  taking  of  riie 

view    419-420 

232.  Presence  of  the  accused  while  taking  testimony 421-422 

233.  Experiments  in  and  out  of  court 422-424 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  IMPEACHMENT  OF  WITNESSES. 

234.  Impeachment  of  witnesses — General  rule 425-426 

235.  The  impeachment  of  necessary  witnesses  and  those  unexpectedly 

hostile 426-429 

236.  Impeachment  of  adverse  witnesses  by  showing  bad   reputation 

for  veracity — Belief  under  oath z^9-43i 

2.Z7.    Impeachment  by  showing  the  general  bad  character  of  the  wit- 
ness aside  from  truthfulness 431-433 

238.  Impeachment  of  the  adverse  witness  by  showing  contradictory 

statements — Necessity  for  foundation 433-436 

239.  Impeachment  by  contradictory  affidavits,  depositions  and  otI~er 

writings    436-437 

240.  Contradictory  writings  must  be  shown  to  the  witness  who  is  to 

be  impeached 438 

241.  Contradiction  of  irrelevant  matters  not  permissible — Proof  of 

confirmatory  statements 438-439 

242.  Previous  silence  as  impeachment 439-440 

243.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show  the  general  reputation  for  truth- 

fulness of  a  witness  who  has  been  impeached 440-441 

244.  Limitations  upon  the  right  to  ask  questions  which  disgrace  the 

witness  442-443 

245.  Impeachment    by    showing    social    connections,    occupation    and 

manner  of  living 443-446 

246.  When  and  how  previous  imprisonment  or  conviction  of  crime 

may  be  shown 446-447 

247.  Incriminating  questions •  447-452 

248.  Interest  and  bias  of  the  witness  as  impeachment 452-456 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XV 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  ATTENDANCE  OF  WITNESSES. 
SECTION.  PAGES. 

249.  The  subpoena — Witness  fees 457-458 

250.  Constitutional   right  of  the  accused  to   compulsory   process    to 

procure  the  attendance  of  witnesses 458-460 

251.  Subpoena  duces   tecum 460-461 

252.  Validity  of  reasons  for  not  producing  writings 461-462 

253.  Service  of  the  subpoena  and  time  allowed  to  witnesses 462 

254.  Recognizance  to  secure  the  attendance  of  witnesses  where  the 

hearing  is  postponed 462-463 

255-    Obstructing  the  attendance  of  witnesses 463-465 

256.  Change  of  venue  for  the  convenience  of  witnesses 465 

257.  The  intentional  absence  of  witnesses — When  it  constitutes  a  con- 

tempt of  court 465-466 

258.  Privilege   of  witnesses   from   civil   arrest   and   from    service   of 

civil   process 466-468 

259.  Attendance  of  witnesses  in  custody 468 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

ABSENT  WITNESSES  AND  CONTINUANCES. 

260.  Grounds  for  admitting  the  testimony  of  missing  witnesses 469-470 

261.  Deceased  or  insane  witnesses — How  death   of  witness  may  be 

proved    4/0 

262.  Witnesses   sick  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction — Distinction  between 

civil  and  criminal  cases 47^ 

263.  Mode  of  proving  absence  of  witness 471-472 

264.  Absence  of  witness  procured  by  connivance — Relevancy  and  use 

of  evidence  of  such  witness 472-473 

265.  Cross-examining  and  confronting  witnesses 473-474 

266.  Mode  of  proving  the  evidence  of  the  absent  witness — Substance 

only  need  be  stated 474-475 

267.  Stenographer's    notes,   judge's    minutes    and   bill    of    exceptions 

when  used  to  prove  the  evidence  of  the  absent  witness 475-477 

268.  Continuance  when  granted  because  of  absence  of  witness — Dis- 

cretionary power  of  the  court 477-479 

269.  Due  diligence  in  summoning  witness  must  be  proved — 'I  lie  com- 

petency and  materiality  of  his  testimony  must  appear 479-482 

270.  What  facts  the  affidavit  for  the  continuance  must  contain 482-483 

271.  Admissions   to   avoid  continuance — Constitutional   right   of   the 

accusefl  to  enjoy  the  benefit  of  oral  testimony 4^3-4^5 

272.  Admission  of  facts  as  true  to  avoid  continuance 485-486 


XVI  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY. 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

273.  The  power  and  right  of  the  jury  to  determine  the  law — Criminal 

libel  487-488 

274.  Character  and  analysis  of  a  general  verdict 489-490 

275.  Charging  the  jury  on  the  law — Physical  power  of  the  jury  to 

disregard  the  judge's  charge 490-492 

276.  Charging  on  the  evidence 493-494 

z'/'j.    Assumption  of  facts  in  charge 495 

278.  Necessity  for  evidence  to  sustain  instructions 495-496 

279.  Directing  a  verdict 496-498 

280.  Order  and  manner  of  introducing  the  proof. . .  .• 498 

280a.  The  credibility  of  detectives  and  experts 499-500 


CHAPTER  XXni. 

EMBEZZLEMENT  AND  LARCENY. 

281.  Embezzlement — Essential  facts  constituting  the  crime 501-502 

282.  Embezzlement — The  intention  to  convert 502-505 

283.  Proving  other  acts  of  embezzlement 505-506 

284.  Evidence  of  demand  and  refusal 506-507 

285.  The  existence  of  the  fiduciary  relation 507-508 

286.  The  ownership  of  the  property 508-509 

287.  Evidence  of  efforts  to  conceal  or  dispose  of  property  or  money.  509-5TO 
2S8.    Circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  the  venue 510 

289.  Value  of  the  property 510-51 1 

290.  Admissions  by  the  defendant 511 

291.  Documentary  evidence 511-513 

291a.  Definition  of  larceny 5i3-5i4 

292.  Larceny — The   felonious  intention 514-516 

293.  The  carrying  away 516-517 

294.  Ownership — Character  and  proof  of 517-518 

295.  Competency  of  owner  of  stolen  goods  as  witness — Proof  of  his 

non-consent    518-519 

296.  Identifying  the  staleh  property 519-522 

297.  Recorded  brands  of  cattle 522-523 

298.  Evidence  of  venue  and  of  the  value  of  money  or  property 523-525 

299.  Inference  from  possession  of  the  property  stolen 525 

300.  Recent  and  exclusive  character  of  possession 526-527 

301.  Burden  of  explaining  possession — Character  of  explanatory  evi- 

dence      528-530 


TABLE    OF    CONTEXTS. 


SECTION. 
302 

304 
305 
306 

307 
30S 
309 


Explanatory  declarations 530-531 

Evidence  of  footprints S3I-532 

Financial  standing  and  expenditures  of  the  defendant 532 

Evidence  of  other  crimes S32-534 

Stolen  goods  found  through  inadmissible  confession 534 

Malicious    mischief 535 

^lalicious   intent 535-536 

Ownership   and   value   of  property — Evidence   that    the   accused 

acted  in  good  faith 537-538 

310.  Maliciously  injuring  animals 538-539 

311.  Injuries  to  grain,  trees,  crops,  etc 539-540 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

HOMICIDE. 

312.  Facts  forming  the  corpus  delicti — Evidence  to  prove  the  cause 

and  manner  of  death 541-546 

313.  The  result  of  the  autopsy  as  evidence 546-547 

314.  Variance  in  proof  of  means  or  weapon  producing  death 54^-55 1 

315.  Weapons  as  evidence 551-552 

316.  Identity  of  the  deceased 552 

317.  The  identification  of  the  body  of  the  deceased 552 

318.  Expert   testimony   and   the   employment   of   a   chemical   analysis 

in  caSes  of  homicide  b}^  poisoning 553-555 

319.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show  poisoning 555-556 

319a.  The  declarations  of  the  deceased 556-558 

320.  Presumption  and  proof  of  malice 558-560 

321.  Connected  crimes 560-562 

322.  Conduct  of  the  accused  subsequent  to  the  crime 562-563 

2,22,.    Facts  showing  possible  motive 563-568 

324.  Competency  of  evidence  showing  the  habits,  character  and  dis- 

position of  the  deceased 568-570 

325.  Nature  of  the  proof  required  to  show  the  character  of  the  de- 

ceased     570-572 

326.  Evidence  of  threats  by  the  deceased 572-575 

227.    Evidence  to  prove  the  peaceable  character  of  the  accused 575-576 

328.  Threats  by  the  accused — General  nature  of  these  threats 576-578 

329.  Form,  character  and  mode  of  proving  threats 578-580 

330.  Declarations  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gesfce 580-582 

330a.  Declarations  of  the  accused  after  the  crime 582-583 

331.  Declarations  of  third  persons  and  cries  and  exclamations  of  by- 

standers      583-584 

332.  Threats  against  deceased  by  third  persons.  . . ; 584-585 


XX  T-UiLE    OF    COXTi:XTS. 

SECTION-.  PAGES. 

384.  Lascivious  cohabitation  or  living  in  unlawful  cohabitation 662-663 

385.  Seduction  defined 663 

386.  The  sexual  intercourse — Relevanc}^  of  evidence 663-664 

387.  Evidence  to  prove  the  promises 664-665 

388.  Relevancy  of  the  previous  conduct  of  the  parties 665-667 

389.  The  examination,  credibility  and  corroboration   of  the  prosecu- 

trix     667 

390.  Character  of  corroborative  evidence  required 668-669 

391.  The  marriage  of  the  accused  to  the  seduced  female 669-670 

392.  The  chastity  of  the  female — What  constitutes  chastity  and  houf 

it  may  be  proved 670-673 

393.  The  presumption  of  chastity 673 

394.  Defilement  of  female  ward  or  servant 674 

395.  Incest   defined 674  675 

396.  Evidence  to  show  the  sexual  intercourse 675-676 

397.  The  kinship  existing  between  the  parties — Evidence  of   accom- 

plices      676 

398.  Bigamy — The  intent — Invalidity  or  annulment  of  first  marriage.  677 

399.  Presumption  and  proof  of  death  of  spouse ■ 677-678 

400.  Competency  of  wife  of  accused 678 

401.  Absence  of  lawful  spouse 679 

402.  Proof  of  marriage  bj-  eye-witness  or  certificate 679-680 

403.  Proof  of  marriage  by  reputation,  cohabitation  and  conduct 680-681 

404.  The  admissions  of  the  accused  as  evidence  to  prove  the  mar- 

riage— Primary  evidence  of  the  ceremony — When  required...  681-682 

405.  Marriage  certificates  and  transcripts  of   records  as  evidence — 

Presumption  of  validity — Venue 682-683 

406.  Bigamous    cohabitation 683 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

RAPE. 

407.  Rape    defined — The   nonconsent    of    the    prosecutrix — Presump- 

tion of  incapacity  to  consent 684-686 

408.  Rape  by  infants 686-687 

409.  Relevancy   of   the   victim's    complaints — Proving   the    details    of 

what  she  said 687-68S 

410.  Proving  the  details  to  impeach  or  corroborate 688-689 

411.  Delay  in  making  complaint — Reasons  for  delay 689-691 

412.  Medical   testimony 692 

413.  Relevancy  of  the  physical  condition  of  the  prosecutrix 692-694 

414.  The  prosecutrix  as  a  witness — Her  competency  and  credibility — 

Infancy  of  the   prosecutrix  when  rendering  her  incompetent 

as  a  witness 694-696 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXi 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

415.  The  prior  relations  of  the  parties 6g7 

416.  Proof  of  carnal  knowledge  requisite 698 

417.  The  force  or  fraud  employed — Threats  and  mortal  fear — Failure 

to  make  outcry 699-701 

418.  Reputation  of  the  prosecutrix  for  chastity — Proof  of  specific  un- 

chaste  acts 701-704 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

FORGERY.   COUNTERFEITING  AND  FALSE  PRETENSES. 

419.  Forgery — Definition  and  classification 705-706 

420.  Competency  of  witnesses 707 

421.  Variance  in  proving  the  writing 707-709 

422.  Fraudulent    intent    and    guilty    knowledge — Circumstantial    evi- 

dence to  show 709-710 

423.  Evidence  of  similar  crimes  to  show  the  intent— Effect  of  acquit- 

tal— Relevancy  of  possession  of   forged  papers  on  charge  of 
forgery 7'^'i--7^2, 

424.  Proof  of  uttering  forged  paper 714 

425.  The  writing  alleged  to  have  been  forged  as  evidence — Primary 

evidence  714-716 

426.  Proving  the  venue 716 

427.  Fictitious  names — Evidence  to  prove  existence  or  non-existence 

of   person 716-717 

428.  Proving  the  corporate   existence   of   the   bank   upon   which   the 

forged  check  is  drawn 717-718 

429.  Proving  the  handwriting — Expert  evidence — Standards  of  com- 

parison      718-720 

430.  Evidence  to  show  that  the  forged  writing  could  not  accomplish 

the  purpose  intended 721-722 

431.  Sufficiency  of  evidence — Pecuniary  condition  of  the  accused 722-723 

432.  Counterfeiting — Elements     of     the     crime — Intent     and     guilty 

knowledge — Evidence  of  similar  offenses 724-725 

433.  Evidence  to  show  that  counterfeit  money  or  implements  for  its 

manufacture  were  found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused 725-726 

434.  Resemblance  to  the  genuine 726-727 

435.  False  pretenses 7-7-7-9 

436.  Evidence  to  show  the  intention  of  the  owner 729 

437.  The  intent  to  defraud 729-/31 

438.  Evidence  of  other  similar  crimes  not  inadmissible  when  relevant 

to  show  the  intent  to  defraud 7?i'^-7^2 

439.  The  pretenses  made  and  evidence  to  sliow  their  falsity 7?>--7M 

440.  The  pretenses  must  have  been  calculated  to  deceive 734-735 


XXll  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

SECTION'.  PAGES. 

441.  The  value  of  the  property  obtained 735-736 

442.  Belief  in  the  false  representations 736 

443.  Evidence  of  the  pecuniary  condition  of  the  accused  at  the  date 

of  making  the  representations 72)7-72^ 

444.  The  false  pretenses  not  necessarily  verbal 738-739 

445.  Proving  the   venue 739 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

OFFENSES  AGAINST  PUBLIC  JUSTICE. 

446.  Obstructing  justice  and  resisting  arrest — Proof  of  official  char- 

acter of  officer  resisted — Validity  of  his  appointment 740-742 

447.  Intention  to  obstruct  justice — Evidence  of  threats  or  to  show 

validity  of  warrant 742-743 

448.  Preventing  attendance  of  witnesses 743 

449.  False   swearing 743-744 

450.  Embracer}' — Evidence    required 744-745 

451.  Bribery   defined — Evidence   of   circumstances   to    prove   corrupt 

intention    745  746 

452.  Judicial  notice  of  official  character  and  acts - 746-747 

453.  Necessity  for  reliance  on  evidence  of  accomplices  in  the  bribery 

— Compulsory  examination  of  accomplice 747-748 

454.  Proving  other  acts  of  bribery 748-749 

455.  Bribery  of  voters — Judicial  notice  of  elections 749-75° 

456.  Extortion — Intent  and  guilty  knowledge — Evidence  to  prove  ig- 

norance or  mistake  of  law  or  fact 750-751 

457.  Value  of  the  thing  extorted — Burden  of  proving  exception  to 

statute    751 

458.  Compounding    offenses — The    intent    to    screen    the    offender — 

Mode  of  proving  that  a  crime  was  committed 751-75^ 

459.  Contempt  defined — Inherent  judicial  power  to  punish 753 

460.  Direct  and  constructive  contempt  distinguished — Court  may  take 

notice  of  without  evidence 753-754 

461.  Procedure  in  receiving  evidence  of  constructive  contempt 755-758 

462.  Escape — Distinction  from  prison  breach 758 

463.  Intention  of  permitting  escape — Negligence  of  officer 758-759 

464.  Aiding  prisoner  to  escape 759-76o 

465.  Illegality  of  arrest,  when  relevant 760-761 

466.  Perjury — The  intent  to  swear  to  what  is  false 761-762 

467.  Materiality  of  the  testimony 763-764 

468.  Number  of  witnesses  required  and  corroboration  of  single  wit- 

ness to  prove  falsity 764-766 

469.  Falsity  of  the  testimony 766-767 

470.  Proof  of  the  testimony  alleged  to  be  false 767-769 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  xxiii 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

CRIMES  AGAINST   PUBLIC   POLICY,    PUBLIC   PEACE   AND   PUBLIC 

HEALTH. 
SECTION.  PAGES. 

471.  Lotteries  and  gaming  or  gambling — What  constitutes 770-771 

472.  Evidence  to  prove  manner  of  playing 771 

473.  The  bet  or  wager — Playing  in  public 71^-llZ 

474.  Accomplice   evidence 774 

475.  Keeping  gambling  houses IIA-Il^ 

476.  Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof 776 

477.  Gambling  instruments  as  evidence 111^117 

478.  Mailing  obscene  literature,  etc 777-77'& 

479.  Evidence  obtained  by  decoy  letters 77^779 

480.  Adulteration  of  food,  drugs,  etc 779-78o 

481.  Evidence  furnished  by  analysis 780-782 

482.  Keeping  disorderly  house 782-784 

483.  Dueling — Sending  a  challenge  to  fight  a  duel 784-785 

484.  Carrying  concealed  weapons — How  concealment  may  be  proved 

—intent   785-788 

485.  Apprehension  of  danger 788-789 

486.  Character  of  the  defendant  as  an  officer  or  traveler 789-791 

487.  Forcible  entry  and  detainer 79i 

488.  Affray    792 

489.  Riot 793-794 

490.  Conspiracy    794-795 

491.  Circumstantial    evidence 795-797 

492.  Admissibility  of  acts  and  declarations  of  fellow-conspirators...  797-799 

493.  Must  be  made  during  existence  of  and  in  furtherance  of  the 

conspiracy  799-801 

494.  Order  of  proving  conspiracy  to  let  in  declarations 801-802 


CHAPTER  XXXn. 

EVIDENCE  IN  INTERNATIONAL  AND  INTERSTATE  EXTRADITION. 

495.  International  extradition — Treaties  and  statutory  regulation 803-804 

496.  Burden  of  proof  and  amount  of  evidence  required  in  interna- 

tional and  interstate  extradition  to  show  criminality  and  other 
essential  facts 804-806 

497.  Fugitive  character  of  the  person  claimed  for  extradition 806-808 

498.  Evidential  rules  governing  interstate  extradition 808-809 

499.  Character,  form  and  authentication  of  indictments,  etc.,  in  in- 

terstate extradition 809-81 1 


XXIV  TABLE    OF    COXTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGES. 

500.  Constitutional  and  statutory  regulation  of  the  mode  of  proving 

and  effect  of  records  of  other  states 811-812 

501.  General  rules  regulating  the  taking  of  evidence  in  foreign  extra- 

dition       812-814 

502.  Authentication   by    consular    certificate    of    warrants    and  "other 

papers  used  as  evidence  in  international  extradition 814-815 

503.  The  competency  of  certified  copies  as  evidence  of  criminality...  815-816 

504.  Proof  of  foreign  laws  and  treaties  in  international  extradition..  816-817 

505.  Proof  of  laws  in  interstate  extradition 817-818 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

EVIDENCE  OF   PREVIOUS   CRIME  TO  INCREASE   PENALTY. 

506.  Statutes  enhancing  the  punishment  of  habitual  criminals 819-820 

507.  Constitutionality  of  legislation  punishing  habitual  criminals 820-821 

508.  Conviction   of   the   former  crime   must  have   been   prior  to   the 

commission  of  the  crime  now  being  tried 822 

509.  Effect  of  pardon  of  former  crime  in  excluding  proof  of  prior 

conviction   S2j^ 

510.  Setting  out  the  former  conviction  in  the  indictment — Variance..   823-824 

511.  Effect  of  plea  of  not  guilty 824 

512.  Order  of  trying  the  issue  of  former  conviction 824-826 

513.  Necessity  of  proving  discharge  from  prison 826 

514.  Proof  of  the  prior  conviction — How  made 826-827 

515.  Proof  of  the  identity  of  the  accused  with  the  person  previously 

convicted   827-829 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

NEWLY-DISCOVERED  EVIDENCE. 

516.  General  considerations 830-831 

517.  Diligent  efforts  to   find  and   to   procure  the  evidence  in  season 

must  be  shown 831-833 

518.  Burden  of  proof — The  new  evidence  must  be  set  out  in  the  affi- 

davits     833 

519.  Credibility  of  ,the  new  evidence 834-835 

520.  Materiality  and  relevancy  of  the  newly-discovered  evidence 835 

521.  New   evidence  impeaching  merely 836 

522.  The  new  evidence  must  not  be  cumulative  merely 836-837 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

EVIDENCE  IN   BASTARDY  PROCEEDINGS. 
StXTION.  PAGES. 

523.  Bastardy  proceedings — Whether  criminal  or  civil  in  their  char- 

acter      838-840 

524.  Degree  of  proof  required — Doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  not  ap- 

plicable    840-841 

525.  Evidence  for  the  jury  from  the  inspection  of  the  child 841-843 

526.  Presumption  of  legitimacy 843-845 

527.  Evidence    rebutting   the   presumption   of    legitimacy 845-846 

528.  The  relations  of  the  parties 846-848 

529.  Competency  and  credibility  of  the  prosecutrix 848 

530.  Variance  in  proving  the  date  of  the  conception 848-849 

531.  The    reputation   of    the    prosecutrix 849 

532.  Sexual  intercourse  with  other  men  during  the  period  of  gesta- 

tion      849-851 

533.  Admissibility  of  the  admissions  and  declarations  of  the  parties..  851-853 

534.  Evidence  of  the  preliminary  examination 853 

535.  Evidence  of  compromise  and  settlement 854 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Aaron  v.  United  States,  155  Fed. 

833  174 

Abbott  V.  People,  86  N.  Y.  460  325 
Abernethy  v.  Commonwealth,  loi 

Pa.  St.  322  328 

Abies  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  292  476 
Abrigo  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  143  36 
Achterberg  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 

463  36 

Ackerson   v.   People,    124  111.   563 

123,  148,  152 

Ackley  v.  People,  9  Barb  (N.  Y.) 

6og  76 

Adams,  Ex  parte,  25  Miss.  883         459 

Adams  v.  Board  of  Trustees,  S7 

Fla.  266  218 

V.  New  York,  192  U.  S.  585      58a 

V.  People,  9  Hun    (N.  Y.)   89 

66,  121 
V.  People,  47  111.  376  no 

V.  State,  52  Ala.  379  301 

V.  State,  78  Ark.  16  395 

V.  State,  28  Fla.  511 

50,  153,  220,  232 
V.  State,  34  Fla.  185  235 

V.  State,  55  Fla.  i  522 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  11  320 

V.  State,  129  Ga.  248  132 

V.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  412  275 

V.  State  (Tex.  App.,  1892),  19 

S.  W.  907  112 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  285     130 
V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  35  309 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  452      48 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  586  409 

Adellberger   v.    State    (Tex.    Cr., 

1897),  39  S.  W.  103  468 

Adkins  V.  Commonwealth,  98  Ky. 
539  271 


Adkisson  v.   State,  34  Tex.   Cr. 

296  403 

Adreveno     v.     Mutual     &c.     Life 

Assn.,  34  Fed.  870  179 

Adutt,  In  re,  55  Fed.  376  496 

.-Etna    Life    Ins.    Co.   v.    Deming, 

123  Ind.  384  179 

.\gan   V.    Hey,   30   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

591  189 

Agee  V.  State,  113  Ala.  52  421,  422 
Ager  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  158  437 

Aguierre  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  519  449 
Ahearn  v.  United  States,  158  Fed. 

606  72, 

Aholtz  V.  People,  121  111.  560  517 

Aiken  v.  State   (Tex.),  64  S.  W. 

57  140 

Alanis  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

81  S.  W.  709  130 

Albany   City  Bank  v.    Schermer- 

horn,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  372  461 

Alberty  v.  United  States,   162  U. 

S.  499  118 

Albin  V.  State,  63  Ind.  598  153 

Albright  v.  Lapp,  26  Pa.  St.  99  226 
Albritton  v.  State,  94  Ala.  76  I49-I53 
Alderman  v.   People,  4  Mich.  414 

72,  172,  176 

Alexander  v.  State,  99  Ind.  450      473 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  406  305 

V.  State.  31  Tex.  Cr.  359  377 

V.  United  States,  138  U.  S.  353  332 

Alford  V.  State,  25  Fla.  852  196 

V.  State,  47  Fla.  i        236,  238,  374 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  621 

87,  331 

Alfred  v.  State,  37  Miss.  296  126 

Allams  V.  State,  123  Ga.  500     156,  157 


XXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


\Rcfcrcnccs  ar 
Allen    V.    Commonwealth     ( Ky. ) , 
82  S.  W.  589  314 

V.  Commonwealth,  10  Ky.  58      225 
V.  Commonwealth,    26    Ky.    L. 

807  121 

V.  People,  82  111.  610  356 

V.  State,  40  Ala.  334  371 

V.  State,  60  Ala.  19  14 

V.  State,  III  Ala.  80  328,  331 

V.  State,  146  Ala.  61  118.  119 

V.  State,   148  Ala.   588  320 

V.  State,  70  Ark.  22  197 

V.  State,   74   Ga.    769  69 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  458  147 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  237  447 

V.  State   (Miss.,   1908),  45  So. 

833  414 

V.  State,  61  Miss.  627  225 

V.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  287    71,  72.  72, 
V.  State,  12  Tex  .A.pp.  190  129 

V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  150  439 

V.  United  States,  164  U.  S.  492 

15,  121.  118,  320 

Allgood  V.  State,  87  Ga.  668  431 

Allison  V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  402  71 
Allred  v.  State,  126  Ga.  537  125 

Alminowicz    v.    People,     117    111. 

App.   415  524 

Alpine  v.  State,  117  Ala.  93  .,  384 
Alsobrook  v.  State,  126  Ga.  100  90 
Alston  V.  State,  109  Ala.  51  352 

Altman  v.  State  (Ga.  App.),  63  S. 

E.  928  74 

Altschuler  v.  Algaza,  16  Neb.  631 

525,  529 

Amos  V.  State,  83  Ala.  i  127 

V.  State,  96  Ala.   120  494 

Anderson  v.  Bank,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  D. 

644  ^77,  179 

V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),    117 

S.  W.  364  89 

V.  Dunn,  6  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  204 

459 
V.  Imhofif,  34  Neb.  335  218 

V.  State,  79  Ala.  5  112 

V.  State,  104  Ala.  83  211,  387 

V.  State,  20  Fla.  381  7 

V.  State,  72  Ga.  98  126 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  175  275 


e  to  Sections.^ 

Anderson  v.  State,  104  Ind.  467 

18,  58,  118,  417,  418 
V.  State,  82  Miss.  784,  409 

V.  State  (Tex.  1897),  39  S.  W. 

109  471 

V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  49  206 

V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  312  69 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  341  336 

V.  State,   41   Wis.  430  407 

V.  State,  133  Wis.  601    126,  131,  484 
Andre  v.  State,  5  Iowa  389 

341,  390,  392,  393 
Andrew  v.  State,   152  Ala.   16        41a 
Andrews  v.  Andrews,  2  John  Cas. 
(N.    Y.)    109  257 

V.  People,   T,2>   Colo.    193  130 

V.  State  (Ala.),  48  So.  858         211 
V.  State,   21    Fla.   598  Z7 

V.  State,  116  Ga.  83  6 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  100  S.  W. 

922  269 

V.    State    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),  83 

S.  W.  188  55.  ITS 

.'Kneals  v.  People,  134  111.  401  77,  238 
Angelo  V.  People,  96  111.  209  21,  68 
Angley  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

427  148 

Anglin  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  475  296 
Angling  v.  State,  137  Ala.  17 

61,  132,  133 
Angus  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  52  326 
Ankeny     v.      Rawhouser      (Neb. 

T901),   95    N.    W.    1053  532 

Annesley  v.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St. 

Tr.  1 139  175 

Anshicks   v.    State,    6    Tex.    App. 

524  228 

Anson   v.    People,   148  111.  494 

89,  420,  423 
.\nthony-v.  State,  Meigs  (Tenn.) 

265  III 

App  V.  State,  90  Ind.  73,  211 

Appleton  V.  State,  61  Ark.  590 

loi,  330 
Appleyard   v.    Massachusetts,   203 

U.    S.  222  498 

Archer  v.  State,  106  Ind.  426  72,,  49i 
Archibald  v.  State,  122  Ind.  122 

103,    1 1 1 
Arcia  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.   198     2,2 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXIX 


[References  at 
Arenz  v.  Commonwealth,  125  Ky. 

737  482 

Areola  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  51  297 
Armitage  v.  State,  13  Ind.  441  434 
Armor  v.  State,  63  Ala.  173  80,  167 
Armstrong  v.  People,  30  Fla.  170  158 
V.  State,  30  Fla.   170 

154,  156,  157,  161,  162 
V.  State,  14  Ind.  App.  566  214 

Arnold   v.    Chesebrough,   41    Fed. 


74 


174 
402 

77^  93 

12 

119 

214 


V.   State,  53  Ga.  574 
V.  State,  131  Ga.  494 
V.  State,  23  Ind.  170 
V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  435 
V.  State,  81   Wis.  278 
Arnwine  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  114 
S.  W.  796  330 

V.  State,    50    Tex.    Cr.    477        324 
V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  213     265,  314 
Ascher  v.  Commonwealth,  28  Ky. 

L.  134  103 

Ashford  v.  State,  36  Neb.  38  371,  2)77 
Ashwood    V.    State,    37    Tex.    Cr. 

550  225 

Ashworth   v.    State,   31    Tex.   Cr. 

419  358 

Askew  V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  79  225 
Askren  v.  State,  51  Ind.  592  524 
Aszman  v.  State,  123  Ind.  347 

17,    18.    104,    166 
Atkins  V.    State    (Tenn.),    105   S. 

W.  353  161 

Attaway    v.    State,    35    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  403  147 

Attorney-General  v.  Briant,  15  M. 

&  W.   169  171 

Atwood  V.  State,  84  Ark.  623         310 
V.  Welton,   7   Conn.   66  201 

Ausmus  V.   People   (Colo.,  1910), 

107  Pac.  204  312,  330,  338,  429 

Austin  V.  Commonwealth,  19  Ky. 

L-  474  m 

V.  Commonwealth,  124  Ky.  55 

133,  267 

V.  People,  102  111.  261  67 

V.  State,    14   Ark.    555  220 

Aiistine  v.   People,   no  111.  248      270 

Avery  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  199 

492,  494 


e  to  Sections.] 

Ayers  v.   State,  88  Ind.  275  73 

V.  Watson,  137  U.  S.  584  49 


B 


Babcock  v.  People,  13  Colo.  515     242 
V.  People,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.)  347 

180,  200,  351,  439 
Baccio  V.  People,  41  N.  Y.  265 

409,  411 
Bachellor  v.   State,   10  Tex.  258     473 
Bacon  v.  Frisbie,  80  N.  Y.  394       173 
V.  Harrington,  5  Pick.  (Mass.) 

63  533 

V.  State,  22  Fla.  51  70,  73 

Badger  v.  State  (Ga.  App.  1909.), 

63   S.   E.  532  357 

Bagley  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  163    298 
Bailey  v.  Commonwealth,  11  Bush 
(Ky.)    688  485 

V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.  1908), 
113  S.  W.  140  281 

V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  107 

411,  416 
V.  State,   26   Ga.    579  195 

V.  State   (Miss.),  49  So.  227      521 
V.  State,  36  Neb.  808  382 

V.  State  (Tex.),  30  S.  W.  669    388 
V.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  706  133 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  540 

386,  390,  391 

Bain  v.  State,  61  Ala.  75  342 

V.  State,  74  Ala.  38  12 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  96      117 

Bainbridge  v.  State,  30  Ohio  St. 

264  197 

Bake  v.  State,  21  Md.  422  523 

Baker    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

17  S.  W.  625  228 

V.  Kuhn,  38  Iowa  392  176 

V.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  3 

Q.  B.  91  ^79 

V.  People,    105   111.  452  346 

V.  State,  49  Ala.  350  485 

V.  State,  122  Ala.  i  67 

V.  State,  85  Ark.  300  96,  108 

V.  State,  87  Ark.  564  469 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  452.  362.  364 

V.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  45  80 


XXX 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Baker  v.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  i  130 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  392  loi 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  118  S.  W. 

542  405 

V.  State,  47  Wis  iii  532 

V.  State,  56  Wis.  568  523 

V.  State,  69  Wis.  2^  528 

V.  State,   80  Wis.   416  301 

V.  State,   120  Wis.   135           12,  184 

Balbo  V.  People,  80  N.  Y.  484  129 
Raldez  v.  State,  2>7  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

413  6 

Baldwin  v.  State,  46  Fla.  115    492,  493 

V.  State,   126  Ind.  24  257 

V.  State,  I  Sneed  (Tenn.)  411  296 

V.  State    (Tex.    Cr.   App.),  28 

S.  W.  951  130 

Balkum   v.    State   115   Ala.    117  76 
Ball  V.  Commonwealth,  30  Ky.  L. 

600  61 
V.  Commonwealth,      125      Ky. 

601  323 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.   107  326 

V.  State  31   Tex.  Cr.  214  241 

Ballard  v.  State,  31  Fla.  266        70,  268 

Ballinger   v.    Elliott,    72    N.    Car. 

596  258 
Ballowe  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

44  S.  W.  646  196 
Banbury    Peerage    Case,    i    Sim. 

&  Stu.  I53_  526 
Bank    of    Utica    v.    ^lersereau,    ^ 

Barb.   Ch.    (N.  Y.)    528             ^  175 

Banks  v.  State,  84  Ala.  430  138 

V.  State,  96  Ala.  78,            380,  383 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  644  296 

Barber  v.  People,  17  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

366  443 

V.  People,  203  111.  543  398 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  598  235 

Barden  v.  State,  145  Ala.  i  61 

Bardin   v.    State,   143   Ala.   74  262 

Bargagliotti,  Ex  parte,  6  Cal.  App. 

333  21 

Barefield  v.  State,  14  Ala.  603  451 

Barfield  v.  State,  29  Ga.  127  422 

Barker  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  286  213 

V.  State,   127  Ga.  276  473 

Barlow  v.  State,  120  Ind.  56  309 

Barnaby  v.  State,  106  Ind.  539  476 


e  to  Sections.'\ 

Barnard    v.    State,    48    Tex.    Cr. 
App.  Ill  67 

V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.),  76  S.  W. 

475  390 

Barnards  v.  State,  88  Tenn.  183  6 

Barnes  v.  Commonwealth,  lOi  Ky. 

556  423 

V.  Harris,  7  Cush.  (Mass.)  576   173 

V.  People,    18   111.   52  23 

V.  State,   88  Ala.   204 

225,  409,  415,  416,  418 
V.  State,  134  Ala.  36  35 

V.  State,  89  Ga.  316  484 

V.  State,  2fi  Tex.  356  127 

V.  State,  2)7  Tex.  Cr.  320 

211.  386,  387,  392 
Barnett  v.   State,  83  Ala.  40 

409,  410,  412,  414 
V.  State    (Ala.,   1909),   51    So. 

299  119,  327,  333 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  280  363 

V.  State,   50  Tex.  Cr.   538  379 

Barney  v.  People,  22  111.  160  417 

Barr  v.  People,  30  Colo.  522  71 

Barrett  v.  State,  24  Ala.  74  249 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  182  395 

Barron  v.   Annistotj    (Ala.   1908), 

48  So.  58  184 

Barry  v.  Coville,  129  N.  Y.  302  174 
Barthelemy     v.      People,     2     Hill 

(N.   Y.)    248  365 

Bartholomew    v.    People,    104    111 

601  210 

Bartley  v.  People,  156  111.  234  143,  147 
Barton  v.  State,  7  Baxt.   (Tenn.) 

105  _  484 

Bartow  v.  People,  78  N.  Y.  377  385 
Bashinski  v.  State,  122  Ga.  164  475 
Bass  V.   State,  i  Ga.  App.  728  21 

Basye  v.  State,  45  Neb.  261 

77,  82,  174  312 
Bates  V.   Holladay,  31    Mo.  App. 
162  61 

V.  United  States,  10  Fed.  92      479 
Bateson  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

34  97.  no,  328 

Bathrick   v.    Detroit    &c.    Co.,    50 

Mich.  629  350 

Batten  v.   State,  80  Ind.  394 

119,    222,    312,   322 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


SXXl 


[References  ar 

Battishill  v.  Humphreys,  64  ^lich. 

514  218 

Baum  V.  Reay,  96  Cal.  462  217 

Baiimer  v.  State,  49  Ind.  544  395 
Baxter  v.  Gormley,  186  ]\Iass.  168  533 
V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  App.  516  185 
Bayntun  v.  Cattle,  i   Alood.  &  R. 

265  455 

Bays  V.    State,  50  Tex.   Cr.  App. 


548 


70 
276 


247 

221 

69 


Baysinger  v.  People,  115  111.  419 
Beach  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  240 

V.  United  States,  46  Fed.  754 
Beal  V.  State,  138  Ala.  94 

V.  State,  72  Ga.  200 
Bean  v.   People,   124  111.  576 

416,  417,  517 
Beard  v.  State,  71   Md.  275  482 

Bearden  v.   State,  44  Ark.  331       232 
Beasley  v.   State,   5  Lea    (Tenn.) 

705  486 

Beason  v.  State  (Miss.  1909),  50 

So.  488     •  408 

Beaty  v.  State,  82  Ind.  228  282 

Beavers  v.  State,  103  Ala.  36,  15 
So.  616  55,   108,   149,   152 

V.  State,  58  Ind.  530        36,  37,  50 
Beck  V.  State,  44  Tex.  430  300 

Beckwith  v.  Galice  Mines  Co.,  50 

Ore.   543  435 

Bedgood  v.  State,  115  Ind.  275  72,  418 
Bebees,  Ex  parte,  2  Wall.  Jr.  C. 

C.   127  461 

Beech's    Case,    i     Leach    Cr.    L. 

158  31 

Beene  v.  State,  79  Ark.  460  312 

Beers  v.  Jackman,  103  ]\Iass.  192  528 
Behler  v.  State,  112  Ind.  140  239 
Belcher  v.  State,  125  Ind.  419 
Belden  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  565 
Bell  V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  242 

44,  262 

V.  State,    115    Ala.    25 

V.  State,  73  Ga.  572 

V.  State,  91   Ga.  15 

V.  State,  93  Ga.  557 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  701 

V.  State,  57  Md.    108 

V.  State  (Miss.),  38  So.  795        40 

V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  362    517 


493 
430 


118 

75 
276 

123,  125 
468 
423 


e  to  Sections.] 

Bell   V.    State,  31   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

276  6r 

Bellamy  v.   State    (Fla.   1908),  47 

So.  868  224 

Bellinger  v.  People,  8  Wend.  (X. 

Y.)  595  247 

Belote  V.  State,  36  ]^Iiss.  96  138,  307 
Belt  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  82  87 
Ben  V.  State,  37  Ala.  103  324 

Bench  v.  State,  63  Ark.  488  421 

Benedict  v.  State,  44  Ohio  St.  679 

172.  173 
V.  State,  14  Wis.  423  328 

Benes  v.  People,  121  111.  App.  103  525 
Benge  v.  Commonwealth,  92  Ky. 

I  270 

Benham  v.  State,  91  Ind.  82  532 

Benjamin  v.  State,  148  Ala.  671       lor 

V.  State,  105  Ga.  830  298 

V.  State,  41  So.  739  322 

Bennefield  v.  State,  62  Ark.  36s 

224,  310 
V.  L'nited   States    (Okla.),  100 

Pac.  34.  48 

Bennett  v.  Kroth,  37  Kan.  235  250 

V.  State,  62  Ark.  516 

33,  430.  492,  493 
V.  State,    8    Humph.    (Tenn.) 

118  82 

V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  73  210 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  539  248 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  341   148,  153 
V.  State    (Tex.   Cr.   App.),  75 

S.  W.  314  III 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  52 

88,  112,  118 
V.  State,  57  Wis.  69  154 

Benson   v.    McMahon,    127  U.   S. 
457  496 

V.  Shotwell,  T03  Cal.  163  262 

V.  State,  119  Ind.  488  321 

V.  State  (Tex.).  103  S.  W.  911  269 
V.  United  States,  146  U.  S.  325 

70,  71 
Benstine  v.  State,  2  Lea  (Tenn.) 

169  418 

Bentley  v.  Cooke,  3  Doug.  422        185 

V.  State,  32  Ala.  596  473 

Benton  v.  Starr,  58  Conn.  285     528,  333 

V.  State,  30  .^rk.  328  229,  230 


XXXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Benton  v.  State,  78  Ark.  284     61,  493 
V.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  551  364 

Bergen  v.  People,  17  111.  426    147,  262 
Bergin  v.   State,  31   Ohio   St.   iii 

22,,  157 
Bcrnekcr  v.  State,  40  Neb.  810  85 

Bernhardt  v.  State,  82  Wis.  2t, 

166,  228 
Berry  v.  Commonwealth,  10  Busli 
(Ky.)    15  147a,  356 

V.  State,  92  Ga.  47  35 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  202  442 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  429  493 

V.  State  (Tex.),  34  S.  W.  6t8     70 
V.  State    (Tex.,    1897),    38    S. 

W.  1038  108 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  483  363 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  423 
Bess   V.   Commonwealth,   116  Ky. 
927 
V.  Commonwealth,  118  Kv.  858 

221,  429 
Bessette  v.  State,  loi  Ind.  85  221 

Betts  V.  State,  93  Ind.  375 
Beyer  v.  People,  86  X.  Y.  369 
Beyerline  v.  State,  147  Ind.  125 
Bice  V.   State,  51   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

}^i  97, 

Bickham    v.    State,    51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.   150 
Bicklev  v.  Commonwealth,  2  J.  J. 

M.  (Ky.)  572 
Biddle  v.  United  States,  156  Fed. 

759 
Biddy  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

412 
Bielschofsky    v.    People,    3    Hun 

(N.  Y.)  40  88,  438 

Bigler  v.  Reyher,  43  Ind.  IT2  176 

Bill  V.  State,  5  Humph.   (Tenn.) 

155 
Billings  V.  State,  52  Ark.  303 
Billingsley  v.  Clelland,  41  W.  Va. 

234 
Bilton  V.  Territory  (Okla.,  1909). 

99  Pac.  163  103,  T  TO 

Bines  v.  State,  t"i8  Ga.  320  147 

Binfield  v.  State,  15  Neb.  484  113 

Bingham  v.  Walk,  128  Ind.  164 

174,  177 


354 


3; 


482 

339 
197 

238 

197 

254 

439 

45 


6 

238 

535 


e  to  Sections.] 

Binkley    v.    State,    51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  54  21,  129,  130 

Binns  v.  State,  46  Ind.  311      152 

V.  State,  57  Ind.  46  23 

Bird  V.  Commonwealth,  21  Gratt. 

(Va.)  800  405 

V.  State,  50  Ga.  585  26 

V.  State.  128  Ga.  253  no 

V.   State,  T04  Ind.  384  342 

V.  State,   T07  Ind.   154  58 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  635  384 

Birdsall   v.    Edgerton,   25    Wend. 

(N.  Y.)  619  523 

Birkenfeld  v.  State,  104  Md.  253 

140,  143 
Birmingham     v.     McPoland,     96 

Ala.  363  218 

Birmingham  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pul- 

ver,  126  111.  329  369 

Birney  v.  State,  8  Ohio  230  456 

Biscoe  V.  State,  67  Md.  6  128 

Bishoff    V.     Commonwealth,     123 

Ky.  340  •  161 

Bishop  V.  State,  55  Md.  138      89,  423 
V.  State,  62  Miss.  289  23 

Bissman  v.  State,  9  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

714  480 

Black  V.  State,  119  Ga.  746      418 

V.  State,  I  Tex.  App.  368      14 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  590    130 

Blackburn   v.   Commonwealth,    12 

Bush    (Ky.)    181  235 

.V.  Crawford,  3  Wall.    (U.  S.) 

175  U6 

V.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  146  147a 

V.  State,  50  Ohio  St.  428  507 

Blackman   v.    State,   23   Ohio    St. 

146  312 

Blackstone  v.  State,  15  Ala.  415      309 
Blackwell  v.  State,  67  Ga.  76  53 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  416  32 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  476  486 

Blake  v.  Rourke,  74  Iowa  519  162 

Blaker  v.  State,  130  Ind.  203 

273,  299,  300,  30  T 
Blanc  V.  Rodgers,  49  Cal.  15  207 

Bland  v.  People,  4  111.  364  36 

Blanks  v.  Commonwealth,  105  Ky. 

41  269 

Bledsoe  v.  State,  64  Ark.  474  467 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XXXlll 


[References  ai 

Blige  V.  State,  20  Fla.  742  269 

Blois  V.  State,  92  Ga.  584  74 

Bloom  V.  State,  68  Ark.  3^6  36 

Bloomer  v.  State,  75  Ark.  297 

121,  324 
V.  State,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.)  66        26 
Blount  V.  State,  49  Ala.  381  357 

Blue  V.  State  (Neb.,  1910),  125  X. 

W.  136  382 

Bluett  V.  State,  151  Ala.  41 

12,  326,  328,  333 
Bluff  V.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  547  433 
Bluman  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

43  188,  369 

Blj-ew  V.  Commonwealth,  91   K}-. 

200  196 

Boatmeyer  v.   State,  31   Tex.   Cr. 

473  225 

Boddie  v.  State,  52  Ala.  395      414,  418 
Bode  V.  State,  80  Neb.  74  45,  290 

Bodiford  v.  State,  86  Ala.  67  381 

Bodine  v.  State,  129  Ala.  106  86a 

Boggs  V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

25  S.  W.  770  36 

Boland   v.    People,    19   Hun    (N. 

Y.)  80  305 

Boles  V.  State,  86  Ga.  255  484 

Bollen  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

70  117 

Boiling  V.  State,  54  Ark.  588 

157,  161,  314 
Bolln  V.  State,  51  Neb.  581  289 

Bolton  V.  State,  146  Ala.  691  118 

V.  State    (Tex.   Cr.,   1897),   39 

S.  W.  672  357 

Bond  V.   Commonwealth,  83   Va. 

581  368,  522 

V.  State,  21  Fla.  738  2x5 

Bone  V.  State,  86  Ga.  108  215 

Bones  v.  State,  117  Ala.  138  6 

Bonnard  v.    State,  25   Tex.   App. 

173  222 

Bonner  v.  State,  107  Ala.  97    276,  323 
V.  State,  125  Ga.  237  320 

Bonners     v.     State      (Tex.     Cr., 

1896),  35  S.  W.  650  305 

Bonnet  v.   Gladfelt,  24  111.   App. 

533  218,  224 

Bookhout  V.  State,  66  Wis.  415 

523,  531 


c  to  Sections.] 
Bookser  v.    State,   26   Tex.   App. 

593  122 

Boone  v.  People,  148  111.  440  27 

Booth  V.  Hart,  43  Conn.  480  524 

Boothe  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  202    332 
Borck  V.    State    (Ala.,    1905),   39 

So.  580  507 

Boren  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  28 

33>  49 

Borer  v.  Lange,  44  Minn,  281  49 

Bork  V.  People,  16  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

476  291 

V.  People,  91  N.  Y.  5  31 

Borrego  v.  Territory,  8  N.  Mex. 

446  148 

Borroun  v.    State    (Miss.,    1897), 

22  So.  62  269 

Boscowitz,  Ex  parte,  84  Ala.  463 

244,  247 
Bossean  v.  State  (Tex.,  1890),  15 

S.  W.  118  484 

Bostic  V.  State,  94  Ala.  45        211,  278 
Bostock  V.  State,  61  Ga.  635  229 

Boston    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Dana,    i 

Gray  (Mass.)  83  45 

Boswell  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  47      384 
Boswell's   Case,   20   Gratt.    (Va.) 

860  157,  166 

Bothwell  V.  State,  71  Neb.  747  161 

Bottomley    v.    United    States,    i 

Story  135  88,  89,  433 

Botts  V.  United   States,   155  Fed. 

50  482 

Boulden  v.  State,  102  Ala.  78  105,  245 
Bouldin  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  332 

337,  374 
Bow  V.  People,  160  111.  438 

61,  95,  225,  358 

Bowden  v.  Achor,  95  Ga.  243  214 

V.  Bailes,  loi  N.  Car.  612  214 

Bowen  v.  Reed,  103  IMass.  46  532 

Bowers  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  542 

173,  387,  388 

V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  542         359 

V.  State,  122  Wis.  163  312 

V.  Wood,  143  Mass.  182      529,  533 

Bowler  v.  State,  41  Miss.  570  437,  439 

Bowles    V.     Commonwealth,     103 

Va.  8r6  97,  103,  325,  330 

Bowlus  V.  State,  130  Ind.  227  357 


:xxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


[References  ar 

Bowman  v.  State,  54  Fla.  16  441 

V.  State    (Tex.,    1893),    21    S. 

W.  48  324 

Boyce  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  644 

390,  392 
Boyd  V.  State,  153  Ala.  41  358 

V.  State,  33  Fla.  316  15 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  58        147,  313 
V.  State,  84  Aliss.  414  319a 

V.  State    (Ohio,    1910),  90  N. 

E.   355  418 

V.  State,  14  Lea   (Tenn.)   16 

233,  3'i2 
V.  State,  94  Tenn.  505  246 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  138  48 
V.  United  States,  116  U.  S.  616  182 
V.  United  States,  142  U.  S.  450  207 
Boykin  v.  Boykin,  70  X.  Car.  262  527 
V.  State,  148  Ala.  608  35 

V.  State,  34  Ark.  443  299 

V.  State,  89  Miss.   19  118 

Boyle  V.  State,  97  Ind.  322  330 

V.  State,  105  Ind.  469 

60,  108,  237,  320 
V.  State,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  163  362 
V.  State,  61  Wis.  440  312 

Bracken  v.  State,  iii  Ala.  68 

223,  388,  392 

Bradburn  v.  State,  162  Ind.  689        416 

Bradford  v.  People,  22  Colo.  157    247 

V.  People,  20  Hun  (N.  Y.)  309  347 

V.  State,  147  Ala.  95     118,  293,  473 

Bradley  v.  State,  103  Ala.  29  358 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  622  69 

V.  State  (Tex.),  in  S.  W.  733 

96,  328 
Bradshaw   v.    Commonwealth,    10 
Bush   (Ky.)   576  loi,  331 

V.  People,  153  111.  156  341 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  165  414 

Brady  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Bibb. 
(Ky.)    517  195 

V.  State  (Tex.),  26  S.  W.  621    308 
Braham  v.  State,  143  Ala.  28 

127,  158,  159,  i6t,  162,  163,  322 
Bramlette  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

611  185 

Branch  v.  State,  41  Tex.  622  310 

Brandon  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  265       61 


■e  to  Sections.] 
Brandt  v.  Klein,  17  Jones  (N.  Y.) 

335  176 

Branson    v.     Commonwealth,    92 

Ky-  330  300 

Brard  v.  Ackerman,  5  Esp.  119  176 
Brashears  v.  State,  58  Md.  563  568 
Brasier's    Case,    i    Leach    Cr.    L. 

237  205 

Brassell  v.  State,  91  Ala.  45  211 

Brauer  v.  State,  25  Wis.  413  413,  416 
Braxton  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  632  296 
Brazil  v.  State,  117  Ga.  32  79 

Breen,  In  re,  73  Fed.  458  496,  502 

Brennan  v.  People,  37  Colo.  256 

103,  no 
V.  People,  7  Hun  (N.  Y.)  171    418 
Bressler  v.  People,  117  111.  422 

222,  238 

Brevaldo  v.  State,  21  Fla.  789         381 

Brewer  v.  State,  72  Ark.  145  147a 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  74  427 

Briceland    v.    Commonwealth,    74 

Pa.  St.  463  149,  152 

Bricker  v.  Commonwealth,  31  Ky. 

L.  596  105 

Briffitt  V.  State,  58  Wis.  39  21 

Briggs  V.  Briggs,  20  Mich.  34  179 

V.  Coleman,  51  Ala.  561  249 

V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  554    237 

Brighton  v.  Miles,  151  Ala.  479  46 

Brill  V.  State,  i  Tex.  App.  152        196 

Brinkley  v.  State,  58  Ga.  296  160 

Briscoe  v.  State,  95  Ga.  496  520 

Brister  v.  State,  26  Ala.  107    122,  126 

Britt  V.  State,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

30  442 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  215  243,  292 

Britton  v.  State,  115  Ind.  55  220 

Broad  v.  Pitt,  3  C.  &  P.  518  177 

Brock  V.  Commonwealth,  92  Ky. 

183  no 

V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),    no 

S.  W.  878  312 

V.  State,  123  Ala.  24  68 

Brog\'      V.      Commonwealth,      lO 

Gratt.   (Va.)  722  262,  263,  414 

Brom  V.  People,  216  111.  148  S7,  103 
Brooke  v.  People,  23  Colo.  374 

36,  49,  280,  297 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XXXV 


[References  ar 
Brooke   v.    State    (Ala.),   46    So. 

491  353,  357 

Brooks    V.    Commonwealth,     100 
Ky.  194  328 

V.  State,  85  Ark.  376  324,  326 

V.  State    (Ark.    1909),    121    S. 

W.  740  467,  468 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  458  268 

V.  State,  96  Ga.  353  331,  378 

V.  State  (Tex.),  27  S.  W.  141    292 
V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  582  468 

Brotherton  v.    People,   75    N.    Y. 

159  108,  157,  158 

Browder  v.  State,  102  Ala.  164        245 

Brown,  Ex  parte,  72  Mo.  83    182,  251 

Brown  v.  Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

17  S.  W.  220  323 

V.  Commonwealth     (Ky.),    61 

S.  W.  4  S08 

V.  Commonwealth,    (Ky.),  117 

S.  W.  281  358 

V.  Commonwealth,   26  Ky.    L. 

1269  103 

V.  Commonwealth,   73   Pa.    St. 

321  106,  265  266 

V.  Commonwealth,   76   Pa.    St. 

319  88,  321 

V.  Commonwealth,     9     Leigh. 

(Va.)  633  147a 

V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  653 

408,  417 
V.  Commonwealth,  86  Va.  935  122 
V.  Commonwealth,  87  Va.  215  367 
V.  Jewett,  120  Mass.  215  174 

V.  Mooers,    6    Gray    (Mass.) 

451  243 

V.  Payson,  6  N.  H.  443  174 

V.  People,  20  Colo.  161  281 

V.  People,  86  111.  239  430 

V.  People,  16  Hun  (N.  Y.)  535  437 
V.  State,  46  Ala.  175  83 

V.  State,  79  Ala.  61  242 

V.  State,  T05  Ala.  117  196 

V.  State,  108  Ala.  18  384 

V.  State,  120  Ala.  342  145,  358 

V.  State,  141  Ala.  80  484 

V.  State,  142  Ala.  287  238,  356 

V.  State,  150  Ala.  25    103,  no,  119 
V.  State,  28  Ark.  126  358 

V.  State,  55  Ark.  593  312,  326 


e  to  Sections.] 

Brown  v.  State,  29  Fla.  543  232 

V.  State,  40  Fla.  459  157 

V.  State,  46  Fla.  159  220,  238 

V.  State,  47  Fla.  16  467 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  479  129 

V.  State,  59  Ga.  456  300 

V.  State,  76  Ga.  623  238,  407 

V.  State,  119  Ga.  572  222 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  145  268 

V.  State,  71  Ind.  470  126 

V.  State,  105  Ind.  385  328 

V.  State,  72  Md.  477  220,  224,  356 
V.  State,  72  Miss.  95  195,  197 

V.  State,  72  Miss.  997 

277,  373,  418 
V.  State,  88  Miss.  166  119 

V.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  496  71,  283 
V.  State,  26  Ohio  St.  176 

90,  308,  309,  310 
V.  State,  85  Tenn.  439  268 

V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  924  247 
V.  State  (Tex.),  48  S.  W.  176  482 
V.  State    (Tex.),    114    S.    W. 

820  23s 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1909), 

124  S.  W.  loi  118 

V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  294  225 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  119  269 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  150  301 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  104  443,  444 
V.  State,  127  Wis.  193 

94,  407,  414,  417 
V.  United  States,  142  Fed.  i  305 
V.  Walker,  161  U.  S.  591  247 

Browne  v.   United   States,   76   C. 
C.  A.  31  80 

Brownell  v.  People,  38  Mich.  732 

82,  324 

Browning  v.  State,  30  Miss.  656      492 
V.  State,  33  Miss.  47  272 

Brownlee   v.    State,   35    Tex.    Cr. 
213  485,  486 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  408  325 

Broyles  v.  State,  47  Ind.  251  123 

Bruce  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  590     238 
V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  26       6r 

Brumley  v.    State,  21    Tex.   App. 

222  94,    TOO 

Brummett  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
108  S.  W.  861  491 


XXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Brunaugh   v.    State    (Ind.,    1910), 
90  N.  E.   1019  442 

Bruner  v.   United   States,  4  Ind. 
Ter.  580  128 

Brungger  v.  Smith,  49  Fed.  124      173 

Bryan  v.  State,  74  Ga.  393        303,  374 
V.  State,  120  Ga.  201  475 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  114 

S.  W.  811  185 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  196     294,  305 

Bryant,  In  re,  80  Fed.  282  496 

Bryant  v.  State,  116  Ala.  445 

6,  296,  299,  302 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  851  300 

V.  State,  80  Ga.  272  36 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  394    105 
V.  United  States,  167  U.  S.  104  496 

Bubster  v.  State,  33  Neb.  663  295 

Buchanan  v.  State,  55  Ala.  154        383 
V.  State,  109  Ala.  7  296 

Buck  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  319        305 

Bueno  v.  People,  i  Colo.  App.  232  411 

Bull      V.      Loveland,      10      Pick. 
(Mass.)  9  252 

Bulloch  V.  State,  10  Ga.  47  283 

V.  Knox,  96  Ala.  195  526 

Bundrick  v.  State,  125  Ga.  753 

331,  483 

Burchfield  v.  State,  82  Ind.  580  272 

Burd  V.  Moring,  i  C.  &  P.  372  174 

Burden  v.  State,  120  Ala.  388  430 

Burdge  v.  State,  53  Ohio  St.  512  423 
Burge  V.  United  States,  26  App. 

D.  C  524  88 

Burger  v.  State,  34  Neb.  397      23,  366 

Burgess  v.  State,  148  Ala.  654  137 

Burk  V.  State,  81  Ind.  128  197 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  185  147 

Burke  v.  State,  47  Ind.  528  461 

V.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  79  286 
Burkett  v.  State,  154  Ala.  19 

58,  312,  320 

Burks  V.  State,  78  Ark.  271  242 

V.  State,  92  Ga.  461  374 

Burley  v.  State,  130  Ga.  343     320.  323 

V.  State    (Ga.   App.    1909),   65 

S.  E.  816                           ^  367 

Burnett  v.  State,  30  Ala.  19  473 

V.  State,  76  Ark.  295            195,  390 

V.  State,  87  Ga.  622             132,  267 


e  to  Sections.] 

Burnett  v.  State  (Neb.  1910),  124 

N.  W.  927  125 

V.  State,  60  N.  J.  L.  255  284 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  515     222,  248 

Burney  v.  State,  100  Ga.  65  12 

Burnham  v.  State,  37  Fla.  327        365 

Burns  v.  Donoghue,  185  Mass.  71  533 

V.  People,  45  111.  App.  70  280a 

V.  State,  49  Ala.  370  119a 

V.  State,  89  Ga.  527  69 

V.  State,  75  Ohio  St.  407  78 

V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  641  83 

Burrell  v.  Bull,  3  Sandf.  Ch.   (N. 

Y.)  15  I8S 

V.  State,  18  Tex.  713  iii 

Burress     v.     Commonwealth,     27 

Gratt.   (Va.)  934.  421 

Burris  v.  Court,  34  Neb.  187  532 

V.  State,  38  Ark.  221  116,  118 

Burrow  v.  State,  147  Ala.  114  373 

Burst  V.  State,  89  Ind.  133        484,  486 
Burt  V.   State,  38  Tex.  Cr.   App. 

397  163 

Burton    v.     Commonwealth,     108 

Va.  892  18,  323 

V.  State,  107  Ala.  108    52,  116,  126, 

135.  140,  314,  315,  322 

V.  State,  IIS  Ala.  i 

52,  238,  314,  328 
V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  138  144 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  196 

161,  40s 
V.  United  States,  142  Fed.  57    478 
Busby  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  83        246 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  289 

282,  28s,  286 

Bush   V.    Commonwealth,   80   Ky. 

244  201,  266 

V.  State,  18  Ala.  415  296 

Buskett,  Ex  parte,  106  Mo.  602      247 

Busse  V.  State,  129  Wis.  171  524 

Butler  V.  State,  22  Ala.  43  425 

V.  State,  91  Ala.  87  77,  290 

V.  State    (Ala.    1909),   50   So. 

400  364 

V.  State,  83  Ark.  272  265,  267 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  397  277 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  623  473 

V.  State,  91  Ga.  161  214 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  232  330 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


XXXVll 


[References  ai 

Butler  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  444      467 
Butt  V.  State,  81  Ark.  173 

491,  492,  494 
Buzard  v.  McAnulty,  77  Tex.  438  50 
Byers  v.  State,  105  Ala.  31  323 

V.  Territory,  i  Okla.  Cr.  677  516 
Bynum  v.  State,  46  Fla.  142  269,  342 
Byrd  v.  State,  76  Ark.  286  161 


Cabrera  v.   State    (Tex.),   118   S. 

W.  1054  492 

Caddell  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  380    366 
Caddis  v.  State,  91  Ga.  148  517 

Cady  V.  Commonwealth,  10  Gratt. 
(Va.)  776  428 

V.  Walker,  62  Mich.  157      173,  174 
Caffey  v.    State    (Miss.),  24  So. 

315  158 

Cahn  V.  State,  no  Ala.  56  482 

Cain  V.  State,  18  Tex.  387  128 

Caldwell  V.  State,  146  Ala.  141 

186,  404 
V.  State,  50  Fla.  4  73 

Calkins  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  366 

68,  286,  287 
Callaghan  v.   State,   36   Tex.   Cr. 

536  482 

Callison    v.    State,    37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  211  92,  213 

Calloway  v.  State,  103  Ala.  27  130 

V.  State,  so  Tex.  Cr.  App.  72      373 
Cameron  v.  State,  14  Ala.  546    19,  399 
Campau  v.  North,  39  Mich.  606        179 
Campbell  v.  Chace,  12  R.  I.  333       187 
V.  Commonwealth,   84  Pa.    St. 

187  69 

V.  Dalhousie,  L.  R.  i  H.  L.  So. 

App.  462  252 

V.  People,  16  Til.  17  326 

V.  State,  23  Ala.  44 

47,  119,  322,  337 
V.  State,  150  Ala.  70  127 

V.  State.  38  Ark.  498  325 

V.  State,  II  Ga.  353  in 

V.  State,  123  Ga.  533  6,  40 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  645  215 

Campos    V.    State,    50    Tex.    Cr. 
App.  289  56,  88,  238 


e  to  Sections.] 
Cancemi  v.  People,  16  N.  Y.  501 

76, 
Cannon  v.  People,  141  111.  270 

211, 
V.  State,  60  Ark.  564 
V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  172 
Cantee  v.   State   (Tex.,  1889),  10 

S.  W.  757 
Canter   v.    State,  7  Lea    (Tenn.) 

349  435, 

Caples  V.   State   (Okla.  Cr.  App., 

1909),  104  Pac.  493 
Card  V.  Foot,  56  Conn.  369 
V.  State,  109  Ind.  415 

423,  492,  493, 
Garden  v.  State,  84  Ala.  417 
Cardwell    v.    Commonwealth,    20 

Ky.  L.  496 
Cargill  V.  Commonwealth,  93  Ky. 

578 
Carle  v.  People,  200  111.  494  i 

Carlisle  v.  State,  76  Ala.  75 
Carlton  v.  Commonwealth,  13  Ky. 
L.  946 

V.  People,  150  111.  181  12, 

Carman  v.  Kelly,  5  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

283 
Carmichael  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App. 

27 
Carnell  v.  State,  85  Md.  i        438, 
Carnes  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

437 
Carney  v.  State,  79  Ala.  14 
Carothers  v.  State,  75  Ark.  574 

6t, 
Carpenter   v.    Commonwealth,   29 
Ky.  L.  107 
V.  People,  3  Gilm.   (111.)    147 
V.  People,  31  Colo.  284 
V.  People.  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  603 
V.  State,  62  Ark.  286  12, 

Carper  v.  State,  27  Ohio  St.  572 
Carr  v.  State,  34  Ark.  448 

484,  485, 
V.  State,  43  Ark.  99 
V.  State,  8r  Ark.  580  61, 

V.  State,  45  Fla.  11 
V.  State,  96  Ga.  284 
V.  State,  23  Neb.  749 
V.  State  (Tex.),  116  S.  W.  591 


84 

213 
269 


439 

245 
217 

494 
119 

328 

228 
19a 

437 

225 

148 

263 

486 
439 


387 

221 

129 
250 
359 
393 
238 
144 

486 
100 
129 
118 

193 
328 

358 


xxxvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Carr  v.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  562     342 
Carreker  v.  State,  92  Ga.  471  302 

Carrington  v.   St.   Louis,  89  Mo. 

208  179 

Carroll  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Pa. 

St.  107  73 

V.  People,  136  111.  456  12,  295 

V.  State,  5  Neb.  31  71 

V.  State,    3    Humph.    (Tenn.) 

315  96 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  431  245 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  155  373 

Carson  v.  State,  50  Ala.  134        79,  80 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  157  276 

Carter  v.   Commonwealth,  2  Va. 

Cas.  169  78 

V.  State,  68  Ala.  96  372 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  477  291a 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  254      no,  214 

V.  State    (Ga.    App.   1909),  65 

S.  E.  1072  489 

V.  State,  106  Ga.  372  492 

V.  State,  2  Ind.  617  350 

V.  State   (Miss.,  1898),  24  So. 

307  269 

V.  State,  2,6  Neb.  481  78,  241 

V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  345 

22,  52 
Carthaus  v.  State,  78  Wis.  560 

81,  270,  312 
Cartwright's  Case,  114  Mass.  230 

459,  461 
Carver  v.  People,  39  Mich.  786        423 
V.  United  States,  164  U.  S.  694 

104,  III 

Carwile  v.  State,  35  Ala.  392  488 

V.  State,  148  Ala.  576         223,  Z'^^i 

Casat  V.  State,  40  Fla.  511  157 

Case  V.  Blood,  71  Iowa  632  267 

Casey  v.  People,  31  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

158  158 

V.  State,  27  Ark.  67  172,  494 

V.  State,  20  Neb.  138  522 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  392 

loi,  240,  246 
Cassem  v.  Galvin,  158  111.  30  213 

Castillo  V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  145 

409,  410 
Castle  V.  State,  75  Ind.  146 

15,  17,  180 
Caswell  V.    State    (Ga.  App.),  63 
S.  E.  566  212,  214 


e  to  Sections.] 

Caswell  V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  483  280 
Cathcart    v.     Commonwealth,    37 

Pa.  St.  108  86,  116 

Cavender  v.  State,  126  Ind.  47  6,  80 
Cawthon  v.  State,  119  Ga.  395  90 

Celender  v.  State   (Ark.),  109  S. 

W.  1024  74 

Central   Nat.   Bank  v.  Arthur,  2 

Sweeney  (N.  Y.)  194  252 

Chadwick   v.    United    States,    141 

Fed.  225  492 

Chaffee      v.      Jones,      19      Pick. 

(Mass.)   260  258 

Chahoon    v.    Commonwealth,    20 

Gratt.   (Va.)  733  424 

Chalk  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

116  97,  323 

Chamberlain,    Ex   parte,   4   Cow. 

(N.  Y.)  49  250 

V.  People,  23  N.  Y.  85  527 

Chamberlin  v.  State,  80  Neb.  812  89 
Chambers     v.     People,    4     Scam. 

(111.)  351  211 

V.  People,  105  111.  409  58,  61 

V.  State,  62  Miss.  108  301 

V.  State  (Tex.),  44  S.  W.  495  74 
Chambless  v.  State  (Tex.),  24  S. 

W.  899  246 

Chandler   v.   Thompson,   30  Fed. 

38  516 

Chant  V.  Browne,  12  Eng.  L.  &  E. 

299  174 

Chapline  v.   State    (Ark.),  95   S. 

W.  477  493 

V.  State,  77  Ark.  444  491 

Chapman  v.  Gates,  54  N.  Y.  132  41 

V.  James,  96  Iowa  233  224 

V.  Peebles,  84  Ala.  283  174 

V.  State,  78  Ala.  463  353 

V.  State,  30  S.  W.  225  269 

Chappel      V.      State,      7      Coldw. 

(Tenn.)   92  148 

Chappell  V.  State,  71  Ala.  322  201 

Charba  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

316  6r 

Charlton's  Case,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  316  255 

Charnock's  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr. 

1377  73 

Chase  v.  People.  40  111.  352  I57 

V.  State,  46  Miss.  683  324 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


XXXIX 


[References  are  to  Scctions-I 


Chase  v.  United  States,  7  App.  D. 

C.  149  187 

Chastang  v.  State,  83  Ala.  29  484 

Cheatham,  Ex  parte,  50  Tex.  Cr. 

SI  499 

Cheek  v.  State,  171  Ind.  98  517 

Cheesum     v.     State,     8     Blackf. 

(Ind.)  332  474 

Chenowith       v.       CommonweaUh 

(Ky.),  12  S.  W.  585  507 

Cherry  v.  State,  68  Ala.  29  342 

V.  State  (Miss.),  20  So!  837       320 
Chestnut    Hill    &c.    Co.    v.    Piper 

&c.  Co.,  15  W.  N.  15  50 

Chew  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  230    383 
Chicago    V.    Bowman    Dairy    Co., 

234  111.  294  480 

Chicago  &c.  Coal  Co.  v.   People, 

214  111.  421  492,  493 

Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazels,  26 

Neb.  364  224 

V.  Shenk,  131  111.  283  227 

V.  Woodward,  47  Kan.  191  216 

Childress  v.  State,  86  Ala.  77  69 

Childs  V.  State,  15  Ark.  204  488 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1893),  22  S. 

W.  1039  269 

Chism  V.  State,  70  Miss.  742  234 

Chitister    v.    State,    S3    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  635  6 

Choice  V.  State,  31  Ga.  424        160,  162 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  285  493 

Chrisman  v.  State,  54  Ark.  283 

166,  338 
Christensen    v.    People,     114    111. 

App.  40  461,  492 

Christian  v.  State,  37  Tex.  475        485 
V.  Williams,  12  Fed.  590  258 

Chute  V.  State,  19  Minn.  271  229 

Cicero  v.  State,  54  Ga.  156  40 

Clapp  V.  State,  94  Tenn.  186  S7 

Clark,  Ex  parte,  208  Mo.  T2I    459,  460 
Clark  V.  Bradstreet,  80  Me.  454      525 
V.  Commonwealth     (Ky.),    92 

S.  W.  573  ^  418 

V.  Commonwealth,    17   Ky.    L. 

540  ^  118 

V.  Commonwealth,   29    I\y.    L. 

154  342 

V.  People,  224  111.  554  345 


Clark  V.  State  (Ga.),  62  S.  E.  663   87 
V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  605  521 

V.  State,  84  Ga.  577  353 

V.  State,  14  Ind.  26  296 

V.  State,  50  Ind.  514  s8a 

V.  State,  79  Neb.  473  90 

V.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  383  144 

V.  State,  12  Ohio  483  161,  162 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  437         294 
V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  402 

300,  301 
V.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  30  519 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  519    48 

Clarke  v.  People,  16  Colo.  511        349 
V.  People,  224  111.  554  348 

V.  State,  78  Ala.  474  328 

V.  State,  8  Crim.  L.  Mag.  Cr. 

450  118 

Claxon  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.), 
30  S.  W.  998  268 

Clay  V.  State,  122  Ga.  136  358 

V.  State  (Miss.),  22  So.  62  447 

V.  State,  15  Wyo.  42  126,  129 

V.  Williams,    2    Munf.     (Va.) 

105  177 

Clayton  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
489  138,  245 

Cleaveland  v.  State,  34  Ala.  254      456 

Clem  V.  State,  33  Ind.  418  243 

Clemens   v.    State    (Miss.,    1908), 
45  So.  834  323 

Clements  v.  State,  51  Fla.  6     268,  269 
V.  State,  80  Neb.  313  522 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  258  33 

Clemons  v.  State,  48  Fla.  9  312 

Cleveland   v.    Commonwealth,    31 
Ky.  L.  ITS  104'  108 

V.  State,  86  Ala.  i        23.  164,  166 

Cleveland    &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Mon- 
aghan,   140  111.  474  sr 

Clifton  V.  State,  26  Fla.  523  377 

V.  State,  46  Tex  Cr.  18  397 

Clawson  v.  State,  129  Wis.  650 

435.  441 

Cline  V.  State.  51  Ark.  140  236 

V.  State,  43  Ohio  St.  332     164,  166 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  320  265 

V.  State,  43  Tex.  494  435 

Clinton  V.  State   (Fla.,  1908),  47 
So.  389  368 


xl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ai 

Clinton  v.   State    (Fla.   1909),   50 
So.  580  369 

V.  State,  S3  Fla.  98  60,  205,  268 
Clore  V.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  624  166 
Close  V.  Samm,  27  Iowa  503  230 

Clough  V.  State,  7  Neb.  320  132 

Clow  V.  Smith   (Neb.,  1909),  124 

N.  W.  140  53: 

Cluck  V.  State,  40  Incl.  263  76,  78,  166 
Cluverius    v.    Commonwealth,    81 

Va.   787  100 

Coates  V.  Birch,  2  Q.  B.  252  174 

V.  State,  50  Ark.  330  408 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  257  371 

Coble  V.  State,  31  Ohio  St.  100 

87,  210 
Coburn  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  257  397 
Cochran     v.     United     States,     14 

Okla.  108  224 

Cockerham  v.  State  (Miss.,  1895), 

19  So.   195  446 

Coffee  V.  State,  25  Fla.  501       130,  146 

V.  State,  4  Lea  (Tenn.)  245        485 

V.  State,  I  Tex.  App.  548  77 

Coffman    v.    State,    51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  478  55 

Cohen,  Ex  parte,  5  Cal.  494  459 

V.  State,  50  Ala.  108  12 

V.  State,  17  Tex.  142  473 

V.  United  States,  157  Fed.  651    494 

Cohn  V.  State  (Tenn.),  109  S.  W. 

I 149  280a 

Cohoe  V.  State  (Neb.),  118  N.  W. 

1088  305 

Coker  V.  State,  144  Ala.  28      238,  331 

Colbert  v.  State,  91  Ga.  705  S73 

Cole  V.  State,  105  Ala.  76  103 

V.  State,  59  Ark.  50       81.  236,  240 

V.  State   (Miss.),  4  So.  577  79 

V.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  239    381 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  225 

119.  330a 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  439 

121,  186,  187 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  89  325 

Colee  V.  State,  75  Ind.  511 

162,  164,  214 
Coleman    v.    Commonwealth,    25 
Gratt.   (Va.)  865  202 

V.  People,  26  Fla.  6r  6 


c  to  Sections.] 

Coleman  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  81  87,  89 
V.  State  (Tenn.,  1908),  113  S. 

W.  1045  461 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  520  32 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  404    144 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  202  475 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  578  244 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  173  485 

Collier  v.  State,  55  Ala.  125  456 

V.  State,  20  Ark.  36        70,  112,  228 
V.  State,  55  Fla.  5  378 

Collins  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.), 
15  Ky.  L.  835  125 

V.  Commonwealth,      12     Bush 

(Ky.)   271  121,  262,  263 

V.  Commonwealth,    15   Ky.    L. 

691  138,  374 

V.  Mack,  31  Ark.  684  179 

V.  People,  39  111.  2S3  296 

V.  People,  98  111.  584  73 

V.  People,  115  111.  App.  280        362 
V.  State,  137  Ala.  50  330a 

V.  State,  138  Ala.  57    314,  491,  492 
V.  State,  46  Neb.  37  103,  223 

V.  State     (Tex.),    118    S.    W. 

1038  298 

V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  141    126 

V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  441   60 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  550  384 

Colquit  V.  State,  107  Tenn.  381       119a 

Colquitt  V.  State,  34  Tex.  550  357 

Colson  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  138      486 

Colter  V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

284  201 

Colton  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  50      270 
Colwell  V.  State  (Tex.),  34  S.  W. 

615  293 

Combs  V.  Commonwealth,  97  Ky. 
24  236 

V.  State  (Tex.),  116  S.  W.  595 

352,  354 
Comer  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  20  S. 

W.  547  _  408 

Commissioners    v.    Ballinger,    20 

Kan.  590  249 

Commonwealth     v.     Abbott,      13 

Met.   (Mass.)   120  275 

V.  Abbott,  130  Mass.  472  332 

V.  Ackland,  107  Mass.  211      21,  36 

V.  Adams,  114  Mass.  323  354 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


x\i 


[References  are 

Commonwealth     v.     Adams,  127 

Mass.  15  349 

V.  Adams,  160  Mass.  310  472 

V.  Allen,  135  Pa.  St.  483  413 

V.  Antaya,  184  Mass.  326  126 

V,  Anthes,  5  Gray  (Mass.)  185 

273.  275 
V.  Austin,  97  Mass.  595  195,  197 
V.  Ayer,  3  Cush.  (Mass.)  150  423 
V.  Bacon,  135  Mass.  521  174 

V.  Bagley,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  279  456 
V.  Bailey  (Ky.),  87  S.  W.  299  448 
V.  Baker,  155  Mass.  287  69,  474 
V.  Bangs,  9  Mass.  387  399 

V.  Barker,  133  Mass.  399  465 

V.  Barker,  185  Mass.  324  185 

V.  Barry,  124  Mass.  325  435 

V.  Barry,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  216  61 

V.  Battis,  I  Mass.  95  144 

V.  Beaman,    8    Gray     (Mass.) 

497  296 

V.  Bell,  145  Pa.  St.  374  247,  453 
V.  Bell,  166  Pa.  St.  405  92 

V.  Bezek,  168  Pa.  St.  603  118 

V.  Bigelow,    8   Mete.    (Mass.) 

235  432,  433 

V.  Bishop,  165  Mass.  148  103 

V.  Blair,  126  Mass.  40  349 

V.  Blanding,   3   Pick.    (Mass.) 

304  _  364 

V.  Blankinship,  165  ]\Iass.  40  475 

V.  Blood,  II  Gray  (Mass.)  74  49 

V.  Blood,  141  Mass.  571  438 

V.  Bonner,  9  Met.  (]\Iass.)  410  364 

V.  Bonner,  97  Mass.  587  6r 

V.  Booker,  25  Ky.  L.  1025  325 
V.  Boott,    Thatcher    Cr.    Cas. 

(Mass.)  390  483 
V.  Bos  worth,  22  Pick.  (Mass.) 

72>  72,  7A: 

V.  Bosworth,  113  Mass.  200        196 

V.  Boutwell,  129  Mass.  124         419 

V.  Bowers,  121  Mass.  45                92 

V.  Boyer,  7  Allen  (Mass.)  306    398 

V.  Boynton,  116  Mass.  343          345 

V.  Bradford,  126  Mass.  42    89,  369 

V.  Brailey,  134  Mass.  527    122,  123 

V.  Branham,  8  Bush  (Ky.)  387  356 

V.  Brennor,  194  Mass.  17               jt, 

V.  Brewer,  164  Mass.  577     103,  no 


to  Sections.^ 

Commonwealth      v.      Briggs,      7 
Pick.  (Mass.)  177  515 

V.  Brigham,  147  Mass.  414  118 

V.  Brooks,  9  Gray  (Mass.)  299  74 
V.  Brown,    14    Gray     (Mass.) 

419  48,  345,  350,  492 

V.  Brown,  121  Mass.  69 

122,  124,  349,  350 
V.  Brown,  130  Mass.  279  71 

V.  Brown,  147  Mass.  585  422 

V.  Brown,  149  Mass.  35  147a 

V.  Brown,  150  Mass.  330  125,  144 
V.  Brown,    22,    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

470  121 

V.  Buccieri,  153  Pa.  St.  535 

160,  163 
V.  Buckingham,      Thach.      Cr. 

Cas.   (Mass.)  29  363 

V.  Burton,  183  Mass.  461  435,  438 
V.  Bush,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)  264  207 
V.  Butland,  119  Mass.  317  468 

V.  Byard    (Mass.),    86    N.    E. 

285  307 

V.  Byron,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  31  222 
V.  Call,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  515 

88,  90,  125,  435 
V.  Campbell,  131  Iowa  645  51 

V.  Campbell,  155  Mass.  537  54 

V.  Caponi,  155  Mass.  534  399 

V.  Carbin,  143  Mass.  124  58a 

V.  Cardoze,  119  Mass.  210  482 

V.  Carey,     12    Cush.     (Mass.) 

246  III 

V.  Care}^,  2  Pick.   (Mass.)  47 

429,  434 
V.  Carter,    11     Pick.     (Mass.) 

277  257 

V.  Casey,    11    Cush.     (Mass.) 

417  107,  113 

V.  Castles,  9  Gray  (Mass.)  121  100 
V.  Gate,  220  Pa.   138  80 

V.  Caufield,  27  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

279  47 

V.  Chaney,  148  Mass.  6  211 

V.  Chilson,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  15  197 

V.  Choate,  105  Mass.  451  91,  152 

V.  Clancy,  154  Mass.  128  217,  475 

V.  Clark,  130  Pa.  St.  641  132 

V.  Cleary,  152  Mass.  491  187 

V.  Cleary,  135  Pa.  St.  64  164 


xlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Coleman  v.  deary,  148  Pa.  St.  26 

265,  327 
V.  Clemmer,  190  Pa.  St.  202 

209,  22^ 
V.  Clifford,  96  Ky.  4  282 

V.  Cloonen,  151  Pa.  St.  605  167 
V.  Coe,  115  Mass.  481  423,  437,  438 
V.  Coleman,  157  Mass.  460  481 

V.  Connolly,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  414  422 
V.  Conroy,  207  Pa.  212  12 

V.  Cony,  2  Mass.  523  457 

V.  Cook,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  93  343 
V.  Cooley,  6  Gray  (Mass.)  350  446 
V.  Cooper,    5    Allen    (Mass.) 

495  105,  348 

V.  Corkin,   136  Mass.  429  345 

V.  Cosseboom,   155   Mass.   298, 

119a,  279 
V.  Costello,  119  Mass.  214  121,  427 
V.  Costello,  120  Mass.  358  427 

V.  Costley,  118  Mass.  i  6,  36 

V.  Cox,  7  Allen  (Mass.)  577  309 
V.  Coy,  157  Mass.  200  133,  314 

V.  Crans,  3  Pa.  L.  J.  442  29 

V.  Cressinger,  193  Pa.  St.  2^6  135 
V.  Crocker,  108  Mass.  464  130 

V.  Crowe,  165  Mass.  139  368 

V.  Cullen,  III  Mass.  435  130 

V.  Culver,  126  Mass.  464  126,  127 
V.  Curtis,     Thach.     Cr.     Cas. 

(Mass.)  202  196 

V.  Daley,  4  Gray  (Mass.)  209  197 
V.  Dame,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  384  210 
V.  Damon,  136  Mass.  441  364 

V.  Dandridge,  2  Va.  Cas.  408  461 
V.  Daniel,  4  Pa.  L.  J.  49  258 

V.  Danz,  211  Pa.  507  319 

V.  Dascom,  11  r  Mass.  404  195 

V.  Davis,    I    W.    N.    C.    (Pa.) 

18  461 

V.  De  Cost,  35  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

88  468 

V.  Dedham,  16  Mass.  14  286 

V.  Deitrick,  221   Pa.  7  338 

V.  Delero,  218  Pa.  487  268 

V.  Demain,  6  Pa.  L.  J.  29  344 

V.  Dennie  (Mass.),  Thach.  Cr. 

Cas.  165  456 

V.  Densmore,  12  Allen  (Mass.) 

.535  145 


c  to  Sections.^ 
Coleman  v.   Desmond,   103  Mass. 
445  21 

v.  Devlin,   141   Mass.  423  437 

V.  Dewhirst,  190  Mass.  293  122 

V.  Dewritt,  10  Mass.  154  298 

V.  Dill,  156  Mass.  226  44,  223 

V.  Dillane,    11    Gray    (Mass.) 

67  198 

V.  Donovan,  13  Allen  (Mass.) 

571  2>Z 

V.  Dorsey,  103  Mass.  412  166,  334 
V.  Dovirer,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  297  133 
V.  Downing,  4   Gray    (Mass.) 

29  69 

V.  Drake,  15  Mass.  161  177 

V.  Drass,  146  Pa.  St.  55  309 

V.  Drew,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  179 

435,  444 
V.  Drew,  153  Mass.  588 

436,  442,  443 
V.  Drum,  58  Pa.  St.  9  12,  320 

V.  Easland,  i  Mass.  15  188 

V.  Eastman,   i   Cush.    (Mass.) 

189  70,  89,  283,  429,  438 

V.  Eddy,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  583 

22,  157 
V.  Edgerly,   10  Allen   (Mass.) 

184  423,  432 

V.  Edgerton,  200  Mass.  318  44 

V.  Eisenhower,  181  Pa.  St.  470  63 
V.  Ellis  (Ky.),  118  S.  W.  973  493 
V.  Emery,  2  Gray  (Mass.)  276  41 
V.  Emmons,  98  Mass.  6  342 

V.  Ervine,  8  Dana  (Ky.)  30  125 
V.  Evans,  loi  Mass.  25  195 

v.  Evans,  132  Mass.  11  480 

V.  Pagan,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  613  27 
V.  Falvey,  108  Mass.  304  310 

V.  Ferrigan,  44  Pa.  St.  386 

90,  323,  324 
V.  Fielding.  184  Mass.  484  369 

V.  Fields,  4  Leigh  (Va.)  648  417 
V.  Fisher,  221  Pa.  538  186 

V.  Fitzpatrick,  140  Mass.  455  241 
V.  Flynn,  165  Mass.  153  221,  358 
V.  Follansbee,  155  Mass.  274 

225,  345,  349 
V.  Foran,  iro  Mass.  179  280a 

V.  Ford,  146  Mass.  131  210,  246 
V.  Foster,  114  Mass.  311  422 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


xliii 


[References  ai 
Coleman  v.  Fox,  7  Gray  (Mass.) 

58s  320 

V.  Furman,  211   Pa.  549  205 
V.  Gadard,    14    Gray    (Mass.) 

402  266 
V.  Galavan,    9    Allen    (Mass.) 

271  124 
V.  Gaming      Implements,      119 

Mass.  z^2  477 

V.  Gauvin,  143  Mass.  134  370 

V.  Gentry,  s  Pa.  Dist.  703  164 
V.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  St.  289 

154.  157,  T58,  163 
V.  Getchell,    16   Pick.    (Mass.) 

452  507 

V.  Gibson,  211   Pa.  546  320 

V.  Gilbert,  165  Mass.  45  216 

V.  Glover,  iii  ]\Iass.  395        69,  371 
V.  Goddard,  14  Gray   (Mass.) 

402  267 

V.  Goddard.  13  ^lass.  455  195 

V.  Goding,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  130  471 

V.  Goldstein,  114  Mass.  273  369 

V.  Goodall,  i6s  Mass.  588  482 
V.  Goodwin,  14  Gray  (Mass.) 

55  6 

V.  Goodwin,  186  Fa.  St.  218  140 
V.  Gordon,    2    Brewst.     (Pa.) 

569  188 

V.  Gorham,  99  Mass.  420  246 

V.  Grady,  13  Bush  (Ky.)  285  440 

V.  Graves,  112  Mass.  282  32 

V.  Graves,  155  Mass.  163     507,  508 

V.  Gray,  17  Ky.  L.  354  330 

V.  Gray,  129  Mass.  474  382 

V.  Green,  17  Mass.  515  209 

V.  Green,  126  Pa.  St.  531  191 

V.  Griffin,  no  ]\Iass.  181  187 

V.  Grose,  99  Mass.  423  304 
V.  Hackett,    2    Allen    (Mass.) 

136  97 
V.  Hagarman,  10  Allen  (Mass.) 

401  144 

V.  Hagenlock,  140  Mass.  125  166 
V.  Haley,     13    Allen     (Mass.) 

587  217 
V.  Hall,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  305 

210,  423 

V.  Haney,  127  Mass.  455      105,  112 

V.  Haiiley,  140  Mass.  457  67 


c  to  Sections.'] 
Coleman  v.  Hardy,  2  Mass.  303 

81,  77,  78 
v.  Hargis,   124  Ky.  356  97,   103 

v.  Harlow,  no  Mass.  411 

58,  67,  68 
v.  Harman,  4  Pa.   St.  269  130 

v.  Harmon,    2    Gray    (Mass.) 

289  364 

V.  Harrington,  3  Pick.  (Mass.) 

26  32 

V.  Harrington,  152  Mass.  488  242 
V.  Harris,  131   Mass.  336  418 

V.  Harvey,     i     Gray     (Mass.) 

487  122 

V.  Haughey,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  223  440 
V.  Hayden,  163  Mass.  453  26,  399 
V.  Hayden,   150  IVIass.  332  367 

V.  Hayes,  145  Mass.  286  187 

V.  Heidler,  191  Pa.  St.  375  157,  158 
V.  Hersey,    2    Allen     (Mass.) 

173  119,  225 

V.  Hill,  II  Cush.  (Mass.)  137  191 
V.  Hill,   14  Mass.  207  204 

V.  Hilliard,    2    Gray    (Mass.) 

294  324 

V.  Hills,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  530 

49,  201 
V.  Hinds,  lOi  Mass.  209  423,  430 
V.  Hoffman,  121  Mass.  369  197 

V.  Hollis,  170  Mass.  433  342 

V.  Holmes,  127  Mass.  424  7^,  74,  75 
V.  Holt,  121  Mass.  61  383 

V.  Homer,    153    Mass.    343  348 

V.  Hooper,     Thatcher     C.     C 

(Mass.)    400  483 

V.  Hoskins     (Ky.)     35    S.    W. 

284  325 

V.  Hourigan,  89  Ky.  305  222 

V.  Howard    (Mass.    1910),    91 

X.  E.  397  312,  323 

V.  Howe,  9  Gray  (Mass.)  no  136 
V.  Howe,    132   IMass.  250 

130,  437,  438 
V.  Howe,  35  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  554  80 
V.  Hoxey,  16  Mass.  385  455 

V.  Hul)cr,  126  Ky.  456  47" 

V.  Hudson,  97  Mass.  565  369 

V.  Hudson,  185   Mass.  402  126 

V.  Hughes,  133  Mass.  496  507,  514 
V.  Hunton,  168  Mass.  130  492 


xliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Commonwealth  v.  Hutchinson,  lO 
j\Iass.  225  205 

V.  Ingraham,  7  Gray    (Mass.) 

46  243 

V.  Israel,  4  Leigh  (Va.)  675  446 
V.  Jackson,  11  Bush  (Ky.)  679  404 
V.  Jackson,  132  IMass.  16 

87,  438,  439 
V.  James,  99   Mass.  438  138 

V.  Jeffries,    7    Allen    (Mass.) 

548  437,  438,  443 

V.  Johnson,  188  Mass.  382  160,  163 
V.  Johnson,  199  Mass.  55 

41a,  50,  55,  88,  376 
V.  Johnson,  162  Pa.  St.  63  116 

V.  Johnson,  213  Pa.  432  52 

V.  Johnson,  217  Pa.  77  130 

V.  Jones,  155  Mass.  170  241 

V.  Kaas,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  422  371 
V.  Kane,   108  ]\Iass.  423  46 

V.  Karamarkovic,  218  Pa.  405  6 
V.  Karpouski,    15    Pa.    Co.   Ct. 

280  445 

V.  Keck,   148  Pa.   St.  639  265 

V.  Keller,   191   Pa.  St.  122  50 

V.  Kendall,  113  Mass.  210  418 

V.  Kennedy,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

531  471 

V.  Kennedy,  131  Mass.  584  144 
V.  Kennedy,  170  ]\Iass.  18 

224,  318,  319 
V.  Kenney,    12    Met.     (Mass.) 

235  122,  123 

V,  Keyes,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  323 

147a 

V.  Killion,  194  Mass.  153  147 

V.  Kirb3^  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  577  446 
V.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  496 

26,  138,  140,  229,  230 
V.  Knapp,     10    Pick.     (Mass.) 

477                                   130,  273 

V.  Krueger,  17  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  181  185 

V.  Ladd,  15  Alass.  526          422,  430 

V.  Lahey,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  91  381 

V.  Lane,  113  Mass.  458  395 
V.  Lannam,    13   Allen    (Mass.) 

563                                     60,  125 

V.  Lannan,  155  Mass.   168  61 

V.  Latampa,  226  Pa.  23       105,  328 


e  to  Sections.] 

Commonwealth  v.  Lawler,  12  Al- 
len (Mass.)  585  237 
V.  Leach,  i  ]\Iass.  59  307 
V.  Leach,  156  Mass.  99 

348,  349,  350 

V.  Leach,  160  Mass.  542  17 

V.  Lee,   143   Mass.   100  237 

V.  Lenousky,  206  Pa.  277  265 
V.  Leonard,  140  ]\Iass.  473 

12,  79,  80 
V.  Levinson,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

286  90 
V.  Lindsey,  2  Ches.  Co.   (Pa.) 

268  250 

V.  Liquors,  155  ]\Iass.  142  14 
V.  Littlejohn,    15    ]\Iass.     163 

383,  404 

V.  Locke,  114  Mass.  288  24a 

V.  Lockhardt,  144  ]\Iass.  132  481 

V.  Loewe,  162  Mass.  518  i6a 

V.  Logue,   160  ^lass.  551  285 

V.  Lowrey,    158    Mass.    18  279 

V.  Luckis,  99  Mass.  431  293 

V.  Luscomb,    130  Mass.   42  480 

V.  Lyden,    113   Mass.  452  221 

V.  Lynes,  142  ]Mass.    577  205 

V.  ^McCarthy,    119   Mass.    354  89 

V.  McComb,  157  Pa.  St.  611  191 

V.  ]\IcConnell,  162  ^lass.  499  68 
V.  McCue,    16    Gray     (Alass.) 

226                                     46,  446 

V.  McDermott,  123  Mass.  44a  123 
V.  McDermott,   37   Pa.    Super. 

Ct.  I  89 
V.  McDonald,    no    ]\Iass.    405. 

245,  417 

V.  McGorty,  114  ]Mass.  299  301 

V.  ^klcGrath,  140  INIass.  296  399 
V.  McKenney,  9  Gray  (Mass.) 

114  298 

V.  INIcKie,   I   Gray   (Mass.)   61  23 

V.  ^McLaughlin,  105  ]\Iass.  460  310 
V.  AIc^NIahon,  145  Pa.  St.  413 

153.  277 
V.  Mc^Ianiman,  27  Pa.   Super. 

Ct.  304  118,  120 
V.  Mc^Manus,    143   Pa.   St.  64 

273,  275,  323 

V.  Maclin,  3  Leigh  (Va.)  809  310 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


xtv 


[References  a 

Commonwealth     v.     Mahon,     145 
Pa.  St.  413  118 

V.  Manson,  2  Ashm.    (Pa.)   31 

188,  189 
V.  Marchand,  155  Mass.  8  507 

V.  Marsh,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  57  70 
V.  Mason,  105  Mass.  163  437 

V.  Mead,  10  Allen  (Mass.)  396  20 
V.  Mead,  12  Gray  (Mass.)  167  192 
V.  Meehan,  170  Mass.  362 

46,  429 
V.  Mehan,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  321  ^3 
V.  Merriam,   14  Pick.    (Mass.) 

518  381 

V.  Merrill,    14    Gray     (Mass.) 

415  279 

V.  Meserve,   154  Mass.  64  427 

V.  Messinger,    i    Binn.     (Pa.) 

273  296 

V.  Mika,  171   Pa.   St.  273  103 

V.  Millard,    i    Mass.    6  378 

V.  Miller,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  484,  514 
V.  Miller,  31  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  309  79 
V.  Minor,  89  Ky.  555  209,  24a 

v.  Moinehan,  140  Mass.  463  47 
V.  Montgomery,        ii        Mete. 

(Mass.)  534    296,  299,  300,  304 
V.  Moore,     3     Pick.      (Mass.) 

194  532 

V.  Moore,  166  Mass.  513  282,  287 
V.  Moore,  99  Pa.  St.  570  439,  440 
V.  Morey,  i  Gray  (Mass.)  461 

126,    138 
V.  Morgan,  107  Mass.  199 

60,  246,  362,  s(i3 
V.  Morgan,  159  Mass.  375  51 

V.  Morihan,   4   Allen    (Mass.) 

585  465 

V.  Morningstar,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

34  33 

V.  Morrell,  99  Mass.  542  49 
V.  Morrill,    8    Cush.     (Mass.) 

571  439 
V.  Morris,  i  Cush.  (Mass.)  391 

381,  383 
V.  Morrow,     9     Phila.      (Pa.) 

583  512 

V.  Mosier,   135   Pa.   St.  221  238 

V.  Mosier,  4  Pa.  St.  264  130 

V.  Moulton,  9  Mass.  29  295 


e  to  Sections.] 

Commonwealth      v.      M'Pike,      3 
Cush.   (Mass.)    i8r  95,  97 

V.  Mudgett,  174  Pa.  St.  211  189 
V.  Mullen,  97  IMass.  545  68,  247 
V.  Murphy,  96  Ky.  28  444 

V.  Murphy,    4    Allen    (Mass.) 

491  185 

V.  Murphy,  165  Mass.  66  408 

V.  ]\Iurphy,  166  Mass.  171  485 

V.  Murray,  135  Mass.  530  451 

V.  Murtagh,    i    Ashm.     (Pa.) 

272  404 
V.  Myers,  160  Mass.  530  137,  138 
V.  Nagle,  157  Mass.  554  77,  84 

V.  Nichols,   ID  Allen    (Mass.) 

199  481 

V.  Nichols,  114  Mass.  285 

60,  92,  247,  381 
V.  Norcross,  9  Mass.  492  383,  404 
V.  O'Brien,    12  Allen    (Mass.) 

183  74,  78,  81,  82 

V.  O'Brien,  134  ]\Iass.  198  342 

V.  O'Brien,  170  Pa.  St.  555  492 
V.  O'Neil,  169  ]\Iass.  394  323 

V.  Palmer,  222  Pa.  299  338 

V.  Parker,    2    Cush.     (Mass.) 

212  "  468 

V.  Parker,  9  Met.   (Mass.)  263 

344,  399 
V.  Parsons,  195  Mass.  560  88,  163 
V.  Pease,  16  Mass.  91  458 

V.  Peters,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  387  196 
V.  Phillips     (Ky.),    82    S.    W. 

286  138 

V.  Phillips,  12  K}'.  L.  410  367 

V.  Phillips,  26  Ky.  L.  543  130 

V.  Phillips,    II    Pick.    (Mass.) 

28  507,  S14 

V.  Pioso,     18    Lane.    L.    Rev. 

(Pa.)  18s  T6a 

V.  Piper,  120  Mass.  185  126,  233 
V.  Place,  153  Pa.  St.  314  365 

V.  Pomeroy,  117  Mass.  143 

157,  161 
V.  Pope,  103  Mass.  440  47,  374 

V.  Powers,  116  Mass.  337  49 

V.  Pratt,  126  Mass.  462  247 

V.  Pratt,  137  Mass.  98 

39,  58,  291 


xivi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  a 

Commonwealth     v.     Preece,     140 
]\Iass.  276  41,  126,  143,  366 

V.  Price,  ID  Gray  (Mass.)  472 

72,  423,  433 
V.  Proctor,  165  Mass.  38  480 

V.  Purdy,  146  Mass.  138  32 

V.  Quinn,  150  Mass.  401  368 

V.  Randall,    4    Gray     (Mass.) 

36  354 

V.  Reynolds,  14  Gray   (Mass.) 

87  255,  448 

V.  Reynolds,  122  Mass.  454  131 

V.  Richards,  18  Pick.   (Mass.) 

434  265,  266 

V.  Ricker,  131  Mass.  581  151 

V.  Riggs,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  376 

298,  305 
V.  Riley,      Thach.      Cr.      Gas. 

(Mass.)  67  432 

V.  Roark,  8  Gush.  (Mass.)  210  41 
V.  Robbins,    3    Pick.     (Mass.) 

63  121 

V.  Roberts,  108  Mass.  296  105 

V.  Robinson,   i    Gray    (Mass.) 

555  188 

V.  Robinson,  146  Mass.  571 

88,  321 
V.  Robinson,  165  Mass.  426  205 
V.  Rogers,     7     Met.      (Mass.) 

500  158,  163 

V.  Rogers,  136  Mass.  158  81 

V.  Roosnell,  143  Mass.  32  408 

V.  Rowell,  146  Mass.  128  31,  480 
V.  Ruddle,  142  Pa.  St.  144  279 
V.  Rudy,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  270  365 
V.  Ruisseau,  140  Mass.  363  516 

V.  Runnels,  10  Mass.  518  489 

V.  Russell,  156  Mass.  196  423 

V.  Ryan,  155  Mass.  523  282 

V.  Sacket,  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  394 

83,  24s 
V.  Samuel,    2    Pick.     (]\Iass.) 

103  24a 

V.  Saulsbury,   152   Pa.   St.   554 

452,  456 
V.  Savory,    10    Gush.    (]\Iass.) 

535  74 

V.  Sawtelle,  141  Mass.  140  290 

V.  Schwartz,  92  Ky.  510 

436,  437,  447 


456 
6 

283 

527 
126 


e  to  Sections.] 

Gommonwealth  v.   Schweiters,  29 
Ky.  L.  417  470 

V.  Scott,  123  Mass.  222  56 

V.  Scowden,  92  Ky.  120 

.      191,  192,  449 
V.  Searle,  2  Binn.  (Pa.)  332 

422,  424 
V.  Shaffer,  32   Pa.   Super.   Gt. 

375  308,  309 

V.  Shaffer,  178  Pa.  St.  409  146 

V.  Shaw,  4  Gush.  (Mass.)  593 

221,  245 
V.  Shed,  I  Mass.  227 
V.  Sheffer,  218  Pa.  437 
V.  Shepard,    i    Allen    (Mass.) 

575 
V.  Shepherd,   6    Binnev    (Pa.) 

283 
V.  Shew,  190  Pa.  St.  23 
V.  Simmons,    6    J.    J.    Marsh 

(Ky.)  614  488 

V.  Sinclair,  195  Alass.  100 

42,  106,  350 
V.  Sliney,  126  Mass.  49  124 

V.  Smith,    II    Allen    (Mass.) 

243  466 

V.  Smith,  2  Gray  (Mass.)  516  201 
V.  Smith.  119  Mass.  305  129,  143 
V.  Smith,  162  Mass.  508  121 

V.  Smith,  163  Mass.  411  238 

V.  Smith,  166  Mass.  370 

16,  24a,  58a,  477 
V.  Smith,  6  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  568 

420  428,  429 
V.  Snee,  145  Mass.  351  239 

V.  Snell,  3  Mass.  82  425 

V.  Snell,  189  Mass.  12  312 

V.  Snelling,    15   Pick.    (Mass.) 

337^  364,  365 

V.  Snelling,    Thach.    Gr.    Gas. 

(Mass.)  318  365 

V.  Snow,  III  Mass.  411  241,  360 
V.  Snowden,     i     Brew.     (Pa.) 

218  461 

V.  Spahr,  211  Pa.  542  iii,  112 

V.  Sparks,    7    Allen     (Mass.) 

534  188,  3^^ 

V.  Spear,  143  ]\Iass.  172  481 

V.  Starr,  4  Allen  (Mass.)  301    239 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


xlvii 


[References  ar 

Commonwealth     v.      Stearns,     2 
Met.    (Mass.)   343  281 

V.  Stearns,    10   Mete.    (Mass.) 

256  432 

V.  Stebbins,   8    Gray    (Mass.) 

492  i6a,  292,  298,  304 

V.  Stevenson,  127  Mass.  zt46 

439,  442 
V.  Stevenson,  142  Mass.  466  342 
V.  Stone,  4  Met.  (Mass.)  43  423 
V.  Straesser,  153  Pa.  St.  451  324 
V.  Sturgeon    (Ky.),   37   S.  W. 

680  484 

V.  Sturtivant,  117  Mass.  122 

55,  88,   167,  312,  321 
V.  Sugland,    4    Gray     (Mass.) 

7  408 

V.  Sullivan,  150  Mass.  315  246 

V.  Sullivan,  13  Phil.  410  233 

V.  Surles,  165  Mass.  59  344 

V.  Switzer,  134  Pa.  383  5I 

V.  Taylor,     5    Gush.     (Mass.) 

605  126,  434 

V.  Taylor,  132  Mass.  261  313 

V.  Thomas    (Ky.),   104   S.   W. 

326  86,  277,  326 

V.  Thomas,  31  Ky.  L.  899  59 

V.  Thomas,  i  Va.  Gas.  307  360 

V.  Thompson,  159  Mass.  56 

103,  225,  3^2,  348,  350 
V.  Thurlow,  24  Pick.    (Mass.) 

374  24,  24a,  32 

V.  Thyng,  134  Mass.  191  235 

V.  Tibbetts,  157  Mass.  519    58a,  349 
V.  Tiroinski,  189  Mass.  257  324 

V.  Tivnon,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  375  375 
V.  Tolliver,  119  Mass.  312  116 

V.  Tracy,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  536    447 
V.  Trefethen,  157  Mass.  180 

116,  348 
v.  Trider,  143  Mass.  180  247 

v.  Trimmer,   i   Mass.  476  294 

V.  Tuckerman,  10  Gray  (Mass.) 

173  89,  139,  146,  283 

V.  Turner,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  19    423 
V.  Twitchcll,    I     Brew.     (Pa.) 

551  116,  233 

v.  Tuttlc,    120    Gush.    (Mass.) 

502  2 

v.  Uhrig,  167  Mass.  420  366 


■  to  Sections.] 

Gommonwealth    v.    Van    Tuyl,    i 
Mete.   (Ky.)   I  275,  445 

V.  Varney,    10   Gush.    (Mass.) 

362,  402 
V.  Vermouth,  174  Mass.  74  197 

V.  Vieth,  155  Mass.  422  480 

V.  Waite,     11     Allen     (Mass.) 

264  481,  490 

V.  Waite,  5  Mass.  261  420 

V.  Walden,    3    Gush.     (Mass.) 

558  308,  309 

V.  Walker,    13   Allen    (Mass.) 

570  123 

V.  Walker,  163  Mass.  226  45 

V.  Wallace,  114  Pa.  St.  405  442 
V.  Walsh,  196  Mass.  369  246 

V.  Ward,  157  Mass.  482  214,  215 
V.  Warren,  6  Mass.  72  435 

V.  Warren,  143  Mass.  568  33 

V.  Weber,  167  Pa.  St.  153        25,  68  • 
V.  Webster,    5    Gush.    (Mass.) 

29s        77,  79,  82,  84,  152,  153- 
229,  247,  314,  317 
V.  Welch,  142  Mass.  473  47 

V.  Wellington,  7  Allen  (Mass.) 

299  367 

V.  Wells,  no  Pa.  St.  463  471 

V.  Welsh,  2  Va.  Gas.  57  508 

V.  Wentz,  I  Ash.  (Pa.)  209  527 
V.  Werntz,  161  Pa.  St.  591  279,  330 
V.  Wesley,  166  Mass.  248  368 

V.  Wheeler.  162  Mass.  429  21 

V.  Wheeler    (Mass.,    1910),  91 

N.  E.  415  480 

V.  White,  145  Mass.  392  423 

V.  White,    147    Mass.   76  193 

V.  Whitman,  121  Mass.  361  55,  294 
V.  Whittaker,  131   Mass.  224 

393,  341 
V.  Willard,    22    Pick.    (Mass.) 

476  69 

V.  Williams,  2  Gush.    (Mass.) 

582  377 

V.  Williams,  13  Mass.  501  250 

V.  Williams,  171  Mass.  461  129,  323 
V.  Wilson,     I     Gray      (Mass.) 

337  163 

V.  Wilson,  2  Gray  (Mass.)  70  421 
V.  Wilson,  30  Pa.  Super.  Gt.  26  456 
V.  Wilson,   186  Pa.  St.  i  140 


xlviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  a 

Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  190 
Pa.  St.  138  157,  161 

V.  Woelfel,  121  Ky.  48  163 

V.  Wood,  II  Gray  (Mass.)  85 

344,  345,  349 
V.  Woodcroft,   17  Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

554  26 

V.  Woods,  10  Gray  (]\Iass.)  477    26 
V.  Worcester,  141  ]\Iass.  58  68 

V.  Wotton,  201  Mass.  81  452 

V.  Wright    (Ky.),    27    S.    W. 

815  391 

V.  York,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  93        320 

V.  Zeh,  138  Pa.  St.  615    23,  24,  24a 

Compton  V.  State,  no  Ala.  24         320 

V.  Wilder,  40  Ohio  St.  130  258 

Comstock   V.    State,    14    Neb.  205 

68,  123,  416 
Conant  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

610  74,  468 

Conkwright  v.  People,  35  111.  204    299 

Conley  v.  Meeker,  85  N.  Y.  618      236 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.).  116  S.  W. 

806  225 

Conly  V.   Commonwealth,  98  Ky. 

125  164 

Conn  V.  People,  116  111.  458  354 

Connell  v.  State,  80  Neb.  296  46 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  142  324 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  259 

106,  108 
Conner  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  378 

44,  263 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  659  147a 

Conners  v.  State,  47  Wis.  523  407 

Connor  v.  People,  18  Colo.  373        241 

Connors  v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  240 

60,  66 
Conrad  v.  State,   132  Ind.  254 

12,  153,  236 
V.  State,  144  Ind.  290  229,  230 

Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247      222 
Conway  v.  State,  118  Ind.  482 

71,  124,  154,  121,  122,  235,  318 

Conyers  v.  State,  50  Ga.  103       24,  476 

Cook,  In  re,  49  Fed.  833  495,  497 

Cook  V.  Johnston,  5«  ^lich.  437        369 

V.  State,  152  Ala.  66  222 

V.  State,  75  Ark.  540  74 

V.  State,  80  Ark.  495  69,  376 


-  to  Sections.] 

Cook  V.  State,  46  Fla.  20  78,  82 

V.  State,  II  Ga.  53  380 

V.  State,  124  Ga.  653  242 

V.  State,  169  Ind.  430  494 

V.  State,  71  Neb.  243  439 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  607        225 

Cooksey  v.  State,  84  Ark.  485  446 

Cooley  V.  Foltz,  85  ]Mich.  47  179 

Coolman  v.  State,  163  Ind.  503         338 

Coon  V.  People,  99  111.  368       211,  213 

Coons  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  256 

381,  403 

Cooper  V.  State,  63  Ala.  80  302 

V.  State,  86  Ala.  610  57 

V.  State,  88  Ala.   107  374 

V.  State,  90  Ala.  641  240,  390 

V.  State,  86  Ark.  30  392 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  730  36 

V.  State,  91   Ga.  362  520 

V.  State,  1 01  Ga.  783  285 

V.  State,  106  Ga.  119  37 

V.  State,  47  Ind.  61  197 

V.  Territory,  19  Okla.  496  74 

Cope  V.  Cope,  i  Moody  &  R.  269     527 

Copeland  v.  Boston  Dairy  Co.,  189 

Mass.  342  481 

V.  State    (Fla.,    1909),   50   So. 

621  323 

V.  State  (Tex.,  1897),  40  S.  W. 

589  525 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  575  280a,  475 
Corbett  v.  Gibson,  16  Blatchf.  334  252 
Corcoran   v.    Higgins,    194    Mass. 

291  523 

Cordes  v.    State    (Tex.   Cr.  App., 

1908),  112  S.  W.  943  163 

Cordova  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  207  123 

Cornelius    v.    Commonwealth,    15 

B.  Mon.   (Ky.)   539  222 

V.  State,  145  Ala.  65  364 

Cornell  v.  Green,  10  S.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

14  266 

Cornwell  v.  State,  Mart.  &  Yerg. 

(Tenn.)    147  96 

Corson  v.  Corson,  44  N.  H.  587        527 
Cortez  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

10  90,  321 

Cossart  v.  State,  14  Ark.  538  459 

Costello  V.  State  (Tex.),  21  S.  W. 
300  373 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


xlix 


[References  ar 

Cotton  V.  State,  87  Ala.  103 

68,  135,  238 

V.  State  (Miss.),  17  So.  372         87 

Cottrell,  Ex  parte,  13  Neb.  193        523 

Couch  V.  State,  28  Ga.  367       422,  424 

Counselman  v.   Hitchock,   142  U. 

S.  547  57,  453 

Counts  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  329      384 
Course  v.  Stead,  4  Dall.   (U.  S.) 

22  505 

Courtney   v.    State,    5    Ind.    App.' 

356  475 

Coveney  v.  Tannahill  i  Hill   (N. 

Y.)  33  175.  176 

Cover  V.  Commonwealth,  6  Cent. 

585  121 

Covington  v.  O'Meara  (Ky.,  1909) 
119  S.  W.  1S7  202 

V.   People.  36  Colo.  183  312 

Cowen  V.  People,  14  111.  348  442 

Cowles  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  498      411 
Cowley  V.   People,  83   N.   Y.  464 

50,  163 

V.  State,  10  Lea  (Tenn.)  282     354 

Cox  V.  Commonwealth,  125  Pa.  St 

94  73 

V.  Hill,  3  Ohio  411  174 

V.  People,  80  N.  Y.  500 

129,  135,  140 
V.  State    (Fla.,    1909),    50   So. 

875  352,  364 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  609  44 

V.  State,  64  Ga.  374  100 

V.  State,  95  Ga.  502  475 

V.  State  (Tex.),  36  S.  W.  435    261 

V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  254     330,  492 

Coxwell  V.  State,  66  Ga.  309  333 

Coyle  V.   Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 

L.  340  no 

V.  Commonwealth,  100  Pa.  St. 

573  158 

V.  State  (Tex.),  72  S.  W.  847    488 
Craddick    v.    State,   48   Tex.    Cr. 

385  211 

Craft   V.    State    (Tex.    Cr.    App., 

1909),  122  S.  W.  547  108 

Craig  V.    State    (Ind.),  86  N.  E. 
397  55.  358 

V.  State,  78  Xeh.  466  223 

iv — Underhill  Cbim.  Ev. 


e  to  Sections.] 

Craighead    v.    State    (Tex.),    117 

S.  W.  128  309 

Crandall  v.   People,  2  Lans.    (N. 

Y.)  309  68 

Crane  v.  State,  in  Ala.  45  278 

v.  State,  94  Tenn.  86  402,  404 

Crass  V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  480        32 

v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  312  90 

Cravens  v.   State    (Tex.),   103  S. 

W.  921  267,  269 

Crawford  v.  State,  112  Ala.  i 

80,  116,  241,  315 
V.  State,  113  Ala.  661  301 

V.  State,  90  Ga.  701  358 

V.  State,    4    Coldw.     (Tenn.) 

190  147a 

V.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  41  532 
V.  State,  2  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  60  193 
V.  State  (Tex.),  34  S.  W.  927  74 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  454  354 

V.  United   States,   30  App.   D. 

C.   I  59,  119,  280 

V.  United  States,  212  U.  S.  183  121 
Crayton  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  88  430 
Creed  v.  People,  81  111.  565  149 

Creek  v.  State,  24  Ind.  151  26 

Creighton   v.    Commonwealth,   83 

Ky.  142  446 

Crenshow  v.    State,   48  Tex.    Cr. 

App.  77  73 

Creswell  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  i     314 
Crews  v.  People,  120  111.  317  270 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  533  88,  321 
Cribb  V.  State,  118  Ga.  316  164 

Criner  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

174  73 

Gripe  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  832  21 

Crittenden  v.   Commonwealth,  82 

Ky.   164  222 

Crockett    v.    State,    45    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  276  103 

Croghan  v.   State,  22  Wis.  444       395 
Cromack  v.   Heathcote,  4  Moore 

357  175 

Crookham  v.  State,  5  W.  Va.  510 

95>  332 

Groom  v.  State,  90  Ga.  430  32S 

Crosby  v.  People,  137  111.  325  493 

Cross  v.  Cross,  43  Miss.  392  526 

v.  Cross,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  139    527 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Cross  V.  People,  47  III.  152       68,  421 
V.  State,  78  Ala.  430  381 

V.  State,  132  Ind.  65  12 

Crossland   v.    State,   yy   Ark.    537 

238,  301,  423 
Crow  V.  Jordon,  49  Ohio  St.  655     525 
V.  State,  6  Tex.  334  144 

Crowell  V.  State,  79  Neb.  784  121 

Croy  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  456  58a,  488 
V.  State,  32  Ind.  384  310 

Crozier  v.  State,  i  Park.  Cr.   (N. 

Y.)   453  392 

Crumbley  v.  State,  61  Ga.  582  353 

Crumley  v.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  231     329 
Crump  V.  Commonwealth,  14  Ky. 

L.  450  103,  237 

Crumpton   v.    State,   52  Ark.   273 

222,  248 
V.  United  States,  138  U.  S.  361    269 
Crutchfield  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 

65  69,  70 

Cryer  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  621       310 
Cubbison  v.  McCreary,  2  W.  &  S. 

(Pa.)    262  201 

Culver  V.  Marks,  122  Ind.  554  45 

V.  Scott    &c.    Lumber    Co.,    53 

Minn.  360  218 

Cummings    v.     State     (Tex.    Cr. 

1907),  106  S.  W.  363  298 

Cummins  v.  People,  42  Mich.  142    118 

Cunningham    v.    People,    210    111. 

410  409 

V.  State.  97  Ga.  214  225 

V.  State,  56  Neb.  691  6 

V.  State,  61  N.  J.  L.  666  439 

Curby  v.  Territory,  4  Ariz.  371         414 

Curlee  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  395      485 

Curran  v.  People,  35  111.  App.  275  532 

Curry  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

158  130,  342 

Curtis  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

606  87 

Custer  V.  State  (Tex.),  y6  S.  W. 

476  74 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  144      87 

Cuthbert  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  600    378 

Cutsinger    v.    Commonwealth,    7 

Bush)    (Ky.)  392  48s 

Cutter  V.  State,  36  N.  J.  L.  125        456 


D 


Dacey  v.  People,  116  111.  555     155,  320 

Daggett  V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  5        sy^ 

Dahlberg  v.  People,  225  111.  485      359 

Daily  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  32 

Conn.  356  106 

V.  State,  51  Ohio  St.  348  311 

Dale  V.  State,  88  Ga.  552  153,  522 

V.  State,  10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  550   154 

Dallas  V.  State,  129  Ga.  602      268,  270 

Daly  V.  Multnomah  Co.,  14  Ore. 

20  249 

Dan  forth  v.  State,  75  Ga.  614  275 

Daniel  v.  Daniel,  39  Pa.  St.  191        174 

Daniels  v.  People,  6  Mich.  381  395 

V.  State,  148  Ala.  6*63  293 

V.  State  (Fla.),48  So.  747  125,  130 

V.  State,  78  Ga.  98       138,  197,  sys 

V.  State,  2  Penn.  (Del.)  586        79 

Dantz  V.  State,  87  Ind.  398  144 

Darby  v.  State,  92  Ala.  9  112 

Darter  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  40 

325,  330a 
Daughdrill  v.  State,  113  Ala.  7  105 
Daughtry  v.    State,   54  Tex.   Cr. 

394  483 

Dave  V.  State,  22  Ala.  23  81 

Davenport    v.    Commonwealth,    I 

Leigh   (Va.)    588  275 

V.  State,  85  Ala.  336  82 

v.  State,  112  Ala.  49  484 

Davidson  v.  People,  90  111.  221        221 

V.  State,  104  Ga.  761  378 

V.  State,  99  Ind.  366  197 

V,  State,  135  Ind.  254  324 

V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  372  466 

Davis  V.   Commonwealth,  25  Ky. 

L.  1426  98 

v.  Commonwealth,  95  Ky.  19      236 

V.  Commonwealth,  30   Pa.    St. 

421  310 

V.  People,  114  111.  86  14 

v.  People,  I  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

447  378 

V.  State    (Ala.    1909),   48    So. 

694  358 

V.  State,  17  Ala.  354  261,  266 

V.  State,  141  Ala.  62  147 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ore  to  Sectioiis.] 


Davis  V.  State,  152  Ala.  25  58 

V.  State,  152  Ala.  82  368,  370 

V.  State,  45  Ark.  359  486 

V.  State,  63  Ark.  470  54,  417 

V.  State,  46  Fla.  137  374a 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  318  58a 

V.  State,  10  Ga.  loi  79 

V.  State,  76  Ga.  16  378 

V.  State,  100  Ga.  69  293 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  843  104 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  564  70 

V.  State,  138  Ind.  11  67 

V.  State,  50  Miss.  86  300 

V.  State,  31  Neb.  247  205,  408 

V.  State,  51  Neb.  301 

IS,  55,  147,  248,  280 
V.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  369  166 

V.  State    (Tex.,   1908),   114   S. 

W.  366  122 

V.  State    (Tex.),    102    S.    W. 

1150  269 

V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  519  306 

V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  594  56 

V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  45  359 

V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  210  34,  296 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  (3r.  App.  377  88 
V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  117  427 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  218  421 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  166  378 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  149  517,  520 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  332  272 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  629  61 
V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  236  318,  323 
V.  State,  134  Wis.  632  36 

V.  United  States,  160  U.  S.  469  157 
V.  United  States,  165  U.  S.  373   163 

Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Neb.  829 

525,  531,  532 

V.  People,  90  111.  221  320 
Dawson  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

25  Ky.  L.  5  358 

V.  State,  16  Ind.  428  166 

V.  State,  62  Miss.  241  153 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  535 

88,  376,  378 

V.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  9  37 

Day  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  no 

S.  W.  417                                  435,  439 

V.  State,  63  Ga.  667  374 

V    State,  91  Miss.  239  517 


Day  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  213         23 
V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  143  71 

Deal  V.    State    (Miss.,    1909),   50 

So.  495  424 

Dean  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  78 
S.  W.  1112  269 

v.  Commonwealth,   25    Ky.    L. 

1876  238 

v.  Commonwealth,     32     Gratt. 

(Va.)  912  315 

v.  State,  89  Ala.  46  354 

V.  State,  98  Ala.  71  484 

v.  State,  105  Ala.  21  336 

V.  State,  93  Ga.  184  518 

V.  State,  29  Ind.  483  526,  527 

V.  State,  130  Ind.  237  276 

V.  State,  147  Ind.  215  284 

V.  State,  85  Miss.  40  323 

Deathridge    v.     State,     i     Sneed 

(Tenn.)  75  138 

Debardelaben  v.   State,  99  Tenn. 

649  471 

Degg  V.  State,  150  Ala.  3  41a 

DeGroat  v.  People,  39  Mich.  124    395 
DeHaven   v.    State,   2   Ind.    App. 

376  475 

Dejarnette  v.  Commonwealth,  75 

Va.  867  159,  163 

Delahoyde  v.  People,  212  111.  554     120 
De  La  Motte's  Case,  21  How.  St. 

Tr.  564  429 

Delaney  v.  State,  148  Ala.  586 

103,  119 

V.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  28       440 

Delany  v.  People,  10  Mich.  241        395 

DeLeon   v.   State    (Tex.),   114  S. 

W.  828  19s 

v.  Territor}^  9  Ariz.   161 

42,  281,  290 
Delk  v.  State,  100  Ga.  61  268 

Delmont  v.  State,  15  Wyo.  271        371 
Deloach  v.  State,  77  Miss.  691  144 

v.  Stewart,  86  Ga.  729  43 

Demaree  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

91  S.  W.  T131  160 

Demolli  v.  United  States,  144  Fed. 

363  478 

Dempsey  v.  State,  83  .Ark.  81  12 

Dcnham  v.   State   (Ga.  App.),  63 
S.  E.  62  S7 


lii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  a) 
6    Maine 


Dennett    v.    Kneeland, 

460 
Dennis  v.  People,  i  Park.  Cr.  (N. 

Y.)  469 


State, 

State 

926 

V.  State. 


139  Ala.  109 
(Ark.),    114 


S.    W. 


533 

428 
473 

276 
519 


103  Ind.  142 
Dennison  v.  Christian,  196  U.  S. 

637  497 

V.  Page,  29  Pa.  St.  420       526,  527 

Densmore  v.  State,  67  Ind.  306 

Denson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1896), 

35  S.  W.  150 
Dentler  v.  State,  112  Ala.  70 
Denton  v.  State,  77  Md.  527 
V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  193 
DePriest  v.  State,  68  Ind.  569 
De  Silva  v.  State,  91  Miss.  776 
Devere  v.    State,  5  Ohio   Cr.   Ct. 

509  423,  425 

Devine,  Ex  parte,  74  Miss.  715        499 
Devoto  V.  Commonwealth,  3  Mete. 

(Ky.)   417  89 

Devoy  v.  State,  122  Wis.  148 
Devries  v.  Phillips,  63  N.  Car.  53 
Dibble  v.  State,  48  Ind.  470 
Dick,  Ex  parte,  14  Pick.  (Mass.) 


120 

330 
35 
290 
418 
524 
357 


417 
247 
524 


Dickerson  v.   State,  48  Wis.  288 


510 


Dickey  v.  State,  68  Ala.  508 
V.  State,  86  Miss.  525    118, 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  430 

Dickinson    v.     State     (Okla. 
App.,  1909),  104  Pac.  923 

Dickson  v.  State,  39  Ohio  St. 
V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  i 
V.  Territory,  6  Ariz.  199 
V.  Waldron,  135  Ind.  507 

Diffey  v.  State,  86  Ala.  66 

Digby  V.  People,  113  111.  123 

Dill  V.  State,  i  Tex.  App.  278 
V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  113 

Dillard  v.  State,  152  Ala.  86 
V.  State,  58  Miss.  368 
V.  United  States,  72  C.  C 

451 
V.  United  States,  141  Fed. 
Dillin  V.  People,  8  Mich.  357 


131,  132 
473 

121,  409 
416 
Cr. 
352 

73  326 
363 
297 
202 

484 
104,  105 

188 

358 
87 
224,  334 
A. 

241 
303   423 

337 


439 
485 
270 

385 
386 


e  to  Sections.] 

Dillingham   v.    State,   5  Ohio   St. 
280 

V.  State  (Tex.),  32  S.  W.  771 
Dingman  v.  State,  48  Wis.  485 
Dinkey  v.  Commonwealth,  17  Pa. 

St.  126 
Disharoon  v.  State,  95  Ga.  351 
District   of    Columbia    v.    Armes, 

107  U.  S.  519  202 

Dixon  V.  People,  18  Mich.  84    185,  189 

V.  State,  13  Fla.  636  328 

V.  State,  86  Ga.  754  234 

V.  State,  116  Ga.  186  130 

Dobbs  V.  State  (Tex.),  113  S.  W. 

923  48 

Dobson  V.  Cothran,  34  S.  Car.  518     39 

V.  State,  46  Neb.  250  299 

Dock's     Case,    21     Gratt.     (Va.) 

909  324 

Dodds  V.  State   (Miss.   1908),  45 

So.  863  246 

Dodson  V.  State,  86  Ala.  60  147a 

Doe  V.  Harvey,  8  Bing.  239  44 

V.  Riley,  28  Ala.  164  452 

Dolan  V.  State,  40  Ark.  454      262,  263 

V.  United  States,  123  Fed.  52      492 
Doles  V.  State,  97  Ind.  555  no 

Dominick  v.  State,  81  Ga.  715  521 

Done  V.  People,  5  Park  Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  364  138 

Don  Moraii  v.   People,  25  Mich. 

3S6  417 

Donnellan    v.    Commonwealth,    7 

Bush  (Ky.)  676  320 

Donnelly  v.  County,  7  Iowa  419 

249,  250 
Donner  v.  State,  69  Neb.  56  41a,  45 
Donoghoe  v.   People,  6  Park  Cr. 

(N.  Y.)  120  76 

Donohue  v.  State,  59  Ark.  375  442 
Donovan  v.  State,  140  Wis.  570  414 
Dooley  v.  State,  89  Ala.  90  485 

Doolittle  V.  State,  93  Ind.  272  312 

Doo  Woon,  In  re,  18  Fed.  898  496 
Dorgan  v.  State,  72  Ala.  173  523 

Dorman  v.  State,  48  Fla.  18  263 

V.  State,  56  Ind.  454  21 

Dorsey  v.  State,  no  Ala.  38       48,  304 

v.  State,  III  Ala.  40  437 

v.  State,  no  Ga.  331  17 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


liii 


[References  ar 

Doss  V.  State,  SO  Tex.  Cr.  48  374 

Dougherty  v.  People,  i  Colo.  514    349 
Doughterty  v.  People,  118  111.  160 

2,7,  21 

Douglass   V.    State    (Ark.,    1909), 

121  S.  W.  923  36,  301 

V.  State   (Tex.),  2,3  S.  W.  228  237 

V.  State  (Tex.),  98  S.  W.  840  236 

V.  State  (Tex.).  114  S.  W.  808   ico 

Dove  V.  State,  3  Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

348 
Dow  V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  278 
Dowd  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  563 
Downey  v.  State,  no  Ala.  99 
Doyle  V.  Kirby,  184  Mass.  409 
V.  People,  147  111.  394 
V.  State,   39   Fla.    155 
V.  State,  77  Ga.  513 
Drake  v.  State,  no  Ala.  9 
V.  State,  75  Ga.  413 
V.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  23 
V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  203 
Drane  v.    State    (Miss.),   45    So. 

149 
Draught!  v.  State,  76  Miss.  574 
Drew  V.  State,  124  Ind.  9  66,  78,  ^2 
Drinkall  v.  Spiegel,  68  Conn.  441  497 
Driscoll  V.  People,  47  Mich.  413 

95,   97,  246 
Driver  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

20  87 

Drowne  v.  Stimpson,  2  JNIass.  441    533 
Druin    v.    Commonwealth     (Ky., 

1910),  124  S.  W.  856  413,  414 

Drumright  v.  State,  29  Ga.  430        124 

DuBose  V.  State,  120  Ala.  300  103,  no 

V.  State,  148  Ala.  560  2,37 

Duchess   of    Kingston's    Case,   20 

How.  St.  Tr.  573  179 

Duck  V.  State,  17  Ind.  210  532 

Duckworth  v.  State,  83  Ark.  6 

192,  196 
Dudley  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  31 

269,  321 
Dudney  v.  State,  22  Ark.  251  475 

Duffin  V.  People,  T07  111.  113      51,  425 
Duffy  V.  People,  26  N.  Y.  588 

138,  275,  279 
Dugan,  In  re,  2  Lowell  C.  C.  367    501 


157 
269 
267 
473 

455 
279 

277 

358 

328,  329 

58a 

364 
112 


226 
126 


■e  to  Sections. "] 

Dugan     V.     Mahoney,     11     Allen 

(Mass.)  572 
Duke  V.  Asljee,  n  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

112 

V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  14 
Dukehart  v.  Coughman,  36  Neb. 

412 

Dukes  V.  State,  n  Ind.  557      100, 
Dulin  V.  Dillard,  91  Va.  718 
Dumas  v.  State,  62  Ga.  58  2'^, 

V.  State,  63  Ga.  600 

V.  State,  94  Ga.  590 
Dunbar    v.    Armstrong,    115    111. 
App.  549 

V.  United  States,  156  U.  S.  185 
Duncan  v.  State,  29  Fla.  430 

V.  State,  97  Ga.   180 

V.  State,  49  Miss.  331 

V.  State,    7    Humph.    (Tenn.) 
148 
Dungan  v.  State,  135  Wis.  151    61 
Dunk  V.  State,  84  Miss.  452 
Dunlap  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  504 
Dunlop  V.  United  States,  165  U. 
S.  486  19, 

Dunmore  v.  State,  86  Miss.  788 
Dunn  V.  People,  109  111.  635 

V.  People,  158  111.  586 

V.  People,  29  N.  Y.  523 

V.  State,  143  Ala.  67 

V.  State,  2  Ark.  229 

V.  State,  70  Ind.  47 
Dunwoody  v.  State,  n8  Ga.  308 
Dupree  v.  State,  23  Ala.  380     265, 

V.  State,  148  Ala.  620     35,  371, 
Durham's  Case,  2  Leach  C.  L.  538 
Durham  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  401 
Durland  v.  United  States,  161  U. 
S.  306  195, 

Duttenhofer  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St. 
91  64, 

Duvall  v.  State,  62  Ala.  12 
Dwight  v.  Cutting,  91  Hun  38 
Dwyer  v.  Rippetoe,  72  Tex.  520 
Dye  v.  State,  130  Ind.  87 
Dyer  v.  State,  74  Ind.  594 

v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1903),  77  S. 
W.  456 


217 

455 
364 

524 

325 
196 
104 
65 
125 

59 

44 

37 

227 

308 

446 

,  77 
235 
359 

478 
129 

12 
337 
345 
326 

90 
198 

374 
325 
373 
73 
214 

197 

176 
298 
218 
267 
124 
35 

245 


liv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Eacock  V.  State,  169  Ind.  488 

79,  121,  220, 
Eads  V.   State   (Wyo.),   loi   Pac. 
946  172, 

Eaker  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  649 
Earles  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  140 
Earll  V.  People,  TZ  HI-  329 

V.  People,  99  111.  123 
Early  v.  Commonwealth,  86  Va. 

921  135, 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  382 

268,  269, 
Earp  V.  State,  104  Md.  253 
Easdale   v.   Reynolds,    143   Mass. 

126 
Easley    v.    Commonwealth     (Pa., 

1887),  II  Atl.  220 
Easlick  v.  United  States,  7   Ind. 

Ter.  707 
Easterwood  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr. 

400 
Eastman    v.     Crosby,    8    Allen 

(Mass.)  206 
Eastwood  V.  People,  3  Park.  Cr. 

Rep.  25 
Eatman  v.  State,  139  Ala.  (i^ 

V.  State,  48  Fla.  21  282, 

Eberhart  v.  State,  47  Ga.  598 

V.  State,  134  Ind.  651 
Echols  V.  State,  147  Ala.  700 

298,  301,  302, 
V.  State,  81   Ga.  696 
Eckels  V.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  508 
Edgington  v.   United   States,   164 

U.  S.  361 
Edington  v.  vEtna  Life  Ins.  Co., 
TJ  N.  Y.  564 

V.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  67  N. 
Y.  i8s 
Edmonds  v.  State,  70  Ala.  89 

V.  State,  34  Ark.  720  312, 

Edmondson  v.  State,  43  Tex.  230 
Edmonson  v.  State,  ']2  Ark.  585 
Edwards    v.    Commonwealth,    78 
Va.  39 
V.  State,  IIS  Ala.  52 
V.  State  (Ga.),  51  S.  E.  505 
V.  State,  126  Ga.  89 


492 

293 
57 

324 
1Z 

349 

138 

143 

532 
527 


323 


50s 


[References  are  to  Sections."] 

Edwards  v.  State,  69  Neb.  386  18 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  452  294 

V.  Territory,  i  Wash.  195  69 

Egbert    v.    Greenwalt,   44    Mich. 

245  527 

Eggler  V.  People,  56  N.  Y.  642 

312,  32s 
Ehrhart  v.  Rork,  114  111.  App.  509  282 
Ehrisman   v.    Scott,   5    Ind.   App. 

596  218 

Eiland  v.  State,  52  Ala.  322      325,  326 
Eldridge  v.  State,  27  Fla.  162 

248,  364 
Eley  V.  State   (Tex.  1890),  13  S. 

W.  998  376 

Elias  V.  Ramirez,  215  U.  S.  398 

496,  SOI 

Ellerbe,  In  re,  13  Fed.  Rep.  S30       226 

Elliott  V.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  113         40 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  31  383 

V.  State,  34  Neb.  48  62 

Ellis  V.  State,  120  Ala.  S2>3  Z2Z 

V.  State,  25  Fla.  702  409,  414 

V.  State,  124  Ga.  91  487 

V.  State,  65  Miss.  44  126 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  601  24 

V.  State,  2,Z  Tex.  Cr.  App.  86 


230 
205 
286 
127 

417 

30S 
6 

293 

79 

179 

179 
293 
330 
250 
128 

509 
308 

484 


6,  161 
Elliston  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  575    296 
Elmore  v.  State,  98  Ala.  12      118,  119 
V.  State,  140  Ala.  184  185 

Elsey  V.  State,  47  Ark.  572  422 

Eisner  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  687    297 
Elsworth   V.   State,   S2   Tex.    Cr. 

App.  I  54 

Elting  V.  United  States,  27  Ct.  CI. 

158  251 

Emerson  v.    State,   43   Ark.   372 

197,  198 
Emery  v.  State,  92  Wis.  146  131,  132 
Emery's  Case,  107  Mass.  172  57 

Emmons  v.  Barton,  109  Cal.  663      187 
Employers'  Teaming  Co.  v.  Team- 
sters'  Joint    Council,    141    Fed. 
679  461 

Endaily  v.  State,  39  Ark.  278  30S 

England  v.  State,  89  Ala.  76 

245,  372,  374 

V.  State  (Tex.),  49  S.  W.  379    364 

English  V.  State,  31  Fla.  340  228 


TABLE   0'^   CASES. 


Iv 


[References  a) 

Ennis    v.    State,    3    Greer    (Iowa 

67  282 

Enquirer  Co.  v.  Johnston,  72  Fed. 

443  363 

Epps  V.  State,  19  Ga.  102    80,  214,  228 
V.  State,  102  Ind.  539 

6,  40,  280a,  312,  318 
Errington's  Case,  2  Lewin's  C.  C. 

148  103 

Erwin  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  186  320 

V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  700  165 

Esch  V.  Graue,  72  Neb.  719  525 

Eskridge  v.   State,  25  Ala.  30  136 

Espalla  V.  State,  108  Ala.  38  424 

Etress  v.  State,  88  Ala.  191  484 
Ettinger    v.     Commonwealth,    98 

Pa.  St.  338              122,  123,  124,  S22i 
Euqua  v.  Commonwealth,  118  Ky. 

5/8  112 

Evans  v.  State,  109  Ala.  il  233 

V.  State,  58  Ark.  47               97,  no 

V.  State,  17  Fla.  192  21,  37 

V.  State,  67  Ind.  68  521 

V.  State,  150  Ind.  651  510 

V.  State,  165  Ind.  369  529 

V.  State,  61  ]\Iiss.  157  71 

V.  State  (Tex.),  76  S.  W.  467  119 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  485  209 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  649  517 

Everage  v.  State,  113  Ala.  102  493 

Everett  v.  State,  33  Fla.  661  185 

V.  State,  62  Ga.  65               312,  329 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  682  175 

Evers  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  318  324 

Ewert  V.  State,  48  Fla.  36  268 

Ewing  V.  Bailey,  36  III.  App.  191  201 

V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),    in 

S.  W.  352  320 

Ezell  V.  State,  103  Ala.  8  315 

V.  State  (Tex.),  71  S.  W.  283  121 


Eager  v.  State,  22  Neb.  332  414 

Falkner  v.  State,  151  Ala.  77  238 

Fallin  v.  State,  83  Ala.  5  241 

Fallwell  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  35  473 

Falmouth  v.  Moss,' 11  Price  455  179 

Fannin  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  41  358 


e  to  Sectioiis.] 

Fanton  v.  State,  50  Neb.  351     12,  271 
Farez,  In  re,  7  Blatchf.  C.  C.  345 

496,  501 

Farley  v.  State,  57  Ind.  331  195 

V.  State,  127  Ind.  419     17,   18,  373 

Farmer  v.  Commonwealth,  28  Ky. 

L.  1168  61,  103 

V.  Salisbury,  77  Vi.   161  21 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  423         310 

Farrall  v.  State,  32  Ala.  557  24 

Farrell,  In  re,  36  Mont.  254  430 

Farrell  v.  People,  103  111.  17  116 

v.  State,  54  N.  J.  L.  416  408 

Farris  v.  People,  129  111.  521  90 

Fassinow  v.  State,  89  Ind.  235  61 

Faulk  v.  State,  52  Ala.  415  197 

Faulkner  v.  State,  S3  Tex.  Cr.  258  388 

V.  Territory,  6  N.  Mex.  464      270 

Faust  V.  United  States,  163  U.  S. 

452  33,  224,  282 

Faustre  v.  Commonwealth,  92  Ky. 

34  _  _       _     402 

Fawcet  v.  Linthecum,  7  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  141  254 

Fay  V.  Commonwealth,  28  Gratt. 
(Va.,)  912  305,  442 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  185    312,  315 
Fears  v.  State,  125  Ga.  740  21 

Feeney  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  116 
N.  Y.  375  179 

V.  State      (Tex.      Cr.      App., 

1910),  124  S.  W.  944         422 
Feilds  V.  State,  46  Fla.  84  54 

Fein   v.    Covenant   &c.    Assn.,  60 

III.  App.  274  239 

Felder  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  477 

54,  no,  331 
Felker  v.  State,  54  Ark.  489  279 

Felsenthal  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 

67s  77,  78 

Fenlon  v.  Dempsey,  21  Abb.  N.  C. 

291  252 

Ferguson  v.  McBean,  91  Cal.  63      174 

V.  State,  141  Ala.  20  97,  336 

v.  State,  71  Miss.  805  390,  393 

V.  State,  72  Neb.  350     58,  220,  222 

V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  504  356 

V.  State,  3T  Tex.  Cr.  App.  93     137 

Ferrel  v.  Commonwealth,  15  Ky. 

L.  321  325 


ivi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  at 

Ferrell  v.  Opelika,  144  Ala.  135  473 
Ferriman  v.  People,  128  111.  App. 

230  460 

Fertig  v.  State,  100  Wis.  301    119a,  267 

Field   V.    Commonwealth,  89   Va. 

690                                     517,  520,  521 

V.  State,  126  Ga.  571  372 

V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  422  378 

Fielder  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

184  138 

Fields  V.  State,  47  Ala.  603        79,  324 

V.  State,  121  Ala.  16  66 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1903), 

74  S.  W.  309  Z72 
V.  United  States,  27  App.  D.  C. 

433                                   281,  286 

Files  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  206  295 

Filkins  v.  People,  69  N.  Y.  loi  59 
Finch  V.   Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 

L.  187  122 

V.  State,  81  Ala.  41       136,  314,  Z32 
Findlev  v.  State,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

576  6 

Fine  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  290  388 
Finklea  v.  State   (Miss.),  48  So. 

I  184 

Finley,  Ex  parte.  66  Cal.  262  430 

Finley,  In  re,  i  Cal.  App.  198  507 
Finn  v.  Commonwealth,  5  Rand. 

(Va.)  701  262 
Finnegan     v.     Dugan,     14    Allen 

(Mass.)   197  525 
Fischl  V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  55 

419,  422 

Fisher  v.  State,  2  Ind.  App.  365  475 

Fisher  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  502  158 

Fitts  V.  State,  102  Tenn.  141  121 

Fitzgerald  v.  State,  12  Ga.  213  484 

V.  State,  II  Neb.  577  104 

V.  State,  78  Neb.  i  414 

V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  475  287 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  265  484 

Fitzpatrick  v.  Commonwealth,  81 

Ky.  357  85 

V.  Daily   States   Pub.   Co.,  48 

La.  Ann.  11 16  364 

V.  State,  ^7  Tex.  Cr.  20  212 

Fizell  V.  State,  25  Wis.  364  408 

Flagg  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  602  292 

Flanagan  v.  People,  52  N.  Y.  467  154 


c  to  Sections.] 

Flanagin  v.  State,  25  Ark.  92  123,  189 
Flanegan  v.  State,  64  Ga.  52  loi 

Flanigan  v.  People,  86  N.  Y.  554  164 
Flannery  v.  People,  225  111.  62  461 
Fleener  v.  State,  58  Ark.  98 

281.  286,  287 

Fleming  v.  State,  150  Ala.  19   97,  326 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  17  476 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  149  153 

V.  State    (Tex.),    114    S.    W. 

383  100 

V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  339  520 

Fletcher  v.  People,  117  111.  184 

521,  522 
V.  State,  12  Ark.  169  144 

V.  State,  85  Ga.  666  153 

V.  State,  90  Ga.  468  12 

V.  State,  49  Ind.  124  58a,  66 

V.  State,  169  Ind.  yy  405 

Flint  V.  Kennedy,  33  Fed.  820  218 
Flohr  V.  Territory,   14  Okla.  477 

267,  281 
Flood  V.  Mitchell,  68  N.  Y.  507  217 
Flores  v.  State  (Tex.)   79  S.  W. 

808  97 

Florez  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  102  452 
Flower  v.  United  States,  116  Fed. 

241  147 

Floyd  V.  State,  79  Ala.  39  446 

V.  State,  82  Ala.  16  240 

Fluty   V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

:o5  S.  W.  138  464 

Flynn    v.    People,    123    111.    App. 

591  475 

V.  State,  43  Ark.  289  lOl 

Fogg  V.  State,  81  Ark.  417  103 

Folden  v.  State,  13  Neb.  328  424 

Foley  V.  State,  11  Wyo.  464  109,  112 
Follis  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

186  129,  312 

Fonseca    v.    State,    48    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  28  129 

Foote  V.  People,  17  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

218  444 

Forbes  v.  Willard,  37  How.   Pr. 

(N.  Y.)  193  247 

Ford  V.  Painter,  3  Okla.  80  214 

V.  State,  71  Ala.  385  158 

V.  State,  34  Ark.  649  122 

V.  State,  91  Ga.  162  517 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ivii 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Ford  V.  State,  7  Ind.  App.  567         196 
V.  State,  112  Ind.  373 

241,  327,  368,  494 

V.  State,  73  Miss.  734  157 

V.  State,  75  Miss.  101    126,  132,  143 

V.  State,  86  Miss.  123  475 

V.  State,  loi  Tenn.  454  273 

Fore  V.  State,  75  Miss.  727  50 

Forehand  v.  State,  51  Ark.  553        228 

Forehead  v.   State,  53  Ark.  46  21 

Fort  V.  State,  52  Ark.  r8o  372 

Fortenberry  v.  State,  56  Miss.  286  285 

Fortson  v.  State,  125  Ga.  16  149 

Foster  v.  Dickerson,  64  Vt.  233        235 

V.  Neilson,   2    Peters    (U.    S.) 

253  504 

V.  People,  18  Mich.  265  176 

V.  State,  39  Ala.  229  197 

V.  State,  70  Miss.  755  230 

V.  State,  79  Neb.  259  271 

V.  State,  I  Ohio.  Cir.  Ct.  467     360 

V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  248  100 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  39        466,  467 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  137  268 

Fountain  v.  Young,  6  Esp.  113        173 

Fouse  V.  State  (Neb.),  119  N.  W. 

478  126,  323 

V.  State,  83  Neb.  258  225 

Fowler,  In  re,  4  Fed.  303  502.  503 

V.  State  (Ala.)  45  So.  913  312,  323 

V.  State,   100  Ala.  96  277 

Fox  V.  People,  95  111.  71 

118,  119,  422,  423 
Fox  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  329  383 
Foxcroft's  Case,  i  Rolle  Abr.  359  526 
Francis   v.    Rosa,    151    Mass.    532 

528,  530 

Francis  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  501    423 

Franco  v.  State.  42  Tex.  276  377 

Frank  v.  State,  39  Miss.  705      373,  375 

V.  State,  94   Wis.  211  60 

Franklin    v.     Commonwealth,    20 

Ky.  L.   1 137  314 

V.  Commonwealth,  92  Ky.  612    323 

V.  Commonwealth,  105  Ky.  237 

124,  314 
V.  State,   29   Ala.    14  324 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.   342  301 


493 
114 

147a 
35,  412 
9i>  376 
482 


Franklin  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  312  301 
Fraser  v.  State,  55  Ga.  325  323 

Frazier  v.  Commonwealth   (Ky.), 
76  S.  W.  28 
V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.) 

S.  W.  268 

V.  State,  56  Ark.  242 

V.  State,  135  Ind.  38  i 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  24 

Freeman  v.   State,   il    Tex.   App 

92  397 

V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  545    97 

French  v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.) 

97  S.  W.  427  461 

V.  State,  12  Ind.  670  152 

V.  Ware,   65    Vt.   338  187 

Fribly  v.  State,  42  Ohio  St.  205     458 

Friday    v.    State    (Tex.    Cr.),   79 

S.    W.    815  328 

Friedman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  7  Phila. 

(Pa.)  203  106 

Friery  v.    People,   54   Barb.    (N. 

Y.)    319  166 

Frink  v.  State  (Fla.  1908),  47  So. 

514  282 

Frisby  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  180       363 
Frizzell  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  42 

48,  329 

Frosh  V.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  280    144 

Fry  V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  33^    418 

V.  State,  96  Tenn.  467  83 

Fulcher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  465 

103,  IDS,  122,  123,  130 
Fuller  V.  State,  147  Ala.  35 

245,   246,   315 
V.  State,   127  Ga.  47  137 

V.  State,    12   Ohio   St.   433  14 

V.  State,   30  Tex.   App.   559       238 
V.  Territory    (Okla.),   99  Pac. 

1098  21,  36 

Fulmer  v.  Comm.onwealth,  97  Pa. 

St.  503  304 

Fulton  V.  State,  13  Ark.  168  305 

Fults  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

502  157,  161 

Funderburg  v.  State  (Tex.),  34  S. 

W.  613  .300 

Funderburk  v.  State,  75  Miss.  20    308 


V.  State,  69  Ga.  36  150,   122  |  Fuqua  v.  Commonwealth,  118  Ky. 

V.  State  (Tex.),  88  S.  W.  357    97      578  267 


Iviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Furst  V.  State,  31  Neb.  403  147a 

Fussell  V.  State,  93  Ga.  450  56 

Futch  V.  State,  90  Ga.  472  35 


403 
58a 


334 
271 
20s 
24a 
62,  220 
167 

21 
268 

54 


493 


Gahagan  v.    People,   i    Park.    Cr. 

(N.  Y.)  378 
Gainer  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  126 
Gaines  v.   Commonwealth,  50  Pa. 
St.  319 

V.  State,  146  Ala.  16 

V.  State,  99  Ga.  703 
Gains  V.  State.,  149  Ala.  29 
Gale  V.  People,  26  Mich.  157 
Gallagher  v.  People,  120  111.  179 

V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  469 

V.  State,  78  Ark.  299 

V.  State,   28   Tex.   App.  247 
Gallegos  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  58    23)3 
Gamble  v.  State,  113  Ga.  701  488 

iGambrell  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky. 
1908),  113  S.  W.  476 

V.  State   (Miss.   1908),  46   So. 

138  102,  no 

Gamel  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  357  482 
Gandolfo  v.  State,  11  Ohio  114  77,  81 
Gandy  v.  State,  23  Neb.  436      255,  469 

V.  State,  77  Neb.  782  448 

Gannon  v.  People,  127  111.  507  6 

Gantier  v.  State    (Tex.   1893),  21 

S.  W.  255  94 

Gantling  v.  State,  40  Fla.  237 

147a,  334 
V.  State,   41    Fla.   587  147 

Garber  v.  State,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 

161  94,  95 

Garcia  v.  State,  26  Tex.  209  295,  301 
Garden  v.  Cresswell,  2  M.  &  W. 

319  257 

Gardiner  v.    People,   6   Park   Cr. 

(N.  Y.)  155  48,  119 

Gardner  v.  People,  106  111.  76        144 
V.  State,  96  Ala.    12  423 

V.  State,  80  Ark.  264        21,  46,  467 
V.  State,  55   Fla.  25 

103,  108,  no,  112 
V.  State,  90  Ga.  310  324 

V.  State,  55  N,  J.  L.  17  17 


e  to  Sections.'] 

Gardner   v.   State    (Tex.),   34   S. 

W.  945  123 
V.  State  (Tex.),  117  S.  W.  140  87 
V.  United    States,  5    Ind.   Ten 

150  268 

Garfield  v.  State,  74  Ind.  60  275 
Garland,   Ex  parte,  4  Wall.    (U. 

S.)    22>3  207 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  643  382 

Garman  v.   State,  66  Miss.   196  232 

Garmire  v.  State,  104  Ind.  444  421 
Garner   v.    State,   28   Fla.    113 

166,   215,    164,  326 

V.  State,  6  Ga.  App.  788    119a,  336 

Garrett  v.  State,  97  Ala.  18  325 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  255  328 

Garrison  v.  People,  87  111.  96  87 

V.  People,  6  Neb.  274  417 

Garrity  v.  People,  107  111.  162  152 

Gartman  v.   State,   16  Tex.  App. 

215  468 
Gartside  v.  Outram,  26  L.  J.  Ch. 

113  173,  175 

Garvin  v.  State,  52  Miss.  207  53 

Gary  son  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

35  S.  W.  1035  22^ 

Garza  v.   State,  39  Tex.   Cr.   358 

269,  222 
Gaskin  v.   State,   105   Ga.  631  417 

Gassenheimer  v.  United  States,  26 

App.  Dec.  432  87,  89,  121 

Gather  v.  State  (Tex.),  81  S.  W. 

717  378 

Gatlin  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

116  69 

Gaunt  V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  490, 

495  53,  525 

Gaut  V.  Satte,  49  Tex.  Cr.  493       429 
Gavin  v.  State,  42  Fla.  332  14 

Gawn  V.  State,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Dec. 

19  370 

Gay  V.   Eugene    (Ore.),   100  Pac. 

306  21 

V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  242    81 

Geiger  v.  State,  25  Ohio  C.  C.  742   124 

Gemmill  v.  State,  16  Ind.  App.  154 

220,  240,  528 

Genz  V.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  482         158 

V.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  488      154,  161 

George  v.  State,  145  Ala.  41     108,  328 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


lix 


[References  ar 

George  v.  State,  i6  Neb.  318     65,  118 
V.  United    States    (Okla.),    97 

Pac.   1052  294 

Gerard  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  690  289 
Gerstenkorn  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr. 

621  268,  269 

Getzlaff  V.  Seliger,  43  Wis.  297  177 
Gholston  V.  State,  33  Tex.  342  310 
Gibbs  V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  65 

325-  330 
V.  United    States,   7   Ind.   Ter. 

182  520 

Gibson  v.  State,  89  Ala.  121  338 

V.  State,   118  Ga.   29  447 

V.  State  (Miss.),  16  So.  298      330 

V.  State,  38  Miss.  313  401 

V.  State  (Tex.),  77  S.  W.  216    362 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  218  235 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  489    129 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  349      50 

Gififord  V.  People,  148  111.  173  412 

Gilcrease  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  619 

269,  336 
Giles  V.  State,  6  Ga.  276         11,  12,  362 
V.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  561     132 
Gilford  V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  1903), 

78  S.  W.  692  302 

Gilhooley  v.  State,  58  Ind.  182  178 
Gilleland  v.   State,  24  Tex.  App. 

524  119 

Gillespie    v.    State,    49    Tex.    Cr. 

530  395 

Gilliam  v.  State,  i  Head.  (Tenn.) 

39  237 

Gillum  V.  State,  62  J\Iiss.  547  323 
Gilman  v.  People,  178  111.  19  122 

Gilmanton  v.  Ham,  38  N.  H.  108    525 
Gilmore  v.  State,  99  Ala.  154    6,  371 
V.  State    (Tex.    Cr.    1895),   33 

S.   W.    120  301 

Gilyard  v.   State,  98  Ala.  59  239 

Gindrat  v.  People,  138  111.  103  47 
Ginn    v.    Commonwealth,    5    Litt. 

(Ky.)   300  531 

Girous  V.  State,  29  Ind.  93  316 

Gise  V.  Commonwealth,  81  Pa.  St. 

428  406 

Givens     v.      Commonwealth,     29 
Gratt.   (Va.)   830  408,  414,  416 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  563    56 


e  to  Sections.] 

Glass  V.  State,  147  Ala.  50 

117,  236,  314,  330 
Glazier  v.   Hebron,  62  Hun    (N. 

Y.)    137  51 

Glenn    v.    State    (Ala.    1908),    47 
So.    1034  328 

V.  State,  46  Ind.  368  523,  534 

Glidewell      v.      State,      15      Lea 

(Tenn.)     133  519 

Glover  v.   State,   146  Ala.  690        298 
V.  State,  129  Ga.  717  161 

V.  State,  109  Ind.  391  451 

V.  State,  146  Ala.  690  294 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1909)  , 

122  S.  W.  396  119a 

V.  Thomas,  75  Tex.  506  43 

V.  United  States,  147  Fed.  426 

152,  214 

Gluck  V.  State,  40  Ind.  263  36 

Goddard  v.  State    78  Ark.  226         268 
V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.   154 

439,  440,  442 
Godfrey  v.  State,  31  Ala.  323  20,  408 
Goetz  V.  State,  41   Ind.   162  476 

Goforth     V.      State,     8     Humph. 

(Tenn.)  37  308,  309 

Golatt  V.  State,  130  Ga.  18  328 

Golden  v.  State,  25  Ga.  527  119 

Goldman  v.    State,    75    Md.   621     273 
Goldsby    v.    United    States,     160 

U.  S.  70  48,  250 

Goldsmith  v.  State,  99  Ga.  253       485 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  112      200,  378 
V.  State,   46   Tex.    Cr.    556         366 
Goldstein  v.  People,  82  N.  Y.  231    300 
Goley  V.  State,  85  Ala.  333  276 

Gomprecht  v.   State,  36  Tex.  Cr. 

434  473 

Gonzales  v.   State    (Tex.),  50   S. 

W.  1018  373 

V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  657  132 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  611  413 

Goersen  v.  Commonwealth,  99  Pa. 

St.  388  88,  89,  90 

Goodall  V.  State,  i  Ore.  333  102 

Goode  V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  505     241 

V.  United  States,  159  U.  S.  663     479 

Gooding   V.    State,    39    Ind.    App. 

42  523 


Ix 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
Grant  v.  State,  141  Ala.  96  364 

419,  430 

V.  State,   Meigs    (Tenn.)    195     271 

Goodwin  V.  State,  102  Ala.  87  82 

V.  State,  118  Ga.  770  466 

V.  State,   96    Ind.    550 

154,  156,  164,  165,  318,  328,  329 
Goodwine  v.  State,  5  Ind.  App.  63 

528,  532 

Gordon  v.  Commonwealth,  92  Pa. 

St.  216  192 

V.  State,  140  Ala.  29    245,  246,  333 

V.  State,   147  Ala.  42  205 

V.  State,  3  Iowa  410  77,  82 

V.  State,  48  N.  J.  L.  611  467 

Gordon's   Case,  2  Leach  C.  Law 

(1789)   581  46 

Gore  V.  People,  162  111.  259  125 

Gorman  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  24  331 
Gormley  v.  Bunyan,  138  U.  S.  623  505 
Goslin  V.  Commonwealth,  121  Ky. 

$98  469,  473 

Gossett  V.  State,  123  Ga.  431  327 

Gould  V.   State,  71   Neb.  651  41a 

IGow   v.    Bingham,   57    Misc.    (N. 

Y.)    66  18 

Grabill  v.  State  (Tex.),  97  S.  W. 

1046  41a,  206 

Grady  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.       3     468 

Graflf  V.  People,  108  111.  App.  168    188 

V.  People,    134   111.   380  279 

V.  People,  208  111.  312  44,  492 

Graham  v.  Commonwealth,  16  B. 

Mon.  (Ky.)  587  157,  158 

V.  Larimer,  83  Cal.  173  220 

V.  People,  63   Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

468  172 

V.  State,   153  Ala.  38  243 

V.  State,  50  Ark.  161     250,  268,  271 
V.  State,  lib  Ga.  807  122,   146 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  48    328,  329,  330a 
V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  123 

S.  W.  691  314 

Granado    v.    State,    37    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  426  6 

Cranberry  v.  State,  61  Miss.  440    384 

Granger   v.    State    (Tex.),    31    S. 

W.   671  315 

V.  State,  so  Tex.  Cr.  488  485 

Grant  v.  State,  97  Ala.  35  276 


e  to  Sections.] 

Grant  v.  State,  141  Ala.  96  364 

V.  State,  89  Ga.  393  225 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  789  519,  520 

V.  State,   118  Ga.  804  103 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  740  215 

V.  State,  124  Ga.  757  loi 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  259  358 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  527  473 

V.  United  States,  28  App.  D.  C. 

169  330 

Grate  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  458    521 
Grattan  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 

Co.,  80  N.   Y.   281  179 

Gravely     v.     Commonwealth,     86 

Va.  396  299,  378 

V.  State,  38  Neb.  871  23,  338 

Graves  v.  State,  45  N.  J.  L.  347     158 

V.  State,   12  Wis.   591  300 

v.  United    States,    150    U.    S. 

118  68 

Gray  v.  Pentland,  2  S.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

23  170 

v.  State,  55  Ala.  86  439 

V.  State,  42  Fla.   174  67 

V.  State   (Tex.)  86  S.  W.  764    88 

Grayson  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

573  143 

Greathouse  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  218  69 

Green  v.  Bedell,  48  N.  H.  546         198 
V.  Commonwealth,     12     Allen 

(Mass.)    155  144,  155 

V.  Commonwealth     (Ky.),    33 

S.  W.  100  321 

V.  Commonwealth     (Ky.),    83 

S.    W.    638  147 

V.  State,  97  Ala.  59  6 

V.  State,  143  Ala.  2  325 

V.  State,   151   Ala.  14  359 

V.  State,  51  Ark.  189  6,  69 

V.  State,  64  Ark.  523  154 

V.  State   (Fla.),  24  So.  537        125 
V.  State,   17  Fla.  669  250,  257 

V.  State,   40   Fla.    191  129 

V.  State,  88  Ga.  510  138 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  742  246,  323 

V.  State,  109  Ind.  175  475 

V.  State,  88  Tenn.  614  158 

V.  State,  97  Tenn.  50  123 

V.  State  (Tex.),  33  S.  W.  120   292 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixi 


[References  ar 

Green  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  109      422 
V.  State,   49  Tex.   Cr.  645  225 

Greenfield  v.  People,  85  N.  Y.  75 

117,  123,  14s,  334 
Greenlaw   v.    King,    i    Beav.    137 

177,    179 
Greenough,  In  re,  31  Vt.  279  499 

V.  Gaskell,    i    M.   &  K.  98  175 

Greenwell  v.  Commonwealth,  125 

Ky.    192  88 

Greer  v.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  300    103 
V.  State,  87  Ga.  559  522 

V.  State,     (Tex.)     106    S.    W. 

359  354 

Gregg  V.   State,   106  Ala.  44  138 

Gregory  v.  State,  140  Ala.  16 

III,  236,  314 

V.  State,   148  Ala.  566         103,  312 

Grentzinger  v.  State,  31  Neb.  460    301 

Griffin  V.  People  (Colo.),  99  Pac. 

321  482 

V.  State,  76  Ala.  29  409,  410 

V.  State,  90  Ala.   596  328 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  534       6,  473 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  476  435 

V.  State,  86  Ga.  257  305 

V.  State,  14  Ohio  St.  55    y6,  77,  78 

V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  552    269 

V.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  157         243 

Griffith  V.  State,  90  Ala.  583     83,  100 

Griffiths  V.  State,  163  Ind.  555  147 

Griggs  V.  United  States,  85  C.  C. 

A.  596  88 

Grigsby  v.  State,  4  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

19  124 

Grimm  v.  People,  14  Mich.  300  188 
Grimsinger  v.  State,  44  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  561  132,  133 

Grissom  v.   State    (Ark.),   113  S. 

W.    ion  467 

Griswold  v.  State,  24  Wis.  144  147a 
Grogan  v.  State,  6;^  Miss.  147  490,  493 
Groom  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  82  32 
Groves  v.  State,  123  Ga.  570  475 

Gnihb  V.  State,  117  Ind.  277  155 

Guenther    v.    State     (Wis.)     118 

N.  W.  640  282 

Guerrero   v.    State,    46    Tex.    Cr. 

445  374 

Guetig  V.  State,  66  Ind.  94         157,  163 


e  to  Sections.'\ 

Guin  V.   State    (Tex.)    50  S.   W. 

350  130 

Guiteau's  Case,  10  Fed.  161  160 

Gunn,  In  re,  50  Kan.  155  257 

Gunter  v.  State,  83  Ala.  96  240 

V.  State,  III  Ala.  23  ^2ii 

V.  State,  79  Ark.  432  2)77 

Guptill  V.  Verback,  58  Iowa  98     175 
Guthrie  v.  State  (Neb.),  96  N.  W. 

243  532 

V.  State,   16  Neb.  667  454 

Gutierrez,  Ex  parte,  45  Cal.  429     507 

Guy  V.  State,  2,7  Ind.  App.  691        357 

V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.    161  133 

Guynes  v.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  584    371 

Guzinski   v.    People,   77   111.   App. 

275  80 


H 


Haase  v.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  34  362 
Habersham  v.  State,  56  Ga.  61  275 
Hackett  v.  People,  54  Barb.   (N. 

Y.)    370  log 

Haddix  v.  State,  76  Neb.  369  224 

Hadnett  v.  State,  117  Ga.  705  296 

Hagan  v.  State,  5  Baxt.   (Tenn.) 

615  160 

Hagar  v.  State,  71  Ga.  164  425 

Haile     v.      State,      11      Humph. 

(Tenn.)    153  166 

Haines  v.  People,  138  111.  App.  49    lOi 

V.  Territory,    3    Wyo.    167         225 

Hainey  v.  State,  147  Ala.  146  484 

Hair   v.    State,    16   Neb.   601 

261,  266,  267 
Halbrook  v.  State,  34  Ark.  511 

398,  402,  404 

Hale  V.  Henkel,  201  U.  S.  43  247 

V.  Richards,  80   Iowa   164  284 

V.  State,  120  Ga.   183  421 

Haley  v.  State,  62  Ala.  83    81,  2^Z,  364 

Hall  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  31 

Ky.  L.  64  492 

V.  Commonwealth,    29   Ky.    L. 

485  332 

V.  County  Com'rs,  82  Md.  618  249 
V.  People,  47  Mich.  62,6  415,  418 
V.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

671  88 


liii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Hall  V.  Somerset  County,  82  Md. 
618  254 

V.  State,  40  Ala.  698  80,  2^3 

V.  State,  130  Ala.  45  248 

V.  State,   134  Ala.  90  277 

V.  State,  31  Fla.  176  494 

V.  State,   34   Ga.   208  301 

V.  State,  48  Ga.  607  96 

V.  State    (Ga.  App.,   1909),  66 

S.  E.  390  90,  373 

V.  State   132  Ind.  317  76,  77, 

94,  96,  108,  124,  312,  327,  330 

V.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  522    262 

V.  State  (Tex.),  34  S.  W.  122    473 

V.  State  (Tex.),  22  S.  W.  141     68 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  250    74 

V.  United  States,  155  Fed.  52    482 

Halleck  v.   State,  65  Wis.  147         370 

Halloran  v.  State,  80  Ind.  586         196 

Ham  V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  126    247 

Hamblin    v.    State,    41    Tex.    Cr. 

135  330 

V.  State,  81  Neb.  148  522 

Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173 

ID,  176,  273,  275 
V.  People,  29  Mich,  195  72,  494 
V.  People,  46  Mich.  186  530 

V.  State,  147  Ala.  no  129 

V.  State,  62  Ark.  543  58,  116 

V.  State,  96  Ga.  301  6 

V.  State,  75  Ind.  586  473,  475 

V.  United  States,  26  App.  Cas 

D.    C    382  163 

Hamilton    Provident   &c.    Soc.    v. 

Northwood,  86  Mich.  315  45 

Hamma  v.  People,  42  Colo.  401  460 
Hammil  v.  State,  90  Ala.  577  103,  104 
Hammock   v.    State,    i    Ga.    App. 

126  58a 

Hammond  v.  State,  147  Ala.  79 

224,  321,  326 
V.  State,  74  ^Mass.  214  26,  80 

V.  State,  39  Neb.  252  414 

Hampton      v.      State,      10      Lea 

(Tenn.)    639  310 

Ham's  Case,   11   Me.  391  383 

Hanawalt    v.    State,    64    Wis.    84 

386,  525 
Handline   v.    State,   6  Tex.    App. 
347  117 


e  to  Sections.] 

Hanley  v.  Donoghue,  116  U.  S.  i  505 
Hanna  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

5  122 

Hannel  v.  State,  4  Ind.  App.  485  309 
Hanners  v.   McClelland,  74  Iowa 

318  210 

V.  State,  147  Ala.  27  492 

Hanney    v.    Commonwealth,    116 

Pa.  St.  322  79 

Hannon  v.  State,  70  Wis.  448  409,  413 
Hannum  v.  State,  90  Tenn.  647  275 
Hanofif  V.  State,  37  Ohio  St.  178 

59,  60,  61 

Hanrahan  v.  People,  91  111.  142  147a 
Hans  V.   State,  50  Neb.   150  32 

Hanscom  v.  State,  93  Wis.  273      467 
Hansford  v.  State  (]\Iiss.)   11  So. 
106  23,  320 

Hanson  v.  United  States,  157  Fed. 

749  478 

Harden  v.  State,  109  Ala.  50  147 

Hardesty    v.    Commonwealth,    88 

Ky.  537  268 

V.  United  States,  164  Fed.  420    58a 

Hardgraves  v.  State    (Ark.),  114 

S.  W.  216  325 

Hardin  v.   State,  63  Ala.  38  485 

V.  State,    66    Ark.    52  128 

V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  208     44 

V.  State,  57  Tex.   Cr.  559  312 

Harding  v.  State,  54  Ind.  359  423 

Hardtke  v.   State,  67  Wis.   552 

125,  412,  415,  416 
Hardy    v.    Commonwealth     (Va., 
1910),  67  S.  E.  522        314,  323,  328 
V.  Merrill,  56  N.  H.  227  161 

V.  State,  7  Mo.  607  275 

V.  State  (Tex.),  44  S.  W.  173    32 
V.  United  States,  3  App.  D.  C. 

35  130,  13s,  140 

Hargis    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky., 

1909),  123  S.  W.  239  326 

Hargrove  v.  State,  147  Ala.  97 

374.   374a 

V.  State,   125  Ga.  270  74 

Harlan  v.  People,  32  Colo.  397         407 

V.  State,  134  Ind.  339  35,  3^ 

Harley  v.  lona  Circuit  Judge,  140 

Mich.   642  523 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixiii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Harman   v.    State    (Tex.),   22    S. 

W.    1038  475 

Harmanson    v.    State    (Tex.    Cr. 

1897),  42  S.  W.  995  269 

Harmon  v.  State,  120  Ga.  197        473 

Harn  v.  State,  12  Wyo.  80       315,  332 

Harper  v.  State,  129  Ga.  770     103,  314 

V.  State,  131  Ga.  771  517 

V.  State,  71   Miss.  202  299 

V.  United    States,   7   Ind.   Ter. 

437  77 

Harrington  v.  State,  36  Ala.  236        69 
V.  State,  19  Ohio  St.  264    79,  80,  84 

Harris,  Ex  parte,  73  N.  Car.  65        259 

Harris,  Ex  parte,  4  Utah  5  226 

V.  Commonwealth,    25    Ky.    L. 

297  330 

V.  People,  64  N.  Y.   148       31,  468 
V.  State,  31  Ala.  362  471 

V.  State,  96  Ala.  24  330 

V.  State,  73  Ga.  41  308 

V.  State,  84  Ga.  269  374 

V.  State,  30  Ind.   131  243 

V.  State,  24  Neb.  803  228 

V.  State,  7  Lea    (Tenn.)    124       68 
V.  State,  5  Tex.  11  476 

V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  97  133 

V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  411  301 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  441  '  132 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  338  243 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  564  377 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  118  269 

Harrison  v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  518    293 
V.  State,   79  Ala.  29  328 

V.  State,  144  Ala.  20  58 

V.  State,  83  Ga.  129  148,  152 

V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  42  14 

V.  Sutter  R.  Co.,  116  Cal.  156     181 

Harrold    v.    Territory,    18    Okla. 
395  220,  221 

Harrolson   v.   State,   54  Te.x.   Cr. 
452  521 

Harsdorf  v.    State    (Tex.   App.), 
18  S.  W.  415  298 

Hart  V.  Commonwealth,  85  Ky.  77  326 
V.  State,  117  Ala.   183  390 

V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  202    48,  115 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  163  320 

V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  563        301 

Harter  v.  People,  204  111.  158  269 


Hartford  v.    State,  96  Ind.  461 

58,  239,  362 
Hartley   v.    Cataract    &c.    Co.,   64 

Hun  634  217 

Hartman  v.  Aveline,  63  Ind.  344  497 
Hartranft,  Appeal  of,  85   Pa.   St. 

433  170 

Hartung  v.    People,   4   Park.   Cr. 

(N.  Y.)    319  313,   318 

Harty  v.   JNIalloy,  67  Conn.  339 

528,   533 
Harvey  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

545  119,  211 
V.  Territory,  11  Okla.  156  36 

Harwood  v.  State,  63  Ark.  130  263 
Haskew  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  107  484 
Haslip  V.  State,   10  Neb.  590  421 

Hatchard  v.  State,  79  Wis.  357  347 
Hathaway       v.       Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  82  S.  W.  400  129 

Hathcock  v.  State,  88  Ga.  91 

80,  442,  443 
Hathcote  v.  State,  55  Ark.  181  486 
Hauger  v.  United  States,  173  Fed. 

54  123 

Hauk  V.   State,  148  Ind.  238 

126,  147a,  179,  180,  370 
Haun  V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  383  425 
Hauser  v.  People,  210  111.  253  152 

Haverstick  v.   State,  6   Ind.  App. 

595  270 

Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  37  18,  173,  218 

Hawkins  v.  State,  29  Fla.  554  215 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  630  277,  417 

V.  State,  98  Md.  355  104,  348 

V.  State,  60  Neb.   380  36 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  273        205 

Haworth  v.  Gill,  30  Ohio  St.  627    527 

Hawthorne  v.  State,  61  ]\Iiss.  749 

325,    326 
Hayden  v.  State,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

546  359 
Hayes  v.  Palmer,  21   App.  D.  C. 

450  499 

V.  People,  25  N.  Y.  390  403 

V.  State,   126  Ga.  95  323 

V.  State,  36  Tex.   Cr.    146  224 

Haygood  v.  State,  98  Ala.  61         343 

Haynes    v.    Commonwealth,    104 

Va.  854  451 


Ixiv 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


163 
426 
2,66 


References  ar 

Haynes  v.  State,  15  Ohio  St.  455     419 

Hays   V.    Commonwealth,    12   Ky. 

L.  611  112 

V.  State,   no  Ala.  23  yj 

V.  State,  40  Md.  633     116,  348,  349 

V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  361    211 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  472  378 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  149  245 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  in     272>,  3/8 

Hayward  v.  Knapp,  22  Minn.  5      230 

Head  v.  Thompson,  yj  Iowa  263     187 

Heald  v.  Thing,  45  Me.  392 

Heard  v.  State,  121  Ga.  138 

V.  State,  116  Tenn.  713 
Hearne  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

431  186,  403 

Heath  v.  Commonwealth,  I   Rob. 
(Va.)   735  88,  321 

V.  State,   36  Ala.  273  446 

V.  State  (Ind.,  1909),  90  N.  E. 

310  408 

V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  464         225 
Hedley,  Ex  parte,  31  Cal.  108  281 

Heflin  v.   State,  88  Ga.   151 

466,  468,  470 
Heidelbaugh  v.  State,  79  Neb.  499 

370,  374 
Heilman    v.     Commonwealth,    84 

Ky.  457  408 

Heine  v.    Commonwealth,  91   Pa. 

St.  145  79,  493 

Heldt   V.    State,    20    Neb.   492 

68,  135,  140, 
Helfrich    v.    Commonwealtth,    23 

Pa.  St.  68 
Hellems  v.  State,  92  Ark.  207 
Heller  v.  People,  22  Colo.  11 
Hellyer  v.   People,   186  111.  550 
Helm  V.   State,  6y  Miss.  562 

195,  210,  246 
Helper  v.  State,  58  Wis.  46  45 

Helvenston  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr. 

636 
Hemenway  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  701 
Hemingway  v.  State,  68  Miss.  371 
Hemminger    v.    Western    Assur. 

Co.,  95  Mich.  355 
Hemphill  v.   State.  71  Miss.  877 
Henderson  v.  People,  124  111.  607 

341-  343 


248 

380 
225 
193 
277 


328 

176 

17 

220 

469 


c  to  Scctions.'\ 

Henderson  v.  State,  70  Ala.  23  302 
V.  State,  14  Tex.  503  422,  425,  431 
V.  State,  22  Tex.  593  270 

V.  State,  2)7  Tex.  Cr.  App.   79 

22,  227 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  511,  161 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  620  272 

Hendrick's   Case,   5  Leigh    (Va.) 

707  432 

Hendrickson  v.  People,  10  N.  Y. 

13  132 

Heningburg  v.  State,  153  Ala.  13 

104,  112,  167,  221,  356 
Hennessy  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App. 

340  421,  423 

Henning  v.  People,  40  Mich.  722      I44 
Henrich,  In  re,  5  Blatchf.  C.  C. 

414  496,  501,  502 

Henry,   In  re    (Idaho),   99   Pac. 

1054  197 

Henry  v.  State,  51  Neb.  149  149 

V.  State,  35  Ohio  St.  128  430 

V.  State  (Tex.),  30  S.  W.  802   332 
Henson  v.  State,  112  Ala.  41    326,  338 
V.  State,  120  Ala.  316  238,  241 

V.  State,  62  Md.  230  482 

Herd  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
600  93 

V.  United  States,  13  Okla.  512    298 
Hernandez  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 
134  172,  174 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  271  314 

Herndon   v.   Commonwealth,    105 
Ky.  197  507 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  552 

68,  87,  371,  378 
Herr  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),9i 

S.  W.  666  476 

Herrick,  Ex  parte,  78  Ky.  23  249 

Herring  v.  Goodson,  43  Miss.  392 

526,  527 

Herrington  v.  State,  121  Ga.  141    484 

V.  State,  130  Ga.  307  96 

Herzinger  v.  State,  70  Md.  278        482 

Hess  V.  Grimes    (Kan.),  48  Pac. 

596  497 

V.  State,  5  Ohio  5        420,  421,  423 

Hester  v.  State,  103  Ala.  83  238 

V.  Commonwealth,  85   Pa.   St. 

139  207 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


Ixv 


[References  ar 

Heuston  v.  Simpson,  115  Ind.  62     179 
Hewitt  V.    Prime,  21   Wend.    (X. 

Y.)  79  179,  180 

Hey  V.  Commonwealth,  ^2  Gratt. 

(Va.)  946  225 

Heyward,  In  re,  i  Sandf.   (N.  Y. 

Super.)  701  499 

Hibbs,  Ex  parte,  26  Fed.  421  427 

Hickam  v.  People,  137  111.  75 

88,  271,  321 
Hickerson  v.  Benson,  8  Mo.  8  471 
Hickey  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  230  315 
Hickman  v.  State,  38  Tex.  190  161 
Hickory  v.  United  States,   160  U. 

S.  408  S8,  118 

Hicks  V.  State,  99  Ala.  169        61,  116 

V.  State,  loi  Ga.  581  293 

Hiegins  v.  People,  58  N.  Y.  Z77      41 1 

High  V.  State   (Tex.),  98  S.  W. 

849  269 

Hightower  v.  State,  58  Miss.  636    133 
Higler  v.  People,  44  IMich.  299 

440,  442 

Hildreth  v.  People,  32  111.  36  296 

Hiler  v.  People,  156  111.  511  399 

Hill  V.  Atlanta,  125  Ga.  697  21 

V.  Commonwealth,    12   Ky.    L. 

914  277 

V.  Commonwealth,      2      Gratt. 

(Va.)  594  104,  320 

V.  Commonwealth,  88  Va.  633    278 
V.  State,  156  Ala.  3  119a,  314 

V.  State,  43  Ala.  335  310 

V.  State,  137  Ala.  66  381,  384 

V.  State,  146  Ala.  51  221,  312 

V.  State,  41  Ga.  484  102,  189 

V.  State,  6s  Ga.  578  21 

V.  State  (Miss.),  16  So.  901 

325,  Z26 
V.  State,  64  ]\Tiss.  431  102 

V.  State,  91  Tenn.  521  216,  241 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  77  S.  W. 

808  414 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  279     352,  354 

V.  State,  2>7  Tex.  Cr.  415  119 

Hill's  Case,  2  Gratt.  (Va.)  594       107 

Hills  V.  State,  6r  Neb.  589  178 

Hines  v.  State,  26  Ga.  614        511,  515 

V.  State,  93  Ga.  187  24a 

V — Underbill  Crim.  Ev 


e  to  Sections.'] 
Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  Ind.  334 

192,  334 
Hinson  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

38  87 

Hintz  V.  State,  125  Wis.  405  126 

Hirsch,  In  re,  74  Fed.  928  252 

Hirschman  v.  People,  loi  111.  568 

81,  82,  85 
Hisler  v.  State,  52  Fla.  30  52,  233 
Hitchins  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  454  473 
Hite  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  20 

S.  W.  217  162 

Hix  V.  People,  157  111.  382  299 

Hixon  V.  State,  130  Ga.  479  328 

Hizer  v.  State,  12  Ind.  330  452 

Hobbs  V.  State,  ^6  Ark.  360  328 

V.  State,  133  Ind.  404  241 

V.  State,  S3  Tex.  Cr.  71  262,  267 
Hobson  V.  State,  44  Ala.  380  308,  310 
Hockenberger  v.    State,   49   Neb. 

706  291 

Hocker  v.  Commonwealth,  33  Ky. 

L.  944  118,  336 

Hodge  V.  State,  97  Ala.  37  12 

V.  State,  26  Fla.  11       205,  213,  214 

V.  Territory,  12  Okla.  108  14 

Hodges  V.  State,  94  Ga.  593  360 

Hodgman  v.  People,  4  Denio  (N. 

Y.)  235  24 

Hodgson  V.  Xickell,  69  Wis.  308    523 

Hoff  V.  Fisher,  26  Ohio  St.  7  534 

V.  State,  83  Miss.  488  67 

Hoffman  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky., 

1909),  121  S.  W.  690  338 

V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  406  z^ 

Hoge  V.  People,  117  111.  35 

152,  236,  238 
Holcomb   V.    Holcomb,   28   Conn. 
177  203 

V.  People,  79  111.  409  530,  532 

Holcombe  v.    State,   5    Ga.   App. 
47  161 

V.  State,  28  Ga.  66  44 

Holden  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  91     493 
Holder  v.  State,  58  Ark.  473  87 

V.  State,  127  Ga.  51  309 

Holland  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
82  S.  W.  596  147 

V.  State,  jz  Ark.  425  486 


Ixvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Holland   v.    State,   39  Fla. 


178 
126, 
79 


V.  State,  131  Ind.  548 

V.  State,  60  Miss.  939 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  27 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  345 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  623 

V.  Hall,  58  Hun  fN.  Y.)  604 
Hollej^  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  306 
Holliday  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  133 
Hollingsworth    v.    Duane,    Wall. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  77 

V.  State,  79  Ga.  605 

V.  State,  III  Ind.  289    45,  284, 
Holloway   v.    State,  45   Tex.    Cr. 

App.  303 
Holls  V.  State,  27  Fla.  387 
Holman  v.  Kimball,  22  Vt.  555 
Holmes,  Ex  parte,  21  Neb.  324 
Holmes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  26      221, 

V.  State,  100  Ala.  81 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  352 
Holsey  v.  State,  89  Ga.  433 
Hoist  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  i 

205, 
Holt  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  383 

V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  282 
Holtz  V.  State,  76  Wis.  99        245, 
Hoober  v.  State,  81  Ala.  51 
Hood  V.  State,  56  Ind.  263 
Hooker  v.  State,  98  Md.  145 

V.  State,  4  Ohio  348  34, 

Hooten  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  6 
Hoover  v.  State,  48  Neb.  184 
Hope  V.  People,  83  N.  Y.  418 
Hopkins     v.     Commonwealth,     3 
Bush  (Ky.)  480 

V.  Commonwealth,      3      Mete. 
(Mass.)  460 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  583 
Hopper  V.  State,  54  Ga.  389 
Hopperwood  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr. 

15 
Hopps  V.  People,  31  111.  385 

77,  81, 
Hopt  V.  People,  104  U.  S.  631 

164, 

V.  People,  no  U.  S.  574 

54,  126,  128, 

V.  Utah,  no  U.  S.  574 


147 
,  80 
464 
328 
270 
373 
258 
269 
277 

461 
224 
291 

82 
407 
173 
516 
237 

23 
242 

303 

409 
214 
492 
248 
138 
380 

369 
296 
296 
161 
26 

485 

507 
473 
386 

214 

158 
166 

130 
16 


Hopt  V.  Utah,  120  U.  S.  430  312 

Horan  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  183 

446,  447 

Horn  V.  State,  98  Ala.  23  88,  227,  277 
V.  State,  102  Ala.  144  120 

V.  State,  12  Wyo.  80  136 

Hornbeck  v.   State,  35  Ohio   St. 
277  409,  411 

Hornish  v.  People,  142  111.  620  154 

Hornsby  v.  State,  94  Ala.  55  48 

Horton  v.  State,  53  Ala.  488  267 

V.  State,  66  Ga.  690  492,  494 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  307  211 

House  V.  State,  139  Ala.  132  269 

V.  State  (Miss.),  48  So.  3  108 

Houser  v.  State,  58  Ga.  78  14,  17 

V.  State,  93  Ind.  228  525,  533 

Housh  V.  People,  24  Colo.  262 

295,  305 

V.  People,  75  111.  487  465 

Howard  v.  Commonwealth  (KJ^) 

80  S.  W.  817  268 

V.  Commonwealth,  118  K}'.  i      187 

V.  State,  108  Ala.  571  6 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  659  36 

V.  State,  so  Ind.  190  149,  154 

Howe  V.  State,  no  Ala.  54  484 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  174  • 

382,  387,  388 
Howell  V.  Blackwell,  7  Ga.  443       250 
V.  Commonwealth,   31    Ky.    L. 

983  468,  469 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  612  520 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  591  430 

Howerton  v.  Commonwealth,  129 

Ky.  482  272 

Howson  V.  State,  73  Ark.  140  133 

Hoy  V.  Morris,  13  Gray  (]\Iass.) 

519  '^73 

Hoyt  V.  Hoyt,  112  N.  Y.  493  179 

V.  People,  140  111.  588  271 

Hronek  v.  People,  134  111.  139 

201,  280a 
Hubbard  v.  State,  107  Ala.  33  302 

Huber  v.  State.  57  Ind.  341  358 

V.  State,  126  Ind.  185  241,  417 

Hubert  v.  State,  74  Neb.  220  407 

Hudelson  v.  State,  94  Ind.  426  12 

Hudson  V.  Roos,  76  Mich.  173         264 

V.  State,  137  Ala.  60  45,  223 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Lxvii 


[References  ai 
Hudson  V.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
407  307 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  323  238 

Hudspeth  v.  State,  50  Ark.  534        236 
V.  State,  55  Ark.  323  521 

Huey  V.   State   (Ga.  App.,  1910), 

66  S.  E.  1023  409 

Huff   V.    Commonwealth,    18    Ky. 

L.  752  339,  343 

V.  State,  104  Ga.  521  40,  248 

V.  State,  106  Ga.  432  418 

Huffaker  v.   Commonwealth,    124 

Ky.   115  272 

Huffman  v.  State,  29  Ala.  40  473 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  174    61,  116 
Huggins    V.    State,    42    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  364  17 

Hughbanks,  In  re,  44  Kan.  105        253 
Hughes  V.  Boone,  102  N.  Car.  137    174 
V.  Commonwealth     (Ky.),    80 

S.  W.  197  269 

V.  People,  223  111.  417  435 

V.  Pflanz,  138  Fed.  980  498 

V.  State,  152  Ala.  5  81 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  29  58a 

V.  State,  103  Ind.  344  308,  309 

V.  State.  29  Ohio  C.  C.  237         212 
V.  Ward,  38  Kan.  452  221 

Hull  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  607  269 

Humbard  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

200  365 

Humber    v.    Commonwealth,    31 

Ky.  L.  606  324 

Humphrey  V.  State,  74  Ark.  554      314 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  329  95 

V.  State,  78  Wis.  569  224,  520,  531 

Hunnicutt  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 

498  69,  207,  208 

Hunt  V.  State,  55  Ala.  138  32 

V.  State,  135  Ala.  i  140 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  149      67,  68 

Hunter  v.  State,  112  Ala.  77 

491,  492,  493 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  761  i6a,  484 
V.  State,  43  Ga.  483  323 

V.  State,  127  Ga.  43 '  489 

V.  State,  74  Miss.  515  126 

V.  State,  40  N.  J.  L.  495        96,  10 1 
V.  State  (Tex.),  114  S.  W.  124  103 
Hurley  v.  State,  29  Ark.  17  228 


e  to  Sections.] 

Hurley  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
282  209 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  73  305 

Hurst  V.  State,  79  Ala.  55  464 

Hurst's  Case,  4  Dall.  387  258 

Hussey  v.  State,  87  Ala.  12         81,  185 
Huston  V.  People,  53  111.  App.  501     21 
V.  People,  121  111.  497  417 

Hutcherson   v.    State    (Tex.),   35 
S.  W.  375  438 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  67  469 

Hutchins  v.  State,  13  Ohio  198        433 
Hutchinson  v.  State   (Ga.  App.), 
63  S.  E.  597  137 

V.  State,  19  Neb.  262  525 

Hutsch  V.  Mclllgargey,  69  ]\Iich. 

377  221 

Huttman,  In  re,  70  Fed.  699  170 

Hyatt  V.  New  York,  188  U.  S.  691  497 
Hj'den  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  401     242 
Hynes  v.   McDermott,  82   N.    Y. 
41  429 


Imboden  v.  People,  40  Colo.  142      58a 
Impson  V.  State  (Tex.),  19  S.  W. 

677  486 

Ince  V.  State,  77  Ark.  426  163 

Ingalls  V.  State,  48  Wis.  647 

73,  165,  166,  299,  507 

Ingraham  v.  State,  82  Neb.  553        300 

Ingram  v.  State,  39  Ala.  247  283 

V.  State,  67  Ala.  67  82 

V.  State,  24  Neb.  33  525 

Inman  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr,  App. 

39  197 

Innis  V.  State,  42  Ga.  473  414 

Irby  V.  State,  32  Ga.  496  21 

V.  State,  91  Miss.  542  21 

Irvin  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  52  484 

Irvine,  Ex  parte,  74  Fed.  954     72,  247 

V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  51  486 

V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  51  486 

Irving  V.    State    (Miss.),   47    So. 

518  122 

Isaac  V.  United  States,  7  Ind.  T. 

196  221 

Isaacs  V.  United  States,  159  U.  S. 
487  316 


U'viii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Isham  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.).  49  S. 

W.  581  268,  269,  301 

Ivey  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  828  129 

V.  State,  23  Ga.  576  483 


Jack  V.  Washington  Territory,  2 

Wash.  Ter.  loi  228 

Jackson,  Ex  parte,  96  U.  S.  727      479 
Jackson    v.    Archibald,    12    Ohio 
Cir.  Ct.  155  499 

V.  CommonweaUh,  100  Ky.  239 

129,  334 
V.  Commonwealth,     19     Gratt. 

(Va.)   656  103,  232 

V.  Commonwealth,  96  Va.  107      59 
V.  Crilly,  16  Colo.  103  265 

V.  Denison,  4  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 

558  176 

V.  Seager,  2  D.  &  L.  13  257 

V.  State,  156  Ala.  93  161 

V.  State,  78  Ala.  471  236 

V.  State,  8r  Ala.  33  320 

V.  State,  83  Ala.  76  127 

V.  State,  117  Ala.  155  473 

V.  State,  147  Ala.  699  81,  325 

V.  State,  29  Ark.  62  523 

V.  State,  54  Ark.  243  268 

V.  State,  76  Ga.  551 

283,  286,  287,  289 
V.  State,  14  Ind.  327  225 

V.  State,  116  Ind.  464  384 

V.  State  (Miss.),  47  So.  502 

108,  no 
V.  State,  39  Ohio  St.  37  130 

V.  State,  41   So.  178  325 

V.  State    (Tex.,    1894),    25    S. 

W.  773  473 

V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  363  295 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  143  378,  379 
V.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  260  451 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  215  269 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  302    128 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  220  382 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  79  225 

V.  State,  81  Wis.  127     79,  266,  267 
V.  State,  91  Wis.  253  15,  411 

Jacobs  V.  Commonwealth,  121  Pa. 
St.  586  160 


e  to  Sections.] 

Jacobs  V.  Hesler,  113  Mass.  157      187 
V.  State,  4  Lea  (Tenn.)    196       195 
Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  U. 

S.  II  21 

Jacques  v.  People,  66  111.  84  416 

Jahnke  v.  State,  68  Neb.  154      73,  323 
Jais  V.  Territory   (N.   Mex.),  94 

Pac.  947  152 

James  v.  State,  45  Miss.  572  12 

V.  United    States,    7    Ind.    T. 

250  246 

Jamison  v.  People,  145  111.  357 

118,  120,  154 
Janes's   Estate,  30  W.   N.   Cases 

(Pa.)  166  526 

Janes  v.  State,  45  Miss.  572  6 

Janzen  v.  People,  159  111.  440  415 

Jarvis  v.  State,  138  Ala.  17 

50,  103,  112,  328 
Jasper  v.  Porter,  2  McLean  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  579  505 

Jay  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  567  333 

Jaynes,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  638   182,  251 

V.  People,  44  Colo.  535  280a 

Jefferds  v.  State,  5  Park.  Cr.  (N. 

Y.)  522  136,  329 

Jefferson  v.  State,  89  Ark.  129        292 

Jeffries  v.  State,  61  Ark.  308  277 

Jeffries  v.  State,  89  Miss.  643  409 

V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  598  166 

V.  United   States,   7  Ind.   Ter. 

47  89 

Jemley  v.  State,  121  Ga.  346  489 

Jenkins  v.  State   (Fla.,   1909),  50 

So.  582  119,  377 

V.  State,  31  Fla.  196     217,  250 

V.  State,  35  Fla.  737      132,  192,  493 

V.  State,  53  Ga.  33  367 

V.  State,  119  Ga.  431        127 

V.  State,  78  Ind.  133         197 

V.  State,  80  Md.  72  324,  325 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  201  245 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  224  486 

V.  State,  62  Wis.  49  6 

Jennings  v.  People.  8  Mich.  81  432 

Jesse  V.  State,  28  Miss.  100  367 

Jessup  V.  State,  14  Ind.  App.  230    475 

Jeter  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  212  392 

Jim  V.  State,  4  Humph.   (Tenn.) 

289  228 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixix 


[References  ai 

Joe  V.  State,  6  Fla.  591  318 

Johns  V.  State,  46  Fla.  153  328 

Johnson  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 


93 

S.  W.  581 

314 

V. 

Commonwealth    ( Ky. ) , 

107 

S.  W.  768 

108, 

268 

V. 

Commonwealth,    12 
873 

K} 

.    L. 

379 

V. 

Commonwealth,   32 
1117 

K> 

.   L. 

108 

V. 

Commonwealth,  81  Ky. 

325 

7 

V. 

Commonwealth,  87  Ky. 

189 

373 

V. 

Commonwealth,  90 

Ky. 

53 

455 

V. 

Commonwealth,  102 

Va 

927 
50, 

429 

V. 

Daverne,  19  Johns. 
134 

(N. 

Y.) 

174 

V. 

People,  140  111.  350 

533 

V. 

People,  55  N.  Y.  512 

507, 

514 

V. 

State,  17  Ala.  618 

108 

V. 

State,  35  Ala.  363 

354, 

358 

V. 

State,  47  Ala.  9 

no. 

188 

V. 

State,  59  Ala.  37 

147 

V. 

State,  61  Ala.  9 

308 

V. 

State,  94  Ala.  35 

[19, 

215, 

323 

V. 

State,  102  Ala.  i 

105 

V. 

State,  III  Ala.  66 

333 

V. 

State,  60  Ark.  308 

402 

V. 

State,  27  Fla.  245 

228 

V. 

State,  51  Fla.  44 

446 

V. 

State,  54  Fla.  45 

196 

V. 

State,  55  Fla.  46 

224, 

374 

V. 

State  (Ga.),  12  S.  E 

•  47 

I 

147a 

V. 

State,  59  Ga.  142 

149 

V. 

State,  62  Ga.  299 

37 

V. 

State,  83  Ga.  552 

521 

V. 

State,  85  Ga.  561 

519 

V. 

State,  88  Ga.  203 

33^ 

V. 

State,  89  Ga.  107 

368 

V. 

State,  119  Ga.  257 

307 

V. 

State,  120  Ga.  135 

118 

V. 

State,  122  Ga.  172 

465 

V. 

State,  124  Ga.  656 

489 

V. 

State,  125  Ga.  243 

217 

V. 

State,  128  Ga.  71 

323 

V. 

State,  13  Ind.  App. 

299 

32 

V. 

State  (Miss.),  40  S 

0    324 

8r 

V. 

State,  63  ]\riss.  313 

68 

V. 

State,  89  Miss.  773 

126 

V. 

State,  90  Miss.  317 

124 

c  to  Sections.] 

Johnson  v.  State,  27  Neb.  687  411 

V.  State,  17  Ohio  593  410 

V.  State    (Tex.),    102    S.    W. 

I 133  429 

V.  State,  I  Te.x.  App.  333  265 

V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  249  425 

V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  385  301 

V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  565  78 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  368  152 

V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  206  330 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  135 

185,  187 
V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  150  318,  323 
V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  569  365 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  271  427 

V.  State,  41  Tex.  Cr.  65  439 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  423 

127,  323 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  314  126 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  648  484 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  201 

268,  377,  378 
V.  State,  129  Wis.  146  98 

V.  State,  133  Wis.  453  212 

V.  United    States    (Okla.),    99 

Pac.  1022  292,  301 

V.  Walker,  86  ^liss.  757  525 

Johnson    Steel   &c.    Co.  v.   North 

Branch  &c.  Co.,  48  Fed.  191  251 

Johnston  v.  Miller,  72  Mich.  265     244 

V.  Todd,  5  Beav.  597  239 

Joiner  v.  State,  119  Ga.  315  122 

Joliff  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

61  49 

Jones    V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
46  S.  W.  217  109 

V.  Commonwealth,   20   Ky.    L. 

355  108,  331 

V.  Commonwealth,  115  Ky.  592  358 
V.  Hays,  4  McLean  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  521  505 

V.  Jones,  45  Md.  144  525 

V.  Knauss,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  211         258 
V.  Leonard,  50  Iowa  106  497 

V.  People,  12  111.  259  301 

V.  State,  26  Ala.  155  471 

V.  State,  67  Ala.  84  401 

V.  State,  100  Ala.  88  ir 

V.  State,  107  Ala.  93  122,  124 


Ixx 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Jones  V.  State,  120  Ala.  303 

12,  60,  82,  125 

V.  State,  137  Ala.  12  314,  3:^6 

V.  State,  141  Ala.  55  238 

V.  State,  145  Ala.  51  238 

V.  State,  155  Ala.  i  312 

V.  State,  156  Ala.  175    53,  122,  126 

V.  State,  88  Ark.  579  106 

V.  State,  58  Ark.  390  35 

V.  State,  59  Ark.  417  276 

V.  State  (Ga.),  62  S.  E.  482        s8a 

V.  State,  I  Ga.  610  71 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  433 

122,  123,  147 

V.  State,  65  Ga.  147  124 

V.  State,  93  Ga.  547  435 

V.  State,  105  Ga.  649  6 

V.  State,  128  Ga.  23  267 

V.  State,  130  Ga.  274    104,  ill,  125 

V.  State,  132  Ga.  340  119 

V.  State,  II  Ind.  357  432 

V.  State,  71  Ind.  66 

95.  96,  97,  112,  330 

V.  State,  70  ]\Id.  326  349 

V.  State  (Miss.),  48  So.  407       358 

V.  State,  30  Miss.  653  300,  301 

V.  State,  65  Miss.  179  238 

V.  State,  70  Miss.  401  no 

V.  State,  51  Ohio  St.  331  23 

V.  State,  70  Ohio  St.  ^^  366 

V.  State,  5  Sneed  (Tenn.)  346   428 

V.  State,  13  Tex.  168  135 

V.  State  (Tex.),  38  S.  W.  992    103 

V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  150  225 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  177  269 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  490  6 

V.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  364     362 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  363  358,  377 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  329      138 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  26      324 

V.  Turpin,    6    Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

181  192 

V.  United  States,  137  U.  S.  202  452 
Jordan  v.  Circuit  Court,  69  Iowa 
177  461 

V.  Commonwealth,     25     Gratt. 

(Va.)  943  54,  358 

V.  State,  79  Ala.  9  248,  328 

V.  State,  50  Fla.  95  55 

V.  State,  127  Ga.  278  45 


Jordan  v.  State,  142  Ind.  422 

185 

V.  State,  32  Miss.  382 

138 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  595 

67 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  646 

295 

Joseph   V.   Commonwealth,  99 

S. 

W.  311 

225 

Joyner  v.  State,  78  Ala.  448 

26 

Judson,  Ex  parte,  3   Blatchf. 

C. 

C.  89 

226 

Judson,  In  re,  3  Blatchf.  (U. 

S.) 

148, 

461 

Jupitz  V.  People,  34  111.  516 

79 

Juretich  v.  People,  223  111.  484 

73, 

423 

Justice  V.  Commonwealth,  20 

Kv. 

L.  386 

60, 

241 

V.  State,  99  Ala.  180 

no 

K 


Kahlenbeck  v.  State,  119  Ind.  118  76 
Kahn  v.  State   (Tex.),  38  S.  W. 

989  384 

Kaine,  Ex  parte,  3  Blatchf.    (U. 

S.)   I  496,  603 

Kane  v.  Commonwealth,   109  Pa. 

St.  541  514,  515 

Kastner  v.  State,  58  Neb.  767  14 

Kaufman  v.  State,  49  Ind.  248  14,  152 
Kean  v.  Commonwealth,  10  Bush 

(Ky.)   190  267 

Kearney  v.  State,  loi  Ga.  803  44 

Kearse'v.  State  (Tex.),  88  S.  W. 

363  41 1 

Keating  v.  People,  160  111.  480 

14,  271,  296,  434 
Kee  V.  State,  28  Ark.  155  77 

Keefe  v.  State,  19  Ark.  190  354 

Keeler  v.  State,  73  Neb.  441  36,  371 
Keenan  v.  Commonwealth,  44  Pa. 

St.  55  166 

Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194 

78,  81,  82,  325 
V.  State,  97  Ga.  388  157 

Keerl  v.  State,  213  U.  S.  135  196 

Keeton  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Kj-. 

L.  1 164  17, 

Keffer  v.  State,  12  Wyo.  49  268 

Kehoe  v.  Commonwealth,  85   Pa. 

St.  127  IDS,  no 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


Ixxi 


324 
439 

491 
468 

269 
225 
50/ 
193 

166 


[References  a) 

Keipp  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  417      298 
Keith  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  63 
Keller  v.  State,  51  Ind.  in 
Kelley  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565 

122,  123,  124, 

V.  State,  SI  Tex.  Cr.  507 

V.  United   States,   7   Ind.  Ter. 
241 
Kelly  V.  People,  17  Colo.  130 

V.  People,  IIS  111.  583 

V.  State,  39  Fla.  122 

V.  State,  3  Sm.  &  M.   (Miss.) 
518 

Kendall  v.  Commonwealth,  14  Ky. 
L.   IS  331 

V.  May,  10  Allen  (Mass.)   S9    202 

V.  State,  6s  Ala.  492  147a 

Kennedy     v.     Commonwealth,     2 
Met.    (Ky.)   36  432 

V.  Commonwealth,   30   Ky.    L. 

1063  97,  105 

V.  Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  447 

21,  119 

V.  People,  39  N.  Y.  245 

V.  State,  147  Ala.  687 

V.  State,  31  Fla.  428 

V.  State,  Id  Ga.  S59 

V.  State,  71  Xeb.  765 
Kennon  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App 

359  126,  299 

Kent  V.  State,  64  Ark.  247 

V.  State,  84  Ga.  438 

V.  State,  6  Cr.  L.  Mag.  520 

V.  State,  42  Ohio  St.  426 
Kenyon  v.  People,  26  N.  Y.  203 
Kenzie  v.  State,  24  Ark.  636 
Kernan  v.  State,  11  Ind.  471 
Kerr  v.  State,  150  Ala.  6ss 

V.  United   States,   7   Ind.   Ter. 

486  19,  341,  392,  393 

Ketchingman  v.  State,  6  Wis.  417  245 
Keys  V.  State,  122  Ind.  527  60 

Kidd  V.  State,  loi  Ga.  528  223,  269 
Kilbourn  v.  State,  9  Conn.  560  515 
Killct  V.  State,  32  Ga.  292  484 

Killins  V.  State,  28  Fla.  313  88,  321 
Kimberly  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  852  267 
Kinard  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  146  42,  46 
Kinchelow    v.    State,    5    Humph. 

(Tenn.)  9  75,  12s 


■c  to  Sections.] 

King  V.  King,  42  Mo.  App.  454 
V.  Dean  of  St.  Asaph,  3  T.  R. 

428 
V.  State,  40  Ala.  314  126, 

V.  State,  89  Ala.  43 
V.  State,  S5  Ark.  604 
V.  State,  99  Ga.  686 
V.  State,  44  Ind.  285 
V.  State,  74  Miss.  576 


3^2,   323 

320 

6 

269 

118,  377 


293 
373 
222 
238 
392 
70 

447 
41a 


V.  btate,  74  Miss.  S76  158, 

V.  State,  91  Tenn.  617  23,  112, 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  463 
V.  State,  43  Tex    351 
Kingory  v.  United  States,  44  Fed. 
669 


669 
Kingsbury's  Case,  106  Mass.  223 
Kinnan  v.  State  (Neb.,  1910),  125 

N.  W.  S94 


Kinnan  v.  State  (] 

N.  W.  S94 
Kinnemer  v.  State,  66  Ark.  206 
Kinnej^  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  500 


ivmnemer  v.  otate,  00  i\ 
Kinnej^  v.  State,  45  Tex.  v^i.  y 
Kinsman  v.  State,  77  Ind.  132 
Kintner  v.  State,  45  Ind.  175 
Kipley  v.  People,  215  111.  358 
Kipper  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  377 
Kirby  v.  People,  123  111.  436 

V.  State,  151  Ala.  66    112,  324, 
V.  State,  57  N.  J.  L.  320 
V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  13    130, 
Kirk  V.   State   (Tex.),  37  S.   W. 

440 
Kirkham  v.  People,  170  III.  9    s8, 
Kirkland  v.  State,  141  Ala.  45  262, 
Kistler  v.  State,  54  Ind.  400  79,  80 
Kitchen   v.    State,   29   Tex.   App. 

45 

Klawiter  v.  State,  76  Neb.  49 

Klein  v.  People,  113  111.  596     149, 
V.  State,  9  Ind.  App.  365 

Klink  V.  People,  16  Colo.  467 

Klug  V.  State,  77  Ga.  734 

Knickerbocker   v.    People,   43 
Y.  177 

Knight  V.  State,  147  Ala.  93 
V.  State,  152  Ala.  56 
V.  State,  58  Neb.  225 
V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  243 

Knowles  v.  People,  15  Mich.  408 
V.  Scribner,  57  Me.  495 
V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  383 

Knudson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App., 
1909),  120  S.  W.  878 


187 

364 
135 
447 
326 
378 
33 
338 
522 
470 
197 

217 
499 

374 
149 

507 
310 
532 
324 
221 
246 
326 
456 
131 

204 
103 
263 


N. 


157, 


414 
152 
353 
517 
238 

375 
387 
282 

369 
117 

185 
524 
269 

308 


Ixxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Koch  V.  State,  115  Ala.  99  424 

V.  State,   126  Wis.  470  246 

Koerner  v.  State,  98  Ind.  7  277,  333 
Koller  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  496  330 
Komp  V.  State,  129  Wis.  20  214 

Konda  v.  United  States,  166  Fed. 

91  276 

Kopcyznski  v.  State,  137  Wis.  358  366 
Kopke  V.  People,  43  Mich.  41  405 

Korell  V.  State,  139  Ala.  i  161 

Kossakowski   v.   People,    177    111. 


563 


13 


283 
356 


337,  374 
Bush 

23 


Kouns  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App, 
Krens  v.  State,  75  Neb.  294 
Kriel  v.   Commonwealth,  5 

(Ky.)  362 
Kroell  V.  State,  139  Ala.  i 

157,  223,  268,  269 
Krolage  v.  People,  224  111.  456  144 
Kunde  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  65      492 


LaBeaii  v.  People,  34  N.  Y.  223 

245,  328,  329 
Lackey  v.  State,  67  Ark.  416  14 

Ladeaux  v.  State,  74  Neb.  19  292 

Lafferty  v.    State    (Tex.),   35    S. 

W.  374  224 

Lahue  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

159  61,  220 

Lake  v.  Calhoun  Co.,  52  Ala.  115      51 
V.  Commonwealth,    31    Ky.    L. 

1232  418 

V.  Commonwealth,   31    Ky.    L. 

1232  77 

Lamar  v.  State,  63  Miss.  265   320,  492 

LaMatt  v.  State,  128  Ind.  123  526,  528 

345 

67 

97 

447 

133 


Lamb  v.  State,  66  Md.  285 

V.  State,  69  Neb.  212 
Lambert  v.  People,  29  Mich.  71 
Lamberton  v.  State,  11  Ohio  282 
Lambe's  Case,  2  Leach  C.  C.  625 
Lambeth  v.  State,  23  Miss.  322 

102,  no 

Lambright  v.  State,  34  Fla.  564        330 

Lamson  v.  Boyden,  160  111.  613        247 

Lanasa  v.    State    (Md.),   71   Atl. 

1058  74 


'  to  Sections.] 

Lanasa  v.  State,  109  Md.  602 
Lancaster  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  267 

7,  18, 
V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  393 
Land  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  330 
Lane  v.   Cole,   12  Barb.    (N.  Y.) 
680 
V.  State    (Tex.   Cr.,    1894),  28 

S.  W.  202 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  335 
Laney  v.  State,  109  Ala.  34 
Lang  V.  Merwin,  99  Me.  486 

V.  State,  97  Ala.  41  283, 

Langdale  v.  People,  100  111.  263 
Langdon,  Ex  parte,  25  Vt.  680 
V.  People,  133  111.  382 

6,  156,  157,  429, 
Langford  v.  State,  33  Fla.  233  89, 
Landis  v.  State,  70  Ga.  651       152, 
Landthrift  v.  State,  140  Ala.  114 
Lanergan  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  39 
La  Plant  v.  People,  60  111.  App. 

340 
Larkin  v.    People,   61    Barb.    (N. 

Y.)  226 
Laros  v.   Commonwealth,  84  Pa. 
St.  200  138, 

La  Rosae  v.  State,  132  Ind.  219 
Lasater  v.  State,  77  Ark.  468    390, 
Lascelles  v.  State,  90  Ga.  347 
Lasher  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  387 
Lasister  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  532 
Lasserot  v.  Gamble   (Cal.,  1896), 

46  Pac.  917 
Lassiter  v.  State,  67  Ga.  739 
V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  540 
Latimer  v.  State,  55  Neb.  609     79, 
Laughlin  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
37  S.  W.  590 
V.  State,  18  Ohio  99 
Lawhead  v.  State,  46  Neb.  607   12 
Lawrence   v.    Commonwealth,   30 
Gratt.   (Va.)  845 
V.  State,  59  Ala.  61 
V.  State,  103  Md.  17 

58,  95,  439, 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  173 
Lawson  v.  State,  155  Ala.  zt4 
V.  State,  20  Ala.  65  92, 

V.  State,  30  Ala.  14 


238 

37 
296 
269 


298 
S7 
533 
471 
291 
421 
461 

522 
423 
153 
205 
124 

527 

35 

307 
390 
391 
427 

2T 
427 

487 
225 
421 
358 

147 
409 

■  73 

342 
33 

492 
519 
324 
122 
352 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxiii 


[References  ar 

Lawson  v.  State,  171  Ind.  431 

162,  323,  338 
V.  State  (Tex.),  31  S.  W.  645    486 
Laydon  v.  State,  52  Ind.  459  27 

Layman's   Will,   In   re,  40  Minn. 

471  176 

Lea  V.  State,  64  ]\Iiss.  294  248 

V.  State,  94  Tenn.  495  83 

Leach  v.   Commonwealth,  t,2>  Kj'. 

1 01 6  244,  248 

V.  State,  99  Tenn.  584  136 

Leache  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  279 

154,  155,  156 
Leak  v.  State,  61  Ark.  599  467 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  97  S.  W. 

476  213 

Leaptrot  v.  State,  51  Fla.  57     161,  470 
Leather  v.   Salvor  Wrecking  &c. 

Co.,  2  Woods  (U.  S.)  680  50 

Ledbetter   v.   State,    35    Tex.    Cr. 

195  294 

Lee,  In  re,  46  Fed.  59  486 

Lee,  In  re,  41  Kan.  318  523 

Lee  V.  State,  136  Ala.  31  473 

V.  State,  56  Ark.  4  68 

V.  State,  116  Ga.  563  154 

V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  338  79 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  94  447 

V.  State,  74  Wis.  45  409 

Leedom  v.  State,  81  Neb.  585  415,  418 

Leeper  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  63        54 

V.  Texas,'  139  U.  S.  462  507 

Lefevre  v.  State,  50  Ohio  St.  584    127 

Lefferts  v.  State,  49  N.  J.  L.  26        39 

Lefforge  v.  State,  129  Ind.  551  92,  396 

Leftridge  v.  United  States,  6  Ind. 

Ter.  30s  40 

Legere  v.  State,  in  Tenn.  368         152 
Leggett  V.  State,  97  Ga.  426  40 

Le  Grand  v.   State   (Ark.,   1908), 

113  S.  W.  1028  404 

Leiber  v.  Commonwealth,  9  Bush 

(Ky.)   II  109 

Leindpcker  v.  Waldron,  52  111.  283  174 
Lemons  v.  State,  97  Tenn.  560 

312,  315,  324 

V.  State,  4  W.  Va.  755  81 

Leonard  v.  State,  115  Ala.  80  304 

V.  State,  150  Ala.  89  120,  374 

V.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  408  422 


c  to  Sections.^ 

Leonard    v.    State,    7    Tex.    App. 
417  281, 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  187 
Lesslie  v.  State,  35  Fla.  184 
Lester  v.  State,  t,~  Ark.  •/2y 
V.  State,  2,7  Fla.  382 

103,  104,  105, 
V.  State,  106  Ga.  371 

Lettz  V.   State   (Tex.),  21   S.  W. 

371 
Leverich  v.  State,  105  Ind.  277 
Levering  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

117  S.  W.  253  2"^^, 

Levison  v.  State,  54  Ala.  520 
Levy  V.  State,  79  Ala.  259 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  203    48, 
Lewallen   v.    State,    22    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  412 
Lewer  v.  Commonwealth,  15  S.  & 

R.   (Pa.)  93 
Lewis  V.  Bruton,  74  Ala.  317 

V.  Commonwealth,  78  Va.  732 

V.  People,  82  111.  104  523, 

V.  People,  37  Mich.  518 

V.  State    (Ala.,    1909),  51   So. 
308 

V.  State,  30  Ala.  54 

V.  State,  120  Ala.  339 

V.  State,  140  Ala.  126 

V.  State,  55  Fla.  54 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  659 

V.  State,  90  Ga.  95 

V.  State,  91  Ga.  168 

V.  State,  129  Ga.  731  2^, 

V.  State  TMiss.),  47  So.  467 

V.  State,  85  Miss.  35 

V.  State  (Tex.),  24  S.  W.  903 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  201    95, 
Lienpo  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  179 
Lightfoot     V.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 
App.),  78  S.  W.  1075 

V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  yy,  100 
Liles  V.  State,  30  Ala.  24  99, 

Lillie  V.  State,  y2  Neb.  228 

222,  322, 
Limouze   v.   People,   58  111.    App. 

3f4 
Lindsay  v.  People,  62  N.  Y.  143 

7,  7h  72,  "7,  148, 


282 
77 
35 

136 

326 
378 


475 
326 

318 
130 
232 
238 

119 

435 
455 
326 
524 
391 

298 

417 

338 

473 

220 

488 

214 

238 

268 

76 

70 

35 

301 

136 

69 

7 

117 

326 

439 
334 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
Lindsey  v.  State,  38  Ohio  St.  507 

?9-  423 
Linehan  v.  State,  113  Ala.  70  328,  338 
Lingerfelt  v.  State,  125  Ga.  4  119 

Lingafelter  v.  State,  28  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  800  423,  430 

Links   V.    State,    13   Lea    (Tenn. ) 

701  305 

Linnehan  v.  State,  120  Ala.  293 

61,  119a,  220 
Lipes    V.    State,    15   Lea    (Tenn.) 

125  _  53 
Lipscomb  v.  State,  75  Miss.  559 

103,  261 
V.  State,  76  ]\Iiss.  22^  108,  195 

Lipsey  v.  People,  277  111.  364  i6a,  141 
Lismore    v.    State    (Ark.,    1910), 

126  S.  W.  853  482 
Little  V.  Commonwealth,  25  Gratt. 

(Va.)  921  94,  191 

V.  People,  157  111.  153  12,  15 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  441  36 

V.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  491     326 

V.  Todd,  3  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  91     250 

Livar  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  115      227 

Livinghouse  v.  State,  76  Neb.  491    414 

Livingston  v.  Commonwealth,   14 

Gratt.  (Va.)  592  330 

V.  Kierstead,     10    Johns.     (X. 

Y.)   362  203 

Llewellyn's  Case,   13  Pa.   Co.   Ct. 

126  226 

Loar  V.  State,  76  Neb.  14S  414 

Lockhart  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  480   373 
V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  589 

96,  106,  108,  330 
Lockwood  V.  State,  i  Ind.  161  29 

V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.),  26  S.  W. 

200  297 

Loder  v.  Whelpley,  11 1  N.  Y.  239  176 
Loehr  v.  People,  132  111.  504  71,  248 
Loeffner  v.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  598 

157.  158 
Logan  V.  Commonwealth,  16  Ky. 
L.  508  116 

V.  State,  149  Ala.  11  103,  333 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  i  294 

V.  United  States,  123  Fed.  291    427 
V.  United  States,  144  U.  S.  263 

57,  209,  493 


e  to  Sections.] 
Loggins  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  434 


174,  I 


122,  123 
472 
302 
270 
270 
74a 

61 
292 

17 
358 
522 

68 

80 
508 

44 


Lohman  v.  State,  81  Ind.  15 
Lohrey  v.  State,  91  Miss.  853 
Long  V.  People,  34  111.  App.  48 

V.  People,  135  111.  435 

V.  State,  86  Ala.  36      7 

V.  State,  72  Ark.  427 

V.  State,  II  Fla.  295 

V.  State,  42  Fla.  509 

V.  State,  12  Ga.  293 

V.  State,  54  Ga.  564 

V.  State,  56  Ind.  182 

V.  State,  23  Neb.  33 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  6 

V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  186 

V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  211 

122,  124,  492 

V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  461  268 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  175 

103,  112,  315 
V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  55  492 

Longenbook    v.    People,    130    111. 

App.  320  461 

Loose  V.  State,  120  Wis.  115  342 

Lord  Audley's   Case,  3  How.   St. 

Tr.  401  185 

Lord  ]\Iorley's  Case,  6  St.  Trials 

770  264 

Lorenz  v.  United  States,  24  App. 

(D.  C.)  337  498 

Lessen  v.  State,  62  Ind.  437  308,  309 
Lothrop  V.  Roberts,  16  Colo.  250  247 
Lott  V.  State,  122  Ind.  393  486 

Louisville  &  N.  R.   Co.  v.   Com- 
monwealth, 117  Ky.  345  87 
Louisville  &c.    R.   Co.  v.   Falvey, 

104  Ind.  409  342 

Lounder  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  121    242 

Love  V.  People,  160  111.  501        71,  373 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  27      121 

Lovelace  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  261  378 

Lovell  v.  State,  12  Ind.  18  92 

Lovett  V.  State,  60  Cal.  125       65,  116 

V.  State,  30  Fla.  142  120 

V.  State,  80  Ga.  255  97 

Low's  Case,  4  Greenl.  (Me.)  439    191 

Low  V.  Mitchell,  18  Me.  372  525 

Lowder  v.  State,  63  Ala.  143  373 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxv 


[References  ai 

Lowe   V.    State    (Ga.),   63   S.    E. 
1 1 14  105 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  792  241,  409 

V.  State,  118  Wis.  641  161,  163 

Lowrance     v.      State,     4     Yerg. 
(Tenn.)    145  294 

Lowry  v.  Rainwater,  70  Mo.  152      477 
V.  State,     53    Tex.     Cr.    App. 

562  119a 

Lucas   V.    Brooks,    18   Wall.    (U. 
S.)  436  184 

V.  State,  96  Ala.  51  265 

V.  State,  2S  Conn.  18  184,  185 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  322  228 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  219      48 

Luck  V.  State,  96  Ind.  16  35 

Luco  V.   United   States,  23  How. 

(U.  S.)  515  50 

Lucre  v.  State,  7  Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

148  70 

Ludlow  V.  State,  156  Ala.  58  97 

Ludwig  V.  State,  170  Ind.  648  520 

Lue  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  15 

S.  W.  664  296,  297 

Luera  v.  State  (Tex.,  1895),  32  S. 

W.  898  133 

Luke  V.  Calhoun  Co.,  52  Ala.  115      50 
V.  State,  49  Ala.  30  369 

Luker   v.   Commonwealth,   9   Ky. 

L.  38s  103 

Lumpkin  v.  State,  125  Ga.  24  122 

Lung's  Case,  i  Conn.  428  25 

Luqua  v.  Commonwealth,  118  Ky. 

5/8  221 

Luttrell  V.  State,  85  Tenn.  232        421 
Lyle  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  153 

222,  248,  486 
Lyles  V.  State,  130  Ga.  294        100,  211 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  119 

93,  103,  106,  113,  120 
V.  United  States,  20  App.  Cas. 

D.  C.  559  276 

Lynch  v.  Commonwealth,  115  Ky. 

309  463 

V.  People,  137  111.  App.  444  59 

V.  State,  84  Ga.  726  517 

Lynes  v.  State,  36  Miss.  617  130 

Lynn    v.    Commonwealth     (Ky.), 

13  S.  W.  74  414 

Lynne  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  386  378 


e  to  Sections.] 

Lynns  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  375  305 
Lyon   V.    Commonwealth,   29   Ky. 

L.  1020  122 

Lyons  v.  People,  137  111.  602  121 

V.  State.  52  Ind.  426  341 

Lytle  V.  State,  31  Ohio  St.  196  166 


M 


McAdams  v.  State,  25  Ark.  405  320 
McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala.  154 

115,  130,  139 

McAfee  v.  State,  85  Ga.  438  44 

McAlIer  v.  State,  46  Neb.  116  285 

McAllister  v.  State,  156  Ala.  122  44 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  654  147 
McAlpine  v.  State,  117  Ala.  93 

81,  126,  235 
McArthur  v.  State,  59  Ark.  431 

17,  19,  236,  365 

V.  State,  41  Tex.  Cr.  635     362,  365 

McBean  v.  State,  83  Wis.  206  193 
McBrayer  v.  State  (Tex.),  34  S. 

W.  114  315 
McBride    v.    Commonwealth,    95 

Va.  818  330 
V.  People,  5  Colo.  App.  91 

106,  108,  113,  ir8,  333 

McBryde  v.  State,  156  Ala.  44  338 

McCabe,  Ex  parte,  46  Fed.  363  495 
McCalman  v.  State,  121  Ga.  491 

526,  534 

McCann  v.  People,  226  111.  562  213 
V.  People,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

272  333 
V.  State,   13  S.  &  M.    (Miss.) 

471                 116,  118,  147a,  322 
McCartney  v.  State,  3  Ind.  353 

423,  432 

McCarty  v.  People,  51  111.  231    82,  327 
McClackey  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App. 

320                                             161,  162 
McClain    v.    Commonwealth,    no 

Pa.  St.  263                      140,  211,  247 

McClellan  v.  State,  53  .Ma.  640  488 

V.  State,  32  Ark.  609  421 

V.  State,  66  Wis.  335  529 

McClerkin  v.  State,  20  Fla.  879 

466,  468 


Ixxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


8i 


358 


St. 


583 


[References  at 

McCloskey  v.  People,  5  Park.  Cr 

(N.  Y.)  299 
McClure    v.     Commonwealth 

Ky.  448 
V.  Com.monwealth,   86   Pa 

353 
McClurg  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  624 
McCollum  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App, 

162 

McCombs  V.  State,  8  Ohio  St.  643  418 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  490  398 

McConnell   v.    State,  2   Ga.   App. 
445  482 

V.  State  (Tex.),  18  S.  W.  645 
McCook  V.  State,  91  Ga.  740 
McCorkle     v.      State,      i      Cold. 

(Tenn.)    2,Z2> 
McCormick,  Ln  re,   117  N.  Y.   S. 

70 
McCorquodale    v.    State    (Tex.), 
98  S.  W.  879  III.  112, 

McCourt  V.  People,  64  X.  Y. 
McCoy  V.  People,  65  111.  439 
V.  State,  46  Ark.  141 
V.  State,  78  Ga.  490 
V.  State,  91  ]\Iiss.  257 
V.  State  (Tex.),  81  S.  W.  46 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1909), 

120  S.  W.  858 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  30 
McCracken  v.  People,  209  111.  215 
McCrary   v.    State,    51    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  502 
McCrory  v.  State,  loi  Ga.  779 
McCue  V.  Commonwealth,  78  Pa. 

St.  185 
McCullar'v.    State,   z^   Tex.    Cr. 

213 
McCully's  Case,  2  Lew  C.  C.  272 
McCune  v.  State,  42  Fla.  192 
McDaniel  v.  State,  97  Ala.   14 
V.  State,  100  Ga.  67 
V.  State,  8  Sm.  &  M.   (Miss.) 

401 
V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  475 
V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  560 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  342 
McDermott  v.  State,  89  Ind.  187 

269,  320 


422 
308 

263 


164 


440 


461 


322 

Z72, 

532 

119a 

228 

93,  325 

67 


299 

375 

58 

28s 
74 

323 

390 
34 
37 
61 

328 

227 
21 

130 
74 


e  to  Sections.] 

McDonald  v.  Commonwealth,  86 
Ky.  10  77,  78  ^ 

V.  ^Massachusetts,     180    U.     S. 

311  S07 

V.  State    (Ala.,   1910),   51    So. 

629  145 

V.  State,  55  Fla.  134  21 

V.  State  (Fla.),  47  So.  485 

296,  301 
V.  vState,  2  Ga.  App.  633  298 

V.  State,  80  Wis.  407  21 

McDonel  v.  State,  90  Ind.  320  48 

McDonnell  v.  State,  58  Ark.  242  421 
^McDongal  v.  State,  88  Ind.  24  157 

McDowell  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky., 
1909),  123  S.  W.  313  439,  440 

V.  State,  68  ]\Iiss.  348  294 

V.  State,  74  Miss.  373  298 

iNIcEwen  v.  State,  152  Ala.  38  105 

McFadden  v.  Re3'nolds  (Pa.),  11 
Atl.  638  '  247 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  241  68 

]\IcFarland  v.  State,  83  Ark.  98  268 
jNIcGarr  v.  State,  75  Ga.  155  425 . 

INIcGary  v.  People,  45  N.  Y.  153  33 
McGee  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  596  207 
AIcGinnis  v.  State,  24  Ind.  500 

42,  296 
V.  State,  16  Wyo.  72  358 

McGlasson  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  620  89,  420 

McGowan       v.       Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  117  S.  W.  387  96,  324 

V.  McDonald,  iii  Cal.  57  218 

V.  State,  9  Yerg.   (Tenn.)   184   275 

McGrath  v.  State,  25  Neb.  780        373 

McGraw  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

20  S.  W.  279  494 

McGrew  v.    State,    13   Tex.   App. 

340  261 

^IcGufif  V.  State,  88  Ala.  147 

205,  225,  412 

McGuire  v.   Lawrence   Mfg.   Co., 

156  Mass.  324  220 

V.  People,  44  ]\Iich.  286  12,  205 

V.  State,  76  Miss.  504  21 

McGullock  V.  State,  48  Ind.  109  7 

McHenry  v.  State.  91  Mass.  562      461 

]\IcHugh  V.  Territory,  17  Okla.  i     325 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxvii 


[References  at 

IMcIlvain  v.  State,  80  Ind.  69  528 

Mclnerney  v.  United  States,   143 

Fed.  729  55 

IMcIntyre  v.  State,  170  Ind.  163        486 
V.  State  (Tex.),  33  S.  W.  347    118 
McKee  v.  People,  36  N.  Y.  113 

99,  119a 

V.  State,  III  Ind.  378  440,  491,  492 

McKenna,  In  re,  47  Kan.  738  57 

McKenzie  v.  State,  24  Ark.  636        70 

V.  State,  26  Ark.  334  157 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  568  492 

McKeone  v.  People,  6  Colo.  346 

60,  65 
]\IcKevitt  V.  People,  208  111. -460 

T20,  144,  246 
]\IcKinney  v.    State,   40   Tex.   Cr. 
App.  372  97,  130 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  591 

93,  3T4 
IMcKinny  v.  State,  29  Fla.  565  408 
IMcKissick  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App. 

673  228 

McKleroy  v.  State,  77  Ala.  93  13 

McKnight  v.    State,   50  Tex.    Cr. 
252  214 

V.  United  States,  122  Fed.  926    285 
IMcLain  v.  Commonwealth,  99  Pa. 
St.  86  i6a,  84,  262 

V.  State,  18  Neb.  154  137,  152 

McLaren  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  643 

466,  468,  470 

McLaughlin  v.  Joy,  100  Me.  517     534 

McLean  v.  State,  16  Ala.  672   103,  225 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  660      419,  430 

McLellan  v.   Richardson,    13   ]Me. 

82  191 

McLeod  V.  State,  35  Ala.  395  92 

V.  State,  128  Ga.  17  320 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  331 

157,  162 
McMahan  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App. 
348  310 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  244  292 

McMahon  v.   State,  46  Tex.   Cr. 

450  328 

McManus  v.  Freeman,  2  Pa.  Dist. 

144  173 

McMath  V.  State,  55  Ga.  303 

408,  409,  414,  418 


e  to  Sections.] 

McMeans  v.  State  (Tex.),  114  S. 
W.  264  131 

McMeen    v.    Commonwealth,    114 

Pa.  St.  300  333 

Mc^Millan  v.  State,  128  Ga.  25  108 

jMcMurrin  v.  Rigby,  80  Iowa  322  413 
McXaghten's    Case,    i    C.    &    K. 

130  154 

McXair  v.  State,  53  Ala.  453  417 

McXamara  v.  People,  24  Colo.  61  358 
IMcXealy  v.  State,  17  Fla.  198  269 

McXeil  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  48  196 
McXish  V.  State,  47  Fla.  69  21,  129 
]\IcPherson  v.  State,  22  Ga.  478  no 
]\IcPhun,  In  re,  30  Fed.  57  503 

McQueen  v.  Commonwealth  (Kj'.), 

88  S.  W.  1047  269 

V.  State,  94  Ala.  50  103,  no 

V.  State,  103  Ala.  12  104 

V.  State,  108  Ala.  54  305 

V.  State,  82  Ind.  72  76,  80 

McQuirk  v.  State,  84  Ala.  435  418 
jMcReynolds  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App. 

327  I 6a 

jMcSwean  v.  State,  113  Ala.  66r 

79,  80,  87 
]\IcTyler  v.  State,  gi  Ga.  254  193,  237 
i\IcVey  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  659  517 
IMcWharter  v.  State,  118  Ga.  55  512 
^laas  V.  Territory,  10  Okla.  714  154 
MacDonnell,    In    re,    11    Blatchf. 

(U.  S.)    170  496 

Mace  V.  State,  58  Ark.  79  471 

MacFadden  v.  United  States,  165 

Fed.  51  478 

Machen  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  115   475 

Mack  V.  State,  54  Fla.  55  56 

V.  State,  48  Wis.  271  100 

]\I?ckey    V.     Commonwealth,     80 

Ky.  345  269 

Mackin  v.  People,  115  111.  312  27 

V.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  495  154 

Macklin    v.     Commonwealth,    93 

Ky.  294  330 

Mackquire  v.  State,  91  Miss.  151    421 

Madden  v.  State,  148  Ind.  183  300 

V.  State,  T  Kan.  340  3^9 

Maddox  v.  State,  159  Ala.  53 

100,  117,  147a 


Ixxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
Madison  v.   State,   i6  Tex.  App. 

435  293 

Magee  v.  People,  139  111.  138    243,  378 
V.  State  (Miss.),  45  So.  360      268 
Magennis   v.   Parkhurst,  4  N.   J. 

Eq.  433  461 

Magnay  v.  Burt,  5  Q.  B.  381  255 

Maguire  v.  State,  47  J\Id.  485 

507,  510,  512,  514 
[Nlahaffey  v.   Territory,    11    Okla. 

213  14 

Mahan  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  534        42 
Maher  v.  People,  10  Mich.  212  23 

Mahon  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  234     470 
Mahoney  v.    State,  2>2>   Ind.   App. 

655  460,  461 

V.  State  (Tex.),  98  S.  W.  854      56 
Maillet  v.  People,  42  Mich.  262 

411,  414,  416 
Mainard  v.   Reider,  2  Ind.   App. 

115  187 

Maine  v.  People,  9  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

13  348 

Maines  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  14    468 
Majors  v.  People,  38  Colo.  437  87 

Malachi  v.  State,  89  Ala.  134     72,,  312 
Mallory    v.    State,    27    Tex.     Cr. 

482  429 

]\Ialone  v.  State,  49  Ga.  210      12,  166 
V.  State,  169  Ind.  72  292 

Maloney    v.    State    (Ark.    1909), 

121  S.  W.  728  122,  261,  427 

Maloy  V.  State,  52  Fla.  loi   60,  66,  2>22, 
Manaway  v.   State,  44  Ala.   375 

42s,  429 
Manchester,  In  re,  5  Cal.  237  497,  499 
Mangrum       v.        Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  39  S.  W.  703  154 

Mangum  v.  State  (Ga.),  62,  S.  E. 
543  6 

V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  362        484 
Mann  v.   Commonwealth,  25  Ky. 
L.  1964  74 

V.  State,  23  Fla.  610  213,  216 

V.  State,  34  Ga.  i  392 

V.  State,  44  Tex.  642  189 

^Manning  v.  State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  180 

364,  365 
V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  326  470 

V.  State,  79  Wis.  178  118 


e  to  Sections.] 
Mapes  V.  State   (Tex.),  85  S.  W. 

797  473 

Maples  V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 

408  130 

]Marable  v.  State,  89  Ga.  425   323,  521 
Alarcy  v.  Barnes,  16  Gray  (Mass.) 

161  SO 

]\Iarion  v.  State,  16  Neb.  349     66,  246 
V.  State,   20   Neb.   233  27 

^Nlarkey  v.  State,  47  Fla.  38  470 

Marks  v.  State,  loi  Ind.  353  532 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  274  331 

Marler  v.    State,  67  Ala.  55 

71,  74,  261,  323,  332 
V.  State,  68  Ala.  580  323 

Marnoch    v.    State,    7    Tex.    App. 

269  22,3 

Maroney  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  524 

467,  468 

Marrash    v.    United    States,    168 
Fed.  225  492 

Marshall   v.   Chicago  &c.   R.  Co., 
48    111.    475  106 

V.  State,  49  Ala.  21  342 

V.  State,  84  Ark.  88  147 

V.  State  (Tex.),  22  S.  W.  878  376 
V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  273  137 

Martin  v.  Anderson,  21  Ga.  301       174 
V.  Commonwealth,    25    Ky.    L. 

1923  III,  245 

V.  Commonwealth,  93  Ky.  189  222 
V.  Commonwealth,      2      Leigh 

(Va.)    745  423,  432,  434 

V.  State,  39  Ala.  523  122 

V.  State,  89  Ala.  1x5  46 

V.  State,  90  Ala.  602  143 

V.  State,  104  Ala.  71  300,  304 

V.  State,  125  Ala.  64  6 

V.  State,  144  Ala.  8  326 

V.  State,  32  Ark.  124  463.  465 

V.  State,  5  Ind.  App.  453  326,  357 
V.  State  (Miss.),  47  So.  426,  484 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  i  207,  208 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  125 

89,  438 
V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  29 

69.  97 
V.  State.  79  Wis.  165  67 

V.  Territory,  14  Okla.  593  209 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxix 


[References  ar 
Martinez   v.    State,   48   Tex.    Cr. 

App.  33  67 

Marts  V.  State,  26  Ohio  St.   162    325 
Marx  V.  People,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

618  65 

iMascolo  V.  Montesanto,  61  Conn. 

SO  360 

Mask  V.  State,  32  Miss.  405  188 

Mason  v.  Hinds,  19  N.  Y.  S.  996    221 

V.  People,  26  N.  Y.  200  373 

V.  State,  42  Ala.  532         87,  88,  90 

V.  State,  153  Ala.  46  371 

V.  State,   171   Ind.  78  99,  302 

V.  State  (Tex.),  98  S.  W.  854    373 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  24  342 

IMassey  v.  Colville,  45  N.  J.  L.  119  258 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  159  279 

Masterson  v.  State,  144  Ind.  240 

228,  467 
Maston  v.  State.  83  Miss.  647  327 

^lastronada  v.  State,  60  Miss.  86   144 
[Nlatherly    v.    Commonwealth,    14 

Ky.  L.  182  104,  108 

Alathews  v.  State,  19  Neb.  330        414 

V.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  98         6 

Mathis  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.), 

13  S.  W.  360  395 

V.  Commonwealth,    il    Ky.   L. 

882  130 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  39  328 

Mathley    v.    Commonwealth,    120 

Ky.  389  323 

Matteson  v.  People,  122  III.  App. 

66  529 

IMatthews  v.  Hoagland,  48  N.  J. 

Eq.  455  175 

V.  People,  6  Colo.  App.  456  67 

V.  State,  96  Ala.  62  262,  267 

Mattox  V.  United  States,   146  U. 

S.  140  no,  III,  193 

Maxey  v.  State,  76  Ark.  276    121,  464 

Maxwell  v.  Hardy,  8  Pick.  (Mass.) 

560  533 

V.  State  (Miss.),  40  So.  615   128 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  78 

S.  W.  516  78 

May  V.  People,  8  Colo.  210  324 

V.  Shnmway,  16  Gray  (Mass.) 

86  258 

V.  State,  14  Ohio  461  429 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  74      6r 


e  to  Sections.] 

Mayberry  v.  State,  107  Ala.  64  484 
Mayer  v.  People,  80  N.  Y.  364  438 
Mayes  v.  State,  64  Miss.  329    96,  330 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  33  236 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  340  309 

Mayfield  v.  State,  no  Ind.  591  326 

V.  State,  loi  Tenn.  673  96,  272 
Maynard  v.  People,  135  111.  416  123 
Mayo  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  342  408 
Mayor  &c.  v.  Caldwell,  81  Ga.  76  202 
Mays  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  76 
S.  W.  162  268 

V.  State,  72  Neb.  723  149 

Mead  v.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  601  425 
Means  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  16  254 
Medis  V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  194  360 
Medley   v.    State    (Ala.),   47    So. 

218  6 

Medrano  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  214  401 
Meehan  v.  State,  46  N.  J.  L.  355  463 
Meek  v.  State,  117  Ala.  116 

437,  438,  439,  440,  442 
Aleeks  v.  State,  80  Ark.  579  461 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  420  468 

Mehan  v.  State,  7  Wis.  670  24a 

Meister  v.  People,  31  Mich.  99 

89,  369 
Melbourne  v.  State,  51  Fla.  69       269 
Mellen,  In  re,  63  Hun    (N.   Y.) 
632  174 

Menefee    v.    State,    50    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  249  93,  323 

Mercer  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  452 

68,  146 
Merrill  v.  State,  58  Miss.  65  109,  112 
Merritt    v.    Campbell,    79    N.    Y. 

62s  429 

V.  State  (Miss.),  5  So.  386         446 
Merriweather  v.    Commonwealth, 

118  Ky.  870  124 

Merriwether  v.  State,  81  Ala.  74     185 
V.  State  (Tex.),  115  S.  W.  44  30i 
Mershon  v.  State,  51  Ind.   14  236 

Mesa  V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  395  391 
Messer  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  635  451 
Methard  v.  State,  19  Ohio  St.  363,  378 
Mettler  v.  People,  36  111.  App.  324  311 
Mctz  V.  State,  46  Neb.  547  67,  378 
Metzger,  In  re,  5  How.  (U.  S.) 
176  495 


Ixxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
Meurer  v.  State,  129  Ind.  587    517,  521 
JNleyer  v.   Standard  &c.   Ins.  Co., 
8  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  74  179 

V.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  310  87 

Meyers,    E.v   parte,    33    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  204  103 

Meyers  v.  Commonwealth,  83  Pa. 
St.  131  157 

V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  35  314 

IMeyncke  v.  State,  68  Ind.  401 

532,  533 
]\Hchaels  v.  People,  208  111.  603  125 
Micheauz  v.   State,  30  Tex.  App. 

660  292 

IMiddangh  v.  State,  103  Ind.  78        473 
]\IiddIebrook  v.    State,  43   Conn. 

257  459,  460 

Mieller  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

609  94 

Miera  v.   Territory,   13   N.   Mex. 

192  312 

Miers  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  161       324 

]\Iilan  V.  State,  24  Ark.  346       172,  174 

Miles  V.  State,  93  Ga.  117  152 

V.  State,  129  Ga.  589  7 

V.  United  States,  103  U.  S.  304 

12,  400,  404 

Mill  V.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  134  36 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  414  137 

Miller  v.  Anderson,  43  Ohio   St. 

473  526 

V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),    113 

S.  W.  518  40 

V.  Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  15  435 
V.  Commonwealth,  117  Ky.  80  472 
V.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  89  Iowa 

567  223 

V.  People,  39  111.  457  149,  153 

V.  People,  216  111.  309  131,  133,  267 
V.  People,  229  111.  376  300,  301 

V.  State,  48  Ala.  122  471 

V.  State,  107  Ala.  40  276 

V.  State,  no  Ala.  69 

119,  312,  524,  525,  528,  529,  533 
V.  State,  146  Ala.  686  328 

V.  State,  IS  Fla.  577  58,  215 

V.  State,  91  Ga.  186  374 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  653  242 

V.  State,  9  Ind.  340  272 

V.  State,  51  Ind.  405  422,  423 


c  to  Sections.] 

jMiller  v.  State,  73  Ind.  88  440 

V.  State,  68  .Miss.  221  124 

V.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  449  486 
V.  State  (Tex.),  50  S.  W.  704  375 
V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  232  117 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  445  377 

V.  State  (Wis.),  119  X.  W.  850 

12,  272,  492,  493 
V.  Territory,  15  Okla.  422 

214,  221,  222,  248 
V.  United  States,  6  App.  D.  C. 

6  471 

Millett  V.  Baker,  42  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

215  523 

^lills   V.    Commonwealth,  93   Va. 

^15                                     390,  392,  393 

V.  State,  20  Ala.  86  473 
V.  United    States,    164    U.    S. 

644  407 
Milne's  Case,  2  East  C.  L.  602  296 
Mimms  v.  State,  16  Ohio  St.  221  330 
Miner  v.  People,  58  111.  59  380,  404 
Ming  V.  Foote,  9  Mont.  201  51 
Minich  v.  People,  8  Colo.  440  12 
Mink  V.  State,  60  Wis.  583  527 
^Minneapolis  TMill  Co.  v.  Minneap- 
olis &c.  R.  Co.,  51  i\Iinn.  304  262 
Elinor  V.  State,  55  Fla.  77  121,  296 
]\Iinters  v.  People,  139  111.  363  247 
Misseldine  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

335  296 

]\Iitchell,  In  re,  i  Cal.  App.  396  307 
Mitchell  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

14  S.  W.  489  106 
V.  Commonwealth,  78  K}^  204 

344,  399 
V.  State,  58  Ala.  417  318 

V.  State,  94  Ala.  68 

47,  60,  236,  237,  248 
V.  State,  S2  Ark.  324  94,  112 

V.  State,  43  Fla.  188  79 

V.  State,  71  Ga.  128  103,  113 

V.  State  (Miss.),  24  So.  312  126 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  278  193 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  71  80 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  37 

120,  514 

Mixon  V.  State,  55  Miss.  525      12,  331 
V.  State  (Tex.),  31  S.  W.  408      88 

Mizell  V.  State,  38  Fla.  20       293,  296 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxi 


[References  ai 

IMockabee   v.    Commonwealth,    78 

Ky.  380  103,   105,  113 

Moeck  V.  People,  100  111.  242  108 

Moett  V.  People,  85  X.  Y.  373        154 
]\Ioffit      V.      State,      2      Humph. 

(Temi),  99  t88 

■Nlonahan  v.  State,  135  Ind.  316        144 
]\Ioncrief  v.   Elj^    19  Wend.    (N. 

Y.)  405  523 

Mondragon  v.  State,  33  Tex.  480    301 
Monroe,  In  re,  20  N.  Y.  82  173 

INIonroe  v.  State,  5  Ga.  8s  100 

]\Iontag  V.  People,  141  111.  75  157 

]\Iontee    v.    Commonwealth,    3    J. 

J.  :\Iarsh   (Ky.)   132  275 

Montgomery    v.    Commonwealth, 

17  Ky.  L.  94  78 

V.  Knox,  23  Fla.  595  238 

V.  State,  80  Ind.  338  106,  108 

V.  State,  II  Ohio  424  266 

V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  323  422 

Moody  V.  People,  20  111.  316  269 

V.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  490 

212,  223 

V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  772    102,  no 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  868  95 

V.  State,  127  Ga.  821  307 

I\Ioon  V.  State,  68  Ga.  687  51 

]Mooney  v.  State,  33  Ala.  419  166 

INIoore  v.   Commonwealth    (Kv.), 

81  S.  W.  669  '        268 

V.  Commonwealth,     2     Leigh 

(Va.)    701  130,  296 

V.  Green,  73  N.  Car.  394  258 

V.  Missouri,  159  U.  S.  673  507 

V.  People,  108  111.  484  222 

V.  State,  146  Ala.  687  103 

V.  State,  79  Ga.  498  205 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  759  474 

V.  State,  126  Ga.  414  21 

V.  State,  130  Ga.  322  36,  42 

V.  State,  55  Miss.  432  36 

V.  State,  86  Miss.  160  325 

V.  State,  53  Neb.  831  144,  281 

V.  State,  17  Ohio  St.  521  408 

V.  State,  96  Tenn.  209 

105,  122,  124,  233,  519 

V.  State  (Tex.),  37  S.  W.  747  377 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  552     349 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  54      324 

vi — Underhill  CkiM.  Evidence. 


e  to  Secfious.] 
Moore  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
449  205 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  468    370,  374 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  336  323 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  364  377 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  559  482 

V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  270    429 
V.  United  States,  150  U.  S.  57    90 
Morales  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 


234 


130 


97 
238 

321 

267 
278 


94 
III 
496 
441 


Moran  v.  People  (111.),  45  N.  E. 
230 
V.  People,  163  111.  372 
V.  Territory,  14  Okla.  544 
Morawitz   v.    State.  49   Tex.    Cr. 

366 
Morearty  v.  State,  46  Xeb.  652 
Morehcad  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  212  17 
r^Torehouse  v.  State,  35  X'^eb.  643  291 
^lorello  V.  People,  226  111.  388 
]Morelock  v.  State,  90  Tenn.  528 
Morgan,  Ex  parte,  20  Fed.  298 
Morgan  v.  State,  42  Ark.  131 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  599  366,  368 

V.  State,  51  X'^eb.  672  6 

V.  State,  48  Ohio  St.  371 

276,  277,  279 

V.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  513  378 

V.  Territory,  16  Okla.  530  314 

Morgan's  Case,  i  Mood.  &  R.  134  429 

Moriarity  v.  State,  62  Miss.  654 

325,  326 
Morphew  v.  State,  84  Ark.  487 
IMorris  v.  Davies,  5  C.  &  F.  163 
V.  Morris,  119  Ind.  341 
V.  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,   148 

N.  Y.  88 
V.  State,  84  Ala.  446 
V.  State,  146  Ala.  66  61,  93, 

126,  262,  323,  328,  330,  491,  492 
V.  State.  54  Fla.  80  435,  439 

V.  State,  125  Ga.  36  291a 

V.  State,  loi  Ind.  560  533 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  95 

88,  321,  322,  323 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  515  328 

V.  Territory    (Okla.),  99   Pac. 

760  50,  164 

V.  Territory,  i  Okla.  Cr.  617      332 


269 
526 
176 

179 
294 


Ixxsii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ai 

Morrison      v.      Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  74  S.  W.  2/7  323 

V.  Commonwealth,    24   Ky.    L. 

2493  324 

V.  Lennard,  3  C.  &  P.  127  204 

Morrow  v.  State,  48  Ind.  432 

100,  119a 
Morse   v.   Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
Ill  S.  W.  714  55,  87,  91 

V.  Commonwealth,   33    Ky.    L. 

831  88,  89,  90 

Morse  v.  Odell,  49  Ore.  iiS  220 

Morton  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  437  loi 
Mose  V.  State,  35  Ala.  421  108,  109 
Moseley  v.  State,  89  Miss.  802  324 
Moss  V.  State,  152  Ala.  30 

47,  48,  268,  314,  374 
V.  State,  17  Ark.  327  70 

V.  State,  40  So.  346  298 

Mott  V.    Consumers'   Ice   Co.,   52 

How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  244  252 

Mount  V.  Commonwealth,  2  Duv. 

(Ky.)  93  509 

Mounts  V.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky. 

274  144 

Mow  V.  People,  31  Colo.  351  51 

Moye  V.  State,  65  Ga.  754  21,  298 
Mulford  V.  People,  139  111.  586 

282,  285 
Mullen  V.  State,  45  Ala.  43  353 

Mullins  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
79  S.  W.  258  269 

V.  Commonwealth,   25   Ky.   L. 

2044  245 

Munkers  v.  State,  87  Ala.  94  388,  390 
Munyon  v.  State,  62  N.  J.  L.  i  188 
Murdock  v.  State,  68  Ala.  567  117 

Murdock's  Case,  2  Bland.   (Md.) 

461  461 

Murphey  v.  State,  43  Neb.  34  225 
Murphree  v.  State  (Tex.),  115  S. 

W.  1 189  36,  115 

Murphy    v.     Commonwealth,    23 
Gratt.  (Va.)  960  187 

V.  People,  9  Colo.  435  84,  320 

V.  People,  63  N.  Y.  590 

129,  137,  140,  323,  337 
V.  Spence,  9  Gray  (Mass.)  399  533 
V.  State,  63  Ala.  i  138 

V.  State,  108  Ala.  10   14,  79,  82,  246 


■e  to  Sections.] 

Murphy  v.  State,  31  Fla.  166  153 

V.  State,  118  Ga.  780  6,  419 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  149  404 

V.  State,  120  Ind.  115  408 

V.  State,  36  Ohio  St.  628  123 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  24  332 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  488  427 

V.  State,  124  Wis.  635  279 

Murray  v.  Great  Western  Ins.  Co., 

72  Hun  282  221 

V.  Louisiana,  163  U.  S.  loi  251 

V.  State,  25  Fla.  528  130 

V.  State,  I  Tex.  App.  417  270 

Muscoe  V.  Commonwealth,  87  Va. 
460  330 

Musfelt  V.  State,  64  Neb.  445  122 

Musgrave  v.  State,  133  Ind.  297      444 

Mussel  Slough  Case,  5  Fed.  680      491 

Musser  v.    Stewart,  21   Ohio    St. 
353  _  523 

Mutual    Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Selby, 
72  Fed.  980  174 

Myer  v.   State,   10  Ohio  Cir.   Ct. 
226  480 

Myers  v.  Commonwealth,  90  Va. 
70s  23 

V.  Stafford,  114  N.  Car.  689        523 
V.  State,  84  Ala.  11  412,  413 

V.  State,  51  Neb.  517  418 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  76    248,  280a,  374 
V.  State,  92  Ind.  390  195 

V.  State,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.)  98     471 

Mynatt  v.  Hudson,  66  Tex.  66  236 


N 


Nagel  V.  People,  229  111.  598  196,  197 
Nail  V.  State,  125  Ga.  234  338 

Nance  v.  State,  126  Ga.  95  468 

Narnard  v.  State,  119  Ga.  436  120 

Nathan  v.  State,  130  Ga.  48  235 

National  Bank  v.  National  Bank, 

7  W.  Va.  544  182 

National  Trust  Co.  v.  Gleason,  77 

N.  Y.  400  209 

Navarro   v.    State,  24  Tex.   App. 

378  185,  213 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  326  486 

Neal  V.  Patten,  47  Ga.  73  176 


TABLE   OF    CASES, 


Ixxxiii 


[References  a) 

Neal's  Case,  22  Gratt.  (Va.)  917  471 
Xeary  v.  People,  115  111.  App.  157  387 
Xeathery  v.  People,  227  111.  no  326 
Xeel  V.  State,  9  Ark.  259  461 

Xeely  v.  State,  2i^  Tex.  Cr.  370  363 
Xehr  V.  State,  35  Xeb.  638  310 

X'eiderluck  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 

320  129 

Xeill  V.  State,  79  Ga.  779  519,  522 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  219  412 

Xeilson  v.  State,  146  Ala.  683      18,  2;^ 

V.  State,  40  So.  221  6 

Xelms  V.  State,  84  Ga.  466  406 

V.  State,  58  Miss.  362  269 

X'elson  V.  State,  151  Ala.  2         55,  405 

V.  State,  2,2  Fla.  244  82,  236 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  223  320 

V.  State,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  22,7    225 

V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  766     355 

V.  State,  I  Tex.  App.  41  314 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  205  298 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  274  493 

V.  United  States,  28  App.  D.  C. 

.    32  475 

V.  United  States,  201  U.  S.  92 

247,  461 
X'eubrandt  v.  State,  53  Wis.  89       378 
X'ewberry   v.    Robinson,    36   Fed. 
^?4i  505 

X'ewcomb  v.   State,  2i7  -Miss.  383 

222,  330 
Xewell  V.  State,  109  Ala.  5  484 

X'^ew   England   Monument  Co.  v. 

Johnson  (Pa.)  22  Atl.  974  39 

X'ewman  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
88  S.  W.  1089  60 

V.  Commonwealth,   28   Ky.    L. 

81  61,  123 

V.  People,  23  Colo.  300      451,  453 
V.  People,   63    Barb.    (X.    Y.) 

630  61 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  27^  ^73 

X'^cwphew   V.    State,    5   Ga.    App. 

84  395 

Xewport  V.  State.  95  Ga.  299  58 

Newson  v.  State,  107  Ala.  133  80 

X^ewton  V.  Commonwealth,  31  Ky. 

L.  327  326 

V.  State,  92  Ala.  ^^  328 

V.  State,  21  Fla.  53  312 


c  to  Scctions.l 

Xewton  V.  State,  51  Fla.  82  103 

V.  State  (Miss.),  12  So.  560  277 
V.  State  (Tex.),  48  S.  W.  507    301 

X^icholas  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Va. 

741  314,  2>i2> 

Xichols     V.     Commonwealth,     11 
Bush   (Ky.)   575  272,  328 

V.  People,    23    Hun    (X.    Y.) 

165  325 

X'icholson   v.   Commonwealth,   91 

Pa.  St.  390  386 

V.  State,  72  Ala.  176  528 

V.  State,  38  Md.  140  126,  127 

Xick  V.  State,  128  Ga.  573  270 

Xickles  V.  State,  48  Fla.  46  314 

Xickols  V.  State,  in  Ala.  58  473 

Xicks  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

I  129,  147a 

Niezorawski    v.    State,    131    Wis. 

166  248 

Xight  V.  State,  147  Ala.  93  392 

Xightengale  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 

3  2,77 

X^ioum  V.  Commonwealth,  128  Ky. 

685  227,  520 

Xixon  V.  Perry,  77  Ga.  530  523 

V.  State,  S2>  Tex.  Cr.  325  261 

X^obles  V.  State,  98  Ga.  72,  146 

V.  State,  127  Ga.  212  381 

X^ofsinger  v.   State,  7  Tex.  App. 

301  117,  322 

X^olan  V.  State,  48  Tex.   Cr.  436 

387,  392 
X^^olen  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  585      126 
V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  474 

122,  129,  141 
Xonemaker  v.  State,  34  Ala.  211  279 
Nordan  v.  State,  143  Ala.  13 

312,  318,  319a,  323 
X'ordgren  v.  People,  211  111.  425 

102,  no,  III,  319a 
X^orfleet  v.  Commonwealth,  17  Ky. 

L.  1137  95 

Norris    v.    Beach,    2    Johns.  (N. 

Y.)  294  258 

V.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  217  445 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  166  244 

North  V.  People,  139  HI.  81 

46,  102,  109,  112,  270 


Ixxsiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

North    Carolina    v.    Vandcrford, 

35  Fed.  282  308 

Norton  v.  State,  72  JMiss.  128  393 

V.  State,  129  Wis.  659  422,  430 

Norwood  V.  State,  45  Md.  68  524 

Noyes  v.  State,  41  N.  J.  L.  418         71 
Nuckolls    V.    Commonwealth,    32 

Gratt.  (Va.)  884  472 

Nugent  V.  State,  18  Ala.  521  413 

Nurnberger  v.  United  States,  156 

Fed.  721  466 

Nusbamer  v.  State,  54  Fla.  87  21 

Nuzum  V.  State,  88  Ind.  599  264 


O 


Oakley  v.  State,  135  Ala.  29  6 

Oates  V.  State,  156  Ala.  99  326 

O'Berry  v.  State,  47  Fla.  75  230 

O'Blenis  v.  State,  47  N.  J.  L.  279   418 
O'Brian  v.  Commonwealth,  6  Bush 

(Ky.)   563  261,  265 

O'Brien  v.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky. 
354  272 

V.  People,  36  N.  Y.  276  161 

V.  People,   48    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

•     274  157 

V.  State,  125  Ind.  38  54 

V.  State,  69  Neb.  691    491,  492,  494 

.  V.  State  (Tex.),  35  S.  W.  666   144 

V.  United    States,   27   App.   D. 

C.  263  42,  217,  282 

Ochsner    v.     Commonwealth,    2>2i 

Ky.  L.  119  69 

O'Connell  v.  People,  87  N.  Y.  377 

23,  157 
V.  State   (Ga.  App.),  62  S.  E. 

1007  21 

Oder  V.  State,  26  Fla.  520  473 

O'Donnell  v.  People,  no  III.  App. 

250  246 

V.  People,  224  111.  218  246 

Ogletree  v.   State,  28  Ala.  693 

154,  157 
O'Grady  v.  State,  36  Neb.  320  166 

O'Hearn  v.    State,   79   Neb.    513 

122    123 

Ohio  V.  Foy,  Tappan  (Ohio)  71     488 


e  to  Sections."] 
Oldham   v.    State,    5    Gill    (Md.) 

90  5-^3 

Oleson  V.  State,  11  Neb.  276  409,  410 
Oliver  V.  Commonwealth,  113  Ky. 

228  5M 
V.  Commonwealth,  loi  Pa.  St. 

215                                     19-  393 

V.  State,  17  Ark.  508     446,  447 

V.  State,  94  Ga.  83  40 

Oliver  v.  State,  129  Ga.  777  103 

V.  State,  II  Neb.  i  73 

Olson  V.  Peterson,  32,  Neb.  358 

525,  529,  532 
O'Mara  v.  Commonwealth,  75  Pa. 

St.  424                                         ^  334 
Omer  v.  Commonwealth,  95   K}-. 

353                                   _  77 

Omichund  v.  Barker,  Willes,  547  199 
O'Neal  V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  42 

484,  485.  486 
Oneale     v.     Commonwealth,      17 

Gratt.  (Va.)  582  404 

Oneil  V.  State,  48  Ga.  66  12 

O'Neill  V.  State,  85  Ga.  383  392 
O'Rear  v.  Commonwealth   (Ky.), 

78  S.  W.  407                            '  269 

Orman  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  604  175 

Ormond  v.  Ball,  120  Ga.  916  446 

Ormsby  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  472  76 

Ornelas  v.  Ruiz,  i6r  U.  S.  502  497 

Orr  V.  State,  107  Ala.  35  299 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  76  517 

Orser  v.  Orser,  24  N.  Y.  51  235 
Osborn  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

20  S.  W.  223  135 
v.  People,  2  Park  Cr.   (N.  Y.) 

583  91 

V.  State,  125  Ala.  106  248 

v.  State,  52  Ind.  526  343 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  46  371 

Osgood  V.  State,  64  Wis.  472  416,  417 

Oteiza,  In  re.  136  U.  S.  330  496 

Ouock  Ting  v.  United  States,  140 

U.   S.  417  i6a 

Overlook  v.  Hall.  8t  Maine  348  S^S 

Oviatt  V  .State,  19  Ohio  St.  573  310 
Owen   V.    State    (Tex.    Cr.    App. 

1910),  125  s.  w.  405  356 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  65 

312,  323,  328 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Isxxv 


[References  ar 

Owens  V.  State,  94  Ala.  97        381,  2^z 

V.  State,  119  Ga.  304  147 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  296  125 

V.  Stale,  67  Md.  307  217 

V.  State,  63  ]\Iiss.  450  58 

V.  State,  80  Miss.  499  248 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  i  482 

Owensby  v.  State,  82  Ala.  63 

118,  143 

Owings  V.  Hull,  9   Pet.    (U.   S.) 

607  505 

Owsley  V.  Commonwealth,  125  Ky. 

384  143 
Ozark  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

106                                      48,  262,  312 

Ozburn  v.  State,  87  Ga.  173  82 


Pace  V.  Alabama,  106  U.  S.  583       507 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  2>7  S. 

W.  948  332 

V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  762    145 
V.  State  (Tex.),  31  S.  W.  173   299 

Padfield  v.  People,  146  111.  660  12 

Padgett  V.  State,  40  Fla.  451  23 

Page  V.  Commonwealth,  27  Gratt. 
(Va.)  954  197 

V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  198  484 

Painter  v.  People,  147  111.  444 

12,  87,  90 

Palmer  v.  People,  138  III.  356         330^ 
V.  State    (Ala.    1909),   51    So. 

358  381,  382 

V.  State,  45  Ind.  388  309 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  393  126,  127 

Panton  v.  People,  114  111.  505  58 

Parham  v.   State,  147  Ala.  57         148 
V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  468  468 

Park  V.  State,  126  Ga.  575 

no,  112,  119a 

Parker  v.  Commonwealth,  96  Ky. 
212  324 

V.  People,  97  111.  z^  422 

V.  State,  39  Ala.  365  34,  296 

V.  State,  III  Ala.  72  298 

V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  ^2,^  517 

V.  State,  135  Ind.  534  61 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  284      12,  96,  153 


c  to  Sections.^ 

Parker  v.  State,  67  Md.  329 

225,  409,  410 
V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.'App.  461 

130,  374,  374a 

Parks  V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  100  223 
Parmelle  v.    People,  8   Hun    (N. 

Y.)  623  437 
Parnell  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

419  115 

Parris  v.  People,  76  111.  274  311 
Parrish    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky. 

1909),  123  S.  W.  339  90 
V.  State,  139  Ala.  16 

129,  157,  160,  161,  162,  163 

V.  State,  14  Neb.  60  275 
Parrott  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

47  S.  W.  452  67 
Parshell  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co., 

66  Hun  (N.  Y.)  62,2,  51 
Parson  v.  Commonwealth,  2>2)  Ky. 

L.  I 05 I  208 

Parsons  v.  State,  81  Ala.  577    154,  155 

Partain  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  100  470 

Partee  v.  State,  67  Ga.  570  75 

Paschal  v.  State,  89  Ga.  303  213 

Pate  V.  State  (Ala.),  48  So.  388  262 
V.  State,  150  Ala.  10 

48,  61,  93,  103,  119 

V.  State  (Tex.),  93  S.  W.  556  395 

V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  462  326 
Patterson,  Ex  parte,  50  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  271  147 

Patterson  v.  State   (Ala.),  47  So. 

52                                               324,  333 

V.  State,  86  Ga.  70                161,  214 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  613  103 

Patton  V.  State  (Ala.),  46  So.  862  314 

V.  State,  93  Ga.  in  310 

V.  State,  6  Ohio  St.  467  493 

V.  State  (Tex.),  80  S.  W.  86  312 

Patrick  v.  State,  17  Wyo.  260  144 

Paul  V.  Paul,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  23  237 

V.  State,  65  Ga.  152  147 

Pauli   V.    Commonwealth,   89   Pa. 

St.  432  78 

Paulk  V.  State.  52  Ala.  427        523,  526 
Paulson  V.  State,   118  Wis.  89 

48,  55,  119a 
Payne  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Met. 

(Ky.)  370  325 


Isxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Payne  v.  State,  60  Ala.  80       238,  326 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  184  378 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  564     103 

Peaden  v.  State,  46  Fla.  124  236 

Peak  V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  56 

1 6a,  276 
V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  179       103,  105 
Pearce  v.  State,  40  Ala.  720  89 

Pearsall  v.  Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 

L.  222  126,  129 

Pearson  v.  State,  55  Ga.  659  431 

Pease  v.  State,  91  Ga.  18  521 

Peat's  Case,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  288  189 

Peck  V.  Parchen,  52  Iowa  46  43 

V.  State,  86  Tenn.  259  66 

Peckham  v.  People,  32  Colo.  140      408 
Peek  V.  Boone,  90  Ga.  767  I73 

Peete  v.   State,  2  Lea    (Tenn.) 

513  427 

Pefferling  v.  State,  40  Tex.  486        409 
Peice  V.  State,  107  Ala.  loi  100 

Pence  v.  State,  no  Ind.  95  292 

Pendleton's  Case,  4  Leigh   (Va.) 

694  42s 

Pendrell  v.  Pendrell,  2  Stra.  925      526 

Pennsylvania  v.  Bell,  Add.  (Pa.) 

156  273 

V.  M'Fail,  Add.  (Pa.)  255  273 

Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Newmeyer, 

129  Ind.  401  221 

Penrice  v.   State    (Tex.),    105    S. 

W.  797  88,  305 

Penrod  v.  People,  89  111.  150  316 

Pentecost  v.  State,  107  Ala.  81        236 
People  v.  Abbott,  97  Mich.  484 

237,  415,  418 
V.  Abbot,    19  Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

192  417.  418 

V.  Acritelli,  57  Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

574  74 

V.  Adams,    3    Denio    (N.    Y.) 

190  445 

V.  Adams,  176  N.  Y.  351     58a,  477 
V.  Ah  Choy,  i  Idaho  317  119 

V.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  61  243 

V.  Ah  Fook,  62  Cal.  493  451 

V.  Ah  Lean,  7  Cal.  App.  626      413 
V.  Ah  Lee,  60  Cal.  85  96,  97 

V.  Ah  Lee  Doon,  97  Cal.  171        85 
V.  Ah  Sam,  41  Cal.  645  428 


c  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Ah  Sing,  51  Cal.  372  120 

V.  Ah  Sing,  59  Cal.  400  378 

V.  Ah  Teung,  92  Cal.  421  465 

V.  Ah  Woo,  28  Cal.  205  424 

V.  Ah  Ying,  42  Cal.  18  163 

V.  Ah  Yute,  54  Cal.  89  124 

V.  Aiken,  66  Mich.  460     6,  348,  350 

V.  Albers,  137  Mich.  678  Si 

V.  Altmau,  147  N.  Y.  473  423 

V.  Alviso,  55  Cal.  230              7,  189 

V.  Amaya,  134  Cal.  531  248 

V.  Ammon,  179  N.  Y.  540  74 

v.  Anderson,  26  Cal.  129  189 

V.  Anderson,  39  Cal.  703    324,  325 

V.  Anderson,  53  Mich.  60  269 

V.  Arensberg,  105  N.  Y.  123  481 
V.  Argentos    (Cal.    1909),    106 

Pac.  65  87,  323 

V.  Argo,  237  111.  173  247 

V.  Arlington,  131  Cal.  231  17 

V.  Armstrong,    114  Cal.   570  33 

V.  Arnold,   116  Cal.  682  61 

V.  Arnold,  43  Mich.  303  116 

V.  Arnold,  46  Mich.  268  493 
V.  Ashe,  44  Cal.  288          76,  79,  80 

V.  Ashmead,  118  Cal.  508  118 

V.  Atkinson,  40  Cal.  284  173 
V.  Babcock,  7  Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

201  435 
V.  Badgley,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

53  74 

V.  Bailey,  120  N.  Y.  S.  618  481 

V.  Baird,  104  Cal.  462  87 

V.  Baker,  100  Cal.  188  421 
V.  Baker,  3  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

42  250 
V.  Baker,  10  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

567  .  28 
V.  Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340  437,  442 
V.  Baldwin,  117  Cal.  244  413,  414 

V.  Balkwell,  143  Cal.  259  74 

V.  Barker,  114  Cal.  617  74 

V.  Barker,  144  Cal.  705  263 
V.  Barker,  60  Mich.  277 

126,  140,  173 

V.  Barker,  153  N.  Y.  in  120 

V.  Barney,  114  Cal.  554  409 

V.  Barrie,  49  Cal.  342  69 

V.  Barry,  94  Cal.  481  373 

V.  Barry,  196  N.  Y.  507  74 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxvii 


[References  at 

People  V.  Barthleman,  120  Cal.  7 

158,  160,  227 
V.  Bawden,  90  Cal.  195  158 

V.  Beach.  87  N.  Y.  508  11 1 

V.  Beckwith,  108  N.  Y.  67  7 

V.  Beevers,  99  Cal.  286  398 

V.  Belencia,  21  Cal.  544  166 

V.  Bell,  49  Cal.  485  80,  334 

V.  Bemmerly,  87  Cal.  117  104,  112 
V.  Benjamin,  2  Park.  Cr.    (N. 

Y.)   201  195 

V.  Benjamin,  9  How.  Pr.   (N. 

Y.)  419  176 

V.  Bennett,  39  Mich.  208  383 

V.  Bennett,  27  N.  Y.  117  146 

Y.  Bennett,  49  N.  Y.  137  279 

V.  Benoit,  97  Cal.  249  396 

V.  Benson,  6  Cal.  221  418 

V.  Berini,  94  Cal.  573  281 

V.  Bernor,  115  ]\Iich.  692 

212,  342,  409,  416 
V.  Berobuto,  196  N.  Y.  293  2-3 

V.  Besold,  154  Cal.  363  279 

V.  Beverly,  108  Mich.  509  107,  112 
V.  Bezy,  67  Cal.  223  76,  328 

V.  Bibby,  91   Cal.  470  423 

V.  Bidleman,  104  Cal.  608 

88.  89,  283,  285 
V.  Bill,  10  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  95  70 
V.  Bishop,  81  Cal.  113  ^2 

V.  Bissert,  172  N.  Y.  643  69.  124 
V.  Blackwell,  27  Cal.  65  .  222 
V.  Blake,  65  Cal.  275  164,  165 

V.  Blakeley,    4    Park    Cr.    (N. 

Y.)   176  17s 

V.  Blanchard,  90  N.  Y.  314  439 

V.  Blatt,  121  N.  Y.  S.  507  80 

V.  Block,  15  N.  Y.  S.  229  299,  372 
V.  Bodine,    i    Denio    (N.    Y.) 

281  76 

V.  Boggs,  20  Cal.  432  228 

V.  Bolanger,  71   Cal.  17  49,  69 

V.  Bonier,  189  N.  Y.  108  323 

V.  Bonifacio,  190  N.  Y.  150  120 
V.  Bonney,  19  Cal.  426  229,  230 
V.  Boo    Doo    Hong,    122    Cal. 

606  23 

V.  Boren,  139  Cal.  210  308 

V.  Borgetto,  99  Mich.  336  146 

V.  Bosquet,  116  Cal.  75  238 


e  to  Sections.'\ 

People  V.  Bosworth,  64  Hun   (X. 
Y.)  72  507 

V.  Botkin,  9  Cal.  App.  244  247,  323 
V.  Bowen,  43  Cal.  439  207 

V.  Bowen,  49  Cal.  65  87,  415 

V.  Boyd,  151  :Mich.  577  268 

V.  Boyle,  116  Cal.  658  360 

V.  Bradbury    (Cal.    1909),    103 

Pac.  215  467 

V.  Bradford     (Cal.),    81     Pac. 

712  20s 

V.  Bradner,  107  X".  Y.  i  516 

V.  Brandt,  14  N.  Y.  St.  419  339 
V.  Bransby,  32  X.  Y.  525  417 

V.  Brasch,  193  X.  Y.  46 

86a,  126,  147 
V.  Brecht,  105  X.  Y.  S.  436  103 

V.  Breese,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  429  35 
V.  Brent  (Cal.  App.  1909),  106 

Pac.  no  i5g 

V.  Brewer,  27  Alich.  134 

341,  392,  393 
V.  Brickner,  8  X.  Y.  Cr.  217  26 
V.  Briggs,    60    How.    Pr.    (X. 

Y.)  17  26,  191 

V.  Brigham,  2  Mich.  550  424 

V.  Britton,  118  X.  Y.  S.  989  282 
V.  Brooks,  loi  Mich.  98  21 

V.  Brooks,  131  X.  Y.  321  222,  248 
V.  Broughton,  49  Mich.  339  383 
V.  Brow,  90  Hun  (X.  Y.)  509 

211,  276 
V.  Brower,  7  X.  Y.  Cr.  292  180 

V.  Brown,  46  Cal.  102  270 

V.  Brown,  53  Cal.  66  67 

V.  Brown,  54  Cal.  243  272 

V.  Brown,  53  Mich.  531  411 

V.  Brown,  6  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  41  461 
V.  Brown,    46    Hun     (X.    Y.) 

320  257 

V.  Brown,  71  Hun  (X.  Y.)  601 

339,  341 
V.  Brown,  72  X.  Y.  571  59,  61,  427 
V.  Brown,   no  App.   Div.    (X. 

Y.)  490  369 

V.  Browne,  118  App.  Div.   (X. 

Y.)   793  427 

V.  Browne,  189  X.  Y.  528  269 

V.  Bruzzo,  24  Cal.  41  71 

V.  Bryon,  103  Cal.  675  458 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Payne  v.  State,  60  Ala.  80       238,  326 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  184  378 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  564     103 

Peaden  v.  State,  46  Fla.  124  236 

Peak  V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  56 

i6a,  276 
V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  179       103,  105 
Pearce  v.  State,  40  Ala.  720  89 

Pearsall  v.  Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 

L.  222  126,  129 

Pearson  v.  State,  55  Ga.  659  431 

Pease  v.  State,  91  Ga.  18  521 

Peat's  Case,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  288  189 

Peck  V.  Parchen,  52  Iowa  46 

V.  State,  86  Tenn.  259 
Peckham  v.  People,  32  Colo.  140 
Peek  V.  Boone,  90  Ga.  767 
Peete  v.   State,  2  Lea    (Tenn.) 

513 
Pefferling  v.  State,  40  Tex.  486 
Peice  V.  State,  107  Ala.  loi 
Pence  v.  State,  no  Ind.  95 
Pendleton's  Case,  4  Leigh   (Va.) 

694 
Pendrell  v.  Pendrell,  2  Stra.  925 
Pennsylvania  v.  Bell,  Add.   (Pa.) 
156 

V.  M'Fail,  Add.  (Pa.)  25s 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Newmeyer, 

129  Ind.  401  221 

Penrice  v.   State    (Tex.),    105    S. 

W.  797  8 

Penrod  v.  People,  89  111.  150 
Pentecost  v.  State,  107  Ala.  81 
People  V.  Abbott,  97  Mich.  484 

237,  41S,  418 
V.  Abbot,    19  Wend.    (N.   Y.) 

192  417,  418 

V.  Acritelli,  57  Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

574  74 

V.  Adams,    3    Denio    (N.    Y.) 


43 

66 

408 

173 

427 
409 
100 
292 

425 
526 

273 
273 


305 
316 
236 


190 


445 
58a,  477 
119 
243 

451 


V.  Adams,  176  N.  Y.  351 

V.  Ah  Choy,  i  Idaho  317 

V.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  61 

V.  Ah  Fook,  62  Cal.  493 

V.  Ah  Lean,  7  Cal.  App.  626      413 

V.  Ah  Lee,  60  Cal.  85  96,  97 

V.  Ah  Lee  Doon,  97  Cal.  171        83 

V.  Ah  Sam,  41  Cal.  645  428 


e  to  Seetious.] 

People  V.  Ah  Sing,  51  Cal.  372       120 
V.  Ah  Sing,  59  Cal.  400  378 

V.  Ah  Teung,  92  Cal.  421  465 

V.  Ah  Woo,  28  Cal.  205  424 

V.  Ah  Ying,  42  Cal.  18  163 

V.  Ah  Yute,  54  Cal.  89  124 

V.  Aiken,  66  Mich.  460  6,  348,  350 
V.  Albers,  137  IMich.  678  81 

V.  Altmaa,  147  N.  Y.  473  423 

V.  Alviso,  55  Cal.  230  7,  1S9 

V.  Amaya,  134  Cal.  531  248 

V.  Ammon,  179  N.  Y.  540  74 

v.  Anderson,  26  Cal.  129  189 

V.  Anderson,  39  Cal.  703  324,  325 
V.  Anderson,  53  Mich.  60  269 

V.  Arensberg,  105  N.  Y.  123  481 
V.  Argentos    (Cal.    1909),    106 

Pac.  65  87,  323 

V.  Argo,  237  111.  173  247 

V.  Arlington,   131   Cal.  231  17 

V.  Armstrong,  114  Cal.  570  33 
V.  Arnold,   116  Cal.  682  61 

V.  Arnold,  43  Mich.  303  116 

V.  Arnold,  46  Mich.  268  493 

V.  Ashe,  44  Cal.  288  76,  79,  80 

V.  Ashmead,  118  Cal.  508  118 

V.  Atkinson,  40  Cal.  284  173 

V.  Babcock,  7  Johns.    (N.  Y.) 

201  435 

V.  Badgley,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

53  74 

V.  Bailey,  120  N.  Y.  S.  618  481 
V.  Baird,  104  Cal.  462  87 

V.  Baker,  100  Cal.  188  421 

V.  Baker,  3  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

42  250 

V.  Baker,  10  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

567  .  28 

V.  Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340  437,  442 
V.  Baldwin,  117  Cal.  244  413,  414 
V.  Balkwell,  143  Cal.  259  74 
V.  Barker,  114  Cal.  617  74 
V.  Barker,  144  Cal.  705  263 
V.  Barker,  60  Mich.  277 

126,  140,  173 
V.  Barker,  153  N.  Y.  in  120 
V.  Barney,  114  Cal.  554  409 
V.  Barrie,  49  Cal.  342  69 
V.  Barry,  94  Cal.  481  373 
V.  Barry,  196  N.  Y.  507       74 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Lsxxvii 


[References  ar 

People  V.  Barthleman,  120  Cal.  7 

158,  160,  327 
V.  Bawden,  90  Cal.  195  158 

V.  Beach,  87  N.  Y.  508  in 

V.  Beckwith,  108  N.  Y.  67  7 

V.  Beevers,  99  Cal.  286  398 

V.  Belencia,  21  Cal.  544  166 

V.  Bell,  49  Cal.  485  ^  80,  334 

V.  Bemmerly,  87  Cal.  117  104,  112 
V.  Benjamin,  2  Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)   201  195 

V.  Benjamin,  9  How.  Pr.   (N. 

Y.)  419  176 

V.  Bennett,  39  Mich.  208  383 

V.  Bennett,  37  N.  Y.  117  146 

V.  Bennett,  49  N.  Y.  137  279 

V.  Benoit,  97  Cal.  249  396 

V.  Benson,  6  Cal.  221  41S 

V.  Berini,  94  Cal.  573  281 

V.  Bernor,  115  Mich.  692 

212,  342,  409,  416 
V.  Berobnto,  196  N.  Y.  293  323 

V.  Besold,  154  Cal.  363  279 

V.  Beverly,  108  Mich.  509  107.  112 
V.  Bezy,  67  Cal.  223  76,  328 

V.  Bibby,  91  Cal.  470  423 

V.  Bidleman,  104  Cal.  608 

88,  89,  283,  285 
V.  Bill,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  95  70 
V.  Bishop,  8r  Cal.  113  S2 

V.  Bissert,  172  N.  Y.  643  69,  124 
V.  Blackwell,  27  Cal.  65  .  222 
V.  Blake,  65  Cal.  275  164,  165 

V.  Blakeley,    4    Park    Cr.    (N. 

Y.)   176  175 

V.  Blanchard,  90  N.  Y.  314  439 

V.  Blatt,  121  N.  Y.  S.  507  80 

V.  Block,  15  N.  Y.  S.  229  299,  372 
V.  Bodine,    i    Denio    (N.    Y.) 

281  76 

V.  Boggs,  20  Cal.  432  228 

V.  Bolanger,  71   Cal.  17  49,  69 

V.  Bonier,  189  N.  Y.  108  323 

V.  Bonifacio,  190  N.  Y.  150  120 
V.  Bonney,  19  Cal.  426  229,  230 
V.  Boo    Doo    Hong,    122    Cal. 

606  23 

V.  Boren,  139  Cal.  210  308 

V.  Borgetto,  99  IMich.  336  146 

V.  Bosquet,  116  Cal.  75  238 


■e  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Bosworth,  64  Hun   (N. 
Y.)  72  507 

V.  Botkin,  9  Cal.  App.  244  247,  323 
V.  Bowen,  43  Cal.  439  207 

V.  Bowen,  49  Cal.  65  87,  415 

V.  Boyd,  151  Mich.  577  268 

V.  Boyle,  116  Cal.  658  360 

V.  Bradbury    (Cal.    1909),    103 

Pac.  215  467 

V.  Bradford    (Cal.),    81     Pac. 

712  205 

V.  Bradner,  107  N.  Y.  i  516 

V.  Brandt,  14  N.  Y.  St.  419  339 
V.  Bransby,  32  N.  Y.  525  417 

V.  Brasch,  193  N.  Y.  46 

86a,  126,  147 
V.  Brecht,  105  N.  Y.  S.  436  103 

V.  Breese,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  429  35 
V.  Brent  (Cal.  App.  1909),  106 

Pac.  no  159 

V.  Brewer,  27  Mich.  134 

341,  392,  393 
V.  Brickner,  8  N.  Y.  Cr.  217  26 
V.  Briggs,    60    How.    Pr.    (N. 

Y.)  17  26,  191 

V.  Brigham,  2  ]Mich.  550  424 

V.  Britton,  118  N.  Y.  S.  989  282 
V.  Brooks,  loi  "Mich.  98  21 

V.  Brooks,  131  N.  Y.  321  222,  248 
V.  Broughton,  49  ]Mich.  339  383 
V.  Brow,  90  Hun  (N.  Y.)  509 

211,  276 
V.  Brower,  7  N.  Y.  Cr.  292  180 
V.  Brown,  46  Cal.  102  270 

V.  Brown,  53  Cal.  66  67 

V.  Brown,  54  Cal.  243  272 

V.  Brown,  53  Mich.  531  411 

V.  Brown,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  41  461 
V.  Brown,    46    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

320  257 

V.  Brown,  71  Hun  (N.  Y.)  601 

339.  341 
V.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571  59,  61,  427 
V.  Brown,   no  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)  490  369 

V.  Browne,  n8  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)   793  427 

V.  Browne,  189  N.  Y.  528  269 

V.  Bruzzo,  24  Cal.  41  71 

V.  Bryon,  103  Cal.  675  458 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[Rcfci-ciiccs  ar 
People  V.  Buchanan,  145  X.  Y.  i 

173,  223,  318,  333 
V.  Buckely,  143  Cal.  375  267 

V.  Buckland,     13     Wend.     (N. 

Y.)   592  45S 

V.  Buckley,  91   App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)  586  464 

V.  Buddensieck,  103  N.  Y.  47        50 
V.  Buettner,  233  111.  272  104 

V.  Bunkers,  2  Cal.  App.  197 

74,  453,  454,  494 
V.  Burke,  11  Wend.  (N.  Y.  129  298 
V.  Burnham,  119  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)   302  291,  292,  293 

V.  Burns,  121  Cal.  529  6 

V.  Burns,  67  Mich.  537  225 

V.  Burridge,  99  Mich.  343  370 

V.  Burt,  51  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 

106  132 

Burt,  170  N.  Y.  560  55 

Bush,  68  Cal.  623  230 

Bush,  71  Cal.  602  230,  231 

Bushton,  80  Cal.  160  235 

Butler,  55  Mich.  408  238 

Butler,  III   Mich.  483  132 

Butler,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  347  5o8 
Cahill     (Cal.     App.     1909), 

106  Pac.  115  88 

Cahill,  103  N.  Y.  232  470 

Cain,  7  Cal.  App.  163  305 

Caldwell,  107  Mich.  374 

212,  276 
Callaghan,  4  Utah  49  103,  112 
Calvert,  22  N.  Y.  S.  220 

371,  377 
Campbell,    16   Det.  Leg.   N. 

1082  422 

Carey,  125  Mich.  535  55 

Carlin,  194  N.  Y.  448  160 

Carlson,    17    Det.    Leg.    N. 

120,  125  N.  W.  361  352 

Carlton,  57  Cal.  559  511 

Carney,  29  Hun  (N.  Y.)  47  525 
Carolan,  71  Cal.  195  210,  246 
Carpenter,  9  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

580  185 

Carpenter,  102  N.  Y.  238 

154-  302 
Carr,  64  ]\Iich.  702  245 


c  to  Sections.] 
People  V.  Carrier,  46  Mich.  442 

339,  341,  343 
V.  Carroll,  54  Mich.  334  378 

V.  Carson,  155  Cal.  164  494 

V.  Carvelto,  123  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)  822  484 

V.  Caryl,    12    Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

547  428,  429 

V.  Cascone,  185  N.  Y.  317  61,  246 
V.  Casey,  65  Cal.  260  277 

V.  Casey,  72  N.  Y.  393  61,  245 

V.  Cassidy,  133  N.  Y.  612 

126,  147a,  369 
V.  Caton,  25  Mich.  388  422 

V.  Cease,  80  Mich.  576  396 

V.  Cesena,  90  Cal.  381  517,  522 
V.  Chadwick,  4  Cal.  App.  63  467 
V.  Chadwick,  2   Park.   Cr.   (N. 

Y.)   163  428 

V.  Chadwick,  7  Utah  134  69 

V.  Chapleau,  121  N.  Y.  266  242 
V.  Chase,  27  Hun   (N.  Y.)  256 

398,  405 
V.  Chase,  79  Hun   (N.  Y.)  296 

104,  105 
V.  Childs,    90    App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)   58  86a 

V.  Chegaray,     18    Wend.     (N. 

Y.)  637  185 

V.  Ching,  74  Cal.  389  240 

V.  Chin  Hane,  108  Cal.  597 

121,  238 
V.  Chin    Mook    Sow,    51    Cal. 

597  102,  no 

V.  Christensen,  85  Cal.  568  237 

V.  Chrones,  141  Cal.  xviii  439 

V.  Chung,  54  Cal.  398  14 

V.  Chung  Ah  Chue,  57  Cal.  567  267 
V.  Church,   116  Cal.  300  358 

V.  Cipperly,  loi  N.  Y.  634  481 

V.  Clark,  151  Cal.  200  161 

V.  Clark,  33  Mich.   112 

387,  388,  389,  392,  393,  412 
V.  Clark.  14  N.  Y.  S.  642  453 

Clark.  102  N.  Y.  735  61 

Clarkson,  56  Mich.   164  432 

Claudius,  8  Cal.  App.  597  343 
Clements,  5  N.  Y.  Cr.  282  453 
Cleveland,   107  Alich.  367 

118,  119 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxix 


[References  ai 

People  V.  Cline,  74  Cal.  575  378 

V.  Clough,  73  Cal.  348  74 

V.  Cobler,  108  Cal.  538  281,  285 
V.  Cochran,  61  Cal.  548  228 

V.  Coffman,  59  ]Mich.  i  40 

V.  Cokahnour,  120  Cal.  253  132 

V.  Colbath,  141  Mich.  189  342 

V.  Cole,  54  Mich.  238  298 

V.  Cole,  113  Mich.  83  523,  533 

V.  Cole,  43  N.  Y.  508  203,  220 

V.  Collins,  9  Cal.  App.  622  419 

V.  Collins,  64  Cal.  293  492 

V.  Collison,  85  Alich.   105  279 

V.  Collun^,  122  Cal.  186  68 

V.  Colmey,  188  N.  Y.  573  118 

V.  Compton,  123  Cal.  403  69,  74 
V.  Compton,    i    Duer    (N.    Y. 

Super.)   512  461 

V.  Conkling,  iii  Cal.  616  228 

V.  Conley,  106  Mich.  424  354 

V.  Conlin,    13    ^lisc.    (N.    Y.) 

303  499 

V.  Connelly  (Cal.),  38  Pac.  42  283 
V.  Connor,  142  N.  Y.  130  196 

V.  Conroy.  97  N.  Y.  62  116,  161 
V.  Considine,  105  Mich.  149  268 
V.  Constantino,  153  N.  Y.  24  227 
V.  Cook,  41  Hun  (N.  Y.)  67 

440,  441,  443 
V.  Cook.  45  Hun  (N.  Y.)  34  515 
V.  Coombs,  158  N.  Y.  532  58a 

V.  Copsey,  71  Cal.  548  201 

V.  Corbin,  56  N.  Y.  363  87,  423 
V.  Corrigan,     129     App.     Div. 

(N.  Y.)  75  422 

V.  Corrigan,  195  N.  Y.  i  467 

V.  Costello,    I   Denio    (N.  Y.) 

83  73 

V.  Coughlin,  65   ]\Iich.  704 

17.  23,  338 
V.  Courier,  79  Mich.  366  416 

V.  Cowgill,  93  Cal.  596  77,  276 

V.  Coyne,  116  Cal.  295  309 

V.  Craig,  in  Cal.  460  205,  321,  328 
V.  Craig,  195  N.  Y.  190  507,  510 
V.  Cramer,    5    Park.    Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  171  197 

V.  Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  288  60 

V.  Crawford,  133  N.  Y.  535 

402,  404 


c  to  Sections.] 
People  V.   Creegan,    121    Cal.   554 

75,  429 
V.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  191  6,  58 

V.  Crosswell,   13  Mich.  427 

407,  408,  417 
V.  Croswell,  3  Johns.  Cas.   (N. 

Y.)  337  273,  361 

V.  Crowley,  102  N.  Y.  234    58,  416 
V.  Cuff,  122  Cal.  580  116,  319 

V.  Cummins,  47  Mich.  334  166 

V.  Cunningham,    6     Park 

(N.  Y.)  398 
V.  Curley,  99  Mich.  238 
V.  Curtis,  97  ]\Iich.  489 
V.  Curtiss,  118  App.  Div. 

Y.)  259 

V.  Cutler,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.)  465  473 
V.  Dailey,  143  N.  Y.  638 
V.  Daniels  (Cal.),  34  Pac.  233 
V.  Daniels,  105  Cal.  262 
V.  D'Argencour,      18     N, 

Wkly.  Dig.  532 
V.  Darr,  3  Cal.  App.  50 
V.  Davis,  61  Cal.  536 
V.  Davis,  52  Mich.  569 
V.  Davis,   21    Wend.    (N. 

309 
V.  Davis,  56  N.  Y.  95 
V.  Deacons,  109  N.  Y.  374 

126,  147,  334 
V.  Dean,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.)  610  295 
V.  De  Camp,  146  Mich.  533  61 

V.  DeFore,  64  ]Mich.  693 

17,  385,  387 
V.  DeGarmo,  179  N.  Y.  130  65 

V.  DeLay.  80  Cal.  52  282 

V.  Deluce,  237  111.  541  300 

V.  Del  Vermo,   192  N.  Y.  470 

50,  95,  97,  103,  no,  314 
V.  Demasters,  109  Cal.  607 

359,  516,  522 
V.  Demousset,  71  Cal.  611  339,  341 
V.  Diaz,  6  Cal.  248,  271,  272 

V.  Dice,  120  Cal.  189  329,  330a 

V.  Dietz,  86  Mich.  419,  357 

V.  Dimick,    41    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

616 
V.  Dinser,    49    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

82 
V.  DiRyana,  8  Cal.  App.  333 


Cr. 

18 
21,  35 
23 
(N. 

no 


6 

279 

Y. 

428 

222,  223 

468 

171 

Y.) 

428,  432 
31,  106 


440 

333 

430 


xc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 


1 89, 

42, 
421, 

(N. 


People  V.  Dixon,  94  Cal.  255 
V.  Dohring,  59  N.  Y.  374 
V.  Dolan,  96  Cal.  315 
V.  Dolan,  186  N.  Y.  4 
V.  Dole,  122  Cal.  486 
V.  Donaldson,  70  Cal.  116 
V.  Donnelly,    2    Park    Cr. 

Y.)    182 
V.  Donnolly,  143  Cal.  394 
V.  Donohue,  84  N.  Y.  438 
V.  Dorthy,  156  N.  Y.  347 
V.  Dowdigan,  67  Mich.  95 
V.  Dowling,  84  N.  Y.  478 

87,  301, 
V.  Downs,  123  N.  Y.  558      154, 
V.  Doyell,  48  Cal.  85 
V.  Doyle  (Fla.),  22  So.  272 
V.  Doyle,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.)  535 

67, 
V.  Driscoll,  107  N.  Y.  414 
V.  Droste  (Mich.  1910),  125  N. 

W.  87 
V.  Drum,    127   App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)  241 
V.  Druse,  103  N.  Y.  655       129, 
V.  Dudenhausen,  115  N.  Y.  S. 

374 
V.  Dumar,  106  N.  Y.  502 
V.  Duncan,  104  Mich.  460 
V.  Durrant,  116  Cal.  179 

50,  213, 
V.  Dye,  75  Cal.  108 
V.  Dyle,  21   N.  Y.  578 
V.  Eastwood,  14  N.  Y.  562 
V.  Eaton,  59  Mich.  559 
V.  Eaton,    122   App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)  706 
V.  Eckert,  2  N.  Y.  Cr.  470 
V.  Eckman,  72  Cal.  582 
V.  Eckman,  63   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

209 
V.  Eddy,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.)  615 
V.  Edwards     (Cal.),    73    Pac. 

416 
V.  Edwards,  41  Cal.  640 
V.  Edwards,  59  Cal.  359 
V.  Egnor,  175  N.  Y.  419 
V.  Eldridge,  3  Cal.  App.  648 
V.  Ellenbogen,  186  N.  Y.  603 
38,  74,  80, 


121 

417 
34-^ 

423 
429 

444 

70 
494 
499 

61 
227 

305 
338 
241 
414 

292 
314 

323 

482 

325 

90 

305 
i6a 


73 
167 
368 

74 
61 
83 

482 
481 

220 
324 
373 
158 
147 

470 


e  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Elliot,  80  Cal.  296  23 

V.  Elliot,  106  N.  Y.  288  73 

V.  Elliot,  163  N.  Y.  II  79 

V.  Elmer,  109  Mich.  493  279 

V.  Elpliis,  139  Cal.  xix  422 

V.  Emerson,  7  N.  Y.  Cr.  97  32 
V.  Emmons,  7  Cal.  App.  685 

4S4>  494 
V.  Eppinger,  114  Cal.  350  519 

V.  Estrado,  49  Cal.  171  119a 

V.  Etting,  99  Cal.  577  21,  35 

V.  Evans   (Cal.),  41   Pac.  444 

116,  328 
V.  Evans,  72  Mich.  367  414 

V.  Everett,  242  111.  628  378 

V.  Everhardt,  104  N.  Y.  591 

75,  89,  200,  423 
V.  Fair,  43  Cal.  137  77,  78 

V.  Fairchild,  48  Mich.  31  366 

V.  Eallon,  149  Cal.  287  147 

V.  Fancher,  2  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

226  29,  226 

V.  Fanning,  131  N.  Y.  659  147,  276 
V.  Farina,  118  N.  Y.  S.  817  414 
V.  Farmer,  77  Cal.  i  iii 

V.  Farmer,   194  N.  Y.  251  154 

V.  Farrell,  30  Cal.  316  433 

V.  Farrell,  31  Cal.  576  59 

V.  Farrington,  140  Cal.  656 

136,  301 
V.  Feilen,  58  Cal.  218  19 

V.  Feinberg,  237  111.  348  73,  238 
V.  Ferguson,  119  Mich.  373  308 
V.  Few,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  290  461 
V.  Fice,  97  Cal.  459 
V.  Fine,  77  Cal.  147 
V.  Finley,  38  Mich.  483 
V.  Finnegan,  i  Park.  Cr.  147 
V.  Fiori,    123    App.    Div.    (N 

Y.)    174 
V.  Fish,  125  N.  Y.  136 
V.  Fishman,  119  N.  Y.  S.  89 
V.  Fitzgerald,  156  N.  Y.  253 

86,  282,  369 
V.  Fitzpatrick,  5  Park  Cr.  26  185 
V.  Flaherty,  79  Hun    (N.   Y.) 

48 
V.  Fleming,  60  Hun    (N.   Y.) 

576  294 

V.  Flock,  100  Mich.  512  291 


518 
119 

12 
275 

127 
312 
196 


418 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ZCl 


[References  ar 

People  V.  Flynn,  73  Cal.  511  277 

V.  Foley,  64  Mich.   148    66,  88,  321 
V.  Pong  Ah   Sing,  64  Cal.  253 

109,  152 
V.  Pong  Ah  Sing,  70  Cal.  8 

106,    III,    2TI 

V.  Pong  Ching,  78  Cal.  169    17,  83 
V.  Pong  Chung,  5  Cal.  App.  587 

271,  411,  413 
V.  Poo,  112  Cal.  17 
V.  Poote,   93   Mich.   38 
V.  Pournier     (Cal.),    47 

1014 
V.  Formosa,  61  Hnn  272 
V.  Fowler,  104  Mich.  449 
V.  Pox,  121  N.  Y.  449 
V.  Francis,  38  Cal.  183 
V.  Frank,  28  Cal.  507 
V.  Prankenberg,  236  111.  408 
V.  Freeman,  92  Cal.  3S9 
V.  Prindel,    58    Hun   '(N.    Y.) 

482  205, 

V.  Frost   (N.  Y.   1910),  91  N. 

E.  376 
V.  Pultz,  109  Cal.  258 
V.  Gage,  62  Mich.  271 
V.  Gaimari,  176  N.  Y.  84    325,  328 
V.  Gallagher,  75  Mich.  512 

64,  132,  176 
V.  Galland,  55  ]\lich.  628  2S2 

V.  Galloway,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

54c  430,  44  T 

V.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9 

76,  160,  164,  324 
V.  Garcia,  63  Cal.  19  104 

V.  Gardner,  144  N.  Y.  119 

53,  54,  5?a 
V.  Garnett,  9  Cal.  App.  194  267 
V.  Garrahan,  19  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)  347 
V.  Gartland,  30  App.  Div.   (X. 

Y.)  534 
V.  Gates,  46  Cal.  52 
V.  Gates,    13    Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

3ir 
V.  Gault,  104  Mich.  575 
V.  Gelabert,  39  Cal.  663 
V.  German,  no  Mirh.  244 
V.  Gctchell,  6  Mich.  496 
V.  Giancoli,  74  Cal.  642 


60 
61 
Pac. 

369 
228 

87 

126,  127 

156 

423 

292 

517 

357 

391 
185,  415 
409,  411 


e  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Gibbons,  43  Cal.  557  132 

V.  Gibbs,  98  Cal.  66r           437,  442 
V.  Gibbs,  70  Mich.  42=; 

385,  388,  389 

V.  Gibbs,  93  N.  Y.  470  87 

V.  Giblin,  115  N.  Y.  196  245 

V.  Gibson,  106  CaJ.  458  312 

V.  Gibson,  58  Mich.  368  151 
V.  Gilhooley,  187  N.  Y.  551 

262,  468 

145,  212 
222 


438 
384 


178 

197 

147a 

466 

437 
117,  iiR 


V.  Gillespie,   in   Mich.  241 


V.  Gillis,  97  Cal.  542 

V.  Girdler,  65  Mich.  68  381 

V.  Giro  (N.  Y.  1910),  90  N.  E. 

432  133 

V.  Glassman,  12  Utah  238  364 

V.  Gleason,  122  Cal.  370  86a 

V.  Glenn,  10  Cal.  32  in,  112 

V.  Glover.  141  Cal.  233  103 

V.  Glover,  71  Mich.  303 

409,  411,  413,  418 
v.  Goldenson,  76  Cal.  328 

25,  54,  222 
v.  Gonzalez,  6  Cal.  App.  255  411 
v.  Gonzalez,  35  N.  Y.  49  334 

v.  Gordon,  100  Mich.  518  185 

v.  Gosch,  82  Mich.  22  247 

v.  Gould,  70  Mich.  240  391 

V.  Goulette,  82  Mich.  36  408 

v.  Governale,  193  N.  Y.  581  87,  90 
V.  Grabutt,  17  Mich.  9  83 

V.  Graney,  91   Mich.  646  17 

v.  Grauer,    12  App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)  464  418 

V.  Gray,  66  Cal.  271  283 

v.  Green,  99  Cal.  564  200 

V.  Green,    i    Denio     (N.    Y.) 

614  185 

V.  Greenwall,  108  N.  Y.  296 

241,  376 
V.  Gregory,  120  Cal.  16  489,  492 
V.  Gress,  107  Cal.  461  330 

V.  Griffin,  77  Mich.  585  377 

V.  Griffin,  38  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

475  298 

V.  Grill,  151  Cal.  592      50,  51,  268 
V.  Gnidici,  100  N.  Y.  503  120 

V.  Gumaer,   4   App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)  412  387 


XCll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


People  V.  Gutierrez,  74  Cal.  Si  511 
V.  Hagan,  14  N.  Y.  S.  233  zil 
V.  Hagenow,  236  111.  514 

89,  90,  312,  345.  349,  330 
V.  Haines,  i  N.  Y.  S.  55  27 

V.  Hall,  94  Cal.  595  106 

V.  Hall,  48  Mich.  482  246,  280 

V.  Hallam,  6  Cal.  App.  331  358 

V.  Hamberg,  84  Cal.  468  196 

V.  Hammond,  132  IMich.  422  451 
V.  Hancock,  7  Utah  170  3 

V.  Handley,  100  Cal.  370  366 

V.  Handley,  93  Mich.  46  367 

V.  Harben,  5  Cal.  App.  29  423 

V.  Hare,  57  Mich.  505  150,  I53 

V.  Harriden,   i    Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  344  395 

V.  Harris,  29  Cal.  678  166 

V.  Harris,  114  Cal.  575  147 

V.  Harris,  95  Mich.  87  324 

V.  Harris,    4    Denio    (N.    Y.) 

150  256 

V.  Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423.  429 

5,  6,  90,  180 
V.  Harrison,  93  IMich.  594  237 

V.  Hartman,  103  Cal.  242  418 

V.  Harty,  49  Mich.  490  523 

V.  Haver,  4  N.  Y.  Cr.  171  88 

V.  Hawes,  98  Cal.  648  276,  330 
V.  Hawkins,  106  IMich.  479  283 
V.  Hawks,  107  Mich.  249  527 

V.  Hawley,  11 1  Cal.  7B  229 

V.  Haxer,  144  Mich.  575  120,  314 
V.  Haves,  9  Cal.  App.  301  330 

V.  Hayes,   70   Hun    (N.    Y.) 

I I I  468 

V.  Haynes,  14  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 

546  442 

V.  Hecker,  109  Cal.  451  ZIZ 

V.  Hemple,  4  Cal.  App.  120  281 
V.  Hendrickson,  53  Mich.  525  381 
V.  Hendrickson.   18  App.   Div. 

(N.  Y.)  404  292 

V.  Hennsler,  48  Mich.  49 

89,  438,  440 
V.  Henrv,    127  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)  489  5T9 

V.  Herrick,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

87  437,  442 

V.  Hess,  85  Jvlich.  128  687 


[Rcfcraiccs  are  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Hess,  8  App.  Div.   (N. 


Y.)   143  174 

V.  Hickey,   109  Cal.  275  360 

V.  Hickman,  113  Cal.  80     125,  137 
V.  Hicks,  98  Mich.  86  357 

V.  Hill,   116  Cal.  562  312 

V.  Hill,  198  N.  Y.  64  321 

V.  Hill  (X.  Y.),  87  N.  E.  813     163 
V.  Hillhouse,  80  IMich.  580 

123,  222 
V.  Hiltel,  131  Cal.  577  6 

V.  Hitchcock,  104  Cal.  482  58 

V.  Hodgdon,  55  Cal.  72        102,  103 
V.  Hodge,  141  Mich.  312  345 

V.  Hodnett,  68   Hun    (N.  Y.) 

341  481 

V.  Hogan,  117  La.  863  136 

V.  Hoin,  62  Cal.  120  154 

V.  Holbrook,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 


90 


296 


V.  Holden,  127  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)  758  69 

v.  Holfelder,  5  N.  Y.  Cr.  179  124 
V.  Holmes,  in  Mich.  364  157 

V.  Hong   Quin   Moon,  92  Cal. 

41  522 

V.  Hooghkerk,  96  N.  Y.  149  61 
V.  Hope,  62  Cal.  291  233,  375,  379 
V.  Hopson,   I   Denio   (N.  Y.) 

574  446 

V.  Horr,   7    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    9 

309,  311 
V.  Horton,  7  Cal.  App.  34  300 

V.  Hosier,  196  N.  Y.  506  87 

V.  Hossler,  135  IMich.  384  122 

V.  Houghton,  24  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

501  185 

V.  Hovev,    29    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

382  185 

V.  Hovev.  30  Hun  (N.  Y.)  354  5^6 
v.  Howell,  4  Johns.    (N.   Y.) 

296  420 

V.  Howes,  81  IMich.  396  126 

V.  Hoy  Yen,  34  Cal.  176  138 

V.  Huggins,  no  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)   613  439 

V.  Hughes,  41  Cal.  234  33 

V.  Hughes,   91    Hun    (N.   Y.) 

354  305 

V.  Hughes,  137  N.  Y.  29  72 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XClll 


[References  ai 

People  V.  Hughes,  ii  Utah  lOO        3S^ 
V.  Hulbut,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.)  133 

26,  191 
V.  Hull,  86  Mich.  449  215,  230 

V.  Humphrey,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 

3i4_  404 

V.  Huntington,  8  Cal.  App.  612  99 
V.  Hurley,  60  Cal.  74 

3od,  301,  302 
V.  Hurst,  62  Mich.  276  282 

V.  Husband,  36  INIich.  306  292 

V.  Hutchings    (Cal.),  97    Pac. 

325  297 

V.  Hutchings,  8  Cal.  App.  550  136 
V.  Hutchings,  137  Mich.  527  429 
V.  Hyler,  2  Park.  Cr.  570  228 

V.  lines,  no  Mich.  250  383 

V.  Irwin,  77  Cal.  494  492 

V.  Isham,  109  Mich.  72  383 

V.  Ivey,  49  Cal.  56  275 

V.  Jackman,  96  Mich.  269  365 

V.  Jackson,  6  N.  Y.  Cr.  393  418 
V.  Jackson,  47  Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

60  451 

V.  Jackson,  in  N.  Y.  362  32,  51 
V.  Jackson,  182  N.  Y.  66  116 

V.  Jacobs,  29  Cal.  579  353 

V.  Jacobs,  49  Cal.  384  235 

V.  James,  5  Cal.  App.  427  163 

V.  James,  no  Cal.  155  33 

V.  Jan  John,  144  Cal.  284  137 

V.  Jeina,  125  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 

697  90 

V.  Jenness,  5  IMich.  305 

92,  381,  395 
V.  Jim  Ti,  32  Cal.  60  130 

V.  Johnson     (Cal.     App.),    98 

Pac.  682  i8s 

V.  Johnson,  57  Cal.  571  61 

V.  Johnson,  91  Cal.  265  282 

V.  Johnson,  106  Cal.  289  418 

V.  Johnson,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 

292  435 

V.  Johnson,  T40  N.  Y.  350  12.  52 
V.  Johnson,  185  X.  Y.  219  329 

V.  Jones  (Cal.),  8  Pac.  611  517 
V.  Jones,  123  Cal.  65  7,  147,  369 
V.  Jones,  195  N.  Y.  547  482 

V.  Jones,  106  N.  Y.  523         45,  427 


c  to  Sections.] 

People   V.    Jones,    129   App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.)   772 

482 

V. -Jones,  115  N.  Y.  S.  800 

516 

V.  Jordan,  66  Cal.  10 

435 

V.  Jordan,   125  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)  522 

512 

V.  Josephs,  7  Cal.  129 

77 

V.  Josselyn,  39  Cal.  393 

346 

V.  Judson,  II  Daly  (N.  Y.)   i 

489 

V.  Kamaunu,  no  Cal.  609 

36 

V.  Kaminskv,  73  Mich.  637 

532 

V.  Kane,  4  Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.) 

15 

387 

V.  Kane,  142  N.  Y.  366 

309 

v.  Keefer,  103  Mich.  83 

532 

V.  Kehoe,  19  N.  Y.  763 

298 

V.  Keith,  141  Cal.  686        411, 

414 

V.  Kelley,  47  Cal.  125  65,  131 

V.  Kelly,  II  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 

495  369 

V.  Kellv,  24  N.  Y.  74    29,  226,  247 
V.  Kelly,  35  Hun  (X.  Y.)  295 

149,  153 
V.  Kemmler,  119  N.  Y.  580  181 
V.  Kendall,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

399  21,  437 

V.  Kent,  41  Misc.  (N.  Y.)   191 

131,  136 
V.  Kerr,  6  X.  Y.  S.  67  80 

V.  Kibler,  106  X.  Y.  321  479 

V.  King,  4  Cal.  App.  213  378 

V.  King,  28  Cal.  265  27 

V.  Kirk,   151   Mich.  253  357 

V.  Kirwan,  22  X.  Y.  160  417 

V.  Knapp,  71  Cal.  i  48 

V.  Knight   (Cal.),  43  Pac.  6 

221,  411,  414,  418 
V.  Koehler,  146  111.  App.  541  514 
V.  Koerner,  154  X.  Y.  355 

124,  160,  224 
V.  Koerner,  191  X.  Y.  528  159,  163 
V.  Kohler,  5  Cal.  72  232 

V.  Koller,  142  Cal.  621  395 

V.  K9ster,   121   App.   Div.    (X. 

Y.)  852  481 

V.  Kraft,  91  Hun  (X.  Y.)  474 

103,  104 
V.  Kraft,  148  X.  Y.  631  102.  no 
V.  Krummer,  4  Park.  Cr.   (X. 

Y.)  217  422,  427 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Krusick,  93  Cal.  74  391 
V.  Kunz,  76  Hun  (N.  Y.)  610  414 
V.  Kurtz,    42    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

335  126 

V.  Lagrille,   i  Wheel.  Cr.   (N. 

Y.)  412  _  432 

V.  Lagroppo,  90  App.  Div.  (N. 


Y.)  219 
Laird,  102  Mich.  135 
Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358 
Lake,  no  N.  Y.  61 
Lamb,    2    Keyes     (N 

360 
Lambert,  120  Cal.  170 
Lampson,  70  Cal.  204 
La  Munion,  64  Mich.  709 

151,  152 
Landiero,  192  N.  Y.  304 

517,  S18 
Lane,  100  Cal.  379 
Lane,  loi  Cal.  513 
Lane,  49  Mich.  340 
Lane,  i  N.  Y.  Cr.  548 
Lane,  31  Hun  (N.  Y.)  13 

516,  522 
Lang,  104  Cal.  363 
Lang,  142  Cal.  482 
Lange,  90  Mich.  454 
Langtree,  64  Cal.  256 
Lapique,  120  Cal.  25 
Lattimer,  86  Cal.  403 
Laverty,  9  Cal.  App.  756  366 
Lawrence,  21  Cal.  368  in 

Leavens    (Cal.   App.    1909), 

106  Pac.  1 103  437,  439 


315 
171 
163 
397 

Y.) 

324 

409,  411 
270 


166 
179,  180 

147 
519,  520 


277 

377 

211 

72,  188 

282 

153,  369 


Ledwon,  153  N.  Y.  10 

Lee,  I  Cal.  App.  169 

Lee,  49  Cal.  37 

Lee  Ah  Chuck,  66  Cal.  662    222 

Lee  Chuck,  74  Cal.  30  326 

Lee   Duck   Lung,    129   Cal 

491 
Lee  Gam,  69  Cal.  552 
Lee  Sare  Bo,  72  Cal.  623 

105,  152 
Leighton,  i  N.  Y.  Crim.  468  522 
Lem  You,  97  Cal.  224  267 

Lennox,  67  Cal.  113  144 

Lennox,  106  Mich.  625  437 

Lenon,  79  Cal.  625  415 


279 
330 
254 


82 
153 


People  V.    Leonardin,    143   N.   Y 

36c 

) 

164 

V. 

Lepper,  51  Mich.  196 

144 

V. 

Levin,    119    App.    Div.    (N 

Y.)  233 

438 

V. 

Levine,  85  Cal.  39 

233 

V. 

Levy,  71  Cal.  618 

161 

V. 

Lewandowski,  143  Cal.  574 

263 

V. 

Lewis,  64  Cal.  401            507 

5," 

V. 

Lewis,  51  Mich.  172 

144 

V. 

Lewis,  16  N.  Y.  S.  881 

124 

V. 

Lewis,  136  N.  Y.  633 

187 

V. 

Leyba,  74  Cal.  407 

356 

V. 

Leyshon,  108  Cal.  440 

271 

V. 

Lilley,  43  Mich.  521 

353 

V. 

Linares,  142  Cal.  17 

17 

V. 

Liphardt,  105  ]\Iich.  80 

453 

V. 

Long,  7  Cal.  App.  27       122, 

124 

V. 

Loris,  115  N.  Y.  S.  236 

280a 

V. 

Loui  Tung,  90  Cal.  377 

521 

V. 

Lowrey,  70  Cal.  193 

230 

V. 

Lowrie,  4  Cal.  App.  137  371 

375 

V. 

Luby,  99  Mich.  89 

144 

V. 

Lynch,   loi   Cal.  229 

326 

V. 

Lyons,  51  Mich.  215 

248 

V. 

McArdle,   5   Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  180 

392 

V. 

Mc.Arron,   121   Mich,   i 

79 

V. 

McBride,  120  Mich.  166    96, 

290 

V. 

McCallam,  103  N.  Y.  587 

137 

V. 

McCamm,  16  N.  Y.  58 

12,  157, 

158 

V. 

McCarthy,   115  Cal.  255 

157 

V. 

McCarthy,  45  How.  Pr.  (N. 

Y.)   97 

507 

V. 

McConnell,  146  111.  532 

267 

V. 

McCord,  76  Mich.  200 

373 

V. 

McCormick,  135  N.  Y.  663 

61 

V. 

McCraney,  6  Park.  Cr.  (N. 

Y.)   49 

189 

V. 

McCrea,  32  Cal.  98         122, 

124 

V. 

McCrory,  41  Cal.  458      144, 

270 

V. 

McCue,   87  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)  72 

122 

V. 

McCurdy,  68  Cal.  576     337, 

517 

V. 

McDonald    (Cal.),   45   Pac. 

1005 

358 

V. 

McDonald,  9  Mich.  150 

408 

V. 

McDonnell,  80  Cal.  285 

432 

V. 

McDowell,  71  Cal.  194 

363 

TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCV 


[References  ar 

People    V.    McDowell,    63    ]Mich. 
229  344 

V.  McElroy,  14  N.  Y.  S.  203        358 
V.  McElvaine,  125  N.  Y.  596 

158,  163 
V.  McGarry,  136  Mich.  316 

225,  451,  454 
V.  McGintv,  24  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

62  358 

V.  McGlade,  139  Cal.  66  430 

V.  McGloin,  91  N.  Y.  241 

131,  132,  13s,  140 
V.  McGonegal,   42    N.    Y.    St. 

307  346 

V.  AIcGonegal,  136  N.  Y.  62  350 
V.  McGregar,  88  Cal.  140  36,  37 
V.  McGuire,  135  N.  Y.  639 
V.  McGungill,  41  Cal.  429 
V.  McKane,  143  N.  Y.  455 

77,  78,  492 
V.  McKenzie,  6  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)    199 
V.  McKeon,  19  N.  Y.  S.  486 
V.  McLane,  60  Cal.  412 
V.  McLaughlin,  44  Cal.  435 
V.  McLaughlin,    2    App.    Div 

(N.  Y.)  419 
V.  McLean,  71  Mich.  309 
V.  McMahon,  15  N.  Y.  384 

126,  131,  132,  135,  138 
V.  McNair,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

608  232 

V.  McNamara,  94  Cal.  509    18,  223 
V.  McXutt,  64  Cal.  116  376 

V.  ]McQuade,  ito  N.  Y.  284        492 
V.  McQuaid,  85  Mich.  123  403 

V.  McSweeny    (Cal.),  38  Pac. 

743  83 

V.  iMcWhortcr,  93  Mich.  641        23 
V.  McWhorter,    4    Barb.     (N. 

Y.)  438  68 

V.  Macard,  73  ]\Iich.  15  18 

V.  Macard,  109  Mich.  623 

467,  469,  470 
V.  Machen,  loi  Mich.  400  225 

V.  MacKinder,    80  -Hun     (N. 

Y.)  40  1.30,  358 

V.  Mahaney,  41   Hun    (N.  Y.) 

26  480 

V.  Mahon,  i  Utah  205  175 


62 


353 
118 

245 
145 

456 
418 


c  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Mahoney,  yy  Cal.  529 

228 

V. 

Main,  114  Cal.  632 

33 

V. 

Majoine,  144  Cal.  303 

223 

V. 

Malaspina,  57  Cal.  628 

153 

V. 

jMallon,  116  App.  Div.  425 

238, 

248 

V. 

Manahan,  32  Cal.  68 

415 

V. 

Manasse,  153  Cal.  10 

61,  62, 

123, 

222 

V. 

Manning,  48  Cal.  335 

36 

V. 

Manoogian,  141  Cal.  59 

2 

159. 

161 

V. 

Mar    Gin    Suie    (Cal. 

App. 

1909),  103  Pac.  951 

315 

V. 

Marion,  29  Mich.  31 

121, 

421 

V. 

]\Iarkham,  64  Cal.  157 

236, 

451 

V. 

Marks,  90  Mich.  555 

78, 

86a 

V. 

Marseiler,  70  Cal.  98 

166, 

250, 

354 

V. 

Marshall,  59  Cal.  386 

339, 

343 

V. 

Martin,  102  Cal.  558 

435 

V. 

Martin,  175  N.  Y.  315 

466 

V. 

Martinez,  66  Cal.  278 

131 

V. 

Mather,  4  Wend.    (N. 

Y.) 

229 

244 

V. 

INLatthai,  135  Cal.  442 

277 

V. 

Maughs,  149  Cal.  253 

50 

V. 

Mayes,  66  Cal.  597 

409 

V. 

Mayes,  113  Cal.  618 

2 

,  60, 

280 

V. 

Mayhew,  19  Misc.    (N. 

Y.) 

313 

519 

V. 

Mavhew,  iso  N.  Y.  346 

74 

V. 

Maxwell,  83   Hun    (N. 

Y.) 

157 

24 

V. 

Mead,  50  Mich.  228 

54,  79. 

374, 

376 

V. 

Melandrez,  4  Cal.  App. 

396 

269 

V. 

Mendenhall,  119  Mich. 

404 

403 

V. 

Messer,  148  Mich.  168 

291 

V. 

Meyer,  73  Cal.  548 

512, 

514 

V. 

Miles,  I9i  N.  Y.  541 

45. 

491, 

494 

V. 

Millard.  S3  Mich.  63 

23, 

280 

V. 

Miller.  66  Cal.  468 

69 

V. 

Miller    114  Cal.  10 

164 

V. 

Miller,  122  Cal.  84 

125 

V. 

;\liller,  91   Mich.  639 

354 

V. 

Miller,  96  Mich.  119 

408 

XCVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
People  V.  Miller,  2  Park.  Cr.  (X. 
Y.)    197  189 

V.  j\Iills,  94  Alich.  630  222,  237 

V.  Mills,  98  N.  Y.   176  166 

V.  Millspaugh,  11  Mich.  278  392 
V.  Minnaugh,  131  N.  Y.  563  276 
V.  Minney,  455  Mich.  534  279 

V.  Mitchell,  94  Cal.  550 

132,  149,  23s,  315 
V.  ]\Iix,  149  ]\Iich.  260  369 

V.  M'Kay,  122  Cal.  628  314,  333 
V.  I\Iol,  137  Mich.  692  451 

V.  Molineux,  168  N.  Y.  264  131 
V.  Mondon,  103  N.  Y.  211  131 

V.  Monk,  8  Utah  35  456 

V.  Monreal,  7  Cal.  App.  37  236 
V.  IMonroe,  138  Cal.  97  36 

V.  Monteith,  73  Cal.  7  167 

V.  Montgomery,  53  Cal.  576  119 
V.  ^Montgomery,  176  N.  Y.  219  323 
V.  ]Moore,  3  Wheeler  Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  82  48S 

V.  Morales,  143  Cal.  550  315 

V.  Moran,  144  Cal.  48 

82,  116,  137,  491 
V.  ]\Iorehouse,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

638  353 

V.  ^lorphy,  lOO  Cal.  84  439 

V.  Morris,  3  Cal.  App.  i  415 

V.  Morrison,    i    Park   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)   625  417 

V.  ]Morse,  196  N.  Y.  306 

48,  90,  102 
V.  Morton,  139  Cal.  719  62 

V.  Morton,  4  Utah  407  377 

V.  Mnhly  (Cal.  App.  1909),  104 

Pac.  466  47 

V.  Muldoon,   2   Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)    13  465 

V.  Mullen,  7  Cal.  App.  547  33 

V.  ]\Iunroe  (Cal.),  33  Pac.  776  421 
V.  Munroe,  100  Cal.  664  218 

V.  Murphy,  45  Cal.  137  262,  266 
V.  Murphy,  146  Cal.  502  78,  81 

V.  Murphy,  loi  N.  Y.  126 

179,  180,  351 
V.  Murphy,  135  N.  Y.  450  369 

V.  ]\Iurphy,  145  IMich.  524  417 

V.  Murray,  10  Cal.  309  324 

V.  ^Murray,  52  Mich.  288  11 1 


c  to  Sections.] 
People    V.    ^Myers,   20   Cal.    518 


157, 

158 

V. 

Mylin,  139  111.  App.  50c 

271 

V. 

Nagle,  137  ^lich.  88 

605 

V. 

Nail,  242  111.  284 

41a 

V. 

Naughton,    7    Abb.     N 

S. 

(N.  Y.)  421 

26 

V. 

Neff,  191  N.  Y.  210 

89 

V. 

Nelson,  85  Cal.  421 

263 

V. 

Nelson,  153  N.  Y.  90 

392 

V. 

Neumann,  85  i\Iich.  98 

279 

V. 

Newman,    5    Hill    (N. 

Y.) 

295 

262, 

265 

V. 

News-Times    Pub.    Co. 

,    35 

Colo.  253 

461 

V. 

New  York  Hospital,  3 

Abb. 

N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  229 

203 

V. 

Neyce,  86  Cal.  393 

283 

V. 

Nichols    (}klich.    1909), 

124 

N.  W.  25 

418 

V. 

Nino,  149  N.  Y.  317 

158, 

163, 

215 

V. 

Noblett,  184  N.  Y.  612 

223, 

438 

V. 

Noelke,  94  N.  Y.  137 

61 

V. 

Nolan,  22  ^lich.  229 

273 

V. 

Nohe,    19    Misc.     (X. 

Y.) 

674 

470 

V. 

Noonan,  14  N.  Y.  S.  5 

19 

519, 

522 

V. 

Northey,  77  Cal.  618 

215 

V. 

Nunley,   142  Cal.  441 

225 

V. 

Nyce,  34  Hun  (N.  Y.)  298 

24 

V. 

O'Brien,  96  Cal.   171 

236 

V. 

O'Brien.  130  Cal.   i 

17 

V. 

O'Brien,  60  Mich.  8 

73 

V. 

O'Brien,  68  Mich.  468 

124 

V. 

O'Brien,  92  ]\Iich.  17 

96 

V. 

O'Brien,  176  N.  Y.  253 

247 

V. 

Odell,  I  Dak.  197 

166 

V. 

Ogden,    8    App.    Div. 

(N. 

Y.)  464 

523 

V. 

Ogle,  104  N.  Y.  511 

6r,  74, 

118. 

119 

V. 

Oldham,  11 1  Cal.  648 

358, 

493 

V. 

Oliver  (Cal.),  95  Pac.  ] 

72 

61 

V. 

01mstead,'36  Mich.  431 

108, 

349 

V. 

O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  251 

75, 

210 

V. 

O'Neill,  107  Mich.  556 

235 

V. 

O'Neill,  112  N.  Y.  355 

117 

V. 

Orr,  92  Hun  (N.  Y.)  199 

390 

TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCVll 


[References  ai 
People    V.    Ortega,    7    Cal.    App. 
480  74 

V.  Osborn    (Cal.    App.    1910), 

106  Pac.  891  442 

V.  Oscar,  105  Mich.  704  437 

V.  Osmer,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

242  434 

V.  Ostrander,  iio]NHch.  60  18 

V.  O' Sullivan,  104  N.  Y.  481 

411,  415 
V.  Owen,  IS  Det.  Leg.  N.  881  60 
V.  Owen,  154  Mich.  571  328 

V.  Oyer  &  Terminer,  83  N.  Y. 

436  440 

V.  Page,  116  Cal.  386  282,  284,  285 
V.  Pallister,  138  N.  Y.  601 

12,  17,  88,  321 
V.  Palmer,  105  jNIich.  568  326 

V.  Palmer,  109  N.  Y.  no  7,  230 
V.  Parker,  67  Mich.  222  429,  431 
V.  Parmelee,  112  Mich.  291  323 

V.  Parton,  49  Cal.  632  137,  224 

V.  Patrick,  182  N.  Y.  131  74,  117 
V.  Patterson,  102  Cal.  230  92 

V.  Peabody,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

472  428,  432 

V.  Peacock,  5  Utah  240  522 

V.  Pearsall,  50  Mich.  233  152,  153 
V.  Pease,  3  John.  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

333  207 

V.  Peck,  139  Mich.  680  291,  423 
V.  Pekarz,  185  N.  Y.  470  318 

V.  Pembroke,  6  Cal.   App.  588 

I5i>  236 
V.  Penhallow,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

103  265 

V.  Perriman,  72  Mich.  182  402 

V.  Petmecky,  2  N.  Y.  Cr.  450  118 
V.  Phalen,  49  Mich.  492  523,  524 
V.  Phillips,  70  Cal.  61  277 

V.  Pichette,  11 1  Mich.  461  148,  152 
V.  Pico,  62  Cal.  50  160,  296 

V.  Pinckney,  67  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

428  439 

V.  Pine,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  566  275 
V.  Pincr  (Cal.  App.  1909),  105 

Pac.  780  140,  371 

V.  Pinkerton,  yy  N.  Y.  245        499 

V.  Plath,  100  N.  Y.  590         23,  339 

V.  Plyler,  121  Cal.  160  268 

vii — Underhill  Crim.  Evidence. 


e  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Poemer,  114  Cal.  51  60 

V.  Poindexter,  243  111.  68  435 

V.  Porter,   104  Cal.  415  469 

V.  Potter,   5    I\lich.    i  99,  154 

V.  Potter,  89  Mich.  353  17,  18 

V.  Powell,  87  Cal.  348  324,  325 

V.  Price,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.)    185 

282,  509 
V.  Price,  119  N.  Y.  650  510 

V.  Probst,  237  111.  390  14,  522 

V.  Pustolka,  149  N.  Y.'  570         50 
V.  Putman,  129  Cal.  258  245 

V.  Putnam,  90  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)   125  88 

V.  Pyckett,  99  Mich.  613  115 

V.  Quick,  51   Mich.   547  59 

V.  Quimby,  134  Mich.  625    318,  322 
V.  Rae,  66  Cal.  423  435 

V.  Raina,  45  Cal.  292  80 

V.  Ramirez,  56  Cal.  533        136,  227 
V.  Randazzio,    194    N.    Y.    147 

129,  147a 
V.  Rando,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

335  89 

V.  Randolph,  2  Park.  Cr.  Rep. 

(N.  Y.)   174  21,  408 

V.  Ranier,   127  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)  47  371 

V.  Ranney,    153    Mich.    293  147 

V.  Rathbun,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

509  119,  424 

V.  Ratz,  115  Cal.  132  408 

V.  Raymond,  96  N.  Y.  38  507 

V.  Reagle,   60    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

527  185 

V.  Reardon,  109  N.  Y.  S.  504        57 
V.  Rector,   19  Wend.    (N.   Y.) 

569  .  312 

V.  Reinhart,   39   Cal.  449  60 

V.  Resh,  107  Mich.  251      17,  58,  152 
V.  Restenblatt.  i  Abb.  Pr.   (N. 

Y.)  268  26 

V.  Rice,  57  Hun   (N.  Y.)  62      226 
V.  Richards,  44  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

278  197 

V.  Rickcr,    51    Hun     (N.    Y.) 

643  69 

V.  Riordan,  7  N.  Y.   Cr.  7         338 
V.  Riordan,   117  N.  Y.  71     23,   154 


XCVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ai 

People  V.  Ritchie,  12  Utah  180 

361,  362,  363 
V.  Rivers,  147  Mich.  643  416 

V.  Roberts,  114  Cal.  67  279 

V.  Robertson,  6  Cal.  App.  514    283 
V.  Robertson,  88  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)    198  413 

V.  Robinson,   19  Cal.  40  135 

V.  Robinson,  2   Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  235  318 

V.  Robles,   34  Cal.   591  305 

V.  Rodawald,   177  N.   Y.  408 

324,  325 
V.  Roderigas,  49  Cal.  9  341,  392 
V.  Rodley,  131  Cal.  240  119a 

V.  Rodrigo,   69   Cal.  601 

12,  23,  81,  246 
V.  Rogers,  71  Cal.  565  314,  321 
V.  Rogers,  18  N.  Y.  9  129,  164,  166 
V.  Rogers,   22   App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)    147  293 

V.  Rogers,  192  N.  Y.  331     90,  126 
V.  Rolfe,  61   Cal.   540  55 

V.  Romero    (Cal.    App.    1910;?, 

107  Pac.  709  297 

V.  Ross,   103   Cal.  425  466 

V.  Ross,  115  Cal.  233  12 

V.  Row,   135   Mich.   505  238 

V.  Rowland  (Cal.  App.).  1909), 

106  Pac.  428  283 

V.  Rowland,  5   Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

449  263 

Royal,  53  Cal.  62  412 

Royce,  106  Cal.  173  284 

Russell,  no  Mich.  46  482 

Ryan.   152  Cal.  364  223 

Ryan,  55  Hun  (N.  Y.)  214  236 
Ryder,  151  ]\Iich.  187  77,  236 
Ryno,  148  Mich.  137  418 

Salas,  2  Cal.  App.  537  227 

Salisbury,  2  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)    39  481 

Salisbury,  134  Mich.  537  451 
Samario,  84  Cal.  484  103 

Sam  Lung,  70  Cal.  515 

225,  472,  477 
Samonset,  97  Cal.  448  391 

Sanchez,  24  Cal.  17  102,  103,  319 
Sanders,   144   Cal.  216 

89,  423,  429 


c  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Sanders,  139  Mich.  442   285 
V.  Sanford,  43  Cal.  29  102,  167 

V.  Sattlekau,  104  N.  Y.  S.  805  442 
V.  Scalamiero,  143  Cal.  343 

120,   137,  409 
V.  Scattura,  238  111.  313  409 

V.  Schiavi,   96  App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)  479  106 

V.  Schildwachter,  5  App.   Div. 

(N.  Y.)  346  532 

V.  Schilling,   no  'SUch.  412  528 

V.  Schooley,  89  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

391  89 

V.  Schooley,  149  N.  Y.  99  429 
V.  Schuyler,  7  N.  Y.  Cr.  262  181 
V.  Schuyler,  43  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

88  163 

163 
98       74 
144 
100 

89    345 
26,  185 


V.  Schuyler,  106  N.  Y.  298 

V.  Sciaroni,  4  Cal.   App.  t 

V.  Scott,  59  (ial.  341 

V.  Scott,  153  N.  Y.  40 

V.  Seaman,  107  Mich.  348 

V.  Sebring,  66  Mich.  705 

V.  Sebring,   14  Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

31  259 

V.  Seeley,  139  Cal.  118  364,  365 
V.  Seeley,  37  Hun  (N.  Y.)  190,  339 
V.  Sekeson,  in  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)    490  305 

V.  Sellick,   4   N.    Y.    Cr.    Rep. 

329  26 

V.  Sessions,  58  Mich.  594  312,  349 
V.  Sevine  (Cal.)  22  Pac.  969  369 
V.  Sexton,  187  N.  Y.  495  212,  213 
V.  Shall,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  778  430 
V.  Sharp,  53  Mich.  523  420,  427 
V.  Sharp,  107  N.  Y.  427 

87,  88,  121,  454 
V.  Shattuck,   109   Cal.   673 

163,  248,331 
V.  Shaw,  ni   Cal.  171  238 

V.  Shaw,  63  N.  Y.  36  108,  113 

V.  Shea,  16  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  in  519 
V.  Sheffield,  9  Cal.  App.  130  416 
V.  Shelters,  99   Mich.   333  437 

V.  Sheriff,   29   Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

622  177 

V.  Sherman,  133  N.  Y.  349  213 
V.  Shoemaker,  131  Mich.  107    280a 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCIX 


[References  ar 

People  V.  Shuler,  28  Cal.  490  6 

V.  Shulman,  8  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    514  523 

V.  Shulman,  80  N.  Y.  373  88 

V.  Sickles,  156  N.  Y.  541  510,  512 
V.  Siemsen,  153  Cal  387  126,  140 
V.  Silvers,  6  Cal.  App.  69  126,  133 
V.  Simmons,  125  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)   234  491 

V.  Simonsen,  107  Cal.  345  147 

V.  Simpson,  48  Mich.  474  112,  130 
V.  Singer,    5    N.    Y.    Cr.    i  27 

V.  Singer,  18  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N. 

Y.)    96  453 

V.  Skutt,  96  Mich.  449  92 

V.  Slack,  90  Mich.  448  167 

V.  Sligh,  48  Mich.  54  267 

V.  Sliney,  137  N.  Y.  570  179,  181 
V.  Smalling,  94  Cal.   112  146 

V.  Smiler,  125  N.  Y.  717  163 

V.  Smith  (Cal.  App.),  99  Pac. 

Ill  88,  325,  327 

V.  Smith,   103  Cal.  563  421 

V.  Smith,    106    Cal.    73 

3-23,  334,  354 
V.  Smith,  121  Cal.  355  36 

V.  Smith,   106   Mich.  431  216 

V.  Smith,  5  Cow.   (N.  Y.)  258 

307.  310 
V.  Smith,  104  N.  Y.  491  106,  no 
V.  Smith,    114  App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)    513  68,  239 

V.  Smith,  121  N.  Y.  578  50,  52 

V.  Smith,  172  N.  Y.  210  124 

V.  Snyder,  no  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)  699  436 

V.  Soeder,  150  Cal.  12  61 

V.  Solani,  6  Cal.  App.  103  233 
V.  Soto,  49  Cal.  67  126,  127 

V.  Soto,  53  Cal.  415  371 

V.  Special    Sessions,    10    Hun 

(N.  Y.)  224  342 

V.  Spencer,  66   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

149  453 

V.  Spencer,  179  N.  Y.  408  161 

V.  Spier,    120    App.    Div.  (N. 

Y.)    786  346 

V.  Spoor,  235  111.  230  398,  405 

V.  Spriggs,  119  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)  236  343 


e  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Squires,  49  Mich.  487  393 
V.  Stackhouse,  49  Mich.  76  241 
V.  Stacy,  192  N.  Y.  577  104,  105 
V.  Stanford,  64  Cal.  27  520 

V.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113 

115,  118,  492,  S07 
V.  Stanley.    loi    Mich.   93  55 

V.  Stark,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.)  51  364 
V.  St.  Clair  (Cal.),  44  Pac.  234  299 
V.  Stearns,  21  Wend.    (N.  Y.) 

409  422,  430 

V.  Sternberg,   in   Cal.   3 
V.  Stevens,   109  N.  Y.   159 
V.  Stewart,  85  Cal.  174 
V.  Stewart,  97  Cal.  238 
V.  Stison,  140  Mich.  216 
V.  Stocking,  50  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

573 
V.  Stokes,  5  Cal.  App.  205 

137,  492,  494 
V.  Stokes,  71  Cal.  263  383 

V.  Stokes,  24  N.  Y.  S.  727  365 
V.  Stone,  32  Hun    (N.  Y.)   41 

466,  468 
V.  Stout,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

670  179 

V.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.) 


227 

309 
418 
409 
106 

32 


71 


88,  90 
205 
161 


(N. 


V.  Stouter,   142   Cal.    146 
V.  Strait,  148  N.  Y.  566 
V.  Strauss,  94   App.   Div, 

Y.)    453  74 

V.  Strong,  31  Cal.  151  125 

V.  Strollo,    191    N.    Y.   42 

56,  132,  133 
V.  Stuart,  4  Cal.  218  26 

V.  Stubenvoll,  62  Mich.  329  10 

V.  Suesser,  142  Cal.  354  157 

V.  Sullivan,    3    Cal.    App.    502 

123,  124 
V.  Sullivan,    144   Cal.  471  358 

V.  Summers,  40  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 

384  456 

V.  Suppiger,   103  111.  434  21 

V.  Sutherland,  154  N.  Y.  345     336 
V.  Sutton,  73  Cal.  243  516 

V.  Swaile     (Cal.    App.     1909), 

107   Pac.    134  122 

V.  Sweeney,  55  Mich.  449    235,  239 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

People    V.    Sweeney,    133    N.    Y. 
609  80 

V.  S wetland,   77   Mich.   53  127 

V.  Taggart,  43  Cal.  81  371 

V.  Tarbox,  115  Cal.  57  147,  412 
V.  Tarm  Poi,  86  Cal.  225  23,  338 
V.  Tatum,   60    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

311  466 

V.  Taylor,  4  Cal.  App.  31  119a 

V.  Taylor,  59  Cal.  640  104,  108 
V.  Taylor,  93  ^lich.  638  126,  147a 
V.  Taylor,  138  N.  Y.  398  154,  i57 
V.  Terwilliger,  124  N.  Y.  629  411 
V.  Thatcher,  108  Mich.  652  87,  318 
V.  Thiede,  11  Utah  241  227 

V.  Thomas,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  169  437 
V.  Thompson,  84  Cal.  598  138 

V.  Thompson,  92  Cal.  506  222 

V.  Thorns,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 

256  147a,  423,  433 

V.  Thomson,  92  Cal.  506  221,  333 
V.  Thornton,  74  Cal.  482  228 

V.  Thurston,  2  Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  49  160 

V.  Tibbs.  143  Cal.  100  39° 

V.  Tice,  IIS  Mich.  219  153.  238 

V.  Tice,  131  N.  Y.  651  60,  247 

V.  Tierney,  57  Cal.  54  409 

V.  Tiley,  84  Cal.  651  222 

V.  Titherington,  59  Cal.  598  378 
V.  Tomlinson,  35  Cal.  503  430 

V.  Tomlinson,  66  Cal.  344  284 

V.  Townsey,  5  Denio   (N.  Y.) 

112  24 

V.  Travers,  88  Cal.  233  I57 

V.  Travis,  56  Cal.  251  326 

V.  Trezza,  128  N.  Y.  529  516 

V.  Tripicersky,    38    N.    Y.    S. 

696  52s 

V.  Tubbs,  147  Mich,  i  115,  223,  246 
V.  Tucker,  104  Cal.  440  305 

V.  Turcott,  65  Cal.  126  215 

V.  Turner,    i    Cal.   App.   420 

122,  241 
V.  Turner,  i  Cal.  152  460 

V.  Turpin,  233  111.  452  298 

V.  UnDong,  106  Cal.  83  60 

V.  Urquidas,  96  Cal.  239  516,  522 
V.  Van  Alstine,  57  Mich.  69  175 
V.  Van  Dam,  107  Mich.  425  79,  379 


e  to  Sections.] 

People  V.  Van  de  Carr,  87  App. 
Div.  386  451 

V.  Vane,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  78    77 
V.  Van  Ewan,   iii    Cal.   144 

220,  283,  290 
V.  Van  Gaasbeck,  189  N.  Y.  408  79 
V.  Van     Gaasbeck,     118     App. 

Div.  (N.  Y.)  511  83,  327 

V.  Van   Houter,   38    Hun    (N. 

Y.)    168  18 

V.  Van    Tassel,    26   App.    Div. 

445  222,  466 

V.  Van    Tassel,    64    Hun    (N. 

Y.)    444  257 

V.  Vedder,  98  N.  Y.  630  349 

V.  Velarde,  59  Cal.  457  I37 

V.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow.   (N.  Y.) 

369  70,  268,  269,  272 

V.  Vaughan,  42  N.  Y.  S.  959       28 
V.  Vidal,  121  Cal.  221  118,  301 

V.  Vincent,  95  Cal.  425  166 

V.  Wade,  118  Cal.  672  390,  392 

V.  Wadsworth,  63   Mich.   500     282 
V.  Wahle,    124  App.  Div.    (N. 

Y.)   762  4S1 

V.  Wah  Lee  Mon,  59  Hun  (N. 

Y.)    626  339 

V.  Wakely,  62  Mich.  297  435 

V.  Walker,  140  Cal.  153  129 

V.  Walker,  38  Mich.  156  166 

V.  Wallace,  89  Cal.  158  331 

V.  Wallace,  109  Cal.  611       387,  393 
V.  Waller,  70  JMich.  237  35 

V.  Ward,   105  Cal.  335  6 

V.  Ward,  3  N.  Y.  Cr.  483  56 

V.  Ward,    15    Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

231  126 

V.  Warden  of  City  Prison,  83 

App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  456  498 
V.  Ware,  29  Hun  (N.  Y.)  473  65 
v.  Warner,  104  Mich.  337  427 

V.  Warner,  51  Hun  53  226 

V.  Wasson,  65  Cal.  538  108 

V.  Way,  119  App.  Div.  344    33,  211 
V.  Way,  191  N.  Y.  533  48 

V.  Wayman,  128  N.  Y.  585    12,  275 
V.  Weaver,  108  Mich.  649  105 

V.  Weaver,  116  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)  594  481 

V.  Weaver,  177  N.  Y.  434  87 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CI 


Peopl 


[References  ar 

e  V.  Webb.  5  N.  Y.  855  182 

Weber,    149   Cal.  325  61, 

82,  117,  137,  211,  233,  313,  323 
Webster,  59   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

398  161,  280a 

Webster,  139  N.  Y.  73  237 

Weil,  244  111.  176  435>  442 

Weithoff,   51    Mich.  203  471 

Welsh,  63  Cal.   167  115 

Wentz,  37  N.  Y.  303  140 

Wenzel,  189  N.  Y.  275  223 

West,  106  Cal.  89  172,  180 

West,  106  N.  Y.  293  480 

Weston,  236  111.  104 
Whalen,   154  Cal.  472 
Whaley,    6    Cow.    (N 

661 
Wheeler,  60  111.  App.  351 
Wheeler,  142  Mich.  212 
Whipple,   9   Cow.    (N.    Y.) 

707 
White,  34  Cal.  183 
White,  142  Cal.  292 
White,  53   ]\Iich,  537 
White,  153  Mich.  617 
White,  3  N.  Y.  Cr.  366 
White,    14  Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

Ill  82,  213 

White,  62  Hun  (N.  Y.)   114   74 
White,  176  N.  Y.  331 

126,  127,  135 
Whiteman,  114  Cal.  338  423 
Wieger,    100  Cal.  352  437 

Willard,  92  Cal.  482  215 

Willard,   150  Cal.   543 

60,  157,  158,  159,  163 
Willctt,  92  N.  Y.  29 

56,  122,  123,  267 
Wilkinson,  60  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

582  296 

Williams,  43  Cal.  344  166 

Williams,   17  Cal.   142  214 

Williams,  18  Cal.  187  222 

Williams,  64  Cal.  87  38 

Williams,  3   Park.   Cr.    (N. 

Y.)  84  100,  318 

Williams,     19    Wend.     (N. 

Y.)    377  70 

Williams,  29  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

520  55 


c  to  Sections.] 
People  V.  Williamson,  6  Cal.  App. 


204,  409 
438 

Y.) 

456 

535 
482 

71 
433 
210 

533 
373 
376 


336 

312, 

333 

V.  Willson,  109  N.  Y.  345 

313 

V.  Wilson,  64  111.  195 

461 

V.  Wilson,  133  Mich.  57 

378 

V.  Wilson,  136  Mich.  298 

531 

V.  Wilson,    7    App.    Div. 

(N. 

Y.)  326 

300, 

375 

V.  Wilson,  151  N.  Y.  403 

300 

V.  Wilson,    3    Park.    Cr. 

(N. 

Y.)    199 

55, 

272 

V.  Wiman,  148  N.  Y.  29 

422 

V.  Winant,  24  Misc.    (N. 

Y.) 

361 

69 

V.  Winslow,  39  Mich.  505 

437 

V.  Winters,  29  Cal.  658 

375 

V.  Wirth,    108   ]\Iich.   307 

242 

V.  Wolcott,  51  Mich.  612 

236, 

374 

V.  Wolf,  95  Mich.  625 

323 

V.  Wong  Chong  Suey,  no 

Cal. 

117 

299 

V.  Wood,  99  Mich.  620 

378 

V.  Wood,  126  N.  Y.  249 

159,  163,  185, 

215, 

322 

V.  Wood,  131  N.  Y.  617, 

21 

V.  Woods,  147  Cal.  265 

321, 

491 

V.  Worden,  113  Cal.  569 

149, 

275 

V.  Wright,  144  Cal.  161 

323 

V.  Wright,  89  Mich.  70 

48 

V.  Wright,    19   Misc.    (N. 

Y.) 

135 

480 

V.  Wyman,  102  Cal.  552 

287 

V.  Yee  Fog,  4  Cal.  App.  730 

238 

V.  Young,    31    Cal.    563 

192 

V.  Young,  102  Cal.  411 

166 

V.  Young,  108  Cal.  8 

122 

124 

V.  Yslas,  27  Cal.  630 

353 

354 

V.  Yut  Ling,  74  Cal.  569 

230 

V.  Zapicek,  233  111.  198 

319 

V.  Zimmermin,  3  Cal.  App.  84 

90, 

151 

Perdue  v.  State,  126  Ga.  112 

lOI 

Perkins   v.    Commonwealth 

(Ky. 

1909),  124  S.  W.  794 

408 

V.  State,  50  Ala.  154 

279 

Perovich  v.  United  States,  205  U. 

S.  86 

129 

Perrin  v.  State.  81   Wis.  135 

304 

V.  Wells,  155  Pa.  St.  299 

262 

Perrow  v.  State,  67  Miss.  365 

255 

488 

Cll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  a) 
Perry  v.    Commonwealth,  27  Ky. 
D."5i2  358 

V.  People,  38  Colo.  23  294,  299 

V.  State,  155  Ala.  93  299 

V.  State,  94  Ala.  25  324 

V.  State,  149  Ala.  40  309 

V.  State,  102  Ga.  365  112 

V.  State,   no  Ga.  234  6 

V.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr.  App.  540  130 
Person  v.  Grier,  66  N.  Y.  124  258 

V.  State,  90  Tenn.  291  19 

Persons  v.    State,  90  Tenn.  291 

280a,  19 
Peters  v.  United  States,  2  Okla.  116  467 
Petrie,  In  re,  i  Kan.  App.  184        254 
V.  Columbia  &c.  R.  Co.,  29  S. 

Car.  303  264 

Pettibone  v.  Nichols,  203  U.  S.  192  498 
V.  United    States,    148    U.    S. 

197  446 

Pettis  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  66 

324,  33,3 

Pettit  V.   State,   135  Ind.  393  269 

V.  Walshe,  194  U.  S.  205  501 

Petty  V.  State,  83  Miss.  260  55 

Pflueger  v.  State,  46  Neb.  493 

161,  162 
Pfomer    v.    People,    4    Park    Cr. 

(N.  Y.)  558  324 

Phelps  V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
32  S.  W.  470  161 

V.  People,  55  111.  334  292 

V.  People,  72  N.  Y.  365  422 

Phillips  V.   People,  57  Barb.    (N. 
Y.)  353  88 

V.  State,  62  Ark.  119  328 

V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  687  i6a 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  597  470 

V.  State,  108  Ind.  406  387 

V.  State  (Tex.),  34  S.  W.  539 

228,  299 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  481     112 

Pickard  v.  Br3^ant,  92  Mich.  430      217 

Pickerel  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.) 

30  S.  W.  617  35 

V.  Commonwealth,    17   Ky.    L. 

120  358 

Pierce,  Ex  parte,  155  Fed.  663        499 
Pierce  v.   State,  13  N.  H.  536 

273,  275 


532 
309 


466 


373 


'■c  to  Sections.'] 
Pierce  v.   United   States,    160  U. 

S.  355  129 

Pierson  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424 

90,  179,  180,  323,  351 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  14  103 

Pigg  V.  State,  145  Ind.  560  224 

Pigman  v.  State,  14  Ohio  555  166 

Pike  V.  People,  34  111.  App.  112 

V.  State,   35   Ala.  419 
Pilger  V.  Commonwealth,  112  Pa. 

St.   220 
Pilgrim  v.  State  (Okla.  Cr.  App. 
1909),  104  Pac.  383  192, 

Pinson  v.  State  (Ark.  1909),  121 

S.  W.  751 

Piper  V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.),  51   S. 

W.  1 1 18  488 

Pippen  V.  State,  77  Ala.  81  308 

Pisar  V.  State,  56  Neb.  455  277 

Pitman,  Ex  parte,   i    Curtis    (U. 

S.)    186  461 

V.  State,  22  Ark.   354  326 

Pitner  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  366   209 

V.  State,  2,7  Tex.  Cr.  App.  268    8S 

Pittman  v.  State,  51  Fla.  94  429 

Pitts  V.  State,  140  Ala.  70 

12,  57,  103,  238,  312 
V.  State,  43  ^liss.  472  7,  147 

Pittsford  V.  Chittenden,  58  Vt.  49  527 
Plake  V.  State,  121  Ind.  433  154,  157 
Plant  V.  State,  140  Ala.  52  94 

Pleasant  v.  State,  13  Ark.  360  275,  417 
V.  State,  15  Ark.  624     225,  410,  418 
Pledger  v.   State,  77  Ga.  242 

226,  239,  364 
Plowes   V.    Bossev,  31    L.   J.    Ch. 

681  '  526 

Plumbly     V.     Commonwealth,     2 

Mete.  (Mass.)  413  507,  510 

Plummer  v.   State,   in    Ga.  839     248 
V.  State,    135    Ind.    308  484 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  202  469 

Plunkett  V.  State,  72  Ark.  409  418 
Poe  V.  State,  155  Ala.  31  314,  2,33 

Pointer  v.  State,  148  Ala.  676  87 

Polin   V.    State,    14   Neb.   540, 

12,  233,  269,  3x5 

Polinsky  v.  People,  72  N.  Y.  65        480 

Polk  V.  State,  36  Ark.  117  69.  318 

V.  State,  19  Ind.  170  157,  158 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


cm 


[References  ar 

Pollard  V.  State,  2  Iowa  567  407 

V.  State,  53  Miss.  410  149 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1910), 

125  S.  W.  390  22,2, 

Pollock  V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  29  488 
Poison  V.   State,   137  Ind.   519 

172,  215,  409,  411,  413 

Pomeroy  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Va. 

Cas.  342  296 

V.  State,  94  Ind.  96  417 

Pontier  v.  State,  107  i\Id.  384  404 

Pontius  V.  People,  82  N.  Y  339        355 

Pool  V  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  596  299 

Poole  V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  348        327 

Porath  V.  State,  90  Wis.  527  395 

Porch  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

335  68,  222,  374 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  7  248 

Porter  v.  People,  31  Colo.  508        492 

V.  State,   55   Ala.  95  130 

V.  State,  140  Ala.  87     157,  160,  161 

V.  State,   51    Ga.   300  473 

V.  State,  76  Ga.  658  74 

V.  United    States,    7    Ind.    Ter. 

616  187,  189 

Porterfield  v.   Commonwealth,  91 

Va.  801  378 

Posey  V.  State,  143  Ala.  54  409 

V.  United   States,   26  App.    D. 

C.  302  87 

Poss  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  486  401 
Post  V.  United  States,  135  Fed.  i  276 
Poston  V.  State,  83  Neb.  240  220 

Potter  V.  State,  92  Ala.  27  374 

Pound  V.  State,  43  Ga.  88  324 

Powe  V.  State,  48  N.  J.  L.  34  349 

Powell,  Ex  parte,  20  Fla.  806  499 

V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  9  S. 

W.  245  421 

V.  State,  58  Ala.  362  188 

V.  State,  88  Ga.  32  298 

V.  State  (]\Iiss.),  20  So.  4  387,  392 
V.  State,  61  Miss.  319  228 

V.  State  (Tex.),  44  S.  W.  504  382 
V.  State,  II  Tex.  App.  401  301 
V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  244  225 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  277  467 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  592     J2 
Powers  V.  Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 
L.  277  328 


358 


93 
461 
272 
103 
79,  108 
83 
368 

21 
418 
159 


2,72, 
268 
482 
no 
140 


e  to  Sections. "[ 

Powers    V.    People,    42    111.    App. 
427 

V.  People,  114  111.  App.  323 

V.  State,  80  Ind.  77 

V.  State,  87  Ind.  144 

V.  State,   74   Miss.   777 

V.  State,  117  Tenn.  2'^2 
Prater  v.  State,  107  Ala.  26 
Prather  v.  United  States,  9  App. 

D.  C.  82 
Pratt  V.  State,  19  Ohio  St.  277 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  227 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  281  265,  222 
Preatis  v.  Bates,  88  Mich.  567  213 
Pressler  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  52  484 
Pressley  v.  State,  132  Ga.  64  320 

Price    V.    Commonwealth     (Ky.), 
112  S.  W.  855 

V.  People,  131  111.  223 

V.  State,  96  Ala.  i 

V.  State,  72  Ga.  441 

V.  State,  114  Ga.  815 

V.  State,    I    Okla.   Cr. 

98,  100,  329,  492 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  102  486 

V.  United    States,    165    U.    S. 

311  479 

Priest  V.  State,  10  Neb.  393  146,  492 
Prince    v.    Gmidaway,    157    iMass. 

417  533 

V.  State,  100  Ala.  144  117,  153 

Prine  v.  State,  72  Miss.  838  276,  326 
Prior  V.  State,  99  Ala.  196  61,  248 
Pritchett  v.  State,  22  Ala.  39  324 

Proctor     V.     Commonwealth, 
Ky.  L.  248 

V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  254 
V.  Territory,  18  Okla.  378 
Proper  v.  State,  85  Wis.  615 

92,  213,  4( 
Pruett  V.  State,  141  Ala.  69 
Pruitt  V.  State,  92  Ala.  41 
Primer  v.  Commonwealth,  82  Va. 

115 
Pryor  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

643 
Pryse  v.  State  (Tex.),  113  S.  W. 

93S 
Pullen  V.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  89 
Pulpus  V.  State,  84  Miss.  49 


14 
410 

494 
473 

410,  412 

188 

262,  267 


384 
130 

96 
269 
336 


CIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Purvis  V.  State,  71  ]\Iiss.  706  6 

Puryear     v.      Reese,     6     Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  21  163 

V.  State,  63  Ga.  692  266 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  454    78 
Putman  v.  State,  49  Ark.  449        446 
V.  United  States,  162  U.  S.  687 

218,  235 
Putnal  V.  State  (Fla.),  47  So.  864 

260,  265 
Pyle  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  811 

102,  103,  III 


Q 


Queenan  v.   Territorj^   190  U.   S. 

548  162 

Queen's  Case.  2  Br.  &  Bing.  284  248 
Quillen    v.     Commonwealth,    105 

Va.  874  207 

Quinn  v.  People,  123  111.  333  6y,  68 
Quintana  v.   State,  29  Tex.  App. 

401  137 

Quong    Yu    V.    Territory     (Ariz. 

1909),  100  Pac.  462  378 


R 


Radford     v.     State      (Ga.     App. 

1910),  67  S.  E.  707  381 

Rafferty  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  655  438 
Ragland  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  492  367 
Railing    v.     Commonwealth,     no 

Pa.  St.  100  106,  348 

Rainbolt  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  153  473 
Rains    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

29  Ky.  L.  66  122,  124 

V.  State,  88  Ala.  91  247 

V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  588  295 

Raker  v.  State,  50  Neb.  202  361 

Rambo  v  State,  134  Ala.  71  248 

Ramey  v.  State,  127  Ind.  243  528 

Ramsey  v.  State,  89  Ga.  198  521 

Rand  v.  Commonwealth,  9  Gratt. 

(Va.)  738  507 

Randall  v.  State,  132  Ind.  539  58,  236 
V.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  488  462 

Randall's  Case,  5  City  Hall  Rec. 

(N.  Y.)    141  185 


'■c  to  Sections.] 

Randolph  v.  State,  100  Ala.  139        35 
V.  State  (Tex.),  49  S.  W.  591    299 
Raney   v.    Commonwealth,    2    Kv 

L.  62  '     28 

Ransbottom  v.  State,  144  Ind.  250    413 

Ransom  v.  State,  26  Fla.  364  473 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  826        152,  153 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  826  137 

V.  State  (Tex.),  70  S.  W.  960    130 

Rapp    V.    Commonwealtht,    14   B. 

i\Ion.    (Ky.)    614  .  324 

Rash  V.  State,  61  Ala.  89  312 

Rath  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  142         452 

Rau  V.  People,  63  N.  Y.  277  21 

Rauck  V.  State,  no  Ind.  384  357 

Rawls  V.  State,  97  Ga.  186  276 

Ray  V.  Coffin,  123  Mass.  365  533 

V.  State,  50  Ala.  104  12 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  67  90,  295 

V.  State,  I  Greene  (Iowa)  316    71 

Rayburn  v.  State,  69  Ark.   177         23 

Raymond    v.    Burlington    &c.    R. 

Co.,  65  Iowa  152  179 

V.  Commonwealth,      123      Kv. 

368  87,  89 

492 
122,  123 
217 
485 


V.  People,  226  III.  433 
V.  State,  154  Ala.  i 

Raynor  v.  Norton,  31  Mich.  210 

Reach  v.  State,  94  Ala.  113 

Read  v.  Commonwealth,  22  Gratt. 
(Va.)  924  521 

v.  State,  2  Ind.  438  357 

Reason  v.  State   (Miss.  1909),  48 

So.  820  130 

Rector  v.  Commonwealtth,  4  Ky. 
L.   323  138 

V.  Commonwealth,  80  Ky.  468    514 

Redd  V.  State,  68  Ala.  492  329 

V.  State,  69  Ala.  255  126 

v.  State,  54  Ark.  621  305 

V.  State,  63  Ark.  457  68 

V.  State,  65  Ark.  475  429 

V.  State,  99  Ga.  210  80 

v.  State  (Tex.),  29  S.  W.  1085   197 

Reddick  v.  State,  72  Miss.  1008  68 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  463     54 

Redditt  v.  State,  17  Tex.  610  473 

Reddy  v.  Commonwealth,  97  Ky. 
784  197 

Redman  v.  State,  33  Ala.  428  471 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cv 


[References  ai 

Reed  v.  Haskins,  ii6  Mass.  198      533 
V.  State,  54  Ark.  621  18 

V.  State,  75  Neb.  509  158 

V.  State,  15  Ohio  217  423,  428,  432 
V.  State  (Okla.  Cr.  App.  1909), 

103  Pac.  1042  326 

V.  Territory    (Okla.),  98   Pac. 

583  21,  35,  47 

Reese  v.  State,  7  Ga.  373  88 

Reeves  v.  State,  95  Ala.  31  291 

V.  State,  29  Fla.  527  18 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  340    129 

Reg.  V.  Armitage,  27  L.  T.  41        529 
V.  Arnold,  8  C.  &  P.  621  130 

V.  Attwood,    5    Cox    Cr.    Cas. 

322  130 

V.  Birkett,  8  C.  &  P.  732  74 

V.  Bleasdale.  2  Carr  &  K.  765  88 
V.  Baillie,  8  Cox  C.  C.  238  339 
V.  Barratt,  12  Cox  C.  C.  498  408 
V.  Beale,  10  Cox  C.  C.  157  408 
V.  Bedingfield,    14   Cox    C.    C 

341  330 

V.  Bennett,  14  Cox  C.  C.  45  401 
V.  Bonlton,  i  Den.  C.  C.  508  437 
V.  Braithwaite,    8    Cox    C.    C. 

254  468 

V.  Browning,  3  Cox  C.  C.  437  449 
V.  Burke,  8  Cox.  C.  C.  44  245 

V.  Camplin,  I  C.  &  K.  746  417 

V.  Chapman,  i  Den.  C.  C.  432  449 
V.  Chappie,  9  C.  &.  P.  355  255 

V.  Child,  5  Cox  C.  C.  197  267 

V.  Clark,  6  Cox  C.  C.  210  510 

V.  Clark,  20  Eng.  L.  &  E.  583  514 
V.  Cockburn,  3  Cox  C.  C.  543  414 
V.  Cockroft,  II  Cox  C.  C.  410  418 
V.  Cooke,  8  C.  &  P.  582  422,  423 
V.  Cotton,  12  Cox  C.  C.  400  88,  89 
V.  Cox,  L.  R.  14  Q.  B.  Div.  153 

175,  176 
V.  Crickmer,  16  Cox  C.  C.  701  90 
V.  Crofts,  9  C.  &  P.  219  515 

V.  Doherty,  13  Cox  C.  C.  23  130 
V.  Eyre,  2  F.  &  F.  579  409 

V.  Farley,  2  C.  &  K.  313  174,  177 
V.  Ford,  I  C.  &  Marsh  iii  70 

V.  Forster,  6  Cox  C.  C.  521  433 
V.  Fox,  10  Cox  C.  C.  502  512 

V.  Frances,  4  Cox  C.  C.  57       225 


e  to  Sections.] 

Reg.  V.  Fretwell,  9  Cox  C.  C.  471  354 

V.  Gadbury,  8  C.  &  P.  676  78 

V.  Gazard,  8  C.  &  P.  595  189 
V.  Geach,  9  C.  &  P.  499       422,  424 

V.  Gibbons,  12  Cox  C.  C.  237  401 
V.  Gould,  9  C.  &  P.  364        138,  307 

V.  Hankins,  2  C.  &  K.  823  172 

V.  Harvey,  8  Cox  C.  C.  99  189 

V.  Hay,  2  F.  &  F.  4  177 
V.  Hayward,  2  C.  &  K.  234 

174,   175,  176,   177 
V.  Hill,  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  547 

202,  203,  204 

V.  Hilton,  8   Cox    C.    C.   87  512 

V.  Hind,  8  Cox  C.  C.  300  106 

V.  Hodges,  8  C.  &  P.  195  25 

V.  Holmes,  i  C.  &  K.  248  130 

V.  Holmes,  12  Cox  C.  C.  137  418 

V.  Horton,  11  Cox  C.  C.  670  401 

V.  Howarth,  11   Cox  C.  C.  588  442 

V.  Howell,  I  Den.  C.  C.  i  104 

V.  Hunt,  I  Cox  C.  C.  177  488 

V.  James,  i  Cox  C.  C  78  353 
V.  Jenkins,  L.   R.  i   C.   C.   187 

103,  105 

V.  Jones,  I  Den.  C.  C.  166  177 

V.  Jordon,  9  C.  &  P.  118  408 

V.  Langford,  i  C.  &  M.  602  309 

V.  Leng,  I  F.  &  F.  77  515 

V.  Levy,  8  Cox  C.  C.  73  515 

V.  Lewis,  6  C.  &  P.   16  90 

V.  Lines,  i  C.  &  K.  393  416 

V.  Lumley,  L.  R.  i  C.  C.  196  399 

V.  J\Larsh,  6  Ad.  &  E.  236  191 

v.  Martin,  L.  R.  i  C.  C.  502  512 

v.  Mathews,  14  Cox  C.  L.  5  309 

V.  Megson,  9  C.  &  P.  420  410 

V.  Miller,  18  Cox  C.  C.  54  116 

v.  Mills,  7  Cox  C.  C.  263  442 

v.  Moore,  3  C.  &  K.  319  166 

v.  Mullins,  3  Cox   C.  C.  526  74 

V.  Murphy,  8  C.  &  P.  297  493 

V.  Murrey,  i  Salk.  122  526 

V.  Naylor,  10  Cox  C.  C.  149  437 
V.  Nicholas,  2  C.  &  K.  246 

205,  414 

V.  O'Brien,  4  Cr.  L.  Mag.  42  365 

V.  Oldham,  2  Den.  C.  C.  472  375 

V.  Owen,  9  C.  &  P.  83  71 

V.   Parker,   i   C,  &   M.  639  468 


CVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Partndge,   6   Cox   C.    C. 


444 
458 
114 
408 
179 
130 


Reg. 
182 

V.  Pascoe,   i   Den.   C.   C.  456 
V.  Perkins,  9  C.  &  P.  396 
V.  Philips,  8  C.  &  P.  736 
V.  Powell,  I  C.  &  P.  97 
V.  Priest,  2   Cox   C.  C.  378 
V.  Radcliffe,  12  Cox  C.  C.  474   444 
V.  Richardson,  3  F.  &  F.  693 

171,  283 
V.  Rovvton,  ID  Cox  C.  C.  25  81 

V.  Russell,  I  C.  &  M.  247  191 

V.  Scaife,  5  Cox  C.  C.  243    262,  264 
V.  Sell,  9  C.  &  P.  346  144 

V.  Shaw,  10  Cox  C.  C.  66  468 

V.  Soley,  II  Modern  115  488 

V.  Sparks,  I  F.  &  F.  388 
V.  Stanton,  i  C.  &  K.  415 
V.  Steele,  12  Cox  C.  C.  168 
V.  Thomas,  9  Cox  C.  C.  376 
V.  Tivey,  i  Den.  C.  C.  63 
V.  Turner,  9  Cox  C.  C.  670 
V.  Tylney,   I    Den.   C.   C.   319 

17s,  176 
V.  Unkles,  Ir.  R.  8  C.  L.  50  147 
V.  Vaughan,  8  C.  &  P.  276 
V.  Virrier,  12  A.  &  E.  317 
V.  Walker,  2  Moo.  &  R.  212 
V.  Warman,  2  C.  &  K.  195 
V.  Whitehead,  L.  R.  i  C.  C.  R, 

33 
V.  Wiggins,  10  Cox  C.  C.  562 
V.  Wilson,  2  C.  &  K.  527 
V.  Wood,  5  Jur.  295 
V.  Woodfield,    16    Cox    C.    C. 

314 
V.  Young,  10  Cox  C.  C.  371 
Regan  v.  State,  46  Wis.  256 
Reggel,  Ex  parte,  114  U.  S.  642 
Reid  V.  State,  20  Ga.  681 
V.     State,  81  Ga.  760 
Reilley  v.  State,  14  Ind.  217 
Reinhold  v.   State,   130  Ind.  467 

215, 

Reitz  V.  State,  33  Ind.   187     386,  525 
Rembert   v.    State,   53   Ala.   467 

419.  430 
Remsen  v.  People,  43  N.  Y.  6  79,  80 
Renfroe   v.  State,   84  Ark.    10 

88,  342,  418 


71 
417 
105 
116 
308 
401 


422 
468 
409 
314 

203 

131 

421 
82 

512 
75 
356 
497 
121 
521 
124 

491 


Renihan  v.  Dennin,  103  N.  Y.  573  179 
Respublica    v.    Teischer,    i    Dall. 

(Pa.)    335  307 
V.  Shaffer,  i  Dall.  (U.  S.)  236    25 
Rex  V.  Addis,  6  C.  &  P.  (Mass.) 

299  74 

V.  Ady,  7  C.  &  P.  140  439 

V.  Akers,  6  Esp.  I25n  171 
V.  All  Saints,  6  [Nlaule  &  Selw. 

194  188 

V.  Atwood,  2  Leach  C.  D.  521  73 

V.  Baker,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  53  106 

V.  Barker,  3  C.  &  P.  589  418 

V.  Barnard,  7  C.  &  P.  784  444 

V.  Beare,  i  Ld.  Rd.  414  362 

V.  Bolland,  i  Leach  C.  C.  97  427 

V.  Book,  I  Wils.  340  527 

V.  Bowman,  6  C.  &  P.  loi  195 

V.  Burdett,  4  B.  &  Aid.  95  6,  7 

V.  Chappie,  R.  &  R.  C  C.  77  310 

V.  Clarke,  2  Starkie  214  418 
V.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221 

90,  133,  147a.  317,  493 

V.  Codrington,  i  C.  &  P.  661  439 

V.  Coe,  6  Car.  &  P.  403  349 

V.  Cook,  I  Leach  Cr.  L.  123  32 

V.  Crockett,  4  C.  &  P.  544  103 

V.  Dawson,  i  Stra.  19  419 

V.  Dean  of  Asaph,  3  T.  R.  428  273 

V.  Derrington,  2  C.  &  P.  418  135 
V.  Dixon,  3  Burr.  1687 

172,  175,  252 

V.  Dunn,  i  Moody  C.  C.  146  89 

V.  Edwards,  4  T.  R.  449  206 

V.  Ellis,  6  B.  &  Cr.  145  88 

V.  Ely,  12  Viner's  Abr.  118  102 

V.  Ford,  2  Salk.  690  207 

V.  Frederick,  2  Stran.  1095  188 

V.  Fursey,  6  Car.  &  Paj-ne  81  91 

V.  Gilham,  i  Moody  C.  C.  186  177 

V.  Gray,  68  J.  P.  327  414 

V.  Griffin,  6  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  219  177 

V.  Groombridge,  7  C.  &  P.  582  408 

V.  Halloway,  i  C.  &  P.  127  296 

V.  Hardy,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  199  171 

V.  Hargrave,  5  Car.  &  P.  170  346 

V.  Haworth,  4  Car.  &  P.  254  425 

V.  Hay,  2  C.  &  P.  458  295 

V.  Haydn,  2  F.  &  S.  379  175 

V.  Holy  Trinity,  7  B.  &  C.  611  44 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


evil 


[References  a> 
Rex  V.  Hutchinson,  2  B.  &  C.  608    106 
V.  Jackson,  3  Campb.  370  444 

V.  Jagger,  i  East  P.  C.  455         185 
V.  Jarvis,  2  iMoo.  &  R.  40  75 

V.  Jolliffe,  4  T.  R.  285  266 

V.  Jones,  2  C.  &  P.  629  147a 

V.  Kinloch,    18    How.    St.    Tr. 

395  203 

V.  Lara,  6  T.  R.  565  435 

V.  Lawley,  2  Str.  904  255 

V.  Lloyd,  4  C.  &  P.  233        106,  140 
V.  Locker,  5  Esp.  107  188 

V.  Luffe,  8  East  193  527 

V.  Maidstone,  12  East  550  527 

V.  Marsh,  6  Ad.  &  El.  236  26 

V.  Martin,  6  C.  &  P.  562  418 

V.  Mead,  2  B.  &  C.  605  106 

V.  Merthyr  Tidvil,  i  B.  &  Ad. 

29  44 

Moffatt,  2  Leach  C.  C.  483  430 
Mosly,  I  Mood  C.  C.  98  105 
Mott,  I  Leach  C.  C.  85  310 

Moyle,  2  East  P.  C.  1076  310 
Osmer,  5  East  304  446 

Partridge,  7  Car.  &  P.  551  300 
Phillips,  3  Camp.  73  349 

Pike,  3  C.  &  P.  598  114 

Plumber,  2  K.  B.  339  144 

Plympton,     2     Ld.     Raym. 

1377  451 

Priddle,  2  Leach  C.  L.  496  206 
Reason,  i  Str.  499  112 

Rooney,  7  C.  &  P.  517  88,  91 
Rudd,  Cowp.  331  72 

Sergeant,  I  Ry.  &  Mood  352  185 
Shukard,  Russ.  &  Ry.  200  424 
Simons,  6  C.  &  P.  540  135 

Smith,  I  Mood.  C.  C.  289  188 
Smith,  Russ.  &  Ry.  417  371 

Sourton,  5  Ad.  &  E.  180  527 

Sparkes,  Peake  N.  P.  78  177 
Spilsbury,  7  C.  &  P.  187  136 

Stannard,  7  C.  &  P.  763  76,  79 
Sutton,  3  Adol.  &  E.  597  21 

Swallow,   31    How.    St.   Tr. 

971  73 
V.  Thompson,   i    Mood.   C.    C. 

78  293 

V.  Thornton,  i  Mood.  C.  C.  27  143 

V.  Tippet,  R.  &  R.  509  147 


e  to  Sections.] 
Rex  V.  Turner,  5  IMaule  &  Selw. 

206  24a 

V.  Turner,  6  How.  St.  Tr.  565  79 
V.  Vaughan,  2  Doug.  516  461 

V.  Wade,  i  Mood.  C.  C.  86 

203,  205 
V.  Walter,  7  C.  &  P.  267  133 

V.  Walters,  7  Car.  &  P.  250  314 
V.  Watson,  32  How.  St.  Tr.  i  171 
V.  Watson.  2  Stark.  104  8,  54 

V.  Warickshall,  r  Leach  Cr.  L. 

298  137 

V.  Wedge,  5  Car.  &  P.  298  342 

V.  Westbeer,  i  Leach  C.  L.  14  71 
V.  Wheeler,  i  W.  Bl.  311  461 

V.  White,  2  Leach  Cr.  L.  482 

201,  203,  205 
V.  Whitney,  I  INIood.  C.  C.  3  310 
V.  Wilkes,"  7  C.  &  P.  272  74 

V.  Williams,  7  C.  &  P.  320 

205,  414 
V.  Woodfall,  5  Burr.  2661  273,  364 
V.  Wyatt,  73  L.  J.  K.  B.  15  88 

Reyes  v.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  422        323 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  346  234 

V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  422  520 

Reynolds  v.  State,  68  Ala.  502  107 

V.  State,  115  Ind.  421  524 

V.  State,  147  Ind.  3      187,  241,  358 

407 


(N. 


417 
264 

145 
87 
70 


V.  State,  27  Neb.  90 

V.  People,    41    How.    Pr 

Y.)  179 
V.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  145 
260, 
Rhea  v.  State,  10  Yerg.    (Tenn.) 

257 
V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  138 
Rhodes  v.  State,  141  Ala.  66 

V.  State,  128  Ind.  189     15,  235,  348 
Rhyne  v.    Hofifman,  6  Jones   Eq. 

(N.  Car.)  335  ^  526 

Rice  V.  Commonwealth,  31  Ky.  L. 
1354  398,  403 

V.  Commonwealth,  102  Pa.  St. 

408  68 

V.  Rice,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  559  53.  252 
V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  215  138 
V.  State     (Tex.),    112    S.    W. 

299  161 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  38  418 


cvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  a) 
Rice  V.    State,  49  Tex.   Cr.   App. 
569  103 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  648 

73,  242 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  255 

103,  105,  121 
V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  149 

318,  319a 
Rich    V.    United    States,    i    Okla. 

354  467 

Richards    v.    Commonwealth,    107 

Va.  881  106,  238,  314 

V.  State,  91  Tenn.  723  59,  2^2 

V.  State,  S3  Tex.  Cr.  400  492 

V.  State,  82  Wis.  172  iii,  124 

Richardson  v.  Commonwealth,  80 

Va.  124  S7 

V.  People,  31  111.  170         524 

V.  State,  145  Ala.  46  127,  314,  374a 

V.  State,  47  Ark.  562        519 

V.  State  (Tex.),  42   S.  W.  996  378 

V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  486     334 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  346  381,  384 

Richburger  v.  State,  90  Miss.  806     137 

Richels  v.  State,  i  Sneed  (Tenn.) 

606  354 

Richie  v.  State,  85  Ark.  413  269 

Richmond  v.  State,  19  Wis.  307       533 
Rickerstricker    v.    State,    31    Ark. 

207  189 

Ridenour  v.  State,  65  Ind.  411  484 

V.  State,  38  Ohio  St.  272  359 

Ridgell  V.  State,  156  Ala.  10  238 

Ridgeway  v.  West,  60  Ind.  371        477 

Riggs   V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

33  S.  W.  413  356 

V.  State,  104  Ind.  261  358 

V.  State,  30  Miss.  635  320,  328 

Riley  v.  State,  88  Ala.  193  224 

V.  State,  132  Ala.  13  364 

V.  State  (Miss.),  18  So.  117      342 

V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  651  6 

V.  State  (Tex.),  44  S.  W.  498   429 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  763  286 

Riley's  Case,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  172    507 

Rinker  v.  United  States,  151  Fed. 

755  429 

Ripley  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  126 

■491,  494 
Risk  V.  State,  19  Ind.  152         386,  525 


■e  to  Sections.] 

Risner  v.   Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
80  S.  W.  457  271 

Ritchey  v.  People,  47  Pac.  272  204 

Ritter  v.  State,  33  Tex.  608  309 

Rivers  v.  State,  97  Ala.  72  248 

V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  177  207 

Rixford  V.  Miller,  49  Vt.  319  263 

Rizzolo    V.     Commonwealth,     126 
Pa.  St.  54  130 

Robbins  v.  Budd,  2  Ohio  16  195 

V.  People,  95  111.  175  475 

V.  Smith,  47  Conn.  182  533 

V.  Springfield  &c.  R.   Co.,   165 

Mass.  30  224 

V.  State,  8  Ohio  St.  131  iir 

Robb's    Petition,    11    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 
442  226 

Roberts  v.  Commonwealth,  14  Ky. 
L.  219  245 

V.  Commonwealth,  94  Ky.  449    225 
V.  People,  19  Mich.  401  166 

V.  Reilly,  116  U.  S.  90        497,  499 
V.  State,  122  Ala.  47  67 

V.  State,  55  Ga.  220  69 

V.  State,  72  Ga.  673  259 

V.  State,  123  Ga.  146    312,  315,  323 
V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  141  no 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  378    103 
V.  State,  84  Wis.  361  529 

Robertson       v.       Commonwealth 
(Va.),  22  S.  E.  359  23 

V.  State,  97  Ga.  206  296 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  441      74 

Robinson  v.  People,  159  111.  115       130 
V.  State    (Ala.    1908),    45    So. 

916  338 

V.  State    (Ga.   App.    1909),   65 

S.  E.  792  398,  401 

V.  State,  82  Ga.  535     214,  446,  462 
V.  State,  118  Ga.  198  330 

V.  State,  128  Ga.  254  263 

V.  State,  130  Ga.  361 

103,  104,  I  TO,  166 
V.  State,  87  Ind.  292  40,  133 

V.  State,  113  Ind.  510  292,  293 

V.  State  (Tex.),  48  S.  W.  176 

269,  305 
V.  State,  24  Tex.  152  476 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  170  353 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  104    209 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CIX 


[References  ai 

Robnett   v.    People,    i6   111.    App. 

299  221 

Robson  V.  State,  ?>2>  Ga.  166 

36,  282,  288 

V.  Thomas,  55  Mo.  581  23 

Rocco  V.  State,  2>7  Miss.  357     195,  197 

Roch  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  48  325 

Rodgers  v.  State,  50  Ala.  102     21,  314 

V.  State,  144  Ala.  32  325 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  510  414 

Rodifer  v.  State,  74  Ind.  21  476 

Rodriguiz  v.   State,  20  Tex.  App. 

542  408 

Rodriquez   v.    State,   32   Tex.   Cr. 

App.  259  48,  315,  336 

Roelker,  In  re,  Sprague  Dec.  276  226 
Roesel  v.  State,  62  N.  J.  L.  216 

127,  130 

Rogers  v.  Bullock,  3  N.  J.  L.  109    258 

V.  State,  117  Ala.  192  17 

V.  State,  60  Ark.  76  189 

V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  691  57 

V.  State,  129  Ga.  589  517,  522 

V.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  404        119a 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  221  469 

V.  State,  77  Vt.  454  159 

Rohr  V.  State,  60  N.  J.  L.  576  422 

Rollings  V.    State    (Ala.),  49  So. 

329  24s,  314,  322 

Rollins  V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W. 
358  269 

V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  148  425 

Rolls  V.  State,  52  Miss.  391  232 

Romanes,  Ex  parte,  i  Utah  23  499 
Ronan  v.  Dugan,  126  Mass.  176  532 
Roode  V.  State,  5  Neb.  174  430 

Roody  V.  People,  43  Mich.  34  144 

Rooney  v.  State,  51  Neb.  576  298 

Roper  V.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  420  174 
Rociuemore  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  542  122 

Rosales  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  673  441 
Rosaman    v.    Okolona,    85    Miss. 

583  486 

Rose  V.  State,  143  Ala.  114  105 

V.  State,  13  Ohio  C.  C.  342    54,  124 

Rosemond  v.  State,  86  Ark.  160     320 

Rosen  v.  United  States,  161  U.  S. 

29  478 

Ross'  Case,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  165      507 


c  to  Sections.'] 
Ross,  Ex  parte,  2  Bond.    (Ohio) 

252  503 

Ross  V.  People,  34  111.  App.  21        530 
V.  State,  74  Ala.  532  120 

V.  State,  139  Ala.  144      60,  81,  245 
V.  State,  169  Ind.  388  224 

V.  State,  116  Ind.  495  59 

V.  State,  67  Md.  286  126 

Rosson    V.    State,    2;^    Tex.    App. 

287  207 

Roszczyniala   v.    State,    125    Wis. 

414  58a 

Roten  V.  State,  31  Fla.  514  324 

Rothschild     v.      State,      13      Lea 

(Tenn.)  294  442 

Rouch  V.  Great  West  R.  R.  Co., 

I  Q.  B.  51  96 

Rounds  V.  State,  57  Wis.  45  267 

Rountree  v.  State,  88  Ga.  457  72 

Rouse  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  184        214 
Roush  V.  State,  34  Neb.  325  421 

Roussell    V.     Commonwealth,    28 

Gratt.  (Va.)  930  270 

Routt  V.  State,  61  Ark.  594  358 

Rowell  V.  Fuller.  59  Vt.  688  50 

Rowland  v.  State,  45  Ark.  132        493 
Rowsey    v.    Commonwealth,    116 

Ky.  617  103 

Royce  v.  Territory,  5  Okla.  61  26 

Ruby  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  353        192 
Ruch  V.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S.  693    266 
Rucker  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  140      147 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  222  304 

Rudy  V.  Commonwealth,  128  Pa. 

St.   500  14,  119a,  154 

Rufer  V.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  464        127 
Ruffin  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

565  69,  451,  46s 

Ruloff  V.  People,  18  N.  Y.  179  7 

V.  People,  45  N.  Y.  213  50,  67 

Runnels  v.  State,  28  Ark.  121  71 

Runles  v.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

555  125 

Rush  V.  Smith,  T  Cr.  M.  &  R.  94    220 
V.  State  (Tex.),  76  S.  W.  927 

270,  227,  329 
Rusher  v.  State,  94  Ga.  363  138 

Russell  V.  Jackson,  9  Hare  387 

17s,  177,  179 


ex 


TAELE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ay 
Russell   V.    State    (Ala.),  38   So. 
291  51,  296,  372,  375 

V.  State,  66  Ark.  185  398 

V.  State,  51  Fla.  124  430 

V.  State,  77  Neb.  519 

68,  387,  390,  392 

V.  State,  S7  Tex.  Cr.  App.  314    120 

Ruston  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  432      54 

Ruston's  Case,  i  Leach  Cr.  L.  455  204 

Ruth   V.    State    (Wis.    1909),    122 

N.  W.  733  45 

Rutherford  v.  Commonwealth,  78 

Ky.  639  230 

Ryan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  124  111. 
App.  188  447 

V.  People,  79  N.  Y.  593 

61,  118,  119,  120,  245 


V.  State,  45  Ga.  128 

V.  State,  104  Ga.  78 

V.  State  (Tex.),  35  S.  W.  288 

V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  699 

V.  State,  83  Wis.  486    118.  215, 

V.  Territory   (Ariz.),   100  Pac. 

770  59,  354 

V.  United    States,  26   App.    D. 

C.  74 
Ryder  v.  State,  100  Ga.  528 


439 
435 
325 
35 
378 


268 


Sabins  v.  Jones,  119  Mass.  167        532 
Saffer  v.  United   States,  87  Fed. 

329  220,  222 

Sage  V.  State,  91  Ind.  141         i6r,  162 
V.  State,  127  Ind.  15      40,  248,  261 
Sahlinger  v.  People,  102  111.  241 

299,  378 
Sailsberry  v.   Commonwealth,   32 

Ky.  L.  1085  no,  112 

Saint  V.  State,  68  Ind.  128  528 

Sale  V.  Crutchfield,  8  Bush  (Ky.) 

636  533 

Sample  v.  Frost,  10  Iowa  266  173 

Samuel  v.  People,  164  111.  379  247 

Sanchez  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  147 

160,  163 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  14  480 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  179    127 

Sanders   v,    Bagwell,   37   S.   Car. 

145  214 


e  to  Sections.] 

Sanders     v.     Commonwealth,     13 
Ky.  L.  820 
V.  People,  124  111.  218 
V.  State,  148  Ala.  603 
V.  State,  113  Ga.  267 
V.  State,  118  Ga.  329 
V.  State,  85  Ind.  318 
V.  State,  94  Ind.  147     157,  164, 
V.  State,  73  Miss.  444 
Sanderson  v.  State,  169  Ind.  301 

90,  333,  491,  492, 
Sands  v.  Commonwealth,  20  Gratt. 

(Va.)  800 
Sanford  v.  State,  143  Ala.  78 

108,  267, 
Sang  V.  Beers,  20  Neb.  365 
Santo  V.  State,  2  Iowa  165 
Sapp  V.  King,  66  Tex.  570 

V.  State  (Tex.),  77  S.  W.  456 
235, 
Sarah  v.  State,  28  Ga.  576 
Sargent  v.  Cavis,  36  Cal.  552 
Sarles,  In  re,  4  City  H.   R.    (N. 

Y.)   107 
Sartorious  v.  State,  24  Miss.  602 

223, 
Sasse  V.  State,  68  Wis.  530 
Sasser  v.  State,  129  Ga.  541 

151,  222, 
V.  State,  13  Ohio  453  428, 

Sater  v.  State,  56  Ind.  37S 
Satterwhite  v.  State,  28  Ala.  65 
Sattler  v.  People,  59  111.  68 
Saucier  v.   State    (Miss.),  48  So. 

840 
Saunders  v.   State,   10  Tex.  App. 

336 
Saunderson  v.  State,  151  Ind.  550 
Saussy  v.   South  Florida  R.   Co., 

22  Fla.  327 
Sawyer  v.  People,  91  N.  Y.  667 

81,  85, 
Sawyers  v.  State,  15  Lea  (Tenn.) 

694 

Saxon  V.  State,  96  Ga.  739         40, 
Saye  v.   State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

569 
Savior     V.     Commonwealth,     122 
ky.  776 


331 
86a 
117 
140 
147 
144 
318 


493 

422 

332 
532 
24a 
253 

297 
130 
249 

434 

225 
230 

323 
432 
153 
524 
309 

467 

144 
461 

243 
338 

153 
246 

77 
462 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


[References  ar 

Sayres  v.  Commonwealth,  88  Pa. 

St.  291  2,33 

Schanzenbach   v.    Brough,  58   111. 

App.  526  237 

Scharf  V.  People,  34  111.  App.  400  532 
Schaser  v.  State,  2,(>  Wis.  429  222, 
Schissler  v.  State,  122  Wis.  365  163 
Schlemmer  v.  State,  51   N.  J.  L. 

23  94,  100 

Schlencker  v.  State,  9  Neb.  241 

161,  166 
Schmidt    v.    United    States,    133 

Fed.  257  468 

Schnicker    v.    People,    88    N.    Y. 

192  100 

Schnier  v.  People,  23  111.  ir  227 

Schnitz  V.  People,  178  111.  320  17,  283 
Schoenfeldt    v.     State,    39    Tex. 

App.  69s  74,  75,  395 

Schoolcraft  v.  People,  117  111.  271 

328,  329 
Schoudel   v.    State,    57    N.    J.    L. 

209  384 

Schroeder  v.   State,   50  Tex.   Cr. 

I I I  484 

Schubkagel  v.  Dierstein,   131   Pa. 

St.  46  173 

Schults  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  351  414 
Schultz  V.  State,  133  Wis.  215 

492,  494 
V.  Territorjs  5  Ariz.  239      152,  158 
Schuster  v.  State,  80  Wis.  107 

150,  212,  213,  23s 
Schutz  V.  State,  125  Wis.  452  494 

Schwantes  v.  State,  127  Wis.  160  6,  7 
Schwartz     v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

App.),  114  S.  W.  809  75 

Schwen  v.  State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  2>^2>  492 
Sconyers  v.  State,  85  Ga.  672  517 

Scott  V.  Donovan,  153  Mass.  378 

525,  533 
V.  People,  141  111.  195 

276,  277,  345,  348,  349 
V.  People,   62   Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

62  440 

V.  State,  94  Ala.  80  484 

V.  State,  113  Ala.  64  248 

V.  State,  141  Ala.  i  318 

V.  State,  42  Ark.  7:^              35,  298 

V.  State,  63  Ark.  310  74 


io  Sections.\ 

Scott  V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  479 
V.  State,  119  Ga.  425 
V.  State,  122  Ga.  138  373, 

V.  State,  64  Ind.  400 
V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  31 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  164 

Scoville    V.    State    (Tex.),   81    S. 
W.  117 

Scruggs  V.  State,  90  Tenn.  81 


340, 
V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  622 
Seaborn  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

80  S.  W.  223 
Searcy  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  513 
Searls  v.  People,  13  111.  597    381, 
Seifert  v.  State,  160  Ind.  464 
Seitz  V.  Seitz,  170  Pa.  St.  71 
Selby   V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
25  Ky.  L.  2209  97, 

Selden  v.  State,  74  Wis.  271 
Self  V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  455 
Sellers  v.  People,  6  111.  183 
Semon  v.  People,  42  Mich.  141 

523, 
Sentell  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  260 
Settle  V.  Alison,  8  Ga.  201 
Sewall  V.  Robbins,  139  Mass.  164 
Sexton  V.  State  (Ark.,  1909),  121 
S.  W.  1075 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  497 

Seymour,     Ex    parte,     14     Pick. 

(Mass.)  40  507, 

Shackelford  v.  State,  32,  Ark.  539 

262, 

Shaffer  v.  State,  ^2  Ind.  221 

V.  State,  100  Ind.  365 

V.  United   States,  24  App.    D. 

C.  417  SO, 

Shaffner    v.     Commonwealth,    72 

Pa.  St.  60 
Shailer  v.  Bullock,  78  Conn.  65 
Shannahan   v.    Commonwealth,   8 
Bush   (Ky.)  463  164, 

Shannon  v.  Swanson,  208  111.  52 
Sharkey  v.  State,  ^2,  Miss.  353 
Sharp   V.   Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
30  S.  W.  414 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.  1909), 

124  S.  W.  316 
V.  People,  29  111.  464 


414 
300 
378 
222 
166 
238 

273 

341 

522 

48 
138 
384 
180 
187 

145 
176 
330 
144 

524 
241 
500 
221 

410 
61 

510 

267 
440 
440 

211 


525 

166 
205 
471 

232 

508 
357 


exn 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ai 

Sharp  V.  State,  51  Ark.  147 

215 

V.  State,  17  Ga.  290 

24 

V.  State,  S2,  N.  J.  L.  511 

437 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  211 

293, 

294 

Shattuck  V.  State,  51  Miss.  575 

463 

Shaw,  Ex  parte,  61  Cal.  s8 

254 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  105  S.  W. 

500 

268 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  236 

364 

V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  155 

133 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  379 

384 

Shears  v.  State,  147  Ind.  51        87, 

247 

Sheehan  v.  People,  131  111.  22  152, 

220 

Sheehy  v.  Territory,  9  Ariz.  269 

96 

Shelby  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Ky. 

S63 

493 

Sheldon,  Ex  parte,   34   Ohio    St. 

319 

499 

Shelly  V.  State,  95  Tenn.  152 

395 

Shelton  v.  State,  143  Ala.  98 

430 

V.  State,  132  Ga.  413 

521 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  431 

488 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  627 

269 

Shepard,  In  re,  3  Fed.  12 

251 

V.  United  States,  160  Fed.  584 

479 

Shepherd  v.  People,  72  111.  480 

316 

V.  People,  25  N.  Y.  406 

195 

V.  State,  31  Neb.  389 

215 

Shepherd's   Case,  2  Leach   C.   C. 

609 

310 

Shepler  v.  State,  114  Ind.  194 

196 

Shepperd  v.  State,  94  Ala.   102 

12, 

299 

Sheridan's  Case,  31   How.  St  Tr. 

543 

49 

Sherman  v.  People,  13  Hnn    (N. 

Y.)   575 

404 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  148 

58a 

Sherrill  v.  State,  138  Ala.  3 

6,  118, 

233 

Sherrod  v.  State,  90  Miss.  856 

238 

Shields  v.  State,  104  Ala.  35 

484 

V.  State,  2i2  Tex.  Cr.  498 

418 

Shiflett  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  530 

493 

Shilling  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

326 

74 

Shinn      v.      Commonwealth,      32 

Gratt.  (Va.)  899                   282, 

293 

'c  to  Sections.^ 
Shipp  V.  Commonwealth,  124  Ky. 

643 
Shires  v.   State    (Okla.),  99  Pac. 

1 100  276, 

Shirley  v.  State,  144  Ala.  35     262, 
V.  State  (Tex.),  22  S.  W.  42 
308, 
Shirwin  v.  People,  69  111.  55 

270,  414,  415, 
Shivers  v.  State,  53  Ga.  149 
Shley  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

190 
Shoemaker    v.    State     (Tex.    Cr. 

App.,  1910),  126  S.  W.  887 
Shorey  v.  Hussey,  :i2  Me.  579 
Short   V.    Commonwealth,    9    Ky. 

L-  255 
Shorter  v.  State,  62,  Ala.  129 
Showalter  v.  State,  84  Ind.  562    67 
Shreveport  v.  Bowen,  116  La.  522 
Shriedley   v.    State,    23    Ohio    St. 

130 
Shrivers    v.    State,    7   Tex.    App. 

450 
Shubrick  v.  State,  2  S.  Car.  21 
Shular  v.  State,  105  Ind.  289 
Shuler  v.  State,  126  Ga.  630 
Shultz  V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  390 
Shumate   v.    State,    38    Tex.    Cr. 

266 
Shumway  v.  State,  82  Neb.  152 

118, 
Shurley  v.  State,  144  Ala.  35 
Siberry  v.  State,  133  Ind.  677 

12,  48,  82,  233,  315, 
Sidelinger  v.  Bucklin,  64  Me.  371 

52s,  531, 

Siebert  v.  People,  143  111.  571 

Sigerella  v.  State  (Del.,  1909),  74 

Atl.  1081  408. 

Simmons  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

18  S.  W.  534 

V.  State    (Ala.),   48   Tex.    Cr. 

App.  289 
V.  State,  T45  Ala.  61  94, 

V.  State,  32  Fla.  387 
V.  State,  88  Ga.  169 
V.  State,  IT5  Ga.  574 
V.  State,  61  Miss.  243  126, 


323 

280 
22,2 

310 

418 
291 

46 

418 

235 

329 

485 
68 

471 


99 
310 
230 
489 
213 

2^2 

lOI 

323 

533 
58a 

413 
320 

119 
223 
240 
464 
124 
127 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


exiii 


[References  at 

Simmons  v.  State,  7  Ohio  ii6  420 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  527    123 

V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  619    387,  392 

Simon  v.  State,  108  Ala.  2y  312 

V.  State,  36  Miss.  636  130 

V.  State,  37  Miss.  288  130 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  186    396,  397 

Simons  v.  People,  150  111.  66  103 

Simpson    v.    Commonwealth,    126 

Ky.  441  70,  74 

V.  State,  III  Ala.  6  374a 

V.  State,  78  Ga.  91  248 

V.  State,  31  Ind.  99  232 

V.  State,  56  Miss.  297  232 

V.  State,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  356    488 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  320  342 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  77  470 

V.  Yeend,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  626        455 

Sims  V.  Sims,  75  N.  Y.  466  209 

V.  State,  15s  Ala.  96  425 

V.  State,  43  Ala.  33  279 

V.  State,  139  x-Vla.  74 

105,  no,  112,  325 
V.  State,  146  Ala.  109  121,  223 

V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  776       21,  473 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  649  197 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  358  373 

V.  State,  88  Tex.  Cr.  637     221,  327 
Sindram  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  190 

85,  324 
Singleton  v.  State,  38  Fla.  297  207 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1909), 

124  S.  W.  92  328 

Sisk  V.    State    (Tex.),  42  S.  W. 
98s  268 

V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  432  218 

Sizemorev.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

108  S.  W.  254  269 

Skaggs   V.    State    (Ark.),   113    S. 
W.  346  409,  413 

V.  State,  108  Ind.  53  204,  227 

Skains  v.  State,  21  Ala.  218  488 

Skates  v.  State,  64  Miss.  644  270 

Skeen  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  308       485 
Skidmore  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App., 
1909),  123  S.  W.  1 129  4Ta 

V.  State,  43  Tex.  93  356 

Skiff  V.  People,  2  Park.  Cr.   (N. 

Y-)  139  439.  442 

Skinner  v.  State,  108  Ga.  747  i6a 

viii — Underhill  Crim.  Evidence. 


e  to  Sections.] 

Skipworth  v.   State,  8  Tex.  App. 

135  270 

Slade  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  381        23 
Slater  v.   United  States,   i    Okla. 

Cr.  275  519 

Slattery  v.  People,  76  111.  217 

122,  123,  344 
Sledge  V.  State,  99  Ga.  684  358 

Slingerland     v.      Slingerland,     46 

Minn.  100  267 

Sloan  V.  People,  47  111.  76  300 

V.  State,  71  Miss.  459  470 

V.  Torry,  78  Mo.  623  505 

Slocum  V.  People,  90  111.  274 

19.  339,  392,  393 

Slone  V.  Commonwealth,  33  Ky. 

L.  266  332 

Small  V.   Commonwealth,  91    Pa. 

St.  304  105 

Smalls  V.  State,  loi  Ga.  570  83 

V.  State,  102  Ga.  31  222 

Smallwood  v.  Commonwealth,  17 

Ky.  L.  1134  356 

Smartt  v.  State,  112  Tenn.  539 

t88,  346 
Smith,  Ex  parte,  3  McLean  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  121  479,  499 

Smith,  In  re,  61  Hun  (N.  Y.)  loi    177 
Smith   V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 
92  S.  W.  610  314 

V.  Commonwealth,    9    Ky.    L. 

215  329 

V.  Commonwealth,  98  Ky.  437 

364,  365 
V.  Commonwealth,     10     Gratt. 

(Va.)  734  138 

V.  Commonwealth,     21     Gratt. 

(Va.)  809  7 

V.  Commonwealth,  85  Va.  924  414 
V.  Commonwealth,  90  Va.  759  188 
V.  Jerome,   47  Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

22  58a 

V.  Jones,  76  Me.  138  258 

V.  Lint,  37  Me.  546  523 

V.  People,  38  Colo.  509  118,  493 
V.  People,  103  111.  82  299 

V.  People,  53  N.  Y.  ill  435 

V.  State,  9  Ala.  990  145 

V.  State,  55  Ala.  i  167 

V.  State,  79  Ala.  21  61 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Ref 

crcnccs  ai 

litl 

1  V.  State,  96  Ala.  66 

484 

V. 

State,  103  Ala.  40 

302 

V. 

State,  107  Ala.  139 

387 

V. 

State,  108  Ala.  i 

32,  58,  391, 

392, 

397 

V. 

State,  142  Ala.  14 

77,  -^27, 

325, 

326 

V. 

State,  145  Ala.  17 

103 

V. 

State,  147  Ala.  692 

122 

V. 

State,  59  Ark.  132 

193 

V. 

State,  74  Ark.  397 

127 

V. 

State,  29  Fla.  408       36, 

116, 

423 

V. 

State,  48  Fla.  307 

103 

V. 

State,  5  Ga.  App.  833 

74 

V. 

State,  2  Ga.  App.  413 

36 

V. 

State,  77  Ga.  705 

414 

V. 

State,  88  Ga.  627 

126 

V. 

State,  106  Ga.  673 

118 

V. 

State,  118  Ga.  61 

no 

V. 

State,  125  Ga.  296 

147 

V. 

State,  126  Ga.  803 

280 

V. 

State,  127  Ga.  56 

280a 

V. 

State,  69  Ind.  140 

484 

V. 

State,  143  Ind.  685  248, 

S17, 

522 

V. 

State,  165  Ind.  180 

314 

V. 

State,  22,  ^le.  48 

344 

V. 

State,  39  Aliss.  521 

353, 

354 

V. 

State,  55  Miss.  513 

442 

V. 

State,  67  i\Iiss.  116 

196 

V. 

State,  75  Miss.  542 

325 

V. 

State,  61  Neb.  296 

119a 

V. 

State,  42  Tex.  ^/[\ 

229, 

230 

V. 

State,  43  Tex.  433 

309 

V. 

State,  43  Tex.  643 

312 

V. 

State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W. 

554 

238 

V. 

State  (Tex.),  32  S.  W. 

696 

422 

V. 

State  (Tex.),  38  S.  W. 

200 

74 

V. 

State  (Tex.),  78  S.  W. 

516 

152 

V. 

State  (Tex.).  99  S.  W. 

100 

216 

V. 

State,  19  Tex.  App.  95 

158 

V. 

State,  21  Tex.  App.  277 

97 

223 

V. 

State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  14 

158 

V. 

State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  265 

290 

V. 

State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  6r8 

6 

V. 

State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  488 

68,  69 

V. 

State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  405 

374 

V. 

State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  267 

233 

491 

V. 

State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  267 

218 

V. 

State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  65 

265 

V. 

State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  27 

238 

c  to  Sections.] 
Smith  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  80 

225,  369,  413 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  344 

122,  223 

V.  State.  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  643     138 
V.  United  States,  161  U.  S.  85 

237,  324 
V.  Young,  I  Campb.  N.  P.  439     44 
Smith's  Case,  i  Leach  C.  L.  223        73 
Smith's    Case,    2    City   Hall    Rec. 

(X.  Y.)  77  177 

Smurr  v.  State,  88  Ind.  504  23 

V.  State,  105  Ind.  125  195 

Snap  V.  People,  19  111.  80  310 

Snapp  V.  Commonwealth,  82  Ky. 

173  304 

Sneed  v.  Territory,  16  Okla.  641     325 

Snell  V.  State,  2  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

347  422 

V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  171  486 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  236  105 

Snelling  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App., 

1909),  123  S.  W.  610  492 

Snodgrass  v.   Commonwealth,  89 

Va.  679  224 

Snow  V.  Gould,  74  Me.  540  174 

Snyder,  In  re,  17  Kan.  542       439,  442 
V.  Commonwealth,   85   Pa.   St. 

519  82,  87 

V.  State,  145  .A.la.  23  238 

V.  State,  151  Ind.  553  461 

Sokel  V.  People.  212  111.  238  405 

Solander  v.  People,  2  Colo.  48  68,  348 
Solomon  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  92  102 
Somers  v.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  475  263 
Sonnenberg    v.    State,    124    Wis. 

124  524 

Soquet  V.  State,  72  Wis.  659  318 

Sorenson    v.    United    States,    143 

Fed.  820  134 

Sort  V.  State,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  568  532 
Sosat  V.  State,  2  Ind.  App.  586  310 
Soto  V.  Territory  (.Ariz.),  94  Pac. 

I 104  98 

South  V.  People,  98  111.  261 

136,  147,  404 
V.  State,  86  Ala.  617  70,  71 

Southern    Railway    News    Co.   v. 
Russell,  91  Ga.  808  247 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXV 


[References  ar 

Southwick  V.  Sonthwick,  2  Sweeny 

(N.  Y.  Super.)  234  186 

Southworth  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr. 

532  60,  235 

Sowder  v.  Commonwealth,  8  Bush 

(Ky.)  432  14 

Sparf  V.  United  States,  156  U.  S. 

51  275 

Sparks  v.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky. 

644  71 

Sparrenberger   v.    State,    53    Ala. 

481  26,  191 

Spearman  v.    State,  34   Tex.    Cr. 

279  138 

Spears  v.  People,  220  111.  72  422 

V.  State,  92  Miss.  613  2i^7,  374a 
Speer  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  273  444 
Speight  V.  State,  80  Ga.  51  37 

Spence  v.  Thompson,  11  Ala.  746  457 
Spencer  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Ky. 

L.  880  _  333 

V.  Commonwealth,  Leigh  (Va.) 

751  37 

Spenrath  v.    State    (Tex.),  48  S. 

W.  192  387,  390 

Spicer  V.  Commonwealth,  21  Ky. 

L.  528  125 

Spies  V.  People,  122  111.  i 

12,  60,  236,  335,  490,  492 
Spigner  v.  State,  103  Ala.  30  277 

Spires  v.  State,  50  Fla.  121  233 

Spittorff  V.  State,  108  Ind.  171 

119a,  296 
Spraggins  v.  State,  139  Ala.  93  14 

V.  State,  150  Ala.  214  14 

Sprague  v.    State    (Tex.),  44    S. 

W.  837  482 

Spratt  V.  State,  8  Mo.  247  192 

Springer  v.  State,  102  Ga.  447  69 

V.  State,  121  Ga.  155      36,  s8a,  484 
Springfield  v.  Dalby,  139  111.  34        223 
V.  State,  96  Ala.  81  80,  164 

Sprinkle    v.    United    States,    141 

Fed.  811  93,  94 

Sprouse  V.   Commonwealth    (Ky., 

1909),  116  S.  W.  344  312,  328 

V.  Commonwealth,  81  Va.  374      63 

Squire  v.  State,  46  Ind.  459  399 

Stacy  V.   Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 

L.  1242  330a 


e  to  Sections.] 

Stafford  v.  State,  50  Fla.  134  328 

V.  State,  55  Ga.  591  89,  135 

Stage's    Case,    5    City    Hall    Rec. 
(N.  Y.)  177  143 

Stalcup  V.  State,  129  Ind.  519  522 

V.  State,  146  Ind.  270  60,  325 

Stalker  v.  State,  4  Conn.  341  433 

Stallings  v.  State,  47  Ga.  572  126 

V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  220  282,  287 

Stallworth  v.  State,  146  Ala.  8        333 

Stamper  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
100  S.  W.  286  468 

Stanfield    v.    State,    i    Ga.    App. 
532  489 

Stanglein    v.    State,    17   Ohio    St. 

453  404,  40s 

Stanley  v.  Montgomery,  102  Ind. 

102  187 

V.  State,  88  Ala.  154  283 

V.  State,  82  Miss.  498  318 

V.  State  (Tex.),  74  S.  W.  318    470 

V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  482     96 

Staples  V.  State,  89  Tenn.  231     67,  68 

Stapletonv.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

3  S.  W.  793  269 

V.  Crofts,  83  Eng.  C.  L.  367      184 

Starck  v.  State,  63  Ind.  285  293 

Starke  v.  State,  97  Ga.  193  381 

Starkey  v.  People,  17  111.  17  102 

Starks  v.  State,  137  Ala.  9       103,  330 

Starling  v.  State,  89  Miss.  328        245 

Starr   v.   Commonwealth,   97   Ky. 

193  109 

V.  State,  160  Ind.  661  328 

V.  United  States,  164  U.  S.  627  118 

Starror,  In  re,  63  Fed.  364  251 

State  V.  Abbatto,  64  N.  J.  L.  658     133 

V.  Abbev,  29  Vt.  60  402,  404 

V.  Abbott  (W.  Va.),  62  S.  E. 

693  6,  12 

V.  Abbott,  8  W.  Va.  741 

ICO,  325,  326 
V.  Able,  65  Mo.  357  261,  266,  267 
V.  Abram,  10  Ala.  928  359 

V.  Abrams,  131  Iowa  479 

125,  147,  486 
V.  Ackcrman,  64  X.  J.  L.  99  197 
V.  Adair,  160  Mo.  391  248 

V.  Adams  (Del.),  65  All.  510 

12,  no,  119,  146 


CXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311 

229,  230,  271 
V,  Adams,  58  Kan.  365  358 

V.  Adams,  40  La.  Ann.  213  188 

V.  Adams,  108  Mo.  208  282,  290 
V.  Adams,  138  N.  Car.  688  88 

V.  Adamson,  114  Ind.  216  284 

V.  Adamson,  43  Minn.  196  246 

V.  Addison,  2  S.  Car.  356  28 

V.  Ah  Chuey,  14  Nev.  79  53,  58a 
V.  Ah  Lee,  8  Ore.  2x4  102,  230 
V.  Aker     (Wash.,     1909),     103 

Pac.  420  392,  397 

Aldrich,  50  Kan.  666  103 

Aleck,  41  La.  Ann.  83  354 

Alexander,  66  Mo.  148  80 

Alexander,  119  Mo.  447  437 

Alexander,  30  S.  Car.  74  154 
Alexis,  45  La.  Ann.  973  246 

Allemand,  25  La.  Ann.  525  257 
Allen,  57  Iowa  431  72, 

Allen,  48  La.  Ann.  1387  338 

Allen,  III  La.  154  328 

Allen,  116  Mo.  548  427 

Allen,  34  Mont.  403  292 

Allen,  I   Hawks   (N.  Car.) 

6  434 

Allen,  107  N.  Car.  805  247 

Allen,  21  S.  Dak.  121  282 

Allisbach,  69  Ind.  50  311 

Allison  (S.  Dak.,  1909),  124 

N.  W.  747  415 

Aired,  115  Mo.  471  270 

Altoffer,  3  Ohio  Dec.  288  24a 
Alton,  105  Minn.  410  97,  334 
Ames,  64  Me.  386  255 

Ames,  90  Minn.  183  451,  454 
Ames,  91  Minn.  365  451 


Anderson  (Conn.,  1909),  75 

Atl.  81  482 

Anderson,  140  Iowa  445  380 

Anderson,  47  Iowa  142  435 

Anderson,  51  La.  Ann.  1181  2^ 
Anderson,  120  La.  331  87,  238 
Anderson,  89  Mo.  312  68 

Anderson,  92  N.  Car.  732 

491,  493,  494 
Anderson,  5  Wash.  350 

24a,  277 
Andette,  81  Vt.  400  380 


e  to  Sections. \ 

State  V.  Andrews,  95  Iowa  451        382 
V.  Andrews,  43  Mo.  470  473 

V.  Andrews,  72  S.  Car.  257 

40,  222,  325 
V.  Anthony,     i     McCord     (S. 

Car.)  28s  188,  189 

V.  Antonio,  3  Brev.   (S.  Car.) 

562  433 

V.  Archer,  54  N.  H.  465  250 

V.  Ariel,  38  S.  Car.  221  320 

V.  Armistead,  106  N.  Car.  639 

446,  46s 
V.  Armstrong,  48  La.  Ann.  314  520 
V.  Armstrong,  4  Minn.  335 

402,  404 
V.  Armstrong,  106  Mo.  395 

272,,  2<^2, 
V.  Armstrong,  203  ]\Io.  554 

127,  129 
V.  Arnold,  12  Iowa  479  82,  163 
V.  Arnold    (Kan.,    1909),    100 

Pac.  64  154 

V.  Arnold,  206  Mo.  589  280 

V.  Arnold,  13  Ired.    (N.  Car.) 

184  24,  342,  525 

V.  Arnold,  146  N.  Car.  602  236 
V.  Arthur,  135  Iowa  48 

371,  374,  492 
V.  Asbell,  57  Kan.  398  6,  312 

V.  Ashworth,  50  La.  Ann.  94 

no,  112 
V.  Athey.  133  Iowa  382  382 

V.  Atkinson,  40  S.  Car.  363  6,  58a 
V.  Atkinson,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

677  197 

V.  Atterbury,  59  Kan.  237  387,  392 
V.  Aughtry,  49  S.  Car.  285  276,  277 
V.  Austin,  113  Mo.  538  507 

V.  Austin,  183  Mo.  478  493 

V.  Avery,  31  La.  Ann.  181  147a 

V.  Avery,  113  Mo.  475  6,  61,  221 
V.  Ayers,  8  S.  Dak.  517  390 

V.  Ayles,  120  La.  661  163 

V.  Baans  (N.  J.),  71  Atl.  in  482 
V.  Babb,  76  Mo.  501  296 

V.  Babcock,  25  R.  I.  224  61 

V.  Baber,  74  Mo.  292  163 

V.  Bacon,  13  Ore.  143  61 

V.  Badger,  69  Vt.  216  loi 

V.  Bailey,  79  Conn.  589  48 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CX\11 


State  V.  Bailey, 


[References  are 
190  Mo.  257      90,  328 


Bailey,  63  W.  Va.  558 
Bain,  43  Kan.  638 
Baird,  13  Idalio  29  118, 

Baker  (Iowa,  1910),  125  X. 

W.  659 
Baker,  20  Mo.  338 
Baker,  136  Mo.  74 
Baker,  209  Mo.  ^^^ 
Baker,  58  S.  Car.  in 
Baker,  13  Lea  (Tenn.)  326 
271, 
Baker,  33  W.  Va.  319 
Balch,  136  Mo.  103 
Baldoser,  88  Iowa  55 
Baldwin,  79  Iowa  714 
Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i 


292 

119 


381 

26.  191 

240,  411 

66 

130 


272 
58a 
358 
67 
no 

117, 


106, 
IIS, 


217,  222,  238,  267,  312,  319 
Baldwin,  214  Mo.  290  340 

Baldwin,  80  N.  Car.  390         465 
Baldwin,  15  Wash.  15  11  r 

Ballard,  104  Mo.  634  296 

Bailer,  26  W.  Va.  90  255 

Ballou,  20  R.  I.  607  338 

Bancroft,  22  Kan.  170  284 

Bancroft,  10  X.  H.  105  371 

Banister,  35  S.  Car.  290 

103,  105,  no 
Banks,  40  La.  Ann.  736  74 

Banks,  78  Me.  490  67 

Banner,  149  N.  Car.  519 

161,  223,  324 
Banusik    (X.    J.),    64    Atl. 

994  129,  140,  147 

Baptiste,  26  La.  Ann.  134 

207,  208 
Barber,  13  Idaho  65  59,  248,  326 
Barber,  2  Kan.  App.  679  248 
Barfield,  8  Ired.   (X.  Car.) 

344  324 

Barham,  82  ^To.  67  iig 

Barker,  2:6  Mo.  532  154,  158 

Barksdale,  122  La.  788  326 
Barnes,  48  La.  Ann.  460        214 

Barnes,  32  Me.  530  362 

Barnes,  47  Ore.  592  7 

Barnett,  203  Mo.  640  61 

Barnett,  34  W.  Va.  74  485 

Barr,  11  Wash.  481  83 

Barrett,  jj7  La.  1086  61,  245 


to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Barrett,  121  La.  1058  419 

V.  Barrett,  40  Minn.  65        236,  238 
V.  Barrett  (X.  Car.,  1909),  65 

S.  E.  894  368 

V.  Barrick,  60  W.  Va.  576  418 

V.  Barringer,  114  N.  Car.  840   488 
V.  Barrington,  198  Mo.  23 

7,  40,  41,  137,  140,  246 
V.  Barrows,  76  Me.  401  71 

V.  Bartlett,  127  Iowa  689  414 

V.  Bartlett,  55  Me.  200  57,  247 

V.  Bartlett,  43  X.  H.  224  157 

V.  Bartlett,  n  Vt.  650  298 

V.  Bartley,  48  Kan.  421  271 

V.  Barron,  37  Vt.  57  121 

V.  Baruth,  47  Wash.  283  122 

V.  Bassett,  34  La.  Ann.  1108 

34,  296 
V.  Batchelder,  5  X.  H.  549  307 

V.  Bateman,  198  Mo.  212  211 

V.  Bateman,  3  Ired.  (X.  Car.) 

474  420 

V.  Bates,  23  Iowa  96  446,  447 

V.  Bates,  46  La.  Ann.  849  87 

V.  Bates,  182  Mo.  70  91,  305 

V.  Baudoin,  115  La.  837  333 

V.  Bauerkemper,  95  Iowa  562 

213.  390,  391,  393 
V.  Bauman,  52  Iowa  68  427 

V.  Beach  (Ind.),  43  X^.  E.  949 

16,  24a 
V.  Beal,  68  Ind.  345  66,  236 

V.  Bean,  77  Vt.  38  233,  315 

V.  Beasom,  40  X.  H.  367  446 

V.  Beaucleigh,  92  Mo.  490  69 

V.  Beaudet,  53  Conn.  536 

loi,  145,  332 
V.  Bebb,  125  Iowa  494  97,  409,  411 
V.  Becht,  23  Minn.  411  461 

V.  Beckner,  194  Mo.  281        78,  323 
V.  Bedard,  65  Vt.  278  150,  409 

V.  Beebe,  13  Kan.  589  465 

V.  Beebe,  17  Minn.  241  79,  192 

V.  Beeman,  51  Wash.  557    371,  378- 
V.  Behan,  113  La.  701  472,  475 

V.  Behnnan,  114  X.  Car.  797      383 
V.  Belcher,  13  S.  Car.  459  185 

V.  Bell,  49  Iowa  440  392 

V.  Bell,  212  Mo.  ni       88,  161,  163 
V.  Bell,  63  X.  Car.  ggn  33 


CXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


State 


[References  are 
V.  Belton,  24  S.  Car.  185        328 
Benjamin  (R.  I.),  71  Atl.  65 

61,  329 
Benge,  61  Iowa  658  270 

Benham,  7  Conn.  414  195 

Benner,  64  Me.  267    116,  192,  212 
Bennett,  31  Iowa  24  185 

Bennett,  52  Iowa  724  269 

Bennett,  137  Iowa  427 

41a,  387,  388,  392 
Bennett,  40  S.  Car.  308 

193,  280a 
Bennett,  21  S.  Dak.  396  67 

Benson,  22  Kan.  471  36 

Benson,  28  Minn.  424  507 

Benson,  no  Mo.  18  436 

Berberick,  38  Mont.  423 

126,  129,  147a,  161 
Berger,  121  Iowa  581  87 

Berkley,  92  Mo.  41  250,  271 

Berlin,  42  Mo.  572  383 

Bernard,  45  Iowa  234  185 

Berry,  50  La.  Ann.  1309 

126,  129,  136,  140 
Bertin,  24  La.  Ann.  46  229,  230 
Bessa,  115  La.  259  77 

Best,  III  N.  Car.  638  193 

Beuerman,  59  Kan.  586  161 

Biango  (N.  J.),  68  Atl.  125    103 
Bias,  37  La.  Ann.  259  484 

Bibb,  68  Mo.  286  421 

Bibby,  91  Cal.  470  429 

Bickle,  53  W.  Va.  597  119 

Bige,  112  Iowa  433  277 

Bigelow,  loi  Iowa  430  95 

Biggerstaft,  17  Mont.  510 

loi,  331 
Biggs    (Wash.,    1910),    107 

Pac.  374  416 

Bingham,  51  Wash.  616 

435,  436,  442 
Birdwell,  36  La.  Ann.  850      328 


86a 
96,  326 

473 


Birdey,  122  Iowa  102 
Birks,  199  IMo.  263 
Bishel,  39  Iowa  42 
Bishop,  73   X.  Car.  44 
Bishop,  98  N.  Car.  773 
Black,  89  Iowa  737 
Black,  42  La.  Ann.  861 

103,  104,  108,  215 


14s 
116 

524 


to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Black,  143  Mo.  166         70,  74 
V.  Blackburn,  61  Ark.  407  523 

V.  Blackburn    (Del.   O.   &   T., 

1892),  75  Atl.  536        124,  320 
V.  Blackburn    (Iowa),    no   N. 

W.  275  414,  418 

V.  Blackburn,  136  Iowa  743        237 
V.  Blackburn,  80  N.  Car.  474 

103,  IDS,  III 
V.  Blackley,  138  N.  Car.  620  284 
V.  Blackwell,  9  Ala.  79  353 

V.  Blaisdell,  33  N.  H.  388  207 

V.  Blalock,  Phil.  (N.  Car.)  242  208 
V.  Blanchard,  74  Iowa  628  421 

V.  Blee,  133  Iowa  725 

221,  326,  331 
V.  Blize,  III   Mo.  464  468 

V.  Blodgett,  50  Ore.  329 

126,  129,  140,  147a 
V.  Bloedow,  45  Wis.  279  359 

V.  Bloom.  68  Ind.  54  77 

V.  Blue,  136  ]\Io.  41  12,  378 

V.  Blunt,  59  Iowa  468  153 

V.  Blydenburg,  135  Iowa  264 

■-   14,  319,  319a,  323 
V.  Bobbitt,  215  Mo.  10  323 

V.  Bobbst,  131  Mo.  328  341,  343 
V.  Bockstruck,  136  Mo.  335  480 
V.  Bodekee,  34  Iowa  520 
V.  Bogardus,  36  Wash.  297 
V.  Boggan,  133  X.  Car.  761 
V.  Bohan,  15  Kan.  407 
V.  Bohanon,  142  N.  Car.  695 

103,  126 
V.  Boies,  68  Kan.  167 
V.  Bokien,  14  Wash.  403 
V.  Bollero,  112  La.  850 
V.  Bonar,  71  Kan.  800 
V.  Bond,  12  Idaho  424 
V.  Bonine,  85  Mo.  App.  462  363 
V.  Borchert,  68  Kan.  360  415 

V.  Bos  well,  2  Dev.    (X.   Car.) 

209  236,  237 

V.  Bourne,  21  Ore.  218  249 

V.  Bouvy,  124  La.  1054  326 

V.  Bowen,  16  Kan.  475  21 

V.  Bowles,  70  Kan.  821  451 

V.  Bowman,  78  X.  Car.  509        318 
V.  Boyd,  178  Mo.  2  81,  245 

V.  Boyd,  34  Xeb.  435  452 


12 

281 
103 
106 


308 

438 

261,  263 

112 

74,  247 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXIX 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Boyd,  2  Hill   (S.   Car.) 
288  26,  185 

Boyer,  79  Iowa  330  473 

Boyland,  24  Kan.  186  87 

Boyles,  80  S.  Car.  352  6r 

Brabham,  108  N.  Car.  793 

47,  314,  322 

Bradley,  45  Ark.  31  197 

Bradley,  90  Mo.  160  270 

V.  Bradley,  34  S.  Car.  136  312 

V.  Bradley,  64  Vt.  466 

116,  117,  22>Z,  334 
V.  Brady,  121  Iowa  561  378 

V.  Brady,  44  Kan.  435  364 

V.  Brady,  124  La.  951  103 

V.  Brady,  71  N.  J.  L.  360  76,  77 
V.  Brame,  6r  Minn.  loi  282 

V.  Brand    (N.   J.   L.),  72  Atl. 

131  369 

V.  Brandenburg,  118  Mo.  181 

81,  391 
V.  Brandon,  8  Jones  (N.  Car.) 

463  154,  157 

V.  Branham,  13  S.  Car.  389  40,  133 
V.  Brannan,  206  Mo.  636  48,  417 
V.  Branner,  149  N.  Car.  559  144 
V.  Brant,  14  Iowa  180  309 

V.  Branton,  49  Ore.  86  429 

V.  Braskamp,  ^7  Iowa  588  21 

V.  Brassfield,  81  Mo.  151  388,  390 
V.  Brecht,  41   Minn.  50 

381,  382,  383 
V.  Breckenridge,  67  Iowa  204 

43,  423,  425 
V.  Breckenridge,  Z3  La.  Ann. 

310  248 

V.  Bresland,  59  Minn.  281  482 

V.  Brett,  16  Mont.  360  419 

V.  Brewer,  33  Ark.  176  488 

V.  Brewer,  38  S.  Car.  263  523 

V.  Brick,  2  Harr.  (Del.)  530  307 
V.  Bricker,  135  Iowa  343  408 

V.  Bridges,  29  Kan.  138  12 

V.  Bridgewater,  171  Ind.  i  477 

V.  Bridgham,  51  Wash.  18,  109  522 
V.  Bridgman,  49  Vt.  202 

88,  92,  188,  381 
V.  Bricn,  32  N.  J.  L.  414  71 

V.  Briggs,  68  Iowa  410  125,  381 
V.  Briggs,  9  R.  I.  361  188 


c  to  Sections."] 
State  V.  Brigman,  94  N.  Car.  888 

308,  310 
V.  Brin,  30  Minn.  522  294 

V.  Bringgold,  40  Wash.  12    40,  448 
V.  Brink,  68  Vt.  659  381,  383 

V.  Brinkaus,  34  Minn.  285  387 

V.  Brinkley    (Ore.    1909),    105 

Pac.  708  125 

V.  Brinte,  4  Penn.   (Del.)  551 

12,  36,  133,  140,  147a 
V.  Briscoe  (Del.),  67  Atl.  154 

12,  435,  437,  441,  444 
V.  Brisk,  199  Mo.  263  2>32> 

V.  Britt,  78  N.  Car.  439 

525,  526,  532 
V.  Brittain,  117  N.  Car.  783  187 
V.  Broadbent,  19  Mont.  467  354 
V.  Brodnax,  91  N.  Car.  543  484 
V.  Bronkol,  s  N.  Dak.  507  197 

V.  Bronstine,  147  Mo.  520  161 

V.  Brooks,  85  Iowa  366 

284,  285,  290 
V.  Brooks,  92  Mo.  542 

118,  119,  135 
V.  Brooks,    4    Hill    (S.    Car.) 

361  489 

V.  Brooks,  79  S.  Car.  144  3ZZ 

V.  Brookshire,  2  Ala.  303  225 

V.  Broughton,     7     Ired.      (N. 

Car.)  96        116,  131,  191,  192 
V.  Brow,  64  N.  H.  577  343 

V.  Brown,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  380 

171,  202 
V.  Brown     (Iowa     1909),     121 

N.  W.  513  381 

V.  Brown     (Iowa     1910),    124 

N.  W.  899  382 

V.  Brown,  95  Iowa  381  178 

V.  Brown,   100  Iowa  50      241,  246 
V.  Brown,  128  Iowa  24  467 

V.  Brown,  54  Kan.  71  4^7 

V.  Brown,  55  Kan.  766  418 

V.  Brown,  28  La.  Ann.  279        189 
V.  Brown,  no  La.  591  466 

V.  Brown,  in  La.  696 

IDS,  221,  224 
V.  Brown,  in  La.  170  467,  470 
V.  Brown.  121  La.  599  516 

V.  Brown,  63  Mo.  439  325 

V.  Brown,  7^  Mo.  631  130 


cxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Brown,  i8i  Mo.   192  80 

163,  164 
V.  Brown,  188  Mo.  451 

103,  108,  328 
V.  Brown,  38  Mont.  309  294,  298 
V.  Brown,  68  N.  H.  200  470 

V.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571  61 

V.  Brown,  47  Ohio  St.  102 

395,  396,  397 
V.  Brown,  28  Ore.  147  95,  248 

V.  Brown,  4  R.  I.  528  433 

V.  Brown,  34  S.  Car.  41  79,  80 

V.  Brown,  62  W.  Va.  546  269 

V.  Brownfield,  15  Mo.  App.  593  68 
V.  Brownlee,  84  Iowa  473  69 

V.  Broxton,  118  La.  126  300 

V.  Bruce,  106  N.  Car.  792  304 

V.  Brunson,  38  S.  Car.  263  523 

V.  Bryan,  40  Iowa  379  284 

V.  Bryan,  34  Kan.  63  391 

V.  Bryan,  74  N.  Car.  351  135 

V.  Bryant,  134  Mo.  246  58 

V.  Buckles,  26  Kan.  237  32,  296 
V.  Buckley,  40  Conn.  246  12 

V.  Buffington,  20  Kan.  599  186 

V.  Bulla,  89  Mo.  595  61 

V.  Bullinger,  54  Mo.  142  397 

V.  Bundy,  24  S.  Car.  439  164 

V.  Bunker,  7  S.  Dak.  639  523,  525 
V.  Burgdorf,  53  Mo.  65  417 

V.  Burgess,  74  N.  Car.  272  294 

V.  Burk,  88  Iowa  661  87 

V.  Burnett,  119  Ind.  392  440 

V.  Burnett,  142  N.  Car.  577  340 
V.  Burns,  124  Iowa  207  269 

V.  Burns,  48  Mo.  438  21,  35,  36 
V.  Burns,  54  Mo.  274  270 

V.  Burns,  148  Mo.  167  238,  268 
V.  Burns,  19  Wash.  52  269,  299 
V.  Burwell,  34  Kan.  312  270 

V.  Bush,  122  Ind.  42  365 

V.  Busse    (Iowa),   100  N.   W. 

536  147a 

V.  Buster,  23  Nev.  346  147a 

V.  Butler  (Iowa  1910),  125  N. 

W.    196  23^ 

V.  Butler,  67  Mo.  59  250 

V.  Butler,  178  Mo.  272  451 

V.  Butler,  47  S.  Car.  25  247 

V.  Butman,  15  La.  Ann.  166       365 


'€  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Byers,  16  Mont.  565   261,  492 
V.  Bj^ers,  100  N.  Car.  512  248 

V.  Byrd,  121  N.  Car.  684  326,  338 
V.  Byrne,  47  Conn.  465 

409,  410,  411 
V.  Bj'^song,  112  Iowa  419  82 

V.  Cadotte,  17  Mont.  315  48,  205 
V.  Cagle,  114  N.  Car.  835  523 

V.  Cain,   I    Hawks    (N.   Car.) 

352  26 

V.  Cain,  9  W.  Va.  559  39 

V.  Calder,  23  ]\Iont.  504  6 

V.  Caldwell,  115  N.  Car.  794  105 
V.  Calkins,  73  Iowa  128  248,  429 
V.  Call,  48  N.  H.  126  443 

V.  Callahan,  100  Minn.  63  238 

V.  Callegari,  41  La.  Ann.  578  240 
V.  Cambron,  20  S.  Dak.  282  482 
V.  Camden,  48  N.  J.  L.  89  24a 

V.  Cameron,  40  Vt.  555  68 

V,  Camley,  67  Vt.  322  470 

V.  Campbell,  73  Kan.  688 

125,  131,  137,  191,  192,  451 
V.  Campbell,  115  Mo.  391  518 

V.  Campbell,  210  Mo.  202  21,  415 
V.  Campbell,  20  Nev.  122  409,  418 
V.  Campbell,  i  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 

124  265 

V.  Campbell,  35  S.  Car.  28  329 

V.  Cannon,  72  N.  J.  L.  46  381 

V.  Cannon,  49  S.  Car.  550  276 

V.  Cardelli,  19  Xev.  319  49 

V.  Cardoza,  1 1  S.  Car.  195  223,  494 
V.  Carey,  76  Conn.  342  73,  346 
V.  Carey,  56  Kan.  84  96 

V.  Carey,  23  Ind.  App.  378  248 

V.  Carkin,  90  Me.  142  282 

V.  Carlson    (Iowa,    1909),    123 

N.  W.  765  421 

V.  Carlton,  48  Vt.  636  96,  330 

V.  Carmody,  50  Ore.  i  21 

V.  Caron,  it8  La.  349  214,  215,  221 
V.  Carpenter,  124  Iowa  5 

409,  410,  417 
V.  Carpenter,  74  N.  Car.  230  32 
V.  Carpenter,  20  Vt.  9  255 

V.  Carpenter,  54  Vt.  551  446 

V.  Carpenter,  32  Wash.  254 

129,  132 
V.  Carr,  28  Ore.  389  74 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXl 


[References  at 

State  V.  Carr,  2>7  Vt.  191  130 

Carr,  20  W.  Va.  679  .      228 

Carroll,  85  Iowa  i  132 

Carroll,  14  Mo.  392  358 

Carroll,  30  S.  Car.  85  122 

Carron,   18  Iowa  372  393 
Carson,  36  S.  Car.  524 

126,  138,  492 


Carter,  106  La.  407 
Carter,  49  S.  Car.  265 
Carver,  89  Me.  74 
Casados,   i  N.  &  McC.   (S 

Car.)   91 
Case,  96  Iowa  264 
Case,  93  N.  Car.  545 
Cassida,  67  Kan.  171 
Cassid}^,  85  Iowa  145 
Castello,  62  Iowa  404 
Castle,  133  N.  Car.  769 


123 
2,^7 

354 


220, 


295 
224 
121 

383,  384 

411,  418 

236 

82,  338 


Casto,  119  Mo.  App.  265  485 
Castor,  93  Mo.  242  300,  301 

Cater,  100  Iowa  501  239,  312 
Cather,  121  Iowa  106  167 

Cavin,  199  Mo.  154  88,  93 

Caywood,  96  Iowa  367  467 

Cecil  Co.,  54  Md.  426  265 

Center,  35  Vt.  378  106,  187 

Cephus  (Del.),  67  Atl.  150 

6,  320,  338 
Chamberlain,  89  iMo.  129 

:i6,  62,  220 
Chambers,  39  Iowa  179  130 

Chambers,  43  La.  Ann.  1108  521 
Chambers,  45  La.  Ann.  36  126 
Champoux,  33  Wash.  339  425 
Chandler,  96  Ind.  591  380,  384 
Chandler,  132  Mo.  155  384 

Chanev,  9   Rich.    (S.   Car.) 

438  "  36 

Charity,  2   Dev.    (X.   Car.) 

543  -^73 

Chase,  68  Vt.  405  118,  227, 

Chavis,  80  X.  Car.  353  320 

Chee  Gong,  16  Ore.  534 

148,  153 
Child,  40  Kan.  482  152 

Chiles,  44  S.  Car.  338  312 

Chinanlt,  55  Kan.  326  197 

Chippcy,    9    Houst.    (Del.) 

583  48s 


e  to  Sections.] 

State  V.   Chisenhall,   106  N.   Car. 
676  126,  340 

V.  Chisnell,  36  W.  Va.  659  67,  68 
V.  Chitman,  117  La.  950  268 

V.  Christian,  44  La.  Ann.  950  236 
V.  Christmas,  lOi  N.  Car.  749  377 
V.  Christopher,    134  Mo.   App. 

6  243 

V.  Church,  199  Mo.  605 

129,  130,  160,  163,  220 
V.  Church,  63  N.  Car.  15  353,  354 
V.  Churchill,  52  Wash.  210 

48,  324,  333 
V.  Chj-o   Chiagek,  92  Mo.  395 

71,  200 
V.  Clark,  69  Iowa  294  409,  410 

V.  Clark,  46  Kan.  65  435 

V.  Clark,   117  La.  920  61 

V.  Clark,  119  La.  733  333 

V.  Clark  (Nev.  1909),  104  Pac. 

593  465 

V.  Clark,  54  N.  H.  456  380,  383,  402 
V.  Clark    (S.    Car.    1910),    67 

S.  E.  300  375 

V.  Clark,  15  S.  Car.  403  312 

V.  Clark,  27  Utah  55  296 

V.  Clark,  34  Wash.  485  157 

V.  Clark,  64  W.  Va.  625 

103,  no,  112 
V.  Claude,  35  La.  Ann.  71  324 

V.  Clawson,  30  Mo.  App.  139  237 
V.  Clemenson,  123  Iowa  524  382 
V.  Clements,  15  Ore.  237  347 

V.  Clifford,  86  Iowa  550  132 

V.  Cline,  146  N.  Car.  640  467 

V.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380  429 

V.  Cloninger,  149  N.  Car.  567 

78,  157 
V.  Clough,  72  N.  H.  178  497 

V.  Clyburn,  16  S.  Car.  375  224 

V.  Clyne,  53  Kan.  8  364 

V.  Coatney,   8    Yerg.    (Tenn.) 

210  532 

V.  Coats,  174  Mo.  396  147 

V.  Cobbs,  40  W.  Va.  718  193 

V.  Cochran,  147  Mo.  504 

268,  269,  328 
V.  Coella,  3  Wash.  99  326 

V.  Coffee,  56  Conn.  399  131  ' 

V.  Coffey,  44  Mo.  App.  455         237 


cxxn 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Cohen,  io8  Iowa  208  6 

V.  Cohn,  9  Nev.  179  60,  63,  66,  369 
V.  Colby,  51  Vt.  291  382 

V.  Cole,  90  Ind.  112  309 

V.  Cole,  132  N.  Car.  1069  320 

V.  Cole,  2  McCord    (S.  Car.) 

117  489 

V.  Cole,  19  Wis.  129  432 

V.  Coleman,  27  La.  Ann.  691  157 
V.  Coleman,  11 1   La.  303  333 

V.  Coleman,  117  La.  973  448 

V.  Coleman,  119  La.  669  326 

V.  Coleman,  199  Mo.  112  264 

V.  Coleman,  20  S.  Car.  441 

157,  158 
V.  Coleman,  17  S.  Dak.  594  321 
V.  Coley,  114  N.  Car.  879  81 

V.  Collins,  20  Iowa  85  185 

V.  Collins,  32  Iowa  36  324 

V.  Collins,  72  N.  Car.  144  296 

V.  Collins,  115  N.  Car.  716  421 
V.  Collins,  28  R.  I.  439  217,  276 
V.  Colombo     (Del.    O.    &    T. 

1909).  75  Atl.  616        409,  413 
V.  Colwell,  3  R.  I.  132  217 

V.  Comeau,  48  La.  Ann.  249  191 
V.  Compagnet,    48     La.     Ann. 

1470  328 

V.  Conable,  81  Iowa  60  364,  365 
V.  Cone,  I  Jones  (N.  Car.)  18  417 
V.  Conerly,  48  La.  Ann.  1561  241 
V.  Congdon,  14  R.  I.  267  230 

V.  Conlan,  3  Penn.  (Del.)  218  yy 
V.  Conlin,  45  Wash.  478  414,  418 
V.  Connelly,  57  Minn.  482  414 

V.  Conners,  95  Iowa  485  373 

V.  Connolly,  3  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 

337  489 

V.  Constantine,  48  Wash.  218 

42,  121,  161,  238 
V.  Conway,  56  Kan.  682 

23,  148,  37S 
V.  Cook,  13  Idaho  45  248 

V.  Cook,  65  Iowa  560  418 

V.  Cook,  17  Kan.  392  318 

V.  Cook,  132  Mo.  App.  167  62 

V.  Cooper,  102  Iowa  146  285 

V.  Cooper,  32  La.  Ann.  1084  333 
V.  Cooper,  103  Mo.  266  403,  404 
V.  Cooper,  22  N.  J.  L.  52  344 


c  to  Sections.] 
State  V.  Cooper  (Tenn.  1908),  113 

S.  W.  1048  456 

V.  Copp,  15  N.  H.  212 

446,  447,  459 
V.  Cornelius,  118  La.  146  61 

V.  Costner,  127  N.  Car.  566  68 

V.  Covington,  94  N.  Car.  913  427 
V.  Court    (Mo.    1910),    125    S. 

W.  451  291a,  515 

V.  Cowan,   7   Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

239  144,  147 

V.  Cowan,  74  Iowa  53  287 

V.  Cox,  67  Mo.  392  78 

V.  Crabtree,  iii  Mo.  136  105,  328 
V.  Craemer,  12  Wash.  217  314,  336 
V.  C'-aft,  118  La.  117  48 

V.  Crafton,  89  Iowa  109  333 

V.  Craig,  190  Mo.  332  104 

V.  Craig,  52  Wash.  66  157 

V.  Craine,  120  N.  Car.  601  105,  iii 
V.  Crane,  202  Mo.  54  269 

V.  Crank,   2   Bailey    (S.   Car.) 

66  138 

V.  Crawford,  34  Iowa  40  .  390 

V.  Crawford,  99  Mo.  74 

368,  370,  517 
V.  Crawford,  2  Dev.  (N.  Car.) 

425  359 

V.  Crawford,  39  S.  Car.  343  87,  89 
V.  Crea,  10  Idaho  88  338 

V.  Cremeans,  62  W.  Va.  134  332 
V.  Creson,  38  Mo.  372  78 

V.  Crofford,  121  Iowa  395  345,  494 
V.  Crogan,  8  Iowa  523  475 

V.  Crone,  209  Mo.  316  no 

V.  Cronin,  64  Conn.  293  103,  116 
V.  Crooke,  129  Mo.  App.  490  302 
V.  Cross,  12  Iowa  66  417 

V.  Cross,  68  Iowa  180  327 

V.  Cross,  95  Iowa  629  301 

V.  Croteau,  23  Vt.  14  273 

V.  Crouch,  130  Iowa  478  414,  415 
V.  Crow,  53  Kan.  662  24a 

V.  Crow,  107  Mo.  341  48,  240,  297 
V.  Crowell,  149  Mo.  391  153 

V.  Crowell,  116  N.  Car.  1052  387 
V.  Crowley,  13  Ala.  172  382 

V.  Cruse,  74  N.  Car.  491  129,  140 
V.  Cummings,  189  Mo.  626 

174,  268,  323 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXlll 


State 


[References  ar 
V.  Cummins,  76  Iowa   133 

213,  234 
Cunningham,  100  Mo.  382  408 
Curdy      (Del.     Gen.     Sess. 

1910),  75  Atl.  868  448 

Curran,  51  Iowa  112  388 

Currie,  13  N.  Dak.  655  67 

Cushenberry,  157  Mo.  168  55 
Cushing,  14  Wash.  527  315,  326 
Dalcourt,  112  La.  420  221 

Dale,  141  Mo.  284  296,  378 

Daley,  53  Vt.  442  100,  292 

Dalton,  106  Mo.  463  416 

Dalton,  134  Mo.  App.  517  490 
Dalton,  2  Murph.  (N.  Car.) 

379  430 

Dalton,  20  R.  I.  114  103,  209 
Dalton,  43  Wash.  278  211 

Daly,  210  Mo.  664  126,  313 

Dana,  59  Vt.  614  397 

Dancy,  83  N.  Car.  608  408 

Danforth,  48  Iowa  43 

386,  413,  52s 
Danforth,  y:^  N.  H.  215  413 

Daniel,  31  La.  Ann.  91  103,  105 
Daniel,  114  N.  Car.  823  439 

Daniels,  49  La.  Ann.  954  271 
Daniels,  122  La.  261  373 

Daniels,  115  La.  59  103,  104,  105 
Daniels,  134  N.  Car.  641  374 

Dankwardt,  107  Iowa  704  450 
Darling,  202  Mo.  150  238,  248 
Darnell,     i     Houst.     (Del.) 

321  140 

Daugherty,  17  Nev.  376  96 

Davenport,  38  S.  Car.  348  6 

David,  131  Mo.  380 

6,  12,  132,  429 
David,  14  S.  Car.  428  232 

Davidson,  44  Mo.  App.  513  12 
Davidson,  yy  N.  Car.  522  185 
Davidson,  30  Vt.  2i7y  7 

Davis,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  407  320 
Davis,  6  Idaho  159 

118,  129,  152,  321,  328 
191 
225 
326 
127 
450 


c  to  Sections.'] 
State  v.  Davis,  14  Nev.  439        23,  465 
v.  Davis,  I  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  125 

353,  354' 
V.  Davis,  2  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  153  310 
V.  Davis,  65  N.  Car.  298  488 

V.  Davis,  69  N.  Car.  313  425 

V.  Davis,  yy  N.  Car.  483  loi,  332 
V.  Davis,  109  N.  Car.  780  157 

V.  Davis,  134  N.  Car.  633  no,  113 
V.  Davison    (N.    H.    1906),  64 

Atl.  761  290 

V.  Dawkins,  32  S.  Car.  17  373 

V.  Dawson,  go  Mo.  149  172 

V.  Day    (Minn.    1909),   121    N. 

W.  611  470 

V.  Day,  188  Mo.  359  81,  414,  418 
V.  Dayton,  23  N.  J.  L.  49  26 

V.  Deal,  64  N.  Car.  270  358 

V.  Deal  (Ore.),  98  Pac.  165  61 

V.  Dean,    13    Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

63  493 

V.  Dean,  72  S.  Car.  74  218,  325 
V.  Dean,  yi  Wis.  678  i6a 

V.  Deatherage,  35  Wash.  326  118 
V.  DeBerry,  92  N.  Car.  800  117 
v.  DeBoy,  117  N.  Car.  702  471 

V.  Decklotts,  19  Iowa  447  320 

V.  DeGraff,  113  N.  Car.  638  130 
V.  DeHart,  38  Mont.  211 

233,  248,     280 
V.  DeHart,    6    Baxt.     (Tenn.) 

222  440 

V.  Deitrick,  51  Iowa  467  386 

V.  Delaneuville,    48    La.    Ann. 

502  238 

v.  Delaney,  92  Iowa  467  150 

V.  Deliso  (N.  J.  1908),  69  Atl. 

218  88 

De  Maio,  69  N.  J.  L.  590 
Demareste,  41  La.  Ann.  617 


Davis,  41  Iowa  311 
Davis,  48  Kan.  i 
Davis,  123  La.  133 
Davis,  34  La.  Ann.  351 
Davis,  112  Mo.  App.  346 


i«9 
133 


V 
V 

V.  Demming,  79  Kan.  526  328,  329 
V.  Dennis,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  433  447 
V.  Denny  (N.  D.  1908),  117  N. 

W.  869  247 

V.  Depoister,  21  Nev.  107 

176,  179,  416 
V.  Desforges,  48  La.  Ann.  y^,  451 
v.  Desmond,  109  Iowa  y2  119 

V.  Dcsroches,  48  La.  Ann.  428 

30,  88,  147a 


CXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are 
State  V.  Dettmer,  124  Mo.  426         268 
V.  Detwiler,  60  W.  Va.  583        418 
V.  Deuel,  63  Kan.  811  79 

V.  Dewitt,    2    Hill    (S.    Car.) 


282 
De  Wolf,  8  Conn.  93 


267 


45, 


204,  411 

77 
300 

493 

354 


374a 
248 

435 
106,  344 

7 
285 
392 


Dexter,  115  Iowa  678 
Deyoe,  97  Iowa  744 
Dickerhoff,  127  Iowa  404 
Dickerson,  98  N.  Car.  708 
Dickerson,  77  Ohio  St.  34 
36,  82,  90,  327 
Dickey,  48  W.  Va.  325 
Dickinson,  21  Mont.  595 
Dickinson,  41  Wis.  299 
Dickson,  78  Mo.  438 
Dierberger,  90  Mo.  369 
Dietrick,  51   Iowa  467 
DiGuglielmo,  4  Penn.  (Del.) 

336  12,  21,  320,  352 

Dill,  48  S.  Car.  249  82,  324 

Dillard,  59  W.  Va.  197  338 

Dilley,  15  Ore.  70  ?24 

Dilley,  44  Wash.  207  133,  492 
Dillon,  48  La.  Ann.  1365  301 
Dineen,  10  Minn.  407  7,  12 

Dineen,  203  Mo.  628  467 

Diskin,  34  La.  Ann.  919  123 

Dix,  :i2>  Wash.  405  492 

Dixon,  47  La.  Ann.  i  269 

V.  Dockstader,  42  Iowa  436  7(^ 

V.  Dodson,  4  Ore.  64  326 

V.  Dodson,  16  S.  Car.  453   207,  493 

V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 

V. 
V. 
V. 

V. 
V. 


Doe,  79  Ind.  9  310 

Dolan,  132  Iowa  196  390 

Dole.  3  Blackf.   (Ind.)  294    47S 
Donahoe,  78  Iowa  486  338 

Donelon,  45  La.  Ann.  923 

27,  82 
Donnelly,  130  Mo.  642  6,  7Z,  323 
Donohoo,  22  W.  Va.  761  76 

Donovan,  61   Iowa  369 

166,  380,  381 
Dooris,  40  Conn.  145  405 

Doris,  51  Ore.  136 

82,  109,  no,  112,  326 
Dorr.  82  Me.  212  32 

Douglas,  26  Nev.  196  69 

Douglass,  48  Mo.  App.  39      34^ 


to  Sections.l 

State 

V.  Douglass,  20  W.  Va.  770 

172 

V. 

Douglass,  28  W.  Va.  297 

320 

V. 

Dowden,  137  Iowa  573 

507 

V. 

Downer,  8  Vt.  424 

446 

V. 

Downs,  91  Mo.  19           324, 

326 

V. 

Drake,  82  N.  Car.  592 

130 

V. 

Drake,  113  N.  Car.  624 

130 

V. 

Draper,  65  Mo.  335 

109 

V. 

Draughon    (N.    Car.    1909), 

65  S.  E.  913 

101 

V. 

Drew,  179  Mo.  315 

299 

V. 

Dudenhefer,  122  La.  288 

281 

V. 

Dudley,  7  Wis.  664          187, 

188 

V. 

Duestrow,  137  Mo.  44    323, 

330 

V. 

Dufif    (Iowa   1909),"  122   N. 

W.  829 

69 

V. 

Duffy,  57  Conn.  525 

189,  211, 

221 

V. 

Duffy,  124  Iowa  705 

358 

V. 

Duffy,  124  Mo.  I              413, 

493 

V. 

Duhammel,  2  Harr.    (Del.) 

532 

458 

V. 

Dulaney,  87  Ark.  17           87,  90 

V. 

Dull,  67  Kan.  793 

323 

V. 

Dumphey,  4  Minn.  438 

2,2^ 

V. 

Duncan,   116  Mo.  288 

lor,  118,  145, 

220 

V. 

Dunlap,  24  Me.  77 

442 

V. 

Dunlap,  149  N.  Car.  550 

324 

V. 

Dunlop,  65  N.  Car.  288 

70 

V. 

Dunn,  53  Iowa  526 

392 

V. 

Dunn,  179  i\Io.  95 

163 

V. 

Dunn,  138  N.  Car.  672 

282 

V. 

Dunn   (Ore.  1909),  99  Pac. 

278 

241 

V. 

Dunn  (Ore.),  100  Pac.  258 

222 

241 

V. 

Dunn    (Wis.),    102   N.   W. 

935                                   80, 

276 

V. 

Dunwell,  3  R.  I.  127 

21 

V. 

Dupont,  2  McCord  (S.  Car.) 

334 

483 

V. 

Durnain,  7^  Minn.  150 

454 

V. 

Dusenberry,  112  ^.lo.  277 

193,  270,  414, 

417 

V. 

Dustin,  5  Ore.  375 

455 

V. 

Dyer,  59  Me.  303            185, 

188 

V. 

Dyer,  139  Mo.   199 

65 

V. 

Eades.  68  Mo.  150 

422 

V. 

Ean,  90  Iowa  534            68, 

381 

TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXV 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Earl,  41  Ind.  464  461 

V.  Earnest,  56  Kan.  31  320 

V.  Eaton,  3  Harr.  (Del.)  554  133 
V.  Eberline,  47  Kan.  155  408,  418 
V.  Eckler,  106  Mo.  585  389 

V.  Eddon,  8  Wash.  292  109 

V.  Eddy,  46  Wash.  494  297 

V.  Edwards,  203  Mo.  528  326 

V.  Edwards,  13  S.  Car.  30  79 

V.  Egbert,   125  Iowa  443  409 

V.  Eggleston,  45  Ore.  346 

381,  382 
V.  Eisenhour,  132  Mo.  140  390 

V.  Elden,  41  Me.  165  195 

V.  Elkins,  loi  Mo.  344  103,  108 
V.  Elliott,  45  Iowa  486  102 

Ellis,  74  Mo.  385  395 

Ellis,  33  N.  J.  L.  102  451 

Ellis.  loi  N.  Car.  765  330 

Elsham,  70  Iowa  531  6 

Emery,  59  Vt.  84    7^,  84,  85,  368 
Emory,  5  Penn.   (Del.)    126 

6,  16 
England,  78  N.  Car.  552  369 
Enright,  90  Iowa  520  408 

Enslow,  ID  Iowa  115  308 

Epstein,  25  R.  I.  131        97,  123 
Espinozei,  20  Nev.  209  78 

Estoup,  39  La.  Ann.  go6         123 
Eubank,  2?,  Wash.  293  300 

Evans,  i  Marv.  (Del.)  477         6 
Evans,  65  Mo.  574  320 

Evans,  124  Mo.  397         104,  105 
Evans,  138  Mo.  116 

118,  185,  412 
Evans,  i  Hayw.   (N.  Car.) 

231  359 
Exum,  138  N.  Car.  599 

129,  325,  328,  2Z?, 

Ezekiel,  33  S.  Car.  115  429 

Faile,  41   S.  Car.  551  103 

Faile,  43  S.  Car.  52  326 

Fain,  T06  N.  Car.  760  287 

Falconer,  70  Iowa  416  269 

Falk,  66  Cnnn.  250  47T 
Farley,  87  Iowa  22      21,  35,  2t6 

Farmer,  84  Me.  436  61 

Farr   (R.   I.    1908),  69  Atl. 

5  117 

Farrell,  82  Iowa  553  248 


e  to  Sections.^ 

State  v.  Farrier,  114  La.  579  44 
V.  Farrier,  i  Hawks  (N.  Car.) 

487  483 
V.  Farrington,  90  Iowa  673 

220,  420,  429 
V.  Fasset,  16  Conn.  458 

26,  28,  191,  192 
V.  Faulk   (S.  Dak.   1908),   116 

N.  W.  72                       29s,  298 
V.  Faulkner,  175  Mo.  546 

466,  467,  468 

V.  Favre,  51  La.  Ann.  434  63 

V.  Fay,  65  Mo.  490  421 

v.  Feeley,   194  Mo.  300       324,  328 

v.  Fellows,  56  Ind.  65  380 

V.  Felter,  ^2  Iowa  49          155,  158 

V.  Feltes,  51  Iowa  495  136 
v.  Fenlason,  78  Me.  495 

149,  152,  368 

v.  Fenn,  112  Mo.  App.  531  362 

v.  Ferguson,  107  N.  Car.  841  44 
v.  Fetterly,  22,  Wash.  599 

27,   267,  414,  415 

V.  Fidment,  35  Iowa  541  127 

V.  Field,  14  Me.  244  324 

V.  Fielding,  135  Iowa  255  328 

V.  Fields,  118  Ind.  491  437 

V.  Fillpot,  SI  Wash.  223  429 

V.  Finch,  70  Iowa  316  298 

V.  Finch,  71  Kan.  793  131 

V.  Findley,  loi  Mo.  217      285,  291 

V.  Finley,  118. N.  Car.  1161  112 

V.  Finn,  199  Mo.  597  358 

V.  Firmatura,  121  La.  676  72 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  3  S.  Dak. 

52  35 

V.  Fishel,  140  Iowa  460        21,  276 

V.  Fisher,  51  N.  Car.  478  130 

V.  Fisher,  149  N.  Car.  557  324 

V.  Fisk,  170  Ind.  166  424 

V.  Fiske,  63  Conn.  388  166 
V.  Fitzgerald,  49  Iowa  260 

344,  345 
V.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa  268 

118,  119,  265,  387,  389.  390 
V.  Fitzgerald,     20     Mo.     App. 

408  363 

V.  Fitzgerald,  130  Mo.  407  312,  314 

V.  Fitzgerald,  68  Vt.  125       68,  174 


CX5V1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  a; 
State    V.    Fitzpatrick,    9    Houst. 
(Del.)  38s  292 

V.  Fitzsimmons,  30  Mo.  236  225 
V.  Fitzsimon,  18  R.  I.  236 

376,  409,  418 
V.  Flanders,  118  Mo.  227  425 

V.  Fleetwood   (Mo.  1909),  122 

S.  W.  696  343 

V.  Fleshman,  40  W.  Va.  726  421 
V.  Fletcher  (N.  J.  L.),  72  Atl. 

33  349 

V.  Fletcher,  24  Ore.  295  145,  233 
V.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304  149,  232,  241 
V.  Flowers,  58  Kan.  702  159 

V.  Floyd,  169  Ind.  136  419 

V.  Floyd,  5   Strob.    (S.   Car.) 

59  419 

V.  Flye,  26  Me.  312  154,  419 

V.  Flynn,  28  Iowa  26  308,  309 

V.  Flynn,  36  N.  H.  64  58a 

V.  Fogg,  206  Mo.  696  392 

V.  Foley,  81   Iowa  36  284 

V.  Foley,  113  La.  52  93,  97 

V.  Foley,  15  Nev.  64  207 

V.  Folwell,  14  Kan.  105  88 

V.  Fontenot,  48  La.  Ann.  305 

90,  119,  321,  323,  326 
V.  Fooks,  65  Iowa  196 

132,  442,  443 
V.  Foot  You,  24  Ore.  61  108 

V.  Force,  69  Neb.  162  128 

V.  Ford,  2  Root  (Conn.)  93  425 
V.  Ford,  37  La.  Ann.  443  325,  492 
V.  Ford,  82  Minn.  452  364,  365 

V.  Ford,    3    Strob.    (S.    Car.) 

517  79 

V.  Forshee,  199  Mo.  142  416 

V.  Forshner,  43  N.  H.  89  418 

V.  Forsythe,  78  Iowa  595  349 

V.  Forsythe,  99  Iowa  i  238,  408 
V.  Forsythe,  89  Mo.  66  355 

V.  Fortner,  43  Iowa  494  139,  140 
V.  Foster,  i   Penn.   (Del.)   289 

281,  282,  289 
V.  Foster,  79  Iowa  726  520 

V.  Foster,  91  Iowa  164  78 

V.  Foster,  136  Mo.  653 

118,  126,  130,  325 
V.  Foster,  23  N.  H.  348  24a 

V.  Fournier,  68  Vt.  262  312 


e  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Fowler,  13  Idaho  317        409 
V.  Fowler,  52  Iowa  103  26 

V.  Fox,  80  Iowa  312  377 

V.  Frahm,  73  Iowa  355  378 

V.  Francis,  199  Mo.  671  6 

V.  Franklin,  69  Kan.  798  90 

V.  Franklin,  80  S.  Car.  332  no 

V.  Franks,  51  S.  Car.  259  70 

V.  Frazier,  i  Houst.  (Del.)  176 

97,  330 
V.  Frederic,  69  Me.  400  119,  267 
V.  Fredericks,  85  Mo.  145  128,  135 
V.  Frederickson,  81  Kan.  854  327 
V.  Freemam,  8  Iowa  428  447 

V.  Freeman,  100  N.  Car.  429  410 
V.  Freeman,  127  N.  Car.  544  488 
V.  Freeman,  146  N.  Car.  615 

374,  374a 
V.  Freeman,  43  S.  Car.  105  238 
V.  Freeman,  27  Vt.  523  514,  515 
V.  Freidrich,  4  Wash.  204  267 

V.  Freshwater,  30  Utah  442  429 
V.  Fritz,  133  N.  Car.  725  488 

V.  Frizell,  in  N.  Car.  722  27 

V.  Froelick,  70  Iowa  213  237 

V.  Froiseth,  16  Minn.  296  26 

V.  Fruge,  44  Tex.  64  228,  243 

V.  Fry,  67  Iowa  475  152 

V.  Fuller,  34  Mont.  12  374 

V.  Fuller,  52  Oreg.  42 

103,  no,  III,  348 
V.  Furney,  41  Kan.  115  no 

V.  Gabriel,  88  Mo.  631  94,  96,  loi 
V.  Gadsden,  70  S.  Car.  430  152 

V.  Gainor,  84  Iowa  209  88,  321,  326 
V.  Gallehugh,  89  Minn.  212  loi 
V.  Gallman,  79  S.  Car.  229 

48,  no,  315,  331 
V.  Gardner,    i    Root    (Conn.) 

485  188,  383 

V.  Gardner,  54  Ohio  St.  24  452 
V.  Garick,  35  La.  Ann.  970  79 

V.  Garner,  8  Port  (Ala.),  447  309 
V.  Garrett,  80  Iowa  589  447 

V.  Garrett,  71  N.  Car.  85  54 

V.  Garrison,  147  Mo.   548 

103,  III,  n8 
V.  Gartrell,  171  Mo.  489  S6a 

V.  Garvey,  28  La.  Ann.  925 

138,  307 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXVll 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


State  V.  Garvey,  ii  Minn.  154 
V.  Garvin,  48  S.  Car.  258 
V.  Gaston,  96  Iowa  505 
V.  Gates,  27  Minn.  52 
V.  Gavigan,  ^6  Kan.  322 
V.  Gay,  18  Mont.  51 
V.  Gay,  94  N.  Car.  814 
V.  Gebey,  196  Mo.  104 
V.  Gedicke,  43   N.  J.  L. 


Gee,  92  N.  Car.  756 
Geer,  48  Kan.  752 
Genz,  57  N.  J.  L.  459 
George,  15  La.  Ann.  145 
George,  214  Mo.  262 
George,  5  Jones   (N 

233 
Gereke,  74  Kan.    196 
Gesell,  124  Mo.  531 
Geyer,  3  Ohio  N.  P.  242 
Gianfala,  113  La.  463 
Gibbs,  39  Iowa  318 
Gibbs,  10  Mont.  213 
Gibson,  132  Iowa  53 
Gibson,  108  Mo.  575 
Gibson,  iii  Mo.  92 
Gideon,  119  Mo.  94 
Gilbert,  21   Ind.  474 
Gilbert,  87  N.  Car.  527 
Gilbert,  68  Vt.    188 
Giles,  103  N.  Car.  391 
Gillespie,  62  Kan.  469 
Gillespie,  63  W.  Va.  152 
Gilliam,  66  S.  Car.  419    242,  329 
Gillick,  7  Iowa  287  103 

Gillick,  ID  Iowa  98  228 

Gillis,  73  S.  Car.  318  7 

Gilluly,   so  Wash.   I  36 

Gilman,  51  Me.  206  65,  125 

Ginger,  80  Iowa  574         312,  529 
Girking,   I   Ired.    (N.  Car.) 

121  359 

Giroux,  26  La.  Ann.  582         in 
Glass,  5  Ore.  73  347 

Glass,  50  Wis.  218  132 

Glave,  51  Kan.  330  68 

Gleason,  68  Iowa  618 
Gleim,  17  Mont.  17 
Glenn,  130  Mo.  App.  145 
Gliddcn,  55  Conn.  46 


166 
33,  301 
415 
393 
422 
103 
429 

293 
6 

345,  348 
145 
470 
144 
138 

211,  244 
Car.) 

129 
418 

225,  236 

451 
98,  103 

192 
468,  470 
438,  441 

343 
341,  343 

250 

447 
484 
293 
532 
119a 
90 


522 

12,  62 

487 

492 


State  V.  Glynn,  51  Vt.  577  238 

V.  Godard,  4  Idaho  750  250 

V.  Godet,  7  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  210 

32,  34,  296 
V.  Godfrey,  17  Ore.  300  353,  356 
V.  Goetz,  34  Mo.  85  305 

V.  Goforth,  136  Mo.  in  188,  248 
V.  Goin,    9    Humph.     (Tenn.) 

175  20,  408 

V.  Goldstein,  72  N.  J.  L.  336  429 
V.  Gonce,  79  Mo.  600  18,  404 

V.  Good,  132  Mo.  114  119,  122 

V.  Goodale,  210  Mo.  275  411,  414 
V.  Goodbier,  48  La.  Ann.  770  238 
V.  Goodson,  116  La.  388  323 

V.  Gordon,  56  Kan.  64  33 

V.  Gordon,  196  Mo.  185  469 

V.  Goss,  66  Minn.  291  499 

V.  Gossett,  9   Rich.    (S.    Car.) 

428  36 

V.  Goulden,   134  N.   Car.   743 

401,  404 
V.  Goyette,  ii  R.  I.  592  21 

V.  Grace,  18  Minn.  398  254 

V.  Grady,  84  Mo.  220  26,  192 

V.  Graeme,  130  Mo.  App.  138  311 
V.  Graham,  116  La.  779  314 

V.  Graham,  41  N.  J.  L.  15  71,  72 
V.  Graham,  74  N.  Car.  646  374 

V.  Gramelspacher,  126  Ind.  398  452 
V.  Granger,  87  Iowa  355  532 

V.  Grant,  86  Iowa  216  492,  494 

V.  Grant,  22  Me.  171  146 

V.  Grant,  76  Mo.  236  494 

V.  Grant,  79  Mo.  113  120,  32S 

V.  Grate,  58  Mo.  22  81 

V.  Graves,  95  Mo.  510  68 

V.  Graves,  13  Wash.  485  250 

V.  Grayson,  38  La.  Ann.  788  40 
V.  Grear,  28  Minn.  426  136 

V.  Grebe,   17  Kan.  458  68,  304 

V.  Green,  35  Conn.  203  323 

V.  Green,  i  Houst.  Cr.   (Del.) 

217  328 

V.  Green,  115  La.  1041  314 

V.  Green,  117  N.  Car.  695  279 

V.  Green,  40  S.  Car.  328  374,  492 
V.  Green,  48  S.  Car.  136  147a,  206 
V.  Green,  52  S.  Car.  520  21 

V.  Green,  61  S.  Car.  12   •  119a 


CXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Green,  7  Wis.  571  439 

V.  Greer,  22  W.  Va.  800  232 

V.  Gregory,  178  Mo.  48  323 

V.  Gregory,  50  N.  Car.  315  130 

V.  Griffie,  118  Mo.  188  33 

V.  Griffin,  87  Mo.  608  119 

V.  Griffin,  43  Wash.  591 

222,  409,  411 
Griggsby,  117  La.  1046  77,  245 
Grimes,  50  Minn.  123  366 

Grimes,  loi  Mo.  188  310 

Grinden,  gi  Iowa  505  81 

Grinstead,  10  Kan.  App.  90    365 
Griswold,  67  Conn.  290  58a 

Gritzner,  134  Mo.  512  44 

Groning,  33  Kan.  18      373,  379 
Grossheim,  79  Iowa  75  408 

Grove,  61  W.  Va.  697 
Groves,  15  R.  I.  208 
Grub,  55  Kan.  678 
Grubb,  201  Mo.  585 
Gruso,  28  La.  Ann.  952 
Gryder,  44  La.  Ann.  962 
Guild,  149  Mo.  370 
Guild,  10  N.  J.  L.  163 
Gullette,  121  Mo.  447 
Gunagy,  84  Iowa  177 
Gurnee,  14  Kan.  11 1 
Gustafson,  50  Iowa  194 
V.  Gut,  13  Minn.  341 
V.  Guy,  69  Mo.  430 
V.  Haas,  163  Fed.  908 
V.  Habib.  18  R.  I.  558 
V.  Hack.  118  Mo.  92 
V.  Hagan,  22  Kan.  490 
V.  Hahn,  38  La.  Ann.   169 

422,  427,  430 
V.  Hailey,  2  Strob.  (  S.  Car.) 

73 
V.  Haines,  23  S.  Car.  170 
V.  Haines,  36  S.  Car.  504 
V.  Hair,  37  Minn.  351 
V.  Hale,  156  Mo.  102 
V.  Halford,  6  Rich.   (S.  Car.) 

58  463 

V.  Hall,  79  Iowa  674  53,  54 

V.  Hall,  97  Iowa  400  517 

V.  Hall,  93  N.  Car.  571  367 

V.  Hall,  132  N.  Car.  1094  276 

V.  Ham,-  98  Iowa  60  378 


237 
481 
416 
301 
360 
421 

71 

130,  143 

430 

517 

38,  42 

79 
166 
326 
452 

89 
245 
269 


447 
439 
232 

359 
123 


c  to  Sections.] 
State  V.  Hambleton,  22  Mo.  452      310 
V.  Hamilton     (Del.),    67    Atl. 

836  121 

V.  Hamilton,  57  Iowa  596  15,  152 
V.  Hamilton,  42  La.  Ann.  1204  227 
V.  Hamlin,  47  Conn.  95  25,  191 
V.  Hancock,  28  Nev.  300  i8g 

V.  Hand,  71  N.  J.  L.  137  130 

V.  Handy,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  566  408 
V.  Handy  20  Me.  81  421 

v.  Haney,  32  Kan.  428  309 

v.  Hanks,  39  La.  Ann.  234 

517,  522 
V.  Hanlon,  38  Mont.  557  326 

v.  Hannibal,  37  La.  Ann.  619  275 
V.  Hanna,  99  Me.  224  456 

V.  Hanscom,  28  Ore.  427  41a 

V.  Hansford,  91  Kan.  300  9j 

V.  Hanson,  69  N.  J.  L.  42  458 

v.  Hardin,  46  Iowa  623  152 

v.  Hargrave,  65  N.  Car.  466  416 
V.  Hargraves,  188  Mo.  337  36 

V.  Harkins,  100  Mo.  666  73 

V.  Harlan,  130  Mo.  381  328 

V.  Harmann,  135  Iowa  167  382 
V.  Harmon,  4  Penn.  (Del.)  580 

12,  320 
V.  Harmon,  70  Kan.  476  477 

V.  Harness,  10  Idaho  18  413,  431 
V.  Harper,  35  Ohio  St.  78  106,  34S 
V.  Harrell,  107  N.  Car.  944  48S 
V.  Harrigan   (Del.),  55  Atl.  5 

352,  357 
V.  Harriman,  75  Me.  562  310 

V.  Harris,  5  Penn.  (Del.),  145  185 
V.  Harris,  97  Iowa  407  358 

V.  Harris,  48  La.  Ann.  1189  118 
V.  Harris,  112  La.  937  106,  109 

V.  Harris,  209  Mo.  423 
V.  Harris,  63  N.  Car.  i 
V.  Harris  (R.  I.  1908),  69  Atl. 

506 
V.  Harrison    (N.  Car.),  58  S. 

E.  754  52 

V.  Harrison,  93  N.  Car.  605  485 
V.  Harrison,  115  N.  Car.  706  135 
V.  Harrison,  36  W.  Va.  729 

154,  270 
V.  Hart,  67  Iowa  142  237 

V.  Hart,  94  Iowa  749  6 


221 
312,  330 


97 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXIX 


State 

V. 
V. 
V. 


[References  are 
V.  Hart,  66  Mo.  208  30 

Hart,  89  Mo.  590  414 

Hartman,  46  Wis.  248  228 

Hartnett     (Del.     1909),    74 

Atl.  82  435,  437 

Harvey,  130  Iowa  394 

221,  369,  370 
Harvey,  131  Mo.  339 

23,  60,  62,  148,  366 
Hascall,  6  N.  H.  352  468 

Hash,  12  La.  Ann.  895  130 

Hasty,  121  Iowa  507 

50,  122,  269,  380 
Hatch.  57  Kan.  420  338 

Hatcher,  29  Ore.  309  133 

Hatfield,  75  Iowa  592  414 

Hauser,  112  La.  313  73,  430 

Havely,  21  Mo.  498  33 

Hawkins,  23  Wash.  289    63,  i6a 
Hawks,  56  Minn.  129  27 

Hawley,  63  Conn.  47  332 

Haworth;,  24  Utah  398  133 

Hayden,  45  Iowa  11 

12,  14,  192,  270 
Hayden,  131  Iowa  i  320 

Hayden,  15  N.  H.  355  432 

Hayden,  51  Vt.  296  161,  163 

Hayes,  78  Mo.  307  239 

Hayes,  105  Mo.  76  373 

Hayes,  214  Mo.  230  293 

Hayes,  138  N.  Car.  660  44 

Hayes,  14  Utah  118  321 

Haynes,  71  N.  Car.  79      145,  332 
Haynes,  35  Vt.  570  514,  515 

Hayward,  62  Minn.  474 

87,  214,  221 
Hazleton,  15  La.  Ann.  72 

172,  176 
Heacock,  106  Iowa  191  364 

Head,  38  S.   Car.  258  133 

Heath,  41  Tex.  426  309 

Heatherton,  60  Iowa  175         387 
Hedgepeth,  125  Mo.  14  174 

Heed,  57  Mo.  252  468 

Heeman,  13  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

502  526 

Heffcrnan,  28  R.  T.  20  60 

Heffernan    (S.    Dak.),    118 

N.  W.  1027  267 


to  Sections.] 

State     V.      Heflin,     8     Humph. 

(Tenn.)  84  488 
V.  Heidelberg,  120  La.  300  220,  330 

V.  Heidenrich,  29  Ore.  381  125 

V.  Height,  117  Iowa  650  138 

V.  Heinze,  2  Mo.  App.  1314  18 

V.  Helm,  92  Iowa  540  326 

V.  Helm,  97  Iowa  378  61 


ix — Underhill  Crim.  Evidence. 


V.  Hemm,  82  Iowa  609        387,  293 


V.  Henderson,  84  Iowa  161 
V.  Henderson,  74  S.  Car.  477 
V.  Henderson,  29  W.  Va.  147 
V.  Hendrix,  45  La.  Ann.  500 
V.  Henn,  39  Minn.  476 
V.  Henry,   5  Jones    (N.   Car.) 

65 
V.  Herlihy,  102  Me.  310 
V.  Herzog,  55  W.  Va.  74 
V.  Hesterly,  182  Mo.  16 
V.  Hetland,  141  Iowa  524 
V.  Heusack,  189  Mo.  295 
V.  Hice,  117  N.  Car.  782 
V.  Hickam,  95  Mo.  322 
V.  Hickerson,  72  N.  Car.  421 
V.  Hicks,  92  Mo.  431 
V.  Hicks,  125  N.  Car.  636 
V.  Hicks,  20  S.  Car.  341 
V.  Higdon,  32  Iowa  262 

341,  389,  393 
V.  Higgins,  13  R.  I.  330  24a 

V.  High,   116  La.  79  221,  272 


381 
129 
420 

522 
357 


79 

265,  267 

166 

268 

414 

61,  210 

76 

23 

524 

100 

14 
223 


V.  High,  122  La.  521 

V.  Hight,  153  N.  C.  817 

V.  Hill,  46  La.  Ann.  27 

V.  Hill,  72  Me.  238 

V.  Hill,  65  Mo.  84 

V.  Hill,  91  Mo.  423 

V.  Hill,  134  Mo.  663 

V.  Hill,  47  Neb.  456 

V.  Hill,  65  N.  J.  L.  626 

V.  Hill,  45  Wash.  694 


225 

87 
24a 

437,  442 

296 

388,  390,  394 

115,  117 

285 

127 

61 


V.  Hillstock,  45  La.  Ann.  298  257 

V.  Hilsabeck,  132  Mo.  348  245,  248 

V.  Hilton,  26  Mo.  199  446 

V.  Hilton,   3    Rich.     (S.    Car.) 

434  404 

V.  Hines,  68  Me.  202  514 

V.  HinkJe,  6  Iowa  380  318 

V.  Hinson,  103  N.  Car.  374 


lOi,  365 


cxxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ai 
State  V.  Hirsch,  45  ]\Io.  429        2;^,  24 
V.  Hobbs,  37  W.  Va.  812  35 

V.  Hobgood,  46  La.  Ann.  855      245 
V.  Hockett,  70  Iowa  442 

154,  163,  280a,  320 
V.  Hodge,  50  N.  H.  510  299 

V.  Hodgkins,  42  N.  H.  474  ig6 

V.  Hodgskins,  19  Me.  155 

383,  402,  404 


Hodgson,  66  Vt.  134 
Hoel,  yy  Kan.  334 
Hoffman,  134  Iowa  587n 
Hoffman,  53  Kan.  700 
Hoffman,  120  La.  949 
Hogan,  117  La.  863 

115,  136,  164 
Hogan,  123  Mo.  App.  319  349 
Hogard,  12  Minn.  293 
Holcomb,  86  Mo.  371 
Hollenbeck,  36  Iowa  112 
Hollenbeck,  67  Vt.  34 
Hollenscheit,  61  Mo.  302 
Hollier,  49  La.  Ann.  371 
Hollingsworth,     132     Iowa 

471 
Hoi  Ion,  22  Kan.  580 
Holloway,  117  N.  Car.  730 
Hollyway,  41  Iowa  200 
Holmes,  65  Minn.  230  67,  6i 
Holmes  (Mich.  1896),  68  N. 

W.  II 
Holt,  84  Me.  509 
Honey  (Del.),  65  Atl.  764 

12,  320 
Honore,  121  La.  573 
Hood,  63  W.  Va.  182 
Hooker,  17  Vt.  658 


507 
467 

77 
299 

45 


301 
330 
345 
418 
147a 
519 

439 

465 

58 

358 

I  79 


283 

255,  448 


90 
102 
261,  266 


Hooper,  2  Bailey  (S.  Car.) 


37 


420,  429 
54 
277 
35 
225,  429 
282,  294 


Hoover,  134  Iowa  17 
Hope,  102  Mo.  410 
Hopkins,  94  Iowa  86 
Hopkins,  50  Vt.  316 
Hopkins,  56  Vt.  250 
Hopkirk,  84  Mo.  278 

135,  136,  140 
Hopper,  71  Mo.  425  228,  257 
Horan,  32  Minn.  394  95,  97 

Horin,  70  Kan.  256  470 

Horn,  204  Mo.  528  109 


c  to  Sections.] 
State  V.  Horn,  209  I\Io.  452      269,  270 
V.  Home,  9  Kan.  119   63,  324,  330 
V.  Horned,  178  Mo.  59  373 

V.  Horner,  i  ]\Iarv.  (Del.)  504 

73,  255 
V.  Horner,  48  Mo.  520  424 

V.  Hornsby,  8  Rob.  (La.)  554  250 
V.  Horseman    (Ore.    1908),  98 

Pac.  135  493 

V.  Hortman,  122  Iowa  104  144 

V.  Horton,  63  N.  Car.  595  191 

V.  Horton,  100  N.  Car.  443 

386,  525 
V.  Hoshor,  26  Wash.  643  248 

V.  Hough,  138  N.  Car.  663  337 

V.  Houghton.  45  Ore.  no  190,242 
V.  House,  55  Iowa  466  445 

V.  Houseworth,  91  Iowa  740  174 
V.  Houston,  3  Harr.  (Del.)  15  174 
V.  Houston,  I  Bailey  (S.  Car.) 

300  423 

V.  Houx,  109  ]\Io.  654  342 

V.  Howard,  120  La.  311 

96,  104,  270 
122 
204 
470 
61,  358 
130 


V.  Howard,  102  ^lo.   142 

V.  Howard,   118  Mo.   127 

V.  Howard,  137  Mo.  289 

V.  Howard,  30  Mont.  518 

V.  Howard,  17  X.  H.  171 

V.  Howard,  35  S.  Car.  197   127,  220 

V.  Howard,  32  Vt.  380  399 

V.  Howell,  80  Conn.  668      459,  461 

V.  Howell,  100  AIo.  628  152 

V.  Howell,    117    Mo.    307  118 

V.  Howell,  9  Ired.    (N.   Car.) 

485  320 

V.  Hoxsie,  15  R.  I.  i  280a 

V.  Hoy,  83   Minn.  286  58 

V.  Hoyt,  46  Conn.  330  328,  329 

V.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518     16,  160,  328 
V.  Hubbard,  20X  Mo.  639  245 

V.  Hudkins,   35    W.    Va.   247 

195,  197 

V.  Huff,  76  Iowa  200  224 

V.  Hughes,  58  Iowa  165  399 

V.  Hughes,  8  Kan.  App.  631      220 

V.  Hughes,  35  Kan.  626  404 

V.  Hughes,  82  Mo.  86  32 

V.  Hull,  83  Iowa  112  369 

V.  Hull,  33  Ore.  56  295 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXl 


[References  arc  to  S 
State 


378 

33 

.392 

238 

70 


State  V.  Hullen,  133  X.  Car.  656 
V.  Humble,  34  ]\Io.  App.  343 
V.  Hummer,  128  Iowa  505 
V.  Hunsaker,   16  Ore.  497 
V.  Hunt,  91  ]Mo.  491 
V.  Hunter,  50  Kan.  302  6 

Hunter,  181  Mo.  316  468,  469 
Hunter,  94  N.  Car.  829  463 

Hunter,  143  N.  Car.  607  374a 
Hunter,  79  S.  Car.  84  267 

Hunter,  18  Wash.  670  229 

Huntley,  91  N.  Car.  617  356 
Huntly,  3   Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

418  484,  488 

Hurd,  loi  Iowa  39^  395,  397 

Hussey,  7  Iowa  409  413,  533 
Hutchings,  30  Utah  310  6,  138 
Hutchinson,  95   Iowa,   566 

54,  410 
Hutchinson,  11 1  ]Mo.  257  :^y^ 
Hutchinson,     55     Ohio     St. 

573  480 

Hutto,  66  S.  Car.  449 
Hyatt,   179  Mo.  344 
Hyer,  39  N.  J.  L.  598 
Hymer,  15  Nev.  49 
Icenbice,  126  Iowa  16 
Ihrig,   106  Mo.  267 
Ireland,  89  ]\Iiss.  763 
Isaacson,  8  S.  Dak.  69 
Jack,  69  Kan.  387 
Jackman,  29  Nev.  403 
Jackson,  12  La.  Ann.  679 
Jackson,  44  La.  Ann.  160 
Jackson,  30  ]\Ie.  29 
Jackson,   73   Me.  91 
Jackson,  17  Mo.  544 
V.  Jackson,  95  Mo.  623 
V.  Jackson,  106  Mo.  174 
V.  Jackson,  112  I\Io.  585 
V.  Jackson,  21  S.  Dak.  494 
V.  Jacobs     (Mo.    App.     1908), 

113  S.  W.  244 
V.  Jacobs,  5  Jones   (N.  Car.), 

259 
V.  Jacobs,    106    N.    Car.    695 

115.  215 
V.  Jacobs,  21  R.  I.  259  147 

V.  Jacobs,  28  S.  Car.  29  224 

V.  Jager,  19  Wis.  235  523 


271 

55 

75 

328 

127,  129 

58 

40 

233 

247 

226 

324 

237 

32,  296 

455 

324 

118 

71,  74 
438 
438 


99 


53 


cctions.] 
V.  Jaggers  (N.  J.  1904),  58 

Atl.  1014 
James,  37  Conn.  355 
James,  194  Mo.  268  55, 

James,  13  S.  E.  325  64, 

James,  34  S.  Car.  49  64, 

James,  34  S.  Car.  579  64, 
Jamison,  38  ]\Iinn.  21  339, 
Jarrell,  141  N.  Car.  722 
Jarvis,  18  Ore.  360 
Jarvis,  20  Ore.  437  395, 
Jaynes,  78  N.  Car.  504  149, 
Jeandell,    5     Harr.     (Del.) 

475 
Jefferson,  6  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

305 
Jefifries,  210  ^lo.  302 

58a,  314, 
Jeffries,   117  N.   Car.  727 
Jenkins,  139  Mo.  535 
Jenkins,  6  Jones  (N.  Car.), 

19 
Jenkins,  14  Rich.    (S.  Car.) 

215 
Jennett,  88  N.  Car.  665    299, 
Jennings,  79  Iowa  513 
Jennings,  81    Mo.   185 

152,  271, 
Jennings,  48  Ore.   483 

116,  235, 
Jerome,  82  Iowa  749 
Jesse,    3    Dev.    &    Bat.    (N. 

Car.)    98 
Jeter,  47  S.  Car.  2 
Jimmerson,     118     N.     Car. 

1 173 
Johnagen,   53   Iowa  250 
Johns   (Del.),  65  Atl.  763 

17, 
Johnson,  17  Ala.  618 
Johnson,  40  Conn.  136      157, 
Johnson,  8  Iowa  525 
Johnson,  19  Iowa  230 
Johnson,  72  Iowa  393        63, 
Johnson,  89  Iowa  i 
Johnson,  133  Iowa  38 
Johnson,    136    Iowa   601 
Johnson,  29  La.  Ann.  717 
Johnson,  30  La.  Ann.  88r 
Johnson,  31  La.  Ann.  368 


117 
10 

378 
176 
492 
176 
343 
95 
397 
397 


275 
418 

374 

87 

404 

32 


300 
378 

301 

239 
409 

423 
366 

320 
248 

320 
log 
166 
320 
6 
522 
224 
415 
268 
211 
127 
332 


CXXXll 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


State 


[References  ar 
V.  Johnson,  35  La.  Ann.  968    94 
Johnson,  41   La.  Ann.  574 

236,  250,  257 
Johnson,  47  La.  Ann.  1225  268 
Johnson,  48  La.  Ann.  437  222 
Johnson,  iii  La.  935  88 

Johnson,  12  ]\Iinn.  476  402,  403 
Johnson,  91  Mo.  430  22,,  153 
Johnson,   115  j\Io.  480 

191,  339,  341,  342,  343 
Johnson,  12  Nev.  121  261,  265 
Johnson,   y^,   N.   J.   L.  412 

122,  124 
Johnson,   i  Ired.    (N.  Car.) 

352  320 

Johnson,  67  N.  Car.  55  54 

Johnson,  16  S.  Car.  187  484 
Johnson,  26  S.  Car.  152  103,  109 
Johnson,  28  Vt.  512  418 

Johnson,  36  Wash.  294  296 

Johnston,  118  La.  276  157 

Jolly,  3  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  Car.) 

no  187 

Jones   (Iowa  1909),   123  N. 

W.  960  408 

Jones,  52  Iowa  150  79 

Jones,  64  Iowa  349  160 

Jones,  70  Iowa  505  359 

Jones,  115  Iowa  113  68 

Jones,  41   Kan.  309  233 

Jones,  39  La.  Ann.  935  408 
Jones,  44  La.  Ann.  960  238 

Jones,  44  La.  Ann.  1120  276 

Jones,  47  La.  Ann.  1524 

103,  129,  224 
Jones,   118  La.  369  117 

Jones,  51  Me.  125  70 

Jones,  55  Minn.  329  33 

Jones,  71   Miss.  872  456 

Jones,  54  Mo.  478  126,  130 

Jones,  86   Mo.  622,  276 

Jones,    134   Mo.   254  325 

Jones,  153  Mo.  457  54 

Jones,  32  Mont.  442  414 

Jones,  50  N.  H.  369  155 

Jones,  70  N.  Car.  75  440 

Jones,  78  N.  Car.  420  465 

Jones,   145   N.  Car.  466  129 

Jones.      I      McMullen      (S. 

Car.)   236  421 


e  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Jones,  29  S.  Car.  201  243 

V.  Jones,  77  S.  Car.  385  lOi 

V.  Jones,  33  Vt.  443  •  311 

V.  Jones,  20  W.  Va.  764  338 

V.  Jones,  53  W.  Va.  613  270 

V.  Judd,  132  Iowa  296  223 

V.  Judge,  42  La.  Ann.  414  195 

V.  Judiesch,  96  Iowa  249  220 
V.  Justesen     (Utah),    99    Pac. 

456  470 
V.  Justice,   2    Dev.    (N.    Car.) 

199  435 

V.  Justus.  II  Ore.  178  233 
V.  Kabrich,  39  Iowa,  277  76,  78 
V.  Kane   (N.  J.),  72  Atl.  39 

93,  99,  100 

V.  Kane,  i  !McCord  (S.  Car.)  i6a 

V.  Kapelino,  20  S.  Dak.  591  loi 

V.  Karver,  65  Iowa  53  532 
V.  Kavanaugh,  4  Penn.   (Del.) 

131  23 

V.  Kearley,  26  Kan.  77  12 
V.  Keaveny,  49  La.  Ann.  667 

517,  520 

V.  Keefe,  54  Kan.  197  80,  325 
V.  Keeland   (Mont.  1909),    104 

Pac.  513  125 

V.  Keeler,  28  Iowa  551     7,  66,  147 


365 
24a 

314 

339 

207,  208 


V.  Keenan,  in  Iowa  286 

V.  Keggon.  55  N.  H.  19 

V.  Kehr,    133    Iowa    35 

V.  Keith.  47  Minn.  559 

V.  Keith,  63  N.  Car.  140 

V.  Kellar,  8  N.  Dak.  563  69 

V.  Kelleher     (I\Io.    1909),    123 

S.   W.   551  109 
V.  Kelleher,    201    Mo.    614 

96,  103,  104,  123,  326 

V.  Kelley,  45  S.  Car.  659  248 

V.  Kelley,  46  S.  Car.  55  50 

V.  Kelley,  65  Vt.  531  87 

V.  Kelliher,  49  Ore.  77  73 

V.  Kelly,  77  Conn.  266  319a 

V.  Kellv,  123  Mo.  App.  680  37 

V.  Kelly,  76  N.  J.  L.  576  482 

V.  Kelly,  28  Ore.  225  126 
V.  Kelsoe,  11  Mo.  App.  91     195,  I97 

V.  Kemp.  87  N.  Car.  538  92 

V.  Kemp,    120  La.   378  269 
V.  Kendall,  143  N.  Car.  659        211 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXlll 


[References  are 
State  V.  Kendig,  133  Iowa  164        267 
V.  Keneston,  59  N.  H.  36  422 

V.  Kennade,   121   Mo.  405  324 

V.  Kennard,  74  N.  H.  76  492 

V.  Kenny,  77  S.  Car.  236  268,  492 
V.  Kennedy,  177  AIo.  98  77,  493 
V.  Kennedy  (S.  Car.  1910),  67 

S.   E.    152  492 

V.  Kenyon,  18  R.  I.  217  324,  325 
V.  Kepper,  65  Iowa,  745  56 

V.  Keyes,  196  Mo.  136  435,  439 
V.  Keyes,  8  Vt.  57  255,  448 

V.  Khowry,  149  N.  Car.  545  124 
V.  Kibler,  79  S.  Car.  170  338 

V.  Kibling,  63  Vt.  636  276 

V.  Ki dwell,  62  W.  Va.  466  6 

V.  Kilcrease,  6  S.  Car.  444  26 

V.  Kimble,  34  La.  Ann.  392  301 
V.  Kimbrell     (N.     Car.     1909) 

66  S.  E.  208  357 

V.  Kinder,  96  j\Io.  548  126,  127 
V.  Kindred,  148  ]\Io.  270 

269,  270,  320 
V.  King,  81  Iowa  587  43,  287,  291 
V.  King,  122  Iowa,  i  79 

King,  71  Kan.  287  465 

King,  47  La.  Ann.  28  325,  326 
King,  78  Mo.  555  77,  119 

King,  III  Mo.  576  37 

King,  203  Mo.  560  328 

King,  67  N.  H.  219  439 

King,  86   N.    Car.   603 

59,   261,   262,    263,    264,    354 
King,  9  S.  Dak.  628  225 

Kingsbury,  58  Me.  238  370 

Kinley,  43  Iowa  294  76.  81,  83 
Kinney,  44  Conn.  153  409,  410 
Kinney,  21  S.  Dak.  390  277 

Kirkpatrick,  63  Iowa  554 

66,  2;i6,  237 
Kline,  54  Iowa  183  355 

Kline,  50  Ore.  420  37 

Klitzke,  46  Minn.  343  528 

V.  Klugherz,  91  Minn.  406  424 

V.  Knapf,  50  Wash.  229  447 

V.  Knapp,  45   N.   H.    148 

411,  412,  415,  418 
V.  Knapp,  70  Ohio  St.  380  147 

V.  Knight,    43    Me.    11        320,    334 


to  Scctiojis.] 

State  V.  Knoll,  69  Kan.  767      102,  103 
V.  Knost,  207  Mo.   18  211,  343 

V.  Knowles,  185  Mo.  141 

147,  284,  286 
V.  Knutson,  91   Iowa  549  387 

V.  Knutson,  18  S.  Dak.  444  524 
V.  Koontz,  31  W.  Va.  127  517 

V.  Kortgaard,  62  Minn.  7  282,  283 
V.  Kriechbaum,  Si  Iowa  6^3  24a 
V.  Krug,  12  Wash.  288  17,  18 

V.  Kyle,  14  Wash.  702  16,  24a 

V.  Labuzan,  37  La.  Ann.  489  326 
V.  Lacey,  11 1   Mo.  513  408 

V.  Lackland,  136  ]\Io.  26  300 

V.  Lagoni,  30  ]\Iont.  472  160 

V.  Laird,  79  Kan.   181  267 

V.  Laliyer,  4  Minn.  368  147 

V.  Lally,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  424  12 
V.  Lamb,  141  Mo.  298  358 

V.  Lambert,  104  Me.  394 

81,  116,  118,  120 
V.  LaMont     (S.     Dak.     1909), 

120  N.  W.  1 104  418 

V.  Lamothe,  37  La.  Ann.  43  522 
V.  Lance,  149  N.  Car.  551  330 

V.  Landers,  21  S.  Dak.  606  48,  126 
V.  Landrum,  127  Mo.  App.  653  209 
V.  Landry,  29  Mont.  218  230 

V.  Lane,  80  N.  Car.  407  421,  423 
V.  Lang,  63   Me.   215  195 

V.  Lang    (N.   Dak.    1910),   125 

N.  W.  558  523 

V.  Lange,  59  Mo.  418  269,  300 

V.  Langford,  45  La.  Ann.  1177 

409,  410 
V.  Langford,  74  S.  Car.  460  374 
V.  Lantz,  23  Kan.  728  228 

V.  Lapage,  57  N.  H.  245  78,  87,  438 
V.  Laque,  41  La.  Ann.  1070  261 
V.  Larkin,  49  N.  H.  39  492,  493 
V.  Larkins,  5  Idaho  200  158,  328 
V.  La  Rose    (Ore.    1909),    104 

Pac.  299  321 

V.  Lashus,  79  Me.  504  SM.  S^S 

V.  Laster,  71  N.  J.  L.  586  95 

V.  Latham,  13  I  red.   (N.  Car.) 

33  310 

V.  Lattin,   29  Conn.   389  4^4 

V.  Lattin,  19  Wash.  57  33° 


CXXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are 
State  V.  Lauderbeck,  g6  Iowa  258    390 
V.  Lautenschlager,     22     iVlinn. 

514  314 

V.  Lavin,  80  Iowa  555  526,  527 
V.  Lawler,   130  Mo.  366  358 

V.  Lawrence,  $7  Me.  574  154,  157 
V.  Lawrence,  74  Ohio  St.  38  418 
V.  Lax,  71  N.  J.  L.  386  299,  301 
V.  Laxton,  76  N.  Car.  216  82 

V.  Laycock,   136  Mo.  93  518 

V.  Laycock,  141  Mo.  274  224 

V.  Leabo,  84  Mo.  168  18 

V.  Leabo,  89  Mo.  247  6 

V.  Leach,  7  Conn.  452  465 

V.  Leaden,  35  Conn.  515  371 

V.  Learnard,  41  Vt.  585  20,  21 

V.  Leary,    iii    La.   301  270 

V.  Leary,  136  N.  Car.  578  487 

V.  Leasia,  45  Ore.  410  41a,  187 

V.  Le  Blanc,  116  La.  822  82 

V.  Ledford,  133  N.  Car.  714  368 
V.  Lee,  69  Conn.   186  347 

V.  Lee,  95  Iowa  427  273 

V.  Lee,  22  Minn.  407  yy,  81,  85 
V.  Lee,  80  N.  Car.  483  214 

V.  Lee  Doon,  7  Wash.  308  225,  230 
V.  Leeper,  70  Iowa  748  240 

V.  Legg,  59  W.  Va.  315 

217,  218,  247,  323 
V.  Lehman,  175  ]\Io.  619  467 

V.  Lehman,  182  Mo.  424  451 
V.  Lehre,    2    Brev.    (S.    Car.) 

446  365 

V.  Leicham,  41   Wis.   565  291 

V.  Lejeune,  116  La.  193  324 

V.  Lem    Woon    (Ore.,    1910), 

107  Pac.  974  315 

V.  Lentz,  45  Minn.  177  312,  323 
V.  Lentz,  184  Mo.  223  282 

V.  Leonard,   135  Iowa  371  378 

V.  Leppere,  66  Wis.  355  79,  80 
V.  Leuhrsman,  123  Iowa  476  119a 
V.  Leuth,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  94 

132,  133,  160 
V.  Levidi,  128  Iowa  3,72  305 

V.  Levine,  79  Conn.  714  292,  293 
V.  Levy,  9  Idaho  483  6,  67 

V.  Levy,  119  Mo.  434  144 

V.  Lewis,   139  Iowa  405  48,  97 

V.  Lewis,  45  Iowa  20  439 


72>, 


to  Sectxons.'\ 

State  V.  Lewis,  96  Iowa  286      29, 
V.  Lewis,  19  Kan.  260 
V.  Lewis,  26  Kan.  123 
V.  Lewis,  56  Kan.  374 
V.  Lewis,  38  La.  Ann.  680 
V.  Lewis,  39  La.  Ann.  mo 
V.  Lewis,  44  La.  Ann.  958 
V.  Lewis,  9  Mo.  App.  321 
V.  Lewis,  136  Mo.  84 
V.  Lewis,    181    Mo.   235 
V.  Lewis,  20  Nev.  ^2>2> 
V.  Lewis,    51    Ore.   467       491, 
v.  Libby,  44  Me.  469 
V.  Libby,   84  Me.  461 
V.  Lichliter,  95  Mo.  402 
V.  Lightsey,  43   S.    Car.    I14 
V.  Liles,  134  N.  Car.  735 
V.  Lincoln,  17  Wis.  597 
V.  Lindley,  51  Iowa  343 
V.  Lindsay,  122  La.  375 
V.  Lingle.  128  Mo.  528 
V.  Linhofif,  121  Iowa  632 
V.  Litchfield,  58  Me.  267 
V.  Littooy,  52  Wash.  87 
V.  Littschke,  27  Ore.  189 
V.  Livesay,    30   Mo.    App.   6^3 

484, 
V.  Lockhart,   188  ^lo.  427 
V.  Lockwood    (Del.,    1909),  74 

Atl.  2 
V.  Lockwood,  58  Vt.  378 
V.  Lodge,  9  Houst.   (Del.)  542 

III, 
V.  Loe.  98  ]Mo.  609 
V.  Logan,  i  Nev.  509 
V.  Lomack,  130  Iowa  79       364, 
V.  Loney,  82  'Mo.  82 
V.  Long,  103  Ind.  481   438,  439, 
V.  Long,  201  ]\Io.  664  I 

V.  Long,  209  Mo.  366 
V.  Loos   (Iowa,  1909),  123  N. 

W.  962 
V.  Lopez,  15  Nev.  407 
V.  Lotono,  62  W.  Va.  310 
V.  Lowe,  6  Kan.  App.  iia 
V.  Lowe,  93   ]\Io.  547  156, 

V.  Lowell,  123  Iowa  427 
V.  Lowry.  42  W.  Va.  205 

23,   148,  228,  422, 
Lowhorne,  66  N.  Car.  638 


492 

465 
441 
277 

28 
1 3-' 
238 
250 
220 

90 
154 
494 
383 

32 
517 
353 
523 
316 

80 

326 

i8s,  386 

17 
182 
276 
196 

485 
238 

368 
296 

227 
271 

26 
365 

70 
443 
19a 

48 

466 
230 
419 
89 
164 
533 

425 
130 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXV 


State  V.  Lucas,  57  Iowa  501  69 

V.  Lucas,  24  Ore.  168  215,  237 

V.  Lucey,  24  Mont.  295  119 

V.  Lucker,  40  S.  Car.  549  232,  268 
V.  Luff    (Del.,    1909),    74   Atl. 

1079  437 

V.  Lull,  48  Vt.  581  324 

V.  Lund,  49  Kan.  580  271 

V.  Luper  (Ore.,  1908),  95  Pac. 

811  466 

V.  Lurles,  117  N.  Car.  720  47 
V.  Lu  Sing,  34  Mont.  31  147a,  20a 
V.  Lyniens,  138  Iowa  113  223 

V.  Lyon,  45  N.  J.  L.  272  282 

V.  Lyon,  81  N.  Car.  600  71,  72 

V.  Lyon,  89  N.  Car.  568  365 

V.  Lytle,   117  N.   Car.  799 

55,  368,  369 
V.  Lyts,  25  Wash.  347  132 

V.  ]\IcAllister,  24  ]\Ie.  139  -j^i,  423 
V.  :McAllister,  65  W.  Va.  97  358 
V.  McBeth,  49  Kan.  584  309 

V.  IMcCaffrey,  69  Vt.  85  23,  24a 
V.  [NlcCahill,  72  Iowa  iii  328,  335 
V.  ]\IcCanon,  51  Mo.  160  no 

V.  ISIcCants,      i      Speers      (S. 

Car.)  384  166 

V.  ^McCarthy,  43  La.  Ann.  541  257 
V.  ^McCarthy,  36  Mont.  226  74,  292 
V.  McCaskey,  104  Mo.  644  390,  393 
V.  McCaulej-,   17  Wash.  88  42 

V.  AlcClain,  130  Iowa  "^Z  299,  302 
V.  ]McClain,  137  ^lo.  307  129,  394 
V.  McClellan    (Kan.),  98  Pac. 

209  81 

V.  IMcClintic,   "JZ   Iowa  663 

237,  386,  388,  393 
V.  ]\IcComb,  18  Iowa  43  271 

V.  JNIcCoomer,  79  S.  Car.  63 

103,  104,  106 
V.  ^IcCoy,   14   N.   H.  364  294 

V.  McCoy,  15  Utah  136  50,  347 

V.  ^IcCoy,   63  W.   Va.  69  358 

V.  McCracken,   66   Iowa    569 

iSi>  152 
V.  McCrum,  38  Minn.  154  343 

V.  McDaniel,  84  N.  Car.  803  19 
V.  ^McDaniel,  115  N.  Car.  807  164 
V.  McDaniel,  68  S.  Car.  304 

242,  312 


{References  arc  to  Sections.] 

State   V.    INIcDavid,    15   La.   Ann. 
403  400,  406 


V.  IMcDermet,  138  Iowa  86  298 
V.  McDermott,  36  Iowa  107  308 
V.  McDevitt,  69  Iowa  549  119 

V.  jMcDonald,  106  Ind.  233  452 
V.  McDonald,  57  Kan.  537  82 

V.  McDonald,  67  Mo.  13  356 

V.  ^IcDonald,  133  N.  Car.  680  282 
V.  ^McDowell,  loi  N.  Car.  734  526 
V.  McDuffie,  34  N.  H.  523  3io 

V.  McDuffie,  107  N.  Car.  885  383 
V.  ]\IcFarlain,  41  La.  Ann.  686 

222,  248 
V.  INIcFarlain,  42  La.  Ann.  803 

40,  44 
V.  McGahey,  3  N.  Dak.  293  223 
V.  McGee,  81  Iowa  17 

82,  492,  493,  494 
V.  }^IcGee,  188  Mo.  401  293 

V.  ]\IcGee,  212  Mo.  95  293 

V.  ]\IcGinnis,  74  Mo.  245  35,  36 
V.  McGlothlen,  56  Iowa  544  529 
V.  jNIcGlynn,  34  N.  H.  422  24a 

V.  McGowan,  66  Conn.  392  221 

V.  iNIcGowan,  36  Alont.  422 

I59>  238 
V.  INIcGraw,  87  Mo.  161  493 

V.  McGreevey    (Idaho,    1909), 

IDS    Pac.   1047  328 

V.  McGuire,  193  Mo.  215  373 

V.  iMcGuire,  15  R.  I.  23  61,  66,  246 
V.  iMcIntosh,  64  N.  Car.  607  523 
V.  iSIcIntyre,  53  Wash  178  198 

V.  ]McKay,  150  N.  Car.  813  6 

V.  McKay,    122   Iowa  658  184 

V.  McKean,  36  Iowa  343  69 

V.  McKee,  109  Ind.  497  309,  310 
V.  McKee,   17  Utah   270  293 

V.  McKellar    (S.    Car.,    1910), 

67  S.  E.  314  328 

V.  McKenzie,  42  Me.  392  434 

V.  McKinney,  76  Kan.  419  196,  301 
V.  ?*IcKinney,  III  N.  Car.  683  241 
V.  ]\IcKinnon,  99  Me.   166  44 

V.  IMcKnight,  1 19  Iowa  79  277 

V.  McKnight,  in  N.  Car.  690  37^ 
V.  McLain.  43  Wash.  267  370 

V.  McLaughlin,  44  Iowa  82 

238,  414 


CXXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


State 

V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 

V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 


62 
263 
349 


[References  ar 
V.  McLaughlin,  27  Mo.  in    518 
McLaughlin,  76  Mo.  320 
McLellan,   79   Kan.    11 
McLeod,  136  Mo.  109 
M'Leod,     I      Hawks      (N. 

Car.)   344  26,  193 

McMahon,  17  Nev.  365  370 

McManus,  89  N.  Car.  555  484 
McNally,  87   Mo.  6z^  79 

McNamara,  212  Mo.  150  323 
McNeil,   33   La.   Ann.    1332 

261,  265 
McO'Blenis,  24  Mo.  402 

261,  265 
McQuire,  15  R.  L  23  66 

Mace,  118  N.  Car.  1244  108 

MacQueen,  69  N.  J.  L.  522  152 
Madeira,  125  Mo.  App.  508  42 
Madigan,   57   Minn.   425  90 

MaFoo,  no  IMo.  7  n9 

Magone,   32  Ore.   206  71 

Magoon,  68  Vt.  289       121,  122 


Maguire,    n3   Mo.  670  58 

Mahan,  132  Mo.  n2  285 

Maher,  74  Iowa  77  148,  149 

Maher,  24  Nev.  465  14 

Mahon,  32  Vt.  241  n9a 

Mahoney,  122  Iowa  168  120 

Maier,  36  W.  Va.  757  161 

Main,  69  Conn.  123  275 

IMaitremme,  14  La.  Ann.  830  145 
Major,  70  S.  Car.  387  122 

Mallon,  75  Mo.  355  ng 

Malloy,  34  N.  J.  L.  410  311 

JNIaloney,   12  R.  I.  251  446 

Manceaux,     42     La.     Ann. 

I I 64  270 

Manicke,  139  Mo.  545  509,  512 
Mann,  39  Wash.  144  185,  369 
Marcks,  140  Mo.  656  417 

]\Iarkins,  95  Ind.  464  92 

Marks,  70  S.  Car.  448  118,  120 
Markuson,  7  N.  Dak.  155  510 
Marselle,  43  Wash.  273  147 

Marsh,  70  Vt.  288 

42,  123,  312,  319a,  323 
Marshall,  ns  Mo.  383  n9 

Marsteller,  84  N.  Car.  726  353 
Martin,  31  La.  Ann.  849  485 
Martin,  124  Mo.  514  246 


e  to  Sections.] 
State  V.  Martin  (N.  J.  1909),  73 

Atl.  548  482 

V.  Martin,  147  N.  Car.  832  307 

V.  Martin,  59  Ohio  St.  212  509 

V.  Martin,  47  Ore.  282  323,  334 
V.  Martin,   30   Wis.   216  353 

V.  Martin,  47  S.  Car.  67  55 

V.  Marvels,  2  Harr.  (Del.)  527  419 
V.  Marvin,  35   N.  H.  22 

92,  187,  188,  381,  383 
V.  Mason,  26  Ore.  273  363 

v.  Massey,  104  N.   Car.  877 

249,  250 
V.  Mathes,  90  Mo.  571  102,  103,  112 
V.  Matheson,  130  Iowa  440  50 

V.  Matheson,  142  Iowa  414  312 

V.  Mathews,  98  Mo.  125  67,  71,  214  . 
V.  Mathews,  202  Mo.  143  121 

V.  Mathias,  206  Mo.  604  471,  475 
V.  Matlock,  5  Penn.  (Del.)  401  470 
V.  Matlock,  70  Iowa  229  402 

V.  Matthews,  119  La.  665  151 

V.  Matthews,  88  Mo.  121  43 

V.  Matthews,  37  N.  H.  450 

459,  460,  461 
V.  Matthews,  66  N.  Car.  106  132 
V.  Matthews,  78  N.  Car.  523  324 
V.  Maxwell,  47  Iowa  454  4^9 

V.  Maxwell,  51   Iowa  314  198 

V.  May,  20  Iowa,  305  302 

V.  May,  62  W.  Va.  129  132 

V.  Mayo,  42  Wash.  540 

103,  no,  in 
V.  Mayberry.  48  Me.  218  296 

V.  Meche,  42  La.  Ann.  273  377 

V.  Medbury,  8  R.   I.   543  383 

V.  Medicott,  9  Kan.  257  103 

V.  Megorden,  49  Ore.  259  213,  312 
V.  Mehojovich,  118  La.  1013  408 
V.  Melick,  65  Iowa  614  374 

V.  Melrose,  98  Mo.  594  492 

V.  Melton,  37  La.  Ann.  77  119 

V.  Melton,    120   N.    Car.   591 

132,  404,  40s 
V.  Melvern,  32  Wash.  7  58,  233 
V.  Merchant    (N.  H.),  18  Atl. 

654  174 

v.  Merkel,  189  Mo.  315  282 

V.  Merriman,  34  S.  Car.  16 

82,  246,  313 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXVll 


[References  ar 


State 

V. 

V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 
V. 

V. 

V. 


V.  Merriman,  34  S.  Car.  576 
Alerritt,    5    Sneed    (Tenn.) 

67 
Meshek,  61  Iowa  316 
Messner,  43  Wash.  206 
jMetcalf,  2  Mo.  App.   1269 
INIetcalf,  17  Mont.  417 
:Meyer,  135  Iowa  507        36, 
Meyers,  120  La.  127 
Meyers,  99  Mo.  107 
Meyers,  46  Neb.  152 
Michael,  37  W.  Va.  565 
Michel,  III  La.  434 
Michel,  20  Wash.  162 
Middleton,  69  S.  Car.  72 
Miles,  89   Me.    142 
Miles,   124   Mo.   App.  283 

484, 
Miles,  15  Wash.  534 
Miller,  9  Houst.   (Del.)  564 
6,  320, 
IMiller,  53  Iowa  84 
Miller,  65  Iowa  60 
Miller,  71  Kan.  200   39,  342, 
Miller,  42  La.  Ann.  1186 

127, 
]\Iiller,  45  Minn.  521  300, 
[Miller,  44  ^lo.  App.  159 

449- 
[Nliller,  93  Mo.  263 
]\Iiller,  100  Mo.  606 
IMiller,  182  Mo.  370 
Miller,  97  N.  Car.  484      73, 
Miller,  43  Ore.  325 
Miller,  3  Wash.   St.  131 
Miller,  42  W.  Va.  215 
Milling,  35   S.  Car.   16 
Millmeier,  102  Iowa  692 
Mills    (Del.    1908),  69   Atl. 

841 
Mills,   17   ]Me.   211 
Mills,  91  N.  Car.  581 
Mills,  116  N.  Car.  1051 
Mills,  79  S.  Car.  187  61,  in. 
Mills,  33  W.  Va.  455 
Mims,  26  Minn.    183      285, 
Mims,  39  S.  Car.  557 
Minard,  96  Iowa  267 
Minnick,   15  Iowa   123 
Minor,  117  Mo.  302    61,  71, 


221, 
6,  245, 


238 

456 
277, 
490 
475 
58 
205 
238 

125 
410 
205 
73 
36 
138 
451 


236 

334 
275 
397 
413 

408 
301 

468 
237 
246 
450 
74 
50 
519 
384 
214 


354 
439 
103 

364 
269 

35 
290 
382 
118 

455 
246 


e  to  Sections.] 
State  V.  Minton,  116  Mo.  605  423,  427 
V.  Mispagel,  207  Mo.  557    282,  289 
V.  [Mitchell,  139  Iowa  455 

6,  352,  354 
V.  [Mitchell,  68  Iowa  116  409,  410 
V.  Mitchell,  Phil.  (N.  Car.)  L. 

447  135 

V.  [Mitchell,  32  Wash.  64  67 
V.  [Mitton,  36  Mont.  376 

419,  421,  422,  423 

V.  [Mize,  117  N.  Car.  780  523 

V.  ^lizis,  48  Ore.   165  488 

V.  IMoberly,  121  Mo.  604  87 

V.  [Mobley,  44  Wash.  549  415 
V.  Moelchen,  53  Iowa  310 

6,  58,  86,  330 

V.  [Moncla,  39  La.  Ann.  868  119 

V.  Monfre,  122  La.  251  124 
V.  [Montgomery,  65  Iowa  483 

59,  355 
V.  [Montgomery,  121  La.  1005  161 
V.  [Montgomery,     17     S.     Dak. 

500  298 

V.  [Mook,  40  Ohio  St.  588  289 

V.  [Moon,  41  Wis.  684  295 

V.  Moore  (Del.,  1909),  74  Atl. 

1 112  320 

V.  Moore,  25  Iowa  128  320 

V.  Moore,  78  Iowa  494  386 

V.  [Moore,  38  La.  Ann.  66  loi 

V.  Moore,    loi    Mo.  316 

118,  120,  301,  302,  305 
V.  Moore,  106  [Mo.  480  358 

V.  Moore,  117  Mo.  395 

97,  120,  372,  373,  378 
V.  Moore,  in  N.  Car.  667  439 
V.  Moore     (Utah,     1909),    105 

Pac.  293  383 

V.  Moran,  131  Iowa,  645  51,  90,  138 
V.  [Moran,  46  Kan.  318  232 

V.  [Moran,  216  Mo.  550        245,  467 
V.  Moran,  15  Ore.  262  192,  230 

V.  [Mordecai,  68  N.  Car.  207  48 

V.  [Morey,  2  Wis.  494  295 

V.  [Morgan,  196  Mo.  177  178 

V.  [Morgan,   2  Dev.   &   B.    (N. 

Car.)    348  423 

V.  Morgan,  3  Ircd.    (N.   Car.) 

186  354 

V.  Morgan,  28  Ore.  578  286 


CXXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


67 
13S 


State  V.  Morgan,  27  Utah  103 

268,  269,  270 
V.  Morney,  196  ]\Io.  43  6 

V.  Morrill,  16  Ark.  384  459 

V.  Morris,  47  Conn.  179  371 

V.  Morris,   109   N.   Car.  820 

22,  241 
V.  Morrison,  46  Kan.  679  447 

V.  Morrow,  40  S.  Car.  221  345 

V.  Morse,  12  Idaho  492  293 

V.  Mortensen,  26  Utah  312 

313,  323,  330 
V.  Mortimer,  20  Kan.  93  138 

V.  Morton,  27  Vt.  310  491 

V.  Morton,  8  Wis.  167  432 

V.  Mosby,  S3  Mo.  App.  571        475 
V.  Moses,  139  Mo.  2x7        517,  518 
V.  Mosley,  31  Kan.  355 
V.  Moss,  -]-]  S.  Car.  391 
V.  Motley,   7  Rich.    (S.   Car.) 

327 

V.  Moultrie,  2>2>  La.  Ann.  1146  270 
V.  Mount,  ^z  N.  J.  L.  582  61 

V.  Mowry,  Zl  Kan.  369  164,  166 
V.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374 

6,  18,  48,  ()T,  312 
V.  INIulch,  17  S.  Dak.  321  221 

V.  Mulkern,  85  Me.  106  411 

V.  JNIullins,  loi  Mo.  514 

65,  122,  123,  132,  133 
V.  Mulloy,  III  Mo.  App.  679  42 
V.  ]\Iungeon,  20  S.  Dak.  612  247 
V.  ]\Iurdy,  81  Iowa  603  112 

V.  Murphy     (Del.,     1907),    (£ 

Atl.  335  446 

V.  ]\Turphy,  45  La.  Ann.  958  61 
V.  INIurphy,  118  Mo.  7 

^7, 79, 164, 413 

V.  Murphy,  84  N.  Car.  742  87 

V.  Murphy,  17  N.  D.  48  423 

V.  Murphy,   17  R.   I.  698  428 

V.  Murphy,  15  Wash.  98  296 

V.  Murray,  6  Cr.  L.  Mag.  255  154 
V.  Murray,  15  Me.  100  465 

V.  Murray,  39  Mo.  App.  127  484 
V.  Murray,  126  Mo.  611  123,  124 
V.  Mushied,  12  Wis.  561  523 

V.  Mushrush,  97  Iowa  444  494 

V.  Musick,  loi  Mo.  260  517 

V.  Myers,  82  Mo.  558  423,  438 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Myers,  198  Mo.  225 

322,  323,  493 
V.  Myrberg  (Wash.  1909),  105 


Pac.   622  409 

V.  Nadal,  69  Iowa  478  400,  404 

V.  Nagel,   136  Mo.  45  5 18 

V.  Nagle,  25  R.  I.  105  233 

V.  Nance,  25  S.  Car.  168  103 

V.  Napier,  65  Mo.  462  119a 

V.  Napper,  141  Mo.  401  58,  211 

V.  Napper,  6  Nev.  113  353 

V.  Nash,  7  Iowa  347     m*  Ii7,  3^2 
V.  Nash,  45  La.  Ann.  974  324 

V.  Neagle,  65  Me.  468  89,  SM 

V.  Neasby,  188  Mo.  467  342 

V.  Nease,  46  Ore.  433  47^ 

V.  Neil,   13  Idaho  539         409,  417 
V.  Neill,   6   Ala.   685  185 

V.  Neimeier,  66  Iowa  634  442 

V.  Nelson,  58  Iowa  208  81 

V.  Nelson,  68  Kan.  566  262 

V.  Nelson,  98  Mo.  414  60 

V.  Nelson,  loi  Mo.  46   104,  106,  no 
V.  Nelson,  39  Wash.  221  187 

V.  Nettlebush,  20  Iowa  257  108 

V.  Neubauer  (Iowa,  1909)  124 

N.  W.  312  92 

V.  New,  22  Minn.  76  284,  288 

V.  Newhouse,  39  La.  Ann.  862     103 
V.  Newman.  57  Kan.  705  159 

V.  Newman,  34  Mont.  434  423 

V.  Newman,  74  N.  H.  10    281,  282 
V.  Newman,  73  N.  J.  L.  202 

331,  438 
V.  Newsum,  129  Mo.  154  268 

V.  Newton,  44  Iowa  45  342 

V.  Newton,  16  N.  Dak.  151        461 
V.  Nichols,  29  Minn.  357  524 

V.  Nickels,  65  S.  Car.  169  277 

V.  Nieuhaus,  217  Mo.  332 

221,  222,  312 
V.  Niles,  47  Vt.  82  411 

V.  Nippert,  74  Kan.  371  21 

V.  Nix,  III  La.  812  326 

V.  Nixon,  32  Kan.  205  154 

V.  Nocton,   121    Mo.  537  326 

V.  Noeninger,  108  Mo.  166  330,  357 
V.  Nolan,  48  Kan.  723  367 

V.  Noland,  in  Mo.  473       282,  291 
V.  Nordall,  38  Mont.  327    3i2>  3^6 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


C5XX1X 


State 


[References  ar 
V.  Norman,  135  Iowa  483 

197,  236,  374 
Norris,  127  Iowa  683  414 

Norton,  89  i\Ie.  290  364 

Norton,   76  Mo.   180  437 

Nowells,   135   Iowa,   53 

103,  113,  233 
Nugent,    134  Iowa  237  386 

Nugent,  116  La.  99  220 

Nulty,    2    Eastern    347  279 

Nussenholtz,  76  Conn.  92  78 

Oakes,  202  Mo.  86  394 

Ober,  52  N.  H.  459  60,  68,  247 
O'Brien,  81  Iowa  88 

108,  246,  265,  266,  2)72> 
O'Brien,  18  Mont,  i 

132,  238,  239,  240,  250 
O'Brien,  35  Mont.  482  69 

O'Connell  (Iowa,  1909),  123 

N.  W.  201  88 

O'Connor,  38  Minn.  243  499 

Odell,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  156  196 
O'Keefe,    141    Mo.   271  391 

Oldham,  200  Mo.  538  475 

Olds,  217  Mo.  305  429,  482 

Oliver,  55  Kan.  711  131 

Oliver,  43  La.  Ann.  1003 

262,  329 
O'Neal,  7  Ired.    (N.   Car.) 

251  76,  78 

O'Neil,  51  Kan.  651  154.  164,  333 
Oppenheimer,  41  Wash.  630  437 
O'Reilly,  126  Mo.  597  50 

Ormiston,  66  Iowa   143  79 

Orr,  64  Mo.  339  I95 

O'Rourke  (Neb.,  1909),  124 

N.  W.  138  531 

Orsborn,    i    Roott    (Conn.) 

152  434 

Orth,   79  Ohio  St.   130  185 

Osborne,  28  Iowa  9  295 

Osborne,  96  Iowa,  281  221 

Oscar,   7   Jones    (N.    Car.) 

305  ^^2^, 

Ostwalt,  118  N.  Car.  1208  523 
Oswald,  59  Kan.  508  475 

Otey,  7  Kan.  69  413 

Otis,  135  Ind.  267  391 

Overstreet,  43  Kan.  299  339,  343 
Owsley,  III  Mo.  450  378 


e  to  Sections.'] 

State  V.  Oxford,  30  Tex.  428  191 

V.  Ozias,  136  Iowa  175  74 

V.  Pabst.  139  Wis.  561  179 

V.  Padillia,  42  Cal.  535  12 

V.  Page,  212  Mo.  224  323 

V.  Pagels,  92  Mo.  300 

154,  157,  163,  250 
V.  Pain,  48  La.  Ann.  311 

82,  i8s,  328 
V.  Painter,  50  Iowa  317  390 

V.  Painter,  67  Mo.  84  356 

V.  Paisley,  36  Mont.  237  118 

V.  Palmberg,  199  Mo.  233 

217,  413,  415 
V.  Palmer,  50  Kan.  318  442 

V.  Palmer,  88  Mo.  568  59 

V.  Palmer,  65  N.  H.  216  118 

V.  Pancoast    (N.   Dak.,    1896), 

67  N.  W.  1052  90,  247 

V.  Parham,  48  La.  Ann.  1309       112 
V.  Parish,  104  N.  Car.  679  415 

V.  Park,  57  Kan.  431  467 

V.  Parker,  134  N.  Car.  209  410 

V.  Parrish,  22  Iowa  284  280 

V.  Parrott,  79  N.  Car.  615  185 

V.  Parsons,  44  Wash.  299  358 

V.  Partlow,  90  Mo.  608  328 

V.  Patillo,  4  Hawks  (N.  Car.') 

348  435 

V.  Patrick,  107  ]\Io.  147 

355,  409,  410,  41S,  418 
V.  Patterson,  72>  ^lo-  695 

126,  127,  129 
V.  Patterson,'  88  Mo.  88  62 

V.  Patterson,  2  N.  J.  L.  J.  2t8    364 
V.  Patterson,  2  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

L.  346  185,  189,  400,  406 

V.  Patterson,  63  N.  Car.  520     119a 
V.  Patterson,  18  S.  Dak.  251 

523,  525 
V.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  308 

III,  112,  320 
V.  Peace,  121  La.  107  326 

V.  Peach,  70  Vt.  283  378,  379 

V.  Pease,  74  Ind.  263  421 

V.  Peebles,  178  Mo.  475  374a 

V.  Peffers,  80  Iowa  580 

100,  324,  32s 
V.  Pell,  140  Iowa  655 

516,  517,  521 


cxl 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


127 


411 


301 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Pellerin,  118  La.  547  282 

V.  Pendleton,  67  Kan.  180  403 

V.  Penna,  35  Mont.  535  160,  161 
V.  Penney,  113  Iowa  691  140 

V.  Pennington,  124  Mo.  388 

21,  185,  32,2, 
V.  Penny,  70  Iowa  190  41,  439 

V.  Pennyman,  68  Iowa  216  161,  299 
V.  Ped,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  488  320 
V.  People,  85  N.  Y.  390  82 

V.  Perkins,  3  Hawks  (N.  Car.) 

Z77  124 

V.  Perkins,  66  N.  Car.  126  236,  237 
V.  Perkins,  117  N.  Car.  698  532 
V.  Perry,  4  Idaho  224  I73 

V.  Perry,  124  La.  931  370,  377 

V.  Perry,  136  Mo.  126  88,  321 

V.  Perry,  5  Jones  (N.  Car.)  9    488 
V.  Peter,  14  La.  Ann.  521 
V.  Peter,   8  Jones    (N.    Car.) 

19 
Peters,  107  N.  Car.  876 
Peterson,  67  Iowa  564 
Peterson,  149  N.  Car.  533 

320,  324,  338 

Petsch,  43  S.  Car.  132     m,  2,33 
Pettaway,     3     Hawks     (N. 

Car.)  623                       526,  527 

Pettit,  119  Mo.  410  324 

Petty,  119  Mo.  425  439 
Peyton  (Ark.  1910),  125  S. 

W.  416  408 
Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90 

60,  210,  246 

Phair,  48  Vt.  366  429 

Phelps,  2  Root  (Conn.)  87  434 

Phelps,  II  Vt.  116  420 

Phelps,  41  Wash.  470  439 

Phifer,  65  N.  Car.  321  439 

Phillips,  5  Ind.  App.  122  532 

Phillips,  24  Mo.  475  "9 
V.  Phillips,  104  N.  Car.  786 

196,  356 

V.  Phillips,  73  S.  Car.  236  493 
V.  Philpot,  97  Iowa  365 

215,  216,  221,  245 

V.  Phipps,  95  Iowa  491  310 

V.  Phipps,  76  N.  Car.  203  71 

V.  Picker,  2  Mb.  App.  1074  279 

V.  Pickett,  II  I^ev.  255  407 


e  to  Sections.^ 

State  V.  Pickett,  174  Mo.  663  442 

V.  Pickett,  118  N.  Car.  1231        446 
V.  Pienick,  46  Wash.  523  367 

V.  Pierce,  7  Ala.  728  310 

V.  Pierce,  65  Iowa  85  12,  167 

V.  Pierce,  77  Iowa  245  287 

V.  Pierson,  12  Ala.  149  275 

V.  Pigford,  117  N.  Car.  748         484 
V.  Pigg,  78  Kan.  618  46 

V.  Pike,  65  Me.  in  333 

V.  Pippin,  88  N.  Car.  646  92 

V.  Pirkey    (S.    Dak.),    118   N. 

W.  1042 
V.  Place,  5  Wash.  773 
V.  Plant,  67  Vt.  454 
V.  Plomondon,  75  Kan.  853 


276 

355 

482 

61 

193,  276 


V.  Plum,  49  Kan.  679 

V.  Plunkett,  64  Me.  534 

V.  Poindexter,  23  W.  Va.  805         37 

V.  Pollok,   4    Ired.    (N.   Car.) 

305  487 

V.  Pomeroy,  25  Kan.  349  96 

V.  Pomeroy,  130  Mo.  489  477 

V.  Poole,  42  Wash.  192  126,  438 

V.  Pope,  109  N.  Car.  849  383 

V.  Pope,  78  S.  Car.  264  250,  269 

V.  Porter,  34  Iowa  131  338 

V.  Porter,  57  Iowa  691  415 

V.  Porter,  97  Iowa  450  373 

V.  Porter,  213  Mo.  43  I59,  329 

V.  Porter,  26  Mo.  20  284,  295 

V.  Porter,  32  Ore.  135  125 

V.  Potter,  18  Conn.  166  130 

V.  Potter,  13  Kan.  414  324 

V.  Potter,  108  Mo.  424  119,  521 

V.  Potter,  42  Vt.  495  73 

V.  Potter,  52  Vt.  33  381 

V.  Potts,  83  Iowa  317  521,  522 

V.  Potts,  9  N.  J.  L.  26  42s,  434 

V.  Poimdstone       (Mo.  App. 

1909),  124  S.  W.  79  41a 

V.  Powell,  5  Penn.   (Del.)  24 

245,  320,  326 

V.  Powell,  5T  Wash.  372  516 

V.  Powers,  130  Mo.  157         55,  I49 
V.  Powers,  51  N.  J.  L.  432  201 

V.  Poyner   (Wash.,  1910),  107 

Pac.  181  384 

V.  Pratt,  20  Iowa  267  122 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxli 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


State 


V.  Pratt,  98  Mo.  482 
71,  28. 
Pratt,  121  Mo.  566 
Pratt,  21  S.  Dak.  305 
Pray,  14  N.  H.  464 
Pressler,  16  Wyo.  214 
Price,  6  La.  Ann.  691 
Price,   12  Gill  &  J.    (Md.) 

260 
Price,  115  Mo.  App.  656 
Priddy,  4  Humph.    (Tenn.) 

429 
Pritchard,  107  X.  Car.  921 

451, 
Pritchett,  106  N.  Car.  667 
Privitt,  175  Mo.  207 
Prolow,  98  Minn.  459 
Pruett,  49  La.  Ann.  283 
Pryor,  30  Ind.  350 
Psycher,  179  Mo.  140 
Pucca,  4  Penn.  (Del.)  71 
Pugh,  7  Jones  (N.  Car.)  61 
Punshon,  124  Mo.  448 
Punshon,  133  Mo.  44 
Purdy,  s6  Wis.  213 
Quarles,  13  Ark.  307 
Queen,  91  N.  Car.  659 
Quick,  150  N.  Car.  820 
Quigley,  26  R.  L  263 
Quinn    (Wash.,    1909). 

Pac.  818 
Quirk,  loi  Minn.  334 
Rabens,  79  S.  Car.  542 
Rainsbarger,  71  Iowa  746 
Ralston,  139  Iowa  44 
Ramsey,  48  La.  Ann.  1407 
Rand,  33  N.  H.  216 
Ransell,  41  Conn.  433 
Raphael,  123  Iowa  452 
Rash,    12    Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

382  90,  328, 

Rathbun,  74  Conn.  524 
Raven,  115  Mo.  419 
Ravenscraft,   62    Mo.    App. 

109 
Ray,  S3  Mo.  345 
Raymond,  46  Conn.  345 

299. 
Raymond,  53  X.  J.  L.  260 

215. 


289,  291 
246 

468,  470 
295 

157,  338 
III 

473 
482 

488 

456 

61 

163 

320 

280 

442 

6 

79 

408 

330 

97,   312 

455 

72 

144 

338 

160 


157, 
105 
326, 


329 
122 
269 
188 
118 

33^ 

118 

89 

377 

333 

280a 

96 

292 

518 

378 
228 


State  V.  Raynor,  145  N.  Car. 


472 
387, 
528, 


390 
V.  Read,  45  Iowa  469  528,  532 

V.  Reader,  60  Iowa  527  21 

V.  Reasby,  100  Iowa  231  53,  54 

V.  Record   (X.  Car.,  1909),  65 

S.  E.  loio  299 

V.  Red,  53  Iowa  69  125,  137 

V.  Reddick,  7  Kan.  143  156,  163 

V.  Reddington,  7  S.  Dak.  368  205 
V.  Redemeier,  71  Mo.  173  158 

V.  Redstrake,  39  X.  J.  L.  365 

422,  424 
V.  Reed,  26  Conn.  202  195 

V.  Reed,  3  Idaho  754  230 

V.  Reed,  62  Iowa  40  152 

V.  Reed,  53   Kan.   767  105 

V.  Reed,  49  La.  Ann.  704  134 

V.  Reed,  62  Me.  129  10,  12 

V.  Reed,  89  Mo.  168  223,  303 

V.  Reed,  137  Mo.  125  112,  326 

V.  Reed,  52  Ore.  377  275 

V.  Reeves,  97  Mo.  668  390 

V.  Register,  133  X.  Car.  746  73,  89 
V.  Reick,  43  Kan.  635  222 

V.  Reid,  20  Iowa  413  373,  378 

V.  Reid,  39  Minn.  277  411,  417 

V.  Reidel,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  470  163 
V.  Reilly,  4  Mo.  App.  392  282 

V.  Reitz,  83  X.  Car.  634  152,  374 
V.  Remington,  50  Ore.  99  280,  354 
V.  Renaud,  50  La.  Ann.  662  135 
V.  Renfrow,  iii  Mo.  589  58 

V.  Renton,  15  X.  H.  169  489 

V.  Revells,  34  La.  Ann.  381 

129,  138 
V.  Reynolds,  5  Kan.  App.  515  87 
V.  Reynolds,  48  S.  Car.  384  185 
V.  Rice   (S.  Car.,  1897),  37  S. 

E.  452  243 

V.  Richards,  33  Iowa  420  409 

V.  Richardson,  18  Ala.  109  207 

V.  Richardson,  194  Mo.  326 

78,  122,  184,  327 
V.  Richmond,  138  Iowa  494  125 
V.  Ricksicker,  73  Kan.  495  21 

V.  Riddle,  20  Kan.  711  324,  325 
V.  Riddle,  179  Mo.  287  263 

V.  Ridcau,  ti6  La.  245  326,  328 

V.  Riggs,  39  Conn.  498  364 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Rights,  82  N.  Car.  675        378 
V.  Riley,  42  La.  Ann.  995     loi,  263 
V.  Riley,  113  N.  Car.  648  279 

V.  Riney,  137  Mo.  102  70 

V.  Ring,  29  Minn.  78    285,  289,  291 
V.  Ring,  142  N.  Car.  596  387 

V.  Ripley,  32  Wash.  182 

95,  268,  358 
V.  Rivers  (Conn.  1909),  74  Atl. 

757  418 

V.  Rivers,  58  Iowa  102  437 

V.  Rivers,  68  Iowa  611  152,  378 

Roach,  2  Mo.  App.  11 14  s^ 

Robbins,  124  Ind.  308  477 

Roberson,  150  N.  Car.  837  320 
Roberts,  39  Mo.  App.  47  484 
Roberts,  201  Mo.  702 

89,  492,  494 
Roberts,  28  Nev.  350 

50,  87,  103,  104,  112 
Roberts,  15  Ore.  187  68,  370 
Roberts,  63  Vt.  139  48 

Robertson,  30  La.  Ann.  340  326 
Robertson,  iii  La.  35  129 

Robinson,  35  La.  Ann.  964  294 
Robinson,  39  Me.  150  514 

Robinson,  117  Mo.  649  6 

Robinson,  16  N.  J.  L.  507  423 
Robinson,  116  N.  Car.  1046  197 
Robinson,  32  Ore.  43  224,  415 
Robinson,  35  S.  Car.  340 

278,  376 
Robinson,  20  W.  Va.  713 

166,  228 

194   320 

318,  319 

189 

514 


e  to  Sections.] 
State  v.  Rogers,  112  N.  Car.  874 

129,  130 


Rochester,  72  S.  Car. 
Rocker,  138  Iowa  653 
Rocker,  130  Iowa  239 
Rockett,  87  Mo.  666 
Roderick,  77  Ohio  St.  301 

324,  325 
Rodgers  (Mont.,  1909),  106 

Pac.  3  118 

Rodman,  62  Iowa  456  79,  118 
Rodriguez,  115  La.  1004 

220,  221,  329 
Roger,  56  Kan.  362  15 

Rogers,  108  ]\Io.  202  236,  394 
Rogers,  135  Mo.  App.  695  349 
Rogers,  31  Mont,  i  245 

Rogers,  79  N.  Car.  609  524 


v.  Rogers,  119  N.  Car.  793 
v.  Rogoway,  45  Ore.  601 
V.  Rohn,  140  Iowa  640 
v.  Rohrer,  34  Kan.  427 
V.  Rollins,  113  N.  Car.  722 

23,  324,  330 
V.  Romaine,  58  Iowa  46  525,  526 
V.  Romero,  117  La.  1003  245,  342 
V.  Ronk,  91  ]\Iinn.  419  233,  324 

V.  Rorbacher,  19  Iowa  154 
V.  Rosa,  71  X.  J.  L.  316 
V.  Rose,  47  Minn.  47 
V.  Rosier,  55  Iowa  517 
V.  Ross,  77  Kan.  341 
V.  Ross  (Ore.,  1909),  104  Pac. 

596 
V.  Roswell,  6  Conn.  446 
V.  Roten,  86  N.  Car.  701 
V.  Rounds,  76  Me.  123 
V.  Rover,  13  Nev.  17 
V.  Row,  81  Iowa  138 
V.  Rowell,  75  S.  Car.  494 
V.  Rowland,  94  Ala.  76 
V.  Rowland,  72  Iowa  327 
V.  Royce,  38  Wash,  in 
V.  Rozeboom      (Iowa,      1910) 

124  N.  W.  783 
V.  Ruby,  61  Iowa  86 
V.  Ruck,  194  Mo.  416 
V.  Rucker,  93  Mo.  88 
V.  Rugan,  5  Mo.  App.  592 
V.  Rugero,  117  La.  1040 
V.  Ruhl,  8  Iowa  447 
V.  Rush,  95  ]\Io.  199 
V.  Russell,  90  Iowa  569 
V.  Russell,  33  La.  Ann.  135 
V.  Russell,  13  Mont.  164 
V.  Russell,  45  N.  H.  83  489 

V.  Ruth,  14  Mo.  App.  140  37 

V.  Ruthven,  58  Iowa  121  458 

V.  Rutledge,  135  Iowa  581 

221,  330a 
v.  Rutledge,  37  Wash.  523  54,  468 
V.  Ryder,  80  Vt.  422 

6,  41a,  93,  94,  95 
v.  Ryno,  68  Kan.  348  427,  429 

V.  Sales,  2  Nev.  268  450 

V.  Salge,  2  Nev.  321  196 


523 
147 
204 

522 


121 
248 
276 

68 

221 

284 

403,   404 

484 

12 

133 
46 
61 

153 

152 
58a 

293 
118 

54,  138,  314 
426 
236 
129 

343 
140 

383 

73 

103,  104 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxliii 


State 


[Refercttccs  a) 

V.  Sammuels  (Del.),  67  Atl. 

164  6,  18,  23 

Samuel,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.   (X. 

Car.)   177  189 

Sanders,  30  Iowa  582  404 

Sanders,  68  AIo.  202  228,  230 
Sanders,  76  Mo.  35  120 

Sanders,  106  JNIo.  188 

36,  58,  152,  355 
Sanders,  14  X.  Dak.  203  358 
Sanders,  75  S.  Car.  409  337,  374 
Sanford,  124  ;Mo.  484  413 

Sargood,  77  Vt.  80  188 

Sargood,  80  Vt.  412 

90,  467,  517 
Sarlls,  135  Ind.   195  284 

Sarvis,  45  S.  Car.  668  366 

Sassaman,  214  ^lo.  695 

237,  276,  321 
Sauer,  38  Minn.  438  12 

Sauer,  42  ]\Iinn.  258  246 

Saunders,  68  Iowa  370  89,  425 
Saunders,  14  Ore.  300  61 

Savant,  115  La.  226  343 

Sawtelle,  66  X.  H.  488  182,  205 
Scaduto,  74  X".  J.  L.  289  326 

Schaefer,  116  Mo.  96  157 

Schaffer,  70  Iowa  371  119a,  301 
Schaffer,  74  Iowa  704  482 

Scheve,  65  Xeb.  853  17 

Schingen,  20  Wis.  74  281 

Schleagel,  50  Kan.  325  76 

Schlemn,    4    Harr.     (Del.) 

577  499 

Schmidt,  73  Iowa  469  103 

Schmidt,  61  Kan.  862  58a 

Schmidt,  136  AIo.  644  133 

Schnettler,  181  Mo.  173  454 

Schoenwald,  31  Mo.  147  14 
Schuerman,  70  ]\Io.  App.  518   32 

Schuyler,  75  X.  J.  L.  487  329 

Schweitzer,  57  Conn.  532  23 

Scott,  I  Kan.  App.  748  195 

Scott,  49  La.  Ann.  253    157,  158 

Scott,  45  Mo.  302  429 

Scott,  28  Ore.  331  382 

Scripture,  42  X.  H.  485  373 

Scroggs,  123  Iowa  649  342 
Seagler,  i   Rich.    (S.  Car.) 

30  293 


e  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Sears,  86  Mo.  169  354 

V.  Sears,  Phil.  (X.  Car.)  146  309 
V.  Sebastian,  215  Mo.  58  237,  521 
V.  Sechrist    (Mo.,    1910),    126 

S.  W.  400  418 

V.  Sederstrom,  99  ^linn.  234  235 
V.   Seeley,  51  Ore.   131  489 

V.  Seene}^  5  Penn.  (Del.)   142   282 


447 
263 
438 
473 
309 

193,  374 
227 

97,  374 


V.  Seery,  95  Iowa  652 
V.  Sejours,  113  La.  676 
V.  Seligman,  127  Iowa  415 
V.  Sellner,  17  Mo.  i\pp.  39 
V.  Semotan,  85  Iowa  57 
V.  Senn,  32  S.  Car.  392 

132 
V.  Severson,  78  Iowa  653 
V.  Sexton,  147  Mo.  89 
V.  Seymour,  94  Iowa  699 

90,  312,  333 
V.  Seymour,  36  Me.  225  371 

V.  Shaeffer,  89  Mo.  271  441,  445 
V.  Shafer,  22  ]\Iont.  17  324,  330 
V.  Shafifner,    2    Penn.     (Del.) 

171  361,  364 

V.  Shannehan,  22  Iowa  435  271 

V.  Shapiro    (Mo.),   115   S.  W. 

1022  69 

V.  Sharkey,  73  N.  J.  L.  491  404 
V.  Sharp,  132  Mo.  165  387,  392 

V.  Sharp,  183  Mo.  715 
V.  Sharpless,  212  Mo.  176 
6, 
V.  Shean,  32  Iowa  88 
V.  Shelters,  51  Vt.  102 
V.  Shelton  (Mo.,  1909),  122  S. 

W.  732 
V.  Shelton,  2  Jones  (X.  Car.) 

360  106,  109 

V.  Shepard,  7  Conn.  54  417 

V.  Sherburne,  59  N.  H.  69  446 

V.  Sheridan,  121  Iowa  164  58a 

V.  Sherman,  35  Mont.  512  126 

V.  Sherouk,  78  Conn.  718 

47,  48,  3^5 
V.  Sherwood,  90  Iowa  550  424 

V.  Shettleworth,  18  Minn.  208  409 
V.  Shields,  45  Conn.  256  407,  416 
V.  Shinborn,  46  X.  PI.  497  429 

V.  Shines,  T25  N.  Car.  730  14 

V.  Shipley,  174  Mo.  512         68,  iig 


242 

S8a,  428 

19,  393 

422 


71 


cxliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


l6l, 


[References  ar 

State  V.  Shockley,  29  Utah  25      87,  88 
V.  Shoemaker,  62  Iowa  343 

523,  526 
V.  Short      (Del.     Gen. 
1909),  75  Atl.  787 
V.  Shoiir,  196  Mo.  202 
V.  Shouse,  188  Mo.  473 
V.  Shreve,  137  Mo.  i 
V.  Shuff,  9  Idaho  115 
V.  Shu  ford,  69  N.  Car.  486 
V.  Shiiman,  loi  Me.  158 
V.  Sibley,  131  Mo.  519  388, 

V.  Sienkiewiez,  4  Penn.  (Del.), 

59 
V.  Silva,  130  Mo.  440 
V.  Simes,  12  Idaho  310 
V.  Simmons,  3  Ala.  497 
V.  Simmons,  78  Kan.  852 
V.  Simmons,  143  N.  Car.  613 
V.  Simmons,  52  Wash.  132 
V.  Simon,  71  N.  J.  L.  142 
V.  Simons,  17  N.  H.  ?-t, 
V.  Simpson,     2     Hawks      (N. 

Car.)  460 
V.  Skidmore,  87  N.  Car.  509 
V.  Skillman,  76  N.  J.  L.  464 
V.  Skinner    (Nev.,    1909),    104 

Pac.  223 
V.  Skinner,  29  Qre.  599 
V.  Slagle,  82  N.  Car.  653 
V.  Slagle,  83  N.  Car.  630 
V.  Slamon,  y^  Vt.  212 
V.  Slingerland,  19  Nev.  135 
V.  Sloan,  55  Iowa  217 

15,  185,  400,  406 
V.  Small,  26  Kan.  209  36,  213,  288 
V.  Small.  49  Ore.  595  461 

V.  Smalley,  50  Vt.  736  89 

V.  Smalls,  72,  S.  Car.  516  82,  314 
V.  Smith,  5  Day  (Conn.)  175  432 
V.  Smith,  49  Conn.  376 

i6a,  167,  22,2, 
V.  Smith,  65  Conn.  283  17 

V.  Smith,  5  Penn.  (Del.)  i  184,  188 
V.  Smith,  9  Houst.   (Del.)   588 

80,  133 
V.  Smith,  54  Iowa  104  525 

V.  Smith,  99  Iowa  26  180,  345 

V.  Smith,  106  Iowa  701  221 

V.  Smith,  129  Iowa  709        512,  515 


Sess., 

378 

41a,  298 

81 

26 

276 

87 
281 

394 

282 
28s 
202,  213 

359 
60,  261 

484 
429 

73, 
24a 

307 
338 
429 

338 
295 
344 
318 
58 
6,  58 


e  to  Sections.'] 
State  V.  Smith,  30  La.  Ann.  457 

122,  123 


46 
103 
314 
157 
528 
421 
119 
360 
358 

129 

188 
469 


V.  Smith,  38  La.  Ann.  301 

V.  Smith,  48  La.  Ann.  533 

V.  Smith,  32  Me.  369 

V.  Smith,  53  Me.  267 

V.  Smith,  47  Minn.  475 

V.  Smith,  31  Mo.  120 

V.  Smith,  114  Mo.  406 

V.  Smith,  137  Mo.  25 

V.  Smith,  174  Mo.  586 

V.  Smith    (N.  Car.),  50  S.  E. 

859 
V.  Smith,    2    Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

402 
V.  Smith,  119  N.  Car.  856 
V.  Smith,  138  N.  Car.  700    174,  175 
V.  Smith     (Ore.,     1909),     106 

Pac.  797  493 

V.  Smith,  II  Ore.  205  446 

V.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  22  228,  275 

V.  Smith,    8    Rich.    (S.    Car.) 

460  269 

V.  Smith,    12  Rich.    (S.   Car.) 

430  325 

V.  Smith,  18  S.  Dak.  341  413,  418 
V.  Smith,  8  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  150  430 
V.  Sneed,  88  Mo.  138  loi,  331 

V.  Snell,  46  Wash.  2^7  156 

V.  Snure,  29  Minn.  132  525 

V.  Snyder,  137  Iowa  600        17,  115 
V.  Snyder,  67  Kan.  801 
V.  Snyder,  44  Mo.  App.  429 
V.  Somerville,  21  Me.  14 
V.  Sommers,  60  Minn.  90 
V.  Soper,  16  Me.  293 

117,  137,  160,  163, 
V.  Soper,  148  Mo.  217  \i 

V.  Sopher,  70  Iowa  494 
V.  Sortor,  52  Kan.  531 
V.  Sortviet,  lOO  ]\Iinn.  12  387,  390 
V.  Southern,  48  La.  Ann.  628  215 
V.  Sowell    (S.    Car.    1910),   67 

S.  E.  316 
V.  Squires,  i  Tyler  (Vt.)   147 
V.  Spalding,  19  Conn.  233 
V.  Sparks,  78  Ind.  166 
V.  Sparks,  79  Neb.  504 
V.  Spary,  174  Mo.  569 


220 

294 
196 

171 

133 
129 

235 


Z72 
176 
432 
463 
438 
2S^ 


V.  Spaugh,  199  Mo.  147   312,  356 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


[References  ar 

State  V.  Spaugh,  200  ^lo.  571 

90,  120,  138 
V.  Spaulding,  61  Vt.  505  514 

V.  Spell,  38  La.  Ann.  20  326 

V.  Speller,  86  N.  Car.  697  48S 

V.  Spencer,  73  Minn.  loi  533 

V.  Spencer,  21  X.  J.  L.  196  154,  159 
V.  Spencer,  10  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

431  196 

V.  Spencer,  15  Utah  149  74 

V.  Speyer,  194  Mo.  459  119a 

V.  Speyer,  207  Mo.  540  157,  160 
V.  Spillman,  43  La.  Ann.  looi  269 
V.  Spivey    (N.  Car.,   1909),  65 

S.  E.  995  374a 

V.  Spotted  Hawk,  22  jMont.  33  69 
V.  Sprague,  149  Mo.  409  73,  299 
V.  Sprague,  64  N.  J.  L.  419  83 

V.  Stackhouse,  24  Kan.  445  333 
V.  Stafford    (Iowa,   1909),   123 

N.  W.  167  173 

V.  Stair,  87  Mo.  268  429 

V.  Staley,  14  Minn.  105  I35 

V.  Stallings,  142  Ala.  112  127 

V.  Stanley,  64  Me.  157  439 

V.  Stanly,  4  Jones    (N.   Car.) 

290  488 

V.  Staples,  47  N.  H.  113  262 

V.  Stark,  202  Mo.  210  423 

V.  Stark,  i   Strobh.    (S.  Car.) 

479  160 

V.  Starling,  6  Jones  (N.  Car.) 

366  157 

V.  Starnes,  97  X.  Car.  423  522 

V.  Staton,  114  X.  Car.  813  77 

V.  Stebbins,  29  Conn.  463 

55,  72,  228 
V.  Steen,  125  Iowa  307  482 

V.  Steeves,  29  Ore.  85  240 

V.  Steidley,  135  Iowa  512  160 

V.  Steifel,  106  Mo.  129  71 

V.  Stentz,  33  Wash.  444  1 18 

V.  Stephens,  71  Mo.  535  144 

V.  Sterrett,  68  Iowa  76  85 

V.  Stevens,  56  Kan.  720  415 

V.  Stevenson,  91  Me.  107  281 

V.  Stevenson,  68  Vt.  529  347 

V.  Stewart  (Del.),  67  Atl.  786 

73,  80,  81,  277 
v.  Stewart,  52  Iowa  284      115,  349 
X — Underbill  Crim.  Evidence. 


e  to  Sections.] 
State    v.    Stewart,    34    La.    Ann. 

1037  263 

V.  Stewart,  47  La.  Ann.  410  324 

V.  Stibbens,  188  I\Io.  387      126,  129 

V.  Stickley,  41  Iowa  232  157 

V.  Stickney,  53  Kan.  308  522 

V.  Still,  68  S.  Car.  37  3^3 

V.  Stines,  138  N.  Car.  686  409 
V.  Stock  ford,  77  Conn.  227 

490,  492 

V.  Stolley,  121  Iowa  11 1  387 

V.  Stone,  40  Iowa  457  285 

v.  Stone,  74  Kan.  189  413 

V.  Stone,  106  Mo.  i  339 

V.  Storkey,  63  X.  Car.  7  408 

v.  Storms,  113  Iowa  385  127 

V.  Storts,  138  Mo.  127  295 

V.  Stotts,  26  Mo.  307  70 

V.  Stout,  71  Iowa  343  382 

V.  Stout,  49  Ohio  St.  270  885 

V.  Stoyell,  54  Me.  24  343 

V.  Strait,  94  IMinn.  384  58a 
V.  Stratford,  149  X.  Car.  483 

323,  328 

V.  Strattman,  100  Mo.  540  394 

V.  Streeter,  20  X^ev.  403  397 
V.  Stroll,    I    Rich.     (S.    Car.) 

244  433 

V.  Strong,  85  Ark.  536  320 

V.  Strong,  153  Mo.  548  119 

V.  Strother  (S.  Car.,  1909),  66 

S.  E.  877  338 

V.  Struble,  71  Iowa  11  54 

V.  Stubbs,  108  X^.  Car.  774  381 

V.  Stukes.  73  S.  Car.  386  61,  221 
V.  Sudduth,  52  S.  Car.  488 

409,  413,  417 
V.  Sudduth,  74  S.  Car.  498  124 

V.  Suggs,  89  X.  Car.  527  122,  133 
V.  Sullivan,  51  Iowa  142  112,  320 
V.  Sullivan,  no  Mo.  App.  75  451 
V.  Sullivan,  43  S.  Car.  205  312,  326 
V.  Sullivan,  68  Vt.  540  408 

V.  Summers,  141  X^.  C.  841  282 

V.  Sumner,  2  Ind.  377  310 

V.  Sumner,  5   Strobh.  (S.  Car.) 

53  488 

v.  Sutherland,  30  Iowa  570 

392,  393 
V.  Sutton,  147  Ind.  158  467 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
State  V.  Swafford,  98  Iowa  362       467 
V.  Swaim,  97  N.  Car.  462  468 

V.  Swain,  68  Mo.  605  80 

V.  Sweizewski.  y^  Kan.  723  6 

V.  Swift,  57  Conn.  496      119a,  154 
V.  Swift,  69  Ind.  505  455 

V.  Symens,  138  Iowa  113      409,  412 
V.  Sysinger    (S.    Dak.,    1910), 

125  N.  W.  879  415 

V.  Talbert,  41  S.  Car.  526     41,  330 
V.  Talbott,  73  Mo.  347  222 

V.  Tall,  43  Minn.  273 

64,  212,  23s,  245,  247,  519 
V.  Talley,  77  S.  Car.  99  89 

V.  Talmadge,  107  Mo.  543     12,  124 
V.  Tarlton   (S.   Dak.),   118  N. 

W.  706  307,  308 

Tarter,  26  Ore.  38  58 

Tatman,  59  Iowa  471  68 

Tatro,  so  Vt.  483  140 

Taylor,  140  Iowa  470  358 

Taylor,  20  Kan.  643  353 

Taylor,  36  Kan.  329  131 

Taylor  (Miss.,  1898),  23  So. 

34  195 

Taylor,  117  Mo.  181  245 

Taylor,  118  Mo.  153  120 

Taylor,  134  Mo.  109 

IS,  s8,  68,  119,  152 
Taylor,  136  Mo.  66  238,  293,  377 
Taylor,  202  Mo.  i  468 

Taylor,  s8  N.  H.  331  380 

Taylor  (N.  Car.),  508  261 

Taylor,  3   Brev.    (S.  Car.) 

243  483 

Taylor,  70  Vt.  I  118,  122 

Taylor,  57  W.  Va.  228 

67,  27s,  277 
Teachey,  134  N.  Car.  6s6  241 
Teachey,  138  N.  Car.  587 

106,  270,  338 
Teasdale,  120  Mo.  App.  692  60 
Teeter,  69  Iowa  717  371 

Tennison,  42  Kan.  330  67 

Terrell,  12  Rich.   (S.  Car.) 

321  106,  III,  318 

Terrio,  98  Me.  17  6 

Terry,  106  Mo.  209  394 

Tessier,  32  La,  Ann.  1227      442 
Testerman,  68  Mo.  408     88,  321 


49 


324 
493 
395 
125,  152 
36 
326 


242 
419 


268 

21 

228 

318 


e  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Thaden,  43  Minn.  32s   71,  247 
V.  Thatcher,  3s  N.  J.  L.  445 

437,  442 
V.  Thawley,    4    Harr.     (Del.) 

562 
V.  Thibeau,  30  Vt.  100 
V.  Thomas,  53  Iowa  214 
V.  Thomas,  135  Iowa  717 
V.  Thomas,  58  Kan.  805 
V.  Thomas,  in  La.  804 
V.  Thomason,     i     Jones     (N. 

Car.)  274 
V.  Thompson,  19  Iowa  299 
V.  Thompson,  127  Iowa  440 

78,  237,  328 
V.  Thompson,  134  Iowa  25  381 

V.  Thompson,  47  La.  Ann.  IS97    73 
V.  Thompson,  121  La.  1051 
V.  Thompson,  8s  Me.  189 
V.  Thompson,  83  Mo.  2S7 
V.  Thompson,  132  Mo.  301 
V.  Thompson,  141  Mo.  408 

269,  319 
V.  Thompson,  49  Ore.  46  104,  324 
V.  Thompson,  68  S.  Car.  133  224 
V.  Thompson,  14  Wash.  285  41S 
V.  Thornton,  49  La.  Ann.  1007  250 
V.  Thrailkill,  71  S.  Car.  136  276 
V.  Thrailkill,  73  S.  Car.  314 

323,  336 
V.  Thurtell,  29  Neb.  148  78 

V.  Tice,  90  Mo.  112  21 

V.  Tice,  30  Ore.  4S7  493 

V.  Tieman,  32  Wash.  294  523 

V.  Tilghman    (Del.),    63    Atl. 

772  6,  147a,  320 

V.  Tilghman,     ll     Ired.      (N. 

Car.)   5 13  104,  105 

V.  Tilly,  3  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  424  324 
V.  Tilman,  30  La.  Ann.  1249  4o8 
V.  Timberlake,  50  La.  Ann.  308 

262,  268,  269 
V.  Timmens,  4  Minn.  32s  390,  392 
V.  Tindal,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  488  432 
V.  Tippet,  94  Iowa  646  315 

V.  Tipton,  I  Blackf.  (Ind.)  166  461 
V.  Tipton,  15  Mont.  74  S33 

V.  Tompkins,  32  La.  Ann.  620 

284.  287 
V.  Tompkins,  71  Mo.  613     228,  429 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cxlvii 


State 


[References  ar 
V.  Toohey,  203  Mo.  674  299,  378 
Tosney,  26  Minn.  262        35,  248 
Tough,  12  N.  Dak.  425  59 

Townsend,  66  Iowa  741 

280a,  320 
Trail,  59  W.  Va.  175  6 

Trolson,  21  Nev.  419  282 

Trounce,  5  Wash.  St.  804      257 
Trove,  i  Ind.  App.  553  279 

Trumbull,  4  N.  J.  L.  139 

257,  461 
Trust}%  I  Penn.   (Del.)  319 

96,  no,  129,  312 
Trusty,  122  Iowa  82  342,  415 
Tucker,  20  Iowa  508 
Tucker,  72  Kan.  481 
Tull,  119  Mo.  421 
Tully,  31  Mont.  365 
Turlej%  3  Humph.   (Tenn.) 

323 
Turlington,  102  Mo.  642 

103,  105,  248,  269 
Turner,  i  Hous.  (Del.)  76  418 
Turner,  122  La.  371  140,  522 
Turner,  106  Mo.  272  371 

Turner,  no  Mo.  196  62 

Turner,  119  N.  Car.  841    74,  286 
Turner,  31  S.  Car.  534  81 

Turner,  36  S.  Car.  534 

214,  236,  238,  242 
Turpin,  yy  N.  Car.  473  325,  326 
Tweedy,  11  Iowa  350  112 

Twitty,  2  Hawks  (N.  Car.) 


26 

269,  343 

420 

21 


32 


423 
6,  12 

2,72, 

522 

404 

68 

69,  70 


Tyre  (Del.),  67  Atl.  199 
Tyrrell,  98  Mo.  354 
Tyson,  56  Kan.  686 
Ullruch,  no  Mo.  350 
Ulsemer,  24  Wash.  657 
Umble,  115  Mo.  452 
Underwood,  44  La.  Ann.  852   62 
Underwood,  76  Mo.  630  270 

Upham,  38  Me.  261  y6,  78 

Urie,  loi  Iowa  411  417 

Usher,  136  Iowa  606  56,  312 

Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 

391  132,  138 

Valentina,  71  N.  J.  L.  552  276 
Vallery,  47  La.  Ann.  182  330 
Valwell,  66  Vt.  558  88,  89 


e  to  Sections.^ 
State  V.  Van  Auken, 


Iowa  674 

419.  430 

Vandemark,  yy  Conn.  201  470 

Vandiver,  149  Mo.  502  61 

Vandimark,  35  Ark.  396  439 
Vanella   (Mont.,   1909),   ro6 

Pac.  364  2,22, 

Van  Kuran,  25  Utah  8  80 

Vansant,  80  Mo.  67    12,  102,  in 

Van  Tassel,  103  Iowa  6  58a 

Van  Vliet,  92  Iowa  476  237 

Van  Winkle,  80  Iowa  15  247 

Vari,  35  S.  Car.  175  225 

Vatter,  71  Iowa  557  369 

V.  Vaughan,  81  Ark.   117  471 

V.  Vaughan,  136  Mo.  App.  635  185 

V.  Vaughan,  199  Mo.  108  358 

V.  Vaughan,  200  Mo.  i        321,  492 

V.  Vaughan,  22  Nev.  285     103,  326 
V.  Vaughan,  i   Bay    (S.  Car.) 

282  436 

V.  Vedder,  98  N.  Y.  630  345 
V.  Veillon  (La.,  1897),  21  So. 

856  269 

V.  Velarde,  59  Cal.  457  299 

V.  Venable,  \\y  Mo.  App.  501  485 

V.  Vickers,  47  La.  Ann.  1574  242 

V.  Vickers,  209  Mo.  12  223 
V.  Vierck  (S.  Dak.,  1909),  120 

N.  W.  1098  378 

V.  Vincent,  24  Iowa  570      100,  330 

V.  Vineyard,  16  Mont.  138  427 

V.  Vinson,  63  N.  Car.  335  305 
V.  Vinton   (Mo.,  1909),  119  S. 

W.  370  301 

V.  Vollander,  57  Minn.  225  383 
V.  VonKutzleben,  126  Iowa  89 

126,  162,  268 

V.  Voorhies,  115  La.  200  312 

V.  Wacker,  16  Mo.  App.  417  35 

V.  Wagner,  61  Me.  178  21 

V.  Wait,  44  Kan.  310  365 

V.  Walke,  69  Kan.  183  413 

V.  Walker,  124  Iowa  414    491,  493 

V.  Walker,  133  Iowa  489  212 
V.  Walker,  yy  Me.  488 

94,  95,  97,  100 

V.  Walker,  69  Mo.  274  270 
V.  Walker,  78  Mo.  380 

94,  loi,  122 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  a. 
State  V.  Walker,  98  Mo.  95  68,  70,  71 
V.  Walker,  129  Mo.  App.  371        42 
V.  Walker,  145  N.  Car.  567 

Z23,  338 
V.  Walker,  149  N.  Car.  527  2y6 
V.  Wallace,  9  N.  H.  515  92 

V.  Waller,  88  Mo.  402  314 

V.  Wallick,  87  Iowa  369  285 

V.  Walls,  4  Penn.  (Del.)  408  12 
V.  Walsh,  44  La.  Ann.  1122  61 

V.  Walsh  (S.  Dak.,  1910),  125 

N.  W.  295  382 

V.  Walters,  6  Jones  (N.  Car.) 

276  310 

V.  Walton,  92  Iowa  455  112 

V.  Walton,  114  N.  Car.  783 

90,  437,  438 
V.  Walton,  53  Ore.  557  265 

V.  Ward.  72,  Iowa  532  81,  4x7,  418 
V.  Ward,  19  Nev.  297  276,  494 

V.  Ward,  103  N.  Car.  419 

119a,  371 
V.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153  117,  121, 

148,  152,  153,  225,  368 
V.  Warford,  106  Mo.  55  273 

V.  Warner,  74  Mo.  83  279 

V.  Warren    (Idaho,  1910),  107 

Pac.  993  121 

V.  Warren,  57  Mo.  App.  502  488 
V.  Warren,  109  Mo.  430  430 

V.  Washelesky      (Conn.),      70 

Atl.  62  i6a 

V.  Washing,  36  Wash.  485  127 

V.  Washington,    36    La.    Ann. 

341  517 

V.  Washington,    40    La.    Ann. 

669  130 

V.  Waterbury,  133  Iowa  135  431 
V.  Waterman,  87  Iowa  255 

197,  198 
V.  Waterman,  75  Kan.  253 

388,  390,  39  T 
V.  Watkins,  9  Conn.  47  90 

V.  Watson,  81  Iowa  380  412 

V.  Watson,  30  Kan.  281  347 

V.  Watson,  2^  La.  Ann.  148  225 
V.  Watson,  47  Ore.  543  366,  370 
V.  Watts,  48  Ark.  56  307 

V.  Way,  5  Neb.  283  381 

V.  Way,  76  S.  Car.  91  95 


re  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Weasel,  30  La.  Ann.  919    492 

V.  Weatherby,  43  Me.  258  383 

V.  Weaver,  57  Iowa  730  123 

V.  Weaver,  165  Mo.  i  67 
V.  Weaver,  13  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

491  419 

V.  Webb,  18  Utah  441  163,  429 

v.  Weems,  96  Iowa  426  221 

v.  Welch,  26  Me.  30  188,  383 

v.  Welch,  79  Me.  99  200 

V.  Welch,  21  Minn.  22  166 

V.  Welch,  32  Ore.  33  55 

V.  Welch,  36  W.  Va.  690  334 

V.  Welch,  27  Wis.  196  447 


V.  Weldon,  39  S.  Car.  318  204,  376 
V.  Wells,  48  Iowa  671  392 

V.  Wells,  III  Mo.  533  12,  58 

V.  Wells,  I  N.  J.  L.  424  133 

V.  Wells     (Utah,     1909),     100 

Pac.  681  347 

V.  Welsh,  29  S.  Car.  4  23 

V.  Wentworth,  65  Me.  234  60,  247 
V.  Wentworth,  37  N.  H.  196  140 
V.  Wenz,  41  Minn.  196  386.  393 
V.  Werner,  16  N.  Dak.  83  410 

V.  Wesie    (N.    Dak.),    118    N. 

W.  20  382 

V.  West,   I   Houst.   Cr.    (Del.) 

371  154 

V.  West,  43  La.  Ann.  1006  82 

V.  West,  120  La.  747  323 

V.  West.  69  Mo.  401  6,  26 

V.  Westcott,  130  Iowa  i 

7,  126,  129,  135 
V.  Westfall,  49  Iowa  328  106 

V.  Whalen,  98  Mo.  222  465 

V.  Wheat,  in  La.  860  261,  262 
V.  Wheaton,  79  Kan.  521  37 

V.  Whedbee    (N.    Car.,    1910), 

67  S.  E.  60  435 

V.  Wheeler,  19  Minn.  98  430 

V.  Wheeler,  94  Mo.  252  392 

V.  Wheeler,  108  Mo.  658  39^ 

V.  Whimpey,  140  Iowa  199  407 

V.  Whisenhurst,  2  Hawks   (X. 

Car.)  458  200 

V.  Whitbeck  (Iowa,  1909),  123 

N.  W.  982  48.  320.  222 

V.  White,    7    Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

180  365 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlix 


State 


[References  ai 
V.  White,  89  N.  Car.  462        305 


White,'  48  Ore.  416            70,  492 

White,  8  Wash.  230  196 

White,  10  Wash.  6ri  58 

White,  40  Wash.  560  499 

Whitesell,  142  Mo.  467  418 

Whitfield,  109  N.  Car.  876  129 
Whitley,  141  N.  Car.  823 

387,  388,  392 

Whitmer,  yj  Iowa  557  522 

Whitne}',  38  La.  Ann.  579  41 
Whitson,  III  N.  Car.  695 

112,  119,  320 

Whittier,  21  Me.  341  205 

Whitworth.  126  Mo.  573  225 
Wideman,  68  S.  Car.  119 


117, 


374 

53 

73 

439 

414 


Wieners,  66  Mo.  13 
Wigger,  196  Mo.  90 
Wilbourne,  87  N.  Car.  529 
Wilcox,  III  Mo.  569 
Wilcox,  132  X.  Car.  1120 

66,  119,  276,  312,  323 
Wilcox,  21  S.  Dak.  532 

250,  272 
Wilcox,    3    Yerg.     (Tenn.) 

278  310 

Wilhite,  132  Iowa  226  21 

Wilkes,  82  S.  Car.  163  377 

Wilkins,  66  Vt.  i      119,  150,  411 
Wilkinson,  121  Mo.  485  343 

Wilks,  58  Rio.  App.  159  300 

Williams,  103  Ind.  235  442 

Williams,  20  Iowa  98  402 

Williams,  66  Iowa  573    116,  422 
Williams,  122  Iowa  115  338 

Williams,  74  Kan.  180  362 

Williams,  11 1  La.  179 

87,  201,  220,  223 
Williams,  120  La.  175  374 

Williams,  76  Me.  480  88,  92 

Williams,  72  Miss.  992  486 

Williams,  95  Mo.  247  292 

Williams,  136  Mo.  293  450 

Williams,  28  Nev.  395  112 

Williams,  30  N.  J.  L.  102        482 
Williams    (N.    Car.,    1909), 

65  S.  E.  908  195 

Williams,  7  Jones  (X.  Car.) 

446  7 


e  to  Sections.] 
State  V.  Williams,  67  X^.  Car.  12      108 
V.  Williams,  46  Ore.  287  312 

V.  Williams,  2  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 

418  423 

V.  Williams,  76  S.  Car.  135  272 
V.  Williams,  27  Vt.  724  116 

V.  Williamson,  42  Conn.  261  75 
V.  Williamson,  106  Mo.  162 

88,  147a,  161,  321 
V.  Willi  ford,  ill  Mo.  App.  668  450 
V.  Willingham,    23    La.    Ann. 

537  220 

V.  Willis.  71  Conn.  293  130,  138 
V.  Willis,  79  Iowa  326  250 

V.  Willis,  63  X^.  Car.  26  320 

V.  Wills    (Minn.,  1897),  73  N. 

W.  177  419 

V.  Wills,  106  Mo.  App.  196  118 

V.  Wilner,  40  Wis.  304  156 

V.  Wilson,  22  Iowa  364  380 

V.  Wilson,  95  Iowa  341  299,  301 
V.  Wilson,  124  Iowa  264  482 

V.  Wilson,  24  Kan.  186  104,  112 
V.  Wilson,  62  Kan.  621  279 

V.  Wilson,  23  La.  Ann.  558  106 

V.  Wilson,  40  La.  Ann.  751  228 
V.  Wilson,  39  Mo.  App.  114 

24,  115 
V.  Wilson  CMo.,  1909),  122  S. 

W.  671  48 

V.  Wilson,  121  Mo.  434  103 

V.  Wilson,  130  Mo.  App.  151  17 
V.  Wilson,  137  Mo.  592  378 

V.  Wilson,  31  X.  J.  L.  77  188 

V.  Wilson,  5  R.  I.  291  49 

V.  Wilson,  80  Vt.  249  458 

V.  Wilson,  9  Wash.  218  24a 

V.  Wimbnsh,  9  S.  Car.  309  447 
V.  Winchester,  113  X.  Car.  641  279 
V.  Windahl,  95  Iowa  470  312,  330 
V.  Wingfield,  34  La.  Ann.  1200  119 
V.  Wingo,  89  Ind.  204  293 

V.  Wingo,  66  Mo.  181  23,  154,  338 
V.  Winner,  17  Kan.  298  494 

V.  Winston,  116  X.  Car.  990  138 
V.  Winter,  83  S.  Car.  153  301 

V.  Wintzingerode,  9  Ore.  153  130 
V.  Wisdom.  84  Mo.  177  276.  486 
V.  Wisnewski,  13  X.  Dak.  649  67 
V.  Wister,  62  Mo.  592  197 


fil 


TAELE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


State  V.  Witt,  34  Kan.  488  12,  15,  316 
V.  Witham,  72  Me.  531  55,  60,  381 
V.  Wolcott,  21  Conn.  272  25,  26 
V.  Wolf  (Del.),  66  Atl.  739 

17,  291a,  293 
V.  Wolfley,  75  Kan.  406  297 

V.  Wood    (La.,   1909),  48  So. 

438  130 

V.  Wood,  124  Mo.  412  193 

V.  Wood,  S3  N.  H.  484        192,  350 
V.  Wood,  53  Vt.  560  107,  109 

V.  Woodard,  132  Iowa  675  319 

V.  Woodfin,  5  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

199  460 

V.  Woodfin,  87  N.  Car.  526         485 
V.  Woodrow,  56  Kan.  217  421 

V.  Woodruff,  67  N.  Car.  89 

53,  52s 
V.  Woods,  49  Kan.  237  39 

V.  Woodward,  34  Me.  293  24 

V.  Woodward,  95  Mo.  129  522 

V.  Woodward,  131  Mo.  369         358 
V.  Woodward,  182  Mo.  391 

269.  450 
V.  Woody,  2  Jones   (N.  Car.) 

335  488 

V.  Woolard,  iii  Mo.  248  152 

V.  Wooley   (Mo.),   115  S.  W. 

417  6 

V.  Wooley,  215  Mo.  620  184 

V.  Woolridge,  45  Ore.  389  470 

V.  Workman,  15  S.  Car.  540 

130,  185 
V.  Workman,  39  S.  Car.  151  522 
V.  Workman,  35  W.  Va.  367  485 
V.  Worthen,  124  Iowa  408  122,  129 
V.  Worthingham,  23  Minn.  528  526 
V.  Worthington,    64    N.    Car. 

594  147a 

V.  Wray,  109  Mo.  594  408 

V.  Wren,  121  La.  55  221 

V.  Wright  (Del.,  1907), 66  Atl, 

364  377 

V.  Wright,  70  Iowa  152  261 

V.  Wright,  41  La.  Ann.  600 

185,  188 
V.  Wright,  48  La.  Ann.  1525  117 
V.  Wright,  53  Me.  328  275 

V.  Wright,  134  Mo.  404 

23,  157,  163 


State  V.  Wright,  141  Mo.  333  327 

V.  Wright,  25  Neb.  38  408 

V.  Wright,  81  Vt.  281  464 

V.  Wyatt,  124  Mo.  537  358 

V.  Wyse,  33  S.  Car.  582 

246,  268,  326 
V.  Yancey,  74  N.  Car.  244  353 

V.  Yates,  132  Iowa  475  338 

V.  Yates,  52  Kan.  566  144 

V.  Yerger,  86  Mo.  33  426 

V.  Yetzer,  97  Iowa  423  250 

V.  Yocum,  117  Mo.  622  412 

V.  York,  37  N.  H.  175  138 

V.  York,  74  N.  H.  125  21 

V.  Young,  96  Iowa  262  482 

V.  Young,  52  La.  Ann.  478  129 

Young,  99  Mo.  284  394 

Young,  105  Mo.  634  214 

Young,  153  Mo.  44S  71 

Zdanowicz,  69  N.  J.  L.  619 

60,  6r 
Zeibart,  40  Iowa  169       320,  446 
Zeilman,  75  N.  J,  L.  357        220 
V.  Zellers,    2    Halst.    (N.    J.) 

220  324 

V.  Zichfield,  23  Nev.  304  401 

V.  Zimmerman,   3    Kan.    App. 

172  220,  222 

V.  Zinn,  26  Mo.  App.  17  309 

V.  Zinn,  61  Mo.  App.  476  277 

V.  Zorn,  202  Mo.  12     104,  no,  324 
V.  Zorn,  22  Ore.  591  166 

Statham  v.  State,  86  Ga.  331    517,  521 
Stavinow   v.   Home   Ins.   Co.,   43 

Mo.  App.  513  218 

Stayton  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  33      245 

Stazey  v.  State,  58  Ind.  514  35 

Steadman  v.  State,  81  Ga.  736        377 

Steele  v.  People,  45  111.  152      269,  432 

V.  State,  83  Ala.  20  82 

V.  State,  33  Fla.  348  326 

V.  State,  76  Miss.  387  60,  132 

Steen  v.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  333 

184,  185 
Stegar  v.   State   (Tex.   Cr.),   105 

S.  W.  789  269 

Steiner  v.  State,  78  Neb.  147  21 

Stephen  v.  State,  11  Ga.  225     147,  409 

Stephens  v.   People,  4   Park.   Cr. 

(N.  Y.)  396  80,  318 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Cli 


[References  are  to  Sections.'] 


Stephens  v.  People,  19  N.  Y.  549  257 

V.  State,  56  Ga.  604  422 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  489  282 

Stephenson  v.  Rannister,  3  Bibb. 

(Ky.),  369  500 

V.  State,  28  Ind.  272  342 

V.  State,  no  Ind.  358  94,  96 

Stepp  V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  349  56 

Stern  v.  State,  53  Ga.  229  476 

Sternaman  v.  Peck,  80  Fed.  883  496 

Stevens  v.  People,  158  111.  in  409 

V.  People,  215  111.  593  350 

V.  State,  138  Ala.  71       95,  129,  268 

V.  State,  50  Kan.  712  247 

V.  State  (Tex.),  38  S.  W.  167  133 

V.  State  (Tex.),  95  S.  W.  505  379 

Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  Vt.  601  243 

V.  State,  69  Ga.  68  330 

Steward  v.  People,  224  111.  434  358 

Stewart  v.  Reid,  118  La.  827  461 

V.  State,  78  Ala.  436  Z2>3 

V.  State,  24  Ind.  142  26 

V.  State,  44  Ind.  2^7  143 

V.  State,  113  Ind.  505  421 

V.  State,  62  Md.  412  296 

V.  State,  22  Ohio  St.  477  79 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  273  220 

Stice,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  51  226 

Sticht  V.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  420  363 

Stiewell  V.  State  (Ark.),  12  S.  W. 

1014  486 

Stitt  V.  State,  91  Ala.  10  23 

Stitz  V.  State,  104  Ind.  359   15,  82,  369 

St.  Louis  V.  Bippen,  201  Mo.  528  481 

V.  Sullivan,  8  Mo.  App.  455  473 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Weaver, 

35  Kan.  412  505 

Stockdale  v.  State,  32  Ga.  225  484 
Stockton   V.    Commonwealth,    125 

Ky.  268  358 
Stoddard  v.  State,  132  Wis.  520 

127,  292 
Stokes  V.  People,  54  N.  Y.  164 

16,  r8,  23,  320,  326 

V,  State,  84  Ga.  258  ^77 
V.  State,  5  Baxt.   (Tenn.)  619 

337,  374 

Stone  V.  State,  105  Ala.  60      140 

V.  State,  50  Fla.  4  77, 

V.  State,  118  Ga.  705  73,  90 


Stone  v.  State,  20  N.  J.  L.  401  428 
V.  State,    4    Humph.    (Tenn.) 

27  87 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  575  482 

v.  White,  55  Fla.  510  220 

Stoner  v.  Devilbiss,  70  Md.  144  223 

Stoppert  V.  Nierle,  45  Neb.  105 

533.  534 
Storms  v.  State,  81  Ark.  25  289 

Storor,  In  re,  6z  Fed.  564  182 

Story  V.  State,  99  Ind.  413  48 

Stout  v.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.   (N. 
Y.)  71  323 

V.  State,  90  Ind.  i  12,  228 

Stovall  v.  State,  9  Baxt.   (Tenn.) 

597  524 

v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  30        95,  312 
Stover  v.  People,  56  N.  Y.  315 

68,  79,  80,  247 

Strait  V.  State,  43  Tex.  486  306 

Strang  v.  People,  24  Mich,  i  418 

V.  State,  2^  Tex.  Cr.  219  423 

Stratton   v.   State    (Tex.),   44   S. 

W.  506  482 

Strauss,  In  re,  126  Fed.  327  497 

v.  State,  58  Miss.  53  269 

Strawhern  v.  State,  27  Miss.  422       70 

Streety  v.  State   (Ala.,   1909),  51 

So.  415  322,  323 

Strickler  v.  Grass,  32  Neb.  811  528 
Stringfellow  v.  State,  26  Miss.  157  147 
Stringfield  v.    State,   4  Ga.   App. 

842  36 

Strobhar  v.  State,  55  Fla.  167  12 

Strong  v.  State,  86  Ind.  208  438 

V.  State,  105  Ind.  i  487 

V.  State,  61  Neb.  35  248 

V.  State,  105  S.  W.  785  475 

Strother  v.  Barr,  5  Bing.  136  44 

v.  State,  74  Miss.  447  485 

Stuart  v.  Binsse,  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y. 

Super.)  436  51 

V.  People,  4  111.  395  460 

V.  People,  42  Mich.  255        149,  378 

Studdy  V.  Sanders,  2  Dowl.  &  R. 

347  ^73,  U4 

Sturgeon  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
37  S.  W.  679  484 

v.  Commonwealth,   31    Ky.    L. 

536  325 


clii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  a 
Sturtevant  v.  Commonwealth,  158 

Mass.  598  507 

Suddeth  v.  State,  112  Ga.  407  277 

Sudduth  V.  State,  70  Miss.  250        485 
Sue  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  122 

48,  221,  326 

Sullivan    v.     Commonwealth,    93 
Pa.  St.  2S4  233 

V.  Jefferson  &c.  Co..  133  ]\Io.  i  239 
V.  Hurley,  147  Mass.  387  528 

V.  People,  6  Colo.  App.  458  33 

V.  People,  108  111.  App.  328  42 

V.  People,  144  111.  24 

35,  36,  58,  247 
V.  State,  loi  Ga.  800  119a 

V.  State,  52  Ind.  309  12 

V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  319 

261,  263,  265,  267 
V.  State,  75  Wis.  650 
V.  State,  100  Wis.  283 

Summerlin  v.  State,  130  Ga.  791 


482 

323 
41a 

Summons  v.  State,  5  Ohio  St.  325    263 
Surber  v.  State,  99  Ind.  71  122 

Surles  V.  State,  89  Ga.  167  243 

Sutfin  V.  People,  43  Mich.  37  523 

Sutherland  v.  State,  121  Ga.  190      103 
Sutherlin  v.  State,  108  Ind.  389 

521,  522 

Sutton  V.  Commonwealth,  97  Ky. 

308  421 

V.  Commonwealth,  85  Va.  128     68 

V.  State,  12  Fla.  135  484 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  659  357 

V.  State,  124  Ga.  815        382 

V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  490  172,  176 

Swaim  v.  Humphreys,  42  111.  App. 

370  174 

Swalley  v.  People,  116  111.  247  198 

Swan  V.   State   (Tex.),  76  S.  W. 

464  268 

Swang  V.  State,  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 

212  144 

Swartz  V.  State,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Dec. 

43  402 

Swearingen  v.  United  States,  161 

u.  s.  446  478 

Sweat  V.  Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 
L.  1067  468 

V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  617  32 


e  to  Sections.] 

Sweatt  V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  194 

66,  237 

V.  State,  153  Ala.  70  89 

Sweet  V.  Sherman,  21  Vt.  23  528 

V.  State,  75  Neb.  263         6,  80,  213 

Swinger  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  397  310 

Swift  V.  State,  126  Ga.  590  442 

Swint  V.  State,  154  Ala.  46  245 

Swisher     v.     Commonwealth,     26 

Gratt.  (Va.)  963                     105,  no 

V.  Malone,  31  W.  Va.  442  531 

Sykes  v.  People,  132  111.  32  33 

V.  State,  151  Ala.  80  58 

V.  State,  IT2  Tenn.  572  418 

Sylvester  v.  State,  71  Ala.  17 

54,  118,  232 
V.  State,  46  Fla.  166 

221,  222,  235,  333 


T 


Tabor  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  387  358 
Tace}^  V.  Noyes,  143  Mass.  449  533 
Taggart    v.    Commonwealth,    104 

Ky.  301  330a 

Talbert  v.  State,  121  Ala.  33     12,  292 

V.  State,  140  Ala.  96 
Tall  V.  Commonwealth,  33  K3\  L. 


541 


157 

514 
225 

61 


Talley  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  395 
Tally  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

474 
Tanner  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1898), 

44  S.  W.  489  269 

Tarbox  v.  State,  3S  Ohio  St.  584  494 

Tarkio  v.  Loyd,  179  Mo.  600  21 

Tarver  v.  State,  43  Ala.  354     352,  353 

V.  State,  137  Ala.  29  no 

Tatum  V.  State,  156  Ala.  144  473 

V.  State,  63  Ala.  i  167 

V.  State,  82  Ala.  5  44 

V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  778  6 

Taulman  v.  State,  37  Ind.  353 

184,  185 
Taylor,   In   re,  8   Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

159  29 
V.  Commonwealth,      3       Bush 

(Ky.)   508  82 
V.  Commonwealth,    13    Yiy.    L. 

860  63 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cliii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Ta3-lor  v.  Commonwealth,  17  Ky. 
L.    1214  68 

V.  Commonwealth,    19   Kv.    L. 

836  "  138 

V.  Commonwealth,    28   Kv.    L. 

1348  '  88 

V.  Commonwealth,  94  Ky.  281    445 
V.  Commonwealth,  90  Va.  109 

68,  193 
V.  Evans    (Tex.,   1894),   29   S. 

W.  172  175 

V.  People,  12  Hun  (X.  Y.)  212    71 
V.  State,  22  Ala.  15  488 

V.  State,  82  Ark.  540  211 

V.  State,  83  Ga.  647  247 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  857  94 

V.  State,  121  Ga.  348  326 

V.  State,  126  Ga.  557  262 

V.  State,  131  Ga.  765  225 

V.  State,  132  Ga.  235  517,  520 

State,  III  Ind.  279  416 

State,  130  Ind.  66  225 

State,  52  Miss.  84  228 

State,  Z7  Neb.  788  125 

State,  62  S.  E.  1048     6,  58a,  236 
State,  15  Tex.  App.  356  302 

State,  22  Tex.  App.  529  415 

State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  381     172 
State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  190  t,j-j 

V.  Territory    (Okla.),  99  Pac. 

628  279 

V.  United  States,  3  How.    (U. 

S.)   197  49 

V.  United  States,  7  App.  Cas. 

D.  C.  27  160,  161 

V.  United  States,  81   C.  C.  A. 

197  247 

V.  United  States,  152  Fed.  i        247 

Teachout  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  7        132 

Teague  v.  State,  120  Ala.  309   118,  324 

V.  State,  144  Ala.  42  80 

Tedford  v.  People,  219  111.  23  448 

V.  United    States,   7   Ind.   Ter. 

254  390,  393 

Telfair  v.  State,  56  Fla.  104  421 

Temple  v.  Commonwealth,  75  Va. 

892  247 

Templeton  v.  People.  27  ^lich.  501    90 
Tenney's  Case,  23  X.  H.  162  459 


V. 
V. 
V. 

v. 

V. 
V. 
V. 

V. 
V. 


Terrill  v.  State,  74  Wis.  278 
Territory   v.    Baker,   4   Gild.    (X. 
Mex.)  236 

v.  Big  Knot  on  Head,  6  ^Mont. 

242 
v.  Clayton,  8  Mont,   i 
V.  Corbett,   3   Mont.   50 
V.  Crozier,  6  Dak.  8 
V.  De  Gutman,  8  X.  Mex.  92 
V.  Dooley,  3  Ariz.  60 
V.  Egan,   3   Dak.    119 
V.  Emilio    (X.  Mex.)   89  Pac. 

239  52, 

V.  Godfrey,  6  Dak.  46 
V.  Guthrie,  2  Idaho  398 
V.  Harding,  6  ]^Iont.  2>^^ 
V.  Livingston,  13  X.  Mex 


164 


124 
242 
395 
308 
205 
270 
312 


318 

299, 
V.  Mahaffey,  3  ]\Iont.  112 
V.  r^Ieredith     (X.     Mex.),    91 
Pac.  731  212, 

V.  Perkins,  2   ^lont.  467 
V.  Price    (X.    Mex.),   91    Pac. 

72,3 
V.  Smith,  12  X.  Mex.  229 
V.  West    (X.    Mex.    1909),   99 
Pac.   343  197. 

Terry  v.  State,  90  Ala.  635 
V.  State,   118  Ala.  79 

82,  312,  2^^, 
V.  State,  120  Ala.  286  272, 

V.     State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  264 
Tetterton        v.        Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  89  S.  W.  8 
Thalheim  v.  State,  38  Fla.  169 
Tharp  v.  State,  15  Ala.  749 
Thayer  v.  Davis,  38  Vt.  163 
V.  State,  138  Ala.  39 
V.  Thayer,  loi  ]Mass.  11 1 
Theisen  v.  Dayton,  82  Iowa  74 
Therasson  v.  People,  20  Hun  (X. 

Y.)   55 
Thockmorton    v.    Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  29  S.  W.  16 
Thomas  v.  Commonwealth  (Kj-.), 
20  S.  W.  226  6, 

v.  Commonwealth,  90  Va.  92 
v.  Commonwealth,  106  Va.  855 


409 
271 
271 

305 
360 

297 
271 

52 
297 

279 
484 

374 
312 

2,23 

Z26 

285 
266 
528 
6 
173 
174 

442 

298 

314 
455 
414 


cliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
Thomas  v.  People,  113  111.  531        44° 
V.  People,  67  N.  Y.  218 

81,  86,  320,  325,  327,  334 
V.  State,   107  Ala.   13  370 

V.  State,  109  Ala.  25  119 

V.  State,  139  Ala.  80  322 

V.  State,  156  Ala.  166  349,  350 

V.  State,  47  Fla.  99  119,  280 

V.  State,  27  Ga.  287  100 

V.  State,  67  Ga.  460  315 

V.  State,  84  Ga.  613  126 

V.  State,  90  Ga.  437  439 

V.  State,  95  Ga.  484  276 

V.  State,  99  Ga.  38  353 

V.  State,   129  Ga.  419  516 

V.  State,  103  Ind.  419 

60,  88,  89,  421,  423,  429,  478 
V.  State,   61    Miss.   60  270 

V.  State  (Tex.),  26  S.  W.  724  383 
V.  State  (Tex.),  116  S.  W.  600 

154,  157 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  178   132 

V.  State,  41  Tex.  27  367 

V.  State,  56  Tex.  Cr.  App.  iii    48 

Thomason  v.  Territory,  4  N.  Mex. 

150  227 

Thomasson  v.  State,  80  Ark.  364   218 
Thompkins     v.     Commonwealth, 

117  Ky.  138  187 

Thompson   v.   Commonwealth,  20 
Gratt.   (Va.)   724  130 

V.  Commonwealth,  88  Va.  45  268 
V.  German    Valley   R.    Co.,   22 

N.  J.  Eq.    Ill  170,  257 

V.  State,  30  Ala.  28  425 

V.  State,   49  Ala.    16  427 

V.  State,  70  Ala.  26  488 

V.  State,  99  Ala.  173  473 

V.  State,  100  Ala.  70  82 

V.  State,  120  Ga.  132  470 

V.  State    (Fla.,    1909),   50   So. 

507  378 

V.  State,  38  Ind.  39  242,  409,  410 
V.  State,  5   Kan.   159  271 

V.  State,  51  Miss.  353  55,  308 

V.  State,  83  Miss.  287  17,  18 

V.  State,  84  Miss.  758  333 

V.  State  (Tex.),  113  S.  W.  536  93 
V.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  466  297 
V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  472     411,  414 


e  to  Sections.] 

Thompson  v.   State,  45  Tex.   Cr. 
397  374 

V.  United    States,   30  App.   D. 

C.  352  61,  246,  346 

V.  United   States,  75  C.  C  A. 

172  61,  90 

Thompson's  Case,  122  ]\Iass.  428  258 
Thornell  v.  People,  11  Colo.  305 

35,  3^ 

Thornley  v.     State  (Tex.),  35  S. 

W.    981  89 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  118  425 

Thornton  v.    State,   113  Ala.  43     314 

Threadgill  v.   State,  32  Tex.   Cr. 

451  378 

Thurman  v.  State,  109  Ind.  240      127 

Thurmond  v.  State,  25  Tex.  App. 

366  424 

V.  State,  37  Tex.   Cr.  422         294 

Tidwell  V.  State,  70  Ala.  33     166,  333 

V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  38 

140,  466 
Tiffany    v.     Commonwealth,    121 

Pa.  St.  165  154,  324 

Till  V.  State,  132  Wis.  242  381 

Tilly  V.  State,  21  Fla.  242  301 

Timmons  v.  State,  80  Ga.  216  422 

Timon  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

363  196 

Tinckler's    Case,     i     East    Pleas 

Crown  354  105 

Tines  v.   Commonwealth,  25   Ky. 

L.  1233  67,  137 

Tinney  v.  State,  in  Ala.  74  36 

Tinsley  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

91  96 

Tioga    County    v.     South    Creek 

Township,  75  Pa.   St.  433  527 

Tipton  V.  State.  140  Ala.  39  328 

V.  State.  53  Fla.  69  285 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  530  243 

Tison  V.  State,  125  Ga.  7  383,  403 
Tittle  V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  597  297 
Titus  V.  State.  117  Ala.  16  103,  246 
Tla-Koo-Yet-Lee  v.  United  States, 

167  U.  S.  274  245 

Todd  V.   Commonwealth,   29   Ky. 
L.   473  292 

V.  State,  31  Ind.  514 

437,  438,  439,  443 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Tolbirt  V.  State,  124  Ga.  767  320 

Toliver  v.  State,  94  Ala.  iii  119 

V.  State,  142  Ala.  3  492 

Toll  V.  State,  40  Fla.  i6g  90 

Tolleson  v.  State,  97  Ga.  352  520 

Tolliver  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  329  315 
Tolston  V.  State  (Tex.),  42  S.  W. 


988  36 

Tompkins  v.  Commonwealth,  117 
Ky.   138  187 

V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  639  21 

V.  State,  17  Ga.  356  357 

Tones  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  ;i63  358 
Took  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  495  57,  58a 
Toops  V.  State,  92  Ind.  13  12,  68 

Topolewski  v.  State,  130  Wis.  244  87 
Totman  v.  Forsaith,  55  Me.  360  533 
Totten  V.  United  States,  92  U.  S. 

105  170 

Towns  V.  State,  11 1  Ala.  i  152 

V.  State,  167  Ind.  315  292 

Townsend  v.  State,  137  Ala.  9        279 

V.  State,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)   151    273 
Tracy,  In  re,  10  CI.  &  F.  154,  191        4 
Tracy  v.  Commonwealth,  87  Ky. 
578  362 

V.  People,  97  111.  Id  102,  113,  221 
Trafton  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  480 

294.  29s 
Trask  v.  People,  151  111.  523    269,  421 
Travers  v.  United  States,  6  App. 
D.  C.  450  325 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  423  127 
Traverse  v.  State,  61  Wis.  144  z^z 
Trevenio  v.   State    (Tex.),  42   S. 

W._  594  zjy 

Trevinio  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  350  470 
Tribble  v.  State,  145  Ala.  23  324 
Trinkle  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  42  331 
Triplett    v.    Commonwealth,    122 

Ky.  35  41,  358 

Tripp  V.  State,  95  Ga.  502  522 

Trogdon    v.    Commonwealth,    31 

Gratt.  (Va.)  862  438 

Trnjillo  v.  Territory,  6  N.  M.  589  225 
Truslow  V.  State,  95  Tenn.  189  292 
Tucker  v.  People,  117  111.  88    404,  405 

V.  People,  122  111.  583  398,  404 

V.  Shaw,  158  111.  326  202 

V.  State,  57  Ga.  503  279 


Tudor  V.  Commonwealth,  19  Ky. 

L.   1039 
Tullis  V.  State,  39  Ohio  St.  200 
Tune  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  445 
Turley     v.      State,     3      Humph. 

(Tenn.)  323 
Turman    v.    State,    50    Tex.    Cr. 
App.  7  53 

Turnbull  v.  Richardson,  69  Mich. 

400 
Turner  v.  Commonwealth,  86  Pa. 
St.  54 

V.  People,  23  Mich.  363 
V.  State,  97  Ala.  57 
V.  State,  89  Ga.  424 
V.  State,   102  Ind.  425 
V.  State,  60  Miss.  351 
V.  State,  89  Tenn.  547 
V.  State  (Tex.),  32  S.  W.  700 
V.  State  (Tex.),  46  S.  W.  830 
V.  State,  22  Tex.  Cr.  103 
Turpin  v.  Commonwealth,  25  Ky. 
L.  90 

V.  State,  55  Md.  462  184, 

Tuttle   V.   Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

22  S.  W.  823 
Tweedy  v.  State,  5  Iowa  433 

17,  154, 
Tyler  v.  Hall,  106  Mo.  313 
V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  10 
Tyrrell  v.  State  (Tex.),  38  S.  W. 
ion 


U 


18,  87, 
48,  96, 


67 

312 
29a 

■  55 
221 

153 
417 
314 


i«5 
112 
225 
268 
323 

61 


328 

338 
173 
418 

87 


Udderzook  v.  Commonwealth,  y6 

Pa.  St.  340  50,  51,  317 

Ullman  v.  State,  124  Wis.  602         354 

Ulrich  V.  People,  39  Mich.  245        139 

Underwood     v.     Commonwealth 

(Ky.),  84  S.  W.  310  47 

V.  State,  72  Ala.  220  23,  294,  299 

V.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  193 

71,  209 
Union  v.  State  (Ga.  App.  1909), 

66  S.  E.  24  48,  248 

United  States  v.   Adams,  2  Dak. 
305  '  284 

V.  Addatte,  6  Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 

76  189 


clvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  at 
United  States  v.  Angell,  ii   Fed. 
34  95,  262 

V.  Angney,  15  Wash.  L.  560  519 
V.  Arredondo,    6    Peters     (U. 

S.)   691  504 

V.  Babcock,  3  Dill  (U.  S.)  566 

182,  251,  491,  492 
V.  Bachelder,  2  Gall.    (U.   S.) 

15  447 

V.  Ball,  163  U.  S.  662 

221,  222,  315 
V.  Barber,  21  D.  C.  456  196 

V.  18   Barrels,   8   Blatchf.    (U. 

S.)  475  223 

V.  Bassett,  5  Utah  131  185 

V.  Battiste,    2    Sum.    (U.    S.) 

240  273,  27s,  279 

V.  Bayaud,  23  Fed.  721  144 

V.  Beboiit,  28  Fed.  522  478 

V.  Beebe,  2  Dak.  292  21 

V.  Blodgett,  35  Ga.  336  25 

V.  Bott,  II  Blatchf.  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)  346  478 

V.  Boyd,  45  Fed.  851  91 

V.  Boese,  46  Fed.  917  147 

V.  Bredemeyer,  6  Utah  143  382 
V.  Breese,  131  Fed.  915  6,  79,  283 
V.  Britton,   2   Mason    (U.    S.) 

464  31,  37 

V.  Brown,    I    Sawy.    (U.    S.) 

531    _  27 

V.  Brown,  40  Fed.  457  61 

V.  Burns,   5   McLean    (U.    S.) 

23  423,  433 

V.  Burr,  25  Fed.  Gas.  I4692d  250 
V.  Candler,  65  Fed.  308  i6a 

V.  Carroll,  147  Fed.  947  460,  461 
V.  Caton,  I  Cranch  C.  C.  15  226 
V.  Chapman,     25     Fed.     Gas. 

14783  130 

V.  Charles,  2  Cranch  G.  G.  76  191 
V.  Chisholm,  153  Fed.  808 

154,  157,  162 
V.  Clark,  27  Fed.  106  178 

V.  Cole,  153  Fed.  801  6,  490,  491 
V.  Coolidge,   2   Gall.    (U.    S.) 

364  26 

V.  Cooper,  4  Dall.  341  257 

V.  Craig,   4  Wash.    C.   G.    (U. 

S.)   729  423,  433 


c  to  Sections.] 

United     States     v.     Grandell,     4 
Cranch  C.  G.  683  362 

V.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  365  221 

V.  Crow,  I  Bond  (U.  S.)  51  119 
V.  Crow  Doc,  3  Dak.  106  185 

V.  Curtis,  107  U.  S.  671  470 

V.  Davis,  2  Sumner  G.  G.   (U. 

S.)   482  495 

V.  Davis,  38  Fed.  326  478 

V.  Densmore,  12  N.  Mex.  99  325 
V.  De  Amador,  6  N.  Mex.  173  468 
V.  Deaver,  14  Fed.  595  456 

V.  Dexter,  154  Fed.  890  12 

V.  Dietrich,  126  Fed.  676  452 

V.  Dodge,  2  Gall  (U.  S.)  313  461 
V.  Doebler,  i   Bald.  G.  G.    (U. 

s.)  519      •  423, 432 

V.  Durling,  4  Biss.  509  249 

V.  Edgerton,  80  Fed.  374  25,  26 
V.  Edme,  9  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  147  258 
V.  Eldredge,  S  Utah  161  522 

v,  Evans.  28  App.  D.  C.  264  358 
r.  Falkenheimer,  21  Fed.  624  305 
v.  Farrington,  5  Fed.  343  26 

V.  Francis,  144  Fed.  520  492 

v.  Ford,  33  Fed.  861  242,  248 

V.  Ford,  99  U.  S.  594  71,  72 

V.  Gibert,  2  Sum.  (U.  S.)   19 

7,  227,  520 

V.  Gilbert,  25  Fed.  Gas.  1=5205  282 
V.  Graff,  14  Blatchf.  C.  G.  (U. 

S.)  381  491 

V.  Greene,  75  Mo.  355  119 

V.  Greene,  146  Fed.  784 

38,  118,  119,  267 
V.  Guiteau,  10  Fed.  160  159 

V.  Gunther,  5  Dak.  234  359 

V.  Hall,  44  Fed.  864  468 

V.  Hall,  53  Fed.  352  207,  208 

V.  Hand,   2  Wash.   G.   C.    (U. 

S.)  435  352 

V.  Hanway,  2  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.) 

139  70,  188 

V.  Harned,  43  Fed.  376  456 

V.  Harper,  33  Fed.  471  10 

V.  Hartwell,   3   Cliff.    (U.    S.) 

221  493 

V.  Hawthorn,   i   Dill.    (U.   S.) 

422  57 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clvii 


IReferences  ar 
United      States     v.     Health,      19 
Wash.  Law  R.  818  12 

V.  Heath,  20  D.  C.  (9  Mackey) 

272  17,  103 

V.  Heinze,  161  Fed.  425  21 

V.  Henry,  4  Wash.  C.  C.    (U. 

S.)  428  70,  71 

V.  Hinman,  i  Bald.  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)  292  423 

V.  Hinz,  35  Fed.  272  71,  72,  75 
V.  Holmes,  i  Clif.   (U.  S.)  98 

23,  154 
V.  Houghton,  14  Fed.  544  422 

V.  Howell,  56  Fed.  21  73 

V.  Hudson,  7  Cranch.  (U.  S.) 

32  459 

V.  Hunter,  i  Cranch.  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)   446  70 

V.  Hunter,  15  Fed.  712  182,  251 
V.  Jackson,  29  Fed.  503  294 

V.  Jones,  2   Wheeler  Cr.   Cas. 

(N.  Y.)  451  207 

V.  Jones,  3  Wash.   C.   C.    (U. 

S.)   209  358 

V.  Jones,  32  Fed.  569  184 

V.  Kee,  39  Fed.  603  255 

V.  Keen,  i  McLean  (U.  S.)  429 

429,  434 
V.  Kenneally,     26     Fed.     Cas. 

15522  250,  433 

V.  Kenney,  90  Fed.  257  17,  58,  466 
V.  Kessler,  Bald.  (U.  S.)  15  75 
V.  Kilpatrick,  16  Fed.  765  26,  27 
V.  Kindred,  4  Hughes  (U.  S.) 

493  255 

V.  King-,    5    McLean    (U.    S.) 

208  433 

V.  Kirkwood,  5  Utah  123  130,  132 
V.  Lancaster,  44  Fed.  896  74,  75 
V.  Lantry,  30  Fed.  232  373 

V.  Lawrence,  4   Cranch   C.   C. 

(U.  S.)   574  25 

V.  Lee,  4  Mackev  (D.  C.)  489  160 
V.  McGlue,  I  Curt.  (U.  S.)  i  157 
V.  Macomb,   5   McLean    C.    C. 

(U.  S.)  286  26r 

V.  Mathews,  68  Fed.  880  32 

V.  Matthews,     26     Fed.     Cas. 

15741b  140 


e  to  Sections.] 

United  States  v.  Mitchell,  i  Bald. 
C.  C.   (U.  S.)  366         422,  424,  433 
V.  Moore,  2  Low.  (U.  S.)  232  469 
V.  Morris,  i  Curt.  (U.  S.)  23     273 
V.  Moses,  4  Wash.  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)  726  171,  422 

V.  Mullaney,  32  Fed.  370  63 

V.  Nardello,  4  Mackey  (D.  C.) 

503  129 

V.  Newtown,  52  Fed.  275  120 

V.  Noble,  5  Cranch  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)  371  432,  433 

V.  Noelke,  17  Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 

554  95.  479 

V.  Ortega,  4  Wash.  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)   531  353 

V.  Palmer,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)    II  24,  25 

V.  Phelps,  4  Day  (Conn.)  469  446 
V.  Piaza,  133  Fed.  998  502 

V.  Pirates,  5   Wheat.    (U.    S.) 

184  44 

V.  Porter,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  60  191 
V.  Porter,  3  Day  (Conn.)  283  31 
V.  Post,  128  Fed.  950  222 

V.  Provenzano,  171  Fed.  675 

432,  433 
V.  Randall,  Deady  (U.  S.)  524  116 
V.  Rauscher,  119  U.  S.  407  495 

V.  Reder,  69  Fed.  965  6 

V.  Reed,    2    Blatchf.    (U.    S.) 

435  28,  192 

V.  Reid,  21  How.   (U.  S.)  361 

70,  250 
V.  Reyburn,  i  Pet.  (U.  S.)  352  41 
V.  Richard,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  439  138 
V.  Richards,  i  Alaska  613  461 

V.  Richards,  149  Fed.  443 

17,  37,  73 
V.  Rose,  12  Fed.  576  457 

V.  Roudenbush,    i    Bald.    (U. 

S.)  514  79 

V.  Sacia,  2  Fed.  754  73,  491 

V.  Shinn,  8  Saw.  (U.  S.)  671  469 
V.   Shipp,  203  U.  S.  563  461 

V.  Simon,  146  Fed.  89  247 

V.  Sims,  161  Fed.  roo8  206 

V.   Slenkcr,  32  Fed.  691  478 

V.  Smallwood,  5  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  35  185 


clviii 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


[References  a 
United  States  v.  Smith,  i  Sawyer 
(U.  S.)  277  520 

V.  Smith,  4  Cranch  C.  C.    (U. 


S.)   659 

475 

V. 

Smith,  47  Fed.  501 

247 

V. 

Stevens,  52  Fed.  120 

433, 

434 

V. 

Taintor,    11    Blatch.    C 

.    C. 

374 

282 

V. 

Taranto,  74  Fed.  219 

433 

V. 

Taylor,  3  McCrary  500 

279 

V. 

Taylor,  11  Fed.  470 

275, 

279 

T. 

Taylor,  35  Fed.  484 

239 

V. 

Tenney,  2  Ariz.  127 

403, 

404 

V. 

Thomas,  47  Fed.  807 

277 

V. 

Tilden,  10  Ben.  566 

251 

V. 

Turner,  7  Pet.   (U.  S.) 

132 

430 

V. 

Vietch,  I  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U. 

S.)_Ti5 

108 

V. 

Watkins,    3    Cranch    C 

c. 

441 

234 

V. 

Wayne,  Wall.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

134 

461 

V. 

Weikel,  8  Mont.  124 

431 

V. 

Whitaker,   6   McLean 

(U. 

S.)   342 

79 

V. 

White,  2  Wash.  C.  C. 

(U. 

S.)  29 

25 

V. 

Whittier,  5  Dill.  C.  C. 

(U. 

S.)  35 

478 

V. 

Wightman,  29  Fed.  636 

478 

V. 

Williams,   I    Cliff.    (U. 

s.) 

5 

7, 

516 

V. 

Williams,  14  Fed.  550 

430 

V. 

Williams,  103  Fed.  938 

133 

V. 

Wilson,   I    Baldw.   78 

275 

V. 

Wilson,  7  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

150 

207, 

208 

V.  Wilson,  69  Fed.  584 

V.  Wood,  3  Wash.  C.  C.    (U. 

S.)  440 
V.  Wood,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  430 
V.  Woods,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  484 
V.  Ybanez,  53  Fed.  536 
V.  Zes  Cloya,  35  Fed.  493 
Untreinor  v.    State,    146  Ala, 


228 


266 


103 

73 

343 


26 
6r,  91 
Upstone  V.  People,  109  III.  169        167 
Upton  V.  State,  48  Tex.  App.  280 

119,  224 


re  to  Sections.] 

Urmston  v.  State,  73  Ind.  175  455 

Usher  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  93  42^ 

Utley  V.  Donaldson,  94  U.  S.  29  44 


V 


Vale  V.  People.  161  111.  309  77 

Valensin  v.  Valensin,  73  Cal.  106  179 
Vallereal  v.  State  (Tex.  1892),  20 

S.  W.  557  372 

Vanata  v.  State,  S2  Ark.  203  269 

Van  Buren  v.  People,  7  Colo.  App. 

136  442 

V.  State,  63  Neb.  453  248 

Vance   v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

115  S.  W.  774  377 

V.  State,  56  Ark.  402  225 

Vandegrift  v.  State,  151  Ala.  105     298 

V.  State,  43  So.  852  298 

Vanderwerker  v.  People,  5  Wend. 

(N.  Y.)   530  21 

Vandeventer  v.  State,  38  Neb.  592  14 
Vandiveer,  In  re,  4  Cal.  App.  650  392 
Van  Dolsen  v.  State,  i  Ind.  App. 

108  384 

Van  Gesner  v.  United  States,  153 

Fed.  46  90 

Vanhouser  v.   State,  52  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  572  18 

Van  Immons  v.  State,  29  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  681  366 

Van  Meter  v.  People,  60  111.  168  272 
Vann  v.  State,  140  Ala.  122  224,  248 
V.  State,  83  Ga.  44  215 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  434  95 
Van  Sickel  v.  People,  29  Mich.  61  429 
Van  Straaten  v.  People,  26  Colo. 

184  300 

Van  Syoc  v.  State,  69  Neb.  520 

295.  304 

Van  Tassel  v.  State,  59  Wis.  351  524 
Van  Walker  v.  State,  2i3  Tex.  Cr. 

359  373 
Van  Wyk  v.   People    (Colo.),  99 

Pac.   1009  116,  323,  492,  493 

Varnadoe  v.  State,  67  Ga.  768  269 

Varner  v.  State,  72  Ga.  745  295 
Vass  V.   Commonwealth,  3  Leigh 

(Va.)  786  112 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clix 


[References  a 

Vasser  v.  State,  75  Ark.  373  89 

Vaughan  v.  State,  57  Ark.  i  6 

V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  563  464 

Vaughn  V.  Commonwealth,  86  Ky. 
431  103 

V.  State,  78  Neb.  317  411 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  180    130 
Veal  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  474        357 
Vernon  v.  United  States,  146  Fed. 
121  6,  36 

V.  Vernon,  6  La.  Ann.  242  526 

Vess  V.  State,  93  Ind.  211  487 

Vetten  v.  Wallace,  39  111.  App.  390 

523,  526 
Viberg  v.  State,  138  Ala.  100 

61,  245,  292 
Vickers  v.  United  States,  i  Okla. 

Cr.  452  87,  416 

Vickery  v.  State,  50  Fla.  144  96 

Vicksburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 

119  U.  S.  99  97 
Vincent  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 

120  298 
Vinton  v.  Peck,  14  Mich.  287  429 
Voght  V.  State,  124  Ind.  358           475 

V.  State,  145  Ind.  12  85 
Vogt  V.   Commonwealth,  92   Ky. 

68  270 

Von  Pollnitz  v.  State,  92  Ga.  16  330 
Von   Vetsera,   Ex  parte,  7   Cal. 

App.  136  40 

Voorhees,  In  re,  32  N.  J.  L.  141  499 
Vowells    V.    Commonwealth,    83 

Ky.  193  197 

W 

Wachstetter  v.  State,  99  Ind.  290 

221,  237 


266 


Wade  V.  State,  7  Baxt.    (Tenn.) 

80  zuu 

Wadge,  In  re,  16  Fed.  864        501,  503 
Waggoner    v.    State    (Tex.    Cr. 
App.),  98  S.  W.  25s  56,  S8a 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  269  473 

Wagner  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Ky. 
L.  ii8s  108 

V.  State,  107  Ind.  71  80 

V.  State,  116  Ind.   181 

156,  164,  238,  280a 


re  to  Sections.l 

Wagoner  v.  State,  90  Ind.  504        440 
Waidley  v.  State,  34  Neb.  250  292 

Wakefield  v.    State,   50  Tex.   Cr. 

App.  124  109,  330a 

Walker  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Leigh 
(Va.)  90  90 

V.  Kennedy.  133  Iowa  284  461 

V.  People,  88  N.  Y.  81 

23,  81,  157,  158 
V.  State,  89  Ala.  74  309 

V.  State,  91  Ala.  76  31,  81,  268 
V.  State,  97  Ala.  85  202,  379 

V.  State,  104  Ala.  56  380 

V.  State,  107  Ala.  5  469 

V.  State,  117  Ala.  42  282,  285,  291 
V.  State,  120  Ala.  293  119a 

V.  State,  139  Ala.  56 

II,  47,  56,  119,  332 
V.  State,  146  Ala.  45  97,  473 

V.  State,  147  Ala.  699  103,  312 

V.  State,  153  Ala.  31  36,  334 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  430  376,  378 
V.  State,  28  Ga.  254  302 

V.  State,  118  Ga.  757  73 

V.  State,  127  Ga.  48  431 

V.  State,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  i  532 
V.  State,  92  Ind.  474  528 

V.  State,  102  Ind.  502  160,  327 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  663  126,  268 

V.  State,  165  Ind.  94  532 

V.  State,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  287  473 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  37  S. 

W.  423  69 

V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  245  130,  374 
V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  618  119,  269 
V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  609  7 

V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  176   173, 176 
Wall  V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  305  7 

Wallace  v.  State,  90  Ga.  117  105 

V.  State,  147  Ind.  621  339 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  758  310 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  341  492 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  318  493 

V.  United  States,  162  U.  S.  466  326 
Waller  v.  People,  209  111.  284 

35,  58,  238,  312 

V.  State,  40  Ala.  325   .   416,  417 

V.  State,  38  Ark.  656         21 

Walling  V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  254  358 


clx 


TAELE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 

Wallis  V.  State,  54  Ark.  611 

36,  284,  288 

Walls  V.    State,  7  Blackf.   (Ind.) 

572  485 

V.  State,  125  Ind.  400  77 

Walrath  v.  State,  8  Neb.  80  138 

Walsh  V.  People,  65  111.  58  45 1 

V.  People.  88  N.  Y.  458        160,  3M 

V.  United  States,  174  Fed.  615      89 

Walston  V.  Commonwealth,  16  B. 

Mon.  (Ky.)  15  103,  no,  in 

Walter  v.  People,  32  N.  Y.  147        157 
V.  State,  105  Ind.  589  195,  198 

Walters   v.    People,   6    Park.    Cr. 
(N.  Y.)    15  88 

V.  State,  39  Ohio  St.  215     148,  152 
V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  226  119 

V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  388  356 

Walton     V.     Commonwealth,     32 
Gratt.  (Va.)  85.^  270 

V.  State,  71  Ark.  398  387,  391,  393 
V.  State,  88  Ind.  9  236,  492 

Wampler  v.   State,  28  Tex.  App. 

352  6 

Wantland  v.  State.  145  Ind.  38  6 

Ward  V.   Commonwealth,  29  Ky. 
L.  62  329 

V.  Commonwealth   (Kv.  1909), 

n6  S.  W.  786  483 

V.  Commonwealth,    26   Ky.    L. 

1256  121 

V.  People,  3  Hill  (X.  Y.)  395    129 
V.  State,  85  Ark.  179  104,  212 

V.  State,  2  Mo.  120  29 

V.  State,  41  Tex.  611  302 

Ware  v.  State,  67  Ga.  349  149 

V.  State,  96  Ga.  349  276 

V.  State,  59  Ark.  379  148.  152 

V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  597 

87,  236 
Warford  v.   People,  43  Colo.   107 

36.  89 
Warickshall's  Case,  i  Leach  C.  C. 

298  306 

Waring  v.  United  States,  7  Ct.  CI. 

CU.  S.)  501  207 

Warlick  v.  White.  76  X.  Car.  175    525 
Warner  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Va. 

Cas.  95  404 

Warrace  v.  State,  27  Fla.  362  36 


e  to  Sectiofis.] 

Warren  v.  Commonwealth,  99  Ky. 
370  245 

V.  State,  94  Ala.  79  484 

V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  619  108 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  573  327 

V.  State,  54  Tex.   Cr.  443 

415,  417,  429 
Warrick  v.  State,  125  Ga.  133 

325,  330 
Wasden  v.  State,  18  Ga.  264  14 

Wash  V.  Commonwealth,  16  Gratt. 

(Va.)   530  423 

Washington    v.     State,    23    Tex. 
App.  336  467,  470 

V.  State,  72  Ala.  272  33,  286 

V.  State,  143  Ala.  62  420,  429 

V.  State,  36  Ga.  242  484 

V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.   1907),  105 

S.  W.  789  520 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  154  517 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  184      214,  328 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  542  269 

Wassells  v.  State,  26  Ind.  30  272 

Waterman  v.  People,  67  111.  91        430 

Waters  v.  People,  104  111.  544        301 

V.  State,  n7  Ala.  108  17 

V.  State,  53  Ga.  567  371 

V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  284  468 

V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  322  333 

Watkins     v.    Carlton,     10    Leigh 

(Va.)  560  ^  526 

V.  Commonwealth.  123  Ky.  817    17 

V.  State,  89  Ala.  82  48,  312 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1910), 

124  S.  W.  959  397 

Watson  V.  Commonwealth,  95  Pa. 
St.  418  148,  152 

V.  Miller.  82  Tex.  279  218 

V.  People,  87  X.  Y.  561  440 

V.  State,  3  Ind.  123  471 

V.  State,  36  Miss.  593  301 

V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  237      69,  346 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  80  464 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  85 

137,  315,  333 
Watt  V.  People,  126  111.  9  67,  122 

V.  State,  97  Ala.  72  458 

Watters  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  94  S. 

W.  1038  217,  305 

Watts  V.  Ownes,  62  Wis.  512  527 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxi 


[References  ar 
Watts  V.  State,  99  ]Mcl.  30 

126,  160,  161,  162 
V.  State,  90  Miss.  757  269 

Wax  V.  State,  43  Xeb.  18  442 

Way  V.  State  (Ala.),  46  So.  273 

12,  55,  56,  76,  336 
Weatherby  v.  State  (Aliss.  1909), 

48  So.  724  520 

Weatherford  v.  State,  78  Ark.  36    261 
V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  530    193 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  430    89 
Weaver  v.  State,  77  Ala.  26  123 

V.  State,   142  Ala.  33  388,  393 

V.  State,  83  Ark.  119 

239,  324,  325 

V.  State,  24  Ohio  St.  584  23 

V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  607  374 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  11  269 

Weaver's    Estate,   9   Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

516  175 

Webb  V.  State,  100  Ala.  47  225 

V.  State,  106  Ala.  52  ■        80 

V.  State,  138  Ala.  53  314 

V.  State   (Miss.   1897),  21   So. 

133  388 

V.  State,  73  llhs.  456  6,  323 

V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  310  281 

V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  205  475 

Webber   v.    Commonwealth,    119 

Pa.  St.  223  163 

Webster  v.  People,  92  X.  Y.  422    439 
Wedgwood's  Case,  8  ^le.  75  383 

Weed  V.  People,  3  T.  &  C.  (X.  Y.) 

50  349 

Weeks  v.  State,  79  Ga.  36  518 

Weideman  v.   State,  4  Ind.  App. 

397  482 

Weightnovel  v.  State,  46  Fla.  i 

116,  348 
Weinberg  v.  People,  208  III.  15        35 
V.  State,  25  Wis.  370  405 

Weinecke  v.  State,  34  Xeb.  14  36 

Weinert  v.  State,  35  Fla.  229  32 

Weisenbach  v.  State,  138  Wis.  152  492 
Weitzel    v.    State,    28   Tex.    App. 

523  33 

Welch  V.  Clark.  50  Vt.  386  533 

V.  Commonwealth,  33  Ky.  L.  57 

60,  61,  90 
V.  State,  124  Ala.  41  6 

xi — Underhill  Crim.  Evidence. 


e  to  Sections.] 

Welch  V.  State,  156  Ala.  112  373 
V.  State,  126  Ga.  495                  291a 

V.  State,  104  Ind.  347          119,  241 

Wellar  v.  People,  30  Mich.  16  333 

Wells,  Ex  parte,  18  How.  (U.  S.) 

307  207 

Wells  V.  Commonwealth,  30  Ky. 

L.  504  245 

v.  Fletcher,  5  C.  &  P.  12  189 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  499  162 

v.  Territory,  i  Okla.  Cr.  469  431 

V.  Territory,  14  Okla.  436  80 

Welsh  V.  State,  96  Ala.  92        12,  145 

V.  State,  97  Ala.  i  119 

Welty  V.  United  States,  14  Okla. 

7  269 

Wesley  v.  State,  65  Ga.  731  416 

V.  State,  37  Miss.  327            79,  324 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1905), 

85  S.  W.  802  87 

Wesoky    v.    United     States,     175 

Fed.  333  185 

West  V.  State,  76  Ala.  98         loi,  145 

V.  State,  53  Fla.  77  ■          52,  119a 

V.  State,  6  Ga.  App.  105  367 

V.  State,  48  Ind.  483  149 

V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  640  325 

V.  State,  I  Wis.  209           250,  393 
V.  United   States,  20  App.    D. 

C.  347  128 
Westbrook  v.  People,  126  111.  81  328 

V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  401  421 
Westbrooks  v.  State,  76  Miss.  710    77 

Weston  V.  Brown,  30  Xeb.  609  217 
Westover  v.  ^tna  Life  Ins.  Co., 

99  N.  Y.  56  179 

Weyrich  v.  People,  89  111.  90  330 
Whalen  v.  Commonwealth,  90  Va. 

544  298 

Whaley  v.  State,  11  Ga.  123  118 

v.  State,  no  Ala.  68  263 

V.  State,  6  Mo.  455  24a 

Wheatley  v.  Williams,  i  M.  &  W. 

533  ^74 

Wheeler,  In  re,  34  Kan.  96  523 

V.  Commonwealth,  120  Ky.  697  328 

V.  Hill,  16  Me.  329  174 

V.  Le  Marchant,  L.  R.   17  Ch. 

D.  675  T78 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  325  245 


clxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  at 
Wheeler  v.  State,  79  Neb.  491         023 
Wherl  V.  State,  79  Neb.  491  248 

Whipp  V.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  87  185 
Whitaker  v.  State,  79  Ga.  87  103,  no 
White,  In  re,  55  Fed.  54  497 

White  V.  Bailey,  10  Mich.  155  163 
V.  Commonwealth,  4  Ky.  L.  2>72  55 
V.  Commonwealth,  20   Ky.    L. 

1942  507 

V.  Commonwealth,  80  Ky.  480  S2, 
V.  Commonwealth,  96  Ky.  180  408 
V.  Commonwealth,  125  Ky.  699  325 
V.  Morgan  &  Co.,  119  Ind.  338  226 
V.  State,  49  Ala.  344  147 

V.  State,  72  Ala.  195  378 

V.  State,  74  Ala.  31  380 

V.  State,  ^6  Ala.  69  174 

V.  State,  103  Ala.  72  451 

V.  State,  III  Ala.  92 

82,  103,  104,  III 
V.  State,  127  Ga.  273  475 

V.  State,  53  Ind.  595  59 

V.  State  (Miss.),  45  So.  611  268 
V.  State,     3     Heisk.     (Tenn.) 

338  307 

V.  State  (Tex.),  38  S.  W.  169  130 
V.  State  (Tex.),  50  S.  W.  1015  i6a 
V.  State  (Tex.  1905),  85  S.  W. 

I 140  122 

V.  State  (Tex.),  98  S.  W.  264  269 
V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  652 

69,  III,  112,  333 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  625 

6,  136 
V.  United    States,    164   U.    S. 

100  80 

Whitehead  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr. 

89  2^3 

Whitehurst  v.  Commonwealth,  79 

Va.  556  265,  521 

Whitley  v.  State.  38  Ga.  50  108 

V.  State,  66  Ga.  656  488 

Whitlo  V.  State  (Tex.),  18  S.  W. 

865  75 

Whitlock,  In  re,  51  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

351  174 

Whitlock   V.    State,   4    Ind.    App. 

432  482 

Whitman  v.  State,  34  Ind.  360         532 


e  to  Sections.} 

Whitney    v.    Commonwealth,    24 

Ky.  L.  2524  138 

Whittake4-  v.   Commonwealth,   13 

Ky.  L.  504  328 

V.  Commonwealth,  95  Ky.  632    397 

V.  State,  so  Wis.  518  407,  417 

Whittem  v.  State,  36  Ind.  196         461 

Whizenant  v.  State,  71  Ala.  383      296 

Whorton  v.  Commonwealth,  7  Ky. 

L.  826  507 

Wiborg  V.  United  States,  136  U. 

S.   632  277 

Wiggins   V.   People,   4   Hun    (N. 

Y.)  540  427 

V.  State,  Id  Ga.  501  270 

V.  Utah,  93  U.  S.  465  326 

Wilber  v.   Scherer,   13  Ind.  App. 

428  218 

Wilcox  V.  Nolze,  34  Ohio  St.  520  497 
V.  State,  94  Tenn.  106  166,  280a 
V.  Wilcox,   46    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

32  49 

Wilde  V.  Commonwealth,  2  Mete. 

(Mass.)  408  SIC 

Wiley  V.   State   (Ark.    1909),   124 
S.  W.  249  300,  493,  494 

V.  State,  74  Ga.  840  z^^  296 

V.  State,  52  Ind.  516  486 

V.  State,    3    Coldw.     (Tenn.) 

362  296 

Wilhite  V.  State,  84  Ark.  67 

19,  390,  393 

Wilke  V.  People,  53  N.  Y.  525        185 

Wilkerson  v.  Commonwealth,  25 

Ky.  L.  780  17 

V.  State,  Tex.  Cr.  App.  86  88 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  86       321,  323 

Wilkins  v.  Metcalf,  71  Vt.  103        533 

V.  State,  98  Ala.  i  58 

V.  State.  35  Tex.  Cr.  525  3:^,2 

Wilkinson  v.  People,  226  111.  135    467 

V.  State,  59  Ind.  416  197 

Willard   v.    State,  27   Tex.    i\.pp. 

386  147 

V.  Superior  Court,  82  Cal.  456    250 

Willet  V.  Commonwealth,  13  Bush 

(Ky.)   230  21 

Williams    v.    Commonwealth,    13 
Ky.  L.  753  522 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxiii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Williams    v.    Commonwealth 
Ky.  L.  663 
V.  Commonwealth,  29  Pa. 

102 
V.  Commonwealth,  91   Pa. 

493 
V.  Commonwealth  (Va.  i^ 

22  S.  E.  859 
Commonwealth,  85  Va. 
Dickenson,  28  Fla.  90 
People,   54  111.  422 
People,  121  111.  84 
People,  166  111.  132 
People,  196  111.  173 
State,  44  Ala.  24 

184, 
State,  52  Ala.  411 
State,  81  Ala.   i 
State,  98  Ala.  52 
State,  103  Ala.  33 
State,   109  Ala.  64 
State,   113  Ala.  58 
State,  144  Ala.  14 
State,  147  Ala.  10       93, 
State,   149  Ala.  4 
State  (Ark.  1891),  16  S. 

816 
State,  42  Ark.  35      122, 
State,  66  Ark.  264 
State,  32  Fla.  251 
State,  40  Fla.  480 
State,  48  Fla.  65 
State,  53  Fla.  89 
State,  4  Ga.  App.  853 
State,  19  Ga.  402 
State,  67  Ga.  260 
State,  99  Ga.  203 
State,  119  Ga.  564 
State,  125  Ga.  741 
State,  47  Ind.  568 
State,  168  Ind.  87 
State,  64  Md.  384 
State   (Miss.  1908),  45 

146 
State,  47  Miss.  609 
State,  46  Xeb.  704 
State,  69  Neb.  402 
State,  14  Ohio  222 
State,  77  Ohio  St.  468 
State,  2  Sneed  (Tenn.) 


,  18 
,   St. 

,  St. 
466, 
?95), 

607 
14, 


484 


131 


400, 
119, 
166, 


528, 
210, 
,96, 

W. 
117, 
123, 
60, 

300, 


147, 


3^2, 

So. 


160 


360 
120 
209 
326 
23 
88 
509 

406 

145 
492 

247 

128 
205 
532 
246 
328 
44 

322 
124 

96 
221 
301 
129 
269 
517 
264 

21 
353 

48 
367 
492 

36 
3^3 

391 
408 
276 
118 
408 
439 
457 


Cr.    1895),   32 
1896),    34    S. 


420 

473 
127 

35 
121 
118 


Williams    v.     State     (Tex.    App. 
1890),  13  S.  W.  609  373 

V.  State  (Tex.  1892),  19  S.  W. 

897  350 

V.  State    (Tex. 
S.  W.  532 
V.  State     (Tex, 

W.  271 
V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  276 
V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  256 
V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  497 
V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  17 
V.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  76 

235,  241 
V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  301  61 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  128  69 
V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  523  296 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  355  225 

V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  606  17 
V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  147  129 
V.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  128  133 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  218  269 

V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  352  269 

V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  396  69,  149 
V.  United  States,  3  App.  D.  C. 

335  205,  331 

V.  United  States,  137  U.  S.  113  520 

V.  Wager,  64  Vt.  326  217 

Williamson  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 

330  18 

V.  United  States,  207  U.  S.  425  466 

Willi  ford  v.   State,   36  Tex.   Cr. 

App.  414  122,  238 

Willingham  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr. 

App.  98  90 

Willis  V.  People,  32  N.  Y.  715        154 
V.  State,   12  Ga.  444  247 

V.  State,  93  Ga.  208  129 

V.  State,  43  Neb.  102  127 

V.  United   States,  6  Ind.  Ter. 

424  133 

Willoughby  v.  Territory,  16  Okla. 

577  110 

Wills  V.  State,  3  Heisk.   (Tenn.) 

141  21 

Wilson  V.  Boerem,  15  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)   286  106 

V.  People,  94  111.  299  223,  330 

V.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753 

173,  177,  179 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ar 
Wilson  V.  State,  31  Ala.  371  473 

V.  State,  61  Ala.  151  464 

V.  State,  68  Ala.  41  486 

V.  State,  72  Ala.   527 

19,  390,  392,  393 
V.  State,  no  Ala.  i  132,  328 

V.  State,  140  Ala.  43 

17,  103,  261,  326 
V.  State,  62  Ark.  497  2)^ 

V.  State    (Ga.   App.    1910),  67 

S.  E.  705  430 

V.  State  (Ga.),  64  S.  E.  112 

35,  36,  147 

V.  State,  58  Ga.  328  385 

V.  State,  69  Ga.  224  58 

V.  State,  57  Ind.  71  257 

V.  State,  70  Miss.  595  421 

V.  State,  2  Ohio  St.  319  399 

V.  State,  41  Tex.  320  313 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  76  295 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  74  S.  W. 

315  352 

V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  481  295 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  64  241 

V.  State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  156  356 

V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  159  282 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  496  69 
.  V.  United   States,  5   Ind.  Ten 

610  238 

V.  United  States,  149  U.  S.  60  67 
V.  United  States,  162  U.  S.  613 

50,  116,  126,  132,  312,  334 

V.  Woodside,  57  Me.  489  533 
Wimberly  v.    State,   53  Tex.    Cr. 

II  482 

Wingo  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  16  268 
Winn  V.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

663  38 

Winsett  v.  State,  57  Ind.  26  521 

Winslow  V.  State,  y6  Ala.  42  2'^7 

V.  State,  97  Ala.  68  440 

Winston  v.  State,  145  Ala.  91  473 
Wisconsin  v.  Pelican  Ins.  Co.,  127 

U.  S.  26s  209 
Wisdom  V.  People,  11  Colo.  170 

71,  72,  149 

V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  215  390 

Wise  V.  State,  100  Ga.  68  312 

V.  State,  2  Kan.  419  324 


T  to  Sections.'] 

Withaup    V.    United    States,    127 

Fed.  530  90 

Witt  V.  State,  6  Cold.  (Tenn.)  5  314 
Wixson   V.    People,    5    Park.    Cr. 

(N.  Y.)  119  70,  y2 

Wohlford  V.  People,  148  111.  296  59 
Wolf  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  332  297 
Womble    v.    State,    39    Tex.    Cr. 

App.  24  160 

Wong  Hane,  hi  re,  108  Cal.  680 

16,  24a 
Wolverton  v.  State,  16  Ohio  173  404 
Wood  V.  People,  53  N.  Y.  511 

443,  510,  513 
V.  State,  34  Ark.  341  166 

V.  State,  31  Fla.  221  12 

V.  State,  48  Ga.  102  383,  392 

V.  State,  92  Ind.  269     100,  220,  326 
V.  State,  58  Miss.  741  161 

V.  State,  46  Neb.  58  408,  410 

Woodward  v.   State,  5  Ga.  App. 

447  392,  393 

Woodbury  v.  State,  69  Ala.  243 

440,  442 
Woodcock's  Case,  2  Leach  C.  L. 

563  102,  104,  105 

Woodin  V.    People,    i    Park.    Cr. 

(X.  Y.)  464  412 

Woodley  v.  State,  103  Ala.  23  71 

Woodruff  V.  State,  61  Ark.  157 

45,  217,  439 
V.  State,  31  Fla.  320  12 

V.  State,  72  Xeb.  815  118 

V.  State  (Tex.  1891),  20  S.  W. 

573  379 

Woods  V.  Miller  Co.,  55  Iowa  168    182 
V.  People,  55  N.  Y.  515  418 

V.  State.  76  Ala.  35  188 

V.  State,  63  Ind.  353  65 

V.  State,  90  Miss.  245  324 

Woodsides     v.     State,     2     How. 

(Miss.)  65s  III 

Woodward  v.  Blue,  107  N.  Car. 

407  526 

V.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  453  193 

V.  Shaw,  18  Me.  304  533 

•  V.  State,  84  Ark.  119      89,  188 

V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  447      387 

V.  State,  54  Ga.  106         277 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


ClXV 


[References  ai 
Woodward    v.    State,    (Tex.    Cr. 
App.  1910),  126  S.  W.  271  447 

V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  554  308 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  294  329 

Woodworth,  Ex  parte,  29  W.  L. 

Bull.  315  226 

Woodworth  v.  State,  26  Ohio  St. 

196  447 

Wooldridge  v.  State,  49  Fla.  137 

44,  423,  429 

Wool  folk  V.  State.  85  Ga.  69 

135,  268,  328 

Woollen  V.  Wire,  no  Ind.  251  267 

Woolley  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  214  390 

Woolsey  v.   State,  30  Tex.  App. 

346  367 

Wooten  V.  State,  119  Ga.  745  35 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  428 

156,  157 

V.  Wilkins,  39  Ga.  223  106 

Work  V.  Corrington,  34  Ohio  St. 

64  499 

Workman     v.     State,     4     Sneed 

(Tenn.)   425  188 

Worthington  v.   Mencer,  96  Ala. 

3T0  204 

Wray  v.  People,  78  111.  212  269 

V.  State,  154  Ala.  36  265 

Wren  v.  State.  70  Ala.  i  475 

Wright,  Ex  parte,  65  Ind.  504  460 

Wright  V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va. 

183                                             377,  378 

V.  Hicks,  12  Ga.  155  526 

V.  Mayer,  6  Ves.  Jr.  280  176 

V.  People,  61  111.  382  284 

V.  People,  4  Neb.  407  157 

V.  State,  108  Ala.  60  384 

V.  State,  138  Ala.  69  423 

V.  State,  148  Ala.  596            58,  354 

V.  State,  149  Ala.  28  221 

V.  State,  30  Ga.  325  310 

V.  State,  88  Md.  705  97 

V.  State,  SO  Miss.  332             40,  133 

V.  State,  21  Neb.  496  6 

V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  358  293 

V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  670  474 

V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  354     390,  39i 

V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  447  493 

Wroe  V.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  460    61,  108 


e  to  Sections.] 

Wrye  v.  State,  95  Ga.  466  58,  189 

Wyatt  V.  People,  17  Colo.  252        257 

V.  State     (Tex.),    114    S.    W. 

812  89,  358 

Wylie  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

182  ^6 

\V>nn     V.     Commonwealth     (Ky. 
1909),  122  S.  W.  516  358 


Yancey  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  366      314 

Yanke  v.  State,  51  Wis.  464 

60,  61,  245 

Yarborough  v.  State,  41  Ala.  405      89 

Yarbrough  v.  State,  105  Ala.  43        55 
V.  State,  115  Ala.  92  301 

Yates  V.  People,  38  111.  527  228 

V.  People,  32  N.  Y.  509  446 

V.  State,  10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  549    35 

Yeoman  v.  State,  21  Neb.  171  395 

Young,  In  re,  137  N.  Car.  552  448 

Young  V.  People,  221  111.  51        42,  44 
V.  State,  68  Ala.  569  129 

V.  State,  95  Ala.  4  320 

V.  State,  149  Ala.  16  23 

V.  State,  155  Ala.  145  439 

V.  State,  65  Ga.  525  i73 

V.  State,  122  Ga.  725  205 

V.  State,  131  Ga.  498  522 

V.  State,  90  Md.  579  140 

V.  State    (Tex.  Cr.   App.),  44 

S.  W.  835  69 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1907), 

102  S.  W.  1 144  162 

V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1908), 

113  S.  W.  276  88 

V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  207 

48,  50 
V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  417  323 

Young    Ah    Gow,    Ex    parte,    73 
Cal.  438  511 

Younger  v.  State,  80  Neb.  201   58a,  81 


Zabriskie  v.  State,  43  N.  L.  L.  640 

19,  390,  392,  393 
Zackery  v.  State,  6  Ga.  App.  104    383 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Zeehandelear,   Ex  parte,   71    Cal. 

238  226 

Zeigler  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  632        192 
Zimmerman    v.    People,    117    111. 

App.  54  532 

Zink  V.  People,  77  N.  Y.  114  435 

Zipperian  v.  People,  2;^  Colo.  134 

106,  no,  223 


Zoldoske  v.  State,  82  Wis.  580 

7,  89,  225,  318 
Zollicoffer  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App. 

312  69 

Zucker  v.  Karpeles,  88  Mich.  413     221 
Zuckerman  v.  People,  213  111.  114 

126,  147a,  282 


CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE. 


CHAPTER  I. 


CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE   AND   REASONABLE   DOUBT. 


1.  Necessity  for  rules  of  evidence 

in  judicial  proceedings. 

2.  Elements  of  probability  and  im- 

probability as  affecting  the 
proof  of  facts  and  circum- 
stances. 

3.  The  character  and  mental  capac- 

ity of  a  witness  as  relating  to 
the  credibility  of  his  testimony. 

4.  The   motive    of    the   witness    to 

misrepresent. 

5.  Concurrent  or  corroborative  tes- 

timony. 

6.  Circumstantial  evidence — To  sus- 

tain conviction  must  exclude 
every  rational  hypothesis  ex- 
cept that  of  guilt. 

7.  Circumstantial  evidence  to  prove 

corpus  delicti  in  trial  for 
homicide. 

8.  Distinction     between    civil     and 

criminal  proceedings  as  re- 
gards relevancy  and  manner 
of  proof. 


9.  The  weight  of  evidence — Rules 
in  civil  and  criminal  cases  dis- 
tinguished— Reasonable   doubt. 

10.  Difficulty  of  defining  reasonable 

doubt. 

11.  Demonstration    and    belief    be- 

yond a  reasonable  doubt  dis- 
tinguished. 

12.  Attempted  definitions  of  reason- 

able doubt. 

13.  Precaution  to  be  employed  in  de- 

fining reasonable  doubt. 

14.  Doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  ap- 

plicable   to    misdemeanors    as 
well  as  to  felonies. 

15.  Reasonable  doubt  in  the  mind  of 

one  juror. 

16.  Statutory    changes    in    rules    of 

evidence    and   modes    of   pro- 
cedure. 
i6a.  Number    of   witnesses    required 
and  positive  and  negative  evi- 
dence. 


§  1.  Necessity  for  rules  of  evidence  in  judicial  proceedings. — That 
the  major  part  of  the  knowledge  which  is  possessed  l)y  any  indi- 
vidual is  derived  wholly  from  information  imparted  to  him  by 
others  is  a  truism.  In  other  words  the  facts  which  constitute  the 
starting  point  in  the  search  for  truth  in  any  sphere  of  investigation 
are  usually  furnished  to  the  mind  through  other  channels  than 

(I) 


g    2  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  2 

observation  or  experience.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  the 
judicial  investigation  of  crime,  by  means  of  trial  by  jury,  for  the 
fact  that  any  person  has  a  knowledge  of  the  facts  of  the  crime  is 
sufficient  to  disqualify  him  as  a  juror.  So,  too,  the  jurors  are 
sworn  to  render  a  verdict  upon  the  evidence  alone,  and  if  any  one 
of  them  knows  anything  of  his  own  knowledge  he  must  be  sworn 
as  a  witness. 

We  must  recognize  the  fact  that  the  disposition  to  believe,  that 
is,  to  rely  upon  what  others  tell  us,  is  inherent,  and  persists  until 
we  become  incredulous,  and  learn  to  distrust  the  statements  of  our 
fellows  because  we  may  have  been  so  frequently  deceived  by 
them.  For  at  a  very  early  period  in  life  we  learn,  because  of  the 
falsehoods  uttered  to  us,  or  to  others  in  our  hearing,  that  an 
urgent  necessity  exists  for  the  discovery  of  principles,  and  the 
creation  and  use  of  rules,  by  which  the  truth  of  what  is  said  may 
be  separated  from  the  false.  Hence,  the  necessity  and  importance 
of  rules  of  evidence  which  will  facilitate  the  ascertainment  of 
truth. 

Besides  the  technical  rules  which  regulate  the  science  of  judi- 
cial evidence  and  the  production  and  employment  of  testimony  in 
court,  other  well-known  principles  of  general  application  in  every- 
day life  exist  which  are  commonly  employed  in  ascertaining  the 
truth.  These  we  must  now  consider. 

§  2.  Elements  of  probability  and  improbability  as  affecting  the 
proof  of  facts  and  circumstances. — The  truth  of  any  statement  of 
fact  may  be  considered  from  the  standpoint  of  the  probability  or 
improbability  of  the  fact  per  se.  Its  probability  or  improbability 
is  to  be  measured  by  the  degree  with  which  the  fact  stated  accords 
with  the  general  experience  of  mankind.  If  the  new  fact  is  in 
accord  with  other  facts  which  are  a  part  of  the  sum  total  of  our 
knowledge,  we  say  it  is  probable,  and  less  evidence,  or  evidence 
of  a  less  satisfactory  character,  is  required  to  convince  us  of  its 
truth  than  when  the  new  fact  is  wholly  unlike  anything  in  our 
experience.  Thus,  we  may  readily  believe  that  a  man  is  dead  if 
it  be  proved  that  he  has  had  a  knife  thrust  through  his  heart, 
from  our  knowledge  of  the  physiological  functions  of  that  organ 
and  the  mortal  character  of  such  a  wound. 

The  confirmation  of  the  truth  of  a  statement  of  fact  by  means 


3         CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.        §    3 

of  knowledge  already  possessed  will  vary  according  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  new  fact  and  the  situation  of  the  individual.  So  a 
statement  involving  a  scientific  discovery  or  invention,  as,  for 
example,  that  oral  communication  can  be  had  by  telephone  be- 
tween persons  w'ho  are  hundreds  of  miles  apart,  will  be  regarded 
as  extremely  probable  or  as  utterly  absurd,  according  as  it  is 
made  to  a  well-educated  man  or  to  an  illiterate  savage.  If  the 
new  fact  is  utterly  irreconcilable,  not  only  with  the  experience 
and  knowledge  already  possessed  by  us,  but  with  the  known  laws 
that  govern  the  operation  of  the  physical  universe,  we  say  that 
it  is  impossible,  that  it  cannot  be  true.  The  dividing  line  between 
the  possible  and  the  probable  is  difficult  of  ascertainment.  It 
wavers  according  to  the  general  comprehension  of  the  rules  which 
regulate  the  physical  universe  and  the  mutations  of  human  affairs. 
So  that  new  facts  which  now  seem  utterly  impossible^  may,  in  the 
light  of  a  fuller  investigation  and  knowledge  of  natural  law^s,  be 
regarded  merely  as  improbable. 

So  if  it  should  be  asserted  as  a  fact  that  an  idiot  or  an  imbecile, 
wdiile  absolutely  devoid  of  mental  capacity,  had  successfully 
demonstrated  an  abstruse  scientific  problem,  the  impossibility  that 
such  a  statement  was  true  would  cause  its  immediate  rejection. 
If,  however,  it  were  asserted  that  an  idiot  had,  after  a  surgical 
operation,  manifested  a  limited  degree  of  mental  power,  we  would 
not,  in  view  of  the  wonderful  modern  development  of  surgical 
science,  regard  such  an  assertion  as  impossible,  though  it  may  be 
highly  improbable.  A  statement  affirming  a  fact  which  is  im- 
possible is  absolutely  incredible,  and  no  testimony  can  make  us 
believe  it.  But  the  mere  possibility  of  an  event  does  not  render  a 
statement  credible  except  so  far  as  its  probability  appears  upon  a 
comparison  w^ith  our  experience.  So  it  is  possible  for  a  very 
strong  man  to  lift  a  barrel  of  merchandise  w^eighing  several  hun- 
dred pounds.  But  the  statement  that  a  person  of  ordinary  strength 
had  stolen  a  barrel  containing  four  hundred  pounds  of  lead,  and 
had,  without  any  means  of  conveyance,  carried  the  same  half  a 
mile,  is  so  improbable  that  no  sane  man  would  believe  it.^ 

§  3.  The  character  and  mental  capacity  of  a  witness  as  relating  to 
the  credibility  of  his  testimony. — Our  knowledge  that  a  witness 

a  See  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2708,  et  seq. 


g    3  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  4 

habitually  tells  the  truth  is  a  most  important  element  in  forming 
our  estimate  of  the  credibility  of  his  evidence.  For  this  reason  it 
is  always  permissible  to  show  that  a  witness  is  reputed  to  be  un- 
truthful or  immoral  among  those  who  know  him  best,  and  by  such 
an  attack  upon  his  character  for  veracity,  morality  the  credibility 
of  his  evidence  may  be  impeached.  And  the  same  principle  is  at 
the  basis  of  impeachment  by  proving  contradictory  statements. 

An  habitual  respect  for  truth,  while  very  important,  is  but  one 
element  in  credibility.  It  is  necessary  that  the  witness  should  pos- 
sess adecjuate  mental  capacity  to  comprehend  the  facts  to  which 
he  is  testifying.  He  should  also  have  had  a  reasonably  good  op- 
portunity for  observation  and  should  have  directed  his  attention 
to  the  facts  in  question.  Because  of  the  absence  of  fully  developed 
mental  powers,  the  evidence  of  infants  and  weak-minded  or  in- 
sane persons,  while  no  longer  incompetent,  is  only  credible  so  far 
as  their  mental  capacity  is  commensurate  with  the  facts  seen  and 
testified  to  by  them.^ 

The  memory  of  a  witness  must  also  be  considered.  Some  per- 
sons have  a  good  memory  for  abstract  principles,  while  finding 
it  extremely  difficult,  and  often  impossible,  to  recollect  facts, 
figures  or  faces.  Others  have  a  good  verbal  memory,  which  re- 
tains accurately  and  fully  the  language  of  others.  With  the  great 
majority  of  persons,  however,  the  memory  is  chiefly  concerned 
with  and  exercised  upon  the  common  events  and  incidents  of  their 
own  experience ;  or  of  the  experience  of  others  with  whom  they 
have  maintained  social  or  business  relations.  Hence,  it  follows 
that  facts  which  most  affect  the  personal  interests  of  the  witness 
will  make  the  deepest  impression  on  his  memory,  and  his  mind 
will  be  most  active  and  retentive  of  that  knowledge  the  recollec- 
tion of  which  will  be  of  the  greatest  advantage  to  him. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  noted  that  the  vividness  of  the 
recollection  of  an  event  is  in  proportion  to  its  proximity  in  point 
of  time  as  well  as  its  personal  importance  in  relation  to  the  wit- 
ness. So  where  the  trial  takes  place  many  years  after  the  commis- 
sion of  a  crime,  the  facts  that  the  chief  prosecuting  witness  was  a 

^Post,  §  202;  Elliott  Ev.,  §  272T.  802;  necessity  of  instructions  as  to 
For  comprehensive  note  on  circum-  law  of  circumstantial  evidence,  see 
stantial  evidences,  see  97  Am.  St.  771-    69  L.  R.  A.  I93-2I7- 


5         CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.       §    4 

young  child  at  the  date  of  the  crime  and  that  the  other  witnesses 
for  the  state  are  now  very  old  are  to  be  considered  by  the  jury." 

§  4.  The  motive  of  the  witness  to  misrepresent. — Though  we  may 
have  been  repeatedly  deceived  by  the  misrepresentations  of  others, 
we  find,  by  experience,  that  men,  as  a  rule,  tell  the  truth.  Where 
neither  prejudice  nor  passion  exists,  and  where  the  individual  has 
no  private  or  personal  interests  to  advance  by  distorting  the  truth, 
we  may  rely  upon  the  credibility  of  his  testimony,  if  it  is  probable 
and  if  we  know  him  to  be  an  intelligent  man,  possessing  adequate 
powers  and  opportunities  for  acquiring  knowledge.  The  entire 
absence  of  all  motive  to  give  false  testimony  justifies  an  assump- 
tion that  his  testimony  is  true,  for  sane  men  do  not  usually  act 
without  motive,  and  will  not  ordinarily  violate  the  principles  of 
truth  without  some  object  in  doing  so,  particularly  if  they  are 
questioned  under  oath,  with  the  fear  of  punishment  for  perjury 
before  their  eyes.  Accordingly,  in  the  case  of  persons,  such  as 
police  and  private  detectives  and  others  engaged  in  the  detection 
of  crime,  or  expert  witnesses  who  testify  under  pay,^  wdio,  from 
their  professional  occupation,  character,  or  position,  are  inclined 
to  take  prejudiced  or  distorted  view^s  of  human  nature,  it  will  re- 
quire a  high  degree  of  credibility  in  the  evidence  to  satisfy  the 
mind  of  an  impartial  hearer. 

On  the  other  hand,  where  no  motive  can  be  imagined  strong 
enough  to  prompt  the  witness  to  make  a  false  statement,  and 
where  all  motives  that  exist  in  his  bosom  prompt  him  to  tell  the 
truth,  we  have  every  reason  to  accept  his  evidence  as  credible, 
irrespective  of  the  poor  opinion  we  may  have  of  his  veracity  under 
circumstances  where  he  would  have  a  motive  to  misrepresent  the 
truth. 

Again,  our  belief  in  the  truthfulness  of  a  witness  is  confirmed 
when  we  find  him  narrating  incidents  which  we  have  ourselves 
observed,  when  placed  in  similar  circumstances.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  may  relate  minor  incidents  which,  being  credible  and 
probable,  as  well  as  consistent  with  the  main  facts,  are  so  startling 

"  People  V.  Hancock,  7  Utah  170,  25  cause    in    which    they    are    embarked 

Pac.  1093.  that    hardly    any    weight    should    be 

^"Skilled  witnesses  come  with  such  given  to  their  evidence."  Tracy,  hire, 

a  bias  on  their  minds  to  support  the  10  CI.  &  F.  154,  191. 


8    5  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  O 

and  original  that,  considering-  his  mental  capacity,  they  could  not 
have  been  invented  by  him. 

§  5.  Concurrent  or  corroborative  testimony. — The  confidence  we 
place  in  the  testimony  of  a  witness  may  be  increased  or  diminished 
by  the  concurrence  of  his  testimony  with  that  of  others.  If  the 
testimony  of  other  witnesses  to  the  same  facts,  or  to  facts  calcu- 
lated to  produce  as  evidence  the  same  results,  is  credible  in  itself, 
consistent  with  the  testimony  first  offered,  and  the  character  of 
the  witnesses  is  not  impeached,  the  corroboration,  in  the  absence 
of  collusion,  is  almost  conclusive.  The  same  result  is  effected 
where  the  evidence  of  one  witness  is  confirmed  by  that  of  another 
witness  to  the  same  facts,  and  it  also  appears  that  the  witnesses 
are  hostile  to  each  other  and  hence  actuated  by  different  motives. 
Here  the  relations  of  both  witnesses  to  the  issue  are  so  diametri- 
cally opposed  that  collusion  is  absolutely  impossible. 

No  witness  can  fairly  be  expected  to  remember  all  the  details 
of  any  transaction,  and  if  he  claims  to  do  so  suspicion  is  quickly 
aroused.  But  where  he  unintentionally  omits  details  which  are 
supplied  by  other  witnesses,  or  where  he  apparently  contradicts 
other  witnesses  on  minor  points  and  the  contradiction  is  fully 
reconcilable  by  any  one  who  possesses  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
whole  subject  or  transaction,  his  hearers  may  well  feel  justified 
in  believing  that  his  narrative  is  trustworth}^  because  wholly  un- 
premeditated and  unfabricated  by  him. 

Another  element  affecting  the  credibility  of  evidence  is  found 
in  the  frequent  occurrence  of  undesigned  coincidences,  which, 
though  sometimes  startling  and  unexpected,  are  unaccountable 
except  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  narrative,  of  which  they  form 
a  part,  is  true.  No  event  stands  alone.  It  is  the  result  of  others 
which  precede  it.  It  may  in  its  turn  be  the  fruitful  cause  of  many 
others  which  follow  or  relate  to  it.  So  every  fact  or  circumstance 
is  connected  with  others  of  a  collateral  nature,  rendering  it  well 
nigh  impossible  for  any  one  to  concoct  a  narrative  which,  upon 
comparison  with  other  and  related  circumstances,  will  stand  the 
test.  Even  by  comparing  the  various  parts  of  the  story,  a  mind 
trained  in  the  habit  of  investigation  may  quickly  ascertain  the 
truth  or  falsity  of  the  narrative ;  for,  in  such  a  case,  the  fabrica- 
tion, however  skillfully  constructed,  will  crumble  to  pieces  by 
reason  of  its  inherent  lack  of  verity. 


7         CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.       §    0 

Again,  the  well-recognized  connection  often  observed  between 
collateral  or  subordinate  facts  which  are  proved  or  admitted  and 
the  main  fact  in  issue  frequently  furnishes  most  cogent  and  satis- 
factory proof  of  the  existence  of  the  latter.  This  is  only  applying 
to  the  law  of  evidence  the  principles  of  inductive  reasoning,  which 
are  used,  often  unconsciously,  by  all  men  in  the  conduct  of  their 
most  trivial  as  well  as  of  their  most  important  affairs.  Such  a 
process  furnishes  a  basis  for  the  division  of  evidence  into  direct 
and  circumstantial.  Direct  evidence  of  the  crime  is  the  evidence 
of  an  eye-witness  that  it  was  committed.  This  includes  in  crim- 
inal law,  the  confessions  and  admissions  of  the  accused  and  dying 
declarations.  Circumstantial  evidence  consists  of  facts  proved 
from  which  the  jury  may  infer  by  a  process  of  reasoning  or  in- 
ference that  the  accused  committed  the  crime.  The  application  of 
the  principles  of  reasoning  allows  the  jury  to  draw  inferences  or 
presumptions,  of  fact  from  other  facts  which  are  proved  to  their 
complete  satisfaction.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rules  of  circum- 
stantial evidence  have  opened  the  door  for  presumptions  of  law, 
which  are  only  presumptions  of  fact  that  have,  from  frequent  re- 
currence, become  rules  of  law.* 

§  6.  Circumstantial  evidence — To  sustain  conviction  must  exclude 
every  rational  hypothesis  except  that  of  guilt. — The  necessity  of  fre- 
quent resort  to  circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  guilt  in  criminal 

*"A1I  evidence  is,  in  a  strict  sense,  credibility   of   witnesses.     The   mind 

more  or  less  circumstantial ;  whether  may  be  reluctant  to  conclude  upon  the 

consisting  of  facts  which  permit  the  issue  of  guilt  in  criminal  cases  upon 

inference  of  guilt,  or  whether  given  evidence  which  is  not  direct,  and  yet, 

by  eye-witnesses;    for   the   testimony  if   the    facts  brought   out,    taken   to- 

of   eye-witnesses   is   based   upon   cir-  gether,  all  point  in  the  one  direction 

cumstances    more    or    less    distinctly  of  guilt,  and  to  the  exclusion  of  any 

and  directly  observed.    But,  of  course,  other  hypothesis  there  is  no  substan- 

there  is  a  difference  between  evidence  tial  reason  for  reluctance.   Purely  cir- 

consisting  in  facts  of  a  peculiar  na-  cumstantial    evidence    may    be    often 

ture,   and   hence   giving  rise_  to  pre-  more  satisfactory  and  a  safer  form 

sumptions,  and  evidence  which  is  di-  of   evidence,    for   it   must    rest   upon 

rect    as    consisting    in    the    positive  facts  which  must  tend  collectively  to 

testimony  of  witnesses,  and  the  dif-  establish   the    guilt    of   the    accused." 

ference  is  material   according  to   the  Gray,  J.,  in  People  v.  Harris,  136  N. 

degree  of  exactness  and  relevancy,  the  Y.  423,  428,  33  N.  E.  65. 
weight  of  the  circumstances  and  the 


§  6 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


8 


proceedings  is  apparent  in  the  very  nature  of  things.  Whenever 
it  is  possible  the  criminal  will  endeavor  to  perform  his  nefarious 
deeds  in  secrecy,  and  where  no  eye-witnesses  are  present  to  behold 
him.  So  he  will  choose  the  time  and  occasion  which  are  most 
favorable  to  concealment,  and  sedulously  scheme  to  render  detec- 
tion impossible.  Circumstantial  evidence  alone  is  enough  to  sup- 
port a  verdict  of  guilty  of  the  most  heinous  crime,  provided  the 
jury  believe  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  accused  is  guilty 
upon  the  evidence.^  No  greater  degree  of  certainty  in  proof  is  re- 
quired where  the  evidence  is  all  circumstantial  than  where  it  is  di- 
rect, for  in  either  case  the  jury  must  be  convinced  of  the  prisoner's 
guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.^  They  are  bound  by  their  oath 
to  render  a  verdict  upon  all  the  evidence,  and  the  law  makes  no 
distinction  between  direct  evidence  of  a  fact  and  evidence  of  cir- 
cumstances from  which  the  existence  of  the  fact  may  be  inferred.'^ 


°  Carlton  v.  People,  150  111.  181,  187, 
'i'j  N.  E.  244,  41  Am.  St.  346;  State 
V.  Atkinson,  40  S.  Car.  363,  18  S. 
E.  1021,  42  Am.  St.  877;  People  v. 
Cronin,  34  Cal.  191,  202;  People  v. 
Daniels  (Cal.),  34  Pac.  233;  State  v. 
Hunter,  50  Kan.  302,  304,  32  Pac.  2)7  \ 
State  V.  Avery,  113  Mo.  475,  495,  21 
S.  W.  193;  State  V.  Slingerland,  19 
Nev.  135,  141,  7  Pac.  280;  State  v. 
Elsham,  70  Iowa  531,  31  N.  W.  66; 
State  V.  Moelchen,  53  Iowa  310,  5  N. 
W.  186;  Epps  V.  State,  102  Ind.  539, 
554,  I  N.  E.  491 ;  Griffin  v.  State,  2 
Ga.  App.  534,  58  S.  E.  781;  Murphy 
V.  State,  118  Ga.  780,  45  S.  E.  609; 
Commonwealth  v.  Sheffer,  218  Pa. 
437,  d'j  Atl.  761 ;  Vernon  v.  United 
States,  146  Fed.  121,  76  C.  C.  A.  547; 
Oakley  v.  State,  135  Ala.  29,  2>2,  So. 
693;  Martin  v.  State,  125  Ala.  64,  28 
So.  92;  People  V.  Hiltel,  131  Cal.  577, 
63  Pac.  919;  State  v.  Evans,  i  Marv. 
(Del.)  477,  41  Atl.  136;  Andrews  v. 
State,  116  Ga.  83,  42  S.  E.  476;  State 
V.  Hunter,  50  Kan.  302,  32  Pac.  Z7', 
Thomas  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  20 
S.  W.  226,  14  Ky.  L.  288;  Cunning- 


ham V.  State,  56  Neb.  691,  "/y  X.  W. 
60;  State  V.  Atkinson,  40  S.  Car.  363, 
18  S.  E.  1021,  42  Am.  St.  877;  Bill  v. 
State,  5  Humph.  (Tenn.)  155.  Direct 
and  circumstantial  evidence  differ 
merely  in  their  logical  relation  to  the 
fact  in  issue.  Evidence  as  to  the  ex- 
istence of  the  fact  is  direct.  Circum- 
stantial evidence  is  composed  of  facts 
which  raise  a  logical  inference  as  to 
the  existence  of  the  fact  in  issue.  A 
conviction  may  well  be  had  upon  cir- 
cumstantial evidence,  but  to  warrant 
such  conviction  the  proven  facts  must 
not  only  be  consistent  with  the  hy- 
pothesis of  guilt,  but  must  clearly  and- 
satisfactorily  exclude  every  other  rea- 
sonable hypothesis  save  that  of  guilt. 
United  States  v.  Greene,  146  Fed.  803. 

*  Though  circumstantial  evidence  is 
often  the  most  satisfactory  and  con- 
vincing that  can  be  produced,  the 
convincing  effect  that  follows  from 
positive  evidence  is  not  necessarily 
expected.  State  v.  Levy,  9  Idaho  483, 
75  Pac.  227. 

^  Spraggins  v.  State,  139  Ala.  93,  35 
So.   1000.     "A  fact  has  the  sense  of 


9         CIRCUMSTAXTIAL    EVIDENCE    AXD    REASONABLE    DOUBT.       §    6 

Hence  a  prejudice  against  circumstantial  evidence  may  be  suffi- 
cient to  disqualify  a  person  who  entertains  it  from  serving  as  a 
member  of  the  jury.^  But  to  sustain  a  verdict  founded  on  circum- 
stances not  directly  proving  a  crime,  the  circumstances  themselves 
must  be  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury.  The  danger  that 
the  jurors,  unused  to  logical  mental  processes,  may  assume  as 
proved  circumstances  in  support  of  which  the  evidence  is  wholly 
or  partially  inadequate,  is  always  present.  It  has  been  often  said 
that  witnesses  may  lie,  but  that  circumstances  never  do.  It  should 
not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  the  circumstances  from  which 
guilt  may  be  inferred  must  be  proved  by  the  direct  evidence  of 
witnesses  who  saw  them,  and  that  such  witnesses  may  misrepre- 
sent or  forget,  or  be  mistaken  as  to  the  circumstances  they  tes- 
tify to. 

The  first  duty  of  the  jury  is  to  determine  carefully  upon  all  the 
testimony  as  stated  by  the  witnesses  whether  the  incriminating 
circumstances,  from  which  they  may  infer  guilt,  are  proved,  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt.''  No  general  rule  can  or  should  be  laid 
down  as  to  what  constitutes  proof  of  circumstances  in  any  par- 
ticular case.  Each  case  is  a  rule  unto  itself,  and  is  to  be  deter- 
mined upon  its  peculiar  circumstances.  But  all  the  circumstances 
as  proved  must  be  consistent  with  each  other,  and,  taken  together, 
they  must  point  surely  and  unerringly  in  the  direction  of  guilt. 

and  is  equivalent  to   a  truth  or  that  65;  State  v.  McKay  (N.  Car.),  63  S*. 

which  is  real.     It  is  in  the  ingenious  E.    1059.      Circumstantial   evidence  is 

combination   of   facts  that  they  may  admissible,  though  there  are  ej^e-wit- 

be    made    to    deceive    or    to    express  nesses  to  the  crime.     Commonwealth 

what  is  not  the  truth.    In  the  evidence  v.  Karamarkovic,  218  Pa.  405,  67  Atl. 

of  eye-witnesses  to  prove  the  facts  of  650;    State  v.   Ryder,  80  Vt.  422,  68 

an   occurrence,   we   are  not   guaran-  Atl.   652;    State  v.   Tyre    (Del.),   67 

teed    against   mistake   and   falsehood,  Atl.  199;  State  v.  Cephus   (Del.),  67 

or  the  distortion  of  truth  by  exagger-  Atl.     150;    Tatum    v.     State,     i     Ga. 

ation  or  prejudice,  but  when  we  are  App.    778,    57    S.    E.    956;    Riley    v. 

dealing  with  a  number  of  established  State,  i  Ga.  App.  651,  57  S.  E.  1031; 

facts,   if,  upon  arranging,  examining  State  v.  Samuels  (Del.),  67  Atl.  164. 
and  weighing  them  in  our  mind,  we        *  State  v.  Leabo,  89  Mo.  247,  252,  I 

reach    only    the    conclusion    of    guilt,  S.    W.    288;    Cluverius    v.    Common- 

the    judgment    rests    upon    pillars    as  wealth,  81  Va.  787,  794,  795 ;  State  v. 

substantial   and  as   sound  as   though  West,  69  Mo.  401,  33  Am.  506. 
resting   upon    the   testimony    of   eye-        "Jenkins   v.    State,  62   Wis.   49,   21 

witnesses."      Gray,    J.,    in    People    v.  N.  W.  232. 
Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423,  429,  33  N.  E. 


§  6 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


lO 


All  the  facts  and  circumstances  taken  together  as  proved  must 
not  only  be  consistent  with  the  inference  that  the  accused  is  guilty, 
but  they  must  at  the  same  time  be  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis 
that  he  is  innocent  and  with  every  other  rational  hypothesis." 

AVhere  the  only  incriminating  evidence  for  the  prosecution  is 
circumstantial,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  instruct  upon  the 


"State  V.  Johnson,  19  Iowa  230; 
State  V.  Miller,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  564, 
571,  32  Atl.  137;  Echols  V.  State,  81 
Ga.  696,  699,  8  S.  E.  443;  Green  v. 
State,  51  Ark.  189,  10  S.  W.  266; 
Findley  v.  State,  S  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
576,  579,  36  Am.  Dec.  557;  James  v. 
State,  45  Miss.  572,  575 ;  State  v.  As- 
bell,  57  Kan.  398,  46  Pac.  770;  People 
V.  Ward,  105  Gal.  335,  38  Pac.  945; 
State  V.  David,  131  Mo.  380,  33  S.  W. 
28;  Jones  V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
490,  30  S.  W.  1059;  State  V.  Avery, 
113  Mo.  475,  495,  21  S.  W.  193;  State 
V.  Miller,  100  Mo.  606,  626,  13  S.  W. 
832,  1051 ;  Gommonwealth  v.  Good- 
win, 14  Gray  (Mass.)  55;  Chitister 
V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  635,  638,  28 
S.  W.  683;  State  V.  Hunter,  50  Kan. 
302,  306,  32  Fac.  37;  Kennedy  v. 
State,  31  Fla.  428,  12  So.  858;  State 
V.  Davenport,  38  S.  Car.  348,  352,  17 
S.  E.  37;  Carlton  v.  People,  150  111. 
181,  37  X.  E.  244,  41  Am.  St.  346; 
Gannon  v.  People,  127  111.  507,  521, 
21  N.  E.  525,  II  Am.  St.  147;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Costley,  118  Mass.  i; 
Coleman  v.  People,  26  Fla.  61,  71,  7 
So.  367;  Lancaster  v.  State,  91  Tenn. 
267,  18  S.  W.  777;  State  V.  Keeler, 
28  Iowa  551,  553 ;  People  v.  Foley,  64 
Mich.  148,  31  N.  W.  94;  Wright  v. 
State,  21  Neb.  496,  32  N.  W.  576; 
People  V.  Aiken,  66  ]\Iich.  460,  33  N. 
W.  821,  II  Am.  St.  512;  Cavender  v. 
State,  126  Ind.  47,  48,  35  N.  E.  875; 
United  States  v.  Reder,  69  Fed.  965; 
Hamilton  v.  State,  96  Ga.  301,  22  S. 


E.  528;  Smith  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  618,  33  S.  W.  339,  34  S.  W.  960; 
Howard  v.  State,  108  Ala.  571,  18  So. 
813;  Wantland  v.  State,  14S  Ind.  38, 
43  N.  E.  931 ;  State  v.  Hart,  94 
Iowa  749,  64  N.  W.  278;  Webb  v. 
State,  73  Miss.  456,  19  So.  238;  Bal- 
dez  V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  413,  35 
S.  W.  664;  State  V.  Moxley,  102  Mo. 
374,  14  S.  W.  969;  People  V.  Shuler, 
28  Cal.  490,  496;  Morgan  v.  State,  51 
Neb.  672,  71  N.  W.  788;  Sherrill  v. 
State,  138  Ala.  3,  35  So.  129;  Neilson 
V.  State,  40  So.  221,  146  Ala.  683  (not 
reported  in  full)  ;  Duckworth  v. 
State,  83  Ark.  192,  103  S.  W.  601; 
State  V.  Tilghman  (Del.),  63  Atl.  772; 
State  V.  Emorj-,  5  Penn.  (Del.)  126, 
58  Atl.  1036;  Mangum  v.  State,  — 
Ga.  App.  — ,  63  S.  E.  543;  Long  v. 
State,  —  Ga.  App.  — ,62  S.  E.  711; 
Campbell  v.  State,  123  Ga.  533,  51 
S.  E.  644;  State  v.  Sweizewski,  73 
Kan.  733,  85  Pac.  800;  State  v.  Ter- 
rio,  98  Me.  17,  56  Atl.  217;  State  v. 
Psycher,  179  Mo.  140,  77  S,  W.  836; 
State  V.  Francis,  199  Mo.  671,  98  S. 
W.  11;  State  V.  Morney,  196  Mo.  43, 
93  S.  W.  1 1 17;  Shumway  v.  State, 
—  Neb.  — ,  117  N.  W.  407;  Sweet  v. 
State,  75  Neb.  263,  106  N,  W.  31; 
State  V.  Hutchings,  30  Utah  319,  84 
Pac.  893 ;  Schwantes  v.  State,  127 
Wis.  160,  106  N.  W.  237;  State  v. 
Abbott,  —  W.  Va.  — ,  62  S.  E.  693 ; 
State  V.  Trail,  59  W.  Va.  175,  53  S. 
E.  17;  United  States  v.  Cole,  153  Fed. 
801 ;  United  States  v.  Breese,  131  Fed. 


I  I      CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.       §    6 


nature  of  circumstantial  evidence  and  upon  the  rules  of  law  regu- 
lating it.^^ 

If,  however,  there  is  some  direct  evidence  in  the  case  for  the 
state  which  would  be  sufficient,  if  believed  by  the  jury,  to  show 
the  prisoner's  guilt,  an  instruction  on  circumstantial  evidence  need 
not  be  given,  though  there  be  circumstantial  evidence  in  the  case/^ 

For  example,  if  the  confession  of  the  accused  is  direct  evidence 
of  his  guilt  an  instruction  on  circumstantial  evidence  is  not  re- 
quired. ^^ 

An  instruction  that  circumstantial  evidence  must  be  clear,  con- 
vincing and  conclusive,  excluding  all  rational  doubt  as  to  the 
prisoner's  guilt,  and  that  from  the  material  and  necessary  circum- 


915;  Bryant  v.  State,  116  Ala.  445,  23 
So.  40;  Medley  v.  State,  —  Ala.  — , 
47  So.  218;  Thayer  v.  State,  138  Ala, 
39,  35  So.  406;  Bones  v.  State,  117 
Ala.  138,  23  So.  138.  The  rule  of  the 
text  is  applied  to  the  facts  which  are 
found  by  the  jury  after  they  have 
heard  the  evidence  for  and  against 
the  accused  and  determined  what  is 
true  and  what  is  untrue.  It  should 
be  applied  not  to  the  items  of  evi- 
dence themselves,  as  these  are  given 
by  the  witness.  State  v.  Kidwell,  62 
W.  Va.  466,  59  S.  E.  494.  The  state 
is  not  restricted  to  direct  proof  of  the 
date  of  the  offense.  Taylor  v.  State, 
62  S.  E.  1048;  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2709. 

"  Gilmore  v.  State,  99  Ala.  154,  13 
So.  536;  Jones  v.  State,  105  Ga.  649, 
31  S.  E.  574;  State  v.  Cohen,  108 
Iowa  208,  78  N.  W.  857,  75  Am.  St. 
213. 

^- Welch  V.  State,  124  Ala.  41,  27 
So.  307;  Vaughan  v.  State,  57  Ark. 
I,  20  S.  W.  588;  People  V.  Burns,  121 
Cal.  529,  53  Pac.  1096;  Langdon  v. 
People,  T33  111.  382,  408,  24  N.  E.  874 ; 
State  V.  Mitchell  (Iowa),  116  N.  W. 
808;  State  V.  Robinson,  117  Mo.  649, 
663,  23  S.  W.  1066 ;  State  v.  Donnelly, 
130  Mo.  642,  32  S.  W.  1124;  Purvis 
V.    State,   71    Miss.   706,   14   So.  268; 


State  V.  Wooley,  —  Mo.  — ,  115  S. 
W.  417;  State  V.  Calder,  2^  Mont. 
504,  59  Pac.  903 ;  Barnards  v.  State, 
88  Tenn.  183,  12  S.  W.  431 ;  Granado 
v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  426,  35  S. 
W.  1069;  Ellis  V.  State,  Z3  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  86,  87,  24  S.  W.  894;  White  v. 
State,  2>2  Tex.  Cr.  App.  625,  25  S.  W. 
784;  Wampler  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 
352,  353,  13  S.  W.  144- 

"  Green  v.  State,  97  Ala.  59,  12  So. 
416,  IS  So.  242;  Perry  v.  State,  no 
Ga.  234,  36  S.  E.  781 ;  State  v.  Robin- 
son, 117  Mo.  649,  2Z  S.  W.  1066; 
Mathews  v.  State,  41  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
98,  51  S.  W.  915.  "Despite  the  fact 
that  inferences  drawn  from  circum- 
stances may  be  and  often  are  errone- 
ous, circumstantial  evidence  may  be, 
and  in  many  cases  is,  as  conclusive 
and  convincing  as  the  direct  and  posi- 
tive testimony  of  eye-witnesses. 
Where  it  is  strong  and  satisfactory  to 
the  jurors  it  is  their  duty  to  act  on  it. 
They  should  give  it  its  just  and  fair 
weight,  and  if  upon  a  candid,  careful 
and  guarded  judgment  of  all  the  cir- 
cumstances proved  they  are  convinced 
of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  it  is  their 
duty  to  convict  him.  Tliey  may  not 
go  outside  of  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances proved  to  fancy  others  which 


§    7  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  12 

Stances  his  guilt  must  be  established  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
is  correct/* 

An  instruction  that  before  the  accused  can  be  convicted  upon 
circumstantial  evidence  alone  the  facts  must  form  a  complete 
chain  and  point  to  his  guilt  and  must  be  irreconcilable  with  any 
reasonable  theory  of  his  innocence,  and  that  the  facts  must  be 
such  as  to  exclude  to  a  moral  certainty  every  hypothesis  but  that 
of  his  guilt,  is  a  sufficient  charge  on  the  law  of  circumstantial 
evidence/^ 

§  7.  Circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  corpus  delicti  in  trial  for 
homicide. — The  rule  seems  at  one  time  to  have  prevailed  that-  a 
conviction  could  not  be  sustained,  so  far  as  a  charge  of  homicide 
was  concerned,  unless  the  corpus  delicti  was  proved  by  direct  evi- 
dence, which  in  such  case  necessitated  the  finding  of  the  victim's 
body.^''  As  an  objection  of  considerable  force  it  has  been  urged 
that  this  rule  offers  a  premium  on  homicide  by  proclaiming  to 
assassins  that  they  will  be  safe  from  punishment  if  they  shall  suc- 
ceed in  utterly  destroying  the  corpses  of  their  victims  by  fire  or 
chemicals,  or  by  sinking  them  to  a  great  depth  in  the  ocean,  so 
that  they  cannot  be  identified  by  direct  evidence.^'^ 

may  point  to  his  innocence,  but  are  274.      The    expression    corpus   delicti 

to  base  the  verdict  upon  the  reason-  has  been  somewhat  loosely  employed 

able  inferences  drawn  from  the  cir-  to    mean    two    separate    and    distinct 

cumstances    proven    that    reasonable  things.     In  its  original   and  primary 

men   would   entertain.      If   all   infer-  sense,     it    means    the     fact     that     a 

ences  thus  made  are  consistent  with  crime    has    been    committed    and    is 

the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  and  incon-  thus  defined  by  Webster's  Dictionary 

sistent  with  his  innocence,  then  they  and  in   Starkey   on    Evidence,    §  575. 

must  convict  him."    State  v.  Elsham,  The  fact  that  a  crime  has  been  com- 

70  Iowa  531,  31  N.  W.  66.  mitted  is  usually  not  so  much  a  fact 

^*  State  V.  Wilcox,  132  N.  Car.  1 120,  as    an    inference    from    other    facts 

44  S.  E.  625.  which   are   divided  into  two    classes, 

^®  State  v.   Sharpless,  212  ]\Io.   176,  the  first  of  which  is  the  facts  ccnsti- 

III  S.  W.  69.  tuting    the    circumstances     or    event 

^^2  Hale  P.  C.  290;  Rex  v.  Burdett,  aside  from  any  personal  agency  in  it, 

4  B.  &  Aid.  95.  and  second,  the  existence  of  a  crimi- 

"  United   States  v.   Gibert,   2    Sum.  nal  and  personal  agency  or  element. 

(U.   S.)    19,  27,  25  Fed.   Cas.   15204;  People  v.  Jones,  123  Cal.  65,  55  Pac. 

State  V.  Williams,  7  Jones  (N.  Car.)  698;  Pitts  v.  State,  43  Miss.  472;  Ru- 

446,  454,  78  Am.  Dec.  248n;  State  v.  lofif  v.  People,  18  N.  Y.  179.     Beside 

Westcott,  130  Iowa  i,  104  N.  W.  341 ;  this    and   particularly    in    relation    to 

Miles  V.  State,  129  Ga.  589,  59  S.  E.  the    crime    of    homicide,    the    words 


13      CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.       §    7 

There  are  many  cases,  however,  which  do  not  require  such 
direct  and  strict  proof  of  corpus  delicti,  but  allow  it  to  be  proved 
by  circumstantial  evidence  if  sufficiently  clear  and  cogent  to  con- 
vince the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  in  connection  with  the 
oth^r  evidence/^ 

This  would  be  the  case  where  it  is  proved  by  direct  evidence 
that  the  body  of  the  person  murdered  had  been  thrown  overboard 
and  never  subsequently  recovered  ;^^  or  where  the  body  has  been 
wholly  or  partly  consumed  by  fire."** 

Such  cases  may,  however,  be  regarded  as  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule  which  is  applicable  and  usually,  if  direct  evidence 
exists  of  the  death  of  the  victim  of  the  homicide,  it  will  be  re- 
quired."^ 

A  broader,  more  accurate  and  more  inclusive  statement  of  the 
general  rule  would  be  that  the  corpus  delicti  of  homicide  must  be 
proved  either  by  showing  that  the  party  alleged  to  have  been 
killed  is  actually  dead  by  proof  of  the  finding  and  identifying  his 
corpse,  or  by  showing  that  the  murder  was  accomplished  or  ac- 
companied by  the  employment  of  violence  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
sufficiently  account  for  the  disappearance  of  the  body  and  render 

have   required  a  secondary  meaning:  S.)    S7in;    Schwantes    v.    State,    127 

Then   they   mean   the   dead   body    or  Wis.  160,  106  N.  W.  237.     A  statute 

remains   of  the  victim  of  the  homi-  which    requires    direct   proof   of    the 

cide.      It    is    in    the    secondary   sense  death   of    a    person    alleged    to   have 

that  the  word  is  used  in  the  text  and  been  killed  does  not  exclude  evidence 

in  the  cases  which  are  cited  to  sup-  of   circumstances    indicating  identity, 

port  it.     See  Burrill  Law  Dictionary;  People  v.   Palmer,  109  N.  Y.  no,  16 

Wharton's    Crim.    Evid.,    §  325,    and  N.  E.  529,  4  Am.  St.  423,  or  evidence 

Burrill    on    Circumstantial    Evidence  of   resemblance   of   features   between 

119.  a   mutilated  body   which   was    found 

^^  Zoldoske   v.    State,  82   Wis.   580,  and  the  person  alleged  to  have  been 

52  N.  W.  778;   Rex  v.  Burdett,  4  B.  killed.     People   v.    Beckwith,    108   N. 

&  Aid.  95 ;  Lightf  oot  v.  State,  20  Tex.  Y.  67,  15  N.  E.  53. 

App.    77-100;    Johnson    v.    Common-  ^"United  States  v.  Williams,  i  Cliff, 

wealth,  81  Ky.  325;   State  v.  Dineen,  (U.  S.)  5,  28  Fed.  Cas.  16707. 

ID    Minn.    407 :    State   v.    Keeler,    28  -°  State  v.   Barnes,  47  Ore.   592,  85 

Iowa  551,  553;  Anderson  v.  State,  20  Pac.  998,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)   i8in. 

Fla.   381;   State  v.   Davidson,  30  Vt.  ^People    v.    Alviso,    55    Cal.    230; 

377,  73  Am.  Dec.  312;  State  v.  Wil-  State  v.  Williams,  7  Jones  (N.  Car.) 

Hams,  7  Jones  (N.  Car.)  446,  453,  78  446,  453,  78  Am.  Dec.  248n;  McCuI- 

Am.  Dec.  248n :  State  v.  Gillis,  7^  S.  loch  v.  State,  48  Ind.  109. 
Car.  318,  53  S.  E.  487,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N. 


§    8  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  I4 

direct  evidence  of  its  whereabouts  or  appearance  impossible  to  be 
obtained.  So  it  has  been  held  in  a  case  of  homicide  where  the 
body  of  the  victim  was  destroyed  that  it  was  not  necessary  to 
prove,  beyond  a  doubt,  the  precise  means  by  which  his  death  was 
produced."" 

The  evidence  of  an  accomplice  is  always  admissible  to  prove 
the  corpus  delicti  of  homicide  and  if  it  is  corroborated,  even  by 
the  confession  of  the  accused,  it  may  be  sufficient.-^ 

But  in  every  case  of  homicide,  if  a  body  is  found  or  if  any  re- 
mains are  found,  they  must  be  identified  as  those  of  the  victim. 
The  disappearance  of  the  person  supposed  to  have  been  killed 
vv'ith  circumstantial  evidence  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  will  not 
sustain  a  conviction  if  the  body  is  not  identified."'* 

§  8.  Distinction  between  civil  and  criminal  proceedings  as  regards 
relevancy  and  manner  of  proof. — It  has  been  remarked,  both  by  the 
writers  of  text-books  and  in  the  adjudications,  that  "there  is  no 
difference  in  the  rules  of  evidence  between  civil  and  criminal 
cases ;  what  may  be  received  in  the  one  may  be  received  in  the 
other ;  what  is  rejected  in  the  one  will  be  rejected  in  the  other.""^ 
And  such  a  rule  would  seem  to  be  not  only  just  and  logical,  but 
necessary  when  we  consider  that  the  sole  object  of  evidence  is  the 
ascertainment  of  truth ;  in  other  words,  that  every  species  of  evi- 
dence is  merely  a  means  towards  an  end,  and  that  end  the  estab- 
lishment or  discovery  of  facts  unknown  or  disputed.  However 
universal  such  a  principle  of  uniformity  may  have  been  in  the 

"  Smith  V.  Commonwealth,  21  Gratt.  609.     Evidence  of   scars,'  moles,  con- 

(Va.)    809,    820;    Pitts    V.    State,    43  genital    marks     or    those    artificially 

Miss.   472,   481 ;    State   v.    Keeler,  28  made,  as   by  tattooing,   the   color   of 

Iowa  551,  553;  Lancaster  v.  State,  91  the    hair    and    beard,    the    condition, 

Tenn.   267,   18  S.  W.   777',   Ruloff  v.  number  of  and  marks  on  the  teeth. 

People,  18  N.  Y.  179;  State  v.  Win-  the  measurement,  weight  and  stature 

ner,  17  Kan.  298;  State  v.  Dickson,  78  of  a  person  are  always  admissible  to 

Mo.   438;   State  v.   Davidson,  30  Vt.  identify    a    dead    body.      Lindsay    v. 

377,  386.  73   Am.   Dec.  312;   State  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143.    The  body  must 

Barrington,  198  Mo.  23,  95  S.  W.  235 ;  be    identified    as    that   of    the   person 

Schwantes  v.  State,  127  Wis.  160,  106  whose  death  is  the  subject  of  inquiry. 

N.  W.  237.     See,  also,  post,  §  338a.  Wall  v.  State,  —  Ga.  App.  — ,  6;^  S. 

-'Follis  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  E.  27. 
186,  loi  S.  W.  242.  ^  Rex  V.  Watson,  2  Stark.  104,  155. 

*•  Walker    v.    State,    14   Tex.    App. 


15      CIRCUMSTAXTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT,       §    8 

early  and  formative  period  of  the  common  law,  it  has  long  since 
ceased  to  be  so.  The  present  tendency  is  to  widen  the  margin  or 
borderland  which  lies  between  the  domains  of  civil  and  criminal 
jurisprudence  so  that  criminal  evidence  differs  from  civil  evidence, 
not  merely  in  the  issues  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied,  but  in  the 
manner  in  which  it  may  be  employed  and  the  facts  which  may  be 
introduced. 

In  general  the  rules  which  regulate  most  of  the  various  sub- 
divisions into  which  the  subject  of  evidence  is  divided,  with  the 
exception  of  the  weight  of  evidence,  and  the  presumption  of  the 
innocence  of  the  accused,  are  substantially  identical  in  both  civil 
and  criminal  proceedings.  But  there  are  exceptions  to  these  rules 
which  must  be  considered.  No  general  rule  has  ever  been  discov- 
ered by  which  it  is  possible  to  determine  in  every  case  whether  any 
given  fact  is  relevant  or  not.  Usually  one  fact  is  relevant  to  prove 
another  when,  by  itself  or  in  combination  with  other  relevant 
facts,  it  proves  or  renders  probable  the  existence  of  the  other. 
The  rules  as  to  the  relevancy  of  facts  and  as  to  the  proof  of  rele- 
vant facts  are  generally  the  same  in  criminal  as  in  civil  proceed- 
ings. If  it  is  essential  to  prove  that  A  is  dead  the  fact  may  be 
proved  in  the  same  way  in  a  criminal  trial  for  his  homicide  as 
in  an  action  to  recover  for  an  insurance  on  his  life.  So  a  witness 
who  saw  his  dead  body  and  knew  it  to  be  the  body  of  A  may  tes- 
tify orally  to  these  facts.  But  some  facts  are  relevant  in  criminal 
proceedings  which  would  not  be  received  in  a  civil  trial  where  the 
same  fact  was  in  issue.  For  example,  the  fact  that  the  accused  is 
reputed  among  his  neighbors  to  be  honest  may  be  proved  in  a 
criminal  trial  for  theft,  not  only  to  reinforce  the  presumption  of 
innocence,  but  as  affirmative  evidence  to  prove  that  he  did  not 
steal,  while  the  state  may  prove  his  bad  character  for  dishonesty 
to  show  that  it  is  extremely  probable  that  he  is  a  thief. 

It  need  hardly  be  said  that  if  the  fact  of  larceny  by  the  defend- 
ant is  in  issue  in  a  civil  proceeding,  his  character  as  an  honest 
man  or  the  reverse  is  not  admissible.  So,  too,  there  are  several 
rules  of  evidence  which  are  applicable  exclusively  to  criminal  pro- 
ceedings. 

The  first  and  most  important  of  these  exclusively  criminal  rules 
is  that  under  which  every  person  who  is  charged  with  crime  is 
presumed  to  be  innocent  until  his  guilt  is  determined  by  the  ver- 


§    9  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  l6 

diet  of  a  jury.  Growing  out  of  it,  and  always  connected  with  it, 
is  the  rule  fixing  the  amount  of  evidence  necessary  in  criminal 
trials,  and  requiring  that  all  the  jurors  shall  be  convinced  of  the 
guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  Other  rules,  pe- 
culiar to  criminal  cases,  admit  confessions  and  dying  declarations, 
contrary  to  the  general  principle  under  which,  in  modern  times, 
hearsay  evidence  is  uniformly  rejected. 

§  9.  The  weight  of  evidence — Rules  in  civil  and  criminal  cases  dis- 
tinguished—Reasonable doubt. — In  cases  where  civil  rights  alone 
are  involved  extreme  strictness  of  proof,  as  regards  the  weight 
of  the  evidence,  is  never  required.  The  jury  may  decide  for  either 
party  according  to  the  probability  and  the  weight  of  the  evidence, 
its  cogency  and  the  degree  of  credibility  they  may  attach  to  it. 
The  verdict  will  be  sustained,  it  matters  not  how  contradictory  the 
evidence  may  be,  so  long  as  it  is  in  favor  of  that  litigant  upon 
whose  side  the  facts  proved  preponderate. 

In  criminal  cases  the  jury  are  not  permitted  to  render  a  verdict 
of  guilty  upon  a  mere  preponderance  of  proof,  but  are  required, 
particularly  where  the  evidence  is  circumstantial,  or  contradictory, 
to  be  satisfied  or  convinced  upon  all  the  evidence  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  that  the  accused  is  guilty. ^^  The  rule  that  a  preponder- 
ance of  evidence  is  sufficient  to  sustain  a  verdict  in  a  civil  suit  is 
due  partly  to  the  fact  that  before  any  evidence  is  offered  in  behalf 
of  either  litigant,  no  presumption  is  indulged  in  favor  of  either, 
but  mainly  to  the  fact  that  the  proof  wall  only  result  in  a  judg- 
ment for  pecuniary  damages,  or  establish  a  civil  right. 

In  a  criminal  trial  the  accused  starts  with  a  legal  presumption 
that  he  is  innocent  of  the  crime  charged,  which  some  authorities 
regard  as  evidence  in  his  favor  and  which  must  be  overcome,  in 
addition  to  any  evidence  which  he  shall  introduce  in  his  own  be- 
half. So  the  reputation,  the  future  livelihood,  and  career,  and, 
perhaps,  even  the  life  of  the  accused  are  involved,  while  in  civil 
cases  any  loss  the  party  may  sustain,  however  great,  may  usually 
be  retrieved  by  his  future  efforts. 

§  10.  Difficulty  of  defining  reasonable  doubt. — The  meaning  of 
the  term  "reasonable  doubt"  has  been  the  subject  of  a  vast  amount 

■*See  §§  11-15;  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2713. 


1/      CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOLTBT.     ^11 

of  discussion,  and  innumerable  attempts  have  been  made  to  define 
it.  What  a  reasonable  doubt  is,  does  not  seem  easy  of  explanation. 
The  most  learned  jurists,  who  possessed  unusual  facility  in  the 
use  of  language,  have  found  it  difficult  to  formulate  or  con- 
vey to  their  own  satisfaction  the  idea  expressed  by  these  words. 
For  the  difficulty  is  not  so  much  in  understanding  the  meaning 
of  the  words  as  in  conveying  their  meaning  to  others.^'  Many  of 
the  cases  point  out  the  terseness  and  seeming  simplicity  of  the 
phrase  and  the  inutility  of  attempting  a  definition  which  must 
necessarily  consist  in  a  restatement  of  the  proposition  in  a  differ- 
ent form  of  words,  which  are  not  any  more  easily  understood,^^ 
but  which  render  the  original  expression  more  obscure  and  tend 
to  create  doubts  and  confusion  rather  than  to  remove  them. 

§  11.  Demonstration  and  belief  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  distin- 
guished.— In  the  whole  domain  of  knowledge,  mathematical  facts 
alone  are  capable  of  that  precise  and  logical  demonstration  which 
absolutely  convinces  the  mind  and  leaves  no  room  for  any  doubt 
whatever.  So  when  one  has  solved  a  given  problem  in  geometry 
and  has  demonstrated  the  correctness  of  his  solution  by  applying 
to  it  the  rules  of  that  science,  and  the  knowledge  which  he  already 
possesses,  the  certainty  of  the  facts  involved  has  been  demon- 
strated by  a  chain  of  facts  and  argument  which  must  completely 
convince  the  mind  of  every  sane  man.  Such  a  demonstration  not 
only  convinces  the  mind  of  the  truth  of  a  proposition  or  hypothe- 
sis, but  absolutely  excludes  the  possibility  that  a  contradictory  or 
inconsistent  proposition  is  true. 

But  with  inductive  or  inferential  facts  a  very  different  prin- 

"  State  V.  Reed,  62  Me.    129,   142;  from  defect  of  knowledge,  or  of  evi- 

Elliott  Ev.,  §§  2706,  2707.     For  com-  dence,  and  that  a  doubt  of  the  guilt 

prehensive  note  on  reasonable  doubt,  of  the  accused,  honestly  entertained, 

see  4  Am.  St.  567;  also  96  Am.  St.  is    a    reasonable    doubt."     People   v. 

210.  Stubenvoll,  62  Mich.  329,  334,  28  N. 

^  "Language  that  is  within  the  com-  W.   883,   and    see   also,    Hamilton  v. 

prehension  of  persons  of  ordinary  in-  People,  29  Mich.  173,  194,  195;  State 

telligence  can  seldom  be  made  plainer  v.  Reed,  62  Me.   129,  142,  145 ;  Miles 

by  further  definition  or  refining.    All  v.  United  States,  103  U.  S.  304,  26  L. 

persons  who  possess  the  qualifications  ed.  481 ;  State  v.  James,  Z7  Conn.  355, 

of  jurors  know  that  a  doubt  is  a  flue-  360;  United  States  v.  Harper,  2Z  Fed. 

tuation  or  uncertainty  of  mind  arising  471,  483. 

2 — UXDERHILL  CrIM.   Ev. 


8    12  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  15 

ciple  obtains.  It  is  absolutely  impossible  as  regards  our  knowl- 
edge of  human  affairs  derived  from  the  testimony  of  witnesses  to 
have  this  sort  of  demonstrative  certainty.  Such  facts  cannot  be 
scientifically  demonstrated  to  be  true.  We  can  be  convinced  only 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  or,  in  other  words,  we  can  have  only 
a  moral  certainty,^^  varying  in  degree  and  never  absolute. 
Whether  we  shall  have  any  certainty  at  all  as  the  result  of  our 
consideration  of  the  evidence  depends  upon  various  and  compli- 
cated circumstances.^''^ 

Thus  if  the  facts  attested  are  in  themselves  probable,  if  the 
witnesses  called  to  prove  them  are  of  good  repute  and  apparently 
credible,  their  opportunities  and  capacity  for  observation  good 
and  their  evidence  consistent  or  uncontradicted,  we  would  have 
a  very  high  degree  of  certainty  and  any  doubt  would  be  unreason- 
able and  not  justified  by  the  circumstances.  As  the  above  elements 
of  belief  diminish  and  disappear  or  become  inoperative  and  the 
evidence  becomes  contradictory  or  incredible,  the  presence  of 
doubts  becomes  manifest.  If  one  is  reasonably  certain,  and,  a 
fortiori,  if  .he  is  absolutely  certain  of  the  existence  of  a  fact,  he 
cannot  be  reasonably  doubtful,  that  is,  he  cannot  have  a  reason- 
able doubt.  Where  the  evidence  in  support  of  a  fact  is  equally 
balanced  by  other  evidence  there  can  be  no  certainty.  We  say  then 
that  there  is  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  existence  of  the  fact,  and  if 
the  fact  is  the  guilt  of  an  accused  person  he  is  entitled  to  the  bene- 
fit of  the  doubt. 

§  12.  Attempted  definitions  of  reasonable  doubt. — The  doubt  of 
the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  to  be  a  reasonable  doubt  must  have  some- 
thing to  rest  upon.  In  other  w'ords,  it  must  be  a  substantial 
doubt.  It  must  arise  from  the  evidence  or  from  the  lack  of  evi- 
dence and  it  cannot  be  a  reasonable  doubt  where  it  is  based  solely 
on  the  arguments  of  counsel.^'' 

Hence,  an  instruction  that  if  a  doubt  is  raised  in  the  minds  of 
the  jury  by  the  evidence  or  by  the  ingenuity  of  counsel,  that 
doubt  is  decisive  in  favor  of  the  prisoner  may  be  refused. ^^ 

^  Jones  V.  State,  lOO  Ala.  88,  14  So.  So.    loii;    State   v.    Lally,    2    Marv. 

772.  (Del.)  424,  43  Atl.  258. 

^a  See    remarks    of    the    court    in  ^^  Strobhar  v.  State,  55  Fla.  167,  47 

Giles  V.  State,  6  Ga.  276,  285.  So.  4 ;  United  States  v.  Dexter,   154 

^"Walker  v.   State,   139  Ala.  56,  35  Fed.  890. 


19     CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.     §    12 

The  doubt  to  be  reasonable  must  be  such  a  one  as  an  honest, 
sensible  and  fair-minded  man  might,  with  reason,  entertain  con- 
sistent with  a  conscientious  desire  to  ascertain  the  truth.^^  A 
vague  conjecture  or  an  inference  of  the  possibility  of  the  inno- 
cence of  the  accused  is  not  a  reasonable  doubt.  A  reasonable 
doubt  is  one  which  arises  from  a  consideration  of  all  the  evi- 
dence in  a  fair  and  reasonable  way.  There  must  be  a  candid  con- 
sideration of  all  the  evidence  and  if,  after  this  candid  considera- 
tion is  had  by  the  jurors,  there  remains  in  their  minds  a  convic- 
tion of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  then  there  is  no  room  for  a  rea- 
sonable doubt.^^ 

A  doubt  is  not  reasonable  that,  in  the  face  of  overwhelming  or 
even  strong  evidence  assumes  that  the  accused  may  possibly  be 
innocent.^* 

There  must  be  sincerity  and  common  sense  as  the  basis  for  the 
doubt  and  in  this  connection  it  may  be  said  that  the  mental  opera- 
tions of  all  sane  men  are  governed  by  the  same  rules,  whether 
they  are  in  the  jury  box  or  out  of  it.  The  jurors  ought  to  be  con- 
vinced as  jurors  by  the  same  proof  that  would  convince  them  as 
men  and  upon  which  they  would  act  in  the  management  of  their 
own  most  important  affairs  and  concerns. ^^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  jurors  should  doubt  as  jurors  what  they 
would  doubt  as  men.®^ 

If  they  have  an  abiding  and  conscientious  conviction  of  the 
prisoner's  guilt  after  a  candid  consideration  of  all  the  facts  which 

'■State  V.   Stewart    (Del.),  67  Atl.  Ga.  276,  285;  Arnold  v.  State,  23  Ind. 

786.  170;    State  V.   Dineen,    10   Minn.  407, 

^Dempsey  v.  State,  83  Ark.  81,  102  417;  State  v.  Pierce,  65  Iowa  85,  89, 

S.  W.  704;    State  V.  DiGuglielmo,  4  21  N.  W.  195;  McGuire  v.  People,  44 

Penn.  (Del.)  336,  55  Atl.  350.  Mich.  286,  6  N.  W.  669,  38  Am.  265; 

^  State  V.   Brinte,  4   Penn,    (Del.)  State  v.  Bridges,  29  Kan.   138;  State 

551,  58  Atl.  258.  V.  Kearley,  26  Kan.  77,  87;   Stout  v. 

''State   V.    Honey    (Del.),  65   Atl,  State,  90  Ind.  i,  12;  Toops  v.  State, 

764;  State  V.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17,  41  92    Ind.    13,    16;    Commonwealth    v. 

Pac.  998,  52  Am.  St.  655,  31  L.  R.  A.  Conroy,  207  Pa.  212,  56  Atl.  427. 

294 ;  Lawhead  v.  State,  46  Neb.  607,  '"  United  States  v.  Heath,  19  Wash. 

65  N.  W.  779;  People  v.  Hughes,  137  Law  R.  818;  Spies  v.  People,  122  111. 

N.  Y.  29,  32  N.  E.   1 105;   People  v,  i,  12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am. 

Wayman,    128   N.   Y.    585,  27   N.   E.  St.   32on ;    State   v.    Rounds,  76   Me. 

T070;  Miles  V.  United  States,  103  U.  123;  Fanton  v.  State,  50  Neb.  351,  69 

S.  304,  26  L,  ed,  481 ;  Giles  v.  State,  6  N.  W.  953,  36  L.  R.  A,  158. 


§    12 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


20 


are,  in  their  opinion  proved,  then  they  are  convinced  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt.  But  the  law  does  not  require  that  each  particu- 
lar incriminating  fact  which  may  aid  the  jury  in  determining  that 
the  accused  is  guilty  shall  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. 
The  doubt  which  will  justify  an  acquittal  is  not  a  doubt  of  any 
particular  fact  constituting  the  sum  of  the  prisoner's  guilt,  but 
a  doubt  upon  all  the  evidence  that  he  is  guilty.^^ 

A  reasonable  doubt  has  also  been  defined  as  "a  doubt  for  which 
a  reason  can  be  given, "^®  as  a  doubt  which  must  satisfy  a  reason- 
able mind,  after  a  full  comparison  and  consideration  of  the  evi- 
dence,^^  as  a  doubt  that  has  something  to  rest  upon  such  as  a 
sensible  and  honest  man  would  reasonably  entertain,^**  as  a  doubt 
growing  out  of  the  evidence  and  the  circumstances  of  the  case,*^ 
having  a  foundation  in  reason,*^  a  substantial  doubt  arising 
from  insufficiency  of  evidence  not  a  mere  possibility,*"  or  prob- 
ability of  innocence,^*  and  as  an  honest,  substantial  misgiving 
generated  by  an  insufficiency  of  proof.^^   But  negative  definitions 


^'  Pitts  V.  State,  140  Ala.  70,  zi  So. 
loi ;  Kossakowski  v.  People,  177  111. 
563,  53  N."  E.  115;  Delahoyde  v.  Peo- 
ple, 212  111.  554,  72  N.  E.  732.  The 
words  "beyond  a  reasonable  doubt" 
and  "to  a  moral  certainty,"  explana- 
tory of  the  quantum  of  proof  re- 
quired to  convict  in  a  criminal  prose- 
cution, are  synonymous.  People  v. 
Bonifacio,  190  N.  Y.  150,  82  N,  E. 
1098,  affirming  21  N.  Y.  Crim.  122, 
104  N.  Y.  Supp.  181. 

^  Jones  V.  State,  120  Ala.  303,  25 
So.  204;  Hodge  V.  State,  97  Ala.  37, 
41,  12  So.  164,  38  Am.  St.  145;  Cohen 
V.  State,  so  Ala.  108,  112;  People  v. 
Guidici,  100  N.  Y.  503,  3  N.  E.  493. 
But  it  has  also  been  said  that  the  ju- 
rors need  not  be  able  to  give  a  rea- 
son for  their  doubt.  See  People  v. 
McCann,  16  N.  Y.  58,  69  Am.  Dec. 
642n;  Siberry  v.  State,  133  Ind.  677, 
688,  33  N.  E.  681 ;  People  v.  Ah  Sing, 
51  Cal.  372;  Densmore  v.  State,  67 
Ind.  306,  33  Am.  96 ;  Leonard  v.  State, 
150  Ala.  89,  43  So.  214. 


^Wood  V.  State,  31  Fla.  221,  240, 
12  So.  539;  People  V.  Guidici,  100  N. 
Y.  503,  3  N.  E.  493;  Miller  v.  State 
(Wis.  1908),  119  N.  W.  850. 

"  Fletcher  v.  State,  90  Ga.  468,  17  S. 
E.  100;  State  V.  Emory,  5  Penn. 
(Del.)  126,  58  Atl.  1036;  State  v. 
Walls,  4  Penn.  (Del.)  408,  56  Atl. 
III. 

*^Malone  v.  State,  49  Ga.  210,  218; 
State  v.  Davidson,  44  Mo.  App.  513. 

^  Conrad  v.  State,  132  Ind.  254,  258, 
31  N.  E.  805;  People  v.  Barker,  153 
N.  Y.  Ill,  47  N.  E.  31;  Barnard  v. 
State,  119  Ga.  436,  46  S.  E.  644. 

*' State  V.  Wells,  in  Mo.  533,  20  S. 
W.  232;  State  V.  Briscoe  (Del.),  67 
Atl.  154;  State  V.  Mahoney,  122  lovi^a 
168,  97  N.  W.  1089;  Way  v.  State 
(Ala.),  46  So.  273. 

"  Bain  v.  State,  74  Ala.  38 ;  State  v. 
David,  131  Mo.  380,  33  S.  W.  28. 

*^  United  States  v.  Newton,  52  Fed. 
27s,  290;  Densmore  v.  State,  67  Ind. 
306.  33  Am.  96:  Siberry  v.  State,  133 
Ind.  677,  688,  33  N.  E.  681 ;  Lovett  v. 


21     CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.     §     12 


are  more  frequent  and  perhaps  safer  and  more  helpful.  Hence,  a 
mere  whim,  or  a  groundless  surmise,**'  a  vague  conjecture,*^  a 
whimsical  or  vague  doubt,**  a  capricious  and  speculative  doubt,*" 
a  desire  for  more  evidence  of  guilt, ^"^  a  captious  doubt  or  misgiv- 
ing, suggested  by  an  ingenious  counsel,  or  arising  from  a  merci- 
ful disposition,  or  kindly  feeling  towards  the  prisoner,  or  from 
sympathy  for  him  or  for  his  family,  is  not  a  reasonable  doubt.  ^^ 

State,  30  Fla.  142,  162,  11  So.  550,  17 
L.  R.  A.  70511;  Lyons  v.  People,  137 
111.  602,  618,  27  N.  E.  677 ;  Carroll  v. 
People,  136  111.  456,  27  N.  E.  18; 
Woodruff  V,  State,  31  Fla.  320,  12  So. 
653;  People  V.  Pallister,  138  N.  Y. 
601,  ZZ  N.  E.  741 ;  Carpenter  v.  State, 
62  Ark.  286,  36  S.  W.  900;  Little  v. 
People,  157  111.  153,  42  N.  E.  389; 
State  V.  David,  131  Mo.  380,  ZZ  S. 
W.  28;  People  V.  Ross,  115  Cal.  233, 
46  Pac.  1059;  State  v.  Blue,  136  Mo. 
41,  2i7  S.  W.  796;  Burney  v.  State, 
100  Ga.  65,  25  S.  E.  911;  Baker  v. 
State,  120  Wis.  135,  97  N.  W.  566; 
State  V.  Harmon,  4  Penn.  (Del.)  580, 
60  Atl.  z^- 

''Welsh  V.  State,  96  Ala.  92,  11  So. 
450. 

*''  Fletcher  v.  State,  90  Ga.  468,  470, 
17  S.  E.  100;  Bluett  V.  State,  151  Ala. 
41,  44  So.  84;  State  V.  Adams  (Del), 
65  Atl.  510. 

*^  Commonwealth  v.  Drum,  58  Pa. 
St.  9 ;  State  v.  Bodekee,  34  Iowa  520 ; 
State  V.  Tyre  (Del.),  67  Atl.  199; 
State  V.  Abbott  (W.  Va.),  62  S.  E. 
693- 

"Talbert  v.  State,  121  Ala.  2,3,  25 
So.  690. 

^^  Shepperd  v.  State,  94  Ala.  102,  10 
So.  663. 

"  United  States  v.  Newton,  52  Fed, 
275,  290.  In  State  v.  Talmadge,  107 
AIo.  543,  551,  17  S.  W.  990,  the  court 
said  in  charging  the  jury:  "If  you 
have  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  de- 
fendant's guilt  you  must  acquit  him, 


but  a  doubt,  to  authorize  an  acquit- 
tal, must  be  a  substantial  doubt,  aris- 
ing from  the  insufificiency  of  evi- 
dence and  not  a  mere  possibility  of 
innocence,"  and  "a  reasonable  doubt 
is  that  state  of  the  case,  which,  after 
the  entire  comparison  and  considera- 
tion of  all  the  evidence,  leaves  the 
minds  of  the  jurors  in  that  condition 
that  they  cannot  say  that  they  feel 
an  abiding  conviction  to  a  moral  cer- 
tainty of  the  truth  of  the  charge." 
So  in  Cross  v.  State,  132  Ind.  65,  31 
N.  E.  473,  the  subject  is  thus  dis- 
cussed :  "A  doubt  produced  by  un- 
due sensibility  in  the  mind  of  the 
juror,  in  view  of  the  consequences  of 
his  verdict,  is  not  a  reasonable  doubt ; 
and  a  juror  is  not  allowed  to  create 
sources  or  material  for  doubt  by  re- 
sorting to  trivial  or  fanciful  supposi- 
tions and  remote  conjectures  as  to  a 
possible  state  of  facts,  dififering  from 
that  established  by  the  evidence. 
Your  oath  imposes  on  you  no  obliga- 
tion to  doubt  where  no  doubt  would 
exist  if  no  oath  had  been  adminis- 
tered. When  a  circumstance  is  of 
doubtful  character  in  its  bearings,  you 
are  to  give  the  accused  the  benefit  of 
the  doubt.  If,  however,  all  the  facts 
established  necessarily  lead  the  mind 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  defendant 
is  guilty,  though  there  be  a  bare  pos- 
sibility, merely,  not  supported  by 
some  good  reason  therefor,  that  he  is 
innocent,  you  should  find  him  guilty. 
A  juror's   duty  to  the  state,   to   so- 


13 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE, 


§  13.    Precaution  to  be  employed  in  defining^  reasonable  doubt. — 

The  danger  of  confusing  the  minds  of  the  jurors  in  attempting  to 


ciety,  and  to  himself  is  equallj^  sacred 
to  hold  for  conviction  if  he  has  an 
abiding  satisfaction  of  defendant's 
guilt;  and  if,  after  deliberation,  no 
juror  is  possessed  of  any  good  reason 
to  doubt  the  defendant's  guilt,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  jury  to  convict." 

"The  court  instructs  the  jury  as 
matter  of  law  that  in  considering  the 
case  the  jury  are  not  to  go  beyond 
the  evidence  to  hunt  up  doubts  nor 
must  they  entertain  such  doubts  as 
are  merely  chimerical  or  conjectural. 
A  doubt,  to  justify  an  acquittal,  must 
be  reasonable,  and  arise  from  a  can- 
did and  impartial  investigation  of  all 
the  evidence  in  the  case,  and  tmless  it 
is  such  that  were  the  same  kind  of 
doubt  interposed  in  the  graver  trans- 
actions of  life,  it  would  cause  a  rea- 
sonable and  prudent  man  to  hesitate 
and  pause,  it  is  insufficient  to  au- 
thorize a  verdict  of  "not  guiltj-."  If, 
after  considering  all  the  evidence, 
you  can  say  you  have  an  abiding  con- 
viction of  the  truth  of  the  charge, 
you  are  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt."  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  I,  8, 
12  N.  E.  86s,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am.  St. 
320n.  See  also,  Painter  v.  People,  147 
111.  444,  35  N.  E.  64;  Carlton  v.  Peo- 
ple, ISO  111.  181,  Z7  N.  E.  244,  41  Am. 
St.  346. 

In  State  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  129,  on  p. 
143,  the  court  says :  "There  is  no  ex- 
act mathematical  test  by  which  we 
may  certainly  know  whether  a  doubt, 
entertained  in  any  case,  is  reasonable 
or  otherwise.  What  would  be  reason- 
able to  one  person  might  be  far 
otherwise  to  another.  Therefore,  no 
certain  line,  as  upon  a  plan,  can  be 
drawn,   that  shall  be   recognized  by 


every  one  as  the  dividing  line  between 
the  mere  skeptical  doubt  and  that 
which  has  the  sanction  of  reason. 
Hence,  whatever  explanation  may  be 
given  of  the  phrase,  its  meaning  prac- 
tically must  depend  very  largely  upon 
the  character  of  the  mind  of  the  per- 
son acting.  Lexicographers  tell  us 
that  reasonable  is  that  which  is 
'agreeable  or  conformable  to  reason.' 
The  doubt,  therefore,  which  conforms 
to  the  reason  of  the  person  examin- 
ing, is  to  him  a  reasonable  doubt.  If 
it  does  not  so  conform,  to  him  it  is 
unreasonable,  and  will  not  be  enter- 
tained. We  must  assume  that  the 
jurors  are  reasonable  men,  and  as 
such  they  must  be  addressed.  When 
told  that,  in  order  to  convict,  the 
proof  must  remove  every  reasonable 
doubt  of  guilt  from  their  minds, 
whatever  the  form  of  words  used,  if 
any  heed  is  given  to  the  instruction, 
the  result  must  be  that  each  individ- 
ual juror  will  understand  it  and  act 
according  to  the  dictates  of  his  own 
reason;  and  if,  tried  by  that  test,  the 
doubt  is  reasonable,  conviction  must 
fall.     Otherwise  it  would  follow." 

"A  reasonable  doubt  is  not  such  a 
doubt  as  any  man  may  start  by  ques- 
tioning for  the  sake  of  a  doubt,  nor  a 
doubt  surmised  without  foundation  in 
the  facts  or  testimony.  It  is  such  a 
doubt  only  as  a  fair,  reasonable  effort 
to  reach  a  conclusion  upon  the  evi- 
dence, using  the  mind  in  the  same 
manner  as  in  other  matters  of  impor- 
tance, prevents  the  jury  from  coming 
to  a  conclusion  in  which  their  minds 
rest  satisfied.  If  so  using  the  mind, 
and  considering  all  the  evidence  pro- 
duced, it  leads  to  a  conclusion  which 


23     CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDEXCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT,     §     1 3 

define  words  seemingh'  so  plain  as  "reasonable  doubt,"  has 
prompted  some  judges  to  refuse  to  attempt  any  definition.^-  Any 
explanation  which  may  be  given  is  apt  to  be  couched  in  language 
more  intricate  and  harder  to  be  understood  than  the  original 
phrase,  and  to  be  little  more  than  a  judicial  paraphrase  of  the 
original  expression.  By  such  subtle  and  scholastic  definitions  as 
have  been  given  in  many  of  the  cases  the  minds  of  the  jurors, 


satisfies  the  judgment  and  leaves 
upon  the  mind  a  settled  conviction  of 
the  truth  of  the  fact,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  jury  so  to  declare  the  fact  by 
their  verdict.  It  is  possible  always  to 
question  any  conclusion  derived  from 
testimony.  Such  questioning  is  not  a 
reasonable  doubt,  but  the  circum- 
stances, if  the  case  is  one  of  circum- 
stantial evidence,  must  so  concur  that 
no  well-established  fact  or  circum- 
stance which  is  capable  of  controlling 
the  case  should  go  counter  to  the  con- 
clusions sought  to  be  reached  or 
which  are  to  be  reached.  If  all  the 
circumstances  concur  in  one  result, 
it  is  for  the  jury  to  say  whether  those 
circumstances  are  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish that  result,  or  whether  there  is  a 
failure  to  cover  probabilities  of  the 
case  so  as  to  make  it  reasonably  cer- 
tain that  the  fact  has  been  made  out." 
Commonwealth  v.  Costley,  118  Mass. 
I,  16. 

For  other  cases  in  which  reason- 
able doubt  has  been  defined,  see : 
State  v.  Kearley,  26  Kan.  TJ,  87; 
State  v.  Witt,  34  Kan.  488,  490,  8 
Pac.  769;  State  v.  Buckley,  40  Conn. 
246;  Commonwealth  v.  Leonard,  140 
Mass.  473,  480,  4  N.  E.  96,  54  Am. 
485;  Parker  v.  State,  136  Ind.  284, 
35  X-  E.  1 105;  Oneil  v.  State,  48  Ga. 
(£\  jMcKleroy  v.  State,  'j']  Ala.  95; 
People  V.  Johnson,  140  N.  Y.  350,  35 
X.  E.  604 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Tuttle, 
12  Cush.    (Mass.)   502,  505;   Padfield 


,v.  People,  146  111.  660,  35  X.  E.  469; 
State  V.  Dineen,  10  Minn.  407,  417; 
Hudelson  v.  State,  94  Ind.  426,  430, 
48  Am.  171 ;  Sullivan  v.  State,  52 
Ind.  309,  311;  People  v.  Rodrigo,  69 
Cal.  601,  II  Pac.  481 ;  State  v.  Pa- 
dillia,  42  Cal.  535;  State  v.  Vansant, 
80  Mo.  (iT,  Dunn  v.  People,  109  111. 
635 ;  State  v.  Pierce,  65  Iowa  85,  89, 
21  N'.  W.  195;  State  v,  Hayden,  45 
Iowa  II,  17;  Minich  v.  People,  8 
Colo.  440,  454,  9  Pac.  4;  James  v. 
State,  45  Miss,  572,  575;  Polin  v. 
State,  14  Xeb.  540,  547,  16  N.  W.  898  ; 
State  v.  Oscar,  7  Jones  (X.  Car.) 
305,  307;  Ray  V.  State,  50  Ala.  104; 
State  V.  Rounds,  76  Me.  123,  125; 
McGuire  v.  People,  44  Mich.  286,  289, 
6  N.  W.  669,  38  Am.  265;  People  v. 
Finley,  38  Mich.  482,  485,  6  X.  W. 
669;  Mixon  V.  State,  55  Miss.  525, 
527. 

""The  term  reasonable  doubt  is 
almost  incapable  of  any  definition 
which  will  add  much  to  what  the 
words  themselves  imply.  In  fact  it  is 
easier  to  state  what  it  is  not,  than  to 
state  what  it  is;  and  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  any  attempt  to  de- 
fine it  will  not  be  more  likely  to  con- 
fuse than  to  enlighten  a  juror.  A 
man  is  the  best  judge  of  his  own 
feelings,  and  he  knows  for  himself 
whether  he  doubts  better  than  any 
one  can  tell  him."  State  v.  Saucr,  38 
Minn.  438,  439,  38  X.  W.  355- 


§    14  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  24 

unused  to  threading  such  devious  intellectual  mazes,  have  been 
confused  and  bewildered.  They  receive  the  erroneous  impression 
that  after  entering  the  jury  box  their  intellectual  processes  are  no 
longer  to  be  regulated  by  the  ordinary  rules  employed  by  them 
in  their  every-day  affairs,  but  by  some  new  system  whose  prin- 
ciples they  must  receive  from  the  lips  of  the  court.  In  other  words 
they  receive  the  impression  that  "the  verdict  is  not  to  be  the  result 
of  the  natural  impression  which  the  evidence  has  made  upon  their 
minds,  but  of  the  operation  of  some  artificial  and  altogether  new 
rules,  which  the  law  has  created  for  them  to  apply  in  reach- 
ing it."'^ 

§  14.  Doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  applicable  to  misdemeanors  as 
well  as  to  felonies. — The  rule  now  under  consideration  is  applicable 
in  all  criminal  cases,  i.  c,  in  misdemeanors  as  well  as  felonies.^* 
But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  rule  does  not  mean  that  the  jury 
must  be  convinced  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  truth  of  every 
proposition  of  fact  alleged  in  the  case  against  the  accused.  The 
rule  does  not  permit  one  or  more  facts,  however  material  in  con- 
stituting the  crime,  to  be  selected  out  of  the  mass  of  facts  in  evi- 
dence and  require  the  jury  to  be  convinced  of  them  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt.  If,  therefore,  the  court  has  instructed  the  jury 
accurately  as  to  the  true  rule  of  reasonable  doubt,  it  cannot  be 
required  to  subdivide  its  instruction  and  charge  separately  as  to 
each  of  the  elements  composing  the  crime.^^ 

It  has  been  held  according  to  the  majority  of  the  decisions  that 
to  warrant  a  conviction  upon  circumstantial  evidence  alone  each 
fact  relied  upon  and  necessary  to  the  proof  of  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  need  not  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  No  par- 
ticular fact  or  class  of  facts  should  be  considered  alone,  but  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  must  be  considered  together;  and  if 
those  which  are  proved,  in  the  opinion  of  the  jury,  taken  together 
are  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  minds  of  the  jurors  beyond  a  reason- 

**  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  2463.  v.   Liquors,   115  Mass.    142,    145,   105 

"Vandeventer    v.    State,    38    Neb.  Mass.  595;   Fuller  v.   State,   12  Ohio 

592,  57  N.  W.  397;  Stewart  v.  State,  St.  433,  436;  i  Bishop  Cr.  Proc.  1093; 

44    Ind.    237;    Sowder    v.    Common-  State  v.  Hicks,   125  N.  Car.  636,  34 

wealth,  8  Bush    (Ky.)    432;  Wasden  S.  E.  247. 

V.  State,  18  Ga.  264;  Commonwealth  '''Walker  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  81. 


25     CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.     §     1 5 

able  doubt  that  the  accused  is  guilty,  they  should  not  acquit  be- 
cause they  believe  that  some  particular  fact,  taken  alone  and  not 
in  connection  with  all  the  circumstances,  is  not  proved  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt.^*' 

According  to  other  authorities  it  has  been  held  that  where  the 
proof  of  certain  facts  is  necessary  to  the  guilt  of  the  accused  he 
should  be  acquitted  if  the  jury  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to 
the  proof  of  any  of  these  facts. ^^ 

§  15.  Reasonable  doubt  in  the  mind  of  one  juror. — The  proposi- 
tion that  the  jury  must  be  convinced  of  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  does  not  require  an  instruction  that  a 
reasonable  doubt  must  be  entertained  by  or  arise  in  the  mind  of 
every  juror,^*  and  that  an  acquittal  is  not  warranted  unless  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  is  entertained  by  all  of  them.^®  On  the  other  hand, 
every  one  of  the  jurors  must  be  convinced  of  the  prisoner's  guilt 
in  order  that  his  conviction  should  be  sustained.  The  law  contem- 
plates, and,  indeed,  demands,  the  concurrence  of  twelve  minds 
in  the  conclusion  that  the  accused  is  guilty,  as  indicted,  before  he 
can  be  convicted.*'"  Each  individual  mind  has  to  arrive  at  this 
conclusion  separately,  and  each  juror,  having  in  view  the  oath  he 
has  taken,  and  his  duty  and  responsibility  thereunder,  should  have 

''^Spraggins  v.    State,    139   Ala.  93,  wealth,  128  Pa.   St.  500,  508,   18  Atl. 

35  So.  1000;  Spraggins  v.  State,  150  344. 

Ala.  89,  43  So.  214;  Murphy  V.  State,  "People    v.    Ah    Chung,     54    Cal. 

108    Ala.    ID,    18    So.    557;    Allen    v.  398;   State  v.  Blydenburgh,  135  Iowa 

State,   60  Ala.   19;   Lackey   v.    State,  264,  112  N.  W.  634;  Gavin  v.  State, 

67  Ark.  416,  55   S.  W.  213;   Houser  42   Fla.    332,   29    So.   405;    State    v. 

V.  State,  58  Ga.  78;  People  v.  Probst,  Maher,    25    Nev.   465,   62    Fac.   236; 

237  111.  390,  86  N.  E.  588;  Williams  Hodge  v.  Territory,  12  Okla.  108,  69 

V.  People,  166  111.  132,  46  N.  E.  749;  Pac.  1077;  Mahaffey  v.  Territory,  11 

Davis  V.  People,  114  111.  86,  29  N.  E.  Okla.  213,  66  Pac.  342;   Harrison  v. 

192;  Keating  v.   People,  160  111.  480,  State,  6  Tex.  App.  42;  Black  v.  State, 

43   N.    E.   724;,  State  v.    Hayden,  45  i  Tex.  App.  368. 

Iowa  II,  17;  State  v.  Schoenwald,  31  °^  State  v.  Sloan,  55  Iowa  217,  220, 

Mo.    147,    iss;    Morgan   v.   State,   51  7  N.  W.  516. 

Neb.   672,    71    N.   W.   788 ;    State   v.  '"  Stitz  v.  State,  104  Ind.  359,  362,  4 

Shines,  125  N.  Car.  730,  34  S.  E.  552 ;  N.  E.  145. 

Kastner  v.  State,  58  Neb.  767,  79  N.  ""Jackson  v.  State,  91  Wis.  253,  64 

W.  713.     Contra,  Kaufman  v.   State,  N.  W.  838. 
49  Ind.  248,  251 ;   Rudy  v.  Common- 


§    1 6  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  26 

his  own  mind  convinced  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  upon  all  the 
evidence  before  he  can  conscientiously  consent  to  a  verdict  of 
guilty.®^  But  the  fact  that  one,  or  even  a  majority,  of  the  jurors, 
are  not  convinced  of  the  prisoner's  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  does  not  necessarily  call  for  the  acquittal  of  the  prisoner, 
and  the  jury  should  be  so  instructed.^^ 

Under  such  circumstances  the  jury  should  report  that  an  agree- 
ment is  impossible.  Each  juror  must  act  on  his  own  judgment  of 
the  evidence,  and  while  he  may  be  aided  by  conferring  with  his 
fellow  jurors  in  reaching  the  truth,  he  is  not  required  to  surrender 
his  conviction  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  prisoner,  or  his 
reasonable  doubt  of  guilt,  remaining  after  a  consideration  of  the 
evidence  and  consultation  with  his  associates,  merely  to  prevent 
a  disagreement^^ 

§  16.  Statutory  changes  in  rules  of  evidence  and  in  modes  of  pro- 
cedure.— Many  very  numerous  and  important  changes  in  the  rules 
of  evidence  established  at  the  common  law  have  been  made  by 
statute,  in  the  United  States  and  England.  The  changes  and 
modifications  have,  as  a  rule,  been  intended  to  afford  the  accused 
a  better  opportunity  to  clear  himself  of  the  charge  against  him. 
Thus,  for  example,  he  has  been  made  a  competent  witness  in  his 
own  behalf  contrary  to  the  rules  of  the  common  law. 

^  Castle  V.  State,  75  Ind.  146 ;  State  evidence,  and  after  having  consulted 

V.  Witt,  34  Kan.  488,  496,  8  Pac.  769;  with   his    fellow   jurymen,   entertains 

State  V.   Sloan,  55  Iowa  217,  220,  7  such  reasonable  doubt,  the  jury  can- 

N.  W.  516;  State  v.  Stewart,  52  Iowa  not  in  such  case  find  the  defendant 

284,  3  N.  W.  99;  Rhodes  v.  State,  128  guilty,  is  correct.     See  Clem  v.  State, 

Ind.  189,   194,  27  N.  E.  866,  25  Am.  42    Ind.    420,    13    Am.    369.    *    *    * 

St.  429;  Little  V.  People,  157  111.  153,  Each  juror  should  feel  the  responsi- 

42  N.  E.  389.  bility  resting  on  him  as  a  member  of 

®^  Boyd  V.  State,  33  Fla.  316,  14  So.  the  body,  and  should  realize  that  his 

836;  Davis  V.  State,  51  Neb.  301,  70  own  mind  must  be  convinced  beyond 

N.  W.  984.  a  reasonable  doubt  before  he  can  con- 

^  State  V.   Hamilton,  57  Iowa  596,  sent  to  a  verdict  of  guilty."   See  also, 

598,   II   N.  W.  5 ;   State  v.  Witt,  34  State  v.  Rogers,  56  Kan.  362,  43  Pac. 

Kan.  488,  496,  8  Pac.  769.     In  Castle  256;  State  v.  Taylor,  134  Mo.  109,  35 

V.  State,  75  Ind.  146,  the  court  said:  S.    W.    92;    Allen    v.    United    States, 

"The    proposition    embodied    in    the  164  U.  S.  492,  41  L.  ed.  528,  17  Sup. 

charge  asked,  that  if  any  one  of  the  Ct.  154. 
jury,  after  having  considered  all  the 


27    CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AXD    REASONABLE    DOUBT.  §    1 6a 

Laws  which  prescribe  the  evidential  force  of  proof  of  certain 
facts  by  enacting  that  upon  proof  of  such  facts  a  given  presump- 
tion shall  arise,  or  which  determine  what  facts  shall  constitute  a 
prima  facie  case  against  the  accused,  casting  the  burden  of  proof 
upon  him  of  disproving  or  rebutting  the  presumption,  are  not 
generally  regarded  as  unconstitutional,  even  though  they  may 
destroy  the  presumption  of  innocence.  An  accused  person  has  no 
vested  right  in  this  or  any  other  presumption,  or  law  of  evidence, 
or  procedure,  that  the  law-making  power  cannot,  within  constitu- 
tional limits,  deprive  him  of.***  The  existing  rules  of  evidence  may 
be  changed  at  any  time  by  legislative  enactment.  But  the  legisla- 
tive power  must  be  exercised  within  constitutional  limitations  so 
that  no  constitutional  right  or  privilege  of  the  accused  is  de- 
stroyed. He  cannot  be  deprived  of  a  fair  and  impartial  trial  by  a 
jury  of  his  peers  and  according  to  the  law  of  the  land.  But  the 
constitutional  prohibition  of  ex  post  facto  laws  is  not  applicable, 
to  statutes  which  merely  alter  the  method  and  details  of  the  pro- 
cedure of  a  criminal  trial,  even  though  the  statute  was  passed  after 
the  crime  was  committed.^"  Thus,  a  statute  which  simply  enlarges 
the  class  of  persons  who  may  be  competent  to  testify  against  the 
accused  is  not  an  ex  post  facto  law  as  regards  crimes  previously 
committed."*^ 

§  16a.  Number  of  witnesses  required  and  positive  and  negative 
evidence. — In  the  common  law  in  all  cases  of  a  criminal  character, 
the  testimony  of  one  witness  to  facts  constituting  a  crime  and 
convicting  the  accused  if  uncontradicted  is  sufficient  for  a  con- 
viction, if  it  is  credible  and  the  jury  believe  it.**' 

"  State  V.  Kyle,   14  Wash.   702,  45  and  Cf.  State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518, 

Pac.    147;    Commonwealth   v.    Smith,  532,  2>^  Am.  Sgn. 

166  Mass.  370,  44  N.   E.  503;   State  "3  Bl.  Comm.  370;  Foster  Crown 

V.  Beach  (Ind.),  43  N.  E.  949;  In  re  L.  233;  2  Hawkins  P.  C,  c.  25,  §  131, 

Wong  Hane,    108  Cal.   680,   41    Pac.  c.  46,  §  2;  Starkie  Ev.  857;  Lipsey  v. 

693,  49  Am.  St.  138.  People,   227   111.   364,  81    N.    E.   348; 

'^  Stokes  V.   People,    53   N.   Y.   164,  Commonwealth   v.    Stebbins,   8    Gray 

174,  13  Am.  492.                ,  (Mass.)    492;    McLain    v.    Common- 

''Hopt  V.  Utah,  no  U.  S.  574,  589-  wealth,  99  Pa.  St.  86;  Commonwealth 

590,  28  L.   ed.   262,  4   Sup.   Ct.   202.  V.  Pioso,  18  Lane.  L.  Rev.  (Pa.)  185; 

See,  also,  25  Am.  Law  Reg.  680-695,  State  v.  Kane,   i   McCord   (S.  Car.) 

482. 


S     iT^a  CRIMIXAL    EVIHRXCE.  28 

In  England,  by  statute,  certain  exceptions  to  the  rule  were  cre- 
ated. These  exceptions  depended  upon  the  nature  of  the  crime 
and  the  principal  reason  for  creating  them  was  either  that  the 
crime  was  of  such  a  character  that  of  necessity  two  witnesses  were 
required  to  prove  it,  as  in  the  case  of  perjury,  or  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  accused  against  his  political  enemies  as  in  the  case 
of  treason. 

A  statute  that  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  convicted  of 
any  crime  punishable  by  death,  w'ithout  the  testimony  of  two  wit- 
nesses or  its  equivalent,  does  not  require  the  testimony  of  two 
living  witnesses. 

It  is  enough  that  the  testimony  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  is 
equivalent  to  that  of  two  witnesses.  It  is  not  necessary  that  two 
witnesses  shall  testify  to  every  important  fact,  but  it  is  sufficient 
for  two  or  more  witnesses  each  to  testify  to  different  parts  of  the 
same  transaction  or  to  different  circumstances  surrounding  the 
case,  because  such  evidence  tends  directly  to  show  the  guilt  of  the 
accused.  In  other  words,  the  evidence  is  sufficient  if  the  proof 
being  given  by  two  or  more  witnesses  taken  as  a  whole  convinces 
the  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.'^** 

So  it  may  be  said,  that  the  jury  in  a  criminal  as  in  a  civil  case, 
are  not  bound  to  believe  that  side  of  the  case  which  produces  the 
larger  number  of  witnesses.  Thus,  where  a  witness  for  the  prose- 
cution testifies  positively  and  substantially  to  the  facts  constitut- 
ing the  crime,  it  is  not  error  for  the  jury  to  believe  him  and  to 
convict,  though  all  his  evidence  was  directly  contradicted  by  two 
witnesses.^'' 

For  it  is  a  general  rule,  that  as  between  witnesses  whom  the 
jury  may  determine  are  of  equal  credibility,  a  witness  who  testi- 
fies to  the  affirmative  of  a  proposition  is  entitled  to  be  believed 
rather  than  a  witness  who  testifies  to  the  negative  of  a  proposi- 
tion. For  illustration,  it  is  more  likely  that  a  witness  who,  being 
present  when  an  assault  and  battery  take  place,  testifies  that  he 
saw  a  blow  struck  is  speaking  the  truth  tlian  one  who,  being 
present  at  the  same  time,  testifies  that  he  did  not  see  the  blow 

'''State    V.    Smith,    49    Conn,    zi^^;        ""White  v.  State    (Tex.   Cr.  App.), 
State  V.  Washelesky  (Conn.),  70  Atl.    50  S.  W.  1015. 
62. 


29    CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE    AND    REASONABLE    DOUBT.  §     1 6a 

Struck,  assuming,  of  course,  that  both  the  witnesses  are  disinter- 
ested persons  and  have  no  motive  to  deceive. 

This,  however,  is  not  a  rule  of  law,  and  an  instruction  which 
directs  the  jury  to  believe  affirmative  evidence  rather  than  nega- 
tive evidence,  regardless  of  the  character,  or  of  the  motive  of 
the  witnesses,  or  of  the  surrounding  circumstances,  is  erroneous."'^ 

The  rule  is  wholly  for  the  guidance  of  the  jury  according  to 
the  particular  facts,  and  they  must  take  into  consideration  with 
it,  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  character,  motives 
and  demeanor  of  the  witnesses.  Its  basis  is  simply  the  well-recog- 
nized fact  that  a  witness  who  testifies  negatively  may  have  for- 
gotten what  actually  occurred  in  his  presence,  or  his  observation 
may  have  been  so  imperfect,  or  his  mind  so  inattentive  that  he 
did  not  see  what  took  place.  On  the  other  hand,  the  witness  who 
testifies  affirmatively  that  something  did  happen  and  that  he  saw 
it,  if  he  be  otherwise  credible,  should  be  believed,  because  it  is 
impossible  to  remember  what  never  happened.'^ 

The  rule  does  not  apply  where  two  witnesses  with  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  knowledge  contradict  each  other  as  to  the  existence  or 
non-existence  of  a  fact.'^^ 

Again,  evidence  is  not  necessarily  to  be  accepted  as  true  by 
the  jury  because  it  is  not  directly  contradicted  or  expressly  im- 
peached by  an  attack  on  the  character  of  the  witness,  or  by  his 
cross-examination.'' 

The  jury  have  the  same  right  to  employ  their  common  sense 
and  judgment  in  weighing  the  testimony  of  an  uncontradicted 
witneis  as  they  have  in  determining  the  credibility  of  uncontra- 
dicted statements  made  to  them  in  their  ordinary  evcry-day  affairs. 

If  the  testimony  of  the  witness  is  inherently  improbable  so  that 
a  fair-minded  and  reasonable  man  would  disbelieve  it,  the  jury 
may  disregard  it,  though  the  witness  is  not  directly  contradicted. 
His  credit  may  be  impeachcfl  by  the  facts  he  relates  as  completely 
as  by  adverse  testimony.  His  credibility  may  be  destroyed  by  the 
imprgbability  of  his  own  testimony,  and  the  jury  have  a  right  to 

"•State  V.  Dean,  71  Wis.  678,  38  N.  Starkic  I'.v.  867;  Wills  Circ.  Ev.  224. 

W.  341 :  Hunter  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  "a  Phillips  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  687. 

761.  62  S.  E.  ifA  57  S.  E.  1070. 

"  MrRtynriMs  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  "Comiiioinvcaiili     v.     Lofwc,      \(\2 

.127;  State  V.  Hawkins.  2.1  Wavh.  28r),  Mass.   518,   y)  X.    E..    102;    People   v. 

(^■^    Pac.    258;    L5est    Prin.    Ev.    280;  Duncan,  104  Mitli.  .j^V).  62  N.  W.  i^^^. 


1 6a 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


30 


believe  that  a  witness  lies  and  reject  all  his  testimony  from  the 
omissions  of  relevant  facts  which  occur  in  his  story  and  from  the 
improbable  things  he  testifies  to.'^^ 

In  Georgia,  it  has  been  held  reversible  error  to  instruct  on  the 
comparative  weight  of  positive  or  negative  evidence  where  there 
is  no  negative  evidence.'*  And  in  that  state  the  court  has  ruled 
that  such  an  instruction  should  not  be  given  where  there  are  two 
witnesses  who  having  equal  facilities  for  seeing  and  hearing  a 
thing  about  which  they  testify  directly  contradict  each  other.'^ 


"  Quock  Ting  v.  United  States,  140 
U.  S.  417,  35  L.  ed.  501,  II  S.  Ct.  733, 
851 ;  United  States  v.  Candler,  65 
Fed.  308. 

""  Peak  V.  State  (Ga.  App.),  62  S.  E. 
665. 

"  Hunter  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  761, 
62  S.  E.  466;  Skinner  v.  State,  108 
Ga.  747,  32  S.  E.  844.  In  England, 
by  several  statutes  and  resolutions,  a 
difference  has  been  mad£  between 
civil  and  criminal  evidence.  Thus,  by 
statutes,  I  Edward  VI,  c.  12,  and  5  & 

6  Edward  VI,  c.  11,  two  witnesses 
were  required  to  convict  in  high 
treason  and  petty  treason  unless  the 
accused  confessed.  The  same  rule 
was  applied  to  counterfeiting  by  stat- 
ute P.  &  M.,  c.  ID.  This  was  fol- 
lowed and  enforced  in  subsequent 
statutes.  Under  these  statutes  a  con- 
fession of  the  person  taken  out  of 
court  before  a  magistrate  or  other 
person  having  competent  authority  to 
take  it  and  proved  b}'  two  witnesses 
was  sufficient  to  convict.     By  statute 

7  William  III,  it  was  also  declared 
that  both  witnesses  must  testify  to  the 
same  overt  act  of  treason  and  no  evi- 
dence was  admitted  to  prove  any 
overt  act  not  laid  in  the  indictment. 
Blackstone  says  that  in  almost  every 
other  accusation  one  positive  witness 
is  sufficient.  In  case  of  indictment 
for  perjury,  at  the  common  law,  the 


testimony  of  one  witness  was  not 
sufficient  to  convict  because  here  is 
only  one  oath  against  another.  This 
last  observation  may  also  be  the  basis 
of  the  requirement  of  two  witnesses 
in  treason,  for  the  oath  of  allegiance 
by  the  accused  might  in  theory  be  re- 
garded as  the  testimony  of  a  witness. 
The  principal  reason,  however,  was  to 
secure  the  subject  and  to  protect  him 
in  his  life  and  liberty  against  his  po- 
litical enemies  who  might  endeavor 
to  compass  his  destruction  bj'  secur- 
ing his  indictment  for  treason.  And 
Blackstone  further  adds  that  all  pre- 
sumptive, 7.  e.,  circumstantial  evi- 
dence of  felony  should  be  admitted 
cautiously,  for  the  law  holds  that  it 
is  better  that  ten  guilty  persons 
escape,  than  that  one  innocent  man 
shall  sufifer.  Sir  Matthew  Hale,  in 
2  Hale  P.  C.  2go,  lays  down  two 
rules,  the  first  of  which  is  never  to 
convict  a  man  for  stealing  the  goods 
of  a  person  unknown  merely  because 
he  will  give  no  account  of  how  he 
came  by  them  imless  an  actual  felony 
be  proven  in  such  case;  and  second, 
never  to  convict  any  person  of  mur- 
der or  manslaughter  until  at  least  the 
body  be  found  dead.  The  former 
rule  is  still  recognized  to  be  good 
law,  but  the  latter  rule,  stated  in  its 
ancient  strictness,  has  been  and  is  re- 
peatedly departed  from. 


CHAPTER  II. 


PRESUMPTIONS    AND   BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 


§  17.  The    presumption    of    innocence 
— General  rule. 

18.  The    presumption    of    innocence 

accompanies  the  accused  until 
a  verdict  is  rendered. 

19.  Presumption  of  chastity  of   fe- 

male, of  continuance  of  life, 
etc.,  conflicting  with  the  pre- 
sumption of  innocence. 

20.  Presumptions  from  infancy. 

21.  Certain    facts   which    the  courts 

are  presumed  to  know. 


22.  Burden  of  proof  and  presump- 

tion     of      innocence      distin- 
guished. 

23.  Burden  of  proof — General    rule 

casting  it  upon  prosecution. 

24.  Burden    of    proving    a   negative 

— F  acts  peculiarly  within 
knowledge  of  party  alleging 
them. 
24a.  Constitutionality  of  statutes 
regulating  the  burden  of 
proof. 


§  17.  The  presumption  of  innocence — General  rule. — It  is  a  car- 
dinal and  important  rule  of  the  law  of  evidence  that  the  defend- 
ant in  a  criminal  trial,  however  degraded  or  debased  he  may  be, 
and  no  matter  what  may  be  the  enormity  of  the  crime  charged 
against  him,  must  always  be  presumed  innocent  of  the  crime  for 
which  he  is  indicted  until  his  guilt  is  proved  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.' 


^  People  V.  Graney,  91  Mich.  646,  52 
N.  W.  66;  United  States  v.  Heath, 
20  D.  C.  272;  People  v.  Pallister,  138 
N.  Y.  601,  60s,  33  N.  E.  741 ;  Gard- 
ner v.  State,  55  N.  J.  L.  17,  652,  26 
Atl.  30 ;  Peoplo  v.  Coughlin,  65  Mich. 
704,  32  N.  W.  905 ;  Castle  v.  State,  75 
Ind.  146,  147;  Farley  v.  State,  127 
Ind.  419,  421,  26  N.  E.  898;  People  v. 
Resh,  107  Mich.  251,  65  N.  W.  99; 
Williams  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
606,  34  S.  W.  943;  State  V.  Krug,  12 
Wash.  288,  41  Pac.  126;  Rogers  v. 
State,  117  Ala.  192,  23  So.  82;  Waters 
V.   State,  117  Ala.  108,  22   So.  490; 

(3 


Wilson  V.  State,  140  Ala,  43,  37  So. 
93;  McArthur  v.  State,  59  Ark.  431, 

27  S.  W.  628;  People  V.  Arlington, 
131  Cal.  231,  63  Pac.  347;  People  v. 
O'Brien,  130  Cal.  i,  62  Pac.  297;  Peo- 
ple V.  Linares,  142  Cal.  17,  75  Pac. 
308;  State  V.  Smith,  65  Conn.  283,  31 
Atl.  206;  State  V.  Johns  (Del.),  65 
Atl.  763;  Long  V.  State,  42  Fla.  509, 

28  So.  775;  Dorsey  v.  State,  no  Ga. 
33f,  35  S.  E.  651 ;  State  v.  Wolf 
(Del.),  66  Atl.  739;  State  v.  Snyder, 
137  Iowa  600,  115  N.  W.225;  Tweedy 
V.  State,  5  Iowa  433;  State  v.  Lin- 
hoff,    121    Iowa   632,   97   N.    W.   77; 

0 


17 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


32 


Nothing  need  be  proved  nor  is  any  evidence  necessary  as  a 
basis  for  this  presumption.  The  imputation  of  the  innocence  of 
the  accused  is  rather  a  legal  assumption  of  a  fact  than  a  presump- 
tion. The  doctrine  is  based  upon  the  well-recognized  fact  which 
the  courts  judicially  notice  that  men  generally  obey  the  rules  of 
the  criminal  law,  and  upon  the  impossibility  of  obtaining,  and  the 
consequent  injustice  of  requiring,  affirmative  proof  from  the  ac- 
cused that  he  has  done  so  in  this  particular  case.  This  presump- 
tion is  merely  stating  concisely  the  rule  that  any  party,  whether 
the  state  or  a  natural  person  desirous  of  redress  for  an  injury,  who 
seeks  the  aid  of  a  court  of  justice,  has  the  burden  of  proving  the 
existence  or  non-existence  of  the  facts  he  affirms  or  denies. 

The  presumption  of  innocence  is  always  rebuttable.^^  As  is 
elsewhere  explained,  the  evidence  which  will  conclusively  rebut 
this  presumption  must  be  sufficient  to  convince  the  jury  upon  all 


Schintz  V.  People,  178  111.  320,  52  N. 
E.  903;  Aszman  v.  State,  123  Ind. 
347,  24  N.  E.  123,  8  L.  R.  A.  3311; 
Keeton  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Ky.  L. 
1164,  108  S.  W.  315;  Watkins  v. 
Commonwealth,  123  Kj-.  817,  97  S.  W. 
740,  29  Ky.  L.  1273;  Wilkerson  v. 
Commonwealth,  25  Ky.  L.  780,  76  S. 
W.  359;  People  V.  Potter,  89  :Mich. 
353.  50  N.  W.  994;  People  v.  DeFore, 

64  Mich.  693,  31  N.  W.  585,  8  Am. 
St.  863n;  State  v.  Wilson,  130  Mo. 
App.  151,  108  S.  W.  1086;  Heming- 
way V.  State,  68  Miss.  371,  8  So. 
317;  Thompson  v.  State,  83  Miss. 
287,    35    So.    689;    State    V.    Scheve, 

65  Neb.  853,  93  N.  W.  169,  59  L. 
R.  A.  927;  Morehead  v.  State,  34 
Ohio  St.  212;  Huggins  v.  State,  42 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  364,  60  S.  W.  52; 
United  States  v.  Richards,  149  Fed. 
443.  Note  on  presumption  of  inno- 
cence in  habeas  corpus  proceeding,  22 
L.  R.  A.  678;  note  on  presmtiption 
that  party  intended  natural  conse- 
quences of  acts,  II  L.  R.  A.  810;  note 
on  presumption  and  burden  of  proof 
as  to  violations  of  liquor  law,  41  L. 


R.  A.  6y2;  note  on  presumption  as  to 
burglary  from  possession  of  stolen 
property,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  200; 
note  on  presumption  of  malice  from 
killing  in  prosecution  for  homicide, 
4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  934;  note  on  pre- 
sumption as  to  voluntariness  of  sub- 
sequent confession,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  857;  note  on  presumption  as  to 
character  of  confession,  18  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  783;  note  on  presumption  of 
intent  to  defraud  in  false  pretenses, 
25  Am.  St.  Rep.  380;  note  on  effect 
on  presumption  of  probable  cause  for 
prosecution  of  fact  that  conviction 
was  procured  by  fraud,  perjury  or 
other  undue  means,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  II43- 

^aThe  presumption  of  innocence  is 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  defendant 
in  a  criminal  case  and  stands  as  his 
sufficient  protection  imless  it  has  been 
overcome  and  removed  by  the  evi- 
dence in  the  case,  taken  as  a  whole, 
proving  his  guilt  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt.  United  States  v.  Ken- 
ney,  90  Fed.  257. 


33  PRESUMPTIONS    AND    BURDEN    OF    P"ROOF.  §    l8 

tlie  facts  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  accused  is  guilty  of 
the  crime  charged  against  him.- 

The  state  need  not,  however,  prove  that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
crime  to  have  been  perpetrated  by  any  other  person  than  the  ac- 
cused,^ that  no  one  else  had  an  opportunity  to  commit  it  or  that  it 
might  not  possibly  have  been  the  act  of  some  one  else.* 

§  18.  The  presumption  of  innocence  accompanies  the  accused  until 
a.  verdict  is  rendered. — The  presumption  of  innocence  does  not 
cease  when  the  jury  retires.  It  accompanies  the  accused  through 
the  trial  down  to  and  until  the  jury  reach  a  verdict  of  guilty,^  and 
it  is  their  duty  if  possible  to  reconcile  the  facts  proven  with  this 
presumption.*^ 

It  is  reversible  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  so  to  charge,'^  or  to 
refuse  a  request  for  a  separate  instruction  upon  the  presumption 
of  innocence,  though  it  does  instruct  fully  and  correctly  upon  the 
necessity  for  proof  of  the  defendant's  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.' ' 

If  the  court  instructs  the  jury  correctly  upon  the  presumption 
of  innocence,  and  the  doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt,  a  further  in- 
struction that  the  state  must  show  facts  which  are  not  only  con- 
sistent with  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  but  inconsistent  with  any 
other  rational  hypothesis,  may,  according  to  some  of  the  cases,  be 
properly  refused. ** 

=§§9-16.  V.  State,  127  Tnd.  419,  421,  26  N.  E. 

^  Commonwealth      v.      Leach,      160  898 ;  Vanhouser  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr. 

Mass.  542,  36  N.  E.  471,  472.  App.  572,   108  S.  W.  386;  Thompson 

*Houser  v.  State,  58  Ga.  78,  81.  v.    State,  83   Miss.   287,   35   So.   689; 

^  People   V.    Macard,    "jz   Mich.    15,  Burton    v.    Commonwealth,    108   Va. 

26,  40  N.  W.  784;   State  v.  Krug,  12  892,  62  S.  E.  376. 

Wash.   288,   41    Pac.    126;    People  v.  ''State  v.  Gonce,  79  Mo.  600,  602; 

McNamara,  94  Cal.  509,  515,  29  Pac.  People  v.  Potter,  89  Mich.  353,  354, 

953;  Edwards  v.  State,  69  Neb.  386,  50  N.   W.  994;   Reeves   v.   State,  29 

95  N.  W.  1038;  Neilson  v.  State,  146  Fla.  527,  10  So.  901,  905. 

Ala.  683,  40  So.  221 ;  State  v.  Sam-  ^  People    v.   Van    Houter,   38   Hun 

uels     (Del.),    67    Atl.    164;    Gow    v.  (N.  Y.)    168,  173;   Stokes  v.   People, 

Bingham,  57  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    66,  107  53    N.    Y.     164,     183,    13    Am.    492. 

N.  Y.  S.  lOll.  Contra,    People    v.    Osstrander,     no 

"Castle  V.   State,  75  Ind.  146,  147;  Mich.   60,  67   N.   W.    1079;    State  v. 

Aszman  v.    State,    123    Ind.  347,   361,  Heinze,  2  Mo.  App.  13T4. 

24  N.  E.  123,  8  L.  R.  A.  33n;  Farley  ^Reed  v.  State,  54  Ark.  621,  16  S. 

3 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


§    19  '  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  34 

It  was  at  one  time  held  that  the  law  presumes  that  the  relations 
existing  between  husband  and  wife  are  amicable,  and  that  such 
friendly  relations  continue  during  the  existence  of  the  marital 
connection,  unless  the  contrary  is  shown  affirmatively.  In  a  prose- 
cution for  wife  murder,  where  the  incriminatory  evidence  is 
wholly  circumstantial,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of 
this  presumption  as  well  as  to  the  advantage  accruing-  from  the 
presumption  of  innocence,  and  the  prosecution  must  rebut  both.^" 
This  appears  to  be  no  longer  the  law." 

§  19.  Presumption  of  chastity  of  female,  of  continuance  of  life,  etc., 
conflicting  with  the  presumption  of  innocence. — It  often  happens 
from  the  nature  of  the  crime  that  the  presumption  that  the  ac- 
cused is  innocent  encounters  or  is  opposed  by  a  presumption  of 
innocence  invoked,  or  existing,  in  behalf  of  some  other  person. 
So,  in  prosecutions  for  seduction,  or  for  slander  in  imputing  un- 
chastity  to  a  female,  the  rebuttable  presumption  that  all  women 
are  chaste  has  sometimes,  but  rarely,  been  permitted  to  overcome 
the  presumption  of  innocence.  In  other  words,  the  state  has  been 
absolved  from  proving  as  a  part  of  its  case  the  female's  chastity.^- 

But  it  should  be  particularly  noted  that  the  presumption  of  in- 
nocence, though  popularly  attributed  to  every  person,  so  that  it 
is  said,  "that  every  person  is  presumed  innocent  until  proved 
guilty,"  is  restricted  in  its  legal  sense  and  application  to  the  de- 
fendant in  a  criminal  trial.  It  is  to  be  used  as  a  weapon  of  defense 
by  the  prisoner,  not  as  a  means  of  assault  upon  him  to  procure  his 
conviction,  when  proof  of  some  fact  necessary  to  show  his  guilt 
is  lacking. 

W.    819,    820,    821;    Williamson    v.  392,   14   S.  W.   969,   15  S.   W.   556; 

State,  30  Tex.   App.  330,   17  S.  W.  State  v.  Leabo,  84  Mo.  168,  54  Am. 

722.     Cf.  contra,  Lancaster  v.  State,  91. 

91    Tenn.   267,   18   S.  W.  777;   State  "State  v.   Soper,   148  Mo.  217,  49 

V.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374,  388,  14  S.  W.  S.  W.  1007;  Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala. 

969,    15   S.  W.   556;    People  V.  Cun-  37,  7  So.  302. 

ningham,  6   Park.  Cr.  Rep.    (N.   Y.)  ^  See  Slocum  v.  People.  90  111.  274, 

398;    Turner   v.    State,    102   Ind.  425,  280;    Kerr   v.    United    States.   7   Ind. 

427,  I  N.  E.  869;  Anderson  v.  State,  Terr.  486,  104  S.  W.  809;  Wilhite  v. 

104  Ind.  467,  473,  4  N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  State,   84   Ark.   67,    104    S.    W.   531. 

71 T.  Contra,  State  v.  McDaniel,  84  N.  Car. 

^*  State    V.    Moxley,    102    Mo.    374,  803,  806. 


35  PRESUMPTIONS    AND    BURDEN    OF    PROOF.  §    20 

So,  though  the  decisions  are  not  harmonious,  the  better  and 
more  reasonable  view  is  that  the  law  will  not  countenance  any 
presumption,  which  by  overcoming  the  presumption  of  innocence 
will  cast  the  burden  of  proving  his  innocence  upon  the  defendant. 
Hence,  where  presumptions  apparently  conflict  the  law  will  recog- 
nize the  presumption  of  innocence  alone  and  will  impose  no  re- 
striction on  its  operation,  but  will  apply  it  to  the  whole  scope  of 
the  charge  against  the  accused  and  to  every  fact  essential  to  the 
crime/^ 

A  man  is  presumed  to  be  alive  until  his  death  is  shown,^*  or 
until  a  counter  presumption  of  his  death  arises  from  evidence  that 
he  has  been  absent  and  has  not  been  heard  from  for  a  consider- 
able period,  by  those  who  would  naturally  have  heard  from  him 
if  he  were  alive.  But  the  presumption  of  the  continuance  of  life 
must  give  way  before  that  of  innocence.^^ 

§  20.  Presumptions  from  infancy.— An  infant  under  the  age  of 
seven  years  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  doli  incapax.  Between 
that  age  and  the  age  of  fourteen  the  absence  of  criminal  intent 
or  guilty  knowledge  will  be  presumed ;  though  in  this  case  the  pre- 
sumption is  rebuttable  by  proving  circumstances  from  which, 
despite  his  youth,  intent  may  be  inferred.  Hence,  if  the  jury  are 
convinced  on  all  the  evidence  and  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
the  infant  between  the  ages  of  seven  and  fourteen  understood  the 
nature  and  consequences  of  his  act,  and  that  it  was  done  with  de- 
liberation and  legal  intent,  they  may  convict  him  of  a  capital 
crime  or  other  felony.*^ 

"  State    V.    McDaniel,    84   N.    Car.  cide,    when    the    body    of    a   man    is 

803,  806;  McArthur  v.  State,  59  Ark.  found  whose  death  by  violence  is  not 

431,  27  S.  W.  628;  Persons  v.  State,  questioned,  as   against  the   presump- 

90    Tenn.   291,    295,    16    S.    W.   726;  tion  of  innocence.     Persons  v.  State, 

Zabriskie  v.   State,  43   N.  J.   L.  640,  90  Tenn.  291,  295,  16  S.  W.  726. 

39    Am.    610;    Oliver    v.    Common-  "Underbill  on  Evid.,  §  233. 

wealth,  loi   Pa.  St.  215,  218,  47  Am.  ^°  Cameron   v.    State,    14   Ala.    546, 

704.     Cf.    contra,   Dunlop   v.   United  48  Am.  Dec.  inn;  People  v.  Feilen, 

States,   165  U.   S.  486,  41  L.  ed.  799,  58  Cal.  218,  41  Am.  258;  Reg.  v.  Will- 

T7  Sup.   Ct.  375;    State  v.   Shean,  32  shire,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  D.  366. 

Iowa  88;    Slocum   v.   People,  90  111.  ^®  Commonwealth  v.  Mead,  to  Allen 

274,    280;    Wilson   V.    State,   7^   Ala.  (Mass.)  396,  398;  State  v.  Learnard, 

527,  534,  and  post,  §  393.     There  is  41  Vt.  585,  589;  Godfrey  v.  State,  31 

no  presumption  against  death  by  sui-  Ala.  323,  70  Am.  Dec.  49411;  State  v. 


21 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


36 


The  evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption  of  criminal  incapacity 
in  the  case  of  a  child  between  the  ages  of  seven  and  fourteen  years 
must  be  strong  and  clear,  and  prove  his  capacity  to  commit  crime 
beyond  all  reasonable  doubt ;"  though  direct  proof  of  malice  is 
not  necessary/^  The  state  must  not  only  show  the  history  and 
character  of  accused  and  the  degree  of  his  intelligence  but  facts 
showing  that  he  knew  that  the  offense  charged  was  criminal  and 
would  subject  him  to  punishment.^"  All  presumptions  in  favor  of 
infancy  cease  when  the  child  is  older  than  fourteen,  for  above  that 
age  he  will  be  presumed  to  be  capable,  mentally  and  physically,  of 
committing  any  crime."" 

§  21.  Certain  facts  which  the  courts  are  presumed  to  know. — The 
general  rules  regulating  and  indicating  those  facts  which  the 
courts  will  judicially  notice  are  equally  applicable  to  the  processes 
of  proving  facts  in  civil  and  criminal  cases.  These  rules  have  been 
very  frequently  formulated  in  statutes  which  should  be  consulted 
in  order  to  ascertain  their  precise  effect  and  operation.  Elsewhere 
in  this  work  the  subject  of  judicial  notice  will  be  found  referred 
to  in  connection  with  the  facts  of  which  no  proof  is  required.'^ 


Goin,  9  Humph.  CTenn.)  175,  176, 
'iTj;  Willet  v.  Commonwealth,  13 
Bush  (Ky.)  230,  232;  People  v.  Ran- 
dolph, 2  Park.  Cr.  Rep.  (N.  Y.)   174. 

"4  Bl.  Com.  24;  State  v.  Tice,  90 
Mo.  112,  2  S.  W.  269;  State  v.  Learn- 
ard,  41  Vt.  585;  Angelo  v.  People, 
96  111.  209,  212,  36  Am.  132. 

^'  What  evidence  will  be  required 
depends  wholly  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  each  case,  as  the  education 
and  intelligence  of  the  child,  his  mo- 
ral character  and  training  and  the 
nature  of  the  crime,  its  attendant  cir- 
cumstances and  the  motives  which 
prompted  it. 

"Binkley  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  54,  TOO  S.  W.  780. 

-"  I  Hale  P.  C.  20;  Irby  v.  State,  32 
Ga.  496,  498;  State  v.  Di  Guglielmo 
(Del.),  55  Atl.  350;  State  v.  Goin.  9 
Humph.   (Tenn.)   175,  176;  McDaniel 


v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  475;  People  v. 
Kendall,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  399;  Rex 
V.  Sutton,  3  Adol.  &  E.  597;  Hill  v. 
State,  63  Ga.  578,  582,  36  Am.  120. 
See  §  403,  post. 

^The  subject  of  judicial  notice  is 
treated  in  cxtcnso  in  Chapter  XVHI 
Underbill  on  Evidence.  A  few  in- 
stances of  facts  which  have  been  ju- 
dicially noticed  in  criminal  cases  are 
here  given.  The  names  of  the 
judges,  Kennedy  v.  Commonwealth, 
78  Ky.  447,  454;  the  names  of  the 
court  officers,  State  v.  Campbell,  210 
Mo.  202,  109  S.  W.  706;  and  the 
terms  of  the  courts.  Kennedy  v. 
Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  447,  454; 
Dorman  v.  State,  56  Ind.  454,  456; 
Rodgers  v.  State,  50  Ala.  102,  103; 
State  V.  Green,  52  S.  Car.  520,  30  S. 
E.  683.  The  records  of  the  court. 
State   V.    Bowen,    16   Kan.    475,   477. 


Z7 


PRESUMPTIONS    AND    BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 


Where  the  number  of  grand  jurors  depends  upon  the  popu- 
lation of  the  county,  the  grand  jurors  and  the  court  will  take  ju- 


Judicial  notice  may  be  taken  that  the 
sheriff  is  the  legal  keeper  of  the  jail 
of  the  county  of  which  he  is  sheriff, 
and  in  that  capacity  is  the  custodian 
of  all  prisoners  confined  therein.  Ex 
parte  Bargagliotti,  6  Cal.  App.  ^iZZ,  92 
Pac.  96.  The  power  of  municipal 
corporations  to  elect  officials.  Gal- 
lagher V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  469, 
471.  That  certain  well-known  liquors, 
as  lager  beer,  wine  and  whiskey,  are 
intoxicating,  and  that  there  is  malt 
in  beer.  Brififitt  v.  State,  58  Wis.  39, 
41-45,  16  N.  W.  39,  46  Am.  621 ; 
State  V.  Goyette,  11  R.  I.  592;  Rau  v. 
People,  63  N.  Y.  2T7;  Waller  v. 
State,  38  Ark.  656,  660;  Cripe  v. 
State,  4  Ga.  App.  832,  62  S.  E.  567; 
(lager  beer)  Tompkins  v.  State,  2 
Ga.  App.  639,  58  S.  E.  II 11;  Fears 
V.  State,  125  Ga.  740,  54  S.  E.  661 ; 
State  V.  Carmody,  50  Ore.  i,  91  Pac. 
446,  io8r,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  828; 
Nussbaumer  v.  State,  54  Fla.  87,  44 
So.  712;  that  whiskey  is  a  spirituous 
or  distilled  liquor.  State  v.  York,  74 
N.  H.  125,  65  Atl.  685;  O'Connell  v. 
State  (Ga.  App.),  62  S.  E.  1007. 
Great  public  and  historical  events. 
Williams  v.  State,  ()^  Ga.  260,  262. 
Facts  of  geography,  particularly  of 
territorial  subdivisions  established  by 
law.  Moore  v.  State,  126  Ga.  414, 
55  S.  E.  327;  State  v.  Thompson,  85 
Me.  189,  194,  27  Atl.  97;  State  v. 
Wagner,  6r  Me.  178;  People  v. 
Brooks,  TOi  Mich.  98,  lOi,  59  N.  W. 
444;  Forehand  v.  State,  53  Ark.  46, 
T3  S.  W.  728;  People  v.  Wood,  131 
N.  Y.  617,  30  N.  E.  243;  State  v. 
Dunwell,  3  R.  I.  127;  United  States 
V.  Beebe,  2  Dak.  292,  293,  11  N.  W. 


505;  State  V.  Reader,  60  Iowa  527,  15 
N.  W,  423;  People  v.  Suppiger,  103 
111.  434.  The  court  will  take  judicial 
notice  of  the  boundaries  of  the  state 
and  of  the  county,  that  a  designated 
county  is  in  the  state,  and  a  desig- 
nated town  in  the  county.  Reed  v. 
Territory  (Okla.  App.),  98  Pac 
583;  State  V.  Burns,  48  Mo.  438; 
State  V.  Pennington,  124  Mo.  388, 
391,  27  S,  W.  1106;  Commonwealth 
V.  Desmond,  103  Mass.  445 ;  State  v. 
Fishel  (Iowa),  118  N.  W.  763; 
Commonwealth  v.  Wheeler,  162  Mass. 
429,  431,  38  N.  E.  1115;  State  v.  Dun- 
well,  3  R.  I.  127 ;  Vanderwerker  v. 
People,  5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  530;  Moye 
V.  State,  65  Ga.  754;  Huston  v.  Peo- 
ple, 53  111.  App.  501,  502;  People  V. 
Etting,  99  Cal.  577,  579,  34  Pac.  2ZT, 
State  V.  Farley,  87  Iowa  22,  53  N.  W. 
T089;  People  V.  Curley,  99  Mich.  238, 
58  N.  W.  68.  Also  of  the  boundaries 
of  counties.  Fuller  v.  Territory 
(Okla  App.),  99  Pac.  1098.  Crimes 
committed  within  a  military  post  or 
fort  are  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of 
state  courts.  Lasher  v.  State,  30  Tex. 
App.  387,  17  S.  W.  1064,  1065,  28  Am. 
St.  922;  Wills  V.  State,  3  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)    141,  148. 

In  a  prosecution  for  an  unlawful 
sale  of  liquor,  the  court  will  take  ju- 
dicial notice  that  the  county  where 
the  sale  was  charged  to  have  been 
made  was  a  prohibition  county.  Irby 
V.  State,  91  Miss.  542,  44  So.  801. 
The  courts  will  take  notice  of  gen- 
eral state  elections,  but  not  of  special 
elections.  Gay  v.  Eugene  (Ore.),  100 
Pac.  306. 


21 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


38 


dicial  notice  of  the  census  in  determining  whether  the  grand  jury- 
is  properly  constituted."' 

Judicial  notice  will  be  taken  of  the  fact  that  a  city  is  by  statute 
a  city  of  the  second  class  where  it  has  been  made  such  by  a  procla- 
mation of  the  state  executive."^ 

The  courts  wnll  take  judicial  notice  of  the  contents  of  the  jour- 
nals of  the  legislature  far  enough  to  determine  whether  an  act 
published  was  actually  passed  and  is  constitutional.^^ 


"State  V.  Braskamp,  87  Iowa  588, 
590,  591,  54  N.  W.  532. 

"*  State  V.  Ricksicker,  y^  Kan.  495, 
85  Pac.  547.  As  regards  public  streets 
and  squares,  it  may  be  said  that  though 
a  court  may  take  judicial  notice  that 
the  public  place  is  located  in  a  city 
or  town  in  the  county,  it  is  not  com- 
pelled to  do.  The  safer  plan  is  to 
prove  the  location  of  the  street  or 
square  in  the  city  in  which  the  venue 
is  laid.  Dougherty  v.  People,  118 
111.  160,  8  N.  E.  673;  Evans  v.  State, 
17  Fla.  192;  Commonwealth  v.  Ack- 
land,  107  Mass.  211. 

^*  McDonald  v.  State,  80  Wis.  407, 
411,  so  N.  W.  185;  People  v.  Mayes, 
113  Cal.  618,  45  Pac.  860. 

The  facts  which  the  courts  will 
notice  judicially,  and  which  therefore 
need  neither  be  alleged  in  the  indict- 
ment, nor  proved  at  the  trial,  may  be 
thus  concisely  summarized: 

The  truesignificatio'n.of  all  English 
words  and  phrases  and  abbreviations 
in  common  use  (McDonald  v.  State, 
55  Fla.  134,  46  So.  176)  and  of  all 
legal  expressions.  United  States  v. 
Heinze,  161  Fed.  425;  State  v.  Nip- 
pert,  74  Kan.  371,  86  Pac.  478;  Sims 
V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  yy6,  57  S.  E. 
1029  (meaning  of  the  words  "craps" 
as  a  game  with  dice  and  that  "quar- 
ter" means  twenty-five  cents). 

The  statutory  and  common  law  and 
generally  whatever  is  established  by 
law.     Courts   are  bound  to  take  no- 


tice of  every  public  statute,  and  the 
facts  they  recite  or  state,  including 
the  time  at  which  they  take  effect, 
though  that  time  depends  on  the  re- 
sult of  a  popular  vote,  to  be  declared 
by  proclamation  issued  by  the  secre- 
tarjf  of  State.  Farmer  v.  Salisburj^ 
77  Vt.  161,  59  Atl.  201. 

Public  and  private  official  acts  of 
the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial 
departments  of  the  state  and  of  the 
United  States.  State  v.  Tull}',  31 
Mont.  365,  78  Pac.  760;  Prather  v. 
United  States,  9  App.  D.  C.  82. 

The  seals  of  all  the  courts  of  the 
state  and  of  the  United  States. 

The  accession  to  office  and  the  offi- 
cial signatures  and  seals  of  the  prin- 
cipal officers  of  government  in  the 
legislative,  executive  and  judicial  de- 
partments of  the  state  and  of  the 
United  States. 

The  existence,  title,  national  flag, 
and  seal  of  every  state  or  sovereign 
recognized  by  the  executive  power  of 
the  United  States. 

The  seals  of  courts  of  admiralty 
and  maritime  jurisdiction  and  of  no- 
taries public. 

The  laws  of  nature,  the  measure  of 
time,  the  value  and  nature  of  the  cir- 
culating medium,  and  the  geograph- 
ical divisions  and  the  facts  of  politi- 
cal histor3^  That  the  sale  of  liquors 
is  prohibited  by  law  in  a  particular 
county.  Bass  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App. 
728,  790,  57  S.  E.  1054. 


39  PRESUMPTIONS    AND    BURDEN    OF    PROOF.  §    22 

So  also,  the  appellate  courts  will  judicially  notice  the  fact  of 
a  prior  reversal,  and  indeed  all  prior  proceedings  in  the  record 
such  as  the  verdict  on  a  demurrer  to  the  plea  of  former  jeopardy.^^ 

The  appellate  courts,  however,  will  not  take  notice  in  deciding 
one  case  of  the  record  of  another  case.  The  latter  record  must  be 
made  part  of  the  case  on  appeal.-*^ 

Generally,  the  higher  courts,  such  as  the  supreme  court  and  the 
courts  of  appellate  jurisdiction,  will  not  take  notice  of  the  exist- 
ence of  municipal  ordinances."' 

But  the  municipal  courts  will  usually  take  judicial  notice  of 
city  ordinances.-'^ 

Thus,  where  an  appeal  is  from  a  conviction  of  violating  a  mu- 
nicipal ordinance  a  court  having  appellate  jurisdiction,  will,  on  a 
trial  dc  novo,  notice  judicially  all  facts  which  would  have  been 
noticed  by  the  lower  court.-^  The  court  will  take  judicial  notice 
of  the  meaning  of  scientific  and  medical  terms,  such  as  "anatomy," 
etc.  Nevertheless,  standard  medical  works  and  other  publications 
defining  such  words  may  be  consulted  by  the  court.®** 

§  22.    Burden  of  proof  and  presumption  of  innocence  distinguished. 

— The  principle  that  the  accused  is  innocent  until  the  jury  has 
pronounced  him  guilty  upon  all  the  evidence,  and  the  rule  that 
regulates  the  burden  of  proof  must  be  clearly  distinguished.  The 
former  is  a  rule  of  substantive  law,  existing  before  any  evidence 
is  offered  and  accompanying  the  accused  throughout  the  trial 
down  to  the  moment  of  his  conviction.  But  the  burden  of  proof, 
designed  mainly  as  a  rule  of  procedure,  confers  only  a  temporary 

"^  McXish    V.   State,  47  Fla.   69,   36  prosecution    for  practicing  medicines 

So.   176;  McGuire  v.  State,  76  Miss,  without  a  license.     State  v.   Wilhite, 

504,  25  So.  495.  132  Iowa  226,   109   N.   W.  730.     Ju- 

"'^  McNish  V.   State,  47  Fla.  69,  36  dicial  notice  will  be  taken  that  vac- 

So.  176.  cination  is  commonly  believed  to  be 

"  Gardner  v.  State,  80  Ark.  264,  97  a   safe   and  valuable  means   of  pre- 

S.  W.  48;   Tarkio  v.  Loyd,  179  Mo.  venting  the  spread  of  smallpox,  and 

600,  78  S.  W.   797;    Hill  V.   Atlanta,  that  this  belief  is  supported  by  high 

125  Ga.  697,  54  S.  E.  354.  medical  authority.     Jacobson  v.  Mas- 

"^  Steiner  v.  State,  78  Neb.  147,  no  sachusetts,    197   U.    S.    11,   49   L.    ed. 

N.  W.  723.  643,  25  Sup.  Ct.  358,  aff'g  Common- 

^°  Steiner  v.  State,  78  Neb.  147,  no  wealth  v.  Pear,  183  Mass.  242,  66  N. 

N.  W.  723.  E.  719,  67  L.  R.  A.  935. 

^This     rule    was    applied    in    the 


§    23  CRIAIINAL    EVIDENCE.  '  4O 

benefit  upon  him.  Under  the  burden  of  proof  the  prosecution  is 
compelled  in  the  first  instance  to  make  out  a  prima  facie  case  prov- 
ing the  essential  facts  embraced  in  the  criminal  transaction  al- 
leged, including  the  intent.  If  this  is  done,  and  the  accused  offers 
no  evidence,  the  case  as  made  out  by  the  state  must  go  to  the  jury. 
They  are  to  consider  it,  but  only  in  connection  with  the  presump- 
tion of  innocence  to  which  the  accused  is  always  entitled,  though 
he  may  have  introduced  no  evidence  whatever.  In  thus  comply- 
ing with  the  requirement  that  it  shall  sustain  the  burden  of  proof, 
the  state  must  produce  such  evidence  as  will  overcome  the  pre- 
sumption of  innocence  and  convince  the  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  After  the  state  has  introduced 
all  the  proof  which  it  regards  as  sufficient  to  convict  the  prisoner, 
he  may  meet  the  case  thus  made  out  against  him  in  three  different 
ways  :  First.  He  may  plead  not  guilty  generally.  By  this  plea  he 
puts  in  issue  all  the  allegations  of  the  indictment.  He  denies  the 
truth  of  all  the  evidence  which  may  be  offered  against  him.  Sec- 
ond. He  may  deny  the  truth  of  some  particular  ingredient  in  the 
criminal  transaction,  as  shown  by  the  state,  as  when  he  pleads 
an  alibi,  or,  admitting  the  doing  of  the  act  charged,  denies  the 
presence  of  a  malicious  intent,  or  alleges  that  he  was  no)i  compos 
mentis  at  the  date  of  the  alleged  crime  and  is,  therefore,  not  re- 
sponsible for  what  he  did.  Third.  He  may  put  in  a  defense  not 
traversing  the  allegations  of  the  indictment,  but  involving  some 
matters  or  facts  which  are  entirely  separate,  distinct  from,  and 
independent  of  the  original  transaction  set  forth  therein.  Thus, 
for  example,  he  may  plead  that  the  court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the 
charge,  or  he  may  plead  that  he  had  a  statutory  license  to  do  what 
he  did,  or  he  may  claim  that  he  has  been  already  tried  and  ac- 
quitted or  convicted  of  the  same  crime.  We  will  first  consider  a 
case  where  the  accused  pleads  not  guilty  merely  and  traverses  tlie 
allegations  of  the  indictment. 

§  23.  Burden  of  proof — General  rule  casting  it  upon  prosecution. — 
The  general  rule  stated  broadly,  as  laid  down  by  the  cases,  is 
that  the  burden  of  proof  and  the  obligation  to  convince  the  jury 
of  the  prisoner's  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  all  facts 
and  circumstances  essential  to  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  including 
the  criminal   intent,   are  upon  the  prosecution  throughout  the 


41 


PRESUMPTIONS    AXD    BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 


^3 


trial.^"*  There  is  no  shifting  of  the  burden  of  proof  during  the 
trial.'^ 

The  making  out  of  a  prima  facie  case  does  not  shift  the  burden 
of  proof  to  the  defendant  but  it  remains  with  the  prosecution  until 
the  verdict  is  reached. 

This  rule  is  clearly  applicable  in  every  case  where  the  defend- 
ant by  pleading  "not  guilty"  alone,  and  without  qualification, 
stands  upon  a  negative  allegation,  and  does  not  rely  upon  any 
facts  which  are  separate  and  distinct  from,  or  independent  of,  the 
original  transaction  set  forth  in  the  indictment.  By  such  a  plea 
the  prisoner  restricts  himself  to  denying  and  disproving  the  facts 


^°a  Note  on  burden  of  proof  as  to 
insanity,  ^6  Am.  St.  Rep.  92,  97;  note 
on  burden  of  proof  in  prosecution  for 
false  pretenses,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  385; 
note  on  freedom  from  fault  by  de- 
fendant in  homicide,  who  began  con- 
flict, 45  L.  R.  A.  706;  note  on  burden 
of  proof  as  to  alibi,  41  L.  R.  A.  530, 
541 ;  note  on  burden  and  measure  of 
proof  of  alibi,  41  L.  R.  A.  530;  note 
on  burden  of  proof  that  confession 
was  voluntary,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  244, 
245.     See  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2706. 

^^  State  V.  Conway,  56  Kan.  682,  44 
Pac.  627;  State  v.  Harvey,  131  Mo. 
339,  32  S.  W.  mo;  State  v.  Lowry, 
42  W.  Va.  20s,  24  S.  E.  561 ;  People 
V.  Coughlin,  65  Mich.  704,  705,  32  N. 

W.  90s;  Maher  v.  People,   10  Mich. 
212,    81    Am.    Dec.    781 ;    Walker   v. 

People,  88  N.  Y.  81,  88;  O'Connell 

V.  People,  87  N.  Y.  377,  380,  41  Am. 

379;   Gravely  v.   State,  38  Neb.   871, 

873,  57  N.  W.  751 ;  Holmes  v.  State, 

100  Ala.  80,  84,  14  So.  864;  Jones  v. 

State,  51  Ohio  St.  331,  38  N.  E.  79; 

State    V.    Hirsch,   45    Mo.    429,   431 ; 

People  V.  Plath,   100  N.   Y.  590,  592, 

3  N.  E.  790,  53  Am.  236;   People  v. 

Curtis,  97  Mich.  489,  490,  56  N.  W. 

925 ;  People  v.  IMcWhorter,  93  IMich. 

641,  643,  644,  53  N.  W.  780;   Burger 


v.  State,  34  Xeb.  397,  400,  51  X.  W. 
1027;  Bishop  V.  State.  62  Miss.  289; 
Hansford  v.  State  (Miss.),  11  So. 
106;  Slade  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App. 
381,  392,  393,  16  S.  W.  253:  People 
V.  Elliott,  80  Cal.  296,  22  Pac.  207; 
Xeilson  v.  State,  146  Ala.  683,  40  So. 
221;  State  V.  Samuels  (Del.),  67  Atl. 
164.  "In  every  criminal  case  the  burden 
is  throughout  upon  the  prosecution. 
Whatever  course  the  defense  deems 
it  prudent  to  take,  in  order  to  ex- 
plain suspicious  circumstances  or  re- 
move doubts,  it  is  incumbent  on  the 
prosecution  to  show,  under  all  the 
circumstances,  as  a  part  of  their  case, 
unless  admitted  or  shown  by  the  de- 
fense, that  there  is  no  innocent  the- 
ory possible,  which  will,  without  vio- 
lation of  reason,  accord  with  the 
facts.  So,  in  a  case  of  alleged  poi- 
soning, where  the  symptoms  and  ap- 
pearances during  the  last  illness  be- 
come controlling  in  determining 
whether  death  was  from  poison  or 
disease,  the  charge  is  not  made  out 
unless  the  state  negative  everything 
but  poison  as  the  cause  of  death. 
This  it  can  do  only  by  showing  that 
the  combined  symptoms  and  the  ab- 
solutely certain  facts  with  which  they 
are   associated   are   inconsistent    with 


§    23 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


42 


involved  in  the  original  transaction  upon  which  the^  charge  is 
based,  including,  of  course,  all  the  accompanying  circumstances. ^- 
The  defendant  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  presumption  of 
innocence  before  he  introduces  any  evidence.  Hence,  though  he 
offers  no  evidence,  the  court  has  no  legal  power  to  direct  a  ver- 
dict, but  the  prima  facie  case  against  him  must  be  submitted  to  the 
jury.  They  must  take  into  consideration  the  presumption  of  in- 
nocence, and  should  not  convict  unless  the  state  has  sustained  the 
burden  of  proof.  But  when  the  defendant  pleads  any  substantive, 
distinct  and  independent  matter  as  a  defense,  either  as  justifica- 
tion or  excuse  or  as  an  exemption  from  criminal  liability,  which 
upon  its  face  does  not  necessarily  constitute  an  element  of  the 
transaction  wath  w'hich  he  is  charged,  and  wdiich  is  wholly  dis- 
connected from  the  offense,  it  has  been  said  that  the  burden  of 
proving  such  defense  devolves  upon  him.^^  The  accused  must 
prove  the  independent  exculpatory  facts  upon  which  he  relies,  and 


any  other  disease."  People  v.  Mil- 
lard, S3  Mich.  63,  18  X.  W.  562.  See, 
also,  Underhill  on  Evid.,  §  247. 

^"  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  ques- 
tion, see  Commonwealth  v.  ]\IcKie,  i 
Gray  (Mass.)  6t,  61  Am.  Dec.  410. 
But  the  rule  does  not  require  an  in- 
struction that  the  burden  of  proof 
in  every  criminal  case  is  on  the  state 
to  prove  all  the  allegations  in  the 
indictment.  Young  v.  State,  149  Ala. 
16,  43  So.  100. 

"State  V.  Rollins,  113  X.  Car.  722, 
729,  734,  18  S.  E.  394;  State  v.  Welsh, 
29  S.  Car.  4,  7,  6  S.  E.  894;  Robert- 
son V.  Commonwealth  (Va.),  22  S. 
E.  359,  362;  Myers  v.  Commonwealth, 
90  Va.  705,  706,  19  S.  E.  881 ;  Cleve- 
land V.  State,  86  Ala.  i,  10,  5  So. 
426;  Commonwealth  v.  Eddy,  7  Gray 
(Mass.)  583,  584:  United  States  v. 
Holmes,  I  CHfif.  (U.  S.)  98,  117,  26 
Fed.  Cas.  15382;  Stitt  v.  State,  91 
Ala.  10,  8  So.  669,  24  Am.  St.  853; 
Day  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  2x3,  17  S. 
W.  262;  Stokes  V.  People,  53  X.  Y. 
164,  13  Am.  492;   State  v.  Wingo,  66 


Mo.  i8r,  183,  186,  27  Am.  329;  State 
V.  Johnson,  91  Mo.  439,  443,  3  S.  W. 
868;  Weaver  v.  State,  24  Ohio  St. 
584,  588,  589;  People  V.  Rodrigo,  69 
Cal.  601,  II  Pac.  481;  People  v.  Tarm 
Poi,  86  Cal.  225,  24  Pac.  998;  Kriel 
v.  Commonwealth,  5  Bush  (K}\) 
2,62;  Bergin  v.  State,  31  Ohio  St.  iii, 
115;  Rayburn  v.  State,  69  Ark.  177, 
63  S.  W.  356;  People  V.  Boo  Doo 
Hong,  122  Cal.  606,  55  Pac.  402; 
State  V.  Schweitzer,  57  Conn.  532,  18 
Atl.  787,  6  L.  R.  A.  125;  State  v. 
Kavanaugh,  4  Pen.  (Del.)  131,  53 
Atl.  335;  Padgett  v.  State,  40  Fla. 
451,  24  So.  145;  Williams  v.  People, 
121  111.  84,  II  N.  E.  881;  State  v. 
Wright,  134  Mo.  404,  35  S.  W.  1145; 
State  V.  Hickam,  95  Mo.  322,  8  S.  W. 
252,  6  Am.  St.  54;  State  v.  Davis,  14 
Xev.  439,  ZZ  Am.  563;  People  v. 
Riordan,  117  X.  Y.  71,  22  X.  E.  455; 
Commonwealth  v.  Zelt,  138  Pa.  St. 
615,  21  Atl.  7,  II  L.  R.  A.  602;  King 
V.  State,  91  Tenn.  617,  20  S.  W.  169; 
State  V.  :McCaffrey,  69  Vt.  85,  27 
Atl.  234. 


43  PRESUMPTIONS    AND    BURDEN    OF    PROOF.  g    24 

in  this  respect  and  to  this  extent,  it  is  correct  to  say  the  burden 
Hes  on  him.  Notwithstanding  this,  if,  after  all  the  evidence  is  in, 
it  is  found  that  upon  the  whole  case  the  prosecution  has  not  sus- 
tained the  burden  of  proof  in  convincing  the  jury  of  the  prisoner's 
guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  he  should  be  acquitted. 

It  may  happen  that  the  facts  which  sustain,  or  tend  to  sustain 
a  defense  of  justification  or  excuse,  shall  came  out  during  the 
examination  of  the  witness  for  the  prosecution.  The  defendant  is 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  this  for  the  rule  that  the  burden  of  proof 
of  an  affirmative  and  independent  defense  is  on  the  accused  does 
not  necessarily  mean  that  he  must  prove  it  wholly  by  his  testi- 
mony or  that  of  his  own  witnesses.  And  no  matter  what  the  evi- 
dence may  be  showing  justification  or  excuse,  and  whether  it  be 
strong  or  whether  it  be  weak,  or  whether  it  shall  proceed  from 
the  state's  witnesses  or  from  the  witnesses  for  the  accused,  the 
accused  is  entitled,  where  there  is  any  evidence  sustaining  an  af- 
firmative defense,  to  have  it  considered  by  the  jury,  with  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case;  and  he  is  entitled  to  an  instruction  that 
though  the  burden  is  on  him  to  prove  an  affirmative  defense,  yet 
upon  all  the  evidence,  the  state  must  establish  his  guilt  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt. 

§  24.  Burden  of  proving  a  negative — Facts  peculiarly  within 
knowledge  of  party  alleging  them. — The  general  rule  is  that  the  bur- 
den of  proof  is  upon  him  who  maintains  the  affirmative,  for  the 
reason  that  the  affirmative  is  the  most  susceptible  of  direct  proof. 
Hence  the  prosecution  has  the  burden  of  proof  as  the  indictment 
is  composed  of  allegations  of  an  affirmative  character. 

The  difficulty  lies  mainly  in  applying  the  rule.  That  it  is  a  real 
difficulty  no  one  will  hesitate  to  believe  who  has  struggled  through 
the  bewildering  jungle  of  contradictory  and  irreconcilable  deci- 
sions endeavoring  to  find  some  common  principle  upon  which  they 
could  be  harmonized  or  at  least  rendered  more  intelligible.  The 
main  source  of  the  confusion  which  has  arisen  has  been  the  forget- 
fulness  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  conceivable  proposition  of  fact 
affirmative  in  its  form  which  does  not  blend  a  negative  with  it. 
or  in  other  words  which  does  not  imply  the  negation  or  denial  of 
its  opposite.  Thus,  for  example,  in  a  prosecution  for  rape  the  al- 
legation that  the  defendant  violated  the  prosecutrix  by  force  or 


§    24  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  44 

fraud  involves  the  negative  allegation  that  she  did  not  consent  to 
the  intercourse. 

So  a  charge  of  larceny  necessitates  proof  that  the  owner  of  the 
property  stolen  did  not  consent  to  the  taking.  The  allegation  that 
personal  property  was  stolen  is  inseparable  from  the  allegation 
that  it  w^as  taken  from  the  owner  without  his  consent,  and  for  the 
state  to  prove  one  necessarily  requires  that  it  shall  prove  the  other. 
Hence  the  rule  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  prosecution 
because  it  has  made  affirmative  allegations  is  not  afifected  by  the 
existence  of  the  implied  negatives  in  the  original  transaction.  The 
prosecution  is  permitted  and  required  to  prove  these  negatives  as 
a  part  of  its  case,  and  cannot  shift  the  burden  of  proving  their 
affirmative  opposites  upon  the  accused.  And  in  criminal  cases  the 
presumption  of  innocence  which  attaches  to  the  accused  casts  the 
burden  of  proving  the  guilt  of  the  accused  upon  the  state  through- 
out. Hence  if  the  non-existence  of  some  fact,  or  the  non-perform- 
ance of  some  duty,  is  a  constituent  and  essential  element  in  the 
crime  with  which  the  accused  is  charged,  the  burden  of  proving 
this  negative  allegation  of  non-existence  or  non-performance  is 
upon  the  state.  Thus,  under  an  indictment  for  selling  goods  not 
produced  in  the  United  States,  the  burden  is  on  the  state  to  show 
that  the  goods  were  foreign.  But  if  a  fact  is  peculiarly  within  the 
knowledge  of  the  accused,  as,  for  example,  his  own  age  when  he 
pleads  non-age  as  a  defense,^*  or  the  fact  that  he  has  a  license  to 
carry  on  a  prohibited  business  or  to  do  a  forbidden  act,  the  bur- 
den of  proof  is  on  him  as  he  has  much  better  means  of  proving 
the  negative  fact  alleged  than  the  prosecution  has  of  proving  the 
contrary.  The  matter  is  peculiarly  within  his  knowledge,  and  to 
require  the  state  to  prove  the  lack  of  a  license  is  to  require  proof 
of  a  negative  allegation. ^^ 

^  Ellis  V.   State,  30  Tex.  App.  6or,  686 ;   Commonwealth   v.  Thurlow,   24 

18   S.   W.    139;    State   V.   Arnold,   13  Pick.     (Mass.)     374,    381;     State    v. 

Ired.    (N.  Car.)    184,  187.  Hirsch,  45   Mo.  429;   Commonwealth 

^' Sharp  V.  State,  17  Ga.  290;  Gen-  v.  Zelt,  138  Pa.  St.  615,  628,  21  Atl. 

ing   V.    State,    i    McCord    (S.    Car.)  7,   11  L.  R.  A.  602;   State  v.  Wood- 

573,  574;  People  V.  Townsey,  5  Denio  ward,    34    Me.    293,    295:    Farrall    v. 

(N.    Y.)    70;    People    v.    Safford,    5  State,  ^2  Ala.   557;   State  v.  Wilson, 

Denio     (N.    Y.)     112;    Hodgman    v.  39  I\Io.  .'\pp.  114,  115;  People  v.  X^xe, 

People,  4  Denio    (N.  Y.)    235;  Con-  34  Hun    (N.  Y.)   298.  300:  People  v. 

yers  v.  State,  50  Ga.  103,  106,  15  Am.  ]\Iaxwell,  83  Hun  (N.  Y.)   157,  31  N. 


45 


PRESUMPTIOXS    AND    BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 


§    24a 


§  24a.    Constitutionality  of  statutes  regulating  the  burden  of  proof. 

— In  some  states  statutes  have  been  passed  which  cast  upon  the 
accused  the  burden  of  proving  certain  particular  and  specific  facts 
which  may  arise  under  the  indictment.  These  statutes  generally 
provide  that  a  certain  act  of  the  accused  when  proved,  shall  be 
presumed  to  have  been  done  with  a  criminal  or  illegal  intent. 
Thus  it  has  been  provided  that  one  accused  of  burglary,  must 
prove  the  innocent  character  of  his  entrance  on  the  premises.^" 
And  again,  there  are  statutes  which  provide  that  the  evidence  of 
the  sale  or  keeping  of  liquors  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence 
that  the  sale  or  keeping  was  illegal. ^^  These  statutes  by  which 
the  jury  are  bound  to  infer  that  some  act  which  would  otherwise 
be  an  innocent  act  is  proof  of  guilt  until  the  accused  shall  con- 
vince them  his  act  was  not  criminal  are  constitutional.^* 


Y.  S.  564 ;  State  v.  McGlynn,  34  N.  H. 
422;  State  V.  Simons,  17  N.  H.  83; 
State  V.  Foster,  23  N.  H.  348,  55  Am. 
Dec.  191 ;  State  v.  Keggon,  55  N.  H. 
19,  20;  Wheat  V.  State,  6  Mo.  455. 
456;  State  V.  Crow,  53  Kan.  662,,  663, 
37  Pac.  170;  State  v.  Camden,  48  N. 
J.  L.  89,  90.  Contra  by  statute,  Com- 
monwealth V.  Thnrlow,  24  Pick. 
(]\Iass.)  374;  Commonwealth  v. 
Locke,  114  Mass.  288,  294;  Mehan  v. 
State,  7  Wis.  670.  The  same  prin- 
ciple is  applicable  where  several  ex- 
ceptions or  qualifications  exist  by 
statute,  and  the  accused  alleges  he  is 
under  one  of  them.  Rex  v.  Turner, 
5  Maule  &  Selw.  206,  2ii„2i3;  Hines 
V.  State,  93  G*i.  187,  189,  18  S.  E. 
558;  Commonwealth  v.  Zelt,  138  Pa. 
St.  615,  21  Atl.  7,  II  L.  R.  A.  602; 
State  V.  Kriechbaum,  81  Iowa  633,  47 
X.  W.  872 ;  State  v.  Hill,  46  La.  Ann. 
27,  49  Am.  St.  316;  Commonwealth 
V.  Samuel,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  103. 
Thus,  for  example,  a  parent  who  is 
prosecuted  for  failing  to  send  his 
child  to  school  for  the  period  pre- 
scribed in  a  truancy  statute,  has  the 


burden  of  showing  he  is  within  the 
exception  of  the  statute.  State  v. 
McCaffrey,.  69  Vt.  85,  37  Atl.  234. 
See  as  to  a  statute  forbidding  one 
not  an  employe  in  the  discharge  of 
his  duty,  riding,  on  a  train  without  the 
permission  of  conductor  or  engineer. 
Gains  v.  State,  149  Ala.  29,  43  So. 
137,  where  it  was  held  incumbent  on 
the  accused  to  prove  he  was  an  em- 
ploye. 

^^  State  V.  Wilson,.  9  Wash.  218,  37 
Pac.  424;  State  v.  Anderson,  5  Wash. 
350,  31  Pac.  969. 

^^  State  V.  Higgins,  13  R.  I.  330,  43 
Am.  St.  26. 

^  State  V.  Beach  (Tnd.),  43  N.  E. 
949;  Santo  V.  State,  2  Iowa  165,  63 
Am.  Dec.  487 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Mi- 
nor, 88  Ky.  422,  II  S.  W.  472,  10  Ky. 
L.  1008;  Commonwealth  v.  Smith, 
166  Mass.  370,  44  N.  E.  503 ;  State  v. 
Altoffer,  3  Ohio  Dec.  288,  2  Ohio  N. 
P.  97;  State  v.  Kyle,  14  Wash.  550, 
45  Pac.  147.  Contra,  Wong  Hane,  In 
re,  108  Cal.  680,  41  Pac.  693,  49  Am. 
St.  138. 


CHAPTER  III. 


EVIDENCE    BEFORE    THE    GRAND    JURY, 


§  25.  Ex  parte  character  of  evidence 
before  the  grand  jury. 
26.  Legal  and  proper  evidence  only 
receivable — Effect  of  basing 
indictment  on  incompetent 
evidence. 


27.  The  accused  as  a  witness  before 

the  grand  jury. 

28.  Sufficiency    of    evidence    before 

the  grand  jury. 

29.  Contempt    by    witnesses    before 

the  grand  jury. 

30.  The  indictment  is  not  evidence. 


§  25.   Ex  parte  character  of  evidence  before  the  grand  jury. — The 

common  law  regarded  the  proceedings  of  grand  jurors  as  abso- 
lutely ex  parte  in  their  character.  This,  it  will  be  seen,  must  of 
necessity  be  the  case,  and  for  this  reason  the  accused  is  not  en- 
titled, as  of  course,  to  appear  before  them  either  in  person  or  by 
counsel/  It  is,  however,  discretionary  with  the  court,  but  never 
matter  of  right,  to  call  the  accused  before  the  grand  jur}^  and, 
perhaps,  under  peculiar  circumstances,  to  permit  him  to  cross- 
examine  the  witnesses  against  him.  The  accused  party  has  no 
right  to  submit  any  evidence.  He  cannot  produce  witnesses  before 
the  grand  jury  nor  submit  evidence  in  his  own  behalf,  even  with 
the  permission  of  the  state's  attorney.^  The  office  of  the  grand 
jury  is  to  examine  the  foundation  on  which  the  change  is  made  by 


^The  grand  jury  are,  in  the  absence 
of  statute,  to  hear  evidence  in  sup- 
port of  the  charge  only.   Lung's  Case, 

1  Conn.  428;  United  States  v.  Palmer, 

2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  11,  27  Fed. 
Cas.  15989.  They  can  not  inquire  in- 
to the  insanity  of  the  accused.  That 
is  matter  of  defense  to  be  proved  in 
his  trial.  Reg.  v.  Hodges,  8  C.  &  P. 
195- 

"  State  V.  Hamlin,  47  Conn.  95,  105, 
36  Am.  54 ;  United  States  v.  Blodgett, 


35  Ga.  336,  342,  Fed.  Case  18312; 
United  States  v.  White,  2  Wash.  C. 
C.  (U.  S.)  29,  30,  28  Fed  Cas.  16685; 
United  States  v.  Edgerton,  80  Fed. 
374;  Respublica  v.  Shaffer,  i  Dall. 
(U.  S.)  236,  I  L.  ed.  116;  United 
States  v.  Palmer,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 
S.)  II,  27  Fed.  Cas.  15989;  United 
States  V.  Lawrence,  4  Cranch  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  574,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15576; 
People  V.  Goldenson,  76  Cal.  328,  19 
Pac.   161. 


(46) 


47  EVIDENCE    BEFORE    THE    GRAND    JURY.  §    26 

the  State  and  not  that  on  which  it  is  denied.  This  rule,  though 
a]jparently  working  an  injustice  to  an  accused  person,  is  actually- 
calculated  to  inure  to  his  benefit.  For,  if  he  were  allowed  to  in- 
troduce witnesses  and  evidence  in  his  own  behalf  and  the  ei'and 
jury  were  then  to  indict  him  on  all  the  evidence  and  after  argu- 
ment of  counsel,  an  indictment  would  partake  of  the  nature  of  a 
verdict  of  guilty.  It  would,  perhaps,  raise  such  bias  and  presump- 
tion of  guilt  that  all  hope  and  expectation  of  impartiality  in  the 
traverse  jurors  would  be  at  an  end. 

The  seeming  harshness  of  a  rule  that  permits  a  presumably  in- 
nocent and  honorable  man  to  be  branded  with  an  indictment  on  ex 
parte  testimony  which  may,  perhaps,  prompted  by  malice  or  man- 
ufactured for  the  occasion,  or  which  may  be  the  result  of  a  popu- 
lar outburst  of  indignation  against  him  and  which  he  may  be  per- 
fectly able  to  disprove  without  any  opportunity  of  meeting  the 
charge  in  its  inception,  has  caused  the  rule  to  be  modified  in  some 
jurisdictions.  It  is  provided  by  statute  in  some  states  that  the 
grand  jury,  though  not  always  bound  to  hear  exculpatory  evi- 
dence, ought,  as  a  matter  of  duty,  to  weigh  all  evidence  submitted 
to  them,  and  when  they  have  reason  to  believe  that  they  can  pro- 
cure other  evidence  which  will  explain  away  the  charge,  they 
should  order  it  to  be  produced. 

From  the  rules  above  set  forth  it  follows  that  the  fact  that  the 
accused  during  the  inquiry  by  the  grand  jury,  which  resulted  in 
his  being  indicted,  was  confined  in  the  state's  prison,  had  no  no- 
tice of  the  proceedings  against  him,  and,  consequently  had  no  op- 
portunity to  be  present  does  not  thereby  invalidate  the  indictment.^ 

So  the  fact  that  the  court  permits  the  accused,  before  he  is  in- 
dicted to  be  brought  handcufifed  into  the  court-room  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  grand  jury,  is  not  sufficient  to  invalidate  the  indict- 
ment since  it  may  be  presumed  that  this  would  have  no  influence 
on  them  as  they  may  know  that  he  is  in  jail  and  handcuffed  even 
though  they  did  not  see  him,*  and  the  knowledge  of  this  fact  is 
in  any  case  not  material. 

§  26.  Legal  and  proper  evidence  only  receivable — Effect  of  basing 
indictment  on  incompetent  evidence. — The  grand  jury  is  bound  to 

"  State  V.  Wolcott,  21  Conn.  272.  *  Commonwealth  v.  Weber,  167  Pa. 

St.  153,  31  Atl.  481. 


§    26  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  48 

require  the  production  of  the  most  satisfactory  and  convincing 
evidence  which  the  case  permits.*^  The  witnesses  should  be 
sworn^  and  the  prosecuting  attorney  should  never,  in  justice  and 
fairness,  introduce  evidence  which  he  knows,  or  has  good  reason 
to  believe,  will  be  ruled  out  as  incompetent  at  the  trial.*'  Many 
statutes  exist  expressly  providing  that  grand  juries  shall  receive 
legal  evidence  only.  Sometimes  it  is  enacted  that  the  best  evidence 
must  be  produced.^ 

For  investigations  before  grand  juries  must  be  made  in  accord- 
ance with  the  well-established  rules  of  evidence,  and  they  must 
hear  the  best  legal  proofs  of  which  the  case  admits.  No  evidence 
should  be  received  by  a  grand  jury  which  would  not  be  admissible 
in  a  court  upon  the  trial  of  the  cause.  And  hearsay  evidence  upon 
questions  before  a  grand  jury  is  no  more  admissible  than  before 
the  court,^ 

Though  usually  the  witnesses  should  be  produced  and  sworn 
before  the  grand  jury,  depositions,  containing  the  evidence  taken 
at  the  preliminary  examination,  may  be  received  where  the  ac- 
cused has  had  at  the  preliminary  examination  an  opportunity  to 
cross-examine  though  he  may  not  have  done  so.^  As  the  accused 
has  no  right  to  cross-examine  witnesses  before  the  grand  jury, 
it  is  not  grounds  for  quashing  an  indictment  that  it  was  based 
solely  on  depositions."   It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that 

*a  Note    on    incompetency    of    evi-  grand  jury,  Bird  v.  State,  50  Ga.  585. 

dence  before  the  grand   jury,  28  L.  ^  People  v.  Sellick,  4  N.  Y.  Cr.  Rep. 

R.  A.  318;  note  on  documentary  evi-  329,  334;  State  v.  Logan,  i  Nev.  509, 

dence  before  the  grand  jury,  28  L.  R.  516. 

A.   320;   note  on  use  of   depositions  ^Ky.    Cr.    Code,    §  107;    Comp.    L. 

and  afifidavits  before  the  grand  jury,  Nev.,  1873,  §  183 1 ;  Cal.  Penal  Code, 

28  L.  R.  A.  319;  note  on  competency  §919;  Minn.  St.  at  Large,  1873,  §  108, 

of    evidence   before   the    grand   jury,  page    1036;    N.    Y.    Code    Cr.    Pro., 

confessions,    admissions    and    refusal  §  256 ;    People  v.   Brickner,   8  N.   Y. 

to  testify,  28  L.  R.  A.  318;  note  on  Cr.  Rep.  217,  221. 

evidence    of   criminals   before   grand  ^  United  States  v.  Reed,  2  Blatchf. 

jury,  28  L?  R.  A.  319.  (U.    S.)    435,    27    Fed.    Cas.    16134; 

^  State  V.  Kilcrease,  6  S.  Car.  444;  United   States  v.   Kilpatrick,  16  Fed. 

United  States  v.  Coolidge,  2  Gall.  (U.  765. 

S.)  364,  25  Fed.  Cas.  T4858.   The  oath  'N.     Y.     Code    Cr.     Pro.,     §255; 

must  be  administered  by  a  legally  ap-  Thompson   and    Merriam    on    Juries, 

pointed    official,    Joyner   v.    State,    78  §  64T. 

Ala.  448,  or  by  the  foreman  of  the  "  People  v.  Stuart,  4  Cal.  218,  225. 


49  EVIDENCE    BEFORE    THE   GRAND    JURY.  §    26 

the  testimony  goes  before  the  grand  jury  in  the  absence  of  the 
judge,  and  very  often  while  the  prosecuting  officer  is  not  in  the 
grand  jury  room.  Hence,  to  confine  grand  juries  to  the  technical 
rules  of  evidence  may  be  intolerable  in  practice/^  As  a  general 
rule  the  fact  that  some  incompetent  evidence  was  received  by  the 
grand  jury  in  connection  with  competent  evidence,  or  an  incom- 
petent witness^"  examined,  is  not  ground  for  quashing  an  indict- 
ment, if  there  is  enough  competent  evidence,  since  these  errors 
may  be  corrected  on  the  trial. ^" 

So  an  indictment  is  not  void  because  it  was  found  by  the  grand 
jury  after  hearing  testimony  from  one  of  the  grand  jurors,  since 
a  grand  jury  may  properly  act  upon  the  personal  knowledge  of 
any  of  its  members.^* 

]\Iany  of  the  trial  courts  absolutely  refuse  to  inquire  into  the 
question  of  the  character,  the  insufficiency,  or  the  incompetency 
of  the  evidence  on  which  the  indictment  is  based,  regarding  the 
finding  of  the  indictment  and  its  indorsement  as  conclusive  of 
the  legality,  propriety  and  sufficiency  of  the  evidence/^ 

But  an  indictment  which  plainly  appears  to  the  trial  court  to 
have  no  evidence  to  support  it,  except  that  which  is  wholly  in- 

"  State  V.    Wolcott,  21    Conn.   272,  338;  Hope  v.   People,  83  N.  Y.  418, 

280;  State  V.  Boyd,  2  Hill  (S.  Car.)  423,  38  Am.  460. 

288,  289.  "Commonwealth    v.    Hayden,    163 

"  "Whether    witnesses    are    compe-  ]\rass.  453,  40  N.  E.  846,  47  Am.  St. 

tent  is  often  a  very  difficult  question  468,  28  L.  R.  A.  318. 

of  law.    To  hold  that  if  a  grand  jury  "Creek  v.  State,  24  Ind.   151,  156; 

happen  to  examine  a  single  incompe-  Hammond  v.  State,  74  Miss.  214,  21 

tent  witness  their  finding  will  be  vi-  So.  149;  State  v.  Shreve,  137  Mo.  i, 

tiated,    is    taking    extreme    ground."  38  S.  W.  548;  People  v.  Sebring,  66 

Dillon,  J.,  in  State  v.  Tucker,  20  Iowa  ]\Hch.  705,  707,  33  N.  W.  808;  United 

508,  510.  States   V.   Reed,  2  Blatchf.    (U.    S.) 

^^Commonwealth  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  435,  466,  27  Fed.   Cas.   16134;  Low's 

(Mass.)  496,  20  Am.  Dec.  491;  State  Case,  4   Greenl.    (]Me.)    439,   446,    16 

V.   Dayton,  23  N.  J.   L.   49,  53   Am.  Am.  Dec.  27in;  Stewart  v.  State,  24 

Dec.  270;  State  v.   Fasset,  16  Conn.  Ind.    142,   145;    People  v.    Hulbut,   4 

458,  471 ;  Bloomer  v.  State,  3  Sneed  Denio  (N.  Y.)  133,  135,  47  Am.  Dec. 

(Tenn.)  66,  70;  Rex  v.  Marsh,  6  Ad.  244;  Hope  v.  People,  83  N.  Y.  418, 

&  El.  236 ;  State  v.  M'Leod,  i  Hawks  38  Am.  460 ;  State  v.  Fowler,  52  Iowa 

(X.    Car.)    344;    State    v.    Logan,    i  103,    104,    2    N.    W.    983;    People   v. 

Nev.  509,  516;  State  v.  Baker,  20  Mo.  Naughton,  7  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  (N.  Y.) 

421. 

4 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


26 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


50 


competent,  must  be  set  aside. ^°  Thus,  an  indictment  which  is 
based  wholly  on  the  evidence  of  the  accused,  who,  in  violation  of 
his  constitutional  rights  and  privileges  was  compelled  to  testify 
against  himself  before  the  grand  jury,^^  or  on  the  knowledge  of 
a  grand  juror  who  was  not  sworn  as  a  witness,^*  or  partly  on 
evidence  given  by  the  wife  of  the  accused, ^°  which  is  incompetent 
because  confidential  or  privileged,  or  upon  the  evidence  of  a 
physician  of  communications  by  his  patient  to  him  w^iich  came 
under  the  rule  of  statutory  privilege,"*'  i's  invalid."^ 

An  indictment  cannot  stand  unless  it  is  based  on  evidence 
which,  at  some  time  or  another,  has  been  considered  by  the  grand 
jury  which  finds  the  indictment.  The  grand  jury  may,^  without 
re-examining  witnesses,  find  one  indictment  as  a  substitute  for  an- 
other previously  found.""  But  an  indictment  which  has  been 
quashed,  or  on  which  a  nol.  pros,  has  been  entered,  is  not  alone 
evidence  enough  to  support  a  new  indictment."^ 

As  a  general  rule,  a  grand  jury  should  hear  no  other  evidence 
than  that  adduced  by  the  prosecution,  but  they  are  sworn  "to  in- 


^'  Sparrenberger  v.  State,  53  Ala. 
481,  486,  25  Am.  643;  People  v.  Rest- 
enblatt,  i  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  268,  272; 
United  States  v.  Farrington,  5  Fed. 
343;  State  V.  Logan,  i  Nev.  509,  516; 
United  States  v.  Coolidge,  2  Gall.  (U. 
S.)  364,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14858;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
496,  498,  20  Am.  Dec.  491 ;  People  v. 
Briggs,  60  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  17,  30; 
Royce  v.  Territory,  5  Okla.  61,  47 
Pac.  1083;  State  v.  Grady,  84  Mo. 
220,  aff'g  12  Mo.  App.  361. 

"  State  V.  Froiseth,  16  Minn.  296, 
298;  United  States  v.  Edgerton,  80 
Fed.  374;  post,  §  27. 

^^  State  V.  Cain,  i  Hawks.  (N.  Car.) 
352,  353.  Cf.  Commonwealth  v.  Hay- 
den,  163  Mass.  453,  455,  40  N.  E.  846, 
47  Am.  St.  468,  28  L.  R.  A.  3i8n. 

"  People  V.  Briggs,  60  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  17;  Commonwealth  v.  Wood- 
croft,  17  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  554. 


="  People  V.  Sellick,  4  N.  Y.  Cr. 
Rep.  329. 

^  In  United  States  v.  Coolidge,  2  Gall. 
(U.  S.)  364,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14858,  the 
court  said,  setting  aside  an  indictment 
based  upon  the  evidence  of  a  witness 
not  sworn:  "The  grand  jury  is  the 
great  inquest  between  the  government 
and  the  citizen.  It  is  of  the  highest 
importance  that  this  institution  be 
preserved  in  its  purity  and  no  citizen 
tried  until  he  has  been  regularly  ac- 
cused. Every  indictment  is  subject  to 
the  control  of  the  court,  and  this  in- 
dictment having  been  found  irregu- 
larly, and  upon  the  mere  unsworn 
statement  of  a  witness,  which  was 
not  evidence,  a  cassetur  must  be  en- 
tered." 

"Commonwealth  v.  Woods,  10 
Gray  (Mass.)  477,  483;  Creek  v. 
State,  24  Ind.  151,  156. 

"^  Sparrenberger  v.  State,  53  Ala. 
481,  486,  25  Am.  643. 


51  EVIDENCE    BEFORE   THE    GRAND   JURY.  §    27 

quire  and  true  presentment  make ;"  and  if,  in  course  of  their 
inquiries,  they  have  reason  to  beheve  that  there  is  other  evidence 
not  presented  and  within  reach,  which  would  quaHfy  or  explain 
away  the  charge  under  investigation,  it  would  be  their  duty  to 
order  such  evidence  to  be  produced.^* 

§  27.  The  accused  as  a  witness  before  the  grand  jury. — Under  the 
universal  constitutional  provisions  that  no  one  shall  be  compelled 
in  any  criminal  matter  to  be  a  witness  against  himself,  an  indict- 
ment should  be  quashed  when  the  defendant  was  compelled  by 
subpoena  to  testify  before  the  grand  jury,  and  the  indictment  is 
founded  on  his  testimony  alone.^^  The  fact  that  the  accused  vol- 
untarily testifies  before  the  grand  jury  affords  no  ground  for  set- 
ting aside  the  indictment.  It  must  be  shown,  however,  not  only 
that  his  appearance  was  voluntary,  but  that  he  confessed  his 
wrong-doing  voluntarily  and  not  inadvertently,  or  under  the  com- 
pulsion or  constraint  of  his  situation,  or  under  the  obligation  of 
an  oath.-° 

The  question  arises,  ought  an  indictment  to  be  quashed  on  mo- 
tion merely  because  the  accused,  being  at  that  time  not  charged 
with  any  crime,  happened  to  be  one  of  several  witnesses  sum- 
moned and  examined  by  the  grand  jury  in  investigating  a  crime  ? 

If  any  person  summoned  fails  to  claim  his  privilege  against 
answering  incriminating  or  implicating  questions,  the  mere  fact 
that  he  has  testified  is  not  enough  to  invalidate  an  indictment 
against  him,  though  based  solely  upon  his  testimony,-^  Nor  will 
the  fact  that  a  suspected  person  has  been  required  to  give  evidence 
in  another  matter  be  sufficient  to  set  aside  an  indictment  on  the 
ground  that  he  was  compelled  to  testify  against  himself,  unless 

'* United    States    v.    Kilpatrick,    16  Abb.   N.  Cas.    (N.  Y.)    96;    State  v. 

Fed.  765.  Donelon,  45  La.  Ann.  744,  12  So.  922, 

"  State   V.   Froiseth,    16  Minn.   296,  923. 

298 ;    Boone  v.    People,    148   111.   440,  ""  People  v.  King,  28  Cal.  265,  272 ; 

449,  36  N.  E.  99;  People  v.  Haines,  i  United  States  v.  Brown,  i  Sawy.  (U. 

N.  Y.  S.  55;  United  States  v.  Edger-  S.)  531,  537,  24  Fed.  Cas.  14671. 

ton,  80  Fed.  374.     This  rule  is  appli-  "United  States  v.  Brown,  i   Sawy. 

cable,   though  the  accused  was   cau-  (U.    S.)    531,    24    Fed.    Cas.    14671;, 

tioned  that  he  was  under  no  obliga-  Boone  v.  People,   148  111.  440,  36  N. 

tion  to   answer  and  was  not  sworn.  E.  99. 
People  V.  Singer,  5  N.  Y.  Cr.  1-4,  18 


§    28  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  52 

it  affirmatively  appears  that  he  was  indicted  wholly  or  in  part  on 
his  own  admissions. ^^ 

§  28.  Sufficiency  of  evidence  before  the  grand  jury. — The  early 
judges,  prompted,  doubtless,  by  a  too  great  subserviency  to  the 
Crown,  and  by  a  disgraceful  zeal  for  securing  the  punishment  of 
those  who  were  obnoxious  to  the  royal  power,  did  not  require  that 
the  evidence  presented  to  the  grand  jurors  on  which  an  indict- 
ment was  based  should  be  either  copious  or  convincing.  "If  there 
be  probable  evidence,  they  ought  to  find  the  bill,"  says  Hale,^*^  "be- 
cause it  is  but  an  accusation,  and  the  trial  follows."  The  better 
and  more  modern  rule,  as  stated  by  Blackstone,  is  that  "a  grand 
jury  ought  to  be  thoroughly  persuaded  of  the  truth  of  an  indict- 
ment, so  far  as  their  evidence  goes,  and  not  to  rest  satisfied  with 
remote  probabilities."^^  In  other  words,  the  grand  jury  ought  not 
to  indict  unless  they  are  convinced  that  the  accused  is  guilty  and 
that  the  evidence  before  them  is  sufficient,  if  unexplained  and  un- 
contradicted, to  convict  him.^^ 

§  29.  Contempt  by  witnesses  before  the  grand  jury. — ^The  grand 
jury  is  a  part  of  the  court.  Its  session  is  a  session  of  the  court, 
and  witnesses  when  summoned  before  it  are  amenable  to  punish- 
ment for  contempt  if  they  refuse  to  appear  or  on  appearing  refuse 
to  testify.^-  The  grand  jurors  may  direct  their  own  officer  to  take 

^'Mackin  v.  People,  115  III.  312,  3  S.  Car.  356;  State  v.  Fasset,  16  Conn. 
N.  E.  222,  56  Am.  167;  State  v.  458,  473;  In  re  Grand  Jury,  62  Fed. 
Hawks,  56  Minn.  129,  139,  57  N.  W.  840.  And  this  is  the  statutory  rule  in 
455-  Where  co-defendants  jointly  in-  many  states,  but  the  ancient  rule  that 
dieted  were  examined  by  the  grand  the  court  will  not  revise  the  judg- 
jury  prior  to  the  indictment,  no  pre-  ment  of  the  grand  jury  for  the  pur- 
sumption  exists  that  either  was  ex-  pose  of  determining  whether  or  not 
amined  against  himself.  State  v.  the  finding  was  on  sufficient  evidence 
Frizell,  iii  N.  Car.  722,  723,  16  S.  E.  was  upheld  in  United  States  v.  Reed, 
409.  2  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  435,  27  Fed.  Cas. 
^2  Hale  P.  C.  157.  16134;  Raney  v.  Commonwealth,  2 
'"'  4  Bl.  Com.  303.  Ky  Law  62 ;  State  v.  Lewis,  38 
^^  In  re  Grand  Jury,  2  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  La.  Ann.  680.  Note  on  sufficiency  of 
667;  I  Chitty  Cr.  Law  318;  People  v.  evidence  before  grand  jury  to  sustain 
Hyler,  2  Park  Cr.  570,  575 ;  People  indictment,  28  L.  R.  A.  324. 
V.  Price,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.)  185,  6  N.  ^"Taylor,  In  re,  8  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 
Y.  S.  833;  People  v.  Baker,  10  How.  159,  28  N.  Y.  S.  500,  509;  Common- 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  567;  People  v.  Vaughan,  wealth  v.  Crans,  3  Pa.  L.  J.  442,  453. 
42  N.  Y.  S.  959;  State  v.  Addison,  2 


53  EVIDENCE    BEFORE    THE    GRAND    JURY.  §    30 

the  witness  before  the  judge  in  order  that  he  may  be  punished 
if  he  remains  contumacious,  and  the  judicial  sentence  on  the  con- 
tempt, whether  fine  or  imprisonment,  is  final  and  conclusive.^^ 

§  30.  The  indictment  is  not  evidence. — The  indictment  is  read  in 
the  statement  of  the  case  of  the  prosecution.  It  does  not  when 
thus  read  have  the  weight  and  significance  which  attach  to  it  if 
read  in  evidence.  Its  true  and  sole  use  is  to  charge  the  crime,  and 
to  inform  the  accused  of  the  offense  alleged  against  him.  The  in- 
dictment is  not  evidence  and  should  not  be  read  to  or  by  the  jurors 
either  in  the  court-room  or  elsewhere.  If  the  court  shall  permit 
this,  and  the  indictment  is  thus  placed  in  evidence  without  any 
limitation  or  any  explanation  of  the  purpose  of  its  introduction, 
the  jury  may  take  it  as  an  intimation  from  the  court  that  the  mere 
fact  of  the  accused  having  been  indicted  is  evidence,  and  that  the 
indictment  must  be  considered  in  determining  his  guilt.^* 

'^  Taylor, //!  rf,  8  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  159,  self-incriminating     questions     before 

28  N.  Y.    S.   500,  504;   Lockwood  v.  the  grand   jury.     State  v.   Lewis,  96 

State,  I  Ind.   161 ;  Ward  v.   State,  2  Iowa  286,  65  N.  W.  295. 

Mo.  120,  22  Am.  Dec.  449;  People  v.  "State  v.   Hart,  (^  Mo.  208,  215; 

Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74 ;  People  v.  Fancher,  State  v.  Desroches,  48  La.  Ann.  428, 

2  Hun  (N.  Y.)  226.    A  witness  is  not  19  So.  250. 
in   contempt  who  refuses  to  answer 


CHAPTER  IV. 


VARIANCE   AND    PROOF    OF   THE   VENUE. 

§  31.  Proving  the  substance  of  the  of-  35.  Proving     the     venue  —  Judicial 

fense  —  What     variances     are  notice  of  general  geographical 

material.  facts. 

32.  Proof  of  essential  particulars  of  36.  The   venue   may   be   proved   by 

persons,  time  and  place.  circumstantial     evidence  — 

3S.  Variance    in    names — Idem    so-  Proof    beyond    a     reasonable 

nans.  doubt  not  required. 

34.  Variance   in  proving  species   or  37.  Proof  of  venue  in  forgery  and 

genus  of  animals.  crimes    committed    in    retire- 
ment. 

§  31.  Proving  the  substance  of  the  offense — What  variances  are 
material. — The  strict  technical  rules  formerly  governing  this  sub- 
ject have  been  greatly  relaxed,  if  not  altogether  abrogated,  by 
statutory  enactment  or  by  the  liberal  spirit  of  the  modern  courts 
of  criminal  jurisdiction.  In  determining  whether  a  variance  is 
material,  the  question  to  be  decided  is,  does  the  indictment  so  far 
fully  and  correctly  inform  the  defendant  of  the  criminal  act  with 
which  he  is  charged  that,  taking  into  consideration  the  proof 
which  is  introduced  against  him,  he  is  not  misled  in  making  his 
defense,  or  placed  in  danger  of  being  twice  put  in  jeopardy  for 
the  same  offense?^  If  this  be  not  so,  then  the  variance  is  material, 
and  the  state,  having  failed  to  prove  the  crime,  in  substance  as  it 
is  alleged,  the  acquittal  of  the  accused  should  be  directed. 

Whether  a  greater  strictness  of  proof  is  required  in  criminal 
than  is  necessary  in  civil  proceedings  in  favor  of  life  and  liberty 
is  a  question  upon  which  the  cases  differ.^  But  though  the  general 
rule  is  that  the  crime  which  is  laid  in  the  indictment  must  be 

^  Harris  v.  People,  64  N.  Y.  148, 153,  United     States     v.     Porter,     3     Day 

154.     Variance  in  proof  of  substance  (Conn.)    283,    286.      Contra,   2   Russ. 

of  charge,  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2714;  vari-  on    Cr.,    §  588;    Rose.    Cr.    Ev.    73; 

ance  in  prosecution  for  gambling,  El-  United    States   v.    Britton,   2    Mason 

liott  Ev.,  §  3007.  (U.  S.)  464,  468.  24  Fed.  Cas.  14650: 

"Beech's  Case,  i  Leach  Cr.  L.  158;  Walker  v.  State,  91  Ala.  76,  9  So.  87. 

(54) 


55  VARIANCE    AND    PROOF    OF    VENUE.  §    32 

proved  substantially  as  alleged,  no  variance  will  be  material  if  the 
allegations  of  the  indictment  are  separable  and  the  substance  of 
the  crime  is  proven,  though  some  immaterial  averments  remain 
unproved.^ 

And  as  a  general  rule  any  allegation  which  is  not  descriptive 
of  the  identity  of  the  offense  itself,  that  is,  which  does  not  mark 
it  out  as  a  crime  and  distinguish  it  from  other  crimes,  or  from 
actions  which  are  not  criminal,  and  which  therefore  may  be 
omitted  without  affecting  the  criminality  of  the  charge  and  with- 
out detriment  to  the  indictment,  is  mere  surplusage  and  need  not 
be  proved.* 

§  32.  Proof  of  essential  particulars  of  persons,  time  or  place. — 
"The  general  rule  is  that  all  averments  necessary  to  constitute  the 
substantive  offense  must  be  proved.  If  there  is  any  exception,  it 
is  from  necessity,  or  great  difficulty  amounting  to  such  necessity, 
as  where  one  could  not  show  the  negative  and  where  the  other 
with  perfect  ease  can  show  the  affirmative."^  All  circumstances 
of  person,  place  or  thing,  which  are  described  in  the  indictment 
with  extreme  or  unnecessary  particularity,  must  be  proven  strictly, 
if,  by  reason  of  such  a  mode  of  pleading,  the  details  are  essential 
to  enable  the  jury  to  perceive  the  identity  of  the  thing  or  person 
proved  with  that  alleged.*'  Thus  where  one  is  indicted  for  stealing 
an  animal  which  is  described  either  by  color,  age  or  brand,  these 
details  become  material,  and  a  variance  is  fatal. '^   The  time  and 

^In  Bork  v.  People,  gi  N.  Y.  5,  13,  ®  Sweat  v.   State,  4  Tex.  App.  617, 

the  court  says :    "Where  an  offense  621. 

may  be  committed  by  doing  one  of  ^  Coleman   v.    State,   21   Tex.   App. 

several  things,  the  indictment  may,  in  520,  528,  2  S.  W.  859;  State  v.  Jack- 

a  single  count,  group  them  together,  son,  30  Me.  29,  30;  Wiley  v.  State,  74 

and  charge  the  defendant  with  having  Ga.  840;  Groom  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App. 

committed  them  all,  and  a  conviction  82,  86,  87,  3  S.  W.  668.    When  by  a 

may  be  had  on  proof  of  the  commis-  statute  animals  are  distinguished  ac- 

sion  of  any  one  of  those  things  with-  cording  to  species,  proof  of  one  spe- 

nut  proof  of  the  commission  of  the  cies  is  a  variance,  if  another  is  al- 

others."     See,  also,  People  v.  Davis,  leged.   State  v.  Buckles,  26  Kan.  237; 

56  N.  Y.  95,  loi.  Rex  V.   Cook,   i    Leach   Cr.   L.    123; 
*  Commonwealth     v.     Rowell,     146  State  v.  Godet,  7  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  210, 

Mass.  128,  130,  IS  N.  E.  154.  211;     State    v.     Turley,    3     Humph. 

^Shaw,    J.,    in    Commonwealth    v.     (Tenn.)   323,  325.     An  allegation  of 

Thurlow,  24  Pick.  (Mass.)  374,  381.       stealing  an   animal   is  not   sustained 


33 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


56 


place  of  the  crime  should  be  stated  with  certainty  in  the  indict- 
ment, though  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  them  precisely  as  stated, 
unless  they  are  necessary  ingredients  in  the  crime.^  But  it  must 
always  be  alleged  and  proved  that  the  crime  was  committed  prior 
to  the  date^  of  the  indictment,  within  the  period  of  limitation,^" 
and  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court."  When,  however,  time 
and  place  are  material,  as  in  a  prosecution  for  selling  liquor  be- 
tween specified  dates,  or  on  forbidden  days,^"  or  for  transporting 
licpior  between  given  places, ^^  the  details  of  time  and  place  must 
be  proved  precisely  as  alleged. 

§  33.  Variance  in  names — Idem  sonans. — A  variance  between  the 
name  of  a  person  as  alleged  and  as  it  is  proved,  whether  it  be  the 
name  of  a  person  assaulted  or  killed,  or  of  the  person  who  owned 
the  property  which  was  the  subject  of  the  crime,  has  often  been 
held  fatal.^*  A  mere  error  in  spelling,  or  the  use  of  a  nickname, 
is  no  variance.   If  the  names  be  idcui  sonans,  or,  if  sufficient  evi- 


by  proof  of  the  theft  of  a  carcass. 
Hunt  V.  State,  55  Ala.  138;  State  v. 
Jenkins,  6  Jones  (N.  Car.)  19,  20. 

*Arch.  Cr.  PI.  40,  41;  Crass  v. 
State,  30  Tex.  App.  480,  17  S.  W. 
1096 ;  Blackwell  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
416,  418,  17  S.  W.  1061 ;  People  v. 
Emerson,  7  N.  Y.  Cr.  97,  105,  6  N.  Y. 
S.  274;  Commonwealth  v.  Harring- 
ton, 3  Pick.  (Mass.)  26;  People  v. 
Stocking,  50  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  573,  586; 
People  V.  Jackson,  11 1  N.  Y.  362,  19 
N.  E.  54,  6  N.  Y.  Cr.  393,  399  (vari- 
ance in  time)  ;  United  States  v.  Ma- 
thews, 68  Fed.  880;  Smith  v.  State, 
108  Ala.  I,  19  So.  306,  54  Am.  St. 
140;  Johnson  v.  State,  13  Ind.  App. 
299;  Hans  V.  State,  50  Neb.  150,  69 
N.  W.  838. 

'Turner  v.  State,  89  Ga.  424,  15  S. 
E.  488;  Commonwealth  v.  Graves,  112 
Mass.  282;  State  v.  Hughes,  82  Mo. 
86;  Hardy  v.  State  (Tex.),  44  S.  W. 

173- 

^"Weinert  v.  State,  35  Fla.  229,  17 
So.  570;   State  V.   Anderson,   51    La. 


Ann.  1 181,  25  So.  990;  State  v. 
Schuerman,  70  Mo.  App.  518;  State  v. 
Carpenter,  74  N.  Car.  230. 

"Arcia  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  198, 
12  S.  W.  599;  State  v.  Dorr,  82  Me. 
212,  214,  19  Atl.  171 ;  State  v.  Bain, 
43  Kan.  638,  640,  23  Pac.  1070. 

^"  Commonwealth  v.  Purdy,  146 
Mass.  138,  139,  IS  N.  E.  364. 

"State  V.  Libby,  84  Me.  461,  464, 
24  Atl.  940. 

"Washington  v.  State,  72  Ala.  272, 
276;  Johnson  v.  State,  iii  Ala.  66,  20 
So.  590;  Sullivan  v.  People,  6  Colo. 
App.  458,  41  Pac.  840;  People  v. 
Armstrong,  114  Cal.  570,  46  Pac.  611 ; 
People  V.  Main,  114  Cal.  632,  46  Pac. 
612;  Commonwealth  v.  Morningstar, 
12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  34;  Clements  v.  State, 
21  Tex.  App.  258,  17  S.  W.  156;  Mc- 
Gary  v.  People,  45  N.  Y.  153,  157; 
Sykes  V.  People,  132  111.  32,  45,  23  N. 
E.  391 ;  King  v.  State,  44  Ind.  285, 
286;  People  V.  Hughes,  41  Cal.  234, 
237 ;  Underwood  v.  State,  72  Ala.  220, 
222 ;  State  v.  Bell,  63  N.  Car.  99n. 


57 


VARIANCE    AND    PROOF    OF    VENUE, 


§    34 


dence  is  introduced  to  identify  the  person  intended,  the  variance 
of  name  is  immaterial  and  will  be  disregarded/^ 

Whether  names  are  idem  sonans  is  never  a  question  of  spell- 
ing, but  of  pronunciation  determined  largely  by  usage.  If  the 
names,  though  spelled  differently,  sound  alike,  the  court  may  de- 
termine that  they  are  idem  sonans  and  instruct  the  jury  to  dis- 
regard the  variance  in  spelling/*'  But  if  they  are  not  necessarily 
pronounced  alike,  the  question,  whether,  being  spelled  differently, 
they  are  idem  sonans,  is  for  the  jury." 

§  34.  Variance  in  proving  species  or  genus  of  animals. — An  in- 
dictment for  stealing  a  cow,^^  chickens,^^  a  sheep, -**  a  horse,-^  or 
a  hog,^^  will  be  sustained  by  proof  of  the  larceny  of  any  variety 
or  sex  of  those  animals.  The  generic  name  ought  and  in  common 


"  Williams  v.  United  States,  3  App. 
D-  C.  335;  Barnes  v.  People,  18  111. 
52,  53,  65  Am.  Dec.  699;  State  v. 
Humble,  34  Mo.  App.  343,  345-348; 
Weitzel  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  523,  13 
S.  W.  864,  19  Am.  St.  855;  Smurr  v. 
State,  88  Ind.  504,  506;  State  v.  Gor- 
don, 56  Kan.  64,  42  Pac.  346;  People 
V.  Mullen,  7  Cal.  App.  547,  94  Pac. 
867.  Evidence  of  the  name  by  which 
a  person  is  known  is  not  the  best  evi- 
dence as  to  his  true  name  set  forth  in 
an  indictment ;  but  it  is  not  hearsay, 
within  the  rule  excluding  hearsay  evi- 
dence. People  V.  Way,  119  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  344,  104  N.  Y.  S.  277,  af- 
firmed in  191  N.  Y.  533,  84  N.  E. 
1 1 17.  See,  as  to  the  admissibility  of 
such  evidence,  Carter  v.  State,  39  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  345,  46  S.  W.  236,  48  S.  W. 
508. 

"  State  V.  Havely,  21  Mo.  498. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Donovan,  13 
Allen  (Arass.)  571,  572;  Common- 
wealth V.  Mehan,  11  Gray  (Mass.) 
321,  323;  Lawrence  v.  State,  59  Ala. 
61 ;  Underwood  v.  State,  72  Ala.  220, 
222;  Commonwealth  v.  Warren,  143 
Alass.  568,  10  X.  E.  178.    For  illustra- 


tions, see  Faust  v.  United  States,  163 
U.  S.  452,  41  L.  ed.  224,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
1112;  People  v.  James,  no  Cal.  155, 
42  Pac.  479 ;  Bennett  v.  State,  62  Ark. 
516,  36  S.  W.  947;  State  V.  Garvin,  48 
S.  Car.  258,  26  S.  E.  570;  Henderson 
V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  79,  38  S. 
W.  617.  "It  matters  not  how  the 
names  are  spelled,  what  their  orthog- 
raphy. They  are  idem  sonans  within 
the  meaning  of  the  books,  if  the  at- 
tentive ear  finds  difficulty  in  distin- 
guishing them  when  pronounced,  or 
common  and  long  established  usage 
has  by  corruption  or  abbreviation 
made  them  identical  in  pronunciation." 
Robson  V.  Thomas,  55  Mo.  581 ;  app'd 
in  State  v.  Jones,  55  Minn.  329,  332, 
S6  N.  W.  1068;  State  v.  Griffie,  118 
]\Io.  188,  197,  23  S.  W.  878. 

^®  Parker  v.  State,  39  Ala.  365,  366. 

^^  State  v.  Bassett,  34  La.  Ann.  1108, 
mo. 

=0  M'CulIy's  Case,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  272. 

"^  Davis  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  210, 

4  S.  W.  590. 

"State  V.  Godet,  7  Ired.  (X.  Car.) 
210,  211. 


§    35  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  58 

speech  does  include  every  variety  of  the  animal,  whether  produced 
naturally,  as  by  age  and  sex,  or  artificially  by  cultivation,  or  oc- 
cupation. Hence,  the  above  rule  would  seem  based  on  reason  and 
common  sense.  It  is  repudiated  by  the  English  courts,-^  and  by 
those  criminal  tribunals  of  this  country  whose  conservatism  has 
deterred  them  from  cutting  loose  from  technical  rules,  or  inquir- 
ing into  the  reasonableness,  or  propriety  of  such  rules."* 

§  35.  Proving  the  venue — Judicial  notice  of  general  geographical 
facts. — The  indictment  is  not  good  unless  it  shows  upon  its  face 
the  venue  of  the  crime,  and  that  it  was  committed  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court.  The  venue  is  a  jurisdictional  fact  and 
must  always  be  proved  by  the  state  as  a  part  of  its  case.  That  is 
to  say,  the  state  must  prove  that  the  crime  alleged  in  the  indict- 
ment was  committed  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the 
court.^^-  And  usually  the  precise  venue  must  be  proved  affirma- 
tively and  substantially,  and  a  failure  to  do  so  is  ground  for  a 
new  trial.-® 

If,  however,  the  crime  is  shown  to  have  been  committed  in,  or 

-^2  East  P.  C.  617.  51   Miss.  353;   Williams  v.    State,  21 

^  Hooker  V.  State,  4  Ohio  348,  351 ;  Tex.   App.  256,  257,   17   S.   W.   624; 

Turley  v.   State,  3  Humph.    (Tenn.)  Ryan  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  699,  703, 

323,  325.  3   S.   W.   547;   Larkin   v.   People,  61 

"State  V.   McGinniss,  74  Mo.   245,  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  226;  Yates  v.  State,  10 

247;   State  V.  Wacker,   16  Mo.  App.  Yerg.  (Temi.)   549;  Boykin  v.'  State, 

417,  421 ;  Barnes  v.  State,  134  Ala.  36,  148  Ala.  608,  42  So.  999 ;  Wilson  v. 

32  So.  670;  Dentler  V.  State,  112  Ala.  State     (Ga.    App.),    64    S.    E.    112; 

70,  20  So.  592;  Dyer  v.  State,  74  Ind.  State  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  3   S.  Dak. 

594.   595;   Harlan  v.    State,   134  Ind.  52,  51  N.  W.  780;  Weinberg  v.  Peo- 

339,   341,   33  N.   E.    1102;    Stazey  v.  pie,  208  111.  15,  69  N.  E.  936;  Wooten 

State,  58  Ind.  514;  State  v.  Mills,  33  v.  State,  119  Ga.  745,  47  S.  E.  193. 
W.  Va.  455,  457,  ID  S.  E.  808;  State        "^The  objection   that  the  venue   is 

V.  Hobbs,  37  W.  Va.  812,  814,  17  S.  E.  not  proved  must  be  taken  at  the  trial. 

380;  Randolph  v.  State,  100  Ala.  139,  State  v.  Hopkins,  94  Iowa  86,  62  N. 

141,     14    So.    792;    Jones    v.    State,  W.  656;  but  will  be  presumed  to  be 

58    Ark.    390,   396,   24    S.    W.    1073;  included  in  an  exception  to  the  ver- 

Frazier     v.     State,      56     Ark.     242,  diet  that   it   is   against  the  law   and 

244,   19   S.   W.   838;   Berry  v.   State,  without  sufficient  evidence  to  support 

92  Ga.  47,  48,   17  S.  E.   1006;  Thor-  it.     Berry  v.  State,  92  Ga.  47,  48,  17 

nell  V.  People,  11  Colo.  305,  17  Pac.  S.   E.   1006;   Futch   v.    State,  90  Ga. 

904 ;   State  v.  Tosney,  26  Minn.  262,  472,  16  S.  E.  102. 
3   N.   W.  345;   Thompson   v.   State, 


59 


VARIANCE   AXD    PROOF    OF   VEXUE, 


36 


very  near,  a  certain  town,  village,  or  other  minor  territorial  sub- 
division, it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  that  this  minor  division  is 
in  the  county.  And  if  it  is  proved  to  have  been  committed  any- 
where in  a  county,  the  latter  need  not  be  proved  to  be  in  the  state. 
The  jury,  as  a  part  of  the  court,  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  gen- 
eral geographical  facts."^ 

§  36.  The  venue  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence — Proof 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  not  required. — The  venue  need  not  be 
proved  by  direct  and  positive  evidence.  It  is  sufficient  if  it  may 
be  reasonably  inferred  from  the  facts  and  circumstances  which 
are  proven  and  are  involved  in  the  criminal  transaction.  It  is 
enough  if  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances  by  the  jury 
that  the  crime  was  committed  in  the  county  alleged  in  the  in- 
dictment."* 


*'  Luck  V.  State,  96  Ind.  16,  20 ;  Les- 
lie V.  State,  35  Fla.  184,  17  So.  559; 
People  V.  Breese,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  429; 
Pickerel  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  30 
S.  W.  617,  17  Ky.  L.  120;  People  v. 
Etting,  99  Cal.  577,  34  Pac.  237 ;  Lew- 
is V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  24  S.  W. 
903;  People  V.  Curley,  99  Mich.  238, 
58  N.  W.  68 ;  State  v.  Farley,  87  Iowa 
22,  53  X.  W.  1089;  Sullivan  v.  Peo- 
ple, 114  111.  24,  28  N.  E.  381;  State  v. 
Burns,  48  Mo.  438;  People  v.  Waller, 
70  Mich.  237,  239,  38  N.  W.  261; 
Waller  v.  People,  209  111.  284,  70  N. 
E.  681 ;  Boykin  v.  State,  148  Ala.  608, 
42  So.  999;  Dupree  v.  State,  148  Ala. 
620,  42  So.  1004;  Reed  v.  Territory 
(Okla.),  98  Pac.  583.  A  failure  by 
the  state  to  prove  the  venue  may  be 
cured  by  evidence  introduced  by  the 
defendant  from  which  it  may  be  in- 
ferred.   Scott  v.  State,  42  Ark.  73. 

^*Tinney  v.  State,  iii  Ala.  74,  20 
So.  597;  People  V.  Kamaunu,  no  Cal. 
609,  42  Pac.  1090;  State  v.  Roach,  2 
Mo.  App.  1 1 14;  Thornell  v.  People, 
II  Colo.  305,  17  Pac.  904;  Common- 
wealth V.  Costley,  118  Mass.  i,  9,  26; 


People  V.  INIanning,  48  Cal.  335 ;  Bland 
V.  People,  4  111.  364;  State  v.  Snj-der, 
44  Mo.  App.  429,  430;  State  v.  Burns, 
48  Mo.  438,  440;  State  v.  McGinniss, 
74  Mo.  245,  246;  Beavers  v.  State,  58 
Ind.  530,  537;  Hoffman  v.  State,  12 
Tex.  App.  406,  407;  Dumas  v.  State, 
62  Ga.  58,  65;  Weinecke  v.  State,  34 
Neb.  14,  51  N.  W.  307;  Wallis  v. 
State,  54  Ark.  611,  620,  16  S.  W.  821; 
Robson  v.  State,  83  Ga.  166,  9  S.  E. 
610,  611 ;  State  v.  Small,  26  Kan.  209; 
State  V.  West,  69  Mo.  401,  33  Am. 
506;  Brooke  v.  People,  23  Colo.  375, 
48  Pac.  502;  Edwards  v.  State  (Ga.), 
51  S.  E.  505;  Smith  V.  State,  2  Ga. 
App.  413,  58  S.  E.  549 ;  Little  v.  State, 
3  Ga.  App.  441,  60  S.  E.  113;  Mill  v. 
State,  I  Ga.  App.  134,  57  S.  E.  969; 
Warford  v.  People,  43  Colo.  107,  96 
Pac.  556;  State  v.  Brinte,  4  Penn. 
(Del.)  551,  58  Atl.  258;  State  v.  Gil- 
luly,  SO  Wash,  i,  96  Pac.  512;  State 
V.  Meyer,  135  Iowa  507,  113  N.  W. 
322,  124  Am.  St.  29in;  State  v.  Har- 
graves,  188  Mo.  337,  87  S.  W.  491; 
Murphree  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
115    S.    W.     1189,     1191;    Fuller    v. 


36 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


60 


The  venue  need  not  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doiibt.'^ 
If  the  only  rational  conclusion  from  the  facts  in  evidence  is  that 
the  crime  was  committed  in  the  county  alleged,  the  proof  is  suf- 
ficient. ^° 

The  venue  may  be  proved  by  circuinstantial  evidence.  It  is  not 
necessary  that  a  witness  expressly  testifies  that  the  crime  was 
committed  in  the  county  as  charged  in  the  indictment.  Such  di- 
rect and  positive  testimony  may  be  dispensed  with.^^ 


Territory  (Okla.),  99  Pac.  1098; 
Walker  v.  State,  153  Ala.  31,  45  So. 
640. 

^Keeler  v.  State,  Tz  Neb.  441,  103 
N.  W.  64;  Wylie  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  182,  109  S.  W.  186;  State  v. 
Burns,  48  Mo.  438,  440;  Boggs  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  25  S.  W. 
770 ;  State  v.  Benson,  22  Kan,  471 ; 
Warrace  v.  State,  27  Fla.  362,  8  So. 
748;  Hoffman  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App. 
406,  407;  Achterberg  v.  State,  8  Tex. 
App.  463;  Wilson  V.  State,  62  Ark. 
497,  36  S.  W.  842,  54  Am.  St.  303. 

""State  V.  Sanders,  106  Mo.  188, 
190,  17  S.  W.  22z;  Weinecke  v.  State, 
34  Neb.  14,  24,  51  N.  W.  307;  Abrigo 
V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  143,  15  S.  W. 
408;  Andrews  v.  State,  21  Fla.  598, 
611;  Commonwealth  v.  Costley,  118 
Mass.  1,  27;  People  v.  Smith,  121  Cal. 
355>  53  Pac.  802.  "The  jury  has  a 
right  to  infer  from  the  testimony  be- 
fore them  whether  it  was  done  in  the 
county.  They  know  all  the  facts  and 
the  maxim  vicini  vicinorum  pm- 
sumunter  scire  applies."  Bryant  v. 
State,  80  Ga.  272,  275,  4  S.  E.  853; 
Wilson  V.  State,  62  Ark.  497,  36  S.  W. 
842,  54  Am.  St.  303;  Lewis  v.  State, 
129  Ga.  731,  59  S.  E.  782;  Wilson  v. 
State  (Ga.  App.),  64  S.  E.  112; 
Howard  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  659,  60 
S.  E.  328;  Cooper  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App. 
730,  59  S.  E.  20;  State  v.  Dickerson, 
77  Ohio  St.  34,  82  N.  E.  969,  122  Am. 


St.  479;  Davis  V.  State,  134  Wis.  632, 
115  N.  W.  150;  People  v.  Monroe,  138 
Cal.  97,  70  Pac.  1072 ;  Tolston  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  42  S.  W.  988; 
Vernon  v.  United  States,  146  Fed. 
121,  76  C.  C.  A.  547 ;  Moore  v.  State, 
130  Ga.  322,  60  S.  E.  544;  Smith  v. 
State,  29  Fla.  408,  10  So.  89 ;  Williams 
V.  State,  168  Ind.  87,  79  N.  E.  1079; 
Springer  v.  State,  121  Ga.  155,  48  S. 
E.  907;  Stringfield  v.  State,  4  Ga. 
App.  842,  62  S.  E.  569. 

'^  Bloom  V.  State,  68  Ark.  336,  58 
S.  W.  41;  Wallis  V.  State,  54  Ark. 
611,  16  S.  W.  821;  Brooke  v.  People, 
23  Colo.  375,  48  Pac.  502;  Robson  v. 
State,  83  Ga.  166,  9  S.  E.  610 ;  Wilson 
V.  State  (Ga.  App.),  64  S.  E.  112; 
Dumas  v.  State,  62  Ga.  58;  Har- 
lan V.  State,  134  Ind.  339,  33  N.  E. 
1 102;  State  V.  Thomas,  58  Kan.  805, 
51  Pac.  228;  Moore  v.  State,  55  Miss. 
432;  State  V.  Sanders,  106  Mo.  188, 
17  S.  W.  223;  State  V.  Chamberlain, 
89  Mo.  129,  I  S.  W.  145 ;  Hawkins  v. 
State,  60  Neb.  380,  83  N.  W.  198; 
Weinecke  v.  State,  34  Neb.  14,  51  N. 
W.  307;  Harvey  v.  Territory,  11  Okla. 
156,  65  Pac.  837;  State  v.  Chaney,  9 
Rich.  (S.  Car.)  438;  State  v.  Gossett, 
9  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  428;  Tolston  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  42  S.  W.  988; 
Abrigo  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  143, 
IS  S.  W.  408;  State  v.  Michel,  20 
Wash.  162,  54  Pac.  995 ;  Douglas  v. 
State   (Ark.,  1909),  121   S.  W.  923. 


6l  VARIANCE   AND    PROOF   OF    VENUE.  §    37 

For  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  where  there  is  no  direct  testi- 
mony showing  the  venue  that  if  there  are  references  in  the  evi- 
dence to  streets,  public  buildings  or  other  landmarks  at  or  near 
the  scene  of  the  crime,  which  are  either  known  to  the  members 
of  the  jury  or  which  may  probably  be  familiar  to  them,  the  jury 
may  safely  presume  that  the  venue  has  been  proved.  For  as  a 
general  rule,  the  court  will  take  judicial  notice  of  streets,  public 
buildings  or  public  places  which  are  known  or  which  may  prob- 
ably be  known  to  the  residents  of  a  certain  locality  and  will  also 
take  notice  that  these  streets  or  public  buildings  and  places  are 
within  the  county.^^  So,  if  there  is  direct  evidence  that  a  crime 
was  committed  in  a  certain  city,  village  or  town,  the  judicial  no- 
tice which  the  court  will  take  of  geographical  facts  will  usually 
be  sufficient  and  stand  in  place  of  actual  proof  that  the  place  men- 
tioned was  in  the  county  charged  in  the  indictment.^" 

§  37.    Proof  of  venue  in  forgery  and  crimes  done  in  retirement. — 

That  the  venue  shall  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence  is  nec- 
essarily the  case  in  respect  to  forgery  and  similar  crimes,  which 
are  secretly  planned  and  committed,  out  of  sight  of  all  but  the 
accomplices  of  the  criminal.  Hence  the  venue  of  the  crime  of 
forging  bank-notes  or  of  uttering  forged  instruments  may  be  cor- 
rectly inferred  by  the  jury  from  evidence  that  forged  and  coun- 

^'  People  V.  McGregar,  88  Cal.  140,  Richardson  v.  Commonwealth,  80  Va. 

26  Pac.  97;  Sullivan  v.  People,  114  111.  124;  Cooper  v.  State,  106  Ga.  119,  32 

24,  28  N.  E.  381;  Cluck  V.  State,  40  S.  E.  23;  State  v.  King,  in  Mo.  576, 

Ind.  263 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ackland,  20  S.  W.  299 ;  United  States  v.  Rich- 

107  Mass.  211.  ards,  149  Fed.  443.     The  evidence  of 

^  Duncan  v.  State,  29  Fla.  439,  451,  one  uncontradicted  and  credible  wit- 

10    So.    815;    Andrews    v.    State,    21  ness     to     the     venue     is     sufficient. 

Fla.     598,    611;     McCune    v.     State,  Speight  v.  State,  80  Ga.  512,  5  S.  E. 

42    Fla.    192,    27    So.    867,    89    Am.  506;    Laydon   v.    State,   52   Ind.   459. 

St.  225;  State  V.  Ruth,  14  Mo.  App.  Some  cases  hold,  however,   that  the 

226;    People    V.    McGregar,    88    Cal.  jury  can  not  assume  that  the  street 

140,     T43,     145,    26    Pac.    97 ;    Cluck  or  public  place  in  which  the  evidence 

V.    State,    40    Ind.    263,    273 ;    Com-  shows    the    crime   was    committed    is 

monwealth    v.    Ackland,     107    Mass.  within  a  town,  city  or  county  within 

211;  State  V.  Fetterly,  33  Wash.  599,  the    jurisdiction,    but    that    this    fact 

74  Pac.  810;   State  v.  Kelly,  123  Mo.  must  appear  from  the  proof.     Evans 

App.   680,    loi    S.   W.   155;    State  v.  v.   State,   17  Fla.    192;   Dougherty  v. 

Kline,  50  Ore.  426,  93  Pac.  237;  State  People,  118  III.  160,  8  N.  E.  673. 
V.   Wheat  on    (Kan.),   99   Pac.    1132- 


38 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


62 


terfeit  notes  and  implements  for  their  manufacture  were  found 
in  the  possession  of  the  accused  in  the  county  as  alleged,^'*  or  that 
he  had  always  resided  in  the  county  and  confessed  the  forgery 
there.^^ 

Though  proof  of  the  finding  of  a  dead  body  in  the  county  al- 
leged is  not,  taken  alone,  sufficient  proof  of  the  venue,  it  is  a  cir- 
cumstance to  go  to  the  jury  to  be  considered  by  them  with  other 
evidence.^''  If  a  corpse  is  found  in  a  river  with  the  marks  of  mor- 
tal injuries  on  it  in  such  a  situation  that  from  the  evidence  it  is 
clear  that  it  was  not  borne  there  by  the  current,  but  that  it  was 
thrown  in  the  stream  by  the  hand  of  man,  the  jury  may  infer  the 
homicide  was  committed  in  the  county  where  the  corpse  is  found. ^^ 


'■*  Spencer  v.  Commonwealth,  2 
Leigh  (Va.)  751,  756,  757;  State  v. 
Poindexter,  23  W.  Va.  805.  Contra, 
Commonwealth  v.  Fagan,  12  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  613. 

^^  Johnson  v.  State,  62  Ga.  299,  301 ; 
Murphree  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
115  S.  W.  1189,  1191.  The  court 
by  Story,  J.,  in  United  States  v.  Brit- 
ton,  2  Mason  (U.  S.)  464,  470,  24 
Fed.  Cas.  14650,  said :  "If  its  exist- 
ence in  a  forged  state  is  not  proved 
in  any  other  place,  it  must,  from  the 
necessity  of  the  case,  be  presumed  to 
have  been  forged  where  its  existence 
in   such   state   is   first   made   known. 


*  *  *  If  the  law  were  otherwise 
it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  con- 
vict any  person  of  a  forgery,  for  such 
acts  are  done  in  retirement  and  con- 
cealment, far  from  the  sight  of  all 
persons  but  confederates  in  guilt." 
As  to  the  venue  in  conspiracy,  see 
Dawson  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  9, 
40  S.  W.  731. 

^^  Beavers  v.  State,  58  Ind.  530,  537 ; 
Marion  v.  State,  20  Neb.  233,  245,  57 
Am.  825 ;  Lancaster  v.  State,  91  Tenn. 
267,  18  S.  W.  777- 

^^Commonwealth  v.  Costley,  118 
Mass.  I,  2,  6. 


CHAPTER  V. 


PRIMARY    EVIDENCE. 


38.  Definition  of  primary  evidence. 

39.  Primariness  of  witnesses — Proof 

of  handwriting. 

40.  Evidence   which    is    required    to 

be  in  writing. 

41.  Statutory    requirements    as    re- 

gards     evidence      of      certain 
facts. 
41a.  The  necessity  for  showing  loss 
or  destruction  of  the  writing. 

42.  Notice  to  produce. 

43.  Writings    whose    existence    and 

contents  are  '  in  issue — Im- 
peachment by  contradictory 
writings. 

44.  Primary    evidence    of    collateral 

facts. 

45.  Exception    in    case    of    proving 

general  results. 


46.  Proof  of  records  and  official  ap- 
pointments. 

Physical  condition  of  personal 
property. 

Incriminating  articles  —  Weap- 
ons, clothing,  etc. 

Inscriptions  on  bulky  articles. 

Photographs  as  primary  evi- 
dence— Personal  identity. 

Accuracy  and  relevancy  of 
photographs. 

Paintings  and  drawings. 

53.  Real      evidence — Inspection      by 

jurors. 

54.  Compelling  accused  to  submit  to 

inspection    or    to    stand     for 
identification. 

55.  Mode   and  effect  of  identifying 

evidence. 
s6.  Identification  of  the  voice. 


47. 


§  38.  Definition  of  primary  evidence. — Primary  evidence  may  be 
defined  as  the  highest  or  best  evidence  which,  from  the  abstract 
nature  of  the  facts  to  be  proved,  is  procurable,  and  which,  under 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  affords  the  greatest  cer- 
tainty of  the  fact,  that  is,  renders  the  probability  of  its  existence 
most  evident  to  the  understanding.  It  is  that  evidence  which  does 
not  indicate  the  existence  of  other  evidence  nearer  the  facts  to  be 
proved.^ 

The  rule  requiring  primary  evidence  of  a  fact  refers  most  fre- 
quently to  offers  of  oral  evidence,  to  prove  the  contents  of  a  writ- 
ing, where  the  writing  itself  ought  to  be  produced.  Hence,  usu- 
ally, unless  it  is  shown  that  the  party  claiming  under  the  writing 
is  unable  to  produce  it  after  a  diligent  search,  oral,  or  in  fact  any 


^Anderson's  Law  Dictionary. 


(63) 


§    39  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  64 

Other  evidence  of  its  contents,  will  be  rejected,"  So  where  a  let- 
ter, if  produced,  would  be  primary  evidence  of  a  relevant  fact, 
a  press  copy,  even  though  an  exact  chirographical  reproduction, 
is  inadmissible,  except  as  secondary  evidence  and  after  the  loss 
or  the  destruction  of  the  original  is  shown." 

If  a  writing  has  been  executed  by  all  parties  in  several  parts, 
or  copies,  each  is  primary  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the  writing.* 

A  letter  press  copy  of  a  letter  found  in  the  possession  of  and 
proved  to  be  in  the  handwriting  of  a  defendant  may  be  received 
as  original  evidence  to  show  the  writer's  state  of  mind  without 
proof  that  the  original  was  sent  to  the  person  to  whom  it  was  ad- 
dressed.^ 

If  a  writing  was  executed  in  counterpart — that  is,  in  duplicate, 
either  part,  though  substantially  the  same  as  the  other,  but  signed 
by  one  party  only,  is  primary  evidence  only  when  offered  against 
the  party  who  signed  it.  Each  of  a  number  of  copies  made  by 
printing,  lithography,  photography,  or  by  any  process  which  will 
secure  exact  uniformity,  is  primary  evidence  to  prove  the  contents 
of  any  or  of  all  the  others.  Though  all  are  from  a  common  orig- 
inal, none  is  primary  evidence  of  that  original.*'  And  where  the 
loss  of  the  original  and  of  a  press  copy  of  a  letter  is  proved,  a 
copy  of  the  press  copy  is  admissible,  where  its  correctness  as  a 
reproduction  of  the  original  letter  is  vouched  for  upon  the  oath 
of  a  witness  having  competent  knowledge.'^ 

§  39,    Primariness  of  witnesses — Proof  of  handwriting. — As  the 

production  of  witnesses  who  will  give  the  strongest,  most  credit- 

-  Underbill     on     Evid.,     §§  30,     31.  tion  of  a  person  to  take  an  oath  as 

"Whether  evidence  is  primary  or  sec-  deputy  was  admitted  to  prove  his  au- 

ondary  has  reference  to  the  nature  of  thority  where  the  original  was  lost  in 

the  case  in  the  abstract,  and  not  to  a     prosecution     for    taking     a     false 

the    circumstances    under    which    the  oath.     People  v.  Ellenbogen,  186  N.  Y. 

party,  in  the  particular  cause  on  trial,  603,  79  N.  E.  11 12,  affirming  114  App. 

may  be  placed.     It  is  a  distinction  of  Div.  (N.  Y.)  182,  99  N.  Y.  S.  897. 

law  and  not  of  fact;  referring  only  to  *  State  v.  Gurnee,  14  Kan.  in,  120. 

the  quality  and  not  to  the  strength  of  ^  United  States  v.  Greene,  146  Fed. 

the  proof.    Evidence  which  carries  on  784. 

its  face  no  indication  that  better  re-  "  People  v.  Williams,  64  Gal.  87,  27 

mains    behind    is    not    secondary   but  Pac.  939. 

primary."    i  Greenl.  on  Evid..  §84.  ^Winn    v.    Patterson,    9    Pet.     (U. 

^A  letter-press  copy  of  a  designa-  S.)  663,  9  L.  ed.  266. 


65  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    39 

able  and  convincing  testimony  is  not  required,  no  principle  of  law- 
is  violated  by  the  introduction  of  faint  or  weak  evidence,  and  the 
withholding  of  that  which  is  more  strong,  cogent  and  convincing, 
if  both  are  equally  original.  But  it  is  a  very  natural  inference, 
partaking  somewhat  of  the  character  of  a  legal  presumption,  at 
least  in  the  absence  of  explanatory  circumstances,  that  a  party 
Avho  is  withholding  the  best  evidence  of  any  fact  in  issue  is 
prompted  by  a  wrong  motive  which  would  be  defeated  by  its  pro- 
duction. When,  therefore,  evidence  is  produced  that  presupposes 
or  suggests  the  existence  of  other  evidence  of  the  same  facts  of 
a  more  original  character,  that  is  to  say,  which  is  more  immediate, 
and  which  lies  closer  to  the  material  facts,  the  evidence  intro- 
duced will  be  regarded  as  substitutionary,  and,  as  such,  will  be 
rejected. 

The  rule  recjuiring  the  production  of  primary  evidence  does 
not  compel  a  choice  between  or  among  several  witnesses,  nor  does 
it  necessitate  the  calling  of  any  particular  witness  among  several 
who  have  knowledge  of  a  given  fact.^ 

So  the  testimony  of  a  witness,  claiming  to  be  a  minor,  to  his 
own  age  is  primary  evidence,  even  if  his  parents  are  living.^  while 
the  oral  evidence  of  a  parent  to  the  age  of  his  child  is  also  pri- 
mary, the  entry  in  a  family  Bible  not  being  of  necessity  the  best 
evidence." 

An  exception  is  recognized  in  the  case  of  subscribing  witnesses 
as  regards  the  proof  of  instruments  which  are  by  statute  invalid 
unless  witnessed.  If  a  subscription  by  witnesses  is  not  required 
by  statute,  the  execution  of  the  instrument  may  be  shown  by  the 
evidence  of  any  person  who  saw  it  signed,  or  who  is  familiar  with 
the  handwriting  of  a  person  who  signed  it,  or  otherwise,  though 
it  is  in  fact  subscribed  by  witnesses.  Hence,  generally,  in  proving 
handwriting,  the  testimony  of  a  witness  acquainted  with  it  is  not 
secondary  to  that  of  the  writer  himself,"  nor  should  the  testimony 

MVhart.  Cr.  Ev.,  §  360;  Common-  "State  v.  Woods,  49  Kan.  237,  30 

wealth   V.   Pratt,   137  Mass.  98,   107;  Pac.  520,  521;  Dobson  v.  Cothran,  34 

New     England     Monument     Co.     v.  S.    Car.   518,    13   S.   E.   679;    Whart. 

Johnson    CPa."),   22   Atl.   974,    29  W.  Ev.,  §  T7. 

X.  C.  (Pa.)  T17.  "Commonwealth     v.      Pratt,      137 

'State  V.  Cain,  9  W.  Va.  559,  570;  Mass.  98,   107.     In  Leffcrts  v.   State, 

State  V.  Miller,  71  Kan.  200,  80  Pac.  49   N-   J-   L-   26,   27,  6   Atl.   521,  the 

5T.  court   said:    "The   testimony   of   the 

5 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev'. 


§  40 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


66 


of  the  former  be  excluded  when  offered  because  the  testimony  of 
the  latter  can  be  obtained. 


§  40.  Evidence  which  is  required  to  be  in  writing. — Oral  evidence 
is  inadmissible  if  the  law  required  primary  evidence  in  writing, 
or  if  the  party  to  substantiate  his  claims  must  produce  a  writing. 
Judicial  records,  other  public  records,  deeds  of  conveyance  and 
contracts  not  to  be  performed  wathin  a  year  are  required  by  stat- 
ute to  be  in  writing.  Hence  the  fact  of  another  indictment  pend- 
ing,^- a  prior  verdict  of  acquittal  or  conviction,^^  the  proceedings 
and  the  testimony  taken  at  a  coroner's  inquest,  or  at  the  prelimi- 
nary examination,^*  or  before  the  grand  jury,  or  a  justice  of  the 
peace,^^  or  any  body  keeping  a  record  of  its  actions,  must  be 
shown  by  the  record  or  by  a  properly  authenticated  copy.^'^ 

§  41.  Statutory  requirement  as  regards  evidence  of  certain  facts. — 
Where  by  statute  any  fact  or  transaction  must  be  evidenced  in 


man  who  signed  the  documents  *  *  * 
was  not  of  a  higher  grade  of  evi- 
dence than  the  testimony  of  a  man 
who  had  seen  him  make  such  signa- 
ture, or  who  was  acquainted  with  his 
writing  and  deposed  to  his  opinion." 
See,  also,  Underhill  on  Evid.,  §§  132, 
139-141- 

^"  Saxon  V.  State,  96  Ga.  739,  23  S. 
E.  116;  State  V.  McFarlain,  42  La. 
Ann.  803,  806,  8  So.  600;  State  v. 
Grayson,  38  La.  Ann.  788;  Hufif  v. 
State,  104  Ga.  521,  30  S.  E.  808;  El- 
liott V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  113,  57  S. 
E.  972;  Leftridge  v.  United  States,  6 
Ind.  Ten  305,  97  S.  W.  1018.  On  a 
trial  for  murder,  to  prove  that  de- 
ceased had  been  tried  for  homicide, 
record  must  be  introduced  as  evi- 
dence. State  V.  Andrews,  y^)  S.  Car. 
257,  53  S.  E.  423. 

"  Miller  v.  Commonwealth,  —  Ky, 
— ,  113  S.  W.  518;  Von  Vetsera,  Ex 
parte,  7  Cal.  App.  136,  93  Pac.  1036. 
See  §  195. 


'*Bell  V.  State  (Miss.),  38  So.  795; 
State  V.  Bringgold,  40  Wash.  12,  82 
Pac.  132;  Robinson  v.  State,  87  Ind. 
292,  293 ;  Epps  v.  State,  102  Ind.  539, 
546,  I  N.  E.  491 ;  Sage  v.  State,  127 
Ind.  15,  26,  26  N.  E.  667;  Leggett 
V.  State,  97  Ga.  426,  24  S.  E.  165 ; 
State  V.  Branham,  13  S.  Car.  389; 
Wright  V.  State,  50  Miss.  332,  335; 
Cicero  v.  State,  54  Ga.  156;  Oliver  v. 
State,  94  Ga.  83,  84,  85,  21  S.  E.  125 ; 
State  V.  Barrington,  198  Mo.  23,  95 
S.  W.  235;  Campbell  v.  State,  123  Ga. 
533,  SI  S.  E.  644.  The  fact  that  a 
preliminary  examination  was  had 
may  be  shown  orally.  People  v. 
Coffman,  59  Mich,  i,  26  N.  W.  207. 
As  to  proof  of  Judicial  records,  see 
Underhill  on  Evid.,  §§  146-149. 

"  State  v.  Ireland,  89  Miss.  76^^,  42 
So.  797- 

^°  For  mode  of  proving  naturaliza- 
tion, see  Underhill  on  Evid.,  §  31. 


6/  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    41a 

writing,  it  is  usually  necessary  to  consult  the  statute  to  understand 
its  scope  and  effect,  or  to  ascertain  the  correct  mode  of  proof  and 
when  secondary  evidence  will  be  received.  Generally,  where  the 
statute  requires  that  written  proof  shall  be  made,  oral  evidence 
is  secondary  and  inadmissible  if  the  writing  is  procurable. 

But  where  either  the  state  or  the  prisoner  can  show  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  court  that  the  writing  was  executed  and  has 
been  destroyed,  or  cannot  be  found  after  a  reasonable  search,  its 
contents  may  be  proved  by  secondary  evidence."  Thus  the  con- 
tents of  the  warrant,  on  which  the  accused  was  arrested,^^  or  of 
the  indictment  against  him,^^  may  be  shown  by  parol  where  the 
loss  of  the  writing  is  proved. "° 

In  many  states  statutes  exist  which  allow  an  instrument,  duly 
acknowledged  and  recorded  or  registered,  to  be  proved  by  a  certi- 
fied copy  of  the  record,  if  the  original  instrument  is  not  obtain- 
able."^ Such  a  provision  is  of  great  benefit  to  one  who,  not  being 
a  party  or  privy  to  the  writing,  may  never  have  had  it  in  his  pos- 
session, and  hence  may  not  be  able. to  account  for  its  absence  by 
showing  its  loss  or  destruction.  But  the  instrument  itself  is  not 
made  secondary  evidence  by  a  statute  requiring  record  and  allow- 
ing proof  by  a  certified  copy,^'  nor  can  a  party  be  excused  from 
producing  it  when  he  can  do  so.  For,  unless  the  statute  makes 
the  copy  equal  in  evidentiary  value  to  the  original,  the  copy  is 
secondary  evidence,  and  the  absence  of  the  original  must  be  ac- 
counted for  before  the  copy  will  be  received."^ 

§  41a.    The  necessity  for  showing  loss  or  destruction  of  the  writing. 

— The  general  rule  that,  before  secondary  evidence  of  the  contents 

"United  States  v.  Reyburn,  6  Pet.  Mo.  23,  95  S.  W.  235;   Campbell  v. 

(U.  S.)  352,  365,  8  L.  ed.  424.  State,  123  Ga.  533,  51  S.  E.  644- 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Roark,  8  Cush.  '^  Commonwealth  v.  Emery,  2  Gray 

(Mass.)  210.  (Mass.)       80;      Commonwealth      v. 

^' State   V.    Whitney,    38    La.    Ann.  Preece,  140  Mass.  276,  278,  5  N.  E. 

579.      See    Underbill    on    Evid.    343,  494;  Underbill  on  Evid.,  §§  134,  142c. 

ante,  §  30.  "  Chapman  v.  Gates,  54  N.  Y.  132, 

^"A  witness  may  not  testify  orally  145;  Triplett  v.   Commonwealth,   122 

as  to  an  offense  charged  in  a  warrant  Ky.  35,  91  S.  W.  281,  28  Ky.  L.  974; 

which    he   had   himself  issued.     The  Lorenz  v.  United  States,  24  App.  (D. 

warrant    itself    is    the   best    evidence.  C.)  337. 

State  V.  Talbcrt,  41   S.  Car.  526,  529,  "''  State   v.   Penny,  70  Iowa   190,  30 

19  S.  E.  852;  State  v.  Harrington,  198  N.  W.  561. 


§  413  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  68 

of  a  writing  shall  be  received,  its  loss  or  destruction  must  be 
shown  is  applicable  to  criminal  cases.**  A  failure  to  observe  this 
rule  is  error.-'^  Proof  of  loss  or  destruction  may  be  taken  in  the 
absence  of  the  jury.-"  The  question  usually  is  whether  the  loss 
or  destruction  of  the  writing  has  been  sufficiently  proved.  Proof 
beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  is  not  necessary  to  render  secondary 
evidence  competent.  There  must  be  proof  of  a  diligent  search 
made  in  places  the  writing  is  likely  to  be  found."^  An  attorney 
or  other  person  may  testify  that  papers  or  books  in  his  possession 
have  been  lost  if  he  had  made  a  search. ^^  Generally  the  proof  of 
a  failure  to  find  the  paper  should  be  given  by  some  one  who  has 
actually  made  the  search.  A  letter  from  a  clerk  of  a  foreign  court 
stating  that  he  had  made  a  search  and  had  failed  to  find  any  rec- 
ord of  a  certain  judgment,  is  not  a  sufficient  foundation  to  admit 
secondary  evidence  of  it.-^ 

The  fact  that  the  instrument  whose  existence  is  in  question  and 
whose  contents  it  is  sought  to  prove  by  secondary  evidence  was 
last  seen  in  the  possession  of  the  accused,  together  with  evidence 
of  a  search  for  it  by  the  witness  is  sufficient  to  admit  secondary 
evidence. ^*^  Proof  that  a  writing  missing  at  the  trial  was  used  in 
evidence  on  a  former  trial,  that  it  went  out  with  the  jury  and  it 
had  not  been  seen  since  by  any  person,  though  a  thorough  search 
of  the  jur_v  room  and  of  the  papers  on  file  had  been  made  is  a 
sufficient  predicate  for  secondary  evidence. ^^  In  all  cases,  the  clerk 
or  other  official  in  whose  custody  the  papers  was  last  seen,  may, 
and  in  fact  ought  to  be  produced  and  testimony  of  the  search  by 
him  and  of  his  inability  to  find  the  writing  is  usually  sufficient.^^ 
AVhere  the  evidence  is  that  the  deceased  person  destroyed  certain 

"  Commonwealth    v.    Johnson,    199  "  State   v.    Bennett,    137   Iowa   427, 

Mass.    55,   85    N.    E.    188;    Gould   v.  no  N.  W.  150. 

State,   71    Neb.   651,   99   N.   W.   541;  "*  State  v.   Shour,  196  Mo.  202,  95 

Donner   v.   State,  69   Neb.   56,   95   N.  S.  W.  405. 

W.  40;  People  V.  Nail,  242  111.  284,  89  '"Grabill  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

N.  E.  1012;  State  v.  Poundstone  (Mo.  97  S.  W.  1046. 

App.,  1909),  124  S.  W.  79;  Skidmore  ^"  State  v.   Leasia,  45   Ore.   410,   78 

V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  123  S.  W.  Pac.  328. 

1129.  ^Andrews  v.  State,  152  Ala.  16,  44 

^'Kerr  v.  State,  105  Ga.  655,  31   S.  So.  696. 

E.   739.  '■  Summerlin  v.   State,   130  Ga.   791, 

"^Degg  V.  State,  150  Ala.  3,  43  So,  61  S.  E.  849. 
484. 


69 


PRIMARY    EVIDENCE. 


42 


letters,  the  reason  she  gave  for  destroying  them  may  be  proved 
and  secondary  evidence  may  then  be  received. ^^ 

§  42.  Notice  to  produce. — In  a  civil  case  if  a  writing  is  known  to 
be  in  the  possession  of  the  opposite  party,  or  if  its  whereabouts 
are  absolutely  unknown,  he  should  have  notice  to  produce  it,  be- 
fore secondary  evidence  of  its  contents  can  be  received.  This  rule 
is  applicable  to  criminal  prosecutions  with  the  qualification  that, 
as  the  state  has  no  power  to  compel  the  production  of  a  writing 
in  the  rightful  possession  of  the  defendant,  the  notice  to  him  is 
nugatory  and  may,  perhaps,  under  some  circumstances,  be  dis- 
pensed with.^* 

This  is  the  case  when  the  indictment,  as  in  forgery,  or  larceny 
of  a  writing,  alleges  the  existence  of  a  writing,  and  by  implication 
that  it  is  in  the  possession  of  the  accused.^^ 

Some  effort  should  be  shown  on  the  part  of  the  state  to  procure 
the  papers  which  are  in  the  possession  of  the  accused.^^  This  need 
not  amount  to  a  notice  to  produce  at  the  trial. 

Before  secondary  evidence  of  writings  in  the  hands  of  the  ac- 
cused can  be  admitted,  it  must  be  shown  by  the  prosecution  or 
admitted  by  the  accused  that  the  papers  are  in  his  possession. 
Where  the  accused  is  possessed  of  relevant  documentary  evidence 
and  does  not  voluntarily  offer  to  produce  it,  secondary  evidence 
is  admitted.^^  The  same  rule  applies  if  he  denies  having  the  docu- 


"^  State  V.  Ryder,  80  Vt.  422,  68 
Atl.  652. 

^  State  V.  Hanscom,  28  Ore.  427, 
43  Pac.  167;  State  v.  Gurnee,  14  Kan. 
Ill,  121;  McGinnis  v.  State,  24  Ind. 
500;  Commonwealth  v.  Sinclair,  195 
Mass.  100,  80  N.  E.  799;  State  v. 
Mulloy,  III  Mo.  App.  679,  86  S.  W. 
569;  Sullivan  v.  People,  108  111.  App. 
328;  State  V.  Walker,  129  Mo.  App. 
371,  108  S.  W.  615;  State  V.  Madeira, 
125  Mo.  App.  508,  102  S.  W.  1046; 
Young  V.  People,  221  111.  51,  ']']  N.  E. 
536;  People  V.  Dolan,  186  N.  Y.  4,  78 
N.  E.  569,  116  Am.  St.  521;  Moore 
V.  State,  130  Ga.  322,  60  S.  E.  544. 

"State  V.  McCauley,  17  Wash.  88, 


49  Pac.  221,  55  Pac.  382;  State  v. 
Constantine,  48  Wash.  218,  93  Pac. 
317.  In  criminal  cases,  parol  evidence 
of  the  contents  of  a  written  instru- 
ment in  the  possession  of  the  accused 
is  admissible  without  notice  to  the 
defendant  to  produce  such  instrument. 
O'Brien  v.  United  States,  27  App.  D. 
C.  263. 

^*  State  V.  Lentz,  184  Mo.  223,  83  S. 
W.  970. 

^^Kinard  v.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  146, 
58  S.  E.  263;  Mahan  v.  State,  i  Ga. 
App.  534,  58  S.  E.  265;  Common- 
wealth V.  Sinclair,  195  Mass.  100,  80 
N.  E.  799- 


§    43  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  70 

ments.  This  rule  is  of  general  application  to  all  writings  in  the 
possession  of  one  or  more  accused  persons  indicted  and  tried 
jointly.  Thus,  where  documentary  evidence  of  an  incriminating 
character  was,  at  the  request  of  one  defendant  delivered  to  the 
other,  the  defendants  tried  jointly  are  not  prejudiced  by  the  ad- 
mission of  proof  of  the  contents  of  the  document  by  secondary 
evidence.^^  So,  the  contents  of  a  letter  which  was  written  from 
jail  by  the  accused  to  his  wife  may  be  proved  by  secondary  evi- 
dence for  the  reason  that  the  law  does  not  permit  the  prosecution 
to  compel  the  wife  to  produce  it  in  court.  A  jailor  or  other  cus- 
todian of  the  prison,  who,  under  the  rules  of  the  jail  or  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  accused,  opened  and  read  the  letter  may  testify 
to  its  contents.^^  Documentary  evidence  which  is  proved  to  have 
been  in  the  possession  of  the  prosecution,  before  the  trial,  should 
be  produced  or  its  absence  accounted  for  before  the  court  should 
admit  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents. ■*" 

§  43.  Writing's  whose  existence  and  contents  are  in  issue — Im- 
peachment by  contradictory  writings. — \\'here  the  existence  or  the 
contents  of  a  writing  which  is  material  to  the  issue,  or  has  an  im- 
portant bearing  upon  the  credibility  of  a  witness,  are  disputed, 
they  cannot  be  shown  orally,  or  by  a  copy,  until  the  absence  of  the 
original  is  accounted  for.  So,  where  in  a  criminal  prosecution 
based  on  a  violation  of  a  statute,  or  city  ordinance,  it  is  necessary 
to  prove  the  existence,  or  contents,  of  the  statute,  or  by-law,  it 
cannot  be  done  by  oral  evidence.*^  It  has  been  found,  as  matter 
of  observation,  that  the  memory  is  extremely  unreliable.  Aside 
from  any  temptation  to  commit  perjury,  to  avoid  which  this  rule 
has  been  adopted,  but  which  would  always  be  present  if  the  lan- 
guage of  disputed  instruments  were  allowed  to  be  shown  by  oral 
evidence,  the  court  has  a  right  to  see  the  whole  document,  in  its 
entirety. 

Where  a  witness  is  cross-examined  on  the  contents  of  a  letter, 
which  he  is  alleged  to  have  written,  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching 

^  State  V.  Marsh,  70  Vt.  288,  40  Atl.  ■"  See      Tiedeman      on      Municipal 

836.  Corp.,  p.   264,   note  5 ;    Underbill   on 

'^DeLeon  v.  Territory,  9  Ariz.  161,  Evid.,  §§  32,  143a,  for  mode  of  prov- 

80  Pac.  348.  ing  ordinances  and  statutes. 

^^  Young  V.   People,   221    111.   51,  'J^ 
N.  E.  536. 


yi  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    44 

him,  by  proving  prior  contradictory  statements  therein,  the  letter 
itself  must  first  be  read  to  him,  and  he  must  be  asked  if  he  has 
written  it/-  It  is  not  proper  to  read  a  portion  of  it,  or  to  incorpo- 
rate a  part,  or  all  of  it  in  a  question,  and  to  ask  him  if  he  wrote  a 
letter  to  that  effect.  So,  where  a  witness  is  examined  under  a 
commission,  and,  in  reply  to  an  interrogatory,  gives  the  contents 
of  a  letter  without  producing  it,  the  answer  will  be  stricken  out, 
if  there  is  no  method  of  obtaining  the  letter.*^ 

An  allegation  of  forgery  suggests  by  implication  the  existence 
of  a  forged  paper  which  must  be  produced,  as  the  best  evidence 
of  the  fact  of  forgery,  or  accounted  for,  even  where  the  forgery 
is  collateral  and  is  relevant  solely  for  the  purpose  of  showing  a 
criminal  intent.^*  Unless  the  accused  has  been  connected  the  er- 
roneous admission  of  parol  evidence  of  the  contents  of  a  missing 
writing  is  cured  by  its  subsequent  production,*^  by  the  party 
claiming  under  it,  or  by  his  adversary.***  A  copy  of  a  writing  may 
be  received  to  prove  the  original  upon  condition  that  its  correct- 
ness shall  subsequently  be  made  to  appear,  and  the  impropriety, 
if  any,  of  receiving  such  a  copy  is  cured  by  showing  that  it  is  a 
true  and  correct  copy. 

§  44.  Primary  evidence  of  collateral  facts. — Wherever  the  facts 
in  issue  are  not  the  reciprocal  rights  and  duties  of  the  parties 
under  a  writing,  but  some  fact  collateral  to  its  contents,  its  pro- 
duction is  not  required  as  primary  evidence  of  that  collateral  fact, 
The  fact  may  be  proved  by  parol,  for,  if  oral  evidence  is  as  near 
the  fact  to  be  proved  as  the  writing,  both  are  primary  evidence.*'^ 

*^Underhill  on  Evid.,  §  350.  duce    a    writing    by    which    his    title 

^  Peck  V.    Parchen,  52  Iowa  46,  2  vested,  but  may  testify  orally  to  the 

N.   W.   597;    State   v.   Matthews,   88  fact  of  ownership  where  that  fact  is 

Mo.  121,  125,  126.  collateral.    That  a  certain  person  was 

**  State    V.    Breckenridge,   drj   Iowa  a   tenant    may   be   proved   orally   by 

204,   206,  25   N.   W.   130.     See  post,  showing  he  paid  rent,  though  a  writ- 

§§  423,  427.  ten  lease  exists.     Rex  v.  Holy  Trin- 

^  State  V.  King,  81  Iowa  587,  47  N.  ity,  7  B.  &  C.  611,  614,  i  Man.  &  Ry. 

W.  775,  776.  444;   but   the   contents   of   the   lease, 

"  Glover   v.  Thomas,   75  Tex.  506,  the    names    of    the    parties    and    the 

12   S.  W.  684;   DeLoach  v.   Stewart,  terms  of  the  tenancy  can  be  proved 

86  Ga.  729,  12  S.  E.  1067.  only  by  the  lease  itself.     Strother  v. 

"  The   owner   of    real   or  personal  Rarr,  5  Ring.  136,  139,  145,  152,  2  M. 

property  will  not  be  required  to  pro-  &   P.  207;   Doe  v.  Harvey,  8  Bing. 


44 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


^2. 


Accordingly  the  oral  evidence  of  prison  or  jail  officials  is  ad- 
missible to  prove  that  prisoners,  whom  the  accused  had  visited 
in  jail,  were  imprisoned  for  crimes  similar  to  that  with  which  he 
is  charged.  The  fact  of  their  being  in  prison  being  collateral  to 
the  issue  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  may  be  proved  orally.*''  The 
arrest  of  the  accused  on  a  charge  other  than  that  for  which  he  is 
on  trial  may  be  proved  by  parol.*"  The  testimony  of  an  officer 
who  made  the  arrest  is  primary  evidence  of  that  fact,  though  the 
loss  of  a  book  in  which  it  was  recorded  is  not  shown. 

Generally  when  the  contents  of  a  letter  or  telegram  are  essen- 
tial to  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties,  it  must  be  produced.^" 
But  if  the  sole  fact  to  be  proved  is  that  a  letter  or  telegram  was 
sent  or  received,  the  writing  need  not  be  produced. ^^ 

So  payment  may  be  shown  by  oral  evidence  of  a  tender  and 
acceptance,  though  a  receipt  in  writing  has  been  given,  while  an 
oral  demand  may  be  proved  though  a  written  demand  may  have 


239;  Rex  V.  Merthyr  Tidvil,  i  B.  & 
Ad.  29,  31 ;  Wooldridge  v.  State,  49 
Fla.  137,  38  So.  3;  Kearney  v.  State, 
loi  Ga.  803,  29  S.  E.  127,  65  Am.  St. 
344- 

**Long  V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  186, 
198;  State  V.  McKinnon,  99  Me.  166, 
58  Atl.  1028. 

**  State  V.  McFarlain,  42  La.  Ann. 
803,  806,  8  So.  600.  An  oral  state- 
ment by  a  witness  that  he  had  been 
divorced  from  the  accused  is  compe- 
tent where  the  divorce  was  merely 
collateral  to  the  guilt  of  the  accused. 
Williams  v.  State,  149  Ala.  4,  43  So. 
720. 

°°The  oral  testimony  of  a  jailer  to 
the  contents  of  letters  sent  or  re- 
ceived by  a  prisoner  while  in  jail  is 
inadmissible  until  their  non-produc- 
tion is  accounted  for.  McAfee  v. 
State,  85  Ga.  438,  ii  S.  E.  810:  Bell 
V.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  242. 

^^  Conner  v.  State,  22,  Tex.  App. 
.378,  38s,  5  S.  W.  189;  Holcombe  v. 
State,  28  Ga.  66,  67.  The  fact  that 
the  prosecutrix  in  a  trial  for  seduc- 


tion made  an  assignation  by  a  letter 
may  be  proved  oralh-  though  the  let- 
ter is  not  forthcoming.  State  v.  Fer- 
guson, 107  N.  Car.  841,  846,  847,  12 
S.  E.  574.  The  presence  of  a  docu- 
ment during  an  interview  may  be 
shown  orally  without  accounting  for 
its  absence.  Tatum  v.  State,  82  Ala. 
5,  8,  2  So.  531.  The  fact  that  the 
deceased  was  an  officer  is  provable 
b}'  parol  on  a  trial  for  homicide  of 
an  officer.  Hardin  v.  State,  40  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  208,  49  S.  \V.  607.  The 
existence  of  a  corporation  either  for- 
eign or  domestic  has  been  proved  in 
a  criminal  case  by  parol.  Graff  v. 
People,  208  111.  312,  70  X.  E.  299,  aff'g 
108  111.  App.  168.  As  to  necessity 
for  the  production  of  a  doctor's 
diploma  where  its  existence  is  ma- 
terial, see  McAllister  v.  State  (Ala.), 
47  So.  i6r.  As  for  example  when 
the  accused  is  on  trial  for  practicing 
medicine  without  a  license.  The  fact' 
that  a  person  is  a  physician  when 
only  collaterally  involved  may  also 
be  proved  orally. 


y^i  PRIMARY    EVIDEXCE.  §    44 

been  made.°-  ^^'here  the  receiver  of  a  telegraphic  dispatch  is  the 
employer  of  the  company,  the  writing  delivered  to  the  company's 
operator  by  the  sender  is  the  original/^  But  where  the  company 
is  the  agent,  not  of  the  receiver  but  of  the  sender  of  the  dispatch, 
the  written  message  which  is  delivered  to  the  addressee  is  the 
original/* 

The  tally  sheets  showing  the  count  of  the  ballots  cast  at  an 
election  are  primary  evidence  of  the  count  of  the  ballots  where  the 
accused,  an  officer  of  elections,  is  charged  with  making  a  false 
count.  The  ballots  themselves  are  evidence  of  the  number  of  bal- 
lots cast  but  they  are  not  the  only  evidence  of  that  fact.°^ 

A  certificate,  parish  register,  transcript  of  a  public  record  or 
other  public  writing  is  not  necessarily  primary  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  the  marriage  relation,  even  when  it  has  been  de- 
clared by  law  to  be  presumptive  evidence.^*'  As  a  general  rule, 
and  though  a  certificate  which  is  known  to  exist  is  not  produced, 
the  fact  of  a  marriage  having  been  solemnized  may  be  proved  by 
other  evidence,  even  in  criminal  trials.  The  performance  of  a 
marriage  ceremony  may  be  shown  by  the  evidence  of  witnesses 
who  were  present,  and  sometimes  by  the  declarations  or  admis- 
sions of  the  accused.  The  evidence  of  such  witnesses  is  not  sec- 
ondary to  that  furnished  by  the  writing.  But  usually  greater 
cogency  of  evidence  to  prove  marriage  is  required  in  a  criminal 
trial  where  marriage  is  directly  in  issue  as  in  bigamy  than  will  be 
demanded  in  a  civil  proceeding.^^ 

"  Smith  V.  Young,  I  Campb.  X.  P.  or    that    he    acted    thereupon    if    the 

439.  telegram    had    been    received   by    the 

"  State   V.    Gritzner,    134    Mo.    512,  addressee.     Young  v.  People,  221  111. 

36  S.  W.  39;  Utley  V.  Donaldson,  94  51,  "/"j  N.  E.  536. 

U.   S.   29,  24  L.   ed.   54.     See  cases,  °^  Commonwealth  v.   Edgerton,  200 

Underbill    on    Ev.,    §    34.      A    type-  Mass.  318,  86  N.  E.  768.     Parol  proof 

written  copy  of  a  telegram  is  admis-  may  be  made  of  the  election  of  the 

sible  if  the  accused  has  admitted  he  officers    of    a    corporation    and    any 

sent  the  telegram  without  accounting  one  present  at  the  election  may  state 

for  the  absence  of  th©  original  mes-  who  was   elected.      State   v.   Farrier, 

sage.     Dunbar  v.  United   States,   156  114  La.  579,  38  So.  460. 

U.  S.  185,  195,  39  L.  ed.  390,  15  Sup.  '^Commonwealth  v.  Dill.  156  Mass. 

Ct.  325.  226,  228,  30  X.  E.  iot6. 

"It  is  necessary,   in  order  to  bind  "See  Underbill   on   Evid..   §§    114, 

the  alleged  sender  of  a  telegram,  to  144,  and  post,  §§  383,  403-405. 
show  either  that  he  signed  or  sent  it 


§    45  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  74 

Where  a  writing  has  no  direct  bearing  upon  a  material  point 
in  issue,  or  relevancy  to  it,  but  is  only  evidence  of  a  collateral 
fact,  or  so  far  as  it  is  evidence  of  a  collateral  fact,  no  objection 
exists  to  oral  evidence  to  prove  a  fact  contained  in  it.'"'^ 

So,  a  written  report  of  an  incident  made  by  a  witness  as  a  part 
of  his  duty  need  not  be  produced  or  accounted  for  to  render  his 
oral  testimony  admissible.  Thus,  a  jailer  may  state  orally  that 
a  prisoner  admitted  he  was  married,  though  this  fact  was  also 
entered  on  the  prison  books, ^°  as  it  should  have  been, 

§  45.  Exceptions  in  the  case  of  proving  general  results. — To  pre- 
vent the  time  of  the  court  from  being  unduly  occupied  in  the  ex- 
amination of  numerous  and  bulky  books  of  account  and  other 
writings  to  prove  a  single  fact,  the  production  of  the  writings 
may  be  dispensed  with  and  a  witness,  who  has  examined  the 
documents,  may  state  orally  the  result  of  the  examination  which 
he  has  made  out  of  court.  This  rule  is  applicable  only  where  the 
books  are  multifarious  and  voluminous,  and  the  jury  would  find 
it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  ascertain  anything  material  from 
their  inspection.  If  the  general  result  is  stated  in  writing,  it  must 
be  verified  by  the  party  who  abstracted  it,  and  the  adverse  party 
must  be  given  a  fair  opportunity  to  examine  the  originals.*^*' 

In  such  cases,  it  should  be  remarked,  the  witness  is  not  re- 
quired to  prove  the  contents  of  the  writing.    He  is  merely  asked 

^*For  example,  a  writing  is  not  in-  him  in  conversing  with  others,  could 

dispensable   to    prove   the  nationality  not  be  proved  orally,  when  the  slips 

of  a  ship,  where  that  fact  is  collateral  used  were  missing  and  unaccounted 

merely.     United   States  v.    Pirates,  5  for. 

Wheat.    (U.    S.)    184,   5    L.    ed.    64;  ^Boston,   etc.,   R.    Co.   v.   Dana,    i 

State  v.  Haj^es,   138  N.  Car.  660,  50  Gray  (Mass.)  83,  104;  Bode  v.  State, 

S.  E.  623;  Cox  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  80  Neb.  74,   113  N.  W.  996;   People 

609,  60  S.  E.  283.  V.  Miles,  123  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  862, 

'^  Commonwealth    v.    Walker,     163  108  X.  Y.  S.  510.     It  has  been  held 

I\Iass.   226,   39    N.    E.    T0T4.     If   the  that  a  witness  will  not  be  permitted 

writing  is  one  that  it  is  customarily  to   state  the   result   of  his    examina- 

destroj-ed  as  soon  as  used,  it  would  tion  of  books  unless  the  books  were 

not  seem  logical,  or  fair,  to  require  kept  by   him,    and   the    entries   made 

its   production    if    its   contents    could  by  him,  or  in  his  presence.     Donner 

be  proved  orally.    But  it  was  held  in  v.   State,  69  Xeb.   56,  95   N'.  W.   40. 

State  v.  De  Wolf,  8  Conn.  93,  20  Am.  This,    however,    is    not    the    general 

Dec.    90.    that    the    admissions    of    a  rule.    Ruth  v.  State,  140  Wis.  373,  122 

deaf  mute,  written  on  slips  used  by  N.  W.  733. 


75  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    45 

to  give  primary  evidence  of  a  fact  within  his  personal  knowledge, 
which  he  has  acquired  through  the  employment  of  his  own  powers 
of  observation.  So,  in  a  prosecution  for  embezzlement,  an  expert 
who  has  examined  the  books  of  account  kept  by  the  prisoner  may 
testify  that  a  certain  balance  is  due  from  the  accused. °^ 

If  the  issue  of  insolvency  is  involved  the  general  result  of  an 
examination  of  the  debtor's  accounts  and  securities  may  be  stated 
without  producing  them.*'"  So  one  whose  duty  it  is  to  keep  a 
record  of  the  names  of  a  certain  class  of  persons  may  state  that 
he  has  examined  the  record  and  that  the  name  of  a  particular 
person  was  not  on  the  list."^ 

So  it  has  been  held  that  a  person  may  testify  to  the  amount  of 
money  which  has  been  stolen  from  his  person  or  from  his  cash 
drawer,  where  his  information  as  to  the  amount  has  been  ascer- 
tained in  a  general  way  from  his  examination  of  his  books."* 

A  witness  will  not  be  allowed  to  testify  to  a  single  fact  which 
is  not  in  the  nature  of  the  general  result  of  an  examination  by 
him  if  he  has  learned  it  solely  from  inspecting  books,  if  they  are 
not  produced.''^ 

The  oral  testimony  of  one  who  has  examined  public  records 
that  he  did  not  find  a  certain  fact  or  name,  which  was  by  statute 
required  to  be  recorded,  is  proof  only  that  a  search  was  made  and 
that  it  was  unsuccessful.  It  may  go  to  the  jury  as  primary  evi- 
dence, that  the  name  or  fact  was  in  fact  not  recorded.^^ 

The  jury  are  entitled,  particularly  in  a  prosecution  for  crime, 

^  See  post,  §  290.  found  against  the  defendant.    Wood- 

*"  Culver   V.    Marks,    122   Ind.    554,  rufif  v.  State,  61  Ark.  157,  32  S.  W. 

566,  567,  23  N.  E.   1086,  17  Am.  St.  102. 

377,  7  L.  R.  A.  489n.    That  the  rules  "'  People  v.  Jones,   106  N.   Y.  523, 

of  the  text  are  applicable  to  criminal  526,  13  N.  E.  93.     Contra,  Hepler  v. 

prosecutions,     see    Hollingsworth     v.  State,  58  Wis.  46,  S3,  SS,   16  N.  W. 

State,  III  Ind.  289,  297,  12  N.  E.  490.  42;  Biddy  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

•"Jordan  v.   State,   127  Ga.  278,  56  412,  107  S.  W.  814.     But  as  regards 

S.  E.  422.  the  weight  of  such  evidence,  a  copy 

**  Hudson  V.  State,  137  Ala.  60,  34  of  a  public  record  must  prevail  over 

So.  854.  the  oral  testimony  of  a  person  who, 

"^  Hamilton  Provident,  etc.,  Soc.  v.  after  examining   the   record,  testifies 

Northwood,  86  Mich.  315,  49  N.  W.  'that  he  cannot  find  the  part  certified. 

37.      Officials    who    have    examined  Boyce  v.   Auditor-General,  90  Mich. 

books  and  accounts  kept  by  the  ac-  314,  321,  51  N.  W.  457. 

cused    may    testify    to    the    balance  . 


§    46  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  76 

to  have  all  the  Hght  possible  that  can  be  thrown  upon  documentary 
evidence.  From  its  nature  and  often  from  its  great  length,  such 
evidence  is  hard  to  be  comprehended  by  persons  of  the  highest 
intelligence  and  trained  in  the  investigation  of  the  facts.  Jurors 
are  likely,  in  the  hurry  and  confusion  which  so  frequently  attend 
criminal  trials,  to  overlook  the  most  important  portions  of  the 
books  of  account,  certified  copies  of  legal  proceedings,  deeds,  let- 
ters and  other  written  proof  which  are  placed  before  them.  The 
report  of  one  who  has  examined  the  written  evidence  either  as 
to  a  single  fact  which  he  has  or  has  not  found  or  as  to  a  general 
result,  derived  from  his  investigation,  is  of  great  evidential  value 
and  is  properly  received  where  the  written  evidence  which  is  or 
has  been  inspected  by  the  witness  is  before  the  jury.*^' 

So  where  an  officer  in  a  bank  was  being  prosecuted  for  the 
crime  of  receiving  deposits  after  he  knew  the  bank  was  insolvent, 
it  was  competent  to  place  expert  accountants  on  the  witness  stand 
to  explain  to  the  jury  the  entries  in  the  books  of  the  bank  which 
already  were  in  evidence. *^^ 

§  46.  Proof  of  records  and  official  appointments. — Public  records, 
because  of  their  official  character  and  the  general  inconvenience 
which  would  always  ensue  if  their  removal  from  the  proper  cus- 
tody was  permitted,  may  usually  be  proved  by  a  duly  authen- 
ticated copy  or  transcript,  without  accounting  for  the  absence  of 
the  original  records.*'^ 

The  later  cases,  under  the  influence  of  statutory  legislation, 
have  somewhat  extended  the  rule.  It  is  often  applied  to  the  books 
of  private  corporations  when  it  is  very  inconvenient  to  produce 
them,  but  only  after  a  reasonable  effort  to  obtain  possession  of  the 
original  has  been  proved.'^" 

\Miere  a  statutory  mode  of  proving  a  record  by  a  certified  copy 
is  provided,  the  copy  is  the  best  evidence  of  the  record,  and  the 
latter  cannot  be  proved  by  parol.  But  where  the  records  are 
shown  to  be  lost,  so  that  a  certified  copy  is  unobtainable,  the  loss 

^  People  V.  Miles,  192  N.  Y.  541,  84  Kinard  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  146.  58  S. 

N.  E.  1 1 17,  aff'g  123  App.  Div.   (N.  E.  263. 

Y.)  862,  108  N.  Y.  S.  510.  '"Commonwealth    v.    Meehan,    170 

**  State  V.  Hoffman,  120  La.  949,  45  ^lass.  362,  49  N.  E.  648;  Brighton  v. 

So.  95T.  Miles,  151  Ala.  479,  44  So.  394- 

''  State  V.  Pigg  (Kan.),  97  Pac.  859; 


'JJ  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    4/ 

and  the  contents  of  the  records  may  be  shown  by  the  testimony 
of  any  person  having  actual  knowledge. 

Another  exception  to  the  rule  requiring  the  production  of  a 
writing  as  the  best  evidence  occurs  where  a  party  is  called  upon 
to  prove  the  validity  of  the  appointment  of  some  public  official 
and  the  official  appointment  is  not  directly  in  issue.  The  written 
appointment  of  the  officer  need  not  generally  be  produced.  From 
proof  that  the  public  official  has  acted  openly  as  such  it  will 
be  presumed,  that  is,  in  collateral  proceedings  not  involving  his 
title  to  the  office,  that  he  was  legally  and  properly  appointed. 
Thus  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  assaulting  or  resisting  a  police 
officer,  written  evidence  of  his  appointment  or  of  his  authority 
to  act  is  never  necessary,  nor  need  its  absence  be  accounted  for.'^ 

§  47.  Physical  condition  of  personal  property. — The  testimony  of 
a  witness  who  has  personal  knowledge  of  the  physical  condition 
or  attributes  of  an  article  of  personal  property  obtained  by  the 
empIo5'ment  of  any  of  his  senses  is  primary  evidence  of  its  char- 
acter and  condition.  The  article  itself  need  not  be  produced.  Thus 
a  witness  may  state  that  he  saw  blood  stains  upon  a  person's  cloth- 
ing/- or  holes  in  clothing,'^  or  that  a  certain  liquor  which  he  saw 
was  intoxicating,'^*  without  producing  the  clothing  or  the  liquor. 

A  witness  may  testify  that  oleomargarine  which  is  alleged  to 
have  been  illegally  sold  resembled  butter  without  producing  the 
article  sold  or  explaining  its  non-production.^^ 

But  an  article  of  personal  property,  the  relevancy  of  which 
has  been  shown  by  its  identification  with  the  subject-matter  of 
the  crime,  may  be  exhibited  to  the  jury  in  the  court  room,  either 

"  Gordon's  Case,  2  Leach   C.   Law  "  Commonwealth      v.      Pope,      103 

(1789)   581,  585;  Martin  v.   State,  89  Mass.  440;  Campbell  v.  State,  23  Ala. 

Ala.  115,  118,  119,  8  So.  23,  18  Am.  44,  69,  72;  Walker  v.  State,  139  Ala. 

St.  91;   North  V.  People,   139  111.  81,  56,  35  So.  loii. 

28  N.  E.  966,  971 ;  Commonwealth  v.  "  Underwood  v.  Commonwealth 
McCue,  16  Gray  (Mass.)  226;  State  (Ky.),  84  S.  W.  310,  27  Ky.  L.  8. 
V.  Row,  81  Iowa  138,  46  N.  W.  872;  "Commonwealth  v.  Welch,  142 
State  V.  Smith,  38  La.  Ann.  301;  Mass.  473.  8  N.  E.  342;  Common- 
Commonwealth  V.  Kane,  108  Mass.  wealth  v.  Moinehan,  140  Mass.  463, 
423,  II  Am.  373;  State  v.  Surles,  117  5  N.  E.  259. 

N.   Car.  720,  23  S.  E.  324;    Shely  v.  "Commonwealth    v.     Caulficld,    27 

State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  190,  32  S.  W.  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  279. 
90T.     See  post,  §  446. 


§    48  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  78 

as  direct  evidence  of  a  relevant  fact,  or  to  enable  them  to  under- 
stand the  evidence  or  to  realize  more  completely  its  cogency  and 
force."" 

The  jury  may  inspect  and  smell  the  contents  of  a  bottle  prop- 
erly identified  and  admitted  in  evidence.'^ 

Comparison  of  materials  may  also  be  made  by  the  jury,  aided 
by  the  evidence  of  expert  witnesses.  So  in  case  the  quality  of  an 
article,  or  its  adaptability  to  a  specific  use  or  purpose,  is  in  issue, 
a  sample  may  be  shown  to  the  jury,  together  with  a  specimen  of 
a  like  material  which  is  shown  to  be  of  good  quality  or  adapted 
to  the  required  purpose,  and  the  jury  may  then  make  a  com- 
parison to  ascertain  possible  points  of  difference.'^- 

As  a  general  rule,  it  seems  essential  that  articles  shown  to  the 
jury  should  be  connected,  at  least  prima  facie,  with  the  crime 
in  issue.'''  Indeed,  the  propriety  and  justice  of  permitting  articles 
and  implements,  such  as  deadly  weapons,  lanterns,  masks,  coun- 
terfeiters' tools,  gambling  apparatus  and  the  like,  used  by  crim- 
inals, but  which  are  not  shown  to  be  connected  with  the  accused, 
to  be  exhibited  to  the  jury  may  well  be  doubted.  Such  a  practice, 
under  the  pretext  of  illustrating  or  explaining  the  evidence,  is 
well  calculated  to  prejudice  the  jury  against  the  accused. 

§  48.  Incriminating  articles — ^Weapons,  clothing,  etc. — A  district 
attorney  has  been  permitted  to  show  the  jury  an  instrument  with 

"^  The  witness-,   it   seems,   need  not  had    examined,    the    prosecution   was 

identif}'    the    article    positively.      He  allowed  to  put  other  imitation  rings 

may  testify  to  his  belief  in  its  iden-  in  evidence  which  had  been  found  in 

tity,    based    on    the    same    principles  a   room  occupied  by  the  accused  by 

that  aid  him  in  determining  whether  an   officer   who  had  broken   into  the 

a  knife  or  a  hat  is  his  own.    Mitchell  room    and    searched    it    without    any 

V.  State,  94  Ala.  68,  10  So.  518,  520.  warrant.    Moss  v.  State,  152  Ala.  30, 

So    one    witness    may    testify   to   the  44  So.  598. 

fact  that  another  identified  an  article  "Reed  v.  Territory  (Okla.),  98  Pac. 

on  a  prior  occasion.     State  v.  Brab-  583- 

ham,   108  N.  Car.  793,  13   S.  E.  217.  "People  v.  Buddensieck,  103  N.  Y. 

In    Gindrat   v.    People,    138   111.    103,  487,  9  N-  E.  44,  57  Am.  766. 

108-110,   27  N.   E.    1085,   which   was  ^' But  see  Underbill  on  Evid.,  §  39; 

an   indictment  for   the   larceny  of   a  State    v.    Sherouk,    61    Atl.    897,    78 

diamond  ring  by  substituting  an  imi-  Conn.  718,  not  reported  in  full.     Peo- 

tation  ring  in  the  place  of  one  con-  pie  v.   Muhly   (Cal.  App.,   1909),   i04 

tained  in   a  tray  which  the   prisoner  Pac.  466. 


79  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    4S 

which  an  abortion  had  been  procured/'^  or  a  pistol,  or  any  weapon, 
article,  or  instrument  with  which  a  homicide,  assault,  or  other 
crime  has  been  committed.  A  witness  will,  also,  be  allowed  to 
show  how  it  could  have  been  used.^^  The  clothing  of  the  victim 
of  a  homicide,  if  properly  identified,  may  be  exhibited,  on  the 
principle  that  it  is  a  part  of  the  res  gestco,  to  illustrate  to  the  jury 
the  character  and  nature  of  the  wounds, ^^  the  motive  of  the  crime, 
the  manner  and  means  of  death, ^^  or  to  show  how  near  the  ac- 
cused w^as  to  him,  when  he  was  slain.** 

*°  Commonwealth     v.      Brown,      14  App.    452,    93    S.    W.    116;    State    v. 

Gray  (Alass.)   419.  Churchill     (Wash.),     100     Pac.     309. 

"  State  V.  Gallman,  79  S.  Car.  229,  Clothing   traced   to    accused   may   be 

60  S.   E.  682;   Paulson  v.   State,   118  received    in    evidence    if    they    were 

Wis.    89,    94   N.    W.    771 ;    Young  v.  shown  to  have  been  stolen.    Williams 

State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  207,  92  S.  W.  v.  State,   119  Ga.   564,  46  S.  E.  837. 

841.     See    generally,    State    v.    Rob-  Clothing  of  the  victim  proved  to  have 

erts,   63    Vt.    139,    142,   21    Atl.    424;  been    worn    by    him    when    he    was 

Siberry  v.   State,  133  Ind.  677,  Z3  ^-  killed  will  not  be  rejected  because  it 

E.  68r ;  Rodriquez  v.   State,  32  Tex.  has  been  washed.     Pate  v.  State,  150 

Cr.  App.  259,  22  S.  W.  978;  Hornsby  Ala.  10,  43  So.  343. 
v.  State,  94  Ala.  55,  64,   10  So.  522;        *' Story  v.   State,  99  Ind.  413,  414; 

State  V.  Crow,  107  Mo.  341,  17  S.  W.  McDonel  v.  State,  90  Ind.  320;  State 

745,  747;    State  v.   Mordecai,   68   N.  v.    Craft,    118   La.    117,   42    So.   718; 

Car.  207;  Gardiner  v.  People,  6  Park  State   v.    Cadotte,    17   ]\Iont.    315,   42 

Cr.  (N.  Y.)  155,  157.   A  watch  charm  Pac.  857;  Hart  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App. 

taken  from  the  person  of  a  man  who  202,  229,  230,  49  Am.  i88n ;  Clark  v. 

had    been    killed    by    the    defendant  State,   51    Tex.   Cr.  App.  519,   102   S. 

while  perpetrating  a  robbery  was  re-  W.   1136;   Sue  v.   State,  S2  Tex.   Cr. 

ceived    in    evidence    in     Goldsby    v.  App.    122,    105    S.    W.    804;    State    v. 

United  States,  160  U.  S.  70,  40  L.  ed.  Landers,  21   S.  Dak.  606,  114  N.  W. 

343,  16  Sup.  Ct.  216;  State  v.  Wilson  717. 

(Mo.  App.,  1909),  122  S.  W.  671 ;  Peo-        ** Lucas  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  .A-pp. 

pie  V.  Morse,  196  N.  Y.  306,  89  N.  E.  219,  95  S.  W.   1055;   Dobbs  v.    State 

816:  Union  V.  State  (Ga.  App.,  1909),  (Tex.    Cr.    App.),    113    S.    W.    923; 

66  S.  E.  24.  State  v.   Brannan,   206  ]\Io.  636,   105 

''Dorsey  v.   State,   no  Ala.  38,  20  S.    W.    602;    People    v.    Wright,    89 

So.   450;    People   V.   Knapp,   71    Cal.  Mich.  70,  50  N.  W.  792;  Watkins  v. 

r,  3,   II   Pac.  793;  Seaborn  v.  Com-  State,  89  Ala.  82,  8  So.  134;  Frizzell 

mon wealth     (Ky.),    80     S.    W.     223,  v.   State,  30  Tex.  App.  42,  16  S.  W. 

25  Ky.  L.  2203;  Bennefield  v.  United  751;    Levy    v.    State,    28    Tex.    .•Xpp. 

States       (Okla.),       100      Pac.      34;  203,   12  S.  W.   596,   19  Am.    St.   826. 

State    V.    Long.    209    Mo.    .366,    108  The  use  of  a  dressmaker's  frame  in 

S.  W.  35;  Boyd  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  court    for    convenipncc    in    exhibiting 

App.   138,  94    S.   W.    1053;   Ozark  v.  to   the  jury  the  clothing  of   the   dc- 

State,  SI   Tex.   Cr.   App.   106,    100  S.  ceased  is  permissible.     So,  where  cer- 

W.  927;  Adams  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  tain  tools  which  were  claimed  by  the 


48  CRnriXAL    EVIDENCE.  80 


In  a  homicide  trial,  the  skull,  jawbone/^  or  vertebra  of  the 
deceased,  if  properly  identified,^*'  may  be  submitted  to  the  inspec- 
tion of  the  jury,  to  show  the  character  and  location  of  the  wounds 
inflicted.'''  Such  a  course  is  not  prejudicial  to  the  accused  upon 
the  grounds  that  it  is  calculated  to  excite  feelings  of  horror  in 
the  minds  of  the  jurors.*"^ 

But  it  is  usually  wholly  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to 
order  decedent's  skull  to  be  exhumed  for  the  purpose  of  putting 
it  in  evidence. ^^  If  there  are  physicians  accessible  as  witnesses  who 
have  dissected  the  skull  and  know  as  much  of  its  condition  as 
can  be  learned  from  an  examination  of  it  by  the  jurors  it  is  not 
error  to  refuse  to  order  the  person  having  custody  of  decedent's 
skull  to  produce  it.®^ 

The  introduction  in  evidence  of  clothing  belonging  to  the  de- 
fendant or  belonging  to  a  witness  or  worn  by  deceased  at  the 
time  of  his  death  is  a  common  occurrence  in  a  homicide  trial. 
The  clothing  of  the  accused  may  be  exhibited  to  the  jury  to  show 
that  spots  found  thereon  are  blood-stains.  The  proper  method  is 
to  prove  first  that  the  clothing  offered  belonged  to  the  accused  and 
that  it  had  been  worn  by  him  at  the  date  of  the  tragedy.  This 
is  usually  done  by  exhibiting  the  clothing  to  the  witness  and 
having  him  identify  it  as  the  clothing  belonging  to  or  which  was 
worn  by  the  accused.  The  weight  and  sufficiency  of  the  identified 
evidence  are  questions  for  the  jury.  It  has  been  held  that  it  need 
not  be  actually  proved  that  the  accused  wore  the  clothing  on  the 
day  of  the  homicide,  if  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  clothing 
belonged  to  him  and  was  worn  by  him  about  that  time.    After 

defendant  to  fit  in  marks  on  a  door  N.    E.    11 17,    119  App.   Div.    (N.  Y.) 

were  introduced  in  evidence  by  him,  344,  104  N.  Y.  S.  277. 

the    state    was    allowed   to    introduce  *"  State    v.    Moxley,    102    Mo.    374, 

the  door  to  prove  that  the  tools  did  388,    14    S.    W.    969,    15    S.    W.    556; 

not  fit.     People  v.  Durrant,   116  Cal.  State  v.  Bailey,  79  Conn.  589,  65  Atl. 

179,  48  Pac.  75.    It  was  not  reversible  95i- 

error  to  admit  a  partly  burned  block  "State  v.  Lewis  (Iowa),  116  N.  W. 

of  wood  taken  from  the  pile  of  char-  606. 

coal  on  which  the  body  of  deceased  *"a  Turner   v.    State,   89   Tenn.    547, 

was    found.      Paulson    v.    State,    118  564.  565,  I5  S.  W.  838. 

Wis.  89,  94  N.  W.  771.  '^Moss  v.  State,  152  Ala.  30,  44  So. 

*^  People  V.  Way,  191  N.  Y.  533,  84  598. 

^  Moss  V.  State,  152  Ala.  30,  44  So. 
598.     The  jawbone  of  the  victim  of 


8l  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §   49 

being  connected  with  accused,  the  clothing  may  itself  be  offered 
with  the  testimony  that  the  spots  on  it  are  blood-stains.^'' 

The  witness  may  point  out  the  spots.  So  the  clothing  of  the 
witness  was  properly  admitted  where  the  witness  testified  to  con- 
tradict the  statement  made  by  the  accused  that  no  one  was  pres- 
ent when  the  deceased  was  shot,  that  she  was  there  and  that  she 
held  the  deceased  and  that  blood  from  his  wounds  flowed  on  her 
clothing.  Having  testified  to  these  facts,  she  may  show  her  cloth- 
ing to  the  jury  to  corroborate  and  illustrate  her  evidence.^^ 

§  49.  Inscriptions  on  bulky  articles. — From  the  inconvenience 
which  would  ensue  if  their  actual  production  in  court  were  re- 
quired, the  rule  has  long  been  recognized  that  monuments,  natural 
or  artificial,  used  to  mark  the  boundaries  of  land,  sign-boards,®^ 
mural  tablets,  gravestones,  packages  of  merchandise  and  similar 
bulky  articles,  need  not  be  produced  for  the  purpose  of  proving 
inscriptions  on  them.  The  inscriptions  may  be  proved  by  the  evi- 
dence of  a  witness  who  has  read  them.  So  the  oral  testimony  of 
a  surveyor  is  admissible  to  describe  the  monuments  which  con- 
stitute and  mark  out  a  boundary  line,''^  and,  from  necessity,  to 
prove  the  marks  which  were  blazed  upon  the  trees  near  the 
same.®*  An  invoice  is  competent  to  prove  the  marks  upon  cases 
of  merchandise  described  in  it.®^ 

Upon  the  same  grounds  and  because  of  the  general  notoriety 
of  the  facts  involved,  oral  evidence  of  the  contents  of  resolutions 
passed  at  public  meetings,  and  of  inscriptions  on  flags  or  banners 

an  assault  who  died  is  competent  to  ^''  State  v.  Sherouk,  61  Atl.  897,  78 

corroborate  proof  that  a  bullet   was  Conn.  718,  not  reported  in  full ;  State 

fired  at  his  chin.    People  v.  Way,  191  v.  Whitbeck  (Iowa,  1909),  123  N.  \V. 

N.   Y.  533,  84  N.  E.   1 1 17,  aff'g  119  982. 

App.   Div.    (N.   Y.)    344,   104   N.   Y.  "' Thomas    v.    State,    45    Tex.    Cr. 

S.   277.      The   skull    of    deceased   in  App.  in,  74  S.  W.  36. 

homicide  was  received  to  sustain  the  ""  State  v.  Wilson,  5  R.  I.  291. 

theory  of  the  prosecution  that  he  was  °®  Borer    v.    Lange,   44    Minn.    281, 

struck    by    the   accused   with    a    pick  286,  46  N.  W.  358. 

in    the    head    while    leaning    forward  ®*Ayers   v.   Watson,   137  U.  S.  584, 

with     his     head    down,    against     the  600,  34  L.  ed.  803,  ti  Sup.  Ct.  201. 

claim  of  the  accused  that  the  killing  °^  Taylor  v.  United  States,  3  How. 

was   in    self-defense.    State   v.   Lewis  (U.  S.)   197,208,  n  L.  ed.  559. 
(Iowa),  116  N.  W.  606. 

6 — Underbill  Crim.  Ev. 


§    50  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  82 

carried  in  public  parades,  has  always  been  admitted  in  criminal 
trials.'*' 

As  regards  unrecorded  brands  and  marks  upon  cattle,  one  who 
has  seen  them  may  testify  to  their  existence,*^"  and  may  explain 
their  character  and  meaning.''^  And  in  a  prosecution  for  the  un- 
lawful sale  of  liquors,  the  names  of  the  liquors  marked  on  the 
bottles  and  other  vessels  may  be  proved  withoijt  producing  the 
vessels  or  labels.^' 

The  contents  of  a  waiting  may  be  proved  orally  wdiere  the 
identity  of  an  article  to  which  it  was  attached  is  relevant.  Thus, 
a  witness  may  state  orally  what  was  on  a  tag,^''*'  or  a  label,"^ 
w'hich  w-as  affixed  to  a  bag,  or  a  package,  without  producing  the 
writing.^"' 

Secondary  evidence  may  be  given  of  writing  that  cannot  be 
produced  in  court,  such  as  mural  monuments,  documents  shown  to 
be  in  a  foreign  country,  books  of  a  concern  the  removal  of  which 
would  be  very  inconvenient  and  others,  such  as  a  license  required 
by  the  federal  statute  which  cannot  be  removed  from  the  place 
of  business  of  accused,  and  produced  in  court  without  violating 
the  federal  statute. ^°^ 

§  50.    Photographs    as    primary    evidence — Personal    identity. — 

Photographs,  whether  originals  or  copies, ^°*  are  admissible  as 
primary  evidence  upon  the  same  grounds  and  for  the  same  pur- 
poses as  are  diagrams,  maps"^  and  drawings  of  objects  or  places. 
Photographs  have  been  received  for  the  purpose  of  describing 

**  Sheridan's  Case,  31  How.  St.  Tr.  ""A  witness  may  testify  to  certain 

543,  ^^2.  marks  which  he  saw  upon  the  cloth- 

"  State  V.  Cardelli,  19  Nev.  319,  10  ing  worn  by  the  accused.     Common- 

Pac.  433;  People  v.  Bolanger,  71  Cal.  wealth    v.    Hills,    10    Cush.    (Mass.) 

17,    II    Pac.    799;    Brooke  v.   People,  530,  533. 

23  Colo.  375,  48  Pac.  502.  ''^Wilcox  v.  Wilcox,  46  Hun    (N. 

°*Boren  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  28,  Y.)  32. 

ZZ,  4  S.  W.  463.  '^Joliff  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

'^  Commonwealth  v.  Blood,  11  Gray  61,  109  S.  W.  176. 

(Mass.)  74.  "^ Adams  v.   State,  28  Fla.  511,   10 

^°"  Commonwealth    v.     IMorrell,     99  So.    106 ;    State  v.    Roberts,   28  Nev. 

Mass.  542.  350,  82  Pac.  100;  Jarvis  v.  State,  138 

^•"Commonwealth    v.    Powers,    116  Ala.  17,  34  So.  1025. 
Mass.  zn,  338. 


83  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    50 

and  identifying  premises  which  were  the  scene  of  a  crime/""  and 
they  need  not  show  all  the  premises  if  they  show  the  material 
part.'*" 

Photographs  of  the  scene,  taken  several  months  after  the  crime 
was  committed,  were  properly  admitted  where  it  appeared  that  the 
condition  of  the  premises  had  not  materially  changed  in  the  mean- 
time.'°' 

It  is  not  allowable,  however,  for  the  prosecution  to  arrange  a 
scene  assumed  to  represent  the  res  gestae  of  the  crime  and  then 
to  photograph  the  scene  represented.  In  a  recent  case,  the  chief 
witness  for  the  prosecution  very  carefully  reproduced  by  means 
of  persons  employed  for  the  purpose,  the  situation  of  the  parties 
to  the  homicide,  and  a  reproduction  of  the  occurrences  which  took 
place  at  the  time  of  the  killing.  This  reproduction  was  photo- 
graphed but  the  court  rejected  the  photograph."'®^  So  in  a  homi- 
cide case,  a  photograph  of  a  man  lying  on  a  porch  in  the  position 
in  which  the  body  of  the  victim  of  the  homicide  was  found,  was 
rejected. '°^ 

Photographs  are  always  admissible  as  primary  evidence  of  the 
identity  of  persons  alive  or  dead/'"  and  to  present  delineations  of 

^"^  People   V.    Pustolka,    149   N.    Y.  Buddensieck,  103  N.  Y.  487,  500,  9  N. 

570,  43  N.  E.  548 ;  State  v.  Kelley,  46  E.  44,  57  Am.  766. 

S.   Car.    55,   24    S.    E.   60;    State   v.  ^"^  Gibson    v.    State,    53    Tex.    Cr. 

O'Reilly,  126  Mo.  597,  29  S.  W.  577;  App.  349,  no  S.  W.  41. 

People  V.  Grill,  151  Cal.  592,  91  Pac.  "'a  Fore  v.   State,  75  Miss.  727,  23 

515;    People   V.    Del    Vermo,    192    N.  So.  710. 

Y.  470,  85  N.  E.  690.  '""  People  v.  Maughs,  149  Cal.  253, 

'"^Chestnut  Hill,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Piper,  86  Pac.  187. 
etc.,  Co.,  15  Weekly  Notes  55.  "It  ""  Shaffer  v.  United  States,  24  App. 
(the  photograph)  exhibited  the  sur-  D.  C.  417;  Commonwealth  v.  John- 
face,  condition  and  state  of  the  wall,  son,  199  Mass.  55,  85  N.  E.  188; 
and  it  no  doubt  carried  to  the  minds  Young  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
of  the  jurors  a  better  image  of  the  207,  92  S.  W.  841 ;  State  v.  Hasty, 
subject-matter  concerning  which  neg-  121  Towa  507,  96  N.  W.  1115;  People 
ligence  was  charged,  than  any  oral  v.  Durrant,  116  Cal.  179,  48  Pac.  75; 
description  by  an  eye-witness  could  Wilson  v.  United  States,  162  U.  S. 
have  done.  In  such  a  case  it  must  be  613,  40  L.  ed.  1090,  16  Sup.  Ct.  895  I 
deemed  established  that  photographic  People  v.  Smith,  121  N.  Y.  578,  582, 
scenes  are  admissible  in  evidence  as  24  N.  E.  852 ;  Udderzook  v.  Common- 
appropriate  aids  to  a  jury  in  applying  wealth,  76  Pa.  St.  340,  352,  353;  Ru- 
the  evidence,  whether  it  relates  to  loff  v.  People,  45  N.  Y.  213,  224; 
persons,  things  or  places."    People  v.  Beavers  v.  State,  58  Ind.  530;  Marion 


§    50  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  84 

wounds  or  other  physical  injuries/^^  as,  for  example,  to  show 
that  a  child  had  been  insufficiently  fed  or  ill-treated. "- 

So  photographs  of  the  bodies  of  drowned  persons  have  been 
received  for  purposes  of  identification  even  when  the  bodies  had 
remained  in  the  water  for  a  very  long  time,  and  the  likeness,  be- 
cause of  this  and  of  the  disadvantageous  circumstances  under 
which  it  was  made,  was  bad.^^" 

Photographs  are  sometimes  received  to  supply  accurate  fac- 
similes of  public  records  wdiich  cannot  be  conveniently  brought 
into  court,^"  and  enlarged  photographs  of  disputed  writings  em- 
phasizing, illustrating  and  making  prominent  peculiarities  of 
handwriting  have  been  employed  by  experts  as  standards  of  com- 
parison.^^^ 

X-ray  photographs  have  been  received  in  evidence  and  are  of 
value  to  show  the  location  of  the  bullet  in  the  body  of  a  deceased 
person.  The  same  rules  and  principles  which  apply  to  ordinary 
photographs  are  applicable  to  them.  It  must  first  be  shown  that 
they  were  prepared  by  one  who  understood  their  preparation. 
An  objection  that  there  was  no  evidence  before  the  jury  that  the 
object  represented  in  the  radiograph  was  a  bullet  and  that  the 
object  was  in  the  same  position  when  the  radiograph  was  taken 

V.  State,  20  Neb.  233,  240,  29  X.  W.  224.     A  witness  who   found  a  muti- 

911,   57  Am.   825;    Luke   v.    Calhoun  lated  body  of  a  man  whom  he  had 

Co.,  52  Ala.    115,    T18,   T19;   State   v.  never    seen    alive,    which    had    been 

McCoy,    15   Utah    136,   49    Pac.    420;  buried  several   days,  was  allowed  to 

Morris     v.     Territory      (Okla.).     99  testify  that  the  face,  though  swollen 

Pac.   760;    Commonwealth   v.    Keller,  and    discolored,    resembled    a    photo- 

191    Pa.  St.  122,  43  Atl.  198  (of  de-  graph    shown    him.      Udderzook    v. 

ceased   standing  beside  a   witness  to  Commonwealth,  76  Pa.  St.  340. 

show   the   size  of   deceased  by  com-  "*  Leathers     v.     Salvor     Wrecking, 

parison).  etc.,  Co.,  2  Woods   (U.  S.)   680,  682, 

^"  State  V.   ^Miller,  43  Ore.  325,  74  15  Fed.   Cas.  8164;    Luco  v.  United 

Pac.  658;   State  v.   Hasty,   121   Iowa  States,  23  How.  (U.  S.)  515,  541,  16 

507,  96  Mo.  1 1 15  (in  adultery  to  iden-  L.  ed.  545. 

tify      the      defendant's      paramour)  ;  "°  Rowell  v.  Fuller,  59  Vt.  688,   10 

Franklin  v.    State,  69  Ga.  36.  42,  47  Atl.    853;    Buzard   v.    McAnulty,    77 

Am.  748.  Tex.   438,   14   S.   W.    138;   Marcy  v. 

"-Cowley  V.  People,  83  N.  Y.  464,  Barnes,  16  Gray  (Mass.)   161;  John- 

476-478,  38  Am.  464;  State  v.  IMathe-  son  v.   Commonwealth,   102  Va.  927, 

son,  130  Iowa  440,  103  N.  W.  137.  46  S.  E.  789. 

"'Ruloff  V.   People,  45  N.  Y.  213, 


85  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §51 

as  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  shooting  is  not  an  ohjection  to  the 
competency  of  the  photograph  but  goes  to  its  credibihty.^^'^ 

§  51.  Accuracy  and  relevancy  of  photographs. — If  the  correctness 
of  the  photograph  as  a  hkeness  is  shown  pviina  facie,  either  by 
tlie  testimony  of  the  person  who  made  it  or  by  other  competent 
witnesses,  to  the  effect  that  it  faith f idly  represents  the  object  por- 
trayed, it  should  go  to  the  jury  subject  to  impeachment  as  to  its 
accuracy.^"  Whether  the  photograph  is  an  accurate  likeness  is 
then  a  question  for  the  jury.^^** 

A  conflict  of  evidence  regarding  the  correctness  of  a  photo- 
graph does  not  exclude  it,  if  it  is  relevant.  It  should  go  to  the 
jury,  and  the  other  side  may  be  allowed  to  introduce  one  they 
deem  to  be  correct.^^^  It  may  not  always  be  necessary  to  show 
the  correctness  of  the  portrait  by  positive  evidence.  In  the  absence 
of  any  attack  upon  the  correctness  of  the  likeness,  the  court  may 
assume  it  to  be  correct  from  the  universal  employment  of  the  art, 
the  general  assent  to  the  correctness  of  its  delineations  and  the 
scientific  principles  on  which  they  are  based.^'° 

The  photograph  or  picture  must  be  relevant  as  well  as  correct. 
Its  relevancy  will  depend  on  the  relevancy  of  the  scene  or  object 
it  represents.  If  a  photograph  purports  to  represent  a  relevant 
scene  or  object,  but  portrays  it  in  a  grossly  inaccurate  manner, 
so  that  it  practically  represents  something  else,  and  the  scene  or 
object  would  scarcely  be  recognized  thereby,  the  non-reliability 
of  the  photograph  as  a  correct  likeness  may  almost  be  considered 
as  producing  irrelevancy.  But  usually  the  question  of  relevancy 
is  distinct  from  that  of  correctness,  and  is  for  the  judge  exclu- 
sively. It  is  to  be  determined  upon  the  considerations  which  gov- 
ern when  the  relevancy  of  any  sort  of  evidence  is  concerned. ^"^ 

If  a  photograph  of 'the  accused  introduced  to  prove  his  identity 
contains  writings  or  marks  which  have  no  bearing  upon  the  ques- 

"'  State  V.  I\fatheson,  130  Iowa  440,  may  be  put  to  the  witness.     Stuart  v. 

103  N.  W.  137,  114  Am.  St.  42711.  Rinsse.  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.  Super.)  436. 

"'Mow  V.  People,  31  Colo.  351,  72  "'Morris  v.   Territory   (Okla.),  99 

Pac.    1069;    People    v.    Durrant,    116  Pac.  760. 

Cal.  179,  48  Pac.  75;  Commonwealth  ""Moon  v.  State,  68  Ga.  687,  695. 

V.   Switzer,   134  Pa.   St.  383,   19   Atl.  '""  Udderzook  v.  Commonwealth,  76 

681 ;   Ming  v.  Foote,  9  Mont.  20T,  23  Pa.    St.   .340,  352,  353 ;    Lake   v.   Cal- 

Pac.    515.      The    questfon,    "Is    this  houn  Co.,  52  Ala.  T15,  ttq. 

photograph  correct?"  though  leading,  ^"^  The    photograph   of   the   accused 


^51  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  86 

tion  of  his  identity,  but  which  by  their  nature  or  meaning  may 
injure  the  accused  in  the  estimation  of  the  jury,  it  should  be  re- 
jected. Thus  a  witness  may  testify  that  he  was  acquainted  with 
the  accused,  and  he  may  identify  him  as  having  seen  him  in 
prison  or  in  jail,  and  he  may  then  state  that  in  his  opinion,  a 
photograph  exhibited  to  him  is  that  of  the  accused.  But  where  a 
witness  by  oral  testimony  has  testified  that  he  had  seen  the  ac- 
cused in  prison  it  was  error  for  the  court  to  receive  in  evidence 
a  photograph  of  the  prisoner  clothed  in  prison  stripes  and  having 
a  prison  number  upon  his  breast,  though  the  witness  swears  that 
that  is  a  picture  of  the  prisoner  as  he  saw  him  in  jail.^^" 

Stationing  men  about  the  scene  to  be  depicted  to  show  the  po- 
sitions occupied  by  persons  present  when  the  crime  was  com- 
mitted, and  to  aid  the  recollection  of  a  witness,^^^  or  the  fact  that 
a  change  had  been  made  in  the  edifice  which  was  photographed, 
will  not  render  the  photograph  irrelevant  if  the  change  is  not  too 
material.^"*  If,  however,  the  photograph  w^as  taken  so  long  after 
the  commission  of  the  crime  that  material  changes  may  have 
taken  place  it  should  be  rejected,  unless  it  is  affirmatively  shown 
that  no  material  change  had  occurred. ^"^ 

The  photograph  to  be  received  need  not,  as  a  rule,  have  been 
taken  by  a  professional  photographer,^-''  But  in  one  instance  a 
photograph  by  an  amateur  was  rejected,  partly  for  the  reason 
that  he  was  utterly  unfamiliar  with  the  locality.^^^ 

is  especially  valuable  and  relevant  to  ^^  People  v.  Jackson,  iii  N.  Y.  362, 

identify  him  when  it  was  taken  im-  370,  19  N.  E.  54. 

mediately   prior   to    or   shortly   after  ^Glazier  v.  Hebron,  62  Hun    (N. 

his   arrest,   if   the  other  evidence  of  Y.)    137,   16   N.,  Y.   S.  503;   Parshell 

his  personal  appearance  at  that  time  v.  New  York,  etc.,  R.   Co.,  (£  Hun 

is   contradictory  or  unconvincing,  or  (N.  Y.)  633,  21  X.  Y.  S.  354;  People 

if    he   had   intentionally   changed  his  v.  Grill,  151  Cal.  592,  91  Pac.  515. 

facial  appearance,  between  his  arrest  ^^  Cleveland,   etc.,   R.   Co.   v.    Mon- 

and  his  trial,  by  growing  or  remov-  aghan,  140  III.  474,  483,  30  N.  E.  869. 

ing  a  beard  or  moustache.     State  v.  ^^  Duffin    v.    People,    107    111,    113, 

Ellwood,    17  R.   I.   ^(iz,  IT^,  24   Atl.  47  Am.  431 ;  Mow  v.  People,  31  Colo. 

782;   Commonwealth  v.   Morgan,   159  351,   "72  Pac.    1069;   Russell  v.    State 

Mass.  375,  34  N.   E.  458;   Common-  (Ala.),  38  So.  291. 

wealth   V.    Campbell,    155    IMass.    537,  '"Cleveland,   etc.,   R.    Co.  v.   Mon- 

30  X.  E.  '/2.  aghan,  140  111.  474,  483,  30  N.  E.  869. 

^"  State    v.   Moran,    131    Iowa   645, 
109  N.  W.  187. 


87  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    52 

§  52.  Paintings  and  drawings. — Pencil  and  pen-and-ink  draw- 
ings have  been  received  to  identify  or  explain  localities.  Though 
they  are  received  as  primary  evidence  appealing  to  the  eyes  of  the 
jury  under  the  rule  admitting  phbtographs,  they  differ  from  the 
latter  in  that  their  accuracy  as  portraits  or  likenesses  must  be  af- 
firmatively shown  by  the  testimony  of  the  artist  or  other  compe- 
tent witness.  There  is  no  presumption  of  correctness  founded  on 
general  use  and  employment,  or  on  their  being  mechanical  repro- 
ductions by  a  process  which  the  court  will  judicially  notice,  as 
exists  in  the  case  of  photographs.  The  witness  called  to  prove 
their  correctness  must  testify  of  his  own  knowledge  that  they 
faithfully  represent  the  object  depicted,  and  their  accuracy,  if 
disputed,  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  turning  upon  the  credibility 
of  the  witnesses.!^"® 

The  map  of  the  locus  in  quo  of  the  homicide  or  a  plan  of  a 
house  which  was  the  scene  of  homicide  or  other  crime,  may  be 
received  in  evidence.  The  main  use  of  these  is  not  as  evidence  but 
to  enable  the  jury  to  better  understand  the  oral  testimony.^-^  The 
draftsman  of  the  map  must  testify  as  to  its  accuracy,  but  any 
other  witnesses  may  refer  to  it  while  testifying.^^°  It  is  not  ma- 
terial by  whom  the  map  was  prepared  providing  that  he  can  tes- 
tify that  the  map  or  diagram  is  accurate  and  is  based  upon  knowl- 
edge derived  from  his  own  investigation.  Thus  a  map  prepared 
by  the  prosecuting  attorney  from  his  own  observation  intended 
to  represent  the  route  that  the  accused  took  in  going  to  and  re- 
turning from  the  place  of  the  crime  has  been  received. ^^^ 

^^  State  V.  Harrison   (N.  Car.),  58  the  persons  portrayed  were  criminals, 

S.  E.  754;  Hisler  v.  State,  52  Fla.  30,  was  raised,  but  not  decided  in  Peo- 

42  So.  692;  Carter  v.   State,  39  Tex.  pie  v.   Smith,  121  N.  Y.  578,  582,  24 

Cr.  App.  345,  46  S.  W.  236,  48  S.  W.  N.   E.  852.     It  would   seem  that  the 

508;  Territory  v.  Emilio   (N.  Mex.),  accusatory    and    derogatory    indorse- 

89     Pac.     239;     Territory     v.     Price  ments,    while    not    keeping    out    the 

(N.    Mex.),   91    Pac.    72>Z',    Common-  photographs,    ought    to    be    excluded 

wealth   V.   Johnson,  213   Pa.    St.   432,  from  the  jury  as  hearsay,  and  as  cal- 

62  Atl.  1064;   People  V.  Johnson,  140  culated  to  prejudice  the  prisoner. 

N.  Y.  350,  35  N.  E.  604;  Burton  v.  '=^West  v.  State,  53  Fla.  77,  43  So. 

State,  107  Ala.  108,  18  So.  284.    The  445. 

question,  what  effect  on  the   compe-  ""Burton   v.    State,    115  Ala.    i,   22 

tency   of  photographs   taken    from   a  So.  585. 

"rogue's   gallery,"  and  offered   solely  '"Burton  v.    State,    iiS   Ala.    i,   22 

for    the    purpose    of    identifying    the  So.  585. 
accused,  certain  indorsements  stating 


§    53  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  88 

§  53.  "Keal  evidence" — Inspection  by  jurors. — Real  evidence 
means  evidence  which  is  obtained  through  the  sight  by  the  actual 
inspection  of  a  person  or  thing  by  the  judge  or  jury  in  open 
court.^^"  The  subject  of  the  production  in  court  of  articles  to 
furnish  visual  proof  of  their  condition  is  considered  elsewhere  in 
this  volume."^  It  remains  to  consider  only  cases  where  a  cjues- 
tion  of  personal  identity,  resemblance  or  physical  condition  is 
concerned.  The  question  is,  when  may  the  accused  be  compelled 
to  submit  to  an  examination  by  the  jurors?  Inspection  and  com- 
parison of  persons  by  the  jury  have  been  frecjuently  allowed 
where  race  or  color  was  in  issue.  This  is  wholly  unobjectionable 
if  the  accused  shall  consent  thereto,  or  if  he  desires  to  introduce 
the  evidence  in  his  own  behalf.^^*  Whether  the  accused  can  be 
compelled  to  exhibit  a  portion  of  his  body  to  the  jury,  or  be  re- 
quired to  submit  to  a  general  physical  examination  by  them,  is  a 
question  upon  which  a  diversity  of  opinion  exists. 

Under  existing  constitutional  provisions,  an  accused  person 
cannot  be  compelled  to  testify  as  a  witness  against  himself.  Hence 
it  has  been  held  that  the  accused,  not  being  a  witness,  could  not 
be  compelled  to  stand  up  before  a  jury  in  order  that  they  might 
ascertain  from  inspection  to  what  race  he  belonged. ^"^  Whether 
compulsory  inspection  of  the  accused  can  be  considered  to  in- 
fringe the  constitutional  prohibition  that  he  shall  not  be  com- 
pelled to  testify  against  himself  depends  somewhat  on  circum- 
stances. He  waives  it  by  going  on  the  stand  in  his  own  behalf. 
If  he  does  this,  he  must  then  submit  to  a  cross-examination  and 

"°  Gaunt  V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  490-  head    for   the  purpose   of   identifica- 

495,  14  Atl.  600,  citing  cases.  tion     by     prosecutrix.       Turman     v. 

^^  §  47,  ante.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  7,  95  S.  W. 

^^  It  is  error  to  refuse  to  permit  the  533. 
accused  to  place  his  physical  appear-  ^^^  State  v.  Jacobs,  5  Jones  (N. 
ance  in  evidence  if  the  physical  char-  Car.)  259.  In  a  prosecution  against 
acteristics  are  such  as  cannot  be  a  negro  for  living  in  adultery  with 
manufactured  for  the  occasion,  as,  an  alleged  white  woman,  it  was  per- 
for  example,  blindness,  lack  of  mem-  missible  for  the  state  to  make  pro- 
bers, or  his  color,  size  and  height,  fert  of  the  woman  to  the  jury,  in 
Lipes  V.  State,  15  Lea  (Tenn.)  125,  order  that  they  might  determine 
127,  54  Am.  402.  On  a  prosecution  whether  or  not  she  was  a  white 
for  assault  with  intent  to  rape,  it  was  woman.  Jones  v.  State  (Ala.),  47  So. 
not  permissible  for  the  state  to  re-  100. 
quire   accused  to  place  a  cap  on  his 


89  PRIMARY    EVIDEXCE. 


DD 


may  be  compelled  to  exhibit  a  part  of  his  person  for  the  inspection 
of  the  jurors. 

Even  if  he  does  not  go  upon  the  witness  stand  the  majority  of 
the  cases  hold  that  jurors  can  use  their  eyes  as  well  as  their  ears, 
and,  recognizing  the  difficulty  of  drawing  any  line  of  demarka- 
tion,  maintain  the  rule  that  the  accused  may  be  required  to  sub- 
mit his  person  or  any  part  of  it  to  the  jury  for  examination/"'^ 

\\'here  the  accused,  on  refusing  to  obey  an  order  to  arise  in 
order  to  be  identified,  is  forcibly  compelled  to  stand  up,  it  has 
been  held  that  his  constitutional  rights  were  not  violated  nor 
was  he  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself,^"'  upon  the 
theory  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  mere  act  of  arising  or  in 
his  personal  appearance  which  necessarily  furnished  evidence 
against  him  or  connected  him  with  the  crime.  The  right  of  the 
accused  to  be  present  with  the  jury  in  court  creates  a  reciprocal 
duty  that  he  shall  remain  in  their  presence.  The  orderly  conduct 
of  a  criminal  trial  requires  that  the  court  shall  have  full  power  to 
say  what  place  the  prisoner  shall  occupy,  when  he  shall  sit  or 
stand,  and  that  he  shall  remain  within  sight  of  the  court  and  the 
witnesses.  So  it  is  universally  admitted  that  if  the  prisoner  shall 
appear  in  a  mask,  or  veiled,  or  with  his  head  covered,  the  court 
may  order  him  to  uncover  his  features,  for  without  this  exposure 
it  would  not  be  certain  who  the  person  really  was  who  assumed 
to  be  the  prisoner.^^^ 

The  information  obtainable  by  inspection  is  of  considerable 
value  when  the  issue  turns  upon  a  question  of  race  or  color  be- 
cause of  the  marked  racial  characteristics  which  enable  anyone 
of  ordinary  intelligence  to  distinguish  between  persons  of  differ- 
ent races.  But  evidence  of  identity,  race  or  age  thus  obtained 
does  not  possess  much  probative  force  because  of  the  unreliability 
of  the  untrained  faculties  of  human  observation.    This  objection 

^^'  State  V.  Ah  Chuey,  14  Nev.  79,  tion,  unless  he  is  also  a  witness.  Gar- 

89,  33  Am.  53on ;  State  v.  Woodruff,  vin  v.  State,  52  Miss.  207,  209. 

67  N.  Car.  89,  91;  State  v.  Hall,  79  "'People    v.    Gardner,    144    i^'-    Y. 

Iowa  674,  44  N.  W.  914;   Garvin  v.  119,   127-129,  38  N.  E.  1003,  43  Am. 

State,    52    Miss.    207,   209;    State    v.  St.  741,  28  L.   R.  A.  699n ;   State  v. 

Wieners,  66  Mo.  13.     Contra,  Black-  Reasby,  100  Iowa  231,  69  N.  W.  451. 

well  V.   State,  67  Ga.   76,  78,  79,  44  "*Rice   v.   Rice,  47  ^'.  J-   Eq.  559, 

Am.    717.      But    he    cannot    be    ques-  21  .Atl.  286,  li  L.  R.  A.  59m. 
tioned  while    under   visual    examina- 


§  54 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


90 


cannot  be  urged  to  its  admissibility,  if  it  is   relevant,   though 
doubtless  affecting  its  credibility/^" 

§  54.  Compelling  the  accused  to  submit  to  inspection  by  the  jury  or 
to  stand  up  for  identification. — The  accused  cannot  object  if  he  be 
identified  in  open  court  without  being  required  to  stand,  A  direc- 
tion to  a  witness  to  look  about  the  court  and  point  out  a  person 
in  court  whom  he  thinks  committed  the  crime  is  always  proper.^*" 
The  court  or  the  prosecuting  attorney  may  even  point  out  the  ac- 
cused and  ask  a  witness  if  that  is  the  person  who  committed  the 
crime."^ 

If  the  accused  shall  voluntarily  stand  up  and  so  thus  be  identi- 
fied by  a  witness  pointing  him  out,  he  should  not  be  granted  a 
new  trial  upon  the  ground  that  he  has  been  compelled  to  testify 
against  himself. ^"'^  And  it  has  been  held  that  merely  directing 
the  accused  to  stand  up  for  identification  is  not  compelling  him 
to  be  a  witness  against  himself.^*^  The  accused  may  immediately 
on  his  arrest,  if  legally  arrested,  be  subjected  to  a  compulsory 


"*  The  question  arises  can  the  de- 
meanor and  conduct  of  the  prisoner, 
his  manifestation  of  emotion  or  the 
absence  of  it  during  the  trial,  but  not 
while  he  is  on  the  witness  stand,  and 
if  he  is  not  expressly  under  the  in- 
spection of  the  jurors,  be  considered 
by  them  as  a  legitimate  source  of  evi- 
dence? The  rule  that  the  conduct  of 
a  witness  may  be  regarded  in  esti- 
mating his  credibility  has  no  applica- 
tion here,  for  the  credibility  of  the 
accused  is  not  material  if  he  is  not 
a  witness,  and  his  demeanor  then  is 
only  relevant,  so  far  as  it  bears  di- 
rectly upon  the  crime,  by  showing 
that  he  is  conscious  of  his  guilt  or 
the  reverse.  Practically  it  is  impos- 
sible to  prevent  jurors  from  observ- 
ing the  appearance  and  behavior  of 
the  accused  very  closely  while  he  is 
in  court  during  the  trial.  They  will 
naturally  draw  inferences  therefrom 
either    favorable    or    unfavorable    to 


him.  The  information  thus  obtained 
is  evidence,  and,  doubtless,  many  a 
verdict  has  been  determined  thereby. 
While  we  countenance  the  modern 
jury  system  and  insist  upon  the  right 
of  the  prisoner  to  remain  in  court 
and  to  confront  his  accusers,  we  can- 
not close  the  eyes  of  the  jurors.  See 
article  in  15  Cr.  Law  Mag.,  p.  339. 

""State  V.  Johnson,  67  N.  Car.  55. 

'"^  State  V.  Hall,  79  Iowa  674,  44 
N.  W.  914;  State  v.  Ruck,  194  Mo. 
416,  92  S.  W.  706. 

"-Gallaher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 
247,  12  S.  W.  1087,  Rex  V.  Watson, 
2  Stark.  104,  116,  128;  People  v. 
Goldenson,  ^(y  Cal.  328,  347,  19  Pac. 
161. 

""^  People  V.  Goldenson,  ^6  Cal.  328. 
19  Pac.  161 ;  State  v.  Reasby,  100 
Iowa  231,  69  N.  W.  451;  People  v. 
Gardner,  144  N.  Y.  119,  38  N.  E. 
1003,  43  Am.  St.  741,  28  L.  R.  A.  699n. 


91  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    54 

physical  examination  to  ascertain  his  identity/'**  His  clothing 
may  be  removed  so  far  as  is  necessary  to  procure  evidence  of 
identity  and  this  may  be  done  by  a  reasonable  amount  of  force 
if  he  resists/'*^ 

A  witness  may  always  testify  to  the  physical  condition  of  the 
prisoner  when  his  condition  is  relevant.  He  may  state  what 
marks  he  saw  on  the  prisoner's  body,  whether  he  was  physically 
deformed  in  any  way,  and  may  describe  his  general  personal  ap- 
pearance so  far  as  he  observed  it.  And  this  is  the  rule  even  where 
the  clothing  of  the  prisoner  is  forcibly  removed  without  his  con- 
sent by  the  police  officers  who  arrested  him,  or  who  have  him  in 
charge,  and  his  nude  body  is  examined  for  purposes  of  identifica- 
tion. The  witness  may  testify  to  what  the  prisoner  wore  and  to 
what  articles  were  found  concealed  upon  him  when  he  was 
searched.  Permitting  witnesses  to  testify  to  what  they  saw  does 
not  compel  the  accused  to  testify  against  himself,  and  such  a  case 
must  clearly  be  distinguished  from  that  in  which  the  accused  is 
placed  upon  the  witness  stand  and  compelled  to  answer  ques- 
tions."*^ Where  the  condition  of  the  prisoner's  hand  at  the  date 
of  the  crime  is  relevant,  it  has  been  held  that  he  may  be  compelled 
to  exhibit  it,  devoid  of  covering ;  and  a  witness  who  saw  it  thus 
exhibited  at  the  coroner's  inquest  may  testify  to  its  condition, 
though  the  exhibition  was  obtained  by  intimidation."' 

When  a  witness  has  forgotten  the  appearance  of  the  accused, 
he  has  been  allowed  to  testify  that  on  a  former  trial  he  had  iden- 
tified the  person  then  accused,  and  such  evidence,  if  coupled  with 
independent  testimony  that  the  present  accused  is  the  same  person 
who  previously  had  been  identified,  is  sufficient  evidence  of 
identity  to  sustain  a  conviction."* 

"*  O'Brien  v.  State,  125  Ind.  38,  25  ^"  State  v.  Garrett,  71  N.  Car.  85, 

N.  E.  137,  9  L.  R.  A.  323n;  State  v.  87,  17  Am.  i. 

Struble,  71  Iowa  11,  32  N.  W.  i.  '"Ruston  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  432, 

"°  O'Brien  v.  State,  125  Ind.  38,  25  434.      Evidence    of    defendant's    per- 

N.  E.  137,  9  L.  R.  A.  323n.  sonal    appearance    two   years    before 

"*  O'Brien  v.  State,  125  Ind.  38,  45,  trial  and  one  year  subsequent  to  the 

25    N.    E.    T37,    9    L.    R.    A.    323n;  crime  is  relevant.     Commonwealth  v. 

Leeper  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  63,  14  Campbell,    155    Mass.    537,   30   N.   E. 

S.  W.   398;   State  V.   Jones,  153  Mo.  72.     A  police  officer  ought  not  to  be 

457,  55  S.  W.  80;  Fields  v.  State  46  permitted  to  testify  as  an  expert  that 

Fla.  84,  35  So.  185.  he  identified  certain  persons  on  some 


§    55  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  92 

The  language  constituting  an  idcntitication  by  a  third  person 
not  produced  in  court  is  hearsay,  if  coming  from  a  person  to 
whom  it  was  related. '■*"  unless  the  extra-judicial  identification  is  a 
part  of  the  res  gcstcc  of  some  relevant  fact,^'"'  or  unless  it  is  con- 
tained in  a  dying  declaration  which  is  admissible  as  such.  The 
objection  that  it  is  hearsay  cannot  then  be  urged  against  it.^^^ 

Under  this  rule  a  witness  will  not  be  allowed  to  state  that  a 
bystander  pointed  out  a  person  to  him  and  declared  that  he  com- 
mitted the  crime. '■''- 

§  55.  Mode  and  eifect  of  identifying  evidence. — The  identity  of 
the  accused  with  the  person  who  committed  the  crime  is  an  im- 
portant element.  Its  proof  is  always  essential  and  in  some  cases 
difficult.  The  relevancy  of  evidence  of  identification  depends  upon 
the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Generally  speaking,  any  fact  which 
would  convince  or  tend  to  convince  a  person  of  ordinary  judg- 
ment in  carrying  on  his  every-day  affairs,  as  to  the  identity  of  a 
person  will  be  received.  The  evidence  will  be  permitted  to  take 
a  wide  range.^^^  Usually  evidence  of  identity  comes  from  those 
present  when  the  crime  was  committed  and  who  state  that  they 
saw  the  accused  commit  it.  This  is  direct  evidence  of  identifica- 
tion, but  circumstantial  evidence  may  be  received. ^^*  In  an  ex- 
treme case  of  this  sort,  the  crime  having  been  committed  on  a 
Thursday,  the  state  was  permitted  to  prove  that  the  accused  had 
a  superstitious  belief  that  Thursday  was  a  lucky  day  for  him, 

prior  occasions  as  robbers  from  a  de-  People  v.    Gardner,    144   N.    Y.    119, 

scription  of  such  persons  given  him  128,  38  N.  E.   1003,  43  Am.  St.  741, 

by  the  person  alleged  to  have  been  28  L.  R.  A.  699n. 

robbed.     State  v.  Rutledge,  37  Wash.  "'Felder    v.    State.    23    Tex.    App. 

523,  79  Pac.  1 123.  477,  485-488,   5   S.   W.    145.   59   Am. 

"'Hopt  V.   People,   no  U.   S.   574,  777n;  Reddick  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 

581,  582,  28  L.  ed.  262,  4  Sup.  Ct.  202;  App.  463,  34  S.  W.  274,  60  Am.  St. 

People  V.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228,  15  N.  56;    State    v.    Hutchinson,    95    Iowa 

W.  95;  Rose  V.  State,  13  Ohio  C.  C.  566,   64  N.  W.  610:   Davis   v.   State, 

342,  7   Ohio   Dec.   226;  Elsworth   v.  63  Ark.  470,  39  S.  \V.  356. 

State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  t,  104  S.  W.  "'  State  v.   Stebbins,   29  Conn.  463, 

903;   State  V.   Hoover,   134  Iowa   17,  79  Am.  Dec.  223:   State  v.  Witham, 

III  N.  W.  323.  72  Me.  531;   State  v.  Martin,  47   S. 

""Jordan     v.     Commonwealth,     25  Car.  67,  25  S.  E.  113. 

Gratt.  (Va.)  943,  945-  '''Craig  v.  State,  —  Ind.  — .  86  N. 

"*  Sylvester  v.  State,  71  Ala.  17,  26;  E.  397. 


93  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  8    55 

and  that  he  would  be  successful  in  anything  he  attempted  on  that 
^l^y  15  5  gQ  j|.  j^-|^y  |-jg  pi'oved  that  the  accused  had  been  previ- 
ously indicted  under  the  assumed  name  alleged  in  the  indict- 
rnent/^*^  A  witness  may  testify  that  he  identified  the  accused 
after  his  arrest  as  the  person  he  saw  commit  the  crime/"  And  a 
witness  may  testify  that  a  photograph  of  the  accused  taken  at  the 
time  of  his  arrest  and  exhibited  to  the  witness  on  the  stand  re- 
sembled the  person  he  saw  commit  the  crime/^®  A  witness  testi- 
fying to  identity  may  describe  a  person  whom  he  saw  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  crime  at  the  date  of  its  occurrence  and  he  may  testify 
to  the  actual  color,  height,  weight  and  other  appearances  of  this 
person  and  his  description  may  be  compared  with  that  of  the 
accused  by  the  jury.^"^  One  who  is  present  when  the  accused  was 
brought  before  the  complaining  witness  for  identification  cannot 
testify  that  the  complainant  identified  the  accused,  as  that  is  a 
conclusion  of  fact,  but  the  witness  may  testify  to  whatever  the 
complainant  said  to  the  accused  in  his  presence  or  he  may  testify 
that  the  complainant  was  silent  when  he  was  asked  if  the  accused 
was  his  assailant/"*^ 

The  identity  of  the  name  of  the  accused  as  given  by  him  in 
court  with  the  name  of  the  person  mentioned  in  the  indictment, 
raises  some  presumption  of  identity  of  person."^  The  names  by 
which  the  defendant  has  been  known  may  be  proved  to  show  his 
identity  and  also  to  prove  that  he  had  given  a  fictitious  name, 
which  under  certain  circumstances  is  suspicious/'^"  It  is  proper 
in  order  that  the  jury  may  determine  the  extent  of  the  knowledge 
of  a  witness  testifying  to  the  identity  of  the  accused  to  permit  him 
to  be  asked  how  long  he  has  known  the  accused  and  how  long 
and  how  often  he  had  visited  him/®^  And  where  the  evidence  of 
identity  is  circumstantial,   it  may  be  permitted  to  take  a  wide 

"^  Davis  V.    State,  51    Neb.   30T,  70  ^™  Andrews     v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

N.  W.  984-  App.),  83  S.  W.  188. 

^°*  Morse  v.   Commonwealth    (Ky.),  ^""Turman    v.    State,    50    Tex.    Cr. 

Ill  S.  W.  714,  33  Ky.  L.  831,  894.  App.  7,  95  S.  W.  533- 

'"Yarbrough  v.  State,  105  Ala.  43,  ^^  Nelson  v.   State,  151    Ala.  2,  43 

16  So.  758;  Beavers  v.  State,  103  Ala.  So.  966. 

36,  15  So.  616.  ^""Commonwealth    v.    Johnson,    199 

"*  People  V.    Carey,   125   Midi.   535,  Mass.  55,  85  N.  E.  188. 

84  N.  W.  1087.  Sec  photographs,  .  "'Way  v.  State  (Ala.),  46  So.  273. 
supra,  §§  50,  51. 


§    55  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  94 

range.  Any  facts,  which  on  their  face,  appear  to  relate  to  the 
accused  and  which  are  of  a  descriptive  character  which  corre- 
spond in  their  details  with  a  description  of  the  accused,  shown 
by  other  evidence,  are  admitted.  Thus,  a  description  of  the  ac- 
cused, giving  his  name,  age,  nationality,  place  of  birth  and  port 
of  arrival  contained  in  a  report  made  by  an  officer  of  a  vessel  to 
the  officers  having  charge  of  immigration  matters  was  received, 
where,  from  the  evidence  it  appears  that  the  accused  had  been  an 
immigrant  and  the  descriptive  statement  tallied  in  its  details  with 
other  facts  brought  out  in  the  evidence.^*'*  If  identity  is  the  sole 
fact  at  issue  and  it  is  proved  that  a  crime  had  been  committed  by 
some  one,  the  jury  should  be  expressly  instructed  to  accjuit  unless 
they  believe  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  accused  has  been 
identified  as  the  party  who  committed  the  crime,^®^ 

Whether  a  witness  in  identifying  the  accused  as  a  person  who 
committed  the  crime  is  expressing  an  opinion  or  stating  a  fact 
within  his  own  knowledge  is  a  question  upon  which  a  diversity 
of  opinion  exists.  Some  of  the  authorities  regard  identity  as  a 
fact  and  require  the  witness  to  identify  the  prisoner  solely  as  a 
matter  of  his  own  knowledge  and  on  personal  recollection. 

So  the  witness  may  be  asked,  "Do  you  know  A.  ?"  and,  if  he 
does,  he  may  then  state  whether  the  accused  is  the  individual  men- 
tioned. He  cannot  be  permitted  to  state  that  he  "thinks"  the  ac- 
cused is  A.,  or  give  his  impression  that  a  man  wdiom  he  saw  near 
the  scene  of  the  crime  is  identical  with  the  accused.  He  should 
state  facts,  leaving  the  inference  of  identity  with  the  jury."" 

According  to  another  view  a  witness,  in  identifying  the  accused 
is  expressing  an  opinion  or  impression,  founded  on  his  observa- 
tion of  numerous  details,  as  his  physical  appearance,  dress  or 
other  personal  and  peculiar  incidents.  He  is  accordingly  permitted 
to  frame  his  answer  to  a  question  touching  the  identity  of  the 
prisoner,  in  the  form  of  an  expression  of  opinion  or  belief  or 
state  it  as  his  impression  mainly  because  the  facts  constituting 
similarity,  or  the  reverse,  in  personal  appearance  are  so  numerous 
and  peculiar  that  they  cannot  be  specifically  narrated  so  as  to 

^"Mclnerney  v.  United  States,  143  ^'^  People  v.  Williams,  29  Hun   (N. 

Fed.  729,  74  C.  C.  A.  655.  Y.)   520,  523,  524;  People  v.  Wilson, 

^"  Petty  V.   State,  83   Miss.  260,  35  3  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.)   199,  206;   State 

So.  213.  V.  Hyatt,  179  Mo.  344,  78  S.  W.  601. 


95  PRIMARY    EVIDENCE.  §    56 

bring  out  clearly  their  proper  force  and  significance  before  the 
jury.^''"  Hence  a  witness,  after  describing  a  person  seen  by  him, 
may  state  that,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  the  prisoner,  or  thai  he  re- 
sembled the  prisoner,  under  the  rule  permitting  a  non-expert  wit- 
ness to  give  his  opinion  where  the  jury  would  be  unable,  other- 
wise, to  form  an  intelligent  conception  of  identity/^® 

The  testimony  of  a  witness  that  he  believed  he  recognized  the 
accused  as  the  one  he  saw  taking  away  stolen  property,  and  that 
he  saw  and  recognized  other  men  who  were  with  him,  has  been 
admitted/''^ 

Indeed,  even  if  it  be  conceded  that  identity  is  a  fact,  the  answer 
should  hardly  be  rejected  because  the  witness  is  not  positive  of 
the  identity  of  the  accused  beyond  all  doubt ;  or,  because,  through 
excessive  caution,  he  qualifies  his  answers  by  such  expressions  as 
"I  think,"  or  "I  believe."  Witnesses  cannot  be  required  to  state 
all  facts  with  equal  positiveness.^^'' 

Pointing  out  a  person  by  a  witness  to  the  jury  without  naming 
him  is  a  sufficient  identification  if  his  name  is  shown  by  inde- 
pendent evidence, ^'^^  nor  will  all  the  testimony  of  a  witness  be  ex- 
punged merely  because  he  failed  to  identify  the  accused  when  the 
latter  would  not  arise  for  identification. 

§  56.  Identification  of  the  voice. — Evidence  of  identity  consist- 
ing of  the  recognition  of  the  voice  of  the  accused  by  a  witness 
who  is  familiar  with  it  has  been  received.  The  witness  may  state 
that  the  accused  was  present  on  a  certain  occasion,  and  made  a 
statement,  and  may  then  add  that  he  knows  it  was  the  accused 
because  he  recognized  his  voice. ^^^ 

'"  See  Underbill  on  Evid.,  §  186.  61    Cal.    540;   People   v.    Stanley,    loi 

"*  White   V.   Commonwealth,  4   Ky.  Mich.  93,   59  N.    W.  498;    People  v. 

L.  373;  Commonwealth  v.  Sturtivant,  Burt,  170  N.  Y.  560,  62  N.  E.  1099; 

117  Mass.  122.  10  Am.  40in;  State  v.  Paulson  v.  State,  118  Wis.  89,  94  N. 

Powers,  130  Mo.  475,  32  S.  W.  984;  W.  771. 

State  V.  Cushenberry,  157  Mo.  168,  56  ^"^  State   v.   Welch,   33   Ore.   33.    54 

S.    W.   737;    State   V.   Lytle,    117   N.  Pac.  213. 

Car.    799,    23    S.    E.    476;    Jordan    v.  ^"'' People  v.  Rolf e,  61  Cal.  540,  543; 

State,  50  Fla.  94,  39   So.   155;   Coff-  Underbill  on  Evid.,  §  t86. 

man  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  478,  "^Commonwealth  v.   Whitman.   121 

103  S.  W.   IT28;   State  V.  James,  194  Mass.  361,  362. 

Mo.  268,  92  S.  W.  679  (as  to  identi-  "'People  v.   Willctt,  92  N.   Y.  29, 

fication  of  things)  ;  People  v.  Rolfe,  32,  33;  State  v.  Kepper,  65  Iowa  745, 


§    57  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  96 

So  the  witness  may  describe  the  tone  of  voice  used,  whether 
angry  or  otherwise,  in  a  conversation  overheard  by  him  between 
the  accused  and  the  victim  of  a  homicide.^" 

This  rule  is  particularly  applicable  in  the  case  of  nocturnal 
crimes,  where  it  is  physically  imj)0ssible  for  the  witness  to  have 
seen  the  accused,  though  he  may  have  been  in  close  proximity  to 
him.  The  same  rule  would  doubtless  apply  in  the  case  of  a  blind 
witness.'"*  The  accused  will  not,  unless  he  shall  go  upon  the  wit- 
ness stand,  be  allowed  to  put  his  own  voice  in  evidence  in  order 
to  show  his  natural  voice  by  speaking  aloud  in  court.  If  per- 
mitted to  speak,  not  being  under  oath  at  the  time,  he  may  simu- 
late. The  jury  will  not  hear  his  natural  and  ordinary  voice,  but 
one  which  is  manufactured  for  the  occasion. 

It  has  also  been  held  that  it  is  not  material  that  the  witness  who 
had  a  conversation  over  the  telephone  with  the  accused,  did  not 
know  at  the  time  of  the  conversation  who  was  talking.  The  con- 
versation over  the  telephone  may  be  proved  if  on  subsequent  ac- 
quaintance with  the  accused,  the  witness  can  identify  the  voice 
which  he  heard  over  the  telephone  as  that  of  the  accused.'"^ 

The  accused  may  prove  to  contradict  a  witness  who  states  he 
recognized  the  voice  of  the  accused  on  the  occasion  of  the  crime, 
that  another  person  present  had  a  similar  voice  and  that  this  per- 
son's voice  had  on  other  occasions  been  mistaken  for  that  of  the 
accused.''*' 

749,  23  X.  W.  304;   Givens  v.   State,  nications   sent  and  received  by   tele- 

35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  563,  34  S.  W.  626;  phone.     Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  85,   and 

Davis   V.    State,    15    Tex.    App.    594,  People  v.  Ward,  3  N.  Y.  Cr.  483,  511, 

598 ;  Stepp  V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  where   a    witness    was    permitted    to 

349,  20  S.  W.  753;  Fussell  V.  State,  state   a   conversation   with   the   pris- 

93  Ga.  450,  21   S.   E.  97;  Waggoner  oner  bad  over  a  telephone.    The  wit- 

v.   State   (Tex.   Cr.  App.),  98  S.   W.  ness  testified  he  had  talked  with  him 

255 ;  Mack  v.  State,  54  Fla.  55,  44  So.  hvmdreds  of  times  before  over  it,  knew 

706,    13  L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)    373n.     A  bis   voice  well   and  recognized  it   on 

witness  may  be  allowed  to  state  that  this    occasion.      State    v.    Usher,    136 

he  heard  a  person  say  something  and  Iowa  606,  11 1  N.  W.  811. 

that    it    was    bis   opinion   it   was    the  ™  People  v.  Strollo,  191   N.  Y.  42, 

voice  of  the  accused.    Way  v.    State  83     N.     E.     573;     Commomvealth    v. 

(Ala.),  46  So.  273.  Scott,  123  Mass.  222,  234,  25  Am.  81. 

'■'Campos    V.    State,    50    Tex.    Cr.  "^  Mahoney     v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

App.  289,  97  S.  W.  100.  App.),  98  S.  W.  854. 

^~*  See  also  admissions  and  commu- 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


57.  Statutory  competency  of  the  ac-     §  67. 

cused. 

58.  The  accused  is  not  compellable        68. 

to    testify    against    himself — 
His   credibility. 
58a.  Evidence   obtained   by    searches 
legal  and  illegal. 

59.  ]\Iode  of  examining  the  accused.        69. 

60.  Cross-examination  —  Incrimina-        70. 

ting  and  disgracing  questions. 

61.  Examination    as    to    prior    im- 

prisonment, etc.  71' 

62.  Statutory    limitation    of    cross- 

examination   to   relevant  mat-        72. 
ters. 

63.  ]\Iode  of  cross-examination.  TZ- 

64.  Privileged     communications     on 

the  cross-examination.  74. 

65.  Conclusiveness  of  answers — Im- 

peachment by  other  witnesses. 

66.  The    bad    character    of    the    ac-        75. 

cused — When     admissible     to 
impeach  him. 


Commenting  on  the  failure  of 
the  accused  to  testify. 

Exclusion  or  withdrawal  of 
comments  on  failure  to  testi- 
fy— Failure  to  call  other  wit- 
nesses, or  to  testify  to  incrim- 
inating facts. 

Definition  of  accomplice. 

Accomplices  when  jointly  in- 
dicted— Witnesses  for  each 
other. 

Accomplices  as  witnesses  for 
the  state. 

Immunity  of  accomplice  when 
testifying  for  the  state. 

Credibility  and  corroboration 
of  accomplices. 

Extent  of  corroboration  re- 
quired— It  must  be  of  material 
facts. 

The  nature  of  the  crime  as  a 
test  of  corroboration — Suffi- 
ciency of  corroboration. 


§  57.  Statutory  competency  of  the  accused. — Because  of  the  com- 
mon-law rule  rendering-  parties  to  the  record  incompetent  as  wit- 
nesses, the  defendant,  in  a  criminal  trial,  was  incapable  at  common 
law  of  testifying  in  his  own  behalf.  It  was  considered  certain  that 
his  fear  of  punishment,  whether  he  were  conscious  of  guilt,  or  of 
innocence,  would  cause  him  to  testify  untruthfully;  and,  to  avoid 
this,  his  testimony  was  wholly  excluded. 

At  the  present  time,  in  most  states,  the  accused  may,  as  a  matter 
of  statutory  right,  if  he  so  elect,  testify  for  himself.  These  statutes 
do  not,  of  course,  violate  a  constitutional  provision  that  a  prisoner 
shall  not  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself.^   But  as  they  are 

*  State  V.  Bartlett,  55  Me.  200,  217. 

7 — UXDERHILL    CrIM.    Ev.  (Q/) 


^^  57 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


98 


derogatory  of  the  common  law,  they  should  receive  a  strict  con- 
struction, though  not  such  a  construction  as  will  nullify  the  legis- 
lative intention,  and  deprive  the  accused  of  his  right  to  speak. 

These  enactments  leave  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  testify 
wholly  optional  with  the  accused,  and  many  of  them  in  terms 
provide  that  his  failure  or  his  neglect  to  exercise  it,  cannot  be  used 
as  an  argument  against  him." 

In  the  federal  courts  the  competency  of  witnesses  is  regulated 
by  a  statute  which  provides  that  the  laws  of  the  state  within  whose 
limits  the  federal  court  is  located  shall  be  its  rules  of  decision  as 
to  competency  in  trials  at  common  law,  in  ecjuity  and  admiralty. 
As  the  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  is  purely  statu- 
tory, the  competency  of  witnesses  in  criminal  trials  in  those  courts 
is  not  regulated  by  the  statute  of  the  state  in  which  the  court  is 
located,  but  by  the  common  law  of  the  state,  modified  by  the  fed- 
eral statutes  defining  crimes  and  regulating  criminal  proceedings 
and  the  competency  of  witnesses.^ 


^  See  post,  §  58.  Note  on  compelling 
accused  to  cover  or  uncover  his  face 
or  head,  94  Am.  St.  339;  note  on  com- 
pelling accused  to  try  on  a  shoe,  94 
Am.  St.  344;  note  on  compellingi  ac- 
cused to  exhibit  marks  on  his  per- 
son, 94  Am.  St.  340;  note  on  com- 
pelling accused  to  make  footprints, 
94  Am.  St.  343 ;  note  on  compelling 
accused  to  give  specimen  of  his  hand- 
writing, 94  Am.  St.  344,  345 ;  note  on 
compelling  accused  to  utter  certain 
words  or  sounds  to  show  his  voice, 
94  Am.  St.  341 ;  note  on  right  of 
party  to  testify  as  to  his  intent  or 
motive,  21  Am.  St.  314;  note  on 
cross-examination  of  defendant  in 
criminal  prosecution,  38  Am.  St.  895- 
897. 

^United  States  v.  Hawthorn,  i  Dill. 
(U.  S.)  422,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15332;  Lo- 
gan v.  United  States,  144  U.  S.  263, 
36  L.  ed.  429,  12  Sup.  Ct.  617.  This 
matter  is  now  regulated  by  the  act  of 
March  16,  1878,  to  be  found  in  20  U. 
S.   Stat.   L.  30,  p.  312,  ch.   27-     The 


statutory  provisions  of  the  various 
states  dififer  in  detail,  but  their  cen- 
tral idea  is  to  give  the  accused  the 
fullest  opportunity  to  testify,  while 
permitting  no  inference  of  his  guilt 
to  arise  from  his  total  silence.  The 
statute  of  Michigan  which  reads: 
"No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a 
witness  in  any  criminal  case,  or  pro- 
ceeding, by  reason  of  his  interest  in 
the  event  of  the  same  being  a  party, 
or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his 
having  been  convicted  of  any  crime ; 
but  such  interest  or  conviction  may 
be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affect- 
ing his  credibility;  provided,  how- 
ever, that  the  defendant  in  any  crimi- 
nal case  shall  only  at  his  own  request 
be  deemed  a  competent  witness,  and 
his  neglect  to  testify  shall  not  create 
any  presumption  against  him,  nor 
shall  the  court  permit  any  reference 
or  comment  to  be  made  upon  such 
neglect,"  may  be  taken  as  an  exam- 
ple. 


99  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    58 

§  58.  The  accused  is  not  compellable  to  testify  against  himself — 
His  credibility. — Though  the  accused  is  now  a  competent  witness 
for  himself,  he  cannot,  under  existing  constitutional  provisions, 
federal  and  state,  ''be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a  wit- 
ness against  himself."*  These  provisions  should  be  applied  in  a 
broad  and  liberal  spirit,  in  order  to  secure  to  the  citizen  that  im- 
munity from  every  species  of  self-accusation  implied  in  the  lan- 
guage in  which  they  are  expressed.^  They  are  meant  to  protect 
the  accused  not  only  from  being  compelled  to  answer  questions 
calling  for  an  express  confession  of  guilt,  but  from  those  calling 
for  collateral  circumstances  also.*' 

Most  of  the  statutes  conferring  competency  upon  the  accused 
expressly  provide  that  he  can  be  called  as  a  witness  at  his  own  re- 
quest only.  The  purpose  of  these  statutes  is  to  confer  a  privilege 
upon  him,  not  to  impose  an  obligation  upon  the  state  to  call  him 
as  its  witness.  Hence,  such  a  statute  does  not  entitled  him  to  de- 
mand that  he  shall  be  called  as  a  witness  for  the  prosecution,  even 
to  prove  his  own  handwriting.'^ 

If  the  accused  goes  on  the  witness  stand  in  his  own  behalf  the 
credibility  of  his  evidence  is  for  the  jury  alone.® 

*U.  S.  Const,  Fifth  Amend.   These  State  v.  Slamon,  73  Vt.  212,  50  Atl. 

provisions  have  been  held   applicable  1097,  87  Am.  St.  711. 

to    accused    persons     and    witnesses  ^  Commonwealth  v.  Pratt,  137  Mass. 

summoned   to   appear  before  the  in-  98,  107. 

terstate  commerce  commission,  Coun-  *  Miller  v.  State,  15  Fla.  577;  State 

selman  v.   Hitchcock,   142  U.   S.   547,  v.  Napper,  141  Mo.  401,  42  S.  W.  957; 

562,  35  L.  ed.  1 1 10,  12  Sup.  Ct.  19s,  to  Kirkham  v.   People,  170  111.  9,  48  N. 

legislative      investigations,      Emery's  E.  465 ;  Wilson  v.   State,  69  Ga.  224. 

Case,   107  Mass.   172,   179,  9  Am.  22,  The    court    may    instruct    the    jury 

and  to  proceedings  to  punish  for  con-  that  they  are  not  to  accept  the  evi- 

tempt,  In  re  McKenna,  47  Kan.  738,  dence  of  the  accused  blindly,  or  any 

28  Pac.  1078.  further    than    it    is    corroborated    by 

"People  V.   Rcardon,    109  N.  Y.   S.  other     evidence,'  but    may     consider 

504.  whether   it   is   true,   and   is   given    in 

°  Emery's  Case,  107  Mass.  172,  179,  good  faith,  or  merely  to  prevent  a 
9  Am.  22 ;  Rogers  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  conviction.  State  v.  Mecum,  95  Iowa 
691,  62  S.  E.  96;  Pitts  v.  State,  140  433,  64  N.  W.  286.  But  a  charge  re- 
Ala.  70,  37  So.  loi ;  Eaker  v.  State,  4  minding  the  jury  that  the  accused  is 
Ga.  App.  649,  62  S.  E.  99 ;  Tooke  v.  the  only  surviving  witness  of  a  homi- 
State,  4  Ga.  App.  495,  61  S.  E.  917;  cide,  for  which  he  is  on  trial,  while  at 
Cooper  V.  State,  86  Ala.  610,  6  So.  the  same  time  emphasizing  his  inter- 
ne, II  Am.   St.  84,  4  L.  R.  A.  766;  est  in  the  outcome  of  the  trial  and 


58 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


lOO 


But  the  court  must  (without,  however,  giving  too  much  prom- 
inence to  this  fact)  instruct  them  that  they  should,"  or  that  they 
may,^"  consider  the  facts  that  he  is  interested  in  the  outcome  of 
the  trial,  and  is  testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  in  determining  his 
credibility. 

The  jury  should  regard,  among  other  things,  the  inherent  prob- 
ability or  improbability  of  his  statements,  his  intelligence  or  want 
of  intelligence,  his  opportunities  for  knowledge  or  business  meth- 
ods, and  to  what  extent  he  has  been  corroborated  by  other  evi- 
dence." 

Speaking  generally  the  jury  must  determine  the  credibility  of 


pointing  out  the  force  and  cogency  of 
the  incriminating  circumstances,  is 
very  objectionable.  Hickory  v.  United 
States,  i6o  U.  S.  408,  40  L.  ed.  474,  16 
Sup.  Ct.  327.  A  charge  that  while  the 
law  says  defendant  is  a  competent 
witness  and  may  testify  in  his  own 
behalf,  and  the  jury  should  not  ca- 
priciously disregard  it,  this  does  not 
mean  that  they  should  believe  it,  but 
onh^  that  they  should  consider  it,  and 
ascertain  to  the  best  of  their  judg- 
ment whether  it  is  true,  and,  if  true, 
they  should  act  on  it  as  on  truth  from 
any  other  source,  and,  if  they  should 
not  believe  it,  they  should  reject  it, 
they  being  the  sole  judges  of  the 
truth  of  the  evidence,  is  not  errone- 
ous. Harrison  v.  State,  144  Ala.  20, 
40  So.  568. 

®  State  V.  Renfrow,  in  Mo.  589, 
598,  20  S.  W".  299;  People  V.  Cronin, 
34  Cal.  191,  203;  People  v.  Hitch- 
cock, 104  Cal.  482,  38  Pac.  198;  Peo- 
ple v.  Crowley,  102  N.  Y.  234,  238,  6 
N.  E.  384 ;  Anderson  v.  State,  104  Ind. 
467,  472,  4  N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  711; 
Wilkins  v.  State,  98  Ala.  i,  13  So. 
312;  Commonwealth  v.  Harlow,  no 
Mass.  411;  State  v.  Moelchen,  53 
Iowa  310,  316,  317,  5  N.  W.  186; 
State  V.  Slingerland,  19  Xev.  135, 
141,   7   Pac.   280;    State   v.    Melvern, 


32  Wash.  7.  72  Pac.  489;  Burkett  v. 
State,  154  Ala.  19,  45  So.  682 ;  Wright 
v.  State,  148  Ala.  596,  42  So.  745; 
Sykes  v.  State,  151  Ala.  80,  44  So.  398; 
Thomas  v.  State  (Ala.),  47  So. 
257;  Davis  V.  State,  152  Ala.  25,  44 
So.  561;  Greer  v.  State  (Ala.),  47  So. 
300. 

"State  V.  Maguire,  113  Mo.  670,  21 
S.  W.  212;  State  V.  Bryant,  134  Mo. 
246,  35  S.  W.  597 ;  State  v.  Ihrig,  106 
Mo.  267,  270,  17  S.  W.  300 ;  Panton  v. 
People,  114  111.  505,  507,  2  N.  E.  411; 
Chambers  v.  People,  105  111.  409,  413, 
414;  Bird  V.  State,  107  Ind.  154,  156, 
8  N.  E.  14 ;  Hartford  v.  State,  96  Ind. 
461,  469,  49  Am.  18s;  Smith  v.  State, 
108  Ala.  I,  19  So.  306,  54  Am.  St.  140; 
People  v.  Resh,  107  Mich.  251,  65  N. 
W.  99;  State  V.  Metcalf,  17  Mont. 
417,  43  Pac.  182;  State  v.  Holloway, 
117  N.  Car.  730,  23  S.  E.  168;  New- 
port V.  State,  140  Ind.  299,  39  N.  E. 
926 ;  Wrye  v.  State,  95  Ga.  466,  22  S. 
E.  273 ;  State  v.  Tarter,  26  Ore.  38, 
S7  Pac.  53 :  Hamilton  v.  State,  62  Ark. 
543,  36  S.  W.  1054.  The  cases  are  not 
harmonious  upon  the  proper  language 
of  the  instruction.  Its  form  is  usu- 
ally prescribed  by  statute. 

"United  States  v.  Kenney,  90  Fed. 
257- 


lOI  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    58a 

the  testimony  of  the  accused  under  the  same  rules  and  principles 
as  with  any  witness/" 

So  an  instruction  that  the  credibility  and  weight  of  defendant's 
testimony  were  for  the  jury,  and  that  they  might  consider  his 
manner  of  testifying,  the  reasonableness  of  his  account  of  the 
transaction,  and  his  interest  in  the  case,  and  should  consider  his 
testimony  and  determine  whether  it  was  true  or  not,  was  not  open 
to  the  objection  of  telling  the  jury  that  they  were  not  bound  to 
treat  defendant's  testimony  the  same  as  that  of  other  witnesses.^^ 

The  jury  should  not  permit  the  fact  that  the  accused,  while  tes- 
tifying, is  burdened  with  an  imputation  of  crime  to  influence  them 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  will  disregard  his  evidence,  if  they 
believe  it  is  true.  They  should  remember  that,  though  accused, 
he  is  presumed  to  be  innocent,  until  they  are  convinced  he  is 
guilty,  and  their  verdict  must  be  based  upon  the  whole  evidence, 
including  his  own.^*  Hence,  the  jury  may  not,  at  pleasure  and 
without  regard  to  the  elements  of  credibility  which  the  evidence 
of  the  accused  may  possess,  reject  it  because  of  his  interest,  or 
because  they  are  not  satisfied  that  it  has  been  corroborated. ^*'' 
They  must  always  fairly  consider  his  evidence  together  with  all 
the  evidence  in  the  case. 

§  58a.  Evidence  obtained  by  searches  legal  and  illegal. — By  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  constitutions  of  the  sev- 

^  Ferguson   v.    State,   72  Xeb.    350,  Sullivan  v.  People,  114  111.  24,  27,  28 

100  X.  \V.  800.  X.  E.  381 ;  State  v.  Sanders,  106  IMo. 

"Waller  v.  People,  209  111.  284,  70  188,  17  S.  W.  223.     See  Underbill  on 

X.  E.  68r.    In  a  prosecution  for  em-  Evid.,  §  234. 

bezzlement,  a  charge  specifically  point-  "^  Owens  v.  State,  63  Miss.  450, 452  ; 

ing  out  accused,  and  calling  attention  State  v.  Melvern,  32  Wash.  7,  72  Pac. 

to  his  testimony,  and  stating  that,  if  489.     It  is  error  to  instruct  the  jury 

he  had  willfully  and  corruptly  testi-  that   they  must    regard  the   evidence 

fied  falsely  to  any  fact  material  to  the  of  the  accused  with  great  caution  be- 

issue,  the  jury  had  the  right  to  en-  cause  of  his  interest,  State  v.  Hollo- 

tirely  disregard  his  testimony,  was  not  way,  117  X^.  Car.  730,  23  S.  E.   168; 

error.     IMcCracken  v.  People,  209  111.  State  v.  White,  10  Wash.  611,  39  Pac. 

215,  70  X.  E.  749.  160,  41   Pac.  442;   or  that  the  jurors 

"Bird  V.  State,  107  Tnd.  154,  156,  8  should  bear  in  mind  the  tendency  on 

N.  E.   14;  Randall  v.  State,  132  Ind.  the  part  of  the  guilty  accused  person 

539.  32   X.   E.   305 ;    State  v.   Taylor,  to  fabricate  a  story  which  may  bring 

134  Mo.  109,  35   S.   W.  92;    State  v.  about   their  acquittal.     State  v.  Hoy, 

Wells,   III    Mo.   533,  20  S.   W.   232;  83  Minn.  286,  86  X.  W.  98. 


§    58a  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  102 

eral  states,  It  has  been  provided  that  no  one  shall  be  compelled  on 
a  criminal  trial,  to  give  evidence  against  himself  and  that  the 
rights  of  the  people  against  unreasonable  searches,  shall  not  be 
violated.  The  mere  fact  that  papers  are  produced  by  the  execution 
of  a  search-warrant  is  no  objection  to  their  admission  in  evidence. 
In  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  accused  was  not  compelled  to  incriminate  himself,  where  his 
private  papers  in  the  possession  of  the  prosecution  were  intro- 
duced against  him.  This  is  the  rule  particularly  where  the  wit- 
ness who  testifies  says  nothing  concerning  the  papers  produced. ^^ 

And  it  has  been  often  held  in  the  state  courts  that  the  above 
constitutional  provisions  are  not  violated  merely  by  the  reception 
in  evidence  of  papers  or  articles  of  personal  property  taken  from 
the  person  or  premises  of  the  accused  while  he  is  under  arrest, 
and  it  does  not  appear  in  these  cases,  that  it  is  material  whether 
the  search  is  made  by  virtue  of  a  legal  search  w^arrant  or  not.^'' 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  articles  obtained  by 
search  of  the  house  of  the  accused  under  an  illegal  search  warrant 
is  not  admissible  under  constitutional  provisions.^'  A  distinction 
is  made  between  articles  or  documents  procured  by  a  search  of 
the  person  of  the  accused  after  he  has  been  arrested  and  the  same 
sort  of  evidence  procured  by  an  illegal  search  of  the  premises  oc- 
cupied by  the  accused. 

In  Georgia  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  evidence  either  di- 
rect or  indirect  which  has  been  secured  by  the  prosecution  by  an 
unlawful  search,  either  of  the  house  or  of  the  person  of  the  ac- 
cused, as,  for  example,  where  the  accused  has  been  illegally  ar- 
rested and  searched  by  police  officers  should  be  excluded."^ 

^^Adams  v.  New  York,  192  U.  S.  158  N.  Y.  532,  53  N.  E.  527,  afif'g  z^ 

585'  48  L.   ed.  575,  24  Sup.   Ct.  372,  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  284,  55  N.  Y.   S. 

aff'g  People  v.  Adams,  176  N.  Y.  351,  276;  Drake  v.  State,  75  Ga.  413,  415; 

68  N.  E.  62,6,  98  Am.  St.  675n,  62,  L.  State  v.  Ah  Chuey,  14  Nev.  79,  83,  33 

R.  A.  406.                               •  Am.  530n;  Roszczyniala  v.  State,  125 

^*  Lawrence  V.  State,  103  Md.  17,63  Wis.   414,   104  N.   W.    113;    State  v. 

Atl.  96;  Commonwealth  v.  Carbin,  143  Baker,  Z3  W.  Va.  319,  10  S.  E.  639. 

Mass.    124,   8    N.    E.    896;    State   v.  "State  v.  Sheridan,  121  Iowa  164, 

Sharpless,  212   Mo.    176,   iii    S.    W.  96  N.  W.  730. 

69 ;  State  v.  Strait,  94  Minn.  384,  102  ^''a  Croy  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  456,  61 

N.  W.  913;  State  v.  Jeffries,  210  Mo.  S.    E.    84S;    Hughes   v.    State,    2   Ga. 

302,  109  S,  W.  614;  People  V.  Coombs,  App.  29,  58  S.  E.  390;  Gainer  v.  State, 


I03 


THE   ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


58a 


Elsewhere  it  has  been  held  to  be  the  general  rule  that  the  courts 
will  not  inquire  at  all  into  the  mode  by  which  the  evidence  is  ob- 
tained if  it  is  relevant  and  otherwise  admissible  and  that  the  il- 
legal seizure  of  papers  does  not  in  itself  constitute  any  obstacle  to 
their  admissibility  if  they  are  relevant/^ 

So  a  pistol  found  on  the  person  of  the  accused/^^  or  documents 
taken  from  him  at  the  time  of  his  arrest/^  or  articles  of  personal 
property  which  are  relevant  taken  from  the  premises  of  the  ac- 
cused"" have  been  received  in  evidence. 

The  production  in  court  of  vouchers  taken  from  the  possession 
of  the  accused  by  a  witness  who  produces  them  under  subpoena, 
does  not  violate  the  constitutional  right  of  the  accused  to  be  ex- 
empt from  giving  evidence  which  would  incriminate  him.^°^  So 
documents  consisting  of  the  letters  of  a  private  character  which 
were  taken  from  among  the  personal  papers  of  the  accused  by 
his  employes  or  other  persons  without  his  knowledge  or  consent 
and  by  them  voluntarily  turned  over  to  the  district  attorney  are 
receivable  in  evidence  if  relevant."^  And  in  New  York,  it  has 
been  expressly  held  that  the  police  may  search  the  person  of  one 


2  Ga.  App.  126,  58  S.  E.  295;  Ham- 
mock V.  State,  I  Ga.  App.  126,  58  S. 
E.  66;  Sherman  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App. 
148,  58  S.  E.  393;  Davis  v.  State,  4 
Ga.  App.  318,  61  S.  E.  404;  Sherman 
V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  686,  58  S.  E. 
1122.     (Concealed  weapons.) 

''  State  V.  Flynn.  36  N.  H.  64 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Tibbetts,  157  Mass.  519, 
32  N.  E.  910 ;  State  v.  Griswold,  67 
Conn.  290,  34  Atl.  1046,  2^2)  L.  R.  A. 
227 ;  Siebert  v.  People,  143  111.  571, 
582,  32  N.  E.  431 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Smith,  166  Mass.  370,  44  N.  E.  503. 
Cf.  People  V.  Gardner,  144  N.  Y. 
119,  128,  38  X.  E.  1003,  43  Am.  St. 
741,  28  L.  R.  A.  699n;  Younger  v. 
State,  80  Xeb.  201,  114  N.  W.  170; 
People  V.  Strollo,  191  N.  Y.  42,  83  N. 
E.  573;  Imboden  v.  People,  40  Colo. 
142,  90  Pac.  608;  Hardesty  v.  United 
States,  164  Fed.  420;  People  v.  Ad- 
ams, 85  App.  Div.  ex.  Y.)  390.  %T,  X. 
Y.  S.  481 ;  Rogers  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App, 


691,  62  S.  E.  96;  Tooke  v.  State,  4  Ga. 
App.  495,  61  S.  E.  917 ;  Tajdor  v.  State 
(Ga.  App.  1908),  62  S.  E.  1048;  Jones 
V.  State  (Ga.  App.),  62  S.  E.  482; 
Eaker  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  649,  62 
S.  E.  99. 

"a  Springer  v.  State,  121  Ga.  155, 
48  S.  E.  907. 

''State  V.  Royce,  38  Wash,  in,  80 
Pac.  268;  Waggoner  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  98  S.  W.  255. 

'"State  V.  Schmidt,  71  Kan.  862,  80 
Pac.  948  (bottles  of  liquor  found  in 
defendant's  possession). 

^^  People  V.  Coombs,  158  X.  Y.  532, 
53  X.  E.  527. 

^  State  V.  Griswold,  67  Conn.  290, 
34  Atl.  1046,  33  L.  R.  A.  227 ;  State  v. 
Van  Tassel,  103  Iowa  6,  72  X.  W. 
497;  State  V.  Atkinson,  40  S.  Car. 
363,  t8  S.  E.  1021,  42  Am.  St.  877; 
Imboden  v.  People,  40  Colo.  142,  90 
Pac.  608. 


§  59  CRIMINAL  EVIDEXCE.  IO4 

who  is  lawfully  under  arrest.  They  may  also  search  the  room  in 
which  he  was  arrested  and  any  other  place  to  which  they  can  se- 
cure lawful  access.  Writings  or  articles  which  are  procured  by 
this  search  are  not  incompetent,--  because  of  the  manner  in  which 
they  w^ere  obtained. 

§  59.  Mode  of  examining  the  accused. — As  the  accused  is  a  com- 
petent witness,  he  has  a  constitutional  right  to  demand  that  he 
shall,  when  testifying,  be  questioned  by  his  own  counsel  in  the 
same  manner  as  other  witnesses.-"  The  court  cannot,  therefore, 
silence  his  counsel  and  compel  the  accused  to  give  a  general 
account  of  the  whole  transaction,  nor  is  his  counsel  precluded 
from  objecting  to  irrelevant  questions  put  to  him  on  his  cross- 
examination."*  He  must  be  permitted  on  his  direct  examination 
to  explain  his  conduct  and  declarations  as  he  has  testified  to  them, 
or  as  they  have  been  described  by  other  witnesses.  He  must  be 
permitted  fully  to  unfold  and  explain  his  actions,  and  to  state  the 
motives  which  he  claims  prompted  them.  It  is,  within  certain 
limits,  relevant  for  him  to  state  what  intention  was  present  in 
his  mind  when  he  participated  in  a  transaction  which  is  in  issue.-'"* 

And  the  jury  are  the  sole  judges  to  determine  whether  the  de- 
fendant's statement  is  false.    They  should  not  ignore  his  state- 

^^  Smith   V.   Jerome,   47   Misc.    (N.  ing,  by  what  thej^  may  have  said  in 

Y.)  22,  93  N.  Y.  S.  202.  regard  to  any  material  fact.    If  par- 

"  Clark  V.    State,  50  Ind.  514,  515;  ties  are  to  be  kept  in  harness  and  not 

Fletcher  v.  State,  49  Ind.  124,  132,  19  allowed  to   explain  their  actions  and 

Am.  67Z-  words  when   they  admit  of  explana- 

"  People  V.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571,  tion  and  when  it  is  needed,  but  half 

573,  28  Am.  183 ;  Hanoff  v.  State,  37  the  evil  which  was  felt  under  the  old 

Ohio  St.  178,  180,  41  Am.  496.  rule    has   been    removed."     People    v. 

''In  People  v.  Quick,  51  Mich.  547,  Farrell,  31  Cal.  576,  584.  Cf.  Ross  v. 
18  N.  W.  375,  it  was  held  error  to  ex-  State,  116  Ind.  495,  497,  19  N.  E.  451. 
elude  the  question  "Why  did  you  do  "When  an  act  forbidden  by  law  is  in- 
that?"  State  v.  Montgomery,  65  tentionally  done,  the  intent  to  do  the 
Iowa  483,  22  N.  W.  639.  "The  object  act  is  the  criminal  intent,  which  im- 
of  the  recent  changes  was  not  merely  parts  to  it  the  character  of  an  of- 
to  enable  parties  to  disclose  facts  fense,  and  no  one  who  violates  the 
wholly  within  their  knowledge,  but  to  law,  which  he  is  conclusively  pre- 
do  what  had  heretofore  been  impos-  sumed  to  know,  can  be  heard  to  say 
sible,  to  explain  the  motives  with  that  he  had  no  criminal  intent  in  do- 
which  they  were  performed,  and  to  Jng  the  forbidden  act.  A  party  can- 
explain,  if  need  be,  what  they  meant,  not  excuse  himself  for  an  act  inten- 
or  intended  to  be  understood  as  mean-  tionally  done,  and  which  is  a  violation 


I05  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITXESS.  §    6o 

ment  of  intention,  unless  they  believe  it  wholly  false;  and  an  in- 
struction which  requires  the  jury  to  do  so  is  error.  They  must 
consider  it  in  connection  with  all  the  evidence.  The  inference 
which  they  draw  from  it  may  be  strong  enough  to  overcome  any 
conclusion  of  guilty  intention  which  they  may  draw  from  his 
other  acts  or  declarations.-^ 

'  One  of  several  defendants  jointly  tried  who  becomes  a  witness 
for  himself  is  a  witness  for  all  purposes ;  and  his  testimony  while 
a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  is  in  no  way  incompetent  merely  be- 
cause it  may  be  injurious  or  beneficial  to  a  co-defendant.  The 
fact  that,  as  usually  happens,  he  tries  to  exonerate  himself  by 
casting  the  guilt  upon  his  associates,  while  it  may  bear  upon  his 
credibility,  is  otherwise  immaterial."^ 

§  60.    Cross-examination — Incriminating  and  disgracing  questions. 

— The  accused,  when  testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  waives  many 
of  the  peculiar  constitutional  privileges  which  belong  to  him  as 
one  accused  of  crime.  It  is  usually  provided  by  statute  that  he 
may  be  examined  and  cross-examined  "as  any  other  witness,"  and 
where  such  is  the  case,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  claim  any 
privilege  while  he  is  a  witness  that  is  not  enjoyed  by  other  wit- 
nesses.-'^ In  other  words,  the  rule  then  is  that  he  cannot  claim  as 
a  witness  the  privileges  which  belong  to  him  solely  as  the  ac- 

of  the  law,  by  saying  he  did  not  so  88  Pac.  418;  State  v.  Palmer,  88  Mo. 
intend.  But  where  acts  are  equivocal  568;  Dunbar  v.  Armstrong,  115  111. 
and  become  criminal  only  by  reason  App.  549;  Filkins  v.  People,  69  X.  Y. 
of  the  intent  with  which  they  are  done,  loi,  25  Am.  143;  State  v.  Tough,  12 
both  must  unite  to  constitute  the  of-  N.  Dak.  425,  96  X.  W.  1025;  White 
fense,  and  both  facts  must  be  proved,  v.  State,  53  Ind.  595 ;  Lynch  v.  Peo- 
In  such  cases,  unless  the  intent  is  pie,  137  111.  App.  444;  Ryan  v.  Terri- 
proved,  the  offense  is  not  proved.  As  tory  (Ariz.),  100  Pac.  770;  People  v. 
the  criminal  intent  may  be  and  usu-  Quick,  51  ]\Iich.  547,  18  N.  W.  375. 
ally  is  inferred  from  the  declarations  "^Commonwealth  v.  Thomas  (Ky.), 
and  conduct  of  the  accused,  he  is  per-  104  S.  W.  326,  31  Kj-.  L.  899. 
mitted  to  disavow  the  imputed  pur-  "'  Richards  v.  State,  91  Tcnn.  723, 
pose  and  repel  the  presumption."  725,  20  S.  W.  533,  30  Am.  St.  907. 
Smith,  C.  J.,  in  State  v.  King,  86  N.  "*  Since  a  witness  can  not  be  re- 
Car.  603 ;  Jackson  v.  Commonwealth,  quired  to  give  evidence  against  him- 
96  Va.  107,  30  S.  E.  452;  Wohlford  self,  or  to  testify  to  facts  showing  his 
V.  People,  148  111.  296,  36  N.  E.  107;  commission  of  a  public  offense,  ac- 
Crawford  v.  United  States,  30  App.  cuscd  can  not  be  required  to  disclose 
D.  C.  I ;  State  v.  Barber,  13  Idaho  65,  the    commission    of    public    offenses 


8  6o 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


1 06 


cused.-"  He  cannot  complain  if  considerable  latitude  is  allowed 
on  his  cross-examination,  and,  generally,  he  may  be  asked  on  his 
cross-examination  the  same  questions  as  any  witness. 

In  states  where  the  cross-examination  of  the  accused  is  not  by 
statute  expressly  limited  to  matters  brought  out  on  his  direct  ex- 
amination, he  may  be  cross-examined,  not  only  upon  matters 
strictly  relevant  to  the  issue,  but  upon  those  which  are  collateral 
and  apparently  irrelevant,  and  which  are  calculated  only  to  test 
the  credibility  and  weight  of  his  testimony.^'' 


other  than  that  for  which  he  is  on 
trial.  Welch  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
108  S.  W.  863,  33  Ky.  L.  57- 
Note  on  right  to  cross-examine  ac- 
cused who  has  taken  witness  stand  as 
to  confession  which  is  not  admissible 
in  evidence,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  604. 

^  State  V.  Simmons  (Kan.),  98 
Pac.  277;  People  v.  Owen  (Mich.), 
118  N.  W.  590,  15  Det.  Leg.  N.  881. 

'"Maloy  V.  State,  52  Fla.  loi,  41  So. 
791 ;  Stalcup  V.  State,  146  Ind.  270,  45 
N.  E.  334;  People  v.  Foo,  112  Cal. 
17,  44  Pac.  453;  State  v.  Harvey,  131 
Mo.  339,  32  S.  W.  1 1 10;  People  v. 
Un  Dong,  106  Cal.  83,  39  Pac.  12; 
People  V.  Roemer,  114  Cal.  51,  45  Pac. 
1003;  Frank  v.  State,  94  Wis.  211,  68 
N.  W.  657;  Commonwealth  v.  Nich- 
ols, 114  Mass.  285,  287,  19  Am.  346n; 
State  V.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90,  96,  12 
Pac.  406;  Newman  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  88  S.  W.  1089,  28  Ky.  L.  81; 
Commonwealth  v.  Lannan,  13  Allen 
(Mass.)  563;  Thomas  v.  State,  103 
Ind.  419,  438,  2  N.  E.  808;  People  v. 
Reinhart,  39  Cal.  449,  450;  Hanoflf  v. 
State,  37  Ohio  St.  178,  180,  i8r,  41 
Am.  496;  Okey,  J.,  dissenting,  pp. 
184-187;  People  V.  Tice,  131  N.  Y. 
651,  657,  30  N.  E.  494,  IS  L.  R.  A. 
669n ;  Connors  v.  People,  50  N.  Y. 
240,  242 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Morgan, 
107  Mass.  199,  204;  State  v.  Witham, 
72  Me.  531 ;  State  v.  Ober,  52  N.  H. 


459,  462,  13  Am.  88;  State  v.  Cohn, 
9  Nev.  179,  189;  Keyes  v.  State,  122 
Ind.  527,  531,  23  N.  E.  1097;  Spies 
V.  People,  122  111.  I,  12  N.  E.  865,  17 
N.  E.  898;  State  v.  Wentworth,  65 
Me.  234,  240,  20  Am.  688;  Boyle  v. 
State,  105  Ind.  469,  474,  5  N.  E.  203, 
55  Am.  218:  Mitchell  v.  State,  94  Ala. 
68,  73,  10  So.  518;  McKeone  v.  Peo- 
ple, 6  Colo.  346,  348;  State  v.  Nelson, 
98  Mo.  414,  II  S.  W.  997;  Yanke  v. 
State,  SI  Wis.  464,  468,  8  N.  W.  276; 
People  V.  Mayes,  113  Cal.  618,  45  Pac. 
860;  People  V.  Conroy,  153  N.  Y.  ^74, 
47  N.  E.  258.  Commenting  on  this 
rule  the  court  says,  in  People  v. 
Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  288,  290,  32  Am.  302. 
"He  goes  upon  the  stand  under  a 
cloud.  He  stands  charged  with  a 
crime,  and  is  under  the  strongest  pos- 
sible temptation  to  give  evidence  fa- 
vorable to  himself.  His  evidence  is 
therefore  looked  upon  with  suspicion 
and  distrust,  and  if,  in  addition,  he 
may  be  submitted  to  cross-examina- 
tion upon  every  incident  of  his  life, 
and  every  charge  of  vice  or  crime 
which  may  have  been  made  against 
him,  and  which  has  no  bearing  upon 
the  charge  for  which  he  is  being  tried, 
he  may  be  so  prejudiced  in  the  minds 
of  the  jury  as  frequently  to  induce 
them  to  convict  on  insufficient  evi- 
dence." See,  also.  State  v.  Teasdale, 
120  Mo.  App.  692,  97  S.  W.  995 ;  Ross 


107 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


6l 


And  the  accused  who  testifies  vohmtarily  in  his  own  behalf  is 
presumed  to  have  done  so  with  knowledge  that  he  accepts  the 
usual  responsibilities  of  every  witness  and  that  anything  he  may 
say  of  an  incriminating  character  may  be  subsequently  used 
against  him.^^ 

The  testimony  of  the  accused  voluntarily  given  at  a  coroner's 
inquest  may  be  subsequently  employed  against  him  to  contradict 
his  testimony  at  the  trial/ ^^ 

So  where  the  accused  having  been  committed  as  an  insane  per- 
son immediately  after  the  crime  voluntarily  testified  in  his  own 
behalf  on  a  hearing  to  secure  his  discharge  as  a  sane  person  the 
reception  in  evidence  on  his  subsequent  trial  of  his  testimony 
thus  given  is  proper,  though  under  the  constitution  he  is  protected 
from  criminating  himself.^" 

§  61.  Examination  as  to  prior  imprisonment,  etc. — He  may  be 
questioned  as  to  specific  facts  calculated  to  discredit  him.  Thus 
his  previous  arrest,^^  or  indictment,^*  or  his  conviction  of  a  felony 
maybe  shown. ^^ 


V.  State,  139  Ala.  144,  36  So.  718; 
State  V.  Heffernan,  28  R.  I.  20,  65  Atl. 
284;  State  V.  Zdanowicz,  69  N.  J.  L. 
619,  55  Atl.  743;  Clinton  v.  State,  53 
Fla.  98,  43  So.  312;  Justice  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  46  S.  W.  499, 
20  K3\  L.  386;  Williams  v.  State,  66 
Ark.  264,  50  S.  W.  517;  Southworth 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  532,  109  S. 
W.  133. 

""  Collins  V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
441,  46  S.  W.  933- 

**»  Jones  V.  State,  120  Ala.  303,  25 
So.  204 ;  Steele  v.  State,  76  Miss.  387, 
24  So.  910.  (Testimony  before  ex- 
amining magistrate.) 

^^  People  V.  Willard,  150  Cal.  543,  89 
Pac.  124. 

^  State  V.  Murphy,  45  La.  Ann.  958, 
13  So.  229;  People  V.  Foote,  93  Mich. 
38,  40,  52  N.  W.  1036;  Hanoff  v. 
State,  37  Ohio  St.  178,  t8o,  41  Am. 
496;  State  V.  Bacon,  13  Ore.  143,  147, 
9  Pac.  393,  57  Am.  8n;  People  v. 
Ogle,  104  N.  Y.  511,  514,  II  N.  E.  53; 


Brandon  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  265. 
Some  cases  hold  that  the  question, 
"Have  you  ever  been,  or  how  many 
times  have  you  been,  arrested?"  can 
not  be  asked,  as  an  arrest,  involving 
only  an  unproved  charge  of  crime,  of 
which  innocence  is  presumed,  throws 
no  light  upon  his  veracity.  People  v. 
Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571,  573,  28  Am. 
183;  People  v.  Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  288, 
293,  32  Am.  302;  Ryan  v.  People,  79 
N.  Y.  593,  601 ;  State  v.  Huff,  11  Nev. 
17,  26-28;  People  V.  Hamblin,  68  Cal. 
loi,  102,  8  Pac.  687;  People  v.  Buck- 
ley, 143  Cal.  375,  77  Pac.  169. 

^  People  V.  Clark,  102  N.  Y.  735,  8 
N.  E.  38;  Wroe  v.  State,  20  Ohio  St. 
460;  People  V.  Gale,  50  Mich.  237,  15 
N.  W.  99;  Bruce  v.  State,  39  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  26,  44  S.  W.  852;  Sexton  v. 
State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  497,  88  S.  W. 
348.  Contra,  People  v.  Cascone,  185 
N.  Y.  317,  78  N.  E.  287;  Smith  v. 
State,  79  Ala.  21. 

■^N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  832;  Peo- 


g  6i 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


1 08 


A  statute  which  provides  that  where  the  accused  pleads  not 
guilty  and  admits  a  prior  conviction  such  connection  must  not  be 
referred  to  on  the  trial  does  not  prevent  the  accused  from  being 
accused  on  cross-examination  if  he  has  been  convicted  of  a 
felony.^*' 

The  accused  may  be  asked  on  cross-examination  if  he  had  not 
heard  that  one  of  his  witnesses  and  associates  was  an  ex-convict.^^ 
So,  a  previous  imprisonment  in  a  penitentiary,^'*  or  house  of  cor- 
rection,^^   his    prior    contradictory    statements,*^    disorderlv    ac- 


plc  V.  Johnson,  57  Cal.  571,  574;  State 
V.  Minor,  117  Mo.  302,  306,  22  S.  W. 
1085;  State  V.  McGuire,  15  R.  I.  23, 
22  Atl.  iri8;  State  v.  Farmer,  84  Me. 
436,  440,  24  Atl.  985;  Prior  V.  State, 
99  Ala.  196,  13  So.  681 ;  People  v.  Ar- 
nold, 116  Cal.  682,  48  Pac.  803;  Farm- 
er V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  91 
S.  W.  682,  28  Ky.  L.  1 168;  State  v. 
Heusack,  189  Mo.  295,  88  S.  W.  21; 
State  V.  Plomondon,  75  Kan.  853,  90 
Pac.  254;  People  v.  Cascone,  185  N. 
Y.  317,  78  N.  E.  287  (holding  that 
mere  indictment  is  irrelevant)  ;  State 
V.  Clark,  117  La.  920,  42  So.  425. 
(Need  not  be  a  conviction  of  similar 
crime.)  A  prior  conviction  of  an  in- 
famous crime  does  not  deprive  the 
accused  of  the  absolute  and  arbitrary 
statutory  right  to  testify  in  his  own 
behalf.  Williams  v.  State,  28  Tex. 
App.  301,  303,  12  S.  W.  1 103;  New- 
man V.  People,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  630. 
It  is  error  to  permit  a  question  to  ac- 
cused calling  for  an  admission  that 
he  has  been  convicted  in  another 
prosecution  of  a  similar  crime  where 
it  appears  he  had  been  granted  a  new 
trial  and  the  incriminating  evidence 
is  weak.  Thompson  v.  United  States, 
30  App.  D.  C.  352;  People  v.  DeCamp, 
146  Mich.  533,  109  N.  W.  1047,  13 
Det.  Leg.  N,  862;  People  v.  Soeder, 


150  Cal.  12,  87  Pac.  1016:  State  v. 
Babcock,  25  R.  L  224,  55  Atl.  685; 
State  v.  Benjamin  (R.  L),  71  Atl.  65. 

'°  People  V.  Oliver  (Cal.),  95  Pac. 
172. 

^^  Long  v.  State,  72  Ark.  427,  81  S. 
W.  387. 

^' Turpin  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
74  S.  W.  734,  25  Ky.  L.  90;  Davis 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  629,  108  S. 
W.  d^T,  People  v.  Courtney,  31  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  199.  The  testimony  of  the 
jailer  and  of  persons  who  saw  him  in 
jail  and  the  commitment  are  usually 
competent  and  sufficient  proof  of  his 
identity  with  the  man  who  was  in 
prison.  State  v.  Howard,  30  Mont. 
518,  T7  Pac.  SO. 

^"Commonwealth  v.  Bonner,  97 
Mass.  587,  589. 

"State  V.  Boylcs,  80  S.  Car.  352, 
60  S.  E.  233 ;  State  v.  Hill,  45  Wash. 
694,  89  Pac.  160;  State  v.  Helm,  97 
Iowa  378,  66  N.  W.  751;  Hicks  v. 
State,  99  Ala.  169,  13  So.  375 :  Com- 
monwealth V.  Tolliver,  119  iNIass.  312, 
315;  May  V.  State,  ZZ  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
74,  24  S.  W.  910:  State  V.  Avery,  113 
Mo.  475,  21  S.  W.  193;  Huffman  v. 
State,  28  Tex.  App.  174,  178,  12  S.  W. 
588 ;  Chambers  v.  People,  103  111.  409 ; 
Angling  v.  State,  137  Ala.  17,  34  So. 
846. 


109 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


6i 


tioiis,"  or  the  commission  of  offenses  similar  to  that  charged,*'  as 
for  example,  where  they  are  contemporaneous  and  a  part  of  the  res 
gcsfcv/^  attempts  to  bribe  witnesses,**  or  simulation  of  insanity,*^ 
may  all  be  brought  out  by  questions  put  to  him  on  his  cross-ex- 
amination, to  show  what  credit  his  evidence  should  receive.*" 

The  accused  may  also  properly  be  asked  upon  his  cross-exami- 
nation questions  relating  to  and  intending  to  show  his  intoxica- 


*"  People  V.  McCormick,  135  N.  Y. 
663,  664,  32  N.  E.  26;  Bow  V.  People, 
160  111.  438,  43  N.  E.  593;  Common- 
wealth V.  Barry,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  216; 
Lahue  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  159, 
loi  S.  W.  1008. 

*^- State  V.  Vandiver,  149  Mo.  502, 
SO  S.  W.  892;  State  v.  Barrett,  117  La. 
1086,  42  So.  513;  People  V.  Casey,  72 
N.  Y.  393,  399;  People  v.  Noelke,  94 
N.  Y.  137,  144;  46  Am.  128;  People 
V.  Hooghkerk,  96  N.  Y.  149,  164;  Fas- 
sinow  V.  State,  89  Ind.  235,  237.  Con- 
tra,  Welch  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
108  S.  W.  863,  33  Ky.  L.  51;  Ball 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  99  S.  W. 
326,  30  Ky.  L.  600. 

■"Pate  V.  State,  150  Ala.  10,  43  So. 

343- 

"^  Bates  V.  Holladay,  31  Mo.  App. 
162,  169;  State  V.  Downs,  91  Mo.  19, 
3  S.  W.  219;  Carothers  v.  State,  75 
Ark.  574,  88  S.  W.  585 ;  State  v.  Deal, 
—  Ore.  — ,  98  Pac.  165. 

^^  State  V.  Pritchett,  106  N.  Car. 
667,  IT  S.  E.  357. 

*°  Newman  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
88  S.  W.  1089,  28  Ky.  L.  81;  Ben- 
ton V.  State,  78  Ark.  284,  94  S.  W. 
688 ;  Tally  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
474,  88  S.  W.  339;  Charba  v.  State, 
48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  316,  87  S.  W.  829; 
People  V.  Manasse,  153  Cal.  to,  94 
Pac.  92;  State  v.  Mills,  79  S.  Car. 
187,  60  S.  E.  664.  See  also,  Bell  v. 
State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  276,  277,  20 


S.  W.  549 ;  McDaniel  v.  State,  97  Ala. 
T4,  12  So.  24T ;  State  v.  Farmer,  84 
Me.  436,  440,  24  Atl.  985;  State  v. 
Walsh,  44  La.  Ann.  IT22,  11  So.  811; 
Parker  v.  State,  T35  Ind.  534,  35  N. 
E.  T79,  2z  L.  R.  A.  859;  United  States 
V.  Brown,  40  Fed.  457;  Common- 
wealth V.  Lannan,  155  Mass.  168,  29 
N.  E.  467;  State  v.  Bulla,  89  Mo. 
595,  I  S.  W.  764;  People  V.  Eckert,  2 
N.  Y.  Cr.  470,  48T,  and  other  cases 
cited;  Underhill  on  Evid.,  §  346a. 
"While  occupying  the  witness  stand 
he  was  entitled  to  the  same  rights 
and  privileges,  and  was  subject  to  the 
same  rules  of  evidence,  as  any  other 
witness.  The  fact  that  he  was  also 
a  party  accused  of  a  crime  clothed 
him  with  no  greater  rights  or  privi- 
leges as  a  witness,  nor  subjected  him 
to  any  different  rule  of  cross-exam- 
ination. The  same  latitude  and  the 
same  limitations  apply  to  his  cross- 
examination  as  if  he  had  not  been  a 
party."  Hanoff  v.  State,  2,7  Ohio  St. 
T78,  180,  41  Am.  496;  People  v.  Oliver 
(Cal.),  95  Pac.  T72.  The  accused 
may  be  asked  on  cross-examination 
if  he  had  not  tried  to  evade  arrest, 
Ryan  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  593;  and  if 
he  had  not  deserted  his  home  and 
family  and  become  a  tramp.  Yankc 
V.  State,  51  Wis.  464,  8  N.  W.  276. 
Compare  State  v.  Barnett,  203  Mo. 
640,  T02  S.  W.  506,  as  to  bad  reputa- 
tion. 


§  6l  CRIMINAL  EVIDEXCE.  IIO 

tion  before  he  committed  the  crime  charged  against  him,*^  or 
whether  he  had  or  had  not  at  one  time  been  criminally  intimate 
with  a  woman,  whose  name  is  stated ;  and  whether  he  had  not 
threatened  to  kill  any  one  who  visited  her.*^  He  may  be  ques- 
tioned on  cross-examination  exhaustively  and  in  detail  as  to  his 
conduct  prior  to  the  crime'*"  as  to  his  residence  and  business  occu- 
pation before  or  at  the  date  of  the  crime,^°  and  in  particular  as  to 
his  movements  or  whereabouts  after  the  commission  of  the  crime 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  he  had  fled  or  attempted  to  flee  to 
escape  arrest/'''^  Questions  on  cross-examination  directed  to  bring 
out  his  immoral  conduct  in  his  past  life,°'  his  lack  of  good  faith, ^^ 
and  his  movements  or  particular  acts  if  impeaching  are  generally 
competent.^*  So  the  prosecution  may  cross-examine  the  accused, 
who  was  an  attorney,  with  the  object  of  proving  that  he  has  been 
disbarred,  to  impeach  his  credit  as  a  witness,  but  the  prosecution 
will  not  be  permitted  to  bring  out  the  details  of  the  professional 
or  other  misconduct  of  the  accused  which  resulted  in  his  disbar- 
ment.^^ The  accused  may  generally  be  cross-examined  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  he  made  statements  out  of  court  which 
contradict  what  he  testifies  to  on  his  direct  examination.^^  And 
where  the  testimony  of  the  accused  on  his  direct  examination,  dif- 
fers materially  from  prior  statements  made  by  him  to  the  prose- 
cuting attorney,  or  to  other  persons,  it  is  proper  to  permit  him  to 
be  asked  whether  he  has  not  altered  his  testimony  for  the  purpose 
of  making  it  correspond  with  or  corroborate  the  testimony  of  his 
own  witnesses. ^^  If  the  accused,  on  the  direct  examination  volun- 
tarily testifies  as  to  his  conduct,  he  may,  on  cross-examination,  be 

*''  State  V.  Rowell,  75  S.  Car.  494,  56  ^^  State  v.  Stukes,  73  S.  Car.  386,  53 

S.  E.  23.  S.  E.  643. 

*®Carr  v.  State,  81  Ark.  589,  99  S.  "Thompson  v.  United  States,  75  C. 

W.  831.  C.  A.  172,   144  Fed.  14;   Linnehan  v. 

**  Barden  v.   State,    145  Ala.    i,  40  State,  120  Ala.  293,  25  So.  6. 

So.  948.  °'  People  V.  Dorthy,  156  N.  Y.  237, 

""  Viberg  v.  State,  138  Ala.  100,  35  50  N.  E.  800. 

So.  53,  100  Am.  St.  22.  '^Morris  v.   State,   146  Ala.  66,  41 

^  State  V.  Cornelius,  118  La.  146,  42  So.  274. 

So.  754 ;  Untreinor  v.  State,  146  Ala.  "  People  v.  Weber,  149  Cal.  325,  86 

26,  41  So.  285.  Pac.  671. 

^"Dungan    v.   State,   135   Wis.    151, 
115  N.  W.  350. 


Ill  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    62 

questioned  as  to  the  details  of  tliis  conduct  and  the  evidence  on 
these  details  will  be  permitted  to  take  a  wide  range. ^'-  The  rule 
that  the  conviction  of  the  accused  may  be  shown  on  his  cross-ex- 
amination as  impeachment  does  not  permit  the  prosecution  to 
bring  out  on  cross-examination,  the  evidence  or  details  of  the 
criminal  offense  of  which  he  was  convicted.  The  admission  of  this 
evidence  is  error  justifying  a  reversal.^^ 

§  62.    Statutory  limitation  of  cross-examination  to  relevant  matters. 

— If,  however,  the  cjuestion  calls  for  an  answer,  which,  though 
ostensibly  invoked  solely  to  aid  the  jury  in  estimating  the  credi- 
bility of  the  accused,  may,  by  showing  him  guilty  of  other  similar 
crimes,  indirectly  lead  them  to  infer  that  he  is  guilty  of  the  crime 
charged,  the  court  may  interfere  in  its  discretion.  To  compel  the 
accused  to  answer  indiscriminately  all  questions  respecting  past 
criminal  transactions,  which,  though  similar,  are  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  that  for  which  he  is  on  trial,  would  not  only  be  treating 
him  more  harshly  than  other  witnesses,  but  would  be  a  serious  in- 
fringement of  his  constitutional  privileges.  Hence,  even  in  those 
states  where  no  statute  exists  confining  the  cross-examination 
within  the  limits  of  the  direct,  it  is  generally  held  that  any  dis- 
gracing question  which  is  put  to  the  accused  upon  his  cross-ex- 
amination must  be  one  that  will  affect  his  credibility  as  a  witness 
alone,  either  directly  or  by  its  tendency  to  show  a  bad  moral 
character.®'' 

In  some  states  it  is  expressly  provided  by  statute  that  the  prose- 
cution shall  be  allowed  to  cross-examine  the  accused  only  upon 
matters  to  which  he  has  already  testified,  or  which  are  legitimately 
connected  therewith,  or  which  were  inquired  of  or  referred  to  on 
the  direct  examination.*'^    These  statutes  should  be  strictly  con- 

°*  State  V.   Zdanowicz,  69  N.  J.   L.  Mo.    339,    32    S.    W.    11 10;    State   v. 

619,  55  Atl.  743.  Chamberlain,  89  Mo.  129,  133,  i  S.  W. 

■^  State  V.  Mount,  'jj)  N.  J.  L.  582,  145 ;   State  v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17,  41 

64  Atl.  124,  aff'g  72  N.  J.  L.  365,  6r  Pac.  998,  52  Am.  St.  655.  31  L-  R-  A. 

Atl.  259.  294;  State  V.  Underwood,  44  La.  Ann. 

""People  V.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.   571,  852,  854,  tt  So.  277;  Gale  v.  People, 

573,  28  Am.  183.  26    Mich.    T57,    160,    t6i  ;    Elliott    v. 

"State   V.    Saunders,    14   Ore.    300,  State,  34  Neb.  48,  50.  5t  N.  W.  3^5; 

309,  12  Pac.  441 ;  State  v.  Harvey,  131  State  v.  Turner,  no  Mo.  196,  2or,  19 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


112 


strued  with  the  view  of  protecting  the  rights  of  the  accused  and 
giving  him  a  fair  and  impartial  trial.  Hence,  in  those  states  it  is 
reversible  error  for  the  court  to  permit  the  cross-examination  to 
extend  beyond  the  limits  of  the  direct,  both  as  regards  questions 
directly  relevant  and  questions  affecting  the  credibility  of  the  ac- 
cused only.  And  this  is  the  rule  where  the  court  has  the  discretion 
to  compel  other  witnesses  to  answer  disgracing  questions  on  their 
cross-examination. "- 

§  63.  Mode  of  cross-examination. — The  cross-examination  of  the 
accused  ought  to  be  carried  on  in  a  regular  and  orderly  manner. 
He  cannot  be  interrogated  by  the  prosecution  until  he  is  properly 
turned  over  for  cross-examination  at  the  close  of  his  direct  ex- 
amination. But  where  the  defendant,  on  taking  his  seat  after  the 
direct  examination,  declares  to  the  jury  that  he  is  a  peaceable, 
law  abiding  citizen,  and  that  he  never  had  any  idea  of  committing 
a  crime,  it  is  not  reversible  error  to  permit  the  district  attorney  to 
ask  him  it  he  had  had  trouble  with  many  other  persons.*'^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  court  may  permit  the  accused  to  be  recalled  for 
further  cross-examination  after  his  cross-examination  has  been 
completed.*'* 


S.  W.  645;  State  V.  Cook,  132  Mo. 
App.  167,  112  S.  W.  710;  People  v. 
Morton,  139  Cal.  719,  73  Pac.  609. 

""People  V.  iManasse,  153  Cal.  10, 
94  Pac.  92 ;  State  v.  Saunders,  14  Ore. 
300,  316,  12  Pac.  441;  State  v.  Mc- 
Laughlin, 76  Mo.  320,  321 ;  People  v. 
McGungill,  41  Cal.  429,  436;  State  v. 
Patterson,  88  Mo.  88,  91,  57  Am.  374. 
"The  humane  provision  of  the  law 
that  a  party  shall  not  be  compelled  to 
be  a  witness  against  himself  remains 
in  full  force,  and  is  as  effectually  vio- 
lated when  the  cross-examination  of 
the  accused  is  extended  beyond  the 
facts  to  which  he  has  testified  as  it 
would  be  if  he  were  to  be  called  and 
made  to  testify  at  the  instance  of  the 
state."  State  v.  Lurch,  12  Ore.  99, 
103,  6  Pac.  408. 


°^  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
18  S.  W.  852,  13  Ky.  L.  860. 

^  State  V.  Home,  9  Kan.  119,  128; 
State  V.  Johnson,  72  Iowa  393,  396, 
397,  34  N.  W.  177;  State  v.  Cohn,  9 
Nev.  179;  Commonwealth  v.  Eisen- 
hower, 181  Pa.  St.  470,  2)7  Atl.  521,. 
59  Am.  St.  670;  State  v.  Favre,  51 
La.  Ann.  434,  25  So.  93.  Where  the 
accused  has  denied  on  the  direct  ex- 
amination that  he  wrote  an  instru- 
ment, he  may  be  compelled  on  cross- 
examination  to  write  the  words  on 
paper.  United  States  v.  Mullaney,  32 
Fed.  370,  371.  The  accused  is  not 
compelled  to  furnish  evidence  against 
himself  if  he  does  this  voluntarily. 
Sprouse  v.  Commonwealth,  81  Va. 
374- 


113  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §§    64,    65 

§  64.    Privileged  communications  on  the  cross-examination. — The 

accused  does  not,  merely  by  going  upon  the  witness  stand,  waive 
the  protection  which  the  statute  affords  his  confidential  statements 
made  to  an  attorney,  physician  or  priest.  He  cannot,  therefore, 
be  made  to  divulge  communications  made  by  him  to  his  counsel, 
or  advice  received  during  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  attorney 
and  client. '^^  The  privilege  is  for  the  protection  of  the  client  and 
may  be  waived  by  him,*^"  but  the  waiver  must  be  express  and  un- 
equivocal.*''^ 

It  cannot  be  waived  by  third  persons  because  they  are  in  privity 
with  him.'^*  The  fact  that  the  accused  denies  upon  the  witness 
stand  that  he  made  a  certain  statement  to  his  attorney  will  not 
authorize  proof  of  it  by  the  latter's  testimony.*'^ 

§  65.    Conclusiveness  of  answers — Impeachment  by  other  witnesses. 

— The  rule  forbidding  the  contradiction  of  the  answers  to  irrele- 
vant questions  on  cross-examination  applies  to  the  answers  of  the 
accused.'"  So  where  on  cross-examination  the  accused  testifies 
to  the  commission  of  other  crimes  by  way  of  impeachment  the 
state  cannot  contradict  it.^^  This  rule,  however,  does  not  preclude 
the  contradiction  of  answers  to  relevant  questions  put  on  the  cross- 
examination,  merely  because  contradiction  tends  indirectly  to  im- 
peach the  credibility  of  the  witness.  The  accused  may  be  asked 
if  he  did  not,  at  a  particular  time  and  place,  give  a  contradictory 
account  of  relevant  facts.  If  he  denies  he  has  done  so,  he  may  be 
contradicted  by  the  evidence  of  some  one  who  heard  him,  though 

*^  Duttenhofer  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  12  S.  E.  657.     "The  true  view  seems 

91.  95,  32  Am.  St.  362.  to  be  that  communications  which  the 

^  The  privilege  is  waived  if  the  wit-  lawyer  is  precluded    from    disclosing 

ness  voluntarily  discloses,  during  the  the  client  can  not  be  compelled  to  dis- 

direct  examination,  the   facts   in  the  cover."    State  v.  White,  19  Kan.  445, 

communication.       State    v.    Tall,    43  447,  27  Am.  I37n. 

Minn.  273,  276,  45  X.  W.  449;  People  '"Marx  v.  People,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

v.  Gallagher,  75  Mich.  512,  515,  42  X.  618,  619;  People  v.  Ware,  29  Hun  (X. 

W.  1063.  Y.)    473,  475,  92  X.  Y.  653;   George 

"  State  v.  James,  34  S.  Car.  49,  58,  v.  State,  16  Xeb.  318,  320,  321,  20  X. 

12  S.  E.  657;   Wharton  on  Cr.  Ev.,  W.  311;  McKeone  v.  People,  6  Colo. 

500.    See  also,  §§  175,  176,  178.  346,  348. 

"*  State  v.  James,  13  S.  E.  325,  34  S.  "  People  v.   Dc   Garmo,    179  X.  Y. 

Car.  579,  not  reported  in  full.  130,  71  X.  E.  736,  rev'g  73  App.  Div. 

"*  State  v.  James,  34  S.  Car.  49,  58,  (X.  Y.)  46,  76  X.  Y.  S.  477- 
8 — Underbill  Cki.m.  Ev. 


§  66  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  II4 

the  probable  result  of  this  is  not  so  much  to  prove  relevant  facts 
as  to  show  the  accused  has  contradicted  himself.  So  the  state  may 
prove  contradictory  statements  voluntarily  made  by  the  accused 
before  tlie  coroner/-  or  on  the  preliminary  examination,  or  upon 
a  former  trial  for  the  same  offense." 

§  66.  The  bad  character  of  the  accused — ^When  admissible  to  im- 
peach him. — Whether  the  accused  may  be  impeached  by  proving 
bad  character  to  the  same  extent  as  other  witnesses  depends 
largely  upon  the  statutes  rendering  him  competent  as  a  witness. 
Where  he  may  be  impeached  as  any  other  witness  his  bad  char- 
acter or  general  reputation  for  veracity  alone  may  always  be 
shown  to  impeach  him.''* 

But  here  a  difficult  cjuestion  suggests  itself.  Can  the  general 
bad  character  of  the  accused  be  shown  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
impeaching  him  as  a  witness,  in  case  he  has  not,  as  the  accused, 
first  offered  evidence  of  good  character?"  Where  the  statute  ex- 
pressly provides  that  the  accused,  when  testifying  as  a  witness, 
subjects  himself  to  the  same  rules  of  examination  as  any  witness, 
the  weight  of  the  cases  maintains  the  affirmative,  at  least  in  those 
states  where  the  general  bad  character  of  a  witness  may  be 
shown.'^"   If,  however,  the  statute  does  not  expressly  provide  that 

^  Woods  V.  State,  63  Ind.  353,  358;  ing  that  when  so  testifying  he  may  be 

Lovett  V.  State,  60  Ga.  257,  260;  Peo-  examined  or  impeached  the  same  as 

pie  V.   Kelley,  47  Cal.    125 ;   State  v.  other  witnesses,  his  general  character 

Mullins,  loi  Mo.  514,  519,   14  S.  W.  is   protected    from    attack,   unless    he 

625;  State  V.  Oilman,  51  Me.  206,  218-  puts  it  in  issue  by  himself  introducing 

226.  evidence    relating    to    it.      People    v. 

"Dumas  v.  State,  63  Ga.  600,  601,  Hinksman,   192  N.  Y.  421,  85  N.   E. 

604;   State  V.  Dyer,  139  Mo.  199,  40  676. 

S.  W.  768.  "  See  §  76  ct  scq. 

'* Adams  v.  People,  9  Kun  (N.  Y.)  '''State  v.  Kirkpatrick,  63  Iowa  554, 

89,  97;  Fletcher  v.  State,  49  Ind.  124,  559,  IQ  N.  W.  660;  Drew  v.  State,  124 

130,  131,  19  Am.  673;   State  v.  Beal,  Ind.  9,   13,  23   N.   E.   1098;   Peck  v. 

68  Ind.  345,  346,  34  Am.  263 ;  State  v.  State,  86  Tenn.  259,  266,  6  S.  W.  389 ; 

Baker,  209  Mo.  444,  108  S.  W.  6;  Ma-  State  v.  Cohn,  9  Nev.   179;  Connors 

loy  V.  State,  52  Fla.  loi,  41  So.  791.  v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  240;  State  v.  Mc- 

Code  Cr.  Proc,  §  393,  providing  that  Guire,  15  R.  I.  23,  22  Atl.  11 18;  Fields 

defendant  may  testify  as  a  witness  in  v.    State,    121    Ala.    16,    25    So.    726; 

his  own  behalf,  not  expressly  provid-  Sweatt  v.  State  (Ala.),  47  So.  194. 


115  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    67 

the  accused  may  be  examined  or  impeached  as  other  witnesses,  his 
general  character  is  protected  from  attack. 

Logically  a  defendant,  who  elects  to  testify,  occupies  the  double 
position  of  accused  and  witness.  He  combines  in  his  person  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  each ;  for  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  stat- 
ute, which  made  him  a  witness,  was  intended  to  deprive  him  of 
any  of  the  constitutional  or  other  privileges  which  he  enjoyed  as 
the  accused  before  its  passage.^ ^ 

Hence,  even  where  the  general  character  of  a  witness  can  be  at- 
tacked, his  character,  when  he  has  not  first  put  it  in  issue,  cannot 
be  impeached  merely  because  he  testifies.^^  Sometimes  it  is  pro- 
vided that  his  prior  conviction  of  felony  may  be  proved,^^  when 
he  testifies,  but  not  his  plea  of  guilty  without  sentence.^" 

§  67.  Commenting  on  the  failure  of  the  accused  to  testify. — It  is 
usually  provided  by  statute  that  the  failure  of  the  accused  to  tes- 
tify in  his  own  behalf  must  not  be  considered  by  the  jury  as  a 
circumstance  against  him,  nor  can  it  be  alluded  to,  or  commented 
on,  by  counsel.  Under  such  a  statute,  the  court  should  promptly 
interrupt  a  prosecuting  counsel  who  shall,  in  his  argument,  at- 
tempt to  make  use  of  the  fact  that  the  prisoner  has  not  taken  the 
Avitness  stand ;  and  should  charge  that  the  prisoner's  silence  cre- 
ates no  presumption  of  his  guilt,*^  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
jury  to  exclude  his  silence  entirely  from  their  consideration. 

"State  V,  Beal,  68  Ind.  345,  346,  34  25   So.   238;    Showalter   v.   State,  84 

Am.  263.  Ind.    562,   566;    Staples  v.   State,  89 

'^  Fletcher  V.  State,  49  Ind.  124,  131-  Tenn.  231,   14  S.  W.  603;   People  v. 

^33,  19  Am.  673;  State  v.  Kirkpatrick,  Brown,  53  Cal.  66;  People  v.  Doyle, 

63  Iowa  554,  559,  i9  N.  W.  660.  58  Hun  (N.  Y.)  535,  536,  12  N.  Y.  S. 

™  State  V.  McGuire,  15  R.  I.  23,  22  836;    State  v.   Mosley,   31    Kan.   355, 

Atl.  1 1 18.  357,  2  Pac.  782;  Gray  v.  State,  42  Fla. 

^Marion  v.  State,  16  Neb.  349,  361,  174,  28  So.  53;  State  v.  IMathews,  98 

20  N.  W.  289.  Mo.  125,  131,  10  S.  W.  144,  II  S.  W. 

*^  State  V.  Mitchell,  32  Wash.  64,  72  1135;  State  v.  Tennison,  42  Kan.  330, 

Pac.  707;  McCoy  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.  332,  22  Pac.  429;  Quinn  v.  People,  123 

App.),  81  S.  W.  46;  State  v.  Weaver,  111.  333,  347,  15  N.  E.  46;  Parrott  v. 

165  Mo.  I,  65  S.  W.  308,  88  Am.  St.  Commonwealth  CKy.),  47  S.  W.  452, 

406;  Staples  V.  State,  89  Tenn.  231,  14  20  Ky.  L.  761 ;  State  v.  Banks,  78  Me. 

S.  W.  603;  Wilson  V.  United  States,  490,  7  Atl.  269.     In  Riiloff  v.  People, 

149  U.   S.  60,  37  L.  ed.  650,  13  Sup.  45  N.  Y.  213,  222.  and  Commonwealth 

Ct.  765 ;  Roberts  v.  State,  122  Ala.  47,  v.  Hanley,  140  Mass.  457,  5  N.  E.  468, 


§    67 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


ii6 


But.  in  order  that  a  verdict  of  guilty  should  be  set  aside,  be- 
cause comment  has  been  permitted  upon  the  failure  of  the  accused 
to  testify,  an  objection  must  be  promptly  made,  the  attention  of 
the  court  obtained,  and  a  ruling  had  thereon.'*" 

Strict  compliance  with  the  statute  is  usually  required.^^ 

The  prosecuting  attorney  must  not  be  allowed  to  evade  it  by  in- 
direct and  covert  allusions,  as  by  calling  the  jury's  attention  to  the 
fact  that  none  of  the  neighbors  of  a  person  on  trial  for  the  murder 
of  his  wife  were  informed  by  him  how  she  came  to  her  death,*** 
or  by  stating  to  the  jury  that,  if  the  accused  shall  fail  to  testify, 
the  law  precludes  the  state  from  commenting  upon  his  failure.^^ 

But  not  every  reference  to  the  law  is  prohibited.  The  true  test 
is,  was  the  reference  calculated  or  intended  to  direct  the  attention 
of  the  jury  to  the  defendant's  neglect  to  avail  himself  of  his 
right?  ^° 


it  was  held  that  any  allusion  by  the 
court  in  its  charge  to  the  fact  that  the 
defendant  has  not  testified  was  error. 

*-  Matthews  v.  People,  6  Colo.  App. 
456,  41  Pac.  839;  Metz  v.  State,  46 
Neb.  547,  65  N.  W.  190;  Martin  v. 
State,  79  Wis.  165,  175,  48  N.  W.  119, 
122. 

*^  Austin  V.  People,  102  111.  261; 
Baker  v.  State,  122  Ala.  i,  26  So.  194; 
Lamb  v.  State,  69  Neb.  212,  95  N.  W. 
1050;  State  V.  Wisnewski,  13  N.  Dak. 
649,  102  N.  W.  883 ;  ]\Iartinez  v.  State, 
48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  33,  85  S.  W.  1066; 
Davis  V.  State,  138  Ind.  11,  37  N.  E. 
797;  State  V.  Baldoser,  88  Iowa  55, 
55  N.  W.  97;  Tudor  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  43  S.  W.  187,  19  Ky. 
L.  1039. 

"  State  V.  Moxley,  T02  Mo.  374,  393, 
14  S.  W.  969,  15  s.  W.  556. 

^  Jordan  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  595, 
16  S.  W.  543.  A  remark  by  a  prose- 
cuting attorney  in  discussing  the 
question  of  night  session  that  "the  de- 
fendant had  not  testified"  is  error. 
State  V.  Bennett.  2T  S.  Dak.  396,  TT3 
N.  W.  78.    Permitting  the  prosecuting 


attorney  to  say,  in  response  to  the 
quotation  by  the  defendant  "that  rape 
is  a  crime  easily  charged,  hard  to  be 
proved  and  difficult  to  be  defended," 
that,  "since  the  legislature  passed  a 
statute  giving  the  defendant  the  right 
to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  it  can 
no  longer  be  said  as  a  maxim  of  law 
that  'rape  is  a  crime  hard  to  be  de- 
fended' "  is  reversible  error.  Austin 
V.  People,  102  111.  261,  263.  So  it  was 
error  for  the  district  attorney  to  say 
to  counsel  for  defendant,  "You  know 
the  laws  of  this  state  permit  the  de- 
fendant to  remain  silent,  and  it  would 
be  improper  and  cowardly  for  me  to 
comment  upon  it,  and  it  is  not  my  in- 
tention to  evade  the  spirit  or  letter  of 
the  law."  State  v.  Holmes,  65  Minn. 
230,  68  N.  W.  II.  It  is  error  for  the 
prosecuting  attorney  to  say  in  closing 
to  the  jury  that  "nobody  on  earth 
denies"  that  defendant  had  written  a 
certain  letter,  and  that  "no  living  soul 
has  denied  that  defendant  seduced 
this  little  girl."  Hoff  v.  State.  83  Miss. 
488,  35  So.  950. 
**Watt  V.  People,  126  111.  9,  32,  18 


117  '^HE   ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    68 

Where  such  comment  is  made  and  the  court,  though  rebuking 
the  speaker,  refuses,  or  even  omits  to  charge  that  it  should  be 
disregarded,  a  new  trial  must  be  had.^" 

The  accused  is  entitled  by  the  statutes  to  have  the  prosecuting 
attorney  remain  absolutely  silent  during  all  the  trial  as  to  the  fail- 
ure of  the  accused  to  testify,  and  not  only  is  he  entitled  to  have 
this,  but  he  is  also  entitled  to  have  the  court  remain  silent  as  well 
and  the  mere  charge  to  the  jury  that  they  should  not  comment  on 
the  failure  of  the  accused  to  testify  nor  should  they  draw  any 
presumption  of  guilt  from  it.  though  intended  to  favor  the  ac- 
cused, has  been  held  reversible  error. ®^ 

§  68.  Exclusion  or  withdrawal  of  comments  on  failure  to  testify — 
Failure  to  call  other  witnesses,  or  to  testify  to  incriminating  facts. — 
Upon  the  question  whether  a  new  trial  should  be  granted  for  a 
comment  upon  the  failure  of  the  accused  to  testify  when  the  dis- 
trict attorney  withdraws  his  remarks,  or  the  court  excludes  them 
and  also  instructs  the  jur}'  that  the  silence  of  the  accused  is  not  a 
circumstance  against  him,  the  authorities  are  divided.  Many 
cases  hold  that  under  these  circumstances  the  error  is  cured,®* 
though  others  hold  that  a  new  trial  should  be  had  though  the 
prosecuting  attorney  is  rebuked  and  the  jurors  are  positively  in- 
structed to  dismiss  the  comments  from  their  minds.^'^ 

N.  E.  340,  I  L.  R.  A.  403;   State  v.  ^ Tines  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  77 

Mosley,  31  Kan.  355,  357,  2  Pac.  782.  S.  W.  363,  25  Ky.  L.  1233. 

*'  State  V.  Banks,  78  Me.  490,  492,  7  ^  People  v.  Hess,  85  Mich.   128,  48 

Atl.   269 ;    People  v.   Brown,  53   Cal.  N.  W.  181 ;  State  v.  Chisnell,  36  W. 

66,  67;  State  v.  Chisnell,  36  W.  Va.  Va.  659,  667,  671,  15  S.  E.  412,  414, 

659,    667,    15    S.    E.    412;    Common-  416;  Crandall  v.  People,  2  Lans.  (N. 

wealth  V.  Harlow,  no  Mass.  411,  412;  Y.)    309;    Calkins  v.    State,    18   Ohio 

Hunt  V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  149,   12  St.     366,     373;      Commonwealth     v. 

S.  W.  727,  19  Am.  St.  815;  State  v.  Worcester,  141  Mass.  58,  61,  6  N.  E. 

Moxley,  102  Mo.  374,  393,  14  S.  W.  700;   State  v.    Cameron,  40  Vt.   555, 

969,  15  S.  W.  556;  People  V.  Rose,  52  565;  Ruloff  v.  People,  45  X.  Y.  213, 

Hun  (N.  Y.)  33,  36,  4  N.  Y.  S.  787;  222;    Staples  v.   State,  89  Tenn.  231, 

State  V.  Currie,   13  N.  Dak.  655,   102  14  S.  W.  603 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Har- 

N.  W.  875,  112  Am.  St.  687,  69  L.  R.  low,  no  Mass.  411,  412;  Herndon  v. 

A.  405 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  57  W.  Va.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  552.  99  S.  W. 

228,  50  S.  E.  247;  Barnard  v.  State,  558;  Clinton  v.  State   (Fla.),  47  So. 

48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  in,  86  S.  W.  760,  389. 

122    .^m.    St.   736;    State   v.    Levy,  9  ""State  v.  Holmes,  65  Minn.  230,  68 

Idaho  483,  75  Pac.  227.  X.  VV.  n;  Sanders  v.  State,  73  Miss. 


§  68  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  Il8 

The  latter  view  would  seem  most  consistent  with  reason  and 
common  sense.  jMere  silence  under  an  accusation  of  crime,  where 
an  opportunity  for  denial  is  afforded,  is  sure  to  create  an  infer- 
ence of  guilt  in  the  mind  of  any  one,  though  no  oral  comment  is 
made  thereon.  It  is  absurd  therefore  to  suppose  that  any  judicial 
declaration  will  remove  the  effect  of  language  which  has  found  a 
lodgment  in  the  minds  of  the  jurors,  spent  its  force  and  subserved 
its  purpose  of  creating  a  prejudice  against  the  accused.^^ 

The  exemption  from  unfavorable  comment  is  applicable  only 
when  the  accused  wholly  refrains  from  testifying.  If  he  volun- 
tarily goes  upon  the  stand  he  waives  this  exemption,  and  the 
state  may  comment  upon  his  testimony  as  fully  as  on  that  of  any 
other  witness,  and  may  call  attention  to  his  silence  and  demeanor 
while  there,  or  at  the  preliminary  examination,^"  to  his  refusal 
to  answer  incriminating  questions;  or  to  deny  prominent  and 
damaging  facts  of  which  he  must  have  some  personal  knowledge.^^ 

The  prosecution  may  always  freely  comment  on  the  failure  of 
the  accused  to  call  particular  witnesses,  or  witnesses  for  a  par- 
ticular purpose,  as,  for  example,  to  account  for  his  whereabouts 

444,  i8  So.  541 ;  Reddick  v.  State,  72  Pac.  8 ;  Lee  v.  State,  56  Ark.  4,  19  S. 

Miss.    1008,    16    So.    490;    Angelo   v.  W.  16;  State  v.  Walker,  98  Mo.  95,9  S. 

People,  96  111.  209,  36  Am.  132;  Quinn  W.  646,  11  S.  W.  1133;  State  v.  An- 

V.  People,  123  111.  333,  346,  15  X.  E.  derson,   89   Mo.   312,    i    S.   W.    135; 

46;  Long  V.  State,  56  Ind.  182,  26  Am.  State  v.  Tatman,  59  Iowa  471,  475,  13 

19;   Showalter  v.   State,  84  Ind.  562,  N.  W.  632;  State  v.  Ober,  52  N.  H. 

566 ;  Hunt  V.  State,  28  Tex,  App.  149,  459,   463,    13  Am.   88 ;   Brashears   v. 

150,  12  S.  W.  737;  State  V.  Brown-  State,  58  Md.  563,  568 ;  Toops  v.  State, 

field,  15  Mo.  App.  593.  92  Ind.  13,  16;  Stover  v.  People,  56 

*^  "As  well  try  to  brush  out  with  the  N.  Y.  315,  320,  321;  Commonwealth 

hand  a  stain  of  ink  on  white  linen."  v.   Mullen,  97   Mass.   545;   Common- 

Quinn  v.  People,  123  111.  333,  347,  15  wealth  v.  McConnell,  162  Mass.  499, 

N.  E.  46;   State  v.  Cameron,  40  Vt.  39  N.  E.  107;  McFadden  v.  State,  28 

555,  565.  Tex.  App.  241,  245,  14  S.  W.   128; 

^^  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  Heldt  v.  State,  20  Xeb.  492,  30  N.  W. 

34  S.  W.  227,  17  Ky.  L.  1214.  626,  57  Am.  835n;  State  v.  Ulsemer, 

**  Russell  V.  State,  77  N^eb.  519,  no  24  Wash.  657,  64  Pac.  800.  Contra, 
N.  W.  380;  Comstock  v.  State,  14  where  it  is  expressly  provided  by 
Neb.  205,  209,  IS  N.  W.  355;  Solander  statute  that  the  cross-examination  of 
V.  People,  2  Colo.  48;  State  v.  Ander-  the  accused  must  be  limited  to  mat- 
son,  89  ]\Io.  312,  320,  I  S.  W.  135;  ters  brought  out  on  the  direct.  State 
Cotton  V.  State,  87  Ala.  103,  107,  6  So.  v.  Graves,  95  jMo.  510,  516,  8  S.  W. 
372;  State  v.  Clave,  51  Kan.  330,  33  739. 


119 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


§    69 


on  the  day  of  the  crime.^^  Hence,  if  the  wife  of  the  accused  is 
competent,  the  state  may  comment  upon  the  failure  of  the  ac- 
cused to  call  her.^^ 

§  69.  Definition  of  accomplice. — An  accomplice,  as  the  word  is 
used  in  this  and  in  the  following  paragraphs,  is  a  person  who  is  in 
some  way  concerned  in  the  commission  of  a  crime  for  which  the 
accused  is  on  trial.  This  includes  principals  and  accessories 
whether  before  or  after  the  fact.  A  person  against  whom  there  is 
sufficient  evidence  to  indict  for  the  crime  upon  which  the  accused 
is  standing  trial  is  his  accomplice.^'  Mere  knowledge  or  belief 
that  a  crime  is  to  be  committed  or  has  been  committed  and  the 


®^  Sutton  V.  Commonwealth,  85  Va. 
128,  135,  7  S.  E.  323 ;  State  v.  Costner, 
127  N.  Car.  566,  zi  S.  E.  326,  80  Am. 
St.  809.  Cf.  Commonwealth  v.  Har- 
low, no  Mass.  411,  412;  State  v.  Ship- 
ley, 174  Mo.  512,  74  S.  W.  612;  Porch 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  335,  99  S. 
W.  102. 

^  State  V.  Millmeier,  102  Iowa  692, 
72  N.  W.  275,  63  Am.  St.  479;  Hall 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  22  S.  W. 
141 ;  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth,  90  Va. 
109,  17  S.  E.  812,  816;  Mercer  v. 
State,  17  Tex.  App.  452,  457;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Weber,  167  Pa.  St.  153, 
31  Atl.  481.  But  if  she  is  not  compe- 
tent, the  state  should  not  be  allowed 
to  comment  on  her  absence.  State  v. 
Hatcher,  29  Ore.  309,  44  Pac.  584; 
State  V.  Taylor,  134  Mo.  109,  35  S. 
W.  92;  Johnson  v.  State,  63  Miss. 
313;  Graves  v.  United  States,  150  U. 
S.  118,  37  L.  ed.  1021,  14  Sup.  Ct.  40. 
Where  evidence  is  equally  acces- 
sible and  material  to  the  state  and  to 
the  accused,  its  non-production  by  the 
accused,  even  though  it  may  affirma- 
tively appear  that  he  made  no  attempt 
to  procure  it,  creates  no  presumption 
against  him.  The  omission  cannot 
be  considered  by  the  jury.     State  v. 


Rosier,  55  Iowa  517,  8  N.  W.  345; 
Brock  V.  State,  123  Ala.  24,  26  So. 
329;  State  V.  Fitzgerald,  68  Vt.  125, 
34  Atl.  429.  But  where  evidence 
which,  if  produced,  would  controvert 
or  explain  some  incriminating  facts 
proved  against  him,  and  which  is  also 
clearly  within  his  knowledge  and  his 
power  to  obtain,  is  not  produced  by 
the  accused,  the  jury  may  consider  the 
fact  in  determining  the  credibility  of 
the  evidence  against  him.  State  v. 
Grebe,  17  Kan.  458;  People  v.  Mc- 
Whorter,  4  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  438,  440; 
Rice  V.  Commonwealth,  102  Pa.  St. 
408;  People  V.  Smith,  114  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  S13,  100  N.  Y.  S.  259. 

^^Redd  V.  State,  dz  Ark.  457,  40  S. 
W.  374;  People  V.  Collum,  122  Cal. 
186,  54  Pac.  589;  Cross  v.  People,  47 
111.  152,  95  Am.  Dec.  474;  State  v. 
Ean,  90  Iowa  534,  58  N.  W.  898; 
State  V.  Jones,  115  Iowa  113,  88  N. 
W.  196;  Territory  v.  Baker,  4  Gild. 
(N.  Mex.)  236,  13  Pac.  30;  People 
V.  McGuire,  32  N.  E.  146,  135  N.  Y. 
639  (not  reported  in  full)  ;  State  v. 
Roberts,  15  Ore.  187,  I3  Pac-  896; 
Harris  v.  State,  7  Lea  (Tenn.)  124; 
Smith  V.  State,  Z7  Tex.  Cr.  App.  488, 
36  S.  W.  586;  State  V.  DufI  (Iowa, 
1909),  122  X.  W.  829. 


69 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


1 20 


concealment  of  such  knowledge  does  not  render  a  witness  an  ac- 
complice unless  he  aided  or  participated  in  the  commission  of  the 
crime.^^ 

Under  the  rule  that  participation  in  the  crime  is  required  to 
constitute  an  accomplice,  the  mere  concealment  of  knowledge  that 
a  crime  has  been  committed  does  not  make  the  person  concealing 
his  knowledge  an  accomplice.  This  is  the  general  rule  and  is 
sustained  by  the  majority  of  the  cases.^''  However  this  may  be 
in  the  case  of  an  accessory  after  the  fact,  it  is  well  settled  that 
all  accessories  before  the  fact  if  they  actually  participate  at  all 
in  the  preparation  for  the  crime  are  accomplices  within  the  rule, 
but  if  their  participation  is  limited  to  the  knowledge  that  a  crime 
is  to  be  committed,  they  are  not  accomplices/"'' 

A  person  who,  as  a  detective,  associates  with  criminals  or  com- 
municates with  or  aids  them  solely  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
commission  of  crime  and  procuring  the  punishment  of  the  crimi- 
nals is  not  an  accomplice."^ 


"  Green  v.  State,  51  Ark.  189.  10  S. 
W.  266;  Allen  V.  State,  74  Ga.  769; 
Bradley  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  622,  58 
S.  E.  1064;  Springer  v.  State,  102  Ga. 
447,  30  S.  E.  971 ;  Ochsner  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  109  S.  W.  326,  23 
Ky.  L.  119;  People  v.  Ricker,  51  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  643,  4  N.  Y.  S.  70,  7  N.  Y. 
Cr.  19;  Greathouse  v.  State.  53  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  218,  109  S.  W.  165;  Martin 
V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  29,  83  S. 
W.  390;  Wilson  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  496,  93  S.  W.  547- 

^'Polk  V.  State,  36  Ark.  117;  Gat- 
lin  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  116,  49 
S.  W.  87 ;  Hunnicutt  v.  State,  18  Tex. 
App.  498,  51  Am.  330,  but  there  are 
other  cases  which  hold  to  the  con- 
trary. State  V.  Umble,  115  Mo.  452, 
22  S.  W.  378;  People  V.  Chadwick, 
7  Utah  134,  25  Pac.  737. 

'""Watson  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App. 
237 ;  Edwards  v.  Territory,   i  Wash. 

195- 

"'  Harrington  v.  State,  36  .A.la.  236 ; 
People   V.    Bolanger,   71    Cal.    17,    11 


Pac.  799;  State  v.  Brownlee,  84  Iowa 
473,  51  N.  W.  25;  State  v.  McKean, 
36  Iowa  343,  14  Am.  530;  Common- 
wealth V.  Baker,  155  Mass.  287,  29 
N.  E.  512;  State  v.  Beaucleigh,  92 
Mo.  490,  4  S.  W.  666;  State  v.  Doug- 
las, 26  Nev.  196,  65  Pac.  802,  99  Am. 
St.  688;  People  v.  Noelke,  94  N.  Y. 
137,  46  Am.  128;  Campbell  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 84  Pa.  St.  187;  Common- 
wealth V.  Downing,  4  Gray  (Mass.) 
29;  Commonwealth  v.  Willard,  22 
Pick.  (Mass.)  476.  When  the  ac- 
cused was  decoyed  into  crime  by  a 
police  detective,  Cooley,  J.,  in  permit- 
ting the  accused  to  make  a  full  ex- 
planation, said :  "The  officer  was  ap- 
parently assisting  or  conniving  in  the 
crime  charged,  and  though  he  may 
have  done  this,  as  he  says,  not  by  way 
of  enticement,  but  only  by  allowing 
him  the  opportunity  he  sought  and 
requested,  yet  it  placed  him  in  an 
equivocal  position,  and  the  jury  ought 
to  have  all  the  light  the  former  deal- 
ings of  the  parties  would  throw  upon 


121 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


§    69 


A  voluntary  participation  in  the  commission  of  the  crime  is  re- 
quired to  constitute  an  accompHce.  One  who  either  by  threats 
or  coercion  inciting  in  him  a  fear  that  he  is  in  clanger  of  losing 
his  life  or  liberty  under  and  by  reason  of  such  coercion  and  fear 
participates  in  a  crime  is  not  an  accomplice/"^ 

So  one  who  is  given  money  by  the  prosecuting  attorney  to  make 
a  purchase  of  intoxicating  liquors  in  order  to  obtain  evidence  of  a 
violation  of  the  law  is  not  an  accomplice/"'^ 

Whether  a  person  is  an  accomplice  depends  upon  the  facts  in 
each  particular  case  considered  in  connection  with  the  nature  of 
the  crime.  This  is  usually  determined  by  the  court  as  a  question 
of  law.  Parties  to  be  accomplices  must  participate  in  the  com- 
mission of  the  same  crime.  Thus  a  person  who  receives  stolen 
goods,  knowing  them  to  be  stolen,  is  not  an  accomplice  of  the 
thief  where  the  receiver  did  not  participate  in  the  commission  of 
the  larceny.    The  receiving  and  the  larceny  are  distinct  crimes.^"'' 

In  perjury,  all  persons  who  with  knowledge  of  the  falsity  of  the 
statement  aid  in  the  commission  of  the  crime  have  been  held  as 
accomplices/"*   A  person  who  gives  or  tenders  a  bribe  to  an  of- 


the  transactions."  An  accessory  after 
the  fact  is  not  an  accomplice.  State 
V.  Umble,  115  Mo.  452,  22  S.  W.  378, 
380. 

"-  Cook  V.  State,  80  Ark.  495,  97  S. 
W.  683;  Green  v.  State,  51  Ark.  189, 
10  S.  W.  266;  People  V.  Miller,  66 
Cal.  468,  6  Pac.  99;  Burns  v.  State, 
89  Ga.  527,  IS  S.  E.  748;  Beal  v. 
State,  72  Ga.  200.  The  word  "accom- 
plice," in  Code  Cr.  Proc,  art.  781,  re- 
quiring a  corroboration  of  the  testi- 
mony of  an  accomplice  in  order  to 
convict,  means  a  person  who,  either 
as  a  principal,  accomplice,  or  acces- 
sory, is  connected  with  a  crime  by  un- 
lawful act  or  omission  transpiring 
either  before,  at  the  time,  or  after  the 
commission  of  the  offense,  whether 
he  was  present  anrl  participated  in  the 
crime  or  not ;  and  while,  in  misde- 
meanor cases,   all   jjartics   are  princi- 


pals, a  witness  in  a  misdemeanor  case 
may  be  an  accomplice.  Williams  v. 
State,  S3  Tex.  Cr.  App.  396,  no  S. 
W.  63. 

"'a  State  V.  O'Brien,  35  Mont.  482, 
90  Pac.  514. 

"'State  V.  Shapiro  (Mo.),  115  S. 
W.  1022;  People  V.  Barric,  49  Cal. 
342;  Roberts  v.  State,  S5  Ga.  220; 
People  V.  Holden,  127  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  758,  III  N.  Y.  S.  1019;  Springer 
V.  State,  102  Ga.  447,  30  S.  E.  971 : 
Young  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  44 
S.  W.  83s;  Walker  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  z^  S.  W.  423:  Crutchfield 
V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  65. 

'•^  Smith  V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
488,  ■^(y  S.  W.  s86 :  Anderson  v.  State, 
20  Tex.  App.  3T2.  An  officer  before 
whom  one  makes  a  false  affidavit  is 
not  an  accomplice  merely  because  lie 
knows  the  affidavit  is  false,  and  docs 


^  70 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


122 


ficer  is  an  accomplice  if  the  l)ril)e  is  accepted  by  the  officer. ^'^^ 
And  this  is  the  rule  in  some  states  where  the  statute  makes  the 
giving  or  offering  of  a  bribe  a  distinct  offense  from  the  taking 
of  one.^"" 

The  jury  is  not  called  on  to  determine  the  guilt  of  a  witness 
who,  it  is  alleged,  is  an  accomplice.  The  rule  that  the  evidence  of 
an  accomplice  must  be  corroborated  does  not  require  that  his  guilt 
as  a  participant  shall  first  l)e  established  as  an  independent  con- 
clusion and  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  If  a  criminal  connection 
with  the  crime  is  admitted  by  the  witness,  the  court  may  charge 
that  the  witness  is  an  accomplice.  If  the  evidence  is  conflicting  on 
this  point,  /.  c,  the  participation  of  the  witness  in  the  commission 
of  the  crime,  the  matter  should  be  left  to  the  jury  under  proper 
instructions  as  to  intent  and  participation."" 

i<  70.    Accomplices  when  jointly  indicted — Witnesses  for  each  other. 

— Accomplices  were  always,  even  in  the  absence  of  statute,  com- 
petent witnesses  for  each  other  if  separately  indicted."^  Where 
accomplices  are  jointly  indicted,  a  different  rule  is  recognized. 


not  refuse  to  administer  the  oath. 
Wilson  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
496,  93  S.  W.  547. 

'°^  People  V.  Bissert,  72  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  620,  76  N.  Y.  S.  1022,  aff'd 
in  172  X.  Y.  643,  65  N.  E.  1120; 
Ruffin  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  565, 
38  S.  W.  169. 

""People  V.  Winant,  24  IMisc.  (N. 
Y.)  361,  53  N.  Y.  S.  695. 

"'  People  V.  Compton,  123  Cal.  403, 
S6  Pac.  44 ;  People  v.  Bolanger,  71 
Cal.  17,  20,  II  Pac.  799;  Williams  v. 
State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  128,  25  S.  W. 
629,  28  S.  W.  958,  47  Am.  St.  21 ;  Zol- 
licoffer  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  312, 
317 ;  White  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
652,  657,  18  S.  W.  462;  Childress  v. 
State,  86  Ala.  77,  5  So.  775;  State  v. 
Lucas.  57  Iowa  501,  10  N.  W.  868; 
Territory  v.  West  (N.  Mex.),  99 
Pac.  343;  Lightfoot  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  78  S.  W.  1075;  Common- 


wealth V.  Glover,  iii  Mass.  395; 
State  V.  Spotted  Hawk,  22  Mont.  33, 
55  Pac.  1026;  State  v.  Kellar,  8'N. 
Dak.  563,  80  N.  W.  476,  73  Am.  St. 
775- 

'"*  United  States  v.  Henry,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  428,  429,  26  Fed.  Cas. 
15351 ;  United  States  v.  Hunter,  i 
Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  446,  26  Fed. 
Cas.  15425;  United  States  v.  Hanway, 
2  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)  139-  26  Fed.  Cas. 
15299;  State  V.  Umble,  115  Mo.  452, 
22  S.  W.  378 ;  State  v.  Riney,  137  Mo. 
102,  38  S.  W.  718;  Lucre  v.  State,  7 
Baxt.  (Tenn.)  148,  150;  People  v. 
Donnelly,  2  Park  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  182; 
State  V.  Walker,  98  Mo.  95,  102,  9  S. 
W.  646,  II  S.  W.  1133;  Rhodes  v. 
State,  141  Ala.  66,  37  So.  365 ;  State  v. 
Black,  143  Mo.  166,  44  S.  W.  340 ;  Mc- 
Kenzie  v.  State,  24  Ark.  636,  638. 
Contra,  by  statute,  Crutchfield  v.  State, 
7  Tex.  App.  65,  67. 


12?, 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS. 


70 


The  fact  that  they  are  tried  separately  does  not,  in  the  absence  of 
a  permissive  statute,  render  one  competent  as  a  witness  for  the 
others,  though,  if  jointly  indicted,  any  one  of  them  may  testify 
against  the  others/"^ 

An  accomplice  cannot  testify  in  favor  of  one  jointly  indicted 
while  the  indictment  is  pending  over  him.  The  criminal  charge 
against  him  must  be  finally  disposed  of  before  he  can  testify  for  a 
co-defendant.^" 

If  the  state,  on  the  trial  of  a  joint  indictment,  closes  its  case 
without  producing  evidence  of  the  guilt  of  any  defendant  suffi- 
cient to  go  to  the  jury,  the  court  must  direct  his  acquittal.  He  is 
then  a  competent  witness  for  a  co-defendant."^  Where  the  evi- 
dence against  a  defendant  is  slight,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion, 
submit  it  to  the  jury  separately,  and  on  his  acquittal  he  is  compe- 
tent as  a  witness  for  a  co-defendant.^^" 

But  a  defendant  has  no  absolute  right  to  insist  that  the  court 
shall  submit  the  case  of  any  co-defendant  jointly  tried  to  the  jury, 
with  the  view  of  using  him  as  a  witness  if  acquitted."^ 


^•^  State  V.  Jones,  51  Me.  125,  126; 
Commonwealth  v.  Marsh,  10  Pick. 
(Mass.)  57;  Lewis  v.  State,  85  Miss. 
35.  37  So.  497;  State  v.  Franks,  51  S. 
Car.  259,  28  S.  E.  908 ;  Davis  v.  State, 
122  Ga.  564,  50  S.  E.  376.  "A  dis- 
tinction is  made  between  the  compe- 
tency of  a  co-defendant,  jointly  in- 
dicted, as  a  witness  for  the  state  and 
for  his  fellow-prisoners.  The  exclu- 
sion of  his  evidence  when  he  is  called 
for  a  co-defendant  is  based  largely  on 
consideration  of  public  policy,  for 
each  would  try  to  swear  the  other 
innocent."  Benson  v.  United  States, 
146  U.  S.  325,  335,  36  L.  ed.  991,  13 
Sup.  Ct.  60. 

""  Collier  V.  State,  20  Ark.  36 ;  State 
V.  Dunlop,  65  N.  Car.  288;  Ballard  v. 
State,  31  Fla.  266,  12  So.  865,  870; 
Moss  V.  State,  17  Ark.  327,  330,  65 
Am.  Dec.  433;  United  States  v.  Reid, 
12  How.  (U.  S.)  361,  13  L.  ed.  1023; 
Wixson  V.   People,   5  Park   Cr.    (N. 


Y.)  119;  Commonwealth  v.  Marsh,  10 
Pick.  (Mass.)  57;  People  v.  Williams, 
19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  377,  378;  State 
V.  Jones,  51  Me.  125,  126.  In  People 
V.  Bill,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  95,  the 
court  says :  "It  appears  to  be  a  well- 
settled  though  technical  rule  that  a 
party  to  the  same  indictment  cannot 
be  a  witness  for  his  co-defendant  un- 
til he  has  been  first  acquitted,  or  at 
least  convicted.  Whether  they  be 
tried  jointly  or  separately  does  not 
vary  the  rule." 

"'State  V.  Jones,  51  Me.  125,  126; 
People  V.  Bill,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  95; 
Bacon  v.  State,  22  Fla.  51,  85;  Mc- 
Kenzie  v.  State,  24  Ark.  636,  638. 

""People  V.  Vermilyca,  7  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  369,  382. 

"'State  V.  Hunt,  91  Mo.  491,  3  S. 
W.  868;  Ferry  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  34  S.  W.  618;  Commonwealth 
V.  Eastman,  i  Cush.  (Mass.)  189,  218, 
48    Am.    Dec.   59<5,    31    Ky.    L.    769; 


^  71 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


124 


An  accomplice  wlio  pleads  guilty,  or  who  is  convicted,  becomes, 
either  before  or  after  sentence,  a  competent  witness  for  a  co- 
defendant  jointly  indicted."'* 

§  71.  Accomplices  as  witnesses  for  the  state. — The  general  com- 
mon-law rule  is  that  accomplices  are  competent  witnesses  against 
their  criminal  associates.  This  rule  is  always  applicable  where  ac- 
complices are  separately  indicted  and  receive  separate  trials."^ 

Persons  jointly  indicted  are  competent  witnesses  for  the  prose- 
cution against  their  associates,  though  jointly  indicted,  if  they 
are  granted  separate  trials.  It  is  enough  that  the  trial  of  the  ac- 
complice has  been  postponed,  for  he  may  testify  for  the  state, 
though  the  charge  against  him  has  not  been  disposed  of.^^*^  Where 


State  V.  White,  48  Ore.  416,  87  P"c. 
137;  State  V.  Jones,  51  Me.  125,  126; 
Reg.  V.  Ford,  i  C.  &  Marsh,  iii. 

"*  Simpson  v.  Commonwealth,  126 
Ky.  441,  103  S.  W.  332;  State  v. 
Jones,  51  Me.  125,  126,  48  Am.  Dec. 
596,  31  Ky.  L.  769;  South  v.  State, 
86  Ala.  617,  6  So.  52;  Strawhern  v. 
State,  Zl  Miss.  422;  State  v.  Loney, 
82  AIo.  82;  Commonwealth  v.  Marsh, 
10  Pick.  (Mass.)  57,  58;  State  v. 
Stotts,  26  Mo.  307;  Wixson  v.  State, 
5  Park  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  119.  In  Wixson 
V.  People,  5  Park  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  119, 
on  p.  126,  the  court,  by  Knox,  J.,  thus 
summarizes  the  law :  "When  the  per- 
sons indicted  are  all  put  on  trial  to- 
gether, neither  can  be  a  witness  for 
or  against  the  other,  but  when  they 
are  tried  separately,  though  jointly  in- 
dicted, the  people  may  call  those  not 
on  trial,  though  not  convicted  or  ac- 
quitted or  otherwise  discharged,  with 
the  permission  of  the  court,  but  they 
cannot  be  called  as  witness  for  each 
other,  though  separately  tried,  while 
the  indictment  is  pending  against 
them.  If  acquitted  they  may  be  ex- 
amined, and  even  if  convicted,  unless 
it  be  for  a  crime  which  disqualifies, 
and  then  sentence  must  have  followed 


the  conviction.  When  all  are  tried 
together,  if  the  people  desire  to  swear 
an  accomplice,  he  must  in  some  way 
be  first  discharged  from  the  record." 

"^Allison  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App. 
402;  Benson  v.  United  States,  146  U. 
S.  Z2^,  327,  36  L.  ed.  991,  13  Sup.  Ct. 
60;  United  States  v.  Henry,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  428,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15351. 

"*  State  V.  Barrows,  76  Me.  401, 
407,  49  Am.  629:  Marler  v.  State,  67 
Ala.  55,  42  Am.  95 ;  Benson  v.  United 
States,  146  U.  S.  325,  333,  337,  36  L. 
ed.  991,  13  Sup.  Ct.  60;  Wixson  v. 
People,  5  Park  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  119;  Car- 
roll v.  State,  5  Neb.  31,  35;  Barr  v. 
People,  30  Colo.  522,  71  Pac.  392; 
Jones  V.  State,  i  Ga.  610,  617;  State 
V.  Brien,  32  N.  J.  L.  414,  416,  417; 
Noyes  v.  State,  41  N.  J.  L.  418,  429; 
Sparks  v.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky.  644, 
20  S.  W.  167 ;  Allen  v.  State,  to  Ohio 
St.  287;  Brown  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St. 
496,  509;  State  v.  Thaden,  43  Minn. 
325,  327,  45  N.  W.  614;  Conway  v. 
State,  118  Ind.  482,  485.  21  N.  E.  285; 
Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  130  Mass. 
279;  Evans  v.  State,  61  Miss.  157; 
Noyes  v.  State,  41  N.  J.  L.  418; 
State  v.  Shelton  (Mo.,  1909),  122  S. 
W.  732. 


125  ^^^    ACCUSED  AS  A  WITNESS.  §  /I 

the  disability  of  convicts  to  testify  has  been  removed  by  statute, 
no  vahd  reason  exists  for  excluding  the  evidence  of  an  accomplice 
who  has  been  convicted,  or  who  has  pleaded  guilty,  against  one 
jointly  indicted,  but  tried  separately/" 

Accomplices  jointly  indicted  and  also  jointly  tried  are  not  com- 
petent witnesses  against  each  other.  But  the  court  may  always 
order  a  nolle  prosequi  upon  the  application  of  the  district  attor- 
ney, ^^^  or  accept  a  plea  of  guilty  with  the  express  or  implied  prom- 
ise of  immunity."^ 

The  admission  of  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  who  is  still 
under  indictment  against  one  who  is  jointly  indicted  is  largely 
in  the  judicial  discretion.^-"  The  court  exercising  this  discretion 
should  bear  in  mind  that  the  evidence  is  receivable  mainly  because 
of  necessity  and  public  policy  and  in  furtherance  of  justice.  The 
question  to  be  considered  is  not  only  whether  it  is  possible  to  con- 
vict without  the  testimony  of  the  accomplice,  but  whether  it  is 
possible  to  convict  if  he  does  testify.  If  sufficient  evidence  has 
been  received  to  sustain  a  conviction  without  that  of  the  accom- 
plice, or  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  evidence  already  in  is  so  weak, 

Contra,  State  V.  Alathews,  98  Mo.  125,  W.    646,    11    S.    W.    1133;    Reg.    v. 

10  S.  W.  144,  II  S.  W.  1 135;  Day  v.  Owen,    9    Carr.    &    P.    83;    State    v. 

State,  27  Tex.  App.  143,  11  S.  W.  36;  Phipps,   76  N.    Car.   203;   Lindsay  v. 

State  V.  Chyo  Chiagk,  92  Mo.  395,  4  People,  63   N.  Y.    143,   154;   State  v. 

S.  W.  704.  and  cf.  2  Hawk.  P.  C,  ch.  Graham,  41  N.  J.  L.   15,  19,  32  Am. 

46;  I  Hale  P.   C.  305;  Rose  Cr.  Ev.  174;  Underwood  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr. 

130,  140:  2  Russ.  Cr.  957;  Whart.  Cr.  App.   193,   41    S.   W.  618;    People  v. 

Ev.,  §  439.  Bruzzo,  24  Cal.  41 ;   Love  v.   People, 

"'People  V.   Whipple,  9  Cow.    (N.  160  111.  501,  43  N.  E.  710,  32  L.  R.  A. 

Y.)  707,  709;  South  V.  State,  86  Ala.  139;  State  v.  Steifel,  106  Mo.  129,  17 

617,  620,  6  So.  52;  Woodley  v.  State,  S.  W.  227. 

103    Ala.    23,    15   So.   820;    Taylor   v.  ""State  v.  Lyon,  81  N.  Car.  600.  31 

People,  12  Hun  (N.  Y.)  212;   Loehr  Am.  5i8n;  United  States  v.  Ford,  99 

V.  People,  132  111.  504,  24  N.  E.  68;  U.    S.   594,   25   L.    ed.   399;    State   v. 

State  v.  Jackson,  106  Mo.  174,  17  S.  Jackson,  106  Mo.   174.  177,  17  S.  W. 

W.  301;  State  V.  Minor,  117  Mo.  302,  30T. 

305,  22  S.  W.  1085 ;  State  V.  Young,  ""  Lindsay  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143, 

153   Mo.   445,   55   S.    W.   82;   Rex   v.  153;    Commonwealth    v.    Brown.    130 

Westbeer,  i  Leach  C.  L.  14;  Wisdom  Mass.  279.     The  judicial  consent,   if 

V.  People,  II  Colo.  170,  17  Pac.  519;  given,   need  not   be   embodied   in    an 

State  v.  Magone,  32  Ore.  206,  51  Pac.  order,    or    indeed    in    any    particular 

452.  form.     Lindsay  v.   People,  63   N.   Y. 

"'  State  v.  Walker,  98  Mo.  95,  9  S.  143,  153. 


§  72 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


126 


conflicting  and  lacking  in  corroborative  force  that,  even  with  his 
testimony,  no  reasonable  probability  arises  that  a  conviction  will 
result,  the  court  should  reject  his  evidence/^^ 

§  72.   Immunity  of  accomplice  when  testifying  for  the  state. — An 

accomplice  who,  confessing  his  own  guilt,  offers  to  testify  against 
an  associate  has  no  legal  right,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  to  de- 
mand exemption  from  a  prosecution  for  the  crime  he  has  con- 
fessed/-- But  an  accomplice  whose  evidence,  while  placing  him 
where  he  could  be  easily  convicted,  has  contributed  to  the  convic- 
tion of  another,  certainly  has  a  strong  moral  and  equitable  claim 
to  clemency,  and  if  he  be  subsequently  convicted  of  that  crime, 
his  moral  claim  should  be  recognized  by  the  pardoning  power. 

If  his  testimony  was  procured  by  an  express  promise  of  im- 
munity, or  during  interviews  with  the  prosecuting  attorney,  prin- 
ciples of  justice  would  demand,  and  the  prevalent  practice  would 
sanction,  the  judicial  recommendation  of  his  case  to  the  executive 
that  his  pardon  may  be  obtained.^-^ 


'"^  State  V.  Pratt,  98  Mo.  482,  11  S. 
W.  977;  Ray  V.  State,  i  Greene 
(Iowa)  316,  48  Am.  Dec.  379;  Reg. 
V.  Sparks,  i  Fost.  &  Fin.  388. 

"-  Runnels  v.  State,  28  Ark.  121, 
123;  United  States  v.  Ford,  99  U.  S. 
594,  605,  25  L.  ed.  399;  United  States 
V.  Hinz,  35  Fed.  272,  279,  280;  State 
V.  Guild,  149  Mo.  370,  50  S.  W.  909, 
'JZ  Am.  St.  395. 

"^Long  V.  State,  86  Ala.  z^,  44,  5 
So.  443;  State  V.  Graham,  41  N.  J. 
L.  15,  16,  20,  32  Am.  174;  State  v. 
Lyon,  81  N.  Car.  600,  602,  31  Am. 
5i8n.  "Accomplices,  not  convicted  of 
an  infamous  crime,  when  separately 
tried  are  competent  witnesses  for  or 
against  each  other.  The  universal 
usage  is  that  such  a  party,  if  called 
and  examined  by  the  state  on  the 
trial  of  his  associate  in  guilt,  will  not 
be  prosecuted  for  the  same  offense, 
provided  it  appears  that  he  acted  in 
good  faith  and  that  he  testified  fully 


and  fairly.  But  it  is  equally  clear 
that  he  cannot  plead  such  fact  in  bar 
of  an  indictment  against  him,  nor 
avail  himself  of  it  upon  his  trial;  for 
it  is  merely  an  equitable  title  to  the 
mercy  of  the  executive,  subject  to  the 
conditions  stated,  and  can  only  come 
before  the  court  by  way  of  applica- 
tion to  put  off  the  trial  in  order  to 
give  the  prisoner  time  to  apply  to  the 
executive  for  that  purpose."  United 
States  V.  Ford,  99  U.  S.  594,  25  L.  ed. 
399,  and  Irvine,  Ex  parte,  74  Fed. 
954.  The  defense  may  show  that  an 
accomplice  testifying  for  the  state 
does  so  with  the  expectation  of  gain 
or  immunity,  and  it  is  immaterial 
whether  there  has  been  any  actual 
agreement  to  that  effect  with  the  pub- 
lic prosecuting  officer  or  not.  Allen 
V.  State,  ID  Ohio  St.  287;  People  v. 
Langtree,  64  Cal.  256,  30  Pac.  813; 
Tullis  V.  State,  39  Ohio  St.  200. 


127 


THE    ACCUSED    AS    A  ■  WITNESS. 


S       -TO 


The  accomplice  may  be  asked,  in  order  to  test  and  bring  out  his 
motives  and  feehngs  towards  the  accused,  whether  he  has  not 
confessed  his  guilt,  and  has  said  he  would  not  be  punished 
alone/^* 

An  accomplice,  who,  with  a  full  knowledge  of  his  privilege 
from  answering  incriminating  questions,  voluntarily  answers  such 
Cjuestions,  cannot  withhold  further  evidence  as  to  the  same  matters 
under  a  claim  of  privilege/"^  So  he  may  be  compelled  to  answer 
incriminating  questions  even  though  he  shall  claim  the  privilege, 
if,  by  statute,  the  use  against  the  witness  of  testimony  given 
under  such  circumstances  is  prohibited/^®  And  the  voluntary  con- 
fession of  an  accomplice  made  in  expectation  of  testifying  against 
an  associate  may  always  be  used  against  the  accomplice,  on  his 
trial  for  the  crime  confessed,  if  he  has  refused  to  testify/"" 

§  73.  Credibility  and  corroboration  of  accomplices. — Xo  presump- 
tion of  law  exists  against  the  credibility  of  the  evidence  of  an  ac- 
complice, so  that  at  common  law,  i.  c,  in  the  absence  of  statute, 
a  conviction  may  be  had  on  his  evidence  alone.^"® 


^^  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  195, 
197. 

"^Alderman  v.  State,  4  Mich.  414, 
422,  423,  69  Am.  Dec.  321 ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Price,  10  Gray  (Mass.) 
472,  476,  71  Am.  Dec.  668n. 

^"°  State  V.  Quarles,  13  Ark.  307 ; 
Bedgoocl  V.  State,  115  Ind.  275,  17 
N.  E.  621,  623. 

^"United  States  v.  Hinz,  35  Fed. 
272,  277. 

^-^  I  Hale  P.  C.  303,  304 ;  Char- 
nock's  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  1377, 
1454;  Rex  V.  Rudd,  Cowp.  331;  Rex 
V.  Atwood,  2  Leach  C.  L.  521 ;  Dur- 
ham's Case,  2  Leach  C.  L.  538;  State 
V.  Thompson,  47  La.  Ann.  1597,  18 
So.  621 ;  State  v.  Donnelly,  130  Mo. 
642,  32  S.  W.  1 124;  Lawhead  v.  State, 
46  Xeb.  607,  65  N.  W.  779;  Bacon 
V.  State,  22  Fla.  51,  79;  State  v.  Har- 
kins,  100  Mo.  666,  13  S.  W.  830; 
People  V.   Dyle,  21    N.  Y.  578,   579; 


Wisdom  V.  People,  11  Colo.  170,  174, 
17  Pac.  519;  Rountree  v.  State,  88 
Ga.  457,  458;  Wixson  v.  People,  5 
Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  119,  128;  People 
V.  O'Brien,  60  :Mich.  8,  14,  26  N.  W. 
795 ;  Lindsay  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143, 
154;  State  V.  iMiller,  97  X.  Car.  484, 
487,  2  S.  E.  363 ;  Olive  v.  State,  1 1 
X^eb.  I,  30,  7  X^.  W.  444;  Common- 
wealth V.  Holmes,  127  IMass.  424,  429, 
435,  34  Am.  39in;  People  v.  Costello, 
I  Denio  (X.  Y.)  83;  Commonwealth 
V.  Bosworth,  22  Pick.  (IMass.)  397; 
Ayers  v.  State,  88  Ind.  275;  Collins 
V.  People,  98  111.  584,  38  Am.  105; 
State  V.  Russell,  33  La.  Ann.  135; 
Juretich  v.  People,  223  111.  484,  79  N. 
E.  181 ;  State  v.  Kelliher,  49  Ore.  77, 
88  Pac.  867;  State  v.  Firmatura,  121 
La.  676,  46  So.  691 ;  Powell  v.  State, 
50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  592,  99  S.  W.  1005 ; 
Criner  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
174,  109  S.  W.  128;  State  V.  Horner, 


7Z 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


128 


And  his  testimony  is  to  be  weighed  by  considering  his  connec- 
tion with  the  crime  and  with  the  accused,  his  interest  in  the  case, 
his  appearance  on  the  stand,  the  reasonableness  of  his  testimony 
and  its  consistency  with  other  facts  proved  in  the  case. 

But  the  jury  is  usually  warned  by  the  court  against  hasty  cre- 
dence of  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice,  and  instructed  that  great 
caution  must  be  employed  in  the  reception  and  consideration  of 
accomplice  evidence,  and  that  it  should  be  submitted  to  the  strict- 
est scrutiny.^-"  So,  too,  juries  are  generally  advised  that  they 
may  acquit  the  accused  if  the  evidence  of  the  accomplice  is  not 
corroborated,  though  a  failure  or  refusal  to  instruct  to  acquit, 
if  his  guilt  is  sustained  solely  by  the  uncorroborated  evidence,  is 
not  error. ^"^ 

The  credibility  of  witnesses,  whether  accomplices  or  not,  is  for 
the  jurv  exclusivelv.^^^ 


I  i\Iarv.  (Del.)  504,  2  Hardesty  178, 
26  Atl.  -/Z^  41  Atl.  139;  Ahearn  v. 
United  States,  158  Fed.  606,  85  C.  C. 
A.  428;  Caldwell  v.  State,  50  Fla.  4, 
39  So.  188;  Stone  v.  State,  118  Ga. 
705,  45  S.  E.  630,  98  Am.  St.  I45n; 
Crenshaw  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
77,  85  S.  W.  1 147;  State  V.  Wigger, 
196  Mo.  90,  93  S.  W.  390;  State  v. 
Simon,  71  X.  J.  L.  142,  58  Atl.  107; 
State  V.  Carey,  76  Conn.  342,  56  Atl. 
632 :  People  V.  Feinberg,  237  111.  348, 
86  N.  E.  584;  State  v.  Stewart  (Del.), 
d"]  Atl.  786;  Commonwealth  v.  Bren- 
nor,  194  Mass.  17,  79  X.  E.  799;  State 
V.  Hauser,  112  La.  313,  36  So.  396. 

^"°  The  earliest  case  where  corrobo- 
ration was  hinted  at  as  necessary  was 
Smith's  Case,  i  Leach  C.  L.  323, 
where,  the  prosecution  being  imable 
to  identify  the  criminal,  the  court 
thought  it  dangerous  to  let  the  case 
go  to  the  jury  on  accomplice  evidence 
alone.  See  also.  Wisdom  v.  People, 
II  Colo.  170,  174,  17  Pac.  519;  State  v. 
Stebbins,  29  Conn.  463,  79  Am.  Dec. 
223;  Earll  V.  People,  "/Z  111.  329; 
United    States   v.    Sacia,   2   Fed.    754, 


758;  United  States  v.  Ybanez,  53  Fed. 
536,  540;  State  V.  Sprague,  149  Mo. 
409,  50  S.  W.  901 ;  United  States  v. 
Richards,  149  Fed.  443 ;  State  v.  Stew- 
art (Del.),  67  Atl.  786;  Walker  v. 
State,  118  Ga.  757,  45  S.  E.  608; 
Stone  V.  State,  118  Ga.  705,  45  S.  E. 
630,  98  Am.  St.  I45n ;  Jahnke  v.  State 
(Xeb.),  104  X.  W.  154- 

^^°  Archer  v.  State,  106  Ind.  426, 
434,  7  X.  E.  225 ;  State  v.  Michel,  1 1 1 
La.  434,  35  So.  629;  State  v.  Potter, 
42  Vt.  495,  506;  State  V.  Litchfield, 
58  Me.  267,  270;  Ingalls  v.  State,  48 
Wis.  647,  653,  4  N.  W.  785 ;  State  v. 
Miller,  97  X.  Car.  484,  2  S.  E.  363; 
Carroll  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Pa.  St. 
107,  121;  Wisdom  V.  People,  11  Colo. 
170,  174,  17  Pac.  519;  Allen  v.  State, 
10  Ohio  St.  287,  306;  Rice  v.  State, 
SO  Tex.  Cr.  App.  648,  100  S.  W.  771. 

"'  While  the  degree  of  credit  to  be 
given  to  the  testimony  of  an  accom- 
plice in  a  criminal  case  is  a  matter 
within  the  exclusive  province  of  the 
jury,  who  may  as  matter  of  law  con- 
vict on  such  testimony  alone,  yet  to 
warrant  a  conviction  such  testimony 


129  "^HE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    74 

The  subject  of  the  credibihty  of  the  testimony  of  an  accompHce 
and  the  necessity  for  corroboration  in  order  to  sustain  a  conviction 
are  involved  in  some  confusion.  The  propositions  that  an  accused 
person  may  be  convicted  on  the  evidence  of  an  accompHce  alone, 
and  that  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  must  be  corroborated,  are 
both  sound,  though  they  involve  a  seeming  inconsistency.  The 
prposition  that  an  accomplice  must  be  corroborated  does  not 
mean  that  there  must  be  cumulative  or  independent  testimony  to 
the  same  facts  to  which  he  has  testified.  So,  evidence  in  a  murder 
case  that  a  coat,  belonging  to  deceased,  was  found  in  defendant's 
possession  is  proper  corroboration,  though  the  accomplice  testi- 
fied only  to  the  killing  and  not  to  the  taking  of  the  coat.^^" 

'Tf  the  testimony  of  the  accomplice,  his  manner  of  testifying, 
his  appearance  upon  the  witness  stand,  impress  the  jury  with  the 
truth  of  his  statement,  there  is  no  inflexible  rule  of  law  which 
prevents  a  conviction."-"^ 

§  74.  Extent  of  corroboration  required — It  must  be  of  material 
facts. — From  early  times  it  has  been  the  rule^^*  that  the  corrobora- 
tion need  not  include  every  material  fact  testified  to  by  the  ac- 
complice, for,  if  he  is  confirmed  in  some  material  particulars,  the 
jury  may  believe  him  in  others. ^^^ 

should    usually    be    corroborated    in  charge  that  it  was  dangerous  to  act 

some  material  part,  although  the  cor-  exclusively   on    the    testimony   of   an 

roboration    need    not    extend    to    all  accomplice,  and  that  the  jury  should 

matters  testified  to  by  the  accomplice,  require  confirmatory  testimonj^  or  to 

and    the    jury    should    also    consider  charge    that    the    unsupported    testi- 

whether  he  has  been  successfully  con-  mony  of  an  accomplice  must  produce 

tradicted  with  respect  to  any  material  entire    belief;    when    the    court    did 

portion    of    his    testimony.      United  charge    on   reasonable    doubt,    telling 

States  V.  Giuliani,  147  Fed.  594.  the  jury  that,  while  they  might  con- 

"■  Malachi  v.   State,  89  Ala.   134,  8  vict  on  the  testimony  of  the  accom- 

So.  104.  plice,  they  should  be  cautious   in  so 

"'Cox  V.   Commonwealth,   125   Pa.  doing.    State  v.  Register,  133  N.  Car. 

St.   94,   103,    17  Atl.  227;    Collins   V.  746,  46  S.  E.  21. 

People,    98    111.    584,    38    Am.     105;  ^^  Rex  v.  Swallow,  31  How.  St.  Tr. 

L'nited  States  v.  Ybanez,  53  Fed.  536,  97 1- 

540.     An    instruction    that    the    jury  ^"^  State  v.  Allen,  57  Iowa  431,  lO  N. 

must  carefully  consider  the  testimony  W.  805 ;  United  States  v.  Howell,  56 

of  a  certain  witness  as  he  stood  be-  Fed.  21 ;  United  States  v.  Ybanez,  53 

fore    the    jury    as    an    accomplice    is  Fed.  536,  538,  541 ;  People  v.   Elliott, 

proper.     It  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  106  N.  Y.  288,    12  N.   E.  602;  Com- 
9 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


§  74  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  I3O 

The  jury  are  not  limited  to  believing  the  evidence  of  the  ac- 
complice only  upon  those  facts  which  are  actually  proved  by 
other  evidence.  Such  an  absurd  construction  of  the  rule  requiring- 
corroboration  w^ould  be,  in  effect,  to  receive  the  evidence  and  let 
it  go  to  the  jury,  while  practically  forbidding  them  to  believe  it. 
If  independent  corroboration  is  required  from  other  witnesses,  it 
must  refer  to  that  portion  of  the  testimony  which  is  material  to 
the  prisoner's  guilt.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  corroboration 
should  be  sufficient  to  prove  the  crime  or  to  connect  the  defendant 
with  it.^^*'  Nor  need  the  corroboration  be  wholly  inconsistent  with 
the  theory  of  the  defense.^^^ 

But  the  corroborative  evidence,  whether  consisting  of  acts  or 
admissions,  in  itself  and  without  that  of  the  accomplice,  must  at 
least  tend  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  by  connecting  him  with 
the  crime ;  for  it  is  a  matter  of  no  importance  to  corroborate  the 
accomplice  on  irrelevant  or  immaterial  details,  or  to  show  that 
he  has  not  perjured  himself  in  stating  matters  not  pertinent  to 
the  issue,  and  upon  which  he  had  no  interest  to  testify  falsely/^'^ 

The  corroborative  evidence  is  sufficient,  though  it  may  not  bear 
directly  upon  any  particular  fact  which  has  been  stated  in  the  evi- 
dence of  the  accomplice.^^^ 

monwealth  v.  Holmes,  127  Mass.  424,  Bunkers,  2  Cal.  App.  197,  84  Pac.  364, 

431,  34  Am.  39in;  Rex  v.  Addis,  6  C.  370;    Commonwealth  v.    Holmes,    127 

&  P.  388;  Commonwealth  v.  Brooks,  Mass.  424,  439,  34  Am.  39in. 

9  Gray   (Mass.)  299;  People  v.  Balk-  ^^"Commonwealth    v.    Holmes,    127 

well,    143    Cal.    259,    '/6    Pac.    1017;  ]\Iass.  424,  441,  34  Am.  39in;  Scott  v. 

Cook  V.  State,  75  Ark.  540,  87  S.  W.  State,   63    Ark.    310,   38    S.    W.    339; 

1176;  State  V.  Black,  143  Mo.  166,  44  Mann  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  79  S. 

S.  W.  340;  McCrory  v.  State,  loi  Ga."  W.  230,  25  Ky.  L.  1964;  United  States 

779,  28  S.  E.  921 ;  Hargrove  v.  State,  v.  Lancaster,  44  Fed.  896,  922,   10  L. 

125  Ga.  270,  54  S.  E.  164 ;  Lanasa  v.  R.  A.  333 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Savory, 

State  (Md.),  71  Atl.  1058.  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  535;  Rex  v.  Wilkes, 

"'"  People  V.  Badgley,  16  Wend.  (N.  7  C.  &  P.  272;  Reg.  v.  Birkett,  8  C. 

Y.)  53;  Celender  v.  State  (Ark.),  109  &  P.  72,2;  Reg.  v.  Mullins,  3  Cox  Cr. 

S.  W.  1024.  Cas.  526,  531.     Defendant's  failing  to 

"^People  V.   Ogle,    104  N.   Y.   511,  call  a  material  witness  was  held  suf- 

515,  II  N.  E.  53;  Porter  v.  State,  y6  ficient     corroboration     in     Common- 

Ga.  658.  wealth   v.    Brooks,    9    Gray    (Mass.) 

^"'Altman  v.   State    (Ga.   App.),  6^  299.    So,  too,  a  declaration  by  the  de- 

S.  E.  928;   Chambers  v.   State    (Tex.  fendant  on  his  arrest  that  the  accom- 

Cr.  App.),  44  S.  W.  495;    People  v.  plice  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  crime. 


131  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    74 

The  corroborative  evidence  is  not  necessarily  required  to  show 
a  commission  of  the  crime,  either  is  it  necessary  that  the  whole 
case  should  be  proved  outside  of  an  accomplice,  and  an  instruction 
that  the  corroborative  must  be  wholly  inconsistent  with  the  in- 
nocence of  the  accused  is  not  proper  if  the  corroboration  intends 
to  connect  the  accused  with  the  commission  of  the  crime.  It  comes 
from  an  independent  source  and  bears  upon  material  facts  tending 
to  show  not  only  that  a  crime  was  committed,  but  that  defendant 
was  concerned  in  it,  it  is  sufficient."^^  The  corroboration  or  intent 
to  prove  the  connection  of  the  accused  with  the  crime  for  evidence 
that  merely  excites  suspicion  or  that  intimates  that  accused  may 
be  guilty  of  the  crime  because  he  had  an  opportunity  to  commit 
it  is  not  corroboration.^*** 

But  the  corroboration  must  bear  directly  or  indirectly,  not  upon 
the  general  character  of  the  accomplice  for  truthfulness,  but  upon 
the  question  whether,  in  this  particular  case  and  upon  the  facts 
involved,  his  testimony  is  reliable  and  worthy  of  credit  by  the  jury 
in  determining  the  guilt  of  the  accused.^*^  The  rule  of  the  com- 
mon law  requiring  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  to  be  corrobo- 
rated has  been  confirmed  by  statutes  in  some  states.  In  New  York 
"a  conviction  cannot  be  had  upon  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice, 
unless  he  is  corroborated  by  such  other  evidence  as  tends  to  con- 
nect defendant  with  the  commission  of  the  crime."^'*- 

indicating    that    defendant    knew    all  761 ;    People   v.    Patrick,    182    N.    Y. 

about  it.     Commonwealth  v.  O'Brien,  131,  74  N.  E.  843;   State  v.  Jackson, 

12  Allen  (Mass.)  183.  106  Mo.  174,  17  S.  W.  301;  Crawford 

'"'a  People    V.     Acritelli,    57    Misc.-  v.  State   (Tex.   Cr.  App.),  34  S.  W. 

Rep.  574,  no  N.  Y.  Sup.  430.  927;  Marler  v.  State,  ^J  Ala.  55,  42 

""  People  V.    Sciaroni,  4   Cal.   App.  Am.  95 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Bosworth, 

698,  89  Pac.  133;  Smith  v.  State  (Ga.  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  397;  Commonwealth 

App.),  63  S.  E.  917.  V.    O'Brien,    12    Allen    (Mass.)    183; 

^"Celender    v.    State     (Ark.),    109  State  v.  Allen,  57  Iowa  431,  10  N.  W. 

S.  W.    1024;    People   V.    Barker,    114  805 ;  United  States  v.  Ybanez,  53  Fed. 

Cal.  617,  46  Pac.  601;  People  v.  May-  536;    People  v.   Clough,   "jz  Cal.  348, 

hew,   150   N.  Y.  346,  44   N.  E.  971 ;  352,   15   Pac.    S ;    State   v.   Banks,  40 

State  V.  Turner,  119  X.  Car.  841,  25  La.    Ann.    736,    5    So.    18;    State    v. 

S.  E.  810;  Blois  V.  State,  92  Ga.  584,  Miller,  97  N.  Car.  484,  488,  2  S.  E. 

20  S.  E.  12;  Schoenfeldt  v.  State,  30  363;  Smith  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 

Tex,  App.  695,  18  S.  W.  640;   Simp-  38  S.  W.  200.     And  see  other  cases 

son  V.   Commonwealth,    126  Ky.   441,  fully  cited  in  Underhill  on  Evidence, 

103  S.  W.  ZTy^,  31  Ky.  L.  769;  State  p.  464. 
V.   Ozias,   136  Iowa   175,   113   N.   W.        ^""People  v.   Ellenbogen,    114   App. 


§    75  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  1 32 

Such  a  statute,  it  seems,  prohibits  a  conviction  on  the  uncor- 
roborated evidence  of  an  accomphce,  even  though  the  jury  beheve 
it  and  are  convinced  by  it  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt/''" 

The  evidence  which  the  statutes  rec[uire  in  corroboration  and 
which  tends  to  connect  the  defendant  with  the  commission  of  the 
crime,  must  be  such  evidence  as  will  independently  of  the  evidence 
of  the  accomplice  tend  to  connect  the  accused  with  the  offense."^^ 
And  it  is  not  usually  necessary  or  proper  to  direct  a  jury  to  dis- 
regard all  the  evidence  of  the  accomplice  which  has  not  been  cor- 
roborated according  to  the  statute.  If,  upon  all  the  facts,  the  con- 
nection of  the  accused  with  the  crime  is  proven  without  the  aid  of 
the  evidence  of  the  accomplice  it  may  be  sufficient,  though  all  the 
independent  evidence  does  not  strictly  corroborate  with  what  the 
accomplice  has  testified  to.^*'* 

The  admission  by  the  accused  that  he  was  connected  with  the 
commission  of  the  crime  is  usually  sufficient  corroboration  under 
the  statute.'*^ 

§  75.  The  nature  of  the  crime  as  a  test  of  corroboration — Suffi- 
ciency of  corroboration. — The  character  and  degree  of  corrobora- 
tion which  are  required  may,  to  a  certain  extent,  be  measured  by 
the  enormity  of  the  crime,  the  moral  perversity  involved  in  its 
commission  and  the  punishment.  Hence  conviction  of  a  misde- 
meanor might  be  sustained  without  the  introduction  of  much  in- 

Div.    (N.   Y.)    182,  99  N.  Y.   S.  897,  7^  S.  W.  476;  Hall  v.  State,  52  Tex. 

I  N.  Y.  St.  — ;  Robertson  v.  State,  46  Cr.  App.  250,  106  S.  W.  379 ;  Shilling 

Tex.   Cr.  App.  441,  80   S.  W.   1000;  v.   State,  52  Tex.  Cr.   App.  326,   106 

People  V.  Strauss,  94  App.  Div.   (N.  S.    W.   357;    State  v.    McCarthy,    2>^ 

Y.)   453,  88  N.   Y.   S.  40;   People  v.  Mont.    226,    92    Pac.    521;    State    v. 

Ortega,  7  Cal.  App.  480,  94  Pac.  869;  Bond,    12    Idaho    424,    86    Pac.    43; 

People  V.  Ogle,  104  N.  Y.  511,  515,  11  Cooper    v.    Territory,    19    Okla.    496, 

N.  E.  53;  People  v.  Elliott,  106  N.  Y.  91   Pac.  1032;  State  v.  Carr,  28  Ore. 

288,   292,    12    N.    E.   602;    People   v.  389,  42   Pac.   215;    State  v.   Spencer, 

White,  62  Hun  (N.  Y.)   114;  People  15  Utah  149,49  Pac.  302. 

V.  Mayhew,  150  N.  Y.  346,  44  N.  E.  "^a  People    v.    Compton,    123    Cal. 

971 ;  People  v.  Barry,  196  N.  Y.  507,  89  403,  56  Pac.  44. 

N.  E.  1 107.  ^**  People  v.  Ammon,  179  N.  Y.  540, 

^^'Conant  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  71  N.  E.  1135,  judgment,  92  App.  Div. 

610,    103    S.    W.    897;    McDaniel    v.  (N.  Y.)  205.  87  N.  Y.  S.  358. 

State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  342,  87  S.  \\\  "'  People  v.    Eaton,    122   App.   Div. 

1044;  Custer  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  (N.  Y.)  706,  107  N.  Y.  S.  849. 


133  THE    ACCUSED    AS    A    WITNESS.  §    75 

dependent  and  corroborative  evidence  where  such  evidence  would 
be  required  in  the  case  of  a  felony/*^ 

It  would  be  illogical  to  place  accomplices  in  every  character  of 
crime  upon  the  same  footing.  Evidently  the  nature  of  the  crime 
in  which  the  accomplice  is  involved  must  vary  the  weight  that  a 
jury  will  accord  to  his  testimony ;  while  the  reasonableness  of  his 
story  and  his  manner  of  testifying,  are  considerations  affecting  his 
credibility  and  tending  to  shape  the  advice  of  the  judge.  If  the 
crime  be  free  from  moral  turpitude,  the  story  which  he  tells  rea- 
sonable, and  the  manner  of  its  relation  evincive  of  truthfulness, 
the  jury  might,  even  under  the  influence  of  the  strongest  caution, 
feel  bound  to  believe  and  convict.  To  deny  a  conviction  legal  sup- 
port under  such  circumstances  would  be  to  take  from  the  jury 
their  right  of  judgment  upon  the  weight  of  the  testimony,  and 
to  compel  them  to  find  against  their  conviction  of  truth. ^*^  The 
evidence  of  the  accomplice  may  be  corroborated  by  the  confession 
of  the  accused;^**  but  not  by  the  accomplice  testifying  that  the 
accused  had  stated  to  him  that  he  intended  to  commit  other  dis- 
tinct crimes/*'' 

Whether  the  evidence  of  the  accomplice  shall  go  to  the  jury  is 
a  question  for  the  judge,  and,  before  submitting  it  to  them,  he 
should  be  satisfied  that  there  is  some  corroboration.  If  corrobora- 
tive circumstances  are  proved  from  which,  with  the  evidence  of 
the  accomplice,  reasonable  men  may  infer  the  existence  of  the 
guilt  of  the  accused,  the  court  may  submit  the  evidence  of  the 
accomplice  to  the  jury.  But  whether  the  testimony  of  the  accom- 
plice is  corroborated  so  that  the  prisoner's  guilt  is  shown  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  is  a  question  for  them  to  determine.^'''*  Cor- 
roboration by  independent  evidence  is  not  dispensed  with  where 

'^'Bell   V.    State,   73   Ga.   572,    574;  896,  921,  10  L.  R.  A.  333 ;  Schoenfeldt 

Rex  V.  Jarvis,  2  Moo.  &  R.  40;  Reg.  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  695,  18  S.  W. 

V.    Young,    TO    Cox    Cr.    Cas.    371 ;  640. 

United   States   v.   Kessler,   Bald.    (U.        "'' Kinchelow    v.    State,    5    Humph. 

S.)  15,  22,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15528;  Under-  (Tenn.)  9,  12. 
hill  on  Evidence,  p.  463,  note  4.  ""Commonwealth    v.    Holmes,    127 

"*  State  V.  Hyer,  39  N.  J.  L.  598,  Mass.  424,  437,  34  Am.  39in ;  People 

602.  V.  Everhardt,  104  N.  Y.  591,  SO4,   n 

"'Partee  v.  State,  67  Ga.  570,  572;  N.  E.  62. 
United   States  v.   Lancaster,  44  Fed. 


§  75 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


134 


several  accomplices  testify  against  the  accused.    The  accomplices 
are  not  deemed  to  corroborate  each  other.^^^ 


^"Whitlow  V.  State  (Tex.  App.), 
18  S.  W.  86s;  United  States  v.  Hinz, 
35  Fed.  -^2',  People  v.  O'Neil,  109 
N.  Y.  251,  16  N.  E.  68;  State  v.  W^il- 
liamson,  42  Conn.  261.  A  failure  to 
so  charge  is  error.  McConnell  v. 
State  (Tex.  App.),  18  S.  W.  645; 
Schwartz  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 


114  S.  W.  809;  People  V.  Creegan, 
121  Cal.  554,  S3  Pac.  1082.  Whether 
the  corroborating  witness  was  an  ac- 
complice is  for  the  jury.  It  may  be 
assumed  from  a  verdict  of  guilty 
that  the  jury  believed  him  not  to  be 
an  accomplice.  People  v.  Creigan, 
121  Cal.  554,  53  Pac.  1082, 


CHAPTER  VII. 


CHARACTER    OF    THE   ACCUSED. 


§  ^d.  Character  defined — The  accused 
may  show  good  character. 

77.  Specific    traits    only    relevant — 

Character  of  associates. 

78.  Bad    character — When    admissi- 

ble. 

79.  Effect  and  operation  of  evidence 

of  good  character. 

80.  Good    character,    though    never 

conclusive,    may    acqtiit    if    it 
creates  a  reasonable  doubt. 


81. 


82. 
83. 

84. 


Mode  of  proof — Irrelevancy  of 
personal  opinions  —  Deroga- 
tory rumors  in  rebuttal. 

Specific  evil  acts — Relevancy  of. 

Remoteness  —  Character  subse- 
quent to  the  date  of  the  crime. 

The  grade  and  moral  nature  of 
the  crime. 

Disposition  is  irrelevant. 

Number  of  witnesses  to  charac- 
ter. 

\.  Instructions  as  to  the  character 
of  the  accused. 


§  76.    Character  defined — The  accused  may  show  good  character. — 

The  character  of  the  accused  means  his  reputation,  /.  e.,  the  gen- 
eral consensus  of  opinion  regarding  him  and  his  conduct  based  on 
his  deportment  and  conduct,  which  is  held  by  his  neighbors, 
friends  and  acquaintances.    The  accused  may  always  prove  his 


good  character.^ 


HVay  V.  State  (Ala.),  46  So.  273; 
Lewis  v.  State  (Miss.),  47  So.  467; 
Hall  v.  State,  132  Ind.  317,  323, 
31  N.  E.  536;  State  v.  Donohoo,  22 
W.  Va.  761,  764;  State  v.  Schleagel, 
50  Kan.  325,  328,  31  Pac.  1105;  Peo- 
ple v.  Ashe,  44  Cal.  '?88,  291 ;  Grifiin 
V.  State,  14  Ohio  St.  55,  63;  State  v. 
Kinley,  43  Iowa  294,  296.  The  repu- 
tation which  is  relevant  is  reputation 
generally  among  all  classes  in  the 
community  where  the  accused  re- 
sides, and  not  his  reputation  among 
a  particular  class,  as  "among  his  fel- 
low workmen."  State  v.  Brady,  71  N. 
J.  L.  360,  59  Atl.  6. 

(I 


In  General. 
Note  on  right  of  defendant  in  crim- 
inal cases  to  prove  character,  20  L.  R. 
A.  613;  note  on  proof  of  character  of 
person  accused  of  crime,  20  L.  R.  A. 
609,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  735,  103  Am. 
St.  889,  Elliott  on  Ev.,  §  3038 ;  note  on 
good  character  of  accused  restricted  to 
traits  involved  in  offense,  103  Am.  St. 
892 ;  note  on  evidence  of  good  charac- 
ter of  accused  where  the  incrimina- 
ting evidence  is  positive,  103  Am.  St. 
908,  909 ;  note  on  what  constitutes  rep- 
utation, 103  Am.  St.  895 ;  note  on  gen- 
eral rule  as  to  admissil)ility  of  evi- 
dence of  good  character  of  accused, 

35) 


76 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


136 


If,  however,  he  offers  no  evidence  of  good  character,  the  law 
presumes  he  has  a  fair  and  respectable,  if  not,  indeed,  an  excellent 
character,  and  does  not  permit  any  presumption  of  guilt  to  arise 
from  his  silence  as  to  his  character  or  from  his  failure  to  offer 
evidence  on  this  point.  That  his  character  is  bad  can  never  be 
])resumed  with  proof,  nor  should  the  prosecution  be  permitted  to 
comment  unfavorably  upon  his  omission  to  offer  evidence  of 
character.- 


103  Am.  St.  891 ;  note  on  competency 
of  witness  to  testify  as  to  character  of 
accused,  103  Am.  St.  894;  note  on  ad- 
missibility of  evidence  of  good  char- 
acter of  accused  to  create  doubt,  103 
Am.  St.  891 ;  note  on  evidence  as  to 
good  character  of  accused  where  the 
evidence  against  him  is  circumstantial, 
103  Am.  St.  907;  note  on  evidence  to 
rebut  evidence  of  good  character  of 
accused,  103  Am.  St.  893,  894,  895,  20 
L.  R.  A.  616;  note  on  evidence  to 
strengthen  the  presumption  of  inno- 
cence, 103  Am.  St.  892;  note  on  evi- 
dence of  good  character  of  accused  to 
rebut  presumption  from  possession  of 
stolen  goods,  20  L.  R.  A.  614;  note 
on  negative  evidence  of  good  charac- 
ter of  accused,  103  Am.  St.  895;  note 
on  cross-examination  as  to  character 
of  accused ;  note  on  right  to  question 
as  to  good  character  of  accused  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury,  103  Am.  St.  889; 
note  on  evidence  as  to  good  character 
of  accused  where  the  intent  must  be 
shown,  103  Am.  St.  906. 

Specific  Offenses. 

Note  on  evidence  of  good  charac- 
ter, in  prosecution  for  arson,  103  Am. 
St.  902;  in  prosecution  for  counter- 
feiting, 103  Am.  St.  903;  in  prosecu- 
tion for  obtaining  money  by  false  pre- 
tenses, 103  Am.  St.  902 ;  in  prosecution 
for  homicide,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  352, 
103  Am.   St.  897,  899;  Elliott  Ev.,  § 


3039;  in  prosecution  for  criminal  libel, 
103  Am.  St.  900;  in  prosecution  for 
violating  election  or  liquor  laws,  103 
Am.  St.  903 ;  in  prosecution  for  per- 
jury, 103  Am.  St.  902:  in  prosecution 
for  larceny  or  robbery,  103  Am.  St. 
901 ;  in  prosecution  for  rape,  103  Am. 
St.  899;  in  prosecution  for  imlawfully 
carrying  firearms,  103  Am.  St.  904. 

"  State  v.  Dockstader,  42  Iowa  436 ; 
Ackley  v.  People  (burglary),  9  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  609,  611;  McQueen  v.  State, 
82  Ind.  72,  73;  Ormsby  v.  People,  53 
N.  Y.  472,  475 ;  Donoghoe  v.  People, 
6  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  120.  124:  State  v. 
Upham  (counterfeiting),  38  Me.  261, 
263;  State  v.  O'Neal,  7  Ired.  (N. 
Car.)  251,  252;  People  v.  Bodine,  i 
Denio  (N.  Y.)  281.  Contra,  State  v. 
McAllister,  24  Me.  139 ;  State  v.  Kab- 
rich,  39  Iowa  277.  Counsel  for  the 
accused  may  comment  on  the  pre- 
sumption of  good  character,  but  may 
not  discuss  the  good  character  of  the 
accused  unless  some  evidence  of  it 
has  been  offered.  Cluck  v.  State,  40 
Ind.  263,  270,  271.  The  fact  that  the 
accused  does  not  testify  as  a  witness 
does  not  prevent  him  from  proving 
his  good  character.  State  v.  Hice, 
T17  N.  Car.  782,  23  S.  E.  357.  It  was 
error  for  the  prosecuting  attorney  to 
remark  in  his  argument  to  the  jury 
that  defendant  had  a  right  under  the 
law  to  offer  evidence  of  good  char- 
acter, and  the  fact  that  he  did  not  do 


137 


CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED. 


77 


The  accused  starts  out  with  the  presumption  of  innocence.  His 
good  character,  if  it  be  proved,  will  strengthen  this.  Its  relevancy 
depends  solely  upon  the  inference  that  any  reasonable  man  ought 
to  draw  that  the  accused  is  not  guilty,  because  experience  teaches 
that  it  is  improbable  that  a  man  of  good  character  would  commit 
any  crime  or  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged.^ 

§  77.  Specific  traits  only  relevant — Character  of  associates. — In  a 
criminal  prosecution,  evidence  of  accused's  general  good  character 
is  admissible  only  when  limited  to  the  particular  trait  involved  in 
the  nature  of  the  charge.  The  traits  of  character  which  may  be 
proved  must  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  crime  alleged  and  the 
moral  wrong  which  is  involved  in  its  commission.* 


so  was  sufficient  evidence  of  bad 
character,  and  tliat  the  attorney  had 
a  right  to  comment  thereon.  State  v. 
Williams,  122  Iowa  115,  97  N.  W. 
992. 

^  "The  object  of  laying  evidence  of 
character  before  the  jury  is  to  induce 
them  to  believe,  from  the  improba- 
bility that  a  person  of  good  character 
would  commit  crime,  that  there  is  a 
mistake  or  misrepresentation  on  the 
part  of  the  prosecution."  Rex  v. 
Stannard,  7  C.  &  P.  (^TZ-  "This  pre- 
sumption a'gainst  the  commission  of 
crime  arises  from  the  general  im- 
probability proved  by  common  obser- 
vation and  experience,  that  a  person 
who  has  uniformly  pursued  an  honest 
and  upright  course  of  conduct  will 
depart  from  jt.  *  *  *  Such  a  person 
may  be  overcome  by  temptation  and 
fall  into  crime,  and  cases  of  that 
kind  often  occur,  but  they  are  excep- 
tions ;  the  general  rule  is  otherwise. 
*  *  *  The  influence  of  the  pre- 
sumption may  be  slight  when  the  ac- 
cusation of  crime  is  supported  by  the 
direct  and  positive  testimony  of  cred- 
ible witnesses.  It  will  seldom  avail 
to  control  the  mind  where  the  testi- 


mony, though  circumstantial,  is  reli- 
able, strong  and  clear.  If  the  evi- 
dence is  nearly  balanced,  but  slightly 
preponderant  against  the  defendant, 
the  presumption  from  proof  of  good 
character  is  entitled  to  great  weight 
and  will  often  be  sufficient  to  turn 
the  scale  and  produce  an  acquittal." 
Cancemi  v.  People,  16  N.  Y.  50T,  506. 
^Balkum  v.  State,  115  Ala.  117,  22 
So.  532,  (i"]  Am.  St.  19;  People  v. 
Bezy,  67  Cal.  223,  7  Pac.  643;  State 
V.  Emery,  59  Vt.  84,  90,  7  Atl.  129; 
People  V.  Garbutt,  \-  Alich.  9,  97  Am. 
Dec.  i62n ;  Kahlenbeck  v.  State,  119 
Ind.  118,  121,  21  N.  E.  460;  Gordon 
V.  State,  3  Iowa  410,  415;  State  v. 
Dexter,  115  Iowa  678,  87  N.  W.  417; 
Basye  v.  State,  45  Neb.  261,  (>Z  N.  W. 
811;  People  V.  Josephs  (rape),  7  Cal. 
129,  130;  People  V.  Fair  (homicide), 
43  Cal.  137,  148-15 1 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Nagle,  157  Mass.  554,  32  N.  E. 
861;  Gandolfo  v.  State  (homicide), 
II  Ohio  St.  114,  117;  Coffee  v.  State, 
I  Tex.  App.  548,  550;  Kee  v.  State, 
28  Ark.  15s,  164 ;  Westbrooks  v.  State, 
"](>  Miss.  710,  25  So.  49T ;  Griffin  v. 
State,  14  Ohio  St.  55,  63;  State  v. 
King,  78  Mo.  555,  556;  State  v.  Ken- 


77 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


138 


Thus  evidence  that  the  accused  was  generally  reputed  to  be  a 
quiet,  peaceable  and  inoffensive  man  is  always  relevant  in  cases 
of  homicide,  and  particularly  so  under  a  plea  of  self-defense. 
And,  illogical  as  it  may  seem,  this  evidence  has  been  admitted  in 
a  case  of  homicide  by  poisoning  upon  the  theory  that  such  traits 
of  character,  being  inconsistent  with  a  disposition  to  take  life  by 
one  method,  would  be  equally  inconsistent  with  homicide  by 
another.'^ 

In  a  prosecution  for  theft  a  witness  may  testify  to  the  general 
reputation  as  to  honesty  and  integrity,  but  may  not  state  that  he 
never  heard  of  accused  failing  to  return  any  money  which  came 
into  his  hands.*' 

Evidence  of  general  good  character  has  been  rejected  in  a 
prosecution  for  rape,  though  upon  this  point  the  cases  are  not 
wholly  in  harmony/ 


ned3%  177  ]\Io.  98,  75  S.  W.  979 ;  Lake 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  104  S.  W. 
1003,  31  Ky.  L.  1232;  State  v.  Bessa, 
115  La.  259,  38  So.  985;  Saye  v.  State, 
50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  569,  99  S.  W.  551; 
Harper  v.  United  States,  7  Ind.  Terr. 
437,  104  S.  W.  673;  Dungan  v.  State, 
135  Wis.  151,  115  N.  W.  350;  Arnold 
V.  State,  131  Ga.  494,  62  S.  E.  806; 
State  V,  Griggsby,  117  La.  1046,  42 
So.  497;  Smith  V.  State,  142  Ala.  14, 
39  So.  329;  I  Taylor  Evid.,  §  326;  i 
Greenl.  Evid.,  §  54.  Some  authorities 
hold  that  evidence  of  good  character 
need  not  be  confined  to  the  trait  in- 
volved, particularly  in  capital  cases. 
Hopps  V.  People,  31  HI-  385,  388,  83 
Am.  Dec.  231 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hardy,  2  Mass.  303,  317;  People  v. 
Vane,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  78;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Webster,  5  Cush. 
(Mass.)  295,  32s,  52  Am.  Dec.  71  in, 
but  see  as  sustaining  the  text. 

Xote  that  evidence  of  defendant's 
character  be  applicable  to  trait  in- 
volved, 20  L.  R.  A.  612;  note  on  ad- 
mfssibility  of  particular  acts  and  spe- 
cific traits  of  defendant  generally,  20 


L.  R.  A.  614;  evidence  of  specific  in- 
stances to  prove  character  in  prose- 
cution for  homicide,  14  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  708;  note  on  impeachment  of  de- 
fendant's character  for  credibility,  20 
L.  R.  A.  616. 

Character  of  Others. 

Note  on  character  of  accomplices, 
20  L.  R.  A.  614;  character  of  inmates 
or  visitors  in  prosecution  for  keeping 
disorderly  house,  20  L.  R.  A.  612,  El- 
liott Ev.,  §  2722;  character  of  victims 
of  crime,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  352,  17 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  708,  722- 

^Hall  V.  State,  132  Ind.  317,  324, 
31  N.  E.  536.  But  evidence  that  the 
character  of  the  accused  for  honesty 
was  bad  is  not  relevant  in  homicide 
to  prove  the  killing  or  to  show  malice. 
People  V.  Cowgill,  93  Cal.  596,  597,  29 
Pac.  228. 

"  Leonard  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
187,  109  S.  W.  149. 

'  People  V.  Josephs,  7  Cal.  129,  130. 
Contra,  State  v.  Lee,  22  Minn.  407- 
409,  21  Am.  769. 


139  CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED.  §    78 

Thus,  in  rape  a  question  as  to  the  reputation  of  the  accused  in 
the  community  may  properly  be  disallowed.  Reputation  is  too 
broad.  The  proper  question  would  be  as  to  his  reputation  for 
chastity  and  morality,  using  the  latter  term  in  its  restricted  sense 
of  the  absence  of  impurity  in  sexual  relations.^ 

So  in  a  prosecution  for  embezzlement,  the  general  reputation 
of  the  accused  for  honesty  may  be  proved,  but  his  reputation  for 
telling  the  truth  is  not  admissible.^ 

So,  too,  in  a  prosecution  for  larceny,  evidence  of  character  must 
bear  directly  on  the  honesty  and  financial  integrity  of  the  ac- 
cused.^° 

Though  the  accused  may  prove  his  own  character,  he  will  not 
be  permitted  to  prove  that  others  conspiring  with  him  and  jointly 
indicted/^  or  who  are  suspected  of  complicity  in  the  crime,^^  are 
men  of  good  character.  This  evidence  is  not  in  the  least  relevant 
to  show  his  innocence,  as  the  fact  that  the  friends  or  acquaintances 
of  the  accused  are  men  of  unimpeachable  character,  in  no  way 
proves  that  he  is  a  person  of  good  character. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  the  admission  of  evidence 
showing  the  bad  character  of  a  co-defendant,  if  separately  tried,  is 
not  error. ^' 

§  78.  Bad  character — ^Wheii  admissible. — Except  so  far  as  the 
character  of  the  accused  for  veracity  may  be  attacked  when  he  is  a 
witness,  the  state  cannot  show  his  bad  character  in  the  first  in- 
stance, i.  e.,  before  he  offers  to  prove  his  good  character/*  When- 

*  State  V.  Brady,  71  N.  J.  L.  360,  59  ^^Aneals  v.  People,  134  III.  401,  415, 

Atl.  6.  25  N.  E.   1022,  1026.     The  defendant 

'  State  V.   Hoffman,  134  Iowa  587,  cannot  be  questioned  as  to  the  bad 

112  N.  W.  103.  character  of  his  relatives,  who  are  in 

"  State  V.  Bloom,  68  Ind.  54-57,  34  no  way  connected  with  the  crime. 
Am.  247;  Butler  v.  State,  91  Ala.  87,  Vale  v.  People,  161  III.  309,  43  N.  E. 
9  So.  191;  Hays  v.  State,  no  Ala.  23,  1091.  The  failure  of  the  court  to 
20  So.  322;  People  V.  Ryder,  151  charge  on  the  evidence  of  good  char- 
Mich.  187,  114  N.  W.  1021;  State  v.  acter  offered  by  the  accused  is  not, 
Conlan,  3  Penn.  (Del.)  218,  50  Atl.  95.  in  the  absence  of  a  request  by  him, 

"Walls  V.  State,  125  Ind.  400,  403,  erroneous.    State  v.  IMurphy,  118  Mo. 

25    N.    E.    457 ;    Omer   v.    Common-  7,  25  S.  W.  95,  96,  98. 

wealth    (homicide),  95  Ky.   353,  362,  "Felsenthal  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 

25  S.  W.  594,  596,  15  Ky.  L.  694.  67s,  ^T7>    t8   S.    W.   644,   645 :    Peo- 

"  State  V.  Staton,  114  N.  Car.  813,  pie  v.  McXane,  143  N.  Y.  455,  473,  38 

818,  19  S.  E.  96.  N.   E.  950;   McDonald  v.  Common- 


§  7^ 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


140 


ever  the  accused  shall  introduce  evidence  of  good  character,  re- 
butting evidence  to  show  his  bad  character,  but  only  as  regards 
the  trait  involved  in  the  crime  charged  against  him,  is  always  ad- 
missible.^° 

And  this  is  the  rule  even  though  the  evidence  of  good  character 
was  elicited  upon  the  cross-examination  of  the  witnesses  for  the 
state." 

To  admit  evidence  of  bad  character  against  the  accused,  it  is 
necessary  that  he  shall  have  already  put  his  character  clearly  and 
expressly  in  issue. ^'^ 


wealth,  86  Ky.  10,  13,  4  S.  W.  687, 
9  Ky,  L.  230;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hardy,  2  Mass.  303,  318;  Montgom- 
ery V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  30  S. 
W.  602,  17  Ky.  L.  94;  State  v.  Thur- 
tell  (larceny),  29  Kan.  148;  Carter 
V.  State,  2,^  Neb.  481,  54  N.  W.  853; 
State  V.  Kabrich,  39  Iowa  277,  278; 
PauH  V.  Commonwealth,  89  Pa.  St. 
432,  435 ;  State  v.  Ellwood,  17  R.  I. 
763,  766,  24  Atl.  782 ;  State  v.  Lapage, 
57  N.  H.  245,  24  Am.  693;  State  v. 
Creson,  38  Mo.  372;  State  v.  O'Neal, 
7  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  251,  253;  Griffin 
V.  State,  14  Ohio  St.  55,  62, ;  Carter 
V.  Commonwealth,  2  Va.  Cas.  169; 
Cluck  V.  State,  40  Ind.  263,  270,  271 ; 
State  V.  Upham,  38  Me.  261,  263. 
Where  the  defendant  introduces  evi- 
dence to  show  good  character  in  one 
community  where  he  has  lived  the 
state  may  show  his  bad  character  in 
another.  State  v.  Foster,  91  Iowa 
164,  59  N.  W.  8.  Cf.  State  v.  Espin- 
ozei,  20  Nev.  209,  19  Pac.  677.  See 
also,  sustaining  text.  State  v.  Nussen- 
holtz,  76  Conn.  92,  55  Atl.  589;  State 
V.  Thompson,  127  Iowa  440,  103  N. 
W.  377;  People  v.  Murphy,  T46  Cal. 
502,  80  Pac.  709;  Puryear  v.  State, 
50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  454,  98  S.  W.  258; 
State  v.  Richardson,  T94  Mo.  326,  92 
S.  W.  649:  Newman  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  88  S.  W.  1089,  28  Ky. 


L.  81 ;  People  v.  Hinksman,  192  N.  Y. 
421,  85  N.  E.  676. 

Note  on  evidence  of  bad  character 
of  accused,  103  Am.  St.  893;  at- 
tacking defendant's  character,  20  L. 
R.  A.  69,  20  L.  R.  A.  610  (disorderly 
house)  ;  note  on  admissibility  of  evi- 
dence of  bad  character  of  deceased  in 
prosecution  for  homicide,  2  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)   102. 

^°  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App. 
565,  572;  Maxwell  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  78  S.  W.  516;  Cook  v.  State, 
46  Fla.  20,  35  So.  665. 

"  Reg.  v.  Gadbury!^  8  C.  &  P.  676. 
Evidence  of  bad  character  is  gov- 
erned by  the  same  rules  whether 
elicited  from  independent  witnesses 
or  on  the  cross-examination  of  the 
accused.  Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194, 
221,  63  Am.  Dec.  269;  Commonwealth 
V.  O'Brien,  119  Mass.  342,  345,  20  Am. 
325.  The  state  may  show  the  actual 
reputation  of  the  defendant,  though 
doing  so  may  entail  an  inquiry  into 
his  political  or  religious  belief.  Peo- 
ple V.  McKane,  143  N.  Y.  455,  473,  38 
N.  E.  950. 

**  People  V.  Fair,  43  Cal.  137;  State 
V.  Beckner,  T94  Mo.  281,  91  S.  W. 
892,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  535n;  Bays 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  .^pp.  548,  99  S. 
W.  561:  Sweatt  V.  State  (.A.la.),  47 
So.  194. 


141 


CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED. 


§    79 


The  fact  that  it  is  incidentally  and  indirectly  referred  to,  as 
when  a  continuance  is  asked  for  because  witnesses  to  good  char- 
acter are  absent,  does  not  let  in  evidence  of  bad  character.^^ 

But  the  rule  protecting  the  character  of  the  accused  from  at- 
tack in  the  first  instance  is  subject  to  a  seeming  exception  if  he 
goes  upon  the  stand  as  a  witness.  If  it  is  expressly  provided,  by 
statute  or  otherwise,  that  he  may  be  examined  or  impeached  as 
any  other  witness,  the  state  may  prove  his  bad  character  for 
veracity  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  him  as  a  witness  (but  for 
no  other  purpose),  before  he  offers  any  evidence  of  good  char- 
acter,-° 

§  79.  Effect  and  operation  of  evidence  of  good  character. — Good 
character  should  be  permitted  to  operate  as  a  positive,  appropriate 
and  substantial  defense.  No  distinction  should  be  made,  in  appli- 
cation and  effect,  between  evidence  to  prove  exculpatory  facts  and 
evidence  to  prove  the  character  of  the  accused.-^ 


"Felsenthal  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
675,  677,  18  S.  W.  644 ;  State  v.  Clon- 
inger,  149  N.  Car.  567,  63  S.  E.  154. 

'°  McDonald  v.  Commonwealth,  86 
K}-.  10,  13,  14,  4  S.  W.  687,  9  Ky.  L. 
230;  State  V.  Cloninger,  149  N.  Car. 
567,  63  S.  E.  154;  Drew  v.  State,  124 
Ind.  9,  23  X.  E.  1098;  Burns  v.  State, 
75  Ohio  St.  407,  79  N.  E.  929;  State 
V.  Cox,  67  Mo.  392.  Where  the  state 
neglects  to  rebut  the  defendant's 
evidence  of  good  character,  it  is  error 
for  the  court  to  charge  "that  the  law 
does  not  permit  the  state  to  attack 
his  character  while  allowing  him  to 
prove  good  character."  The  bene- 
ficial effect  of  the  defendant's  evi- 
dence may  be  nullified  by  the  infer- 
ence which  may  be  drawn  that  the 
prosecution  is  akvays  precluded  from 
attacking  good  character.  People  v. 
Marks,  90  Mich.  555,  51  N.  W.  638. 

"'State  V.  Murphy,  118  Mo.  7,  25 
S.  W.  95,  97;  State  V.  McNally,  87 
Mo.   644,  658,   659;   Lee   v.   State,   2 


Tex.  App.  338,  341 ;  Rex.  v.  Stannard, 
7  C.  &  P.  673;  State  V.  Pucca,  4 
Penn.  (Del.)  71,  55  Atl.  831;  Cannon 
V.  Territory  (Okla.  1909),  99  Pac. 
622;  State  V.  King,  122  Iowa  i,  96  X. 
W.  712. 

X'ote  on  consideration  of  good 
character  of  accused,  103  Am.  St. 
904;  note  on  effect  of  evidence 
of  defendant's  good  character  to  re- 
but presumption  from  possession  of 
stolen  goods,  20  L.  R.  A.  614;  note 
on  effect  of  evidence  of  good  char- 
acter to  create  a  doubt  of  guilt,  20  L. 
R.  A.  617;  note  on  weight  and  effect 
of  evidence  as  to  character,  20  L.  R. 
A.  618,  103  Am.  St.  905;  note  on 
consideration  of  evidence  of  good 
character  in  determining  degree  of 
guilt  or  crime,  20  L.  R.  A.  619;  note 
on  instruction  as  to  effect  of  evi- 
dence of  good  character,  T03  Am.  St. 
893 ;  note  on  instruction  limiting  con- 
sideration of  good  character  to  doubt- 
ful cases,  20  L.  R.  A.  618. 


§  79 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


142 


Both  rest  on  the  same  basis.  A  man's  good  character  is  a  fact 
making  strongly  for  the  inference  that  he  is  innocent,  and  not  a 
mere  make-weight  to  be  thrown  in  the  scale  if  his  guilt  is  trem- 
bling in  the  balance. 

Though  good  character  is  of  especial  importance  w^hen  the  in- 
criminating evidence  is  wdiolly  circumstantial,""  it  is  not  to  be 
rejected,  or  even  disregarded,  wdien  the  evidence  against  the  ac- 
cused is  direct.-^  And,  except  in  a  few  early  cases,-*  its  admissi- 
bility has  never  been  limited  to  doubtful  cases,  or  to  those  in 
which  the  other  evidence  was  contradictory  or  unconvincing.-^ 

The  correct  rule  is  that  in  all  cases  a  good  character,  if  proved, 
the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  must  be  considered.-*^ 


"  Jackson  v.  State,  81  Wis.  127,  138, 
51  N.  W.  89. 

-^  State  V.  Rodman,  62  Iowa  456,  17 
N.  W.  663;  Stover  v.  People,  56  N. 
Y.  31S,  319. 

=*Rex  V.  Turner,  6  How.  St.  Tr. 
565,  613;  Commonwealth  v.  Webster, 
5  Cush.  (Mass.)  295,  52  Am.  Dec. 
7iin;  United  States  v.  Roudenbush, 
I  Bald.  (U.  S.)  514,  27  Fed.  Cas. 
16198.  See  State  v.  Edwards,  13  S. 
Car.  30,  33. 

■^  "It  has  been  usual  to  treat  the 
good  character  of  the  accused  as  evi- 
dence to  be  taken  into  consideration 
only  in  doubtful  cases.  Juries  have 
generally  been  told  that  where  the 
facts  proved  are  such  as  to  satisfy 
their  minds  of  the  guilt  of  the  party, 
character,  however  excellent,  is  no 
subject  for  their  consideration,  but 
when  they  entertain  any  doubt  as  to 
the  guilt  of  the  party,  they  may  prop- 
erly turn  their  attention  to  his  good 
character.  It  is,  however,  submitted 
with  deference,  that  the  good  char- 
acter of  the  party  accused,  when  sat- 
isfactorily established,  is  an  ingredi- 
ent which  ought  always  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury,  together  with  the 
other  facts  and  circumstances  of  the 


case.  The  nature  of  the  charge  and 
the  evidence  by  which  it  is  supported 
will  often  render  such  ingredient  of 
little  or  no  value,  but  the  more  cor- 
rect course  seems  to  be,  not,  in  any 
case,  to  withdraw  it  from  considera- 
tion, but  to  leave  the  jury  to  form 
their  own  conclusion  upon  the  evi- 
dence whether  an  individual,  whose 
character  was  previously  unblem- 
ished, has,  or  has  not,  committed  the 
particular  crime  for  which  he  is 
called  upon  to  answer."    2  Russ.  Cr. 

785. 

-*  People  V.  Van  Dam,  107  Mich. 
425,  65  N.  W.  277 ;  Murphy  v.  State, 
108  Ala.  10,  18  So.  557;  Edgington 
V.  United  States,  164  U.  S.  361,  41  L. 
ed.  467,  17  Sup.  Ct.  72;  McSwean  v. 
State,  113  Ala.  661,  21  So.  211;  Wes- 
ley V.  State,  Z7  Miss.  327,  75  Am. 
Dec.  62;  People  v.  Ashe,  44  Cal.  288, 
293;  United  States  v.  Whitaker,  6 
]McLean  (U.  S.)  342,  344,  28  Fed. 
Cas.  16672;  Cole  v.  State  (Miss.), 
4  So.  577;  State  V.  Holmes,  65  Minn. 
230,  68  N.  W.  1 1 ;  Latimer  v.  State, 
55  Neb.  609,  76  N.  W.  207,  70  Am.  St. 
403;  Harrington  .v.  State,  19  Ohio 
St.  264,  269;  Stewart  v.  State,  22 
Ohio  St.  477,  485;  State  v.  Henry,  5 


143 


CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED. 


§    80 


§  80.  Good  character,  though  never  conclusive,  may  acquit  if  it 
creates  a  reasonable  doubt.— Though  evidence  of  good  character 
should  always  receive  due  consideration,  the  fact  that  the  defend- 
ant has  estabhshed  a  high  character  for  peace  or  honesty  furnishes 
no  reason  why  the  jury  must  beHeve  the  evidence  offered  in  his 
behalf,  if  it  is  weak  or  contradictory."^ 

The  rule  is  that  evidence  of  good  character  must  always  be  con- 
sidered not  alone  but  in  connection  with  all  the  evidence  bearing 
upon  the  question  of  the  guilt  or  the  innocence  of  accused.  The 
jury  have  no  right  to  separate  it  from  the  mass  of  the  testimony, 
and  to  say  that  they  believe  the  accused  has  a  good  character  and 
that  therefor  they  will  disregard  all  the  evidence  of  guilt."- 

An  instruction  in  a  prosecution  for  robbery  that  if  the  jury  are 
satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  prisoner's  guilt,  after  a 
consideration  of  all  the  evidence,  including  that  showing  his  char- 


Jones  (N.  Car.)  65,  66;  State  v. 
Ormiston,  66  Iowa  143,  23  N.  W.  370 ; 
State  V.  Gustafson,  50  Iowa  194,  197; 
Fields  V.  State,  47  Ala.  603,  609,  11 
Am.  771 ;  Carson  v.  State,  50  Ala. 
134,  138;  People  V.  Elliott,  163  N.  Y. 
11;  57  N.  E.  103;  Cancemi  v.  People, 
16  N.  Y.  SOI,  505-507;  Stover  v.  Peo- 
ple, 56  N.  Y.  315,  317;  State  v.  Lep- 
pere,  66  Wis.  355,  28  N.  W.  376 ;  State 
V.  Jones,  52  Iowa  150,  2  N.  W.  1060; 
State  V.  Ford,  3  Strobh.  (S.  Car.) 
517;  Heine  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa. 
St.  145,  148;  Holland  v.  State,  131 
Ind.  568,  571,  31  N.  E.  359;  Lee  v. 
State,  2  Tex.  App.  338,  .341 ;  Kistler 
V.  State,  54  Ind.  400,  405;  Davis  v. 
State,  10  Ga.  loi,  105 ;  Jupitz  v.  Peo- 
ple, 34  111.  516,  521 ;  Remsen  v.  Peo- 
ple, 43  N.  Y.  6,  57  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
324;  People  V.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228, 
15  N.  W.  95;  Commonwealth  v. 
Leonard,  140  Mass.  473;  4  N. 
E.  96,  54  Am.  485;  Hanney  v. 
Commonwealth,  116  Pa.  St.  322,  9 
Atl.  339;  Powers  v.  State,  74  Miss. 
777,  21  So.  657;  United  States  v. 
Breese,    131     Fed.    915;     Daniels    v. 


State,  2  Penn.  (Del.)  586,  48  Atl. 
196,  54  L.  R.  A.  286;  Bilton  v.  Ter- 
ritory, —  Okla.  — ,  99  Pac.  163 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  VanGaasbeck,  189  N.  Y.  408, 
82  N.  E.  718;  Eacock  v.  State,  169 
Ind.  488,  82  N.  E.  1039;  Common- 
wealth V.  Miller,  31  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
309;  Mitchell  V.  State,  43  Fla.  188, 
30  So.  803;  Brazil  v.  State,  117  Ga. 
32,  43  S.  E.  460;  State  v.  Deuel,  63 
Kan.  811,  66  Pac.  1037;  State  v. 
Garick,  35  La.  Ann.  970;  People  v. 
McArron,  121  Mich,  i,  79  N.  W.  944; 
State  V.  Beebe,  17  Minn.  241. 

Note  on  instruction  limiting  con- 
sideration of  good  character  to  doubt- 
ful cases,  20  L.  R.  A.  618;  note  on 
instruction  as  to  effect  of  evidence  of 
good  character  of  accused,  103  Am. 
St.  893. 

'■  State  V.  Brown,  34  S.  Car.  41,  48, 
12  S.  E.  662;  State  V.  Stewart  (Del.), 
67  Atl.  786;  Wells  V.  Territory,  14 
Okla.  436,  78  Pac.  124;  State  v. 
Brown,  181  Mo.  192,  79  S.  W.  iiii. 

''Sweet  V.  State,  75  Neb.  263,  106 
N.  W.  31 ;  Teague  v.  State,  144  Ala. 
42,  40  So.  312. 


§  So  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  I44 

acter  tor  lionesty.  then,  tliougli  they  might  believe  he  had  a  good 
character  for  honesty  before  the  crime,  it  will  not  entitle  him  to 
an  acquittal,  and  they  may  disregard  it.  is  correct.""  But  while 
proof  of  unblemished  character  alone  may  not  be  sufficient  as 
against  proof  of  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,^"  evidence  of 
good  character  should  go  to  the  jury  without  language  of  dis- 
paragement by  the  court,  to  be  considered  with  all  the  evidence 
and  not  independently  of  it.^^ 

In  a  criminal  case  the  circumstances  may  be  such  that  an  estab- 
lished reputation  for  honesty  and  integrity  would  create  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  guilt,  and  require  an  acquittal,  though,  aside  from 
such  reputation,  the  evidence  might  be  convincing,  and  justify  a 
verdict  of  guilty. 

Unless  the  evidence  of  guilt  is  so  convincing  that  it  precludes 
a  reasonable  doubt,  an  acquittal  will  be  justified  if  the  evidence 

"^  McQueen  v.  State,  82  Ind.  72,  74;  66  Mo.  148;  Stover  v.  People,  56  X. 

Wagiier  v.  State,   107  Ind.  71,  74,  7  Y.  315,  319;  State  v.  Leppere,  66  Wis. 

N.  E.  896,  57  Am.  79;   Cavender  v.  355,  360,  28   X.   W.   376;   Aneals   v. 

State,  126  Ind.  47,  49.  25  N.  E.  875;  People,    134   HI.   401,   415,   25   N.    E. 

Holland  v.  State,  131  Ind.  568,  31  N.  1022;   Kistler   v.   State,   54   Ind.   400, 

E.    359;    State    V.    Smith,    9    Houst.  405;   State  v.   Dunn    (Wis.),   102  X. 

(Del.)  588.  33  Atl.  44 T.  W.   935;   Teague   v.    State,    144   Ala. 

**  Harrington  v.  State,  19  Ohio  St.  42,  40  So.  312.  See  remarks  of  the 
264:  People  V.  Sweeney,  133  X.  Y.  court  in  Commonwealth  v.  Leonard, 
609.  610,  30  X.  E.  1005 ;  Hathcock  v.  140  Mass.  473,  479,  4  N.  E.  96,  54 
State,  88  Ga.  91,  13  S.  E.  959;  Epps  Am.  485.  Its  weight  and  effect  are 
V.  State,  19  Ga.  102,  120:  Springfield  for  the  jury  alone.  Hence  it  is  im- 
V.  State,  96  Ala.  81,  11  So.  250,  252,  proper  to  charge  that,  in  a  doubtful 
38  Am.  St.  85 ;  Webb  v.  State,  106  case,  evidence  of  character  should 
Ala.  52,  18  So.  491.  Thus  good  char-  have  great  weight  with  them.  State 
acter  for  honesty  is  not  enough,  v.  Brown,  34  S.  Car.  41,  48,  12  S.  E. 
alone,  to  rebut  the  presumption  which  662,  and  White  v.  United  States,  164 
arises  from  the  unexplained  posses-  U.  S.  100,  41  L.  ed.  365,  17  Sup.  Ct. 
sion  of  stolen  property.  Wagner  v.  38.  In  estimating  and  weighing  char- 
State.  107  Ind.  "T.  73,  7  X.  E.  896,  acter  evidence  the  jury  may  take  into 
57  Am.  79.  consideration  the  testimony  of  the  ac- 

"  Springfield   v.    State,  96   Ala.   81,  cused  and  the  impression  which  they 

II  So.  250.  2^2,  38  .-Xm.  St.  85;  Heine  may    derive    from    his    conduct    and 

v.    Commonwealth.    91    Pa.    St.    145,  manner  on  the  stand.     People  v.  El- 

148:    People   V.   Raina,   45   Cal.   292,  lenbogen,    186   N.    Y.   603,   79   X.   E. 

293:  People  v.  .Ashe.  44  Cal.  288,  292,  1112,  aff'g  114  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  182, 

293:  Holland  v.   State,  131   Ind.  568,  99  X.  Y.  S.  897;  People  v.  Blatt,  121 

31    X.    E.   359;    State   v.   Alexander,  X.  Y.  S.  507. 


145 


CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED. 


§    80 


of  good  character,  considered  in  connection  with  all  the  other 
evidence,  raises  a  reasonable  doubt.^- 

Evidence  that  the  accused  is  a  man  of  good  character  consid- 
ered in  connection  with  the  other  evidence  may  be  sufficient  to 
create  a  reasonable  doubt  of  guilt,  where  such  a  doubt  w^ould  not 
otherwise  exist.  The  verdict  of  the  jury,  however,  is  to  be  based 
upon  the  whole  evidence,  and  if,  after  considering  carefully  the 
evidence  of  good  character,  the  jury  still  believe  the  accused  is 
guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  they  are  justified  in  rejecting 
the  evidence  of  good  character.'^^ 

A  witness  is  competent  to  prove  good  character  where  he 
knows  the  character  or  reputation  of  the  man,  though  he  ad- 
mitted he  had  never  heard  his  character  discussed.^* 


~  Commonwealth  v.  Cate,  220  Pa.  St. 
138.  69  Atl.  322,  123  Am.  St.  683 ;  Ste- 
phens V.  People,  4  Park  Cr.  (X.  Y.) 
396;  Xewsom  v.  State,  107  Ala.  133,  18 
So.  206 ;  State  v.  Leppere,  66  Wis.  355, 
361,  362,  28  N.  W.  376;  People  v. 
S\vccne\%  133  X.  Y.  609,  611,  30  X. 
E.  1005;  People  V.  Bell,  49  Cal. 
485;  Redd  V.  State,  99  Ga.  210, 
25  S.  E.  268;  McSwean  V.  State,  113 
.•\la.  661,  21  So.  211;  Crawford  v. 
State,  112  Ala.  i,  21  So.  214;  Ham- 
mond V.  State,  74  Miss.  214,  21  So. 
149:  McQueen  v.  State,  82  Ind.  72,  74; 
Hall  V.  State,  40  Ala.  698,  707;  Armor 
V.  State,  63  Ala.  173;  State  v.  Swain, 
68  Mo.  605;  State  V.  Lindley,  51  Iowa 
343,  I  X.  W.  484,  33  Am.  139;  State 
V.  Kcefc,  54  Kan.  197,  38  Pac.  302; 
Carson  v.  State,  50  .-Ma.  134,  138;  Long 
V.  State,  23  Xcb.  33,  36  X.  W.  310; 
I'.akcr  V.  State,  53  .\.  J.  L.  45,  20  Atl. 
858:  Guzinski  v.  People,  77  111.  App. 
-75 ;  People  v.  Kerr,  6  X.  Y.  S.  674,  6 
N'.  Y.  Cr.  406;  State  v.  Van  Kuran,  25 
L'tal)  8,  (xj  Pac.  60.  "There  is  no  case 
in  whicii  the  jury  may  not,  in  the  cxcr- 
( isc  of  a  sr)uii<I  discretion,  give  a  pris- 
<ncr   th«;   hcnrfit   f>f   a   previous   good 

10 — U.NDKRHILL  CkI.«.  Ev. 


character.  X^o  matter  how  conclusive 
the  other  testimony  may  appear,  the 
character  of  the  accused  may  be  such 
as  to  create  a  doubt  in  the  minds  of 
the  jurors,  and  may  lead  them  to  be- 
lieve, in  view  of  the  improbabilities 
that  a  person  of  such  character  would 
be  guilty  of  the  offense  charged,  that 
the  other  evidence  in  the  case  is  false 
or  the  witnesses  mistaken.  An  indi- 
vidual accused  of  crime  is  entitled  to 
have  it  left  to  the  jury  to  form  their 
conclusions  upon  all  the  evidence, 
whether  he,  if  his  character  was  pre- 
viously unl)lcmishcd,  has  or  has  not 
committed  the  particular  crime  al- 
leged against  him."  Remsen  v.  Peo- 
ple, 43  X.  Y.  6,  8,  9.  Evidence  of 
good  character  is  substantive  evidence 
and  not  a  mere  makeweight  intro- 
duced into  a  doubtful  case.  Such  evi- 
dence may  have  the  effect  to  create 
a  reasonai)le  doubt,  and  thereby  pro- 
duce an  acquittal.  Commonwcaltli  v. 
Howe,  35  I'a.  Super.  Ct.  554. 

•*  Browne  v.  United  States,  76  C.  C. 
A.  31,  145  Fe<l.  I. 

"Mitchell  V.  State.  51  Te.\.  Cr. 
A|)p.  71,  too  S.  W.  930. 


^  8i 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


146 


§  81.  Mode  of  proof — Irrelevancy  of  personal  opinions — Deroga- 
tory rumors  in  rebuttal. — Character,  /.  c,  the  general  reputation 
which  the  accused  possesses  and  enjoys  among  his  acquaintances, 
may  be  shown  by  the  testimony  of  such  persons  only.  The  wit- 
ness is  not  competent  unless  it  is  first  shown  that  he  knows  such 
leputation,^^  which  must  be  that  which  is  current  in  the  neigh- 
borhood where  both  he  and  the  accused  reside.^^ 

The  witness  cannot  give  an  opinion  which  is  merely  the  result 
of  observing  the  disposition  and  conduct  of  the  defendant.  What 
is  required  of  him  is  his  knowledge  of  the  existing  general  repu- 
tation which  he  has  obtained  by  hearing  the  comments  of  others 
on  the  accused  while  he  lived  among  those  who  knew  him.'^ 

The  witness  must  be  acquainted  with  the  character  of  the  ac- 


^^  State  V.  Lambert,  —  Me.  — ,  71 
Atl.  1092;  State  V.  Coley,  114  N.  Car. 
879,  883,  19  S.  E.  705;  Gay  v.  State, 
40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  242,  49  S.  W.  612.  A 
question  as  to  the  knowledge  the  wit- 
ness has  of  the  character  of  the  ac- 
cused in  the  neighborhood  where  he 
lives  must  not  be  leading  or  suggest- 
ive of  the  answer  desired.  Thus  a 
witness  called  to  prove  bad  character 
ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  answer 
the  question  whether  he  knew  the  ac- 
cused to  be  a  turbulent,  violent  or 
boisterous  man.  Ross  v.  State,  139 
Ala.  144,  36  So.  718. 

Note  on  credibilitj'  of  character 
witnesses  in  criminal  cases,  14  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  739-745- 

^^  People  v.  Rodrigo,  69  Cal.  601, 
603,  1 1  Pac.  481 ;  People  v.  Murphy, 
146  Cal.  502,  80  Pac.  709. 

Note  on  admissibility  of  evidence 
to  prove  good  character,  103  Am.  St. 
890;  how  and  by  whom  defendant's 
character  proved,  note  in  20  L.  R.  A. 
614 ;  note  on  kind  of  evidence  admis- 
sible to  prove  good  character  of  ac- 
cused, 103  Am.  St.  894 ;  when  particu- 
lar facts  admissible  bearing  on  good 
character,  of  accused,  note  in  103  Am. 


St.  893 ;  proof  of  disorderly  house  by 
evidence  of  general  reputation,  20  L. 
R.  A.  611. 

^'  Reg.  V.  Rowton,  10  Cox  Cr.  Cas. 
25,  30;  Commonwealth  v.  Rogers,  136 
;Mass.  158,  159;  State  v.  Grinden,  91 
Iowa  505,  60  N.  \V.  37;  Sawyer  v. 
People,  91  N.  Y.  667;  Hirschm.an  v. 
People,  Id  111.  568,  574;  Berneker  v. 
State  (larceny),  40  Neb.  810,  814,  816, 
59  N.  W.  372 ;  State  v.  Ward,  7:^  Iowa 
532,  35  N.  W.  617;  Hughes  v.  State, 
152  Ala.  5,  44  So.  694;  State  v.  Day, 
188  Mo.  359.  87  S.  W.  465 ;  People  v. 
Albers,  137  Mich.  678,  100  N.  W.  908; 
State  V.  Shouse.  188  Mo.  473,  87  S. 
W.  480;  Younger  v.  State,  80  Neb. 
201,  114  N.  W.  170;  State  v.  Boyd,  178 
AIo.  2,  76  S.  W.  979;  Jackson  v.  State, 
147  Ala.  699,  41  So.  178.  The  witness 
need  not  be  pereonally  acquainted 
with  the  accused  if  he  knows  his  rep- 
utation. State  V.  Turner,  36  S.  Car. 
534,  539,  15  S.  E.  602.  Nor  need  the 
witness  reside  in  the  same  community. 
State  V.  Lambert,  —  Me.  — ,  71  Atl. 
T092.  State  V.  Stewart  (Del.),  67  Atl. 
786:  McAlpine  v.  State,  117  Ala.  93, 
23  So.  130. 


147 


CHARACTER   OF    THE    ACCUSED, 


§    8l 


cused  before  he  can  testify.  An  acquaintance  extending  over  sev- 
eral years  is  certainly  sufficient  to  qualify  a  witness  to  testify  as  to 
the  good  character  of  the  accused.  If  having  known  the  accused 
for  several  years  he  further  testifies  that  he  is  of  good  character 
and  that  he  never  heard  his  character  questioned  and  that  the 
question  of  his  character  never  was  discussed  outside  of  his  own 
family,  his  evidence  should  be  received.^^ 

Evidence  of  the  good  actions  of  the  accused  is  inadmissible  to 
prove  his  good  reputation.^**  Vague  rumors  are  not  reputation, 
and  a  witness  is  not  competent  to  prove  reputation  whose  sole 
basis  of  knowledge  is  rumor,  idle  reports  and  fugitive  gossip  not 
traceable  to  any  known  and  responsible  source.^" 

Affirmative  testimony  of  express  oral  comments  of  the  neigh- 
bors, friends  and  acquaintances  of  the  accused,  upon  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  accused  is  not  always  required.  Evidence  that  the  char- 
acter of  the  accused  had  never  been  denied  or  doubted,  or  even  dis- 
cussed or  spoken  of  among  his  acquaintances,  though  negative 
in  form,  is  always  admissible  and  often  of  the  highest  value.*^ 


^  State  V.  McClellan  —  Kan.  — ,  98 
Pac.  2og. 

^  Carthaus  v.  State,  78  Miss.  560,  47 
N.  W.  629;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  N. 
Y.  218,  223;  Hopps  V.  People,  31  111. 
385,  388,  83  Am.  Dec.  231 ;  Walker  v. 
State,  91  Ala.  76,  9  So.  87,  88;  Kistler 
V.  State,  54  Ind.  400,  405 ;  State  v. 
Kinley,  43  Iowa  294,  296;  Common- 
wealth V.  Hardy,  2  Mass.  303,  317; 
Commonwealth  v.  O'Brien,  119  Mass. 
342,  345,  20  Am.  325 ;  Keener  v.  State, 
18  Ga.  194,  221 ;  State  v.  Stewart 
(Del.),  67  Atl.  786. 

^^  Haley  v.  State,  63  Ala.  83,  86. 
Hence  the  results  of  a  stranger's  in- 
quiries in  the  neighborhood  where  the 
accused  resides  are  not  admissible. 
Dave  V.  State,  22  Ala.  23,  39. 

"  State  V.  Brandenburg,  118  Mo. 
181,  185,  23  S.  W.  1080,  40  Am.  St. 
362;  State  V.  Grate,  68  Mo.  22,  27; 
Cole  V.  State,  59  Ark.  50;  26  S.  W. 
3771  Lemons  v.  State,  4  W.  Va.  755, 


761,  6  Am.  293;  Hussey  v.  State,  87 
Ala.  121,  6  So.  420;  State  v.  Nelson, 
58  Iowa  208,  12  N.  W.  253;  State  v. 
Lee,  22  Minn.  407.  "A  very  sensible 
and  commendable  relaxation  of  the 
old  and  strict  rule  is  the  reception  of 
negative  evidence  of  good  character 
as  the  testimony  of  a  witness  that  he 
has  been  acquainted  with  the  defend- 
ant for  a  considerable  time,  under 
such  circumstances  that  he  would  be 
more  or  less  likely  to  hear  what  was 
said  about  him,  and  that  he  has  never 
heard  any  remark  about  his  character 
— the  fact  that  a  person's  character  is 
not  talked  about  at  all  being,  on 
grounds  of  common  experience,  ex- 
cellent evidence  that  he  gives  no  oc- 
casion for  censure."  State  v.  Lee,  22 
Minn.  407,  409,  21  Am.  769;  Johnson 
V.  State  (Miss.),  40  So.  324;  Gan- 
dolfo  V.  State,  11  Ohio  St.  114;  Reg. 
V.  Rowton,  10  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  25. 


§  82 


CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE. 


148 


§  82.  Specific  evil  acts — ^Relevancy  of. — Evidence  of  specific  acts 
of  bad  conduct  is  not  admissible  to  show  bad  character.  The  ac- 
cused may  always  be  prepared  to  meet  an  attack  on  his  general 
character,  but  cannot  fairly  be  required,  without  notice,  to  con- 
trovert particular  facts. ■*- 

It  is  error  to  permit  a  character  witness  to  be  cross-examined  as  to 
his  own  knowledge  of  particular  acts  of  bad  conduct  by  accused.*"^ 

But  a  witness  to  good  character  may  be  asked  on  cross-exami- 
nation to  list  his  credibility  whether  he  has  heard  rumors  of 
particular  and  specific  charges  of  the  commission  of  acts  incon- 
sistent with  the  character  which  he  was  called  to  prove,*"  and 


*-  Underbill  on  Evidence,  p.  26,  506 ; 
Davenport  v.  State,  85  Ala.  336,  5  So. 
152;  Nelson  v.  State,  32  Fla.  244,  13 
So.  361,  362;  People  V.  Lee  Duck 
Lung,  129  Cal.  491,  62  Pac.  71 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Bishop,  81  Cal.  113,  22  Pac. 
477;  Steele  v.  State,  83  Ala.  20,  3  So. 
547;  McCarty  v.  People,  51  111.  231, 
232;  State  V.  Donelon,  45  La.  Ann. 
744,  754,  12  So.  922;  Hirschnian  v. 
People,  loi  111.  568,  574;  Common- 
wealth V.  O'Brien,  119  Mass.  342,  345, 
20  Am.  325 ;  Gordon  v.  State,  3  Iowa 
410,  415;  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth,  3 
Bush  (Ky.)  508,  511;  Reg.  v.  Rowton, 
ID  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  25 ;  Drew  v.  State, 
124  Ind.  9,  17,  23  N.  E.  1098;  Stitz  v. 
State,  104  Ind.  359,  4  N.  E.  145 ;  Ben- 
nett v.  State,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  118; 
State  V.  Laxton,  76  N.  Car.  216; 
Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194,  221,  63 
Am.  Dec.  269;  State  v.  Bysong,  112 
Iowa  419,  84  N.  W.  505;  Common- 
wealth V.  Webster,  5  Cush  (Mass.) 
295,  324,  52  Am.  Dec.  71  in;  People  v. 
White,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  in,  114; 
Snyder  v.  Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St. 
519,  522;  Brownell  v.  People,  38  Mich. 
732,  736;  State  V.  Donelon,  45  La. 
Ann.  744,  12  So.  922 ;  Basye  v.  State, 
45  Neb.  261,  63  N.  W.  811.  A  deputy 
sheriff  can  not  be  permitted  to  testify 
that  he  nearly  always  had  a  warrant 
for   the   defendant's   arrest.     Murphy 


V.  State,  108  Ala.  10,  18  So.  557;  State 
V.  Castle,  133  N.  Car.  769,  46  S.  E.  i. 

Note  on  proof  of  other  crimes  to 
rebut  defendant's  good  character,  62 
L.  R.  A.  300. 

*^aCook  V.  State,  46  Fla.  20,  35  So. 
665. 

^' White  V.  State,  ixi  Ala.  92,  21 
So.  330;  People  V.  Moran,  144  Cal. 
48,  77  Pac.  777;  State  v.  McDonald, 
57  Kan.  537,  46  Pac.  966;  Goodwin  v. 
State  (homicide),  102  Ala.  87,  15  So. 
571 ;  Siberry  v.  State,  133  Ind.  677, 
684,  33  N.  E.  681;  Reg.  v.  Wood,  5 
Jur.  295 ;  Ingram  v.  State,  67  Ala.  67 ; 
State  v.  Pain,  48  La.  Ann.  311,  19 
So.  138;  State  v.  Merriman,  34  S. 
Car.  16,  35,  12  S.  E.  619;  Ozburn  v. 
State,  87  Ga.  173,  13  S.  E.  247,  249; 
State  V.  Arnold,  12  Iowa  479,  487; 
State  V.  Dill,  48  S.  Car.  249,  26  S.  E. 
567;  Holloway  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  303,  77  S.  W.  14;  Cook  V.  State, 
46  Fla.  20,  35  So.  665  (homicide) ; 
Terry  v.  State,  118  Ala.  79,  23  So. 
776;  People  V.  Weber,  149  Cal.  325, 
86  Pac.  671 ;  State  v.  Smalls,  73  S. 
Car.  516,  53  S.  E.  976;  State  v.  Dick- 
erson  (Ohio),  82  N.  E.  969;  Cook  v. 
State,  46  Fla.  20,  35  So.  665. 

Note  on  admissibility  of  particular 
acts  and  specific  traits  of  defendant 
on  cross-examination,  20  L.  R.  A.  615. 


149  CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED.  §    83 

generally  as  to  the  grounds  of  his  evidence,  not  so  much  to  estab- 
lish the  truth  of  such  facts  or  charges,  as  to  test  his  credibility, 
and  to  determine  the  weight  of  his  evidence.**  He  may  be  asked 
if  he  has  not  heard  some  general  report  which  contradicts  the 
good  reputation  which  he  has  been  called  upon  to  prove.*" 

A  witness  to  the  good  character  of  the  accused  may  properly 
be  cross-examined  as  to  particular  facts  which  are  within  his 
knowledge  to  test  the  soundness  of  his  belief  that  the  character 
of  the  accused  is  good,  and  the  facts  on  which  it  is  founded.*** 
Thus,  he  may  be  asked  on  cross-examination  whether  he  had  not 
heard  of  a  difficulty  during  which  the  accused  had  assaulted  a 
person  with  a  knife.*'^ 

If  he  admits  having  heard  derogatory  reports  of  the  accused, 
the  latter  may  show  their  nature  and  subject-matter  to  prove  that 
they  did  not  relate  to  and  do  not  affect  the  particular  trait  of 
character  in  issue.*^ 

Where  it  appears  from  the  cross-examination  of  a  character 
witness  that  he  had  heard  that  the  accused  had  trouble  with  his 
neighbors  the  accused  may  bring  out  all  the  facts  in  order  to  show 
what  the  trouble  was  about  and  that  he  was  not  at  fault,*^ 

§  83.    Remoteness — Character  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  crime. 

' — Evidence  of  character,  either  good  or  bad,  is  irrelevant  if  too 
remote  in  time  or  place.^° 

Though  a  man's  character  may  have  been  bad  at  one  period  of 
his  life,  he  may  subsequently  have  reformed  and  become  a  law- 
abiding  person  at  the  date  of  the  crime.    Nor  does  it  follow  be- 

**  Commonwealth    v.    O'Brien,     119  '^'' State  v.  Taylor,  45  La.  Ann.  605, 

Mass.  342,  356,  20  Am.  325;  State  v.  608,  12  So.  927.     Remote  evidence  of 

McGee,  81    Iowa    17,  46   N.   W.   764,  good    character    is    not    objectionable 

765.  wliere   the  only  evidence  against   the 

*°  State  V.  West,  43  La.  Ann.   too6,  defendant    is    circumstantial.     Fry    v. 

10  So.  364;  Thompson  v.  State   (lar-  State,  96  Tenn.  467,  35  S.  W.  883. 

ccny),  100  Ala.  70,  14  So.  878.  Evidence    of   defendant's   character 

*"  State   V.   Le    Blanc,    116   La.   822,  restricted  as  to  time,  note  in  20  L.  R. 

41  So.  105.  A.  612;  period  to  which  evidence  must 

*^  Jones   V.    State,    120   Ala.   303,   25  relate,  note  in  103  Am.  St.  890;  rcp- 

So.  204.  utation   since    the   charge   was   made, 

"  Stape  V.  People,  85  N.  Y.  390,  393.  note  in  103  Am.  St.  896,  897. 

"State  V.  Doris  (Ore.),  94  Pac.  44. 


§  83  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  I5O 

cause  the  accused  enjoyed  a  reputation  for  peacefulness  and  hon- 
esty when  a  boy  that  he  retained  it  after  maturity  or  down  to  the 
date  of  the  crime.'^^ 

But  even  when  the  evidence  is  not  excluded  for  remoteness  the 
remoteness  of  the  time  and  place  may  be  considered  in  estimating 
the  weight  of  character  evidence.  It  was  so  held  where  it  was 
proved  that  the  accused  was  of  a  peaceable  and  quiet  reputation 
in  a  place  where  he  lived  many  years  before  committing  the 
crime.  ^^ 

Again,  evidence  of  bad  character  must  refer  to  a  period  prior 
to  the  discovery  of  the  crime. °^  It  is  onl}-  just  that  this  evidence 
should  be  free  from  any  imputation  or  suggestion  of  wrong-doing 
which  may  have  arisen  from  a  public  discussion  of  the  crime 
or  of  the  arrest  of  the  accused.  To  permit  the  inquiry  to  extend 
down  to  the  arrest  or  trial  would  be  to  embarrass,  if  not  to  de- 
stroy, the  probability  of  innocence  arising  from  good  character 
by  evidence  of  a  single  wicked  transaction  with  which  the  ac- 
cused may  not  have  been  connected  at  all.  This  is  not  only  con- 
trary to  all  recognized  rules  of  evidence,  but  extremely  unfair  to 
the  accused.^* 

Thus,  for  example,  the  state  is  not  entitled  to  bring  out  on 
cross-examination  of  a  witness  called  to  prove  the  good  character 
of  the  accused  that,  after  the  commission  of  the  crime,  he  had 
heard  that  the  accused  had  been  guilty  of  actions  and  conduct 
that  would  indicate  that  the  witness  was  mistaken  in  his  estimate 
of  his  character.^^ 

"  State  V.   Barr,    11    Wash.  481,   39  Ga.  570,  28  S.  E.  981,  40  L.  R.  A.  369; 

Pac.    1080,  48  Am.   St.  890,  29  L.  R.  Lea  v.  State,  94  Tenn.  495,  496,  29  S. 

A.    15411.    The  reputation   of  the  ac-  W.  900;  Brown  v.  State,  46  Ala.  175, 

cused  as  a  soldier  in  the  army  is  not  184;  Griffith  v.  State,  90  Ala.  583,  539, 

relevant  to  show  character,  good  or  8     So.     812;     People    v.     McSweeny 

bad.     People  v.  Eckman,  72  Gal.  582,  (Gal.),  38  Pac.  743;  People  v.  Fong 

14    Pac.    359;    People   v.    Garbutt,    17  Ghing,  78  Gal.  169,  20  Fac.  396;  State 

Mich.  9,  97  Am.  Dec.  i62n;  Burns  v.  v.  Sprague,  64  N.  J.  L.  419,  45  Atl.  788; 

State,  23  Tex.  App.  641,  5  S.  W.  140.  but  compare  Gommonwealth  v.  Sack- 

'"  People  V.  Van  Gaasbeck,  T18  App.  et,  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  394,  399. 

Div.    (N.  Y.)   511,  913,  103  N.  Y.  S.  "White  v.   Commonwealth,  80  Ky. 

249-  480,  4  Ky.  L.  373. 

^*  White  V.   Gommonwealth,   80  Ky.  ^'^  Powers    v.    State,    117    Tenn.    363, 

480,  485,  4  Ky.  Law  373;  State  v.  Kin-  97  S.  W.  815. 
ley,  43  Iowa  294;  Smalls  v.  State,  lOi 


151  CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED.  §§    84.    85 

§  84.  The  grade  and  moral  nature  of  the  crime. — The  admissi- 
bility  and  force  of  evidence  of  character  do  not  depend  upon  the 
degree  of  immorality  involved  in  the  crime,^*'  but  rather  upon 
the  cogency  and  force  of  the  evidence  tending  to  prove  its  com- 
mission and  upon  the  motives  which  prompted  the  crime.  In  the 
case  of  a  great  crime,  which  apparently  was  planned  and  exe- 
cuted with  great  deliberation,  no  reason  exists  why  character 
should  not  be  considered,  as  it  is  extremely  probable  that  a  person 
of  blameless  and  pure  habits  would  not  engage  therein.  Of 
course,  unusual  and  atrocious  crimes  involving  great  moral  tur- 
pitude are  so  obviously  beyond  the  ordinary  bounds  of  human 
conduct  that  it  is  clear  that  the  perpetrator  must  have  been 
prompted  by  extraordinary  motives,  far  different  from  those 
guiding  his  every-day  actions,  upon  which  estimates  of  his  char- 
acter are  based.  Hence,  perhaps,  evidence  does  not  possess  the 
same  cogency  in  connection  with  a  crime  of  extraordinary  ma- 
lignity apparently  committed  with  little,  if  any,  forethought,  and 
under  the  influence  of  some  sudden  and  powerful  emotion,  as  it 
would  in  the  case  of  an  inferior  offense.^'^ 

§  85.  Disposition  is  irrelevant. — It  is  important  to  distinguish 
Ijetween  evidence  of  reputation  to  show  character  and  direct  evi- 
dence of  the  good  or  bad  moral  disposition  of  the  accused.  Evi- 
dence of  a  good  disposition  is  not  admissible  for  him,  to  mitigate 
or  excuse  his  act,^*  or  of  a  bad  or  malicious  disposition  to  show 
the  probability  of  his  guilt.^^ 

'"Cancemi  v.  People,  16  N.  Y.  501,  435,  448,   13   Pac.  528;   Hirschman  v. 

506,  507 ;  Harrington  v.  State,  19  Ohio  People,  loi  111.  568 ;  People  v.  Ah  Lee 

St.  264,  268.  Doon,  97  Cal.  171,  31  Pac.  933;  Sin- 

"  Commonwealth     v.     Webster,     5  dram  v.   People,  88  N,   Y.   196,  200 ; 

Cush.   (Mass.)  295,  324,  52  Am.  Dec.  Fitzpatrick  v.  Commonwealth,  81  Ky. 

71  in.    Cf.  McLain  v.  Commonwealth,  357,     360;      Sawyer     v.     People,     91 

99  Pa.  St.  86.    Evidence  of  good  char-  N.  Y.  667,  668 ;  Voght  v.   State,  145 

acter  has  been  sometimes  confined  in  Ind.   12,  43  N.  E.   1049;   Berneker  v. 

its  operation  to  those  crimes  the  com-  State,  40  Neb.  810;    59   N.    W.   372; 

mission  of  which  involves  some  moral  State  v.  Emery,  59  Vt.  84,  7  Atl.  129. 

turpitude.     It  is  then  not  relevant  in  And  see  i  Crim.  Law  Mag.  33^-335- 

mere  statutory  offenses  not  malmn  in  Contra,   State  v.    Lee,  22   Minn.  407, 

sc.      Commonwealth    v.     Nagle,     157  410,  21  Am.  769;  State  v.  Sterrett,  68 

Mass.  554,  32  N.  E.  861.  Iowa  76,  78,  25  N.  W.  936. 

"  State  V.   Emery,  59  Vt.  84.  90,  7  °''  Reg.  v.  Rowton,   10  Cox  Cr.  Cas. 

Atl.   129;   Murphy  v.  People,  9  Colo.  25,29. 


§§  86,  86a  CRIMINAL  evidence.  152 

Accordingly  the  opinion  of  a  witness  that  a  prisoner  accused 
of  murder  was  a  kind-hearted  man,*"*  or  as  to  what  his  disposition 
was  when  crossed  or  misused, "^^  or  that  his  behavior  was  rude, 
arbitrary  and  unreasonable,"^  is  inadmissible.  But  the  state  has 
been  permitted  to  show^  that  the  accused  charged  with  homicide 
had  been  in  active  military  service,  and  w^as  thus  probably  dis- 
posed to  acts  of  bloodshed  and  to  place  a  low-  estimate  on  human 
life.''' 

§  86.  Number  of  witnesses  to  character. — It  is  sometimes  pro- 
vided by  statute  that,  under  circumstances  specifically  described, 
that  the  witnesses  to  reputation  called  by  the  accused  in  a  crim- 
inal trial  shall  not  exceed  a  given  number  unless  the  party  call- 
ing them  shall  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  fees  for  the  wit- 
nesses in  excess."* 

Such  statutes,  it  has  been  held,  do  not  violate  a  constitutional 
provision  that  the  accused  shall  be  entitled  to  compulsory  process 
to  procure  the  attendance  of  his  wntnesses."''^ 

§  86a.  Instructions  as  to  the  character  of  the  accused. — The  ac- 
cused, it  is  said,  is  not  entitled  to  an  instruction  that  his  character 
is  presumed  to  be  good,  unless  he  introduces  evidence  of  char- 
acter or  unless  the  prosecution  attacks  it.*"'"  While  an  express  re- 
fusal of  a  request  by  the  accused  that  the  court  shall  charge  that 
he  is  presumed  to  have  a  good  character,  unless  the  contrary  is 
shown,  would  not  be  error,  it  is  customary  for  the  court  to  charge 

*"  Cathcart  v.  Commonwealth,  2>7  Pa.  ute,  compel  the  attendance  of  ten  wit- 

St.  108.  nesses  to  his  character  at  public  ex- 

"  Thomas  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  218,  pense.     If  he  desires   more   he  must 

22^.  pay  their  expenses.     The  limitation  is 

•^  People   V.    Fitzgerald,    156   N.    Y.  a  reasonable  one,  and  in  no  way  de- 

253,  50  N.  E.  846,  rev'g  20  App.  Div.  prives   the  accused  of   any   constitu- 

(N.  Y.)   139,  46  N.  Y.  S.  1020.  tional       right.       Commonwealth       v. 

*^  State  V.  Moelchen,  53  Iowa  310,  5  Thomas  (Ky.),  104  S.  W.  326,  31  Ky. 

N.  W.  186.  L.  899- 

"For  an  example  of  such  a  statute,        **  Bodine  v.  State,   129  Ala.   106,  29 

see  2  Bates  Rev.  Stat.  (Ohio),  §  7287.  So.  926;   Sanders  v.   People,   124  111. 

**  State  V.  Stout,  49  Ohio  St.  270,  30  218,  16  N.  E.  81 ;  People  v.  Brasch, 

N.  E.  437,  438.     Their  purpose  is  to  193  N.  Y.  46,  85  N.  E.  809;  State  v. 

prevent  the  waste  of  time  and  money.  Gartrell,  171  Mo.  489,  71  S.  W.  1045. 
The  accused  may,  under  such  a  stat- 


153  CHARACTER    OF    THE    ACCUSED.  §    86a 

on  the  presumption  of  good  character  as  a  part  of  the  law  of  the 
case.  In  any  event,  it  would  be  error  for  the  court  to  single  out 
the  failure  of  the  accused  to  offer  evidence  of  good  character  and 
call  attention  to  it  as  a  part  of  its  instruction.*^" 

Any  charge  which  directly  or  indirectly  tells  the  jury  that  the 
prosecution  cannot  in  the  first  instance  attack  the  character  of  the 
accused  would  be  error  as  from  such  a  charge,  the  jury  might 
reasonably  infer  that  the  prosecution  is  compelled  by  the  law  to 
keep  silence  as  to  evidence  which  it  has  in  its  possession  which, 
if  permitted  to  be  received,  would  prove  the  accused  to  be  a 
man  of  bad  character.*'^  It  is  error  to  refuse  to  charge  that  the 
character  of  the  accused  may  be  such  as  to  lead  the  jury  to  be- 
lieve that  the  evidence  against  him  was  false."''  Any  instruction 
which  confines  the  effect  of  character  evidence  to  a  doubtful  case, 
is  erroneous  for  the  reason  that  the  good  character  of  the  accused 
must  be  considered  without  reference  to  the  apparently  conclusive 
or  inconclusive  character  of  the  other  evidence.'^'' 

*^  People    V.    Bodine,    i    Denio    (N.  "' People  v.  Childs,  90  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)  281 ;  State  v.  Sanders,  84  N.  Car.  Y.)  58,  85  N.  Y.  S.  627. 

728.  ''"  State  V.  Birkey,  122  Iowa  102,  97 

^*  People  V.  Marks,  90  Mich.  555,  51  N.  W.  980. 
X.   W.  638;    People  V.   Gleason,    122 
Cal.  370,  55  Pac.  123. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES. 

§  87.  General  rule  regarding  evidence  §  90.  Relevant   evidence   not   inadmis- 

of     crimes     other     than     that  sible   because    indirectly    prov- 

chargod  in  the  indictment.  ing   or    tending    to    prove    an- 

88.  Connected        or         intermingled  other  crime  —  Dissimilar 

crimes    forming   parts    of    one  crimes  united  in  motives, 

whole.  91.  Identity   of    means    employed    in 

89.  Evidence    of    other    offenses    to  several    crimes  —  Identity    of 

show      specific      intention      or  accused, 

guilty  knowledge.  92.  Sexual  crimes. 

§  87.  General  rule  regarding  evidence  of  crimes  other  than  that 
charged  in  the  indictment. — The  rule  which  requires  that  ah  evi- 
dence which  is  introduced  shall  be  relevant  to  the  guilt  or  the  in- 
nocence of  the  accused  is  applied  with  considerable  strictness  in 
criminal  proceedings.  The  wisdom  and  justness  of  this,  at  least 
from  the  defendant's  stand-point,  are  self-evident.  He  can  with 
fairness  be  expected  to  come  into  court  prepared  to  meet  the  ac- 
cusations contained  in  the  indictment  only,  and,  on  this  account, 
all  the  evidence  offered  by  the  prosecution  should  consist  wholly 
of  facts  which  are  within  the  range  and  scope  of  its  allegations. 
The  large  majority  of  persons  of  average  intelligence  are  un- 
trained in  logical  methods  of  thinking,  and  are  therefore  prone 
to  draw  illogical  and  incorrect  inferences,  and  conclusions  with- 
out adequate  foundation.  From  such  persons  jurors  are  selected. 
They  will  very  naturally  believe  that  a  person  is  guilty  of  the 
crime  with  which  he  is  charged  if  it  is  proved  to  their  satisfac- 
tion that  he  has  committed  a  similar  offense,  or  any  offense  of 
an  equally  heinous  character.  And  it  cannot  be  said  with  truth 
that  this  tendency  is  wholly  without  reason  or  justification,  as 
every  person  can  bear  testimony  from  his  or  her  experience,  that 
a  man  who  will  commit  one  crime  is  very  likely  subsequently  to 
commit  another  of  the  same  description. 

To  guard  against  this  evil,  and  at  the  same  time  to  avoid  the 

(154) 


155 


PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES. 


8/ 


delay  which  would  be  incident  to  an  indefinite  multiplication  of 
issues,  the  general  rule  (to  which,  however,  some  very  important 
exceptions  may  be  noted)  forbids  the  introduction  of  evidence 
which  will  show,  or  tend  to  show,  that  the  accused  has  committed 
any  crime  wholly  independent  of  that  offense  for  which  he  is  on 
trial/ 


'  People  V.  Corbin,  56  N.  Y.  363,  15 
Am.  427;  People  v.  Sharp,  107  N.  Y. 
427,  14  N.  E.  319,  I  Am.  St.  851 ;  Cole- 
man V.  People,  55  N.  Y.  81 ;  State  v. 
Shuford,  69  N.  Car.  486,  493;  State  v. 
Jeflfries,  117  X.  Car.  727,  23  S.  E.  163; 
People  V.  Gibbs,  93  N.  Y.  470;  State 
V.  Murphy,  84  N.  Car.  742;  Snyder  v. 
Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St.  519,  521 ; 
Mason  v.  State,  42  Ala.  532,  537 ;  Co- 
ble V.  State,  31  Ohio  St.  100,  102; 
State  V.  Boyland,  24  Kan.  186,  187; 
Clapp  V.  State,  94  Tenn.  186,  202,  203, 
30  S.  W.  214;  People  V.  Fowler,  104 
Mich.  449,  62  N.  W.  572;  People  v. 
Baird,  104  Cal.  462,  464,  38  Pac.  310; 
People  V.  Bowen,  49  Cal.  654 ;  State  v. 
Moberly,  121  Mo.  604,  610,  26  S.  W. 
364;  Painter  v.  People,  147  111.  444, 
447, 463,  35  N.  E.  64 ;  Garrison  v.  Peo- 
ple, 87  111.  96;  State  V.  Burk,  88  Iowa 
661,  667,  56  X.  W.  180;  State  V.  Craw- 
ford, 39  S.  Car.  343,  17  S.  E.  799; 
Cotton  V.  State  (Miss.),  17  So.  372; 
State  V.  Bates,  46  La.  Ann.  849,  851, 
15  So.  204;  Commonwealth  v.  Jack- 
son, 132  Mass.  16-21,  citing  many 
cases;  Holder  v.  State,  58  Ark.  473, 
25  S.  W.  279;  State  V.  Lapagc,  57  X. 
H.  245,  24  Am.  69;  Stone  v.  State,  4 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  27;  People  v.  Stout, 
4  Park.  Crim.  (X.  Y.)  71,  127;  People 
V.  Dowling,  84  X.  Y.  478;  State  v. 
Kelley,  65  Vt.  531,  27  Atl.  203,  36  Am. 
St.  884 ;  'I'urner  v.  State,  102  Ind.  425, 
427,  I  X.  E.  869;  People  v.  Thacker, 
108  Mich.  652,  66  X.  W.  562;  Meyer 
V.  State,  59  X.  J.  L.  310,  36  .'\tl.  483; 
State  V.  Reynolds,  5  Kan.  App.  515,  47 


Pac.  573;  Ware  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  597,  38  S.  W.  198;  Tyrrell  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1897),  38  S.  W.  ion; 
Rhea  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  138, 
38  S.  W.  1012;  Shears  v.  State,  147 
Ind.  51,  46  X"^.  E.  331.  Admissions 
made  b}^  accused  before  a  crime,  as  to 
the  commission  of  other  independent 
crimes,  to  induce  a  third  person  to 
take  part  in  the  crime  are  receivable. 
State  V.  Hayward,  62  Minn.  474,  65 
X.  W.  63;  McSwean  v.  State,  21  So. 
211,  113  Ala.  661,  not  reported  in  full. 

General  rule  as  to  evidence  of 
other  crimes  in  criminal  cases,  note  62 
L.  R.  A.  193 ;  reason  for  general  rule 
excluding,  105  Am.  St.  977.  See  also 
Elliott  Ev.,  §  2720. 

See,  also,  sustaining  the  text :  Gas- 
senheimer  v.  United  States,  26  App. 
Dec.  432;  State  v.  Right  (X.  Car.), 
63  S.  E.  1043 ;  Vickers  v.  United 
States  (Okla.),  98  Pac.  467;  Denham 
v.  State  (Ga.  App.),  63  S.  E.  62; 
Campbell  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
116  S.  W.  581;  Belt  V.  State,  47  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  82,  78  S.  W.  933;  Gard- 
ner V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  117  S. 
W.  140;  State  V.  Williams,  in  La. 
179,  35  So.  505 ;  People  v.  Governale, 
193  N.  Y.  581,  86  X.  E.  554;  Clark  v. 
State  (Ga.  App.),  62  S.  E.  663;  Hin- 
son  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  102, 
100  S.  W.  939;  Majors  v.  People,  38 
Colo.  437,  88  Pac.  636;  Morse  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  in  S.  W. 
714,  33  Ky.  L.  831,  894;  State  v. 
Shncklcy,  29  Utah  25,  80  Pac.  865; 
Alford  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  621, 


87 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


156 


To  this  general  rule  there  are  several  distinct  exceptions  which 
have  been  permitted  from  absolute  necessity,  to  aid  in  the  detec- 
tion and  punishment  of  crime.  These  exceptions  ought  to  be 
carefully  limited  and  guarded  by  the  courts  and  their  number 
should  not  be  increased.  But  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  modern 
tendency  on  the  part  of  the  courts  is  to  be  liberal  in  the  admission 
of  evidence  of  collateral  crimes.  The  exceptions  to  the  general 
rule  arise  either  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  as,  for  example, 
where  two  or  more  crimes  constituent  parts  of  one  transaction  so 
that  to  prove  either  necessitates  proof  of  the  other,  or  when  the 
intent  is  to  be  proved  from  circumstances  or  in  the  third  place 
where  the  identity  of  the  accused  is  expressly  in  issue,  that  is  to 
say,  where  the  evidence  conclusively  shows  a  crime  was  com- 
mitted by  some  one  but  there  is  a  sharp  conflict  as  to  the  person 
who  committed  it.^* 


108  S.  W.  364;  Driver  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  20,  85  S.  W.  1056; 
Lane  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  335, 
92  S.  W.  839 ;  Curtis  v.  State,  52  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  606,  108  S.  W.  380;  Wesley 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1905),  85  S. 
W.  802;  Custer  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  144,  86  S.  W.  757;  Herndon  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  552,  99  S.  W. 
558;  State  V.  Roberts,  28  Xev.  350,  82 
Pac.  100;  People  v.  Weaver,  177  N. 
Y.  434,  69  N.  E.  1094;  State  v.  An- 
derson, 120  La.  331,  45  So.  267;  Ray- 
mond V.  Commonwealth,  123  Ky.  368, 
96  S.  W.  515,  29  Ky.  L.  785;  State 
V.  Berger,  121  Iowa  581,  96  N.  W. 
1094;  Brom  V.  People,  216  III.  148,  74 
N.  E.  790;  Posey  v.  United  States, 
26  App.  D.  C.  302;  State  v.  Dulaney 
(Ark.  1908),  112  S.  W.  158;  Pointer 
V.  State,  41  So.  929,  148  Ala.  676,  not 
reported  in  full;  Dillard  v.  State,  152 
Ala.  86,  44  So.  537;  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.  V.  Commonwealth,  117  Kj*. 
345,  78  S.  W.  167,  25  Ky.  L.  1442; 
Topolewski  v.  State,  130  Wis.  244, 
T09  N.  W.  1037,  118  Am.  St.  1019,  7 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  756n;  People  v. 
Hosier,  196  N.  Y.  506,  89  X.  E.  1107; 


People  v.  Argentos  (Cal.  App.  1909), 
106  Pac.  65. 

'a  To  rebut  special  defenses:  Proof 
of  other  crimes  to  rebut  special  de- 
fenses— note,  62  L.  R.  A.  299,  300. 

Corroboration  and  relation  of  par- 
ties: Proof  of  other  offenses  to  cor- 
roborate other  testimony — note,  105 
Am.  St.  993 ;  proof  of  other  offenses 
to  show  relation  of  the  parties — note, 
105  Am.  St.  993. 

As  constituting  pari  of  res  gestcc: 
Proof  of  other  crimes  as  constitut- 
ing part  of  res  cjcstcr — note,  105  Am. 
St.  984,  62  L.  R.  A.  308,  319;  in 
prosecution  for  arson,  62  L.  R.  A. 
319;  in  prosecution  of  assault,  62  L. 
R.  A.  314;  in  prosecution  for  assault 
with  intent  to  murder,  62  L.  R.  A. 
313;  in  prosecution  for  burglary,  62 
L.  R.  A.  317;  in  prosecution  for 
forgery,  62  L.  R.  A.  319;  in  prosecu- 
tion for  larceny,  62  L.  R.  A.  315;  in 
prosecution  for  murder,  62  L.  R.  A. 
308;  in  prosecution  for  rape,  62  L. 
R.  A.  314;  in  prosecution  for  receiv- 
ing stolen  property,  62  L.  R.  A.  317: 
in  prosecution  for  robbery,  62  L.  R. 
A.  318. 

Miscellaneous    instances    of    creep- 


157 


PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES. 


§  88.  Connected  or  intermingled  crimes  forming  parts  of  one  whole. 

— If  several  crimes  are  intermixed,  or  blended  with  one  another, 
or  connected  so  that  they  form  an  indivisible  criminal  transaction, 
and  full  proof  by  testimony,  whether  direct  or  circumstantial,  of 
any  one  of  them  cannot  be  given  without  showing  the  others, 
evidence  of  any  or  all  of  them  is  admissible  against  a  defendant 
en  trial  for  any  offense  which  is  itself  a  detail  of  the  whole  crim- 
inal scheme." 


tion  to  rule:  When  evidence  as  to  other 
crimes  not  prejudicial — note,  62  L.  R. 
A.  347;  evidence  of  to  prove  defend- 
ant's connection  with  act  charged,  62  L. 
R,  A.  278,  105  Am.  St.  978;  to  show 
common  scheme  or  system  connecting 
defendant  with  act  charged,  62  L.  R. 
A.  291 ;  to  show  the  criminal  charac- 
ter of  accused,  105  Am.  St.  981,  988, 
992 ;  to  show  identity  of  accused,  105 
Am.  St.  984;  to  show  that  crime  was 
committed  to  conceal  another,  105 
Am.  St.  990;  evidence  of  other 
crimes  to  characterize  act,  105  Am. 
St.  993;  to  affect  credibility  of  wit- 
nesses, 105  Am.  St.  1005 ;  remoteness 
of  time  as  affecting  admissibility,  105 
Am.  St.  1005 ;  insinuation  by  prose- 
cution of  other  crimes — statement,  62 
L.  R.  A.  348;  cross-examination  of 
defendant  concerning,  62  L.  R.  A. 
345 ;  instructing  jury  concerning,  62 
L.  R.  A.  350-355- 

1)1  prosecution  for  particular  of- 
fenses: Notes  on  evidence  of  other 
crimes  in  prosecution  for  adultery,  105 
Am.  St.  1004;  in  prosecution  for  arson, 
105  Am.  St.  996,  looi ;  in  prosecution 
for  counterfeiting,  105  Am.  St.  995, 
996;  in  prosecution  for  embezzlement, 
105  Am.  St.  996,  lOOi ;  in  prosecution 
for  false  pretenses,  25  Am.  St.  387, 
105  Am.  St.  996,  lOOi,  1003;  in  prose- 
cution for  fraud,  105  Am.  St.  997, 
looi  ;  in  prosecution  for  gambling,  El- 
liott Ev.,   §  3004 ;  in  prosecution   for 


larceny,  62  L.  R.  A.  231,  281,  315,  322; 
in  prosecution  for  violation  of  liquor 
law,  62  L.  R.  A.  230,  290,  325;  in 
prosecution  for  subornation  of  per- 
jury, 105  Am.  St.  983;  in  prosecution 
for  rape,  62  L.  R.  A.  314,  322,  105 
Am.  St.  1004;  in  prosecution  for  re- 
ceiving stolen  goods,  105  Am.  St. 
995 ;  of  crimes  committed  in  resisting 
arrest  or  in  attempting  to  escape  after 
commission  of  crime  charged,  62  L. 
R.  A.  368,  105  Am.  St.  991 ;  in  prose- 
cution for  robbery,  62  L.  R.  A.  288, 
318,  324;  in  prosecution  for  sexual 
offenses,  62  L.  R.  A.  329,  338,  105 
Am.  St.  989,  993,  994,  1003;  in  prose- 
cution for  uttering  forged  checks,  105 
Am.  St.  995,  996. 

"  Rex  v.  Ellis,  6  B.  &  Cr.  145 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Call,  21  Pick.  (Mass.) 
515,  522;  Commonwealth  v.  Sturti- 
vant,  117  Mass.  122,  132,  19  Am. 
40in;  State  v.  Valwell,  66  Vt.  558, 
562,  29  Atl.  1018;  People  V.  Bidleman, 
104  Cal.  608,  38  Pac.  502;  People  v. 
Dailey,  143  N.  Y.  638,  37  N.  E.  823, 
aff'g  73  Hun  (N.  Y.)  16,  25  N.  Y.  S. 
1050;  Mixon  V.  State  (Tex.,  1895), 
31  S.  W.  408;  Dawson  v.  State,  32 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  535,  25  S.  W.  21,  40 
Am.  791 ;  Wilkerson  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  86,  90,  19  S.  W.  903;  Davis 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  377,  23  S. 
W.  794;  Turner  v.  State,  102  Ind. 
425,  427,  I  N.  E.  869;  Frazier  v. 
State,  135  Ind.  38,  41,  34  N.  E.  817; 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


158 


Accordingly,  where  two  or  more  persons  are  assaulted  at  or 
about  the  same  time  and  place,  it  will  be  permitted  to  prove  all 
the  assaults  on  the  trial  of  one  indicted  for  any  one  of  them  for 
the  reason  that  all  the  assaults  are  merely  parts  of  one  transac- 
tion, and  to  prove  one  necessitates  proof  of  all.^  So  where  the 
accused  was  being  tried  for  the  forgery  of  money  orders  purport- 
ing to  be  issued  by  an  express  company,  it  was  held  competent 
to  permit  the  state  to  prove  that,  a  few  days  before  the  forged 
orders  were  uttered  by  the  accused,  the  office  from  which  they 
appeared  to  have  been  issued  was  robbed.*  Under  this  exception 
to  the  rule  it  is  not  material  that  the  crimes  are  dissimilar  if  they 
are  all  parts  of  one  indivisible  whole. 

But  no  separate  and  isolated  crime  can  be  given  in  evidence 
under  this  exception  to  the  rule.  In  order  that  a  collateral  crime 
may  be  relevant  as  evidence  it  must  be  connected  with  the  crime 
under  investigation  as  part  of  a  general  and  composite  trans- 
action.^ 


Bottomley  v.  United  States,  i  Story 
(N.  S.)  135,  3  Fed.  Cas.  1688;  State 
V.  Fohvell,  14  Kan.  105 ;  Walters  v. 
People,  6  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  15,  22; 
Reese  v.  State,  7  Ga.  373 ;  Reg.  v. 
Bleasdale,  2  Carr.  &  K.  765;  People 
V.  Haver,  4  N.  Y.  Cr.  171 ;  Phillips 
V.  People,  57  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  353,  aff'd, 
42  N.  Y.  200;  State  v.  Desroches,  48 
La.  Ann.  428,  19  So.  250;  State  v. 
Williamson,  106  Mo.  162,  170,  17  S. 
W.  172;  People  V.  Pallister,  138  X. 
Y.  601,  60s,  33  N.  E.  741;  Hickam  v. 
People,  137  111.  75,  27  N.  E.  88,  89; 
State  V.  Testerman,  68  Mo.  408,  415 ; 
Killins  V.  State,  28  Fla.  313,  334,  9 
So.  711 ;  State  v.  Gainor,  84  Iowa  209, 
50  N.  W.  947;  Pitner  v.  State,  37  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  268,  39  S.  W.  662;  People 
V.  Foley,  64  Mich.  148,  157,  31  N.  W. 
94;  Heath  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Rob. 
(Va.)  735,  743;  Crews  v.  State,  34 
Tex.  Cr.  533,  3i  S.  W.  373;  Brown 
V.  Commonwealth,  76  Pa.  St.  319,  337; 
Commonwealth  v.  Robinson,  146 
Mass.  571,  578,  16  N.  E.  452;  Morris 
V.   State,  30  Tex.  App.  95.  16  S.  W. 


757;  State  V.  Perry,  136  Mo.  126,  37 
S.  W.  804;  State  V.  Deliso  (X.  J. 
1908),  69  Atl.  218;  People  V.  Smith 
(Cal.  App.),  99  Pac.  iiii;  Bennett  v. 
State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  52,  81  S.  W. 
30;  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
92  S.  W.  292,  2C  Ky.  L.  1348;  Gray 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1905),  86  S. 
W.  764;  State  V.  Shockley,  29  Utah 
25,  80  Pac.  865;  Ryan  v.  United 
States,  26  App.  D.  C.  74;  State  v. 
O'Connell  (Iowa,  1909),  123  N.  W. 
201. 

^  Greenwell  v.  Commonwealth,  125 
Ky.  192,  100  S.  W.  852,  30  Ky.  L. 
1282. 

*  State  V.  Bell,  212  Mo.  in,  in  S. 
W.  24. 

°  The  theory  upon  which  this  evi- 
dence is  relevant  is  that  the  motive 
prompting  the  commission  of  the  sev- 
eral crimes  is  the  same,  or  that  the 
objects  aimed  at  are  identical.  Thus, 
for  example,  where  it  was  alleged 
that  the  accused  had  poisoned  his 
wife  for  the  purpose  of  securing  her 
property,   the   state  was   permitted   to 


159  PROOF    OF   OTHER    CRIMES.  §    88 

To  illustrate  the  exception,  that  the  crime  must  be  connected 
either  by  identity  of  motive  or  by  being  a  constituent  part  of  the 
res  gcstcc  we  may  cite  a  case  where  the  bod}'  of  the  deceased,  a 
woman,  was  found  some  distance  from  her  residence.  When  the 
person  who  discovered  it  came  to  the  residence,  he  found  her  two 
children  mortally  wounded,  and  discovered  foot  prints  from  the 
house  leading  to  the  spot  where  the  body  of  the  woman  had  been 
found. '^  On  the  other  hand,  if  from  remoteness  in  point  of  time, 
or  from  distance  in  point  of  place,  or  by  reason  of  intervening 
circumstances  of  whatever  nature,  the  court  can  see  that  there  is 
no  necessary  connection  between  the  two  crimes,  evidence  of  the 
independent  and  disconnected  crime  should  be  rejected.  So,  while 
it  may  be  allowed  on  a  trial  for  burglary  to  prove  that  crimes  were 
committed  by  the  accused  on  the  night  of  the  burglary,  it  will  not 
be  allowed  to  prove  burglaries  or  attempted  burglaries  within  a 
year  prior  thereto.' 

The  movements  of  the  accused  within  a  reasonable  period  prior 
to  the  instant  of  the  crime  are  always  relevant  to  show  that  he  was 
making  preparations  to  commit  it.  Hence,  on  a  trial  for  homi- 
cide, it  is  when  necessary  permissible  to  prove  that  the  accused 
killed  another  person  during  the  time  he  was  preparing  for  or 
was  in  the  act  of  committing  the  homicide  for  which  he  is  on 
trial.*  And,  generally,  when  several  similar  crim.es  occur  near 
each  other,  either  in  time  or  in  locality,  as.  for  example,  several 
burglaries  or  incendiary  fires  upon  the  same  night,  or  on  different 
nights  but  in  the  same  building,  it  is  relevant  to  show  that  the 
accused,  being  present  at  one  of  them,  was  present  at  the  others 
if  the  crimes  seem  to  be  connected.^ 

prove  that  a  few  days  before  he  had  *Horn  v.  State,  98  Ala.  23.   13  So. 

administered    poison    to    her    mother  329 ;  Renf roe  v.  State,  84  Ark.  16.  104 

with  the  same  end  in  view.     Goersen  S.  W.  542;  Morse  v.  Commonwealth 

V.    Commonwealth,    99    Pa.    St.    388.  (Ky.),  in  S.  W.  714,  33  Ky.  L.  831. 

See  also,  Commonwealth  v.  Johnson,  894;  Young  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 

199  Mass.  55,  85  N.  E.  188:  Griggs  v.  T908,  113  S.  W.  276;  State  v.  Cavin. 

United   States,  85  C.   C.  A.   596,   158  199  Mo.  154,  97  S.  W.  573;  Campos 

Fed.  572.  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  289,  97  S. 

'State  V.  Adams,   138  N.  Car.  688,  W.  too.     See  cases  cited.  §§  321.  376. 

50  S.  E.  765.  "  "Where  several    felonies   are  con- 

'  Commonwealth     v.     Parsons,     195  nected  as  parts  of  one  scheme  or  plot. 

Mass.  560,  81   N.  E.  291.  like  the  acts  of  a  drama,  and  .-ill  tend 


§  88  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  l6o 

Evidence  that  a  person  charged  with  a  crime  was  seen  in  the 
vicinity  where  the  crime  was  committed  shortly  after  or  before 
the  event  is  admissible,  and  if  when  seen  he  was  engaged  in  the 
commission  of  another  crime,  the  evidence,  otherwise  admissible, 
is  not  therefore  to  be  disregarded.^'' 

Usually  some  connection  between  the  crimes  must  be  shown  to 
have  existed  in  fact  and  in  the  mind  of  the  accused,  uniting  them 
for  the  accomplishment  of  a  purpose  common  to  both,  before 
such  evidence  can  be  received. ^^ 

Thus  on  a  trial  of  the  accused  for  a  homicide  it  may  be  shown 
that  the  accused  shot  and  killed  the  owner  of  the  premises  he  was 
breaking  into,  though  such  proof  shows  or  tends  to  show  the  ac- 
cused W'as  guilty  of  the  crime  of  burglar}^ 

The  connection  must  appear  from  the  evidence.  Whether  any 
connection  exists  is  a  judicial  question.  If  the  court  does  not 
clearly  perceive  it,  the  accused  should  be  given  the  benefit  of  the 
doubt  and  the  evidence  should  be  rejected.  The  minds  of  the 
jurors  must  not  be  poisoned  and  prejudiced  against  the  prisoner 
by  receiving  evidence  of  this  description  unless  the  case  clearly 
comes  under  the  exception.^ - 

to  a  common  end,  then  they  maj-  be  and    dangerous.     The    people    might 

given  in  evidence  to  show  the  process  have   shown   the   condition  of   things 

of    motive    and    design    in    the    final  where   the   property   was    found,    but 

crime.     The  several  crimes  are  parts  they  could  not  prove  another  felony, 

of  a  chain  of  cause  and  consequence,  unless   it  was   so    strongly   connected 

so  linked  together  as  to  be  necessarily  with  the  felony  charged  as  to  prove, 

provable  as  several  parts  of  the  same  or  strongly   tend   to   prove,   that   the 

act  or  crime."    The  court  in  People  v.  man    who    committed    the    one    was 

Stout,  4  Park.  _Cr.   (N.  Y.)    71,  127;  guilty  of  the  other."     But  when  two 

Mason  v.  State,  42  Ala.  532,  535,  539.  persons  in  a  stage  coach  were  robbed 

See  Thomas  v.   State,   103   Ind.  419,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  held  that  on 

432,   2   N.    E.   808;    People   v.    Cahill  the  trial  of  the  accused  for  robbing 

(Cal.  App.,  1909),  106  Pac.  115.  one  of  them,  it  might  be  shown  that 

"State  v.  Johnson,  iii  La.  935,  Z^  property  belonging  to  the  other  was 

So.  30.  found  on  him.     Rex  v.  Rooney,  7  C. 

"  In  Hall  v.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.  (N.  &  P.  517. 
Y.)   671,  the  defendant  was  charged       "See    remarks    of    Agnew,    J.,    in 

with  stealing  certain  articles.     It  was  Shaffner    v.    Commonwealth,    72   Pa. 

held  error  to  permit  proof  that  other  St.   60,   13  Am.  649,  and  Cf.   People 

articles    stolen    from    another    party  v.  Sharp,  107  N.  Y.  427,  14  N.  E.  319, 

were   found   in   his   possession.     The  i  Am.  St.  851 ;  Burge  v.  United  States, 

court  said:    "This  testimony  is  loose  26  App.  D.  C.  524  (homicide). 


i6i 


PROOF   OF   OTHER    CRIMES. 


89 


It  is  immaterial  (at  least  where  the  evidence  of  another  crime 
is  pffered  to  show  guilty  intent  or  knowledge)  that  the  other 
crime  was  committed  before  or  after  the  crime  for  which  the 
accused  is  on  trial/^ 

§  89.  Evidence  of  other  offenses  to  show  specific  intention  or  guilty 
knowledge. — Another  exception  to  the  rule  occurs  when  the  inten- 
tion present  in  an  act  is  material.  Thus,  suppose  the  question  is, 
was  a  given  act,  either  by  the  accused,  or  by  some  other  person, 
intentional  or  accidental?  Here  it  is  relevant  to  prove  that  the 
person  whose  intention  is  in  question  had  performed  acts  of  a 
precisely  similar  nature  either  before  or  after  the  act  the  in- 
tention of  which  is  in  question.  And  if  it  be  found  that  he  has 
performed  many  such  acts,  we  have  the  best  of  grounds  for  draw- 
ing the  conclusion  that  the  act,  in  the  present  instance,  is  inten- 
tional and  not  accidental."    So  where  the  commission  of  an  act 


^'  People  V.  Shulman,  80  N.  Y.  373 ; 
State  V.  Williams,  76  Me.  480;  Reg. 
V.  Cotton,  12  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  400;  Biel- 
schofsky  v.  People,  3  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
40;  State  V.  Bridgman,  49  Vt.  202, 
210,  24  Am.  124:  Williams  v.  People, 
166  111.  132,  46  X.  E.  749;  Penrice  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  105  S.  W. 
797;  People  V.  Putnam,  90  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  125,  85  X.  Y.  S.  1056;  State 
V.  Johnson,  in  La.  935,  36  So.  30; 
Rex  V.  Wyatt,  73  L.  J.  K.  B.  15,  52 
Wkly.  Rep.  285,  68  J.  P.  31,  20  Cox 
Cr.  Cas.  462,  20  Times  Law  Rep.  68. 

"  People  V.  Seaman,  107  Mich.  348, 
65  X^.  W.  203,  61  Am.  St.  326;  Morse 
V.  Commonwealth  (Kj-.),  in  S.  W. 
714,  33  Ky.  L.  831,  894.  Where  upon 
the  trial  of  one  for  a  homicide  by 
poisoning,  the  defendant  admits  the 
death  by  poisoning,  but  alleges  that 
llie  poison  was  accidentally  taken  or 
administered,  it  is  relevant  to  show 
that  other  persons,  as,  for  example, 
relatives  and  friends  with  whom  the 
accused  came  in  contact,  had  died, 
II — Underhill  Cki.m.  Ev. 


previous  to  the  present  crime  by  the 
same  poison.  Reg.  v.  Cotton,  12  Cox 
Cr.  Cas.  400,  I  Green's  Cr.  Law  102, 
104;  Goersen  v.  Commonwealth,  99 
Pa.  St.  388;  Zoldoske  v.  State,  82 
Wis.  580,  597,  52  X.  W.  778. 

To  shoiv  intent:  Proof  of  other 
offenses  admissible  where  it  tends  to 
show  intent,  —  notes,  105  Am.  St. 
978,  981,  991,  992,  994,  looi,  62  L.  R. 
T.  214-274;  to  show  fraudulent  in- 
tent, 105  Am.  St.  983;  to  show  felo- 
nious intent,  105  Am.  St.  991 ;  to 
show  innocence  of  intent,  105  Am. 
St.  995;  to  show  guilty  intent,  105 
Am.  St.  991,  996;  to  rebut  inference 
of  innocent  intent,  105  Am.  St.  091, 
997 :  where  the  act  is  criminal  regard- 
less of  intent,  105  Am.  St.  998;  where 
defendant  admits  criminal  intent,  105 
Am.  St.  998;  to  show  intent  where  it 
may  be  otherwise  shown,  105  Am.  St. 
999 ;  to  show  common  scheme,  plan  or 
system  indicating  intent,  105  Am.  St. 
TOGO,  62  L.  R.  A.  2t8:  to  show  intent 
where  there  is  other  evidence  or  pre- 


§  89 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


162 


alleged  to  be  a  crime  is  admitted  by  the  accused  but  he  denies 
that  he  intended  to  commit  it  or  alleges  that  he  did  it  without 
guilty  knowledge  his  doing  similar  acts,  wholly  independent  and 
unconnected  with  that  under  investigation  is  relevant  to  show 
intention. 

Evidence  of  similar  and  independent  crimes  (but  never  of  those 
which  are  dissimilar)  is  often  relevant  to  show  the  presence  of 
some  specific  intent.  Thus,  evidence  of  forgeries  by  the  accused 
has  been  received  to  prove  the  intent  to  defraud,  which  is  essen- 
tial in  forgery  ;^^  and  of  arson  or  of  attempts  at  arson  to  prove 
that  a  burning  was  not  the  result  of  accident. 


sumption  of  intent,  62  L.  R.  A.  215; 
to  show  intent  where  intent  is  imma- 
terial, 62  L.  R.  A.  218;  in  prosecution 
for  fraud  or  false  pretenses,  62  L.  R. 
A.  222;  in  prosecution  for  counter- 
feiting, 62  L.  R.  A.  229;  in  prosecu- 
tion for  embezzlement,  62  L.  R.  A. 
226;  in  prosecution  for  forgery,  62  L. 
R.  A.  224. 

"  Langford  v.  State,  33  Fla.  233,  14 
So.  815;  People  V.  Sanders,  114  Cal. 
216,  46  Pac.  153;  Anson  v.  People,  148 
111.  494,  506,  135  N.  E.  145 ;  People  v. 
Bidleman,  104  Cal.  608,  615,  38  Pac. 
502;  State  V.  Valwell,  66  Vt.  558,  562, 
29  Atl.  1018;  State  V.  Smalley,  50  Vt. 
736,  750 ;  Commonwealth  v.  McCarthy, 
119  Mass.  354,  355;  Commonwealth 
V.  Bradford,  126  Mass.  42,  45;  Cole- 
man V.  People,  55  X.  Y.  81,  91 ;  Staf- 
ford V.  State,  55  Ga.  591,  592;  Pearce 
V.  State,  40  Ala.  720 :  State  v.  Xeagle, 
65  Me.  468,  469;  State  v.  Ransell,  41 
Conn.  433,  441;  State  v.  Plunkett,  64 
Me.  534,  538;  People  v.  Everhardt, 
104  N.  Y.  591,  II  N.  E.  62;  Bishop  v. 
State,  55  Md.  138:  State  v.  Saunders, 
68  Iowa  370,  27  X.  W.  455:  Lindsey 
V.  State,  38  Ohio  St.  507;  IVIeister  v. 
People,  31  Mich.  99;  People  v.  Hens- 
sler,  48  Mich.  49,  1 1  X.  W.  804 ;  State 
V.  Habib,   18  R.   I.  558,  30  Atl.  462; 


State  V.  Crawford,  39  S.  Car.  343.  17 
S.  E.  799;  Devoto  V.  Commonwealth, 
3  Mete.  (Ky.)  417,  419;  People  v. 
Rando,  3  Park  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  335,  336; 
Shriedley  v.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  130, 
142;  Yarborough  v.  State,  41  Ala. 
405,  2  Russell  on  Cr.  251 ;  Rex  v. 
Dunn,  I  Moody  C.  C.  146;  McGlas- 
son  V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App.  620, 
40  S.  W.  503,  66  Am.  St.  842.  "In  all 
cases  where  the  guilt  of  the  party 
depends  upon  the  intent,  purpose,  or 
design  with  which  the  act  is  done,  or 
upon  his  guilty  knowledge,  I  under- 
stand it  to  be  the  general  rule  that 
collateral  facts  may  be  examined  into 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  such 
guilty  intent,  design,  purpose,  or 
knowledge."  Bottomley  v.  United 
States,  I  Story  (X.  S.)  135,  143,  3 
Fed.  Cas.  1688.  See,  also,  as  sustaining 
text :  State  v.  Register,  133  X.  Car. 
746,  46  S.  E.  21 ;  State  v.  Talley, 
77  S.  Car.  99,  57  S.  E.  618;  122 
Am.  St.  559;  Wyatt  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App."),  114  S.  W.  812;  Ander- 
son V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  117 
S.  W.  364;  Jeffries  v.  United  States, 
7  Tnd.  Ter.  47,  103  S.  W.  761 ;  State 
V.  Lowe,  6  Kan.  App.  no,  50  Pac. 
912:  Chamberlin  v.  State,  80  Xeb.  812, 
115  X.  W.  555 ;   Sweatt  v.  State,  153 


1 63 


PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES. 


90 


So,  when  it  is  material  to  show  that  a  given  act  was  done  with 
a  fraudulent  intention,  as,  for  example,  in  a  prosecution  for  oh- 
taining  goods  by  false  pretenses.  Other  disconnected  false  pre- 
tenses in  which  the  presence  of  fraud  is  recognized  may  be  proved 
solely  to  show  the  intent/*'  To  illustrate  where  the  accused 
had  used  a  fraudulent  abstract  of  title  to  induce  one  to  sell  him 
goods  in  exchange  for  real  estate  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused 
had  on  the  same  day  employed  the  same  means  to  induce  another 
person  to  sell  him  goods/^ 

§  90.  Relevant  evidence  not  inadmissible  because  indirectly  prov- 
ing or  tending  to  prove  another  crime — Dissimilar  crimes  united  in 
motives. — .\11  evidence  is  relevant  which  throws,  or  tends  to  throw, 
any  light  upon  the  guilt  or  the  innocence  of  the  prisoner.  And 
relevant  evidence  which  is  introduced  to  prove  any  material  fact 
ought  not  to  be  rejected  merely  because  it  proves,  or  tends  to 
prove,  that  at  some  other  time  or  at  the  same  time  the  accused 
has  been  guilty  of  some  other  separate,  independent  and  dis- 
similar crime.    The  general  rule  is  well  settled  that  all  evidence 


Ala.  70,  45  So.  588;  Mitchell  v.  State, 
140  Ala.  118,  Z7  So.  y^,  103  Am.  St. 
i7n;  Ryan  v.  United  States,  26  App. 
D.  C.  74 ;  Warford  v.  People,  43  Colo. 
107,  96  Pac.  556;  Raymond  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 123  Ky.  368,  96  S.  W. 
515,  29  Ky.  L.  785;  Carnes  v.  State, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  437, 103  S.  W.  403 ; 
Weather  ford  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  430,  103  S.  W.  62,2,',  Common- 
wealth V.  McDermott,  27  Pa-  Super. 
Ct.  I ;  People  V.  Neff,  191  N.  Y.  210, 
83  X.  E.  970;  Woodward  v.  State,  84 
Ark.  119,  104  S.  W.  1 109. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Tuckerman,  10 
Gray  (Mass.)  173;  Commonwealth  v. 
Eastman,  i  Cush.  (Mass.)  189,  217, 
48  Am.  Dec.  596;  Thomas  v.  State, 
103  Tnd.  419,  432,  2  N.  E.  808 :  People 
V.  Schooley,  89  Hun  (N.  Y.)  391,  35 
X.  Y.  S.  429.  See,  also,  §§89,  423, 
4,18.  "A  man  may  have  one  forged 
or  counterfeit  note  in  his  possession 


and  yet,  with  reason,  be  assumed  to 
be  ignorant  of  its  true  character.  But 
if  he  has  been  proved  to  have  had 
many  such  false  instruments  in  his 
hands  at  various  times ;  and  particu- 
larly, if  it  appears  that  he  knew  that 
they  were  suspected  of  being  forged, 
he  can  not  complain  if  the  inference 
is  drawn  that  he  was  aware  of  their 
character."  It  is  reversible  error  for 
the  court  to  fail  to  instruct  the  jury 
that  evidence  of  other  crimes  should 
only  be  considered  upon  the  question 
of  the  intent.  Martin  v.  State,  36 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  125,  35  S.  W.  976; 
Thornlcy  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
35  S.  W.  981.  See,  also.  People 
V.  Hagenow,  236  Til.  514,  86  N.  E. 
370:  Vasser  v.  State,  75  .Ark.  27?)^  ^7 
S.  W.  635 ;  Gasscnheimcr  v.  United 
States,  26  App.  D.  C.  432. 

"State  V.  Roberts,  201  Mo.  702, 
100  S.  W.  484;  Walsh  v.  United 
States,  174  Fed.  615. 


90 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


164 


must  lie  relevant.  If  evidence  is  relevant  upon  the  general  issue 
of  guilt,  or  innocence,  no  valid  reason  exists  for  its  rejection 
merely  because  it  may  prove,  or  may  tend  to  prove,  that  the  ac- 
cused committed  some  other  crime,  or  may  establish  some  col- 
lateral and  unrelated  fact.^'* 

Thus,  the  fact  that  the  evidence  introduced  to  prove  the  motive 
of  the  crime  for  which  the  accused  is  on  trial  points  him  out  as 


'^  Moore  v.  United  States,  150  U.  S. 
57,  37  L.  ed.  996,  14  Sup.  Ct.  26;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Call,  21  Pick.  (Mass.) 
515,  522;  Commonwealth  v.  Choate, 
105  Mass.  451,  458;  State  v.  Fonte- 
not,  48  La.  Ann.  305,  19  So.  1 1 1 ; 
Mason  v.  State,  42  Ala.  532,  537,  539 ; 
Reg.  V.  Lewis,  6  C.  &  P.  i6r,  163; 
Reg.  V.  Crickmer,  16  Cox  Cr.  Cas. 
701 ;  People  v.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.  ( N. 
Y.)  71,  114;  Painter  v.  People,  147 
111.  444,  447,  463,  35  N.  E.  64;  State 
V.  Walton,  114  N.  Car.  783,  18  S.  E. 
945;  Ray  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  67,  60 
S.  E.  816;  Stone  v.  State,  118  Ga. 
70s,  45  S.  E.  630,  98  Am.  St.  i4Sn; 
State  V.  Dulaney  (Ark.,  1908),  112  S. 
W.  158;  People  V.  Hagenow,  236  111. 
514,  86  N.  E.  370;  Commonwealth  v. 
Levinson,  34  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  286; 
State  V.  Spaugh,  200  Mo.  571,  98  S. 
W.  55;  People  V.  Dudenhausen,  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.),  115  N.  Y.  S.  374; 
Thompson  v.  United  States,  75  C.  C. 
A.  172,  T44  Fed.  14;  State  v.  Frank- 
lin, 69  Kan.  798,  ^^  Pac.  588;  State 
V.  Bailey,  190  Mo.  257,  88  S.  W.  ^zy, 
People  V.  Zimmerman,  3  Cal.  App.  84, 
84  Pac.  446.  In  the  case  of  Walker  v. 
Commonwealth,  i  Leigh  (Va.),  on  p. 
574,  the  court  says :  It  frequently 
happens  that  as  the  evidence  of  cir- 
cumstances must  be  resorted  to,  for 
the  purpose  of  proving  the  commis- 
sion of  the  particular  offense  charged, 
the  proof  of  these  circumstances  in- 
volves the  proof  of  other  acts,  which 
may  be  criminal,  or  may  be  apparently 


innocent.  In  such  cases  it  is  proper 
that  the  chain  of  events  should  be 
luibroken.  If  one  or  more  links  of 
this  chain  consist  of  circumstances, 
which  tend  to  prove  the  prisoner  has 
been  guilty  of  other  crimes  than  that 
charged,  this  is  no  reason  why  the 
court  should  exclude  these  circum- 
stances. They  are  so  entirely  con- 
nected and  blended  with  the  main 
fact  that  they  can  not  be  departed 
from  with  propriety,  and  there  is 
no  reason  why  the  criminality  of 
such  intimate  and  connected  circum- 
stances should  exclude  them  more 
than  other  facts  apparently  innocent." 
Relevancy  and  materiality  of  evi- 
dence of  other  crimes — notes,  62  L.  R. 
A.  320,  325,  326,  105  Am.  St.  980, 
981 ;  admissibility  merely  to  prove  de- 
fendant's propensity  to  commit  crime, 
IDS  Am.  St.  981,  988,  992;  reasons  for 
admitting   evidence   of   other   crimes, 

105  Am.  St.  979,  980;  test  of  admissi- 
bility, 105  Am.  St.  980;  purpose  for 
which  admissible,  105  Am.  St.  579; 
exceptions  to  rule  excluding,  105  Am. 
St.  973;  admissibility  of  evidence  of 
similar  offenses,  105  Am.  St.  979;  ev- 
idence of  other  offenses  where  they 
constitute  a  scries  of  crimes,  105  Am. 
St.  983 :  evidence  where  the  other 
offenses  are  an  essential  ingredient 
of  the  crime  charged,  105  Am.  St. 
982;  State  v.  Hansford,  81  Kan.  300, 

106  Pac.  738;  Hall  V.  State  (Ga.  App., 
1909),  66  S.  E.  390;  Parrish  v.  Com- 
onwealth   (Ky.,  1909),  123  S.  W.  339. 


165  PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES.  §    90 

guilty  of  an  independent  and  totally  dissimilar  offense  is  not 
enough  to  bring  about  its  rejection,  if  it  is  otherwise  competent/'* 

Thus,  to  illustrate  where  it  was  necessary  for  the  prosecution 

'  to  show  the  absence  of  the  accused  from  the  state  to  avoid  the 

statute  of  limitation  it  was  admissible  to  prove  that  the  accused 

has  spent  several  years  in  a  penitentiary  in  another  state,  though 

this  evidence  tends  to  show  accused  had  committed  a  felony.-" 

Under  this  exception  to  the  general  rule,  where  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances amount  to  proof  of  another  crime  than  that  which  is 
charged,  and  it  appears  probable  that  the  crime  charged  grew  out 
of  the  other  crime,  or  was  in  some  way  caused  by  it.  the  facts  and 
circumstances  of  the  other  crime  may  be  proved  to  show  the  mo- 
tive of  the  accused."^ 

This  exception  is  of  value  in  a  homicide  where  the  accused  has 
taken  the  life  of  two  or  more  persons  at  or  about  the  same  time 
aaid  place  and  he  is  indicted  and  on  trial  for  the  killing  of  only 
one  of  them.  So  that  accused  had  killed  three  persons  at  one 
time  and  place  in  an  attempt  to  commit  a  burglary  may,  of  neces- 
sity, be  proved  on  his  trial  for  the  murder  of  any  one  of  them.^^ 
So  evidence  of  facts  leading  up  to  the  homicide  participated  in  by 
the  accused  is  always  relevant  to  show  his  intent,  though  the 
evidence  may  reveal  another  crime  committed  by  him.-"  It  may 
be  shown  that  in  the  affray  in  which  the  deceased  was  killed  the 
accused  shot  him  once  before  he  inflicted  the  death  wound. -^* 
So,  in  most  cases  where  the  intent  is  in  question,  prior  crimes  of 
the  same  nature,  if  not  too  remote  in  time,  are  receivable  in  evi- 
dence, though  the  court  can  see  that  there  is  no  connection  be- 
tween them.-'' 

"  Brown  v.  State,  26  Ohio  St.   176,  ■"  State  v.  !Moran,  131  Iowa  645,  log 

181 ;  People  v.  Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423,  X.  W.  187. 

^3   X.   E.   65 ;   Farris   v.    People,    129  "*  Commonwealth     v.     Ferrigan,    44 

111.  521,  21  X.  E.  821,  16  Am.  St.  283,  Pa.  St.  386,  387. 

4  L.  R.  A.  582;  State  v.  Madigan,  57  "People  v.  Rogers,  192  X.  Y.  331, 

Minn.  425,  59  X.  W.  490,  492;  State  85  X.   E.    135:  holding  also  that  this 

V.   Sargood,   80  Vt.   412,  68  Atl.   51 ;  evidence  might  be  received  to  corrob- 

State  V.  Gillispie,  63  W.  Va.   152,  59  orate  a  confession  by  the  accused. 

S.    E.   957;    Sanderson   v.    State,    169  "'^  Clark  v.    State,  79  Xeb.  473,    113 

Tnd.  301,  82  X.  E.  525;  State  v.  Dick-  X.  W.  221. 

crson,  77  Ohio  St.  34,  82  X.  E.  869,  "''■1  People   v.    Jeina,    125    .\pp.    Div. 

122  Am.   St.  479:  Cortez  v.  State,  47  fX.  Y.)  697,  no  X.  Y.  S.  H3. 

Tex.  Cr.  App.  10,  83  S.  W.  812.  "'  VVithaup    v.    United    States,     127 


90 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE, 


1 66 


Thus,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  victim  of  a  homicide,  for  which 
the  defendant  is  on  trial,  was  a  pohce  officer,  or  other  person 
who.  when  he  was  killed,  was  engaged  in  investigating  the  circum- 
stances of  another  prior  and  independent  crime  of  which  the 
accused  was  suspected. -^ 

Thus,  where  the  accused  kills  an  officer  who  attempts  to  arrest 
him  witliout  a  warrant,  proof  that  the  accused  had  committed  a 
felony  is  competent,  as  that  is  necessary  to  justify  an  arrest  with- 
out a  warrant.-*' 

And,  generally,  if  one  crime  may  have  been  perpetrated  for 
the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  commission  or  concealment  of  an- 


Fed.  530,  62  C.  C.  A.  328;  Toll  v. 
State,  40  Fla.  169,  23  So.  942. 

To  shoiv  motive:  Proof  of  other 
crimes  to  show  motive — notes,  62  L. 
R.  A.  199,  208,  105  Am.  St.  984,  986, 
987;  to  show  single  motive  for  sev- 
eral crimes,  105  Am.  St.  990;  to  show 
motive — common  plan  or  system,  62 
L.  R.  A.  199;  in  prosecution  for  mur- 
der, 62  L.  R.  A.  200 ;  in  prosecution 
for  assault  with  intent  to  murder,  62 
L.  R.  A.  207;  in  prosecution  for  ar- 
son, 62  L.  R.  A.  208;  in  concealment, 
resisting  arrest  or  escape,  62  L.  R.  A. 
211. 

To  show  malice:  Evidence  of  other 
crimes  to  show  malice,  62  L.  R.  A. 
277,  IDS  Am.  St.  989. 

-^  Moore  v.  United  States,  150  U.  S. 
57,  61,  Z7  L-  ed.  996,  14  Sup.  Ct.  26; 
Dunn  V.  State,  2  Ark.  229,  35  Am. 
Dec.  54:  State  v.  Honore,  121  La. 
573,  46  So.  655  (killing  of  police  offi- 
cer) ;  Cortez  v.  State.  47  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  ID,  83  S.  W.  812;  People  v. 
Morse,  196  N.  Y.  306,  89  N.  E.  816. 

^  In  such  a  condition  of  affairs,  the 
court  properly  charged  that  the  proof 
of  the  commission  of  a  felony  was 
necessary  to  justify  such  arrest,  that 
the  testimony  was  inadmissible,  of  it- 
self, and  its  only  purpose  was  to  show 


the  cause  of  the  attempted  arrest. 
State  v.  Honore,  121  La.  573,  46  So. 
655.  In  a  recent  case  in  the  state  of 
New  York,  where  the  accused,  having 
shot  a  man  during  a  quarrel  and  fled, 
was  subsequently  found  by  two  offi- 
cers in  a  building  about  five  hundred 
feet  awa3%  where  he  shot  the  two 
officers  who  were  not  in  uniform  and 
killed  one  of  them,  the  court  made  a 
distinction  between  receiving  evidence 
of  the  prior  shooting  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  the  occasion  for  the  flight 
of  the  accused  and  the  purpose  of  the 
officers  pursuing  him ;  and  receiving 
the  same  evidence  as  direct  proof 
that  the  accused  shot  the  officers  or 
that  the  killing  of  the  officer  was  a 
part  of  the  commission  of  a  felony. 
The  evidence  of  the  prior  crime  was 
received  because  it  might  show  the 
lawful  character  and  purpose  of  the 
pursuit  by  the  officers  as  the  right  of 
the  accused,  whose  plea  was  self-de- 
fense, to  defend  himself  would  not 
applj'  if  he  were  being  lawfully  pur- 
sued by  policemen  after  committing 
a  felony.  The  court  ruled  out  this 
evidence  for  every  other  purpose, 
holding  that  the  first  shooting  was  an 
independent  crime.  People  v.  Gov- 
ernale,  193  X.  Y.  581,  86  N.  E.  554. 


167  PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES.  §    9O 

Other,  or  to  aid  the  escape  of  the  accused,-'  the  incidental  crime 
may  be  shown  as  furnishing  a  motive  for  the  commission  of  the 
crime  for  which  the  accused  has  been  indicted."^  Hence,  adultery 
committed  by  the  accused  with  a  woman  may  be  proved  upon  his 
trial  for  the  killing  of  the  woman's  husband.  For  it  is  obvious 
that  an  illicit  intercourse,  of  which  the  adultery  was  a  part,  proved 
to  exist  between  the  prisoner  and  the  wife  of  his  victim,  would 
be  a  strong  circumstance  for  the  jury  to  consider  in  determining 
the  existence  of  a  motive  prompting  the  accused  to  desire  the 
removal  of  the  husband  in  order  that  he  might  obtain  possession 
of  the  woman.-" 

The  two  crimes,  though  dissimilar,  are  so  far  unified  in  motive 
that  they  are  really  parts  of  a  single  transaction.  They  were  both 
designed  to  bring  about  a  single  result.  The  adultery  which  may 
be  called  the  subsidiary  crime  is  not  relevant,  because  any  infer- 
ence that  the  defendant  killed  the  husband  can  be  drawn  justly 
or  universally  from  the  fact  that  he  debauched  the  wife.  It  is 
received  solely  to  show  that  the  defendant,  having  committed 
adultery  with  the  wife,  was  thereafter  possessed  of  a  motive, 
which  iiiigJif.  under  the  circumstances,  prompt  him  to  the  greater 
crime,  that  he  might  remove  the  person  who  stood  in  the  way  of 
the  complete  enjoyment  of  his  illicit  passion.'"' 

"'If  the  circumstances  tend  to  show  Cr.  App.  312,  315,  20  S.  W.  579;  Peo- 
that  accused  has  committed  an  inde-  pie  v.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.  71,  115;  Rex 
pendent,  dissimilar  crime  to  enable  v.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221 ;  Alsobrook 
him  to  commit  or  conceal  the  offense  v.  State,  126  Ga.  100,  54  S.  E.  805 ; 
charged,  evidence  of  the  independent  State  v.  Lewis,  181  Mo.  235,  79  S.  W. 
crime  is  admissible,  when  the  intent  671  ;  Cawthon  v.  State,  119  Ga.  395, 
to  commit  or  conceal  the  independent  46  S.  E.  897;  Welch  v.  Common- 
offense  was  the  motive  of  the  offense  wealth  (Ky.),  108  S.  W.  863,  33  Ky. 
charged.      Morse    v.    Commonwealth  L.  51. 

(Ky.).  Ill   S.  W.  714,  33  Ky.  L.  831,  -'People  v.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.    (N. 

894.  Y.)    71,    115.    T32:    State  V.   Rash,    12 

"*  Willi ngham  v.   State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  Tred.    (N.  Car.)   382.  384;  Pierson  v. 

App.    98.    25    S.    W.    424 ;    Dunn    v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424,  435.  436.  35  .Vm. 

State.  2  Ark.  229,  35   Am.   Dec.   54;  524;   Templeton   v.    People,  27   Mich. 

State  V.  Pancoast  (N.  Dak.,  1896),  67  501;    Commonwealth   v.   Ferrigan,   44 

N.   W.    1052;    State   v.    Seymour,   94  Pa.  St.  386,  387;  State  v.  Watkins.  9 

Towa  699,  63  N.  W.  661 ;    Painter  v.  Conn.  47,  53 ;  Van  Gesncr  v.  United 

People,  147  111.  444,  447,  463,  35  X.  E.  States,  153  Fed.  46,  82  C.  C.  .\.  t8o. 

64;  People  V.   Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423,  '"In  Gocrsen  v.  Commonwealth,  99 

33  N-  E.  65;  Crass  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Pa.   St.  388,  the  court  said:    "Under 


§  91  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  l68 

i^  91.  Identity  of  means  employed  in  several  crimes — Identity  of 
accused. — Where  a  crime  has  been  committed  by  some  peculiar, 
extraordinary  and  novel  means  or  implement  or  apparatus  or  in 
a  peculiar  or  extraordinary  manner,  evidence  of  a  similar  crime 
committed  by  the  accused,  by  the  same  means,  or  in  the  same 
manner,  has  been  received  to  prove  the  identity  of  the  accused  as 
an  inference  from  the  similarity  of  method."^  Thus,  where  the 
accused  is  charged  with  arson  in  setting  fire  to  a  building  by 
means  of  a  box  or  other  apparatus  contrived  solely  for  incendiary 
purposes,  it  may  be  shown  that*  he  had  employed  a  similar  device 
elsewhere,  with  the  same  object  in  view."' 

Often  it  may  be  permitted  to  prove  a  collateral  offense  or  crime 
as  part  of  the  evidence  which  is  introduced  to  identify  the  ac- 
cused.^" Take,  for  example,  the  case  of  one  who  is  on  trial  for 
a  crime  which  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  him  under  an 
assumed  name ;  and  he  claims  that  the  crime  was  committed  by 
another  person.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  proper  to  permit 
the  state  to  prove  any  fact  which  will  tend  to  identify  the  accused, 
one  of  which  would  be,  that  he  has  committed  similar  offenses 
under  the  same  assumed  name.  So  on  an  indictment  under  an 
assumed  name  for  embezzlement  it  may  properly  be  shown  that 
the  accused  embezzled  other  sums  of  money  under  the  same  name. 
The  jury  should  be  instructed,  however,  that  evidence  of  other 
crimes  offered  to  identify  the  accused  should  be  considered  by 
the  jury  only  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the  identity  of  the 
accused.'* 

some   circumstances    evidence   of   an-  '^  I\Iorse   v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

other  offense  may  be  given.     It  may  iii  S.  W.  714,  33  Ky.  L.  831,  894. 

be  done  to  establish  identity,  to  show  ^'  Commonwealth     v.     Choate,     105 

the  act  charged  was   intentional   and  Mass.  451,  457;  Rex  v.  Fursey,  6  Car. 

willful,  not  accidental;  to  show  guilty  &  Payne  81. 

knowledge  and  purpose  and  to  rebut  ^"  Rose.  Cr.  Ev.  90 :  Rex  v.  Rooney, 
any  inference  of  mistake;  in  death  by  7  C.  &  P.  517,  518;  United  States  v. 
poison  to  show  defendant  knew  the  Boyd,  45  Fed.  851 ;  Osborne  v.  Peo- 
substance  administered  to  be  poison;  pie,  2  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  583;  Un- 
to show  him  to  be  one  of  an  organi-  treinor  v.  State,  146  Ala.  133,  41  So. 
zation  banded  together  to  commit  170;  State  v.  Bates,  182  Mo.  70,  81  S. 
similar    crimes    and    to    connect    the  W.  408. 

other  offense  with  the  one  charged  as  ^^  Morse   v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

part  of  the  same  transaction."  in  S.  W.  714,  33  Ky.  L.  831,  894. 


169  PROOF    OF    OTHER    CRIMES.  §    92 

So  where  the  accused  is  on  trial  for  arson,  it  may  be  shown 
that  goods,  which  were  stored  in  the  burned  building,  were  found 
in  his  possession,  though  this  evidence  tends  to  prove  him  guilty 
of  the  larceny  of  the  goods.  And  evidence  that  tracks  found  in 
the  vicinity  of  each  of  two  houses,  which  had  been  broken  into, 
corresponded  with  the  foot-wear  of  the  accused  is  admissible  as 
tending  to  prove  his  whereabouts  on  the  night  in  cjuestion."'' 

§  92.  Sexual  crimes. — Crimes  involving  illicit  sexual  intercourse 
either  in  incest,  adultery  or  rape  constitute  another  exception  to 
the  general  rule.  Thus,  under  an  indictment  for  adultery  or  incest 
evidence  of  the  commission  of  similar  crimes  by  the  same  parties 
prior,  but  not  subsequent,  to  the  offense  alleged  is  received  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  inclination.^® 

In  all  such  cases  the  mutual  relations  and  the  disposition  of 
the  parties  towards  one  another  are  relevant  upon  the  question, 
did  they  have  illicit  intercourse?  And,  it  is  a  very  fair  inference 
that  the  accused  was  guilty  of  the  crime  alleged,  if  it  affirmatively 
appears  that  he  had  committed  acts  of  adultery  or  incest  with 
the  same  person  on  prior  occasions.^^ 

Trazier  v.   State,    135  Ind.  38,  41,     pie  v.  Jenness,  5  Mich.  305,  319;  Mc- 

34  N.  E.  817.  Leod  v.  State,  35  Ala.  395,  398;  Law- 
Proof    of    other    crimes    to    show     son  v.  State,  20  Ala.  65,  56  Am.  Dec. 

identity  of  accused,  105  Am.  St.  984.  182;  Proper  v.  State,  85  Wis.  615,  55 

"*  Callison  v.  State,  zi  Tex.  Cr.  App.  N.  W.  1035 ;  State  v.  Markins,  95  Ind. 

211,  39  S.  W.  300;  Commonwealth  v.  464,  48  Am.  '/2>'i',   Lefforge  v.    State, 

Bell,  166  Pa.  St.  405,  411,  31  Atl.  123;  129  Ind.  551,  29  N.  E.  34;   Lovell  v. 

People  V.  Patterson,  102  Cal.  239,  244,  State,  12  Ind.  18.     Evidence  of  illicit 

36   Pac.  436;    State  v.    Bridgman,  49  intercourse  indulged  in  by  the   same 

Vt.  202,  24  Am.  124;  State  v.  Marvin,  parties  subsequently  to  the  date  upon 

35  N.  H.  22,  28,  29;  State  v.  Wallace,  which  the  adultery  is  laid  was  admit- 
9  N.  H.  515,  517,  518;  Common-  ted  in  State  v.  Williams,  76  Me.  480. 
wealth  V.  Nichols,  114  Mass.  285,  288,  But  the  weight  of  the  cases  would 
19  Am.  346n ;  Commonwealth  v.  seem  to  exclude  subsequent  adulter- 
Bowers,  121  Mass.  45,  46;  State  v.  ous  acts.  State  v.  Xeubauer  (Iowa, 
Williams,  76  Me.  480;  State  v.  Pippin,  1909).  124  X.  W.  312. 

88  N.  Car.  646,  647;  State  v.  Kemp,        "See  §  381. 

87  N.  Car.  538,  540;  People  v.  Skutt,  Proof  of  other  offenses  in  prosecu- 
96  Mich.  449,  450,  56  N.  W.  II  ;  Peo-     tions  for  sexual  crimes,  62  L.  R.  A. 

329,  338. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  A  PART  OF  THE  RES  GESTAE. 

§  93.  Scope    and   limit   of    facts   and  §  97.  Interval    for    consideration    or 

declarations    forming    a    part  taking  advice, 

of  the  res  gcstce.  98.  Mental     and     physical     condi- 

94.  Necessity  for  approximation  of  tions  as   influencing  the  dec- 

unity  in  time,  place  and  mo-  larations. 

tive    prompting    the    declara-  99.  Admissibility  for  the  accused. 

tions.  100.  Declarations    uttered    prior    to 

95.  Declarations  must   explain   and  the  crime. 

illustrate    the    main    transac-        loi.  Declarations  by  bystanders  and 
tion.  other  third  persons. 

96.  Contemporaneous   character   of 

the  declarations. 

§  93.  The  scope  and  limit  of  facts  and  declarations  forming  the  res 
gestae. — T!ie  expression,  res  gcstcv,  as  applied  to  a  crime,  means 
the  complete  criminal  transaction  from  its  beginning  or  starting- 
point  in  the  act  of  the  accused  until  the  end  is  reached.  What  in 
any  case  constitutes  the  res  gestcc  of  a  crime  depends  wholly  on 
th.e  character  of  the  crime  and  the  circumstances  of  the  case.^ 
The  rule  of  the  res  gestcc  under  which  it  is  said  that  all  facts 
■which  are  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc  are  admissible,  is  a  rule  de- 
termining the  relevancy  and  not  the  character  or  probative  force 
of  the  evidence.  If  the  court  determines  that  the  fact  offered  is 
a  part  of  the  res  gestcc,  it  will  be  accepted  because  as  it  is  said 
that  fact  is  then  relevant.  Relevancy  is  always  a  judicial  question 
to  be  determined  according  to  the  issue  which  is  to  be  tried. 
Taking  the  main  facts  which  are  embraced  in  the  commission  of 
any  crime  and  which  are  essential  to  be  proved,  it  will  be  found, 
in  most  instances,  that  they  are  connected  with  others  which  are 
not  essential  to  be  proved,  but  which  tend  more  or  less  to  prove 
those  facts  which  are  to  be  proved.  Every  occurrence  which  is 
the  result  of  human  agency  is  more  or  less  implicated  and  involved 

'State  V.  Foley,  113  La.  52,  36  So.   885.  104  Am.  St.  493. 

(170) 


I/I        DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST-'E.       §    93 

with  Other  occurrences.  One  event  is  the  cause  or  the  result  of 
another  or  two  or  more  events  or  incidents  may  be  collaterally 
connected  or  related.  Circumstances  constituting  a  criminal  trans- 
action which  is  being  investigated  by  the  jury,  and  which  are  so 
interwoven  with  others,  and  with  the  principal  facts  which  are 
at  issue  that  they  cannot  be  very  well  separated  from  the  principal 
facts  at  issue  without  depriving  the  jury  of  proof  which  is  neces- 
sary for  them  to  have  in  order  to  reach  a  direct  conclusion  on  the 
evidence,  may  be  regarded  as  res  gestcu.~ 

And  it  is  a  rule  that  evidence  of  connected,  precedent,  or  sur- 
rounding circumstances  is  proper  to  show  the  probability  that  the 
principal  fact  has  happened  in  all  cases  where  it  may  naturally  be 
assumed  that  a  connection  exists  between  the  main  fact  and  the 
subordinate  fact." 

Some  crimes  like  homicide  and  rape  consist  of  a  single  and 
complete  and  continuous  transaction  circumscribed  in  its  incidents 
both  as  to  time  and  place.  For  example,  in  homicide,  the  circum- 
stances and  details  of  what  occurred  at  the  very  instant  of  the 
homicide  are  usually  the  res  gestcu  of  the  homicide.^    Thus  as  a 

-  Sprinkle  v.  United  States,  14T  Fed.  So.  992 ;  State  v.  Cavin,  199  Mo.  154, 

811,  73  C.  C.  A.  285.  97  S.  W.  573;   Menefee  v.  State,  50 

^Powers  V.  People,  42  111.  App.  427,  Tex.    Cr.   App.    249,    97    S.    W.    486; 

431;    State  V.   Ryder,  80  Vt.  422.   68  Lyles  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  119, 

Atl.   652.     Res  gestcB   includes    those  86  S.  W.  762,. 

circumstances   which   are    the   under-  In  particular  offenses:   Proof  of  res 

signed  incidents  of  a  particular  liti-  gestce    in     particular     offenses :       In 

gated  act.    They  may  be  separated  by  prosecution  for  homicide,  Elliott  Ev., 

the  act  from  a  lapse  of  time  more  or  §  3029;    in    prosecution    for    rape — 

less  appreciable,  and  may  consist  of  note,    19   L.    R.    A.   744;    Elliott   Ev., 

speeches  of  any  one  concerned,  wheth-  §  3098 ;    in   prosecution    for   robbery, 

er    participant    or    bystander.      They  Elliott  Ev.,  §  3134;  in  prosecution  for 

may  comprise  things  left  undone  as  seduction,     Elliott     Ev.,     §  3149;     in 

well   as  things   done;   their  sole  dis-  prosecution   for   treason,   Elliott   Ev., 

tinguishing    feature    being    that    they  §  3160. 

should  be  necessary  incidents  of  the  Other   offenses  part   of  res  gestce: 

litigated  act  in  the  sense  that  they  are  When  other  crime  is  part  of  res  ges- 

part    of    the   immediate    preparations  tee — note,  62  L.    R.    A.    308,   319,    105 

for  or  emanations  of   such   act,  and  Am.    St.  984;   in  prosecution  for  ar- 

are   not    produced   by   the   calculated  son,  62  L.  R.  A.  319;  in  prosecution 

policy  of  the  actors.     State  v.  Kane  for  assault,  62  L.  R.  A.  314;  in  prose- 

(^-  J.),  72  Atl.  39.  cution  for  assault  with  intent  to  mur- 

'  Williams  v.  State,  147  Ala.   10,  41  der,  62  L.   R.  A.  313;  in  prosecution 


§    93  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  1 72 

part  of  the  res  gcstcc  of  the  homicide,  it  is  usually  competent  to 
show  that  the  accused,  in  killing  the  person  for  whose  death  he 
is  on  trial,  in  the  same  transaction  killed  another  person.  But  the 
tendency  is  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  criminal  transaction  to 
incidents  occurring  immediately  before  and  after  it.  Accordingly, 
it  is  permitted  to  show  what  the  accused  did  immediately  after 
committing  the  crime.^  And  also  in  homicide  what  took  place 
immediately  before  the  shooting  to  show  the  intent.''  So,  for 
example,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  had  prepared  to  com- 
mit the  homicide  or  that  he  had  threatened  to  kill  the  deceased, 
or  that  he  was  seen  in  the  company  of  the  deceased  before  the 
homicide.  It  has  been  held  proper  to  admit,  as  part  of  the  res 
gestcc  of  the  homicide,  proof  that  prior  to  the  homicide,  the  de- 
fendant had  quarreled  with  another  person  than  the  accused  and 
had  attempted  to  kill  him.^ 

An  event  which  is  the  cause  of  or  furnishes  a  motive  for  the 
homicide  is  always  admissible  as  of  the  res  gestar,  though  pre- 
ceding it  considerably  in  point  of  time.**  So,  where  two  men  are 
jointly  indicted  for  a  homicide  committed  by  both  in  concert  and 
at  the  same  time,  the  acts  of  either  of  them  are  admissible  as  part 
of  the  res  gestcv  on  the  trial  of  the  other.^  So  where  the  accused 
assaulted  two  persons  at  the  same  time  and  place,  evidence  show- 
ing the  assault  on  either  person  or  the  effects  of  the  assault  on 
either,  is  admissible  against  the  accused  on  his  trial  for  either 
of  the  two  assaults.  The  crimes  are  separate  in  their  character 
and  punishment,  but  connected  into  one  indivisible  transaction. 

The  principles  at  the  foundation  of  the  rule  permitting  the 
proof  of  all  incidents  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gcstce  are  also 

for    burglary,    62    L.    R.    A.    317;    in  343;  Arnold  v.  State,  131  Ga.  494,  62 

prosecution  for  forgery,  62  L.  R.  A.  S.  E.  S06. 

319;   in  prosecution  for  assault  with  *  ]\Iorris  v.    State.   146   Ala.   66,  41 

intent  to  murder,  62  L.  R.  A.  313;  in  So.  274;   Herd  v.  State.  50  Tex.   Cr. 

prosecution  for  larceny,  62  L.  R.  A.  App.  600,  99  S.  W.  11 19. 

315 ;    in   prosecution    for   murder,   62  "  jMcKinney   v.    State,   49   Tex.    Cr. 

L.  R.  A.  308;  in  prosecution  for  re-  App.  591,  96  S.  W.  48. 

ceiving  stolen  property,  62  L.  R.  A.  ®  Thompson     v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

317;  in  prosecution  for  rape,  62  L.  R.  App.,  1908),  113  S.  W.  536. 

A.   314;   in   prosecution    for   robbery,  '  ^IcCoy  v.   State,  91   Miss.  257,  44 

62  L.  R.  A.  318.  So.  814. 
*Pate  V.  State,  150  Ala.   10,  43  So. 


173       DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST^.       §    93 

the  basis  for  the  admission  of  circumstantial  evidence.  The  facts 
which  are  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcu  must  tend  to  prove  the  principal 
facts.  So,  circumstantial  evidence  is  only  relevant  where  it  clearly 
has  a  tendency  to  prove  the  necessary  facts. 

This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  use  and  application  of  circum- 
stantial evidence.  Thus,  suppose  the  question  is,  did  A.  kill  B.  by 
shooting  him  ?  Evidence  would  be  admissible  to  prove  as  part 
of  the  res  gestce  or  main  transaction,  and  as  a  natural  result  of  it, 
that  A.  was  seen  a  few  minutes  after  the  killing  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  crime  with  a  recently  discharged  and  smoking  pistol 
in  his  hand.  But  obviously  such  a  fact  witnessed  a  week  after  the 
crime  would  be  wholly  irrelevant,  as  it  could  not  be  a  natural 
result  of  the  transaction  for  which  A.  is  on  trial,  or  in  any  way 
connected  with  it. 

The  principles  just  enumerated  regulate  the  admission  of  rele- 
vant facts.  Upon  similar  principles  the  declarations  of  partici- 
pants referring  to  relevant  facts  and  illustrating  them  are  also  re- 
ceived without  producing  the  declarant  as  an  exception  to  the  rule 
rejecting  hearsay  evidence. 

For  example,  let  us  suppose  that  A.,  when  discovered  with  the 
smoking  pistol,  impulsively  declared  that  the  deceased  had  at- 
tacked him :  and  that  he  had  shot  to  defend  himself,  or  a  party 
who  has  been  assaulted  immediately  thereafter  states  some  fact 
relevant  to  the  assault  or  to  the  purpose  or  intention  of  the  as- 
sailant. Usually  statements  made  by  third  persons  not  produced 
as  witnesses  are  objectionable  as  hearsay.  But,  it  has  been  re- 
marked, here  the  events  speak  for  themselves,  giving  out  their 
fullest  meaning  through  the  unprompted  language  of  the  partici- 
pants. The  spontaneous  character  of  the  language  is  assumed  to 
preclude  the  probability  of  its  premeditation  or  fabrication.  Its 
utterance  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  is  regarded,  with  a  good  deal 
of  reason,  as  a  guarantee  of  its  truth.  These  instinctive  utterances 
are  as  much  original  evidence  as  are  the  events  whence  they  em- 
anate or  of  which  they  form  an  inseparable  part.  Their  value  as 
evidence  does  not  depend  in  the  slightest  degree  upon  our  con- 
fidence in  the  credibility  of  the  declarant,  or  upon  our  knowledge 
of  him  as  a  man  who  habitually  tells  the  truth.  He  is  regarded 
merely  as  the  channel  through  which  the  events  describe  them- 
selves contemporaneously,  or  nearly  so,  with  their  occurrence. 


§  94  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  I74 

These  declarations  must  possess  three  characteristics :  First, 
they  must  have  been  uttered  contemporaneously  with  and  grow 
out  of  the  act  upon  which  they  have  a  bearing  so  as  to  be  spon- 
taneous and  not  narrative;  second,  they  must. qualify,  illustrate, 
explain  or  unfold  its  character  or  significance,  so  as,  third,  to 
be  connected  with  it  in  such  a  manner  that  the  declaration  and 
the  act  form  a  single  and  indivisible  transaction. 

§  94.  Necessity  for  approximation  of  unity  in  time,  place  and  mo- 
tive prompting:  the  declarations. — If  the  declaration  springs  out  of 
or  accompanies  the  event,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the 
motive  prompting  each  is  identical.  This  identity  or  unity  of 
motive  may  have  reference  to  the  motive  of  the  crime  itself,  or  to 
the  motive  of  persons  who  are  charged  with  it,  or  of  the  person  or 
persons  who  were  the  passive  participants  in  it  and  whose  declara- 
tions are  offered.  So  the  elements  of  time  and  place  are  very  im- 
portant, for  the  subsequent  presence  of  persons  at  the  locus  in  quo 
who  were  not  there  when  the  event  occurred  may  suggest  the  in- 
tervention of  new  motives  prompting  the  declaration.  If  a  new 
motive  has  prompted  the  declarations,  it  is  no  longer  admissible 
as  a  part  of  the  original  transaction.  Hence  an  immediate  and 
sudden  accusation  of  crime,  a  confronting  with  the  corpus  delicti, 
the  flight,  pursuit  or  arrest  of  an  accused  person,  the  placing  of 
the  accused  in  jail,  or  the  doing  of  something  by  accused  or 
by  the  person  whose  declaration  is  offered  which  has  no  necessary 
connection  with  the  crime,  entailing  a  change  of  scene  and  the 
intervention  of  new  persons,  both  unexpected  and  sudden,  may 
rob  any  explanatory  declaration  of  its  character  as  a  part  of  a 
relevant  transaction.^" 

Thus,  declarations  passing  between  parties  are  admissible  when 
the  nature  of  the  relations  between  them  is  in  question,  as,  for 

"State  V.  Walker,  78  Mo.  380,  386,  652;   Simmons  v.   State,   145  Ala.   6r, 

387;    State  V.   Johnson,  35   La.  Ann.  40  So.  660;  Morello  v.  People,  226  111. 

968;     Little     V.     Commonwealth,     25  388,  80  N.  E.  903;  Mitchell  v.  State, 

Gratt.    (Va.)   921,  924,  926;   Stephen-  82  Ark.  324,  loi  S.  W.  763. 

son  V.  State,  no  Ind.  358,  372,  11  N.  How  near  main  transaction  must  be 

E.  360,  59  Am.  216;  Hall  v.  State,  132  to  declaration  made  in  order  to  con- 

Ind.  317,  321,  31  N.  E.  536;  Brown  v.  stitute  part  of  res  gestce — note,  19  L. 

State,   127  Wis.  193,   106  N.  W.  536:  R.  A.  7Z7- 
State  V.   Ryder,  80  Vt.  422,  68  Atl. 


1/5       DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST.E. 


§  95 


example,  when  it  cannot  otherwise  be  ascertained  what  feeHngs 
they  entertained  towards  each  other  at  a  particular  time.^^ 

This  rule  applies  when  the  cjuestion  of  malice  or  premeditation 
is  raised  on  the  trial  of  a  homicide.  The  statements  of  the  ac- 
cused, uttered  at  the  commission  of  the  crime,  being  often  the 
only  evidence  procurable  to  show  his  mental  state,  are  then  re- 
ceived for  or  against  him  to  show  that  the  killing  was  deliberate 
or  under  the  sudden  impulse  of  anger  or  fear/- 

§  95.  Declarations  must  illustrate  and  explain  main  transaction. — 
The  range  of  events  included  by  the  term  res  gestcc  varies  accord- 
ing to  the  crime  which  is  charged  and  the  particular  facts  consti- 
tuting the  criminal  transaction.  This  fact  must  be  kept  in  view, 
for  it  is  largely  the  explanatory  and  illustrative  character  of  the 
declarations  as  applied  to  the  principal  transaction  that  admits 
them  as  evidence.^^ 


"  Garber  v.  State,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 
161,  170;  Brumley  v.  State,  21  Tex. 
App.  222,  239,  17  S.  W.  140,  57  Am. 
612;  State  V.  Gabriel,  88  Mo.  631; 
Sprinkle  v.  United  States,  141  Fed. 
81  r,  72  C.  C.  A.  285.  Under  the  stat- 
ute of  Georgia  the  declarations  to  be 
received  as  res  gestce  must  be  con- 
nected in  point  of  time,  so  as  to  be 
free  from  all  suspicion  of  delibera- 
tion. Taylor  v.  State,  120  Ga.  857, 
48  S.  E.  361. 

"  State  V.  Walker,  77  Me.  488,  491, 
I  Atl.  357;  Gantier  v.  State  (Tex. 
1893),  21  S.  W.  255;  Miller  v.  State, 
3T  Tex.  Cr.  App.  609,  21  S.  W.  925, 
37  Am.  St.  836;  Schlemmcr  v.  State, 
51  N.  J.  L.  23,  27,  29,  15  Atl.  836; 
Plant  V.  State,  140  Ala.  52,  37  So. 
T59- 

"  State  V.  Brown,  28  Ore.  147,  41 
Pac.  1042;  Bow  V.  People,  t6o  III. 
438,  43  N.  E.  593:  Norfleet  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.  1896),  33  S.  W.  938, 
17  Ky.  L.  1T37;  State  v.  Bigelow,  tot 
Iowa   430,    70    \.    W.   600;    Jones   v. 


State,  71  Ind.  66,  81,  82;  Crookham 
V.  State,  5  W.  Va.  510,  513;  State 
V.  Walker,  77  Me.  488,  491,  i  Atl. 
357;  United  States  v,  Noelke,  17 
Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  554,  570;  Garber  v. 
State,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.),  161,  169; 
Schlemmer  v.  State,  51  N.  J.  L.  23, 
29,  15  Atl.  836;  United  States  v.  An- 
gell,  II  Fed.  34,  41 ;  Lewis  v.  State, 
29  Tex.  App.  201,  T5  S.  W.  642; 
Commonwealth  v.  M'Pike,  3  Gush. 
(Mass.)  181,  184;  State  v.  Horan, 
32  J\linn.  394,  396,  20  N.  W.  905; 
Driscoll  V.  People,  47  Mich.  413,  415, 
416,  II  N.  W.  221;  State  v.  Ryder,  80 
Vt.  422,  68  Atl.  652;  Vann  v.  State, 
45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  434,  77  S.  W.  8T3, 
T07  Am.  St.  997;  State  v.  Jarrell,  T4T 
N.  Car.  722,  53  S.  E.  127:  State 
V.  Taster,  71  N.  J.  L.  586,  60  Atl. 
361 ;  Moody  v.  State.  120  Ga.  868,  48 
S.  E.  340;  Humphrey  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.  T909),  T16  S.  W.  570;  Peo- 
ple V.  Del  Vcrmo,  T92  N.  Y.  470.  85 
X.  E.  600 :  Lawrence  v.  State,  T03 
Aid.   T7,  63  Atl.- 96;  Stevens  v.  State, 


§  96  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  I76 

No  general  rule  can  be  enunciated  as  to  what  declarations  do 
or  do  not  constitute  a  part  of  the  res  gcsfcc.  The  main  question 
is :  are  they  relevant  to,  and  do  they  explain  and  illustrate  the 
facts  of  the  transaction  in  issue?  In  other  words,  can  we  learn 
from  them  something  of  the  motives  or  intention  present  in  a  rele- 
vant act?  For  declarations  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestce  are 
only  admissible  when  the  act  with  which  they  are  connected  is 
equivocal,  or  its  nature  or  purpose,  its  motive  and  meaning  are 
doubtful,  and  the  words  of  the  person  are  invoked  to  render  his 
actions  clear  and  intelligible. 

§  96.  Contemporaneous  character  of  the  declarations. — Whether 
the  declaration  must  be  precisely  contemporaneous  with  the  trans- 
action which  it  is  presumed  to  illustrate  and  unfold,  has  been 
much  discussed.  It  is  useless  to  look  for  harmony  in  the  cases. ^* 
The  early  rule  was  very  strict  that  the  declaration  must  be  strictly 
contemporaneous  with  the  main  transaction  charged  as  an  offense. 
So,  for  example,  the  exclamation,  "I  am  stabbed !"  uttered  by 
the  deceased  at  the  instant  of  the  fatal  blow,  would  be  received, 
while  his  exclamation,  "A.  stabbed  me,"  made  a  few  seconds 
afterwards,  while  pursuing  his  assailant,  would  be  rejected. ^^ 

It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  lay  down  any  rule  which,  will  l^e 
applicable  in  criminal  cases  generally  to  determine  whether  a 
declaration  is  or  is  not  a  part  of  iho.  res  gestce.  Some  crimes,  such 
as  murder  and  rape,  often  consist  of  a  single  isolated  act  on  the 
part  of  the  active  participant,  occupying  but  a  very  small  portion 
of  time  from  its  inception  to  its  consummation ;  while  other 
crimes,  as  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  or  to  obtain  money  by  false 

138   Ala.    71,    35    So.    122;    State    v.  tions   admissible   as  part   of   the  res 

Ripley,  z^  Wash.    182,   72   Pac.   1036,  gestce,  they  must  be  substantially  con- 

and  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  75.  temporaneous  with  the  crime,  and  be 

""Declarations,    to    be    admissible,  the  instinctive  utterances  of  the  mind 

must    be   contemporaneous    with    the  under    the    active    influence    of    the 

main  fact  or  transaction,  but  it  is  im-  transaction.    State  v.  Way,  76  S.  Car. 

practicable  to  fix,  by  any  general  rule,  91,  56  S.  E.  653;  Stovall  v.  State,  53 

any  exact   instant  of  time,  so  as  to  Tex.  Cr.  App.  30,  108  S.  W.  699. 

preclude   debate   or  conflict   of   opin-  "Reg.    v.    Bedingfield.    14  Cox    Cr. 

ion  in  regard  to  this  particular  point."  Cas.  341,  342 ;   People  v.  O'Brien,  92 

Lund  V.  Inhabitants,  9  Cush.  (I\Iass.)  Mich.  17,  19,  52  N.  W.  84;  Sheehy  v. 

2,6,  43.     In  order  to  render  declara-  Territory,  9  Ariz.  269,  80  Pac.  356. 


1/7       DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST^.       §    96 

pretenses,  consist  of  a  series  of  connected  facts  and  incidents 
spread  over  a  considerable  portion  of  time,  some  of  which  may- 
be innocent  in  themselves,  but  all  of  which  lead  up  to,  and  termi- 
nate in,  the  criminal  transaction  which  is  the  principal  fact. 

Again,  it  is  now  the  universal  practice  to  permit  certain  ac- 
tions of  the  accused  after  the  commission  of  the  crime  to  be 
])roved  as  relevant  to  show  that  he  committed  it.  Thus  it  may  be 
shown  that  he  attempted  to  escape,  or  fled  from  justice  or  that  he 
destroyed  evidence  or  endeavored  to  fabricate  evidence.  Such 
facts  may,  with  correctness,  be  assumed  to  form  a  part  of  the  res 
gcstcu,  though  not  contemporaneous  with  the  principal  transac- 
tion. If  this  is  so,  there  can  be  no  impropriety  in  receiving  the 
declarations  accompanying  them.^*' 

Nor  is  the  period  intervening  between  the  criminal  transaction 
and  the  subsidiary  act  material  if  they  are  connected.  An  interval 
of  a  day  will  not  exclude  the  subsidiary  act  with  its  accompanying 
declaration." 

But  it  has  been  also  determined  that  statements  of  the  deceased 
uttered  four  or  five  minutes  after  the  mortal  wound  has  been  in- 
flicted are  not  receivable  as  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc  where  it  is 
not  proved  what,  if  anything,  happened  between  the  wounding 
and  the  statement  from  which  it  might  be  reasonably  inferred 
that  the  intervening  circumstances  were  a  part  of  the  crime. ^"^ 

On  the  whole,  the  res  gestcu  cannot  be  arbitrarily  confined  with- 
in any  limits  of  time.  The  element  of  time  is  not  always  material. 
If  the  declarations  are  narrative  and  descriptive  in  their  form  and 
character,  if  they  are  not  the  impromptu  outpourings  of  the  mind, 
they  should  be  rejected,  though  uttered  only  a  few  minutes  after 
the  main  transaction.^'' 

"The  ;r^  firr^/ff  of  larceny  is  not  re-  Mart.    &    Yerg.     (Tenn.)     147:    Mc- 

tricted  to  the  limited  time  when  the  Gowan  v.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),  117 

hand    reaches    out    and     grasps    the  S.  W.  387. 

stolen   property.     The  intention,   and        ^'  Vickcry  v.   State,  50  Fla.   144,  38 

all  conduct  by  which  it  may  be  shown,  So.  907. 

form,  also,  a  part  thereof,  and  decla-        "  People  v.  Ah  Lee,  60  Cal.  85,  91 ; 

rations  accompanying  acts   preceding  State  v.  Raven,  115  Mo.  419,  422,  22 

the  taking  may  be  proven.     State  v.  S.    W.   376;    State   v.    Daugherty,    17 

Gabriel,  88  Mo.  631,  639.  Nev.   ^76,    379,   30    Pac.    1074;    Jones 

"Carroll      v.      State,     3      Humph,  v.  State,  71  Ind.  66,  81;  Hall  v.  State, 

(Tenn.)      315;     Cornwell     v.     State,  132  Ind.  317,  321,  322,  31  N.  E.  536; 
12 — Undekhill  Ckim.  Ev. 


§  97 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


178 


§  97.  Interval  for  consideration  or  taking  advice. — The  spon- 
taneous, unpremeditated  character  of  the  declarations  and  the  fact 
that  they  seem  to  be  the  natural  and  necessary  concomitants  of 
some  relevant  transaction  in  which  their  author  was  a  partici- 
pant, constitute  the  basis  for  their  admission  as  evidence."^  So 
it  has  been  held  that  spontaneous  exclamations  of  persons  who 
were  not  actually  present  at  a  homicide,  are  properly  admitted  as 
a  part  of  the  res  gestcc  where  they  were  uttered  on  hearing  the 
report  of  a  revolver  which  was  employed  in  committing  the 
homicide."^ 

If  a  sufficient  period  has  intervened  between  the  act  and  the 
statement  for  consideration,  preparation  or  taking  advice,  the 
statement  may  be  rejected.  The  mere  likelihood  or  probability 
that  the  statement  was  the  result  of  advice,  preparation  or  con- 
sideration may  exclude  it.   Actual  preparation  need  not  be  shown. 


Stephenson  v.  State,  no  Ind.  358,  11 
N.  E.  360,  59  Am.  216;  Parker  v. 
State,  136  Ind.  284,  290,  35  X.  E. 
1 105;  State  V.  Carey,  56  Kan.  84,  42 
Pac.  371 ;  Turner  v.  State,  89  Tenn. 
547,  559,  IS  S.  W.  838;  Hall  v.  State, 
48  Ga.  607,  608;  State  v.  Howard, 
120  La.  311,  45  So.  260;  Tinsley  v. 
State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  91,  106  S.  W. 
347;  Bradley  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 
1908),  III  S.  W.  72>3\  Lockhart  v. 
State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  589,  in  S. 
W.  1024;  Herrington  v.  State,  130 
Ga.  307,  60  S.  E.  572;  State  v.  Carl- 
ton, 48  Vt.  636,  643  (two  minutes 
after  main  act)  ;  State  v.  Pomeroy, 
25  Kan.  349  (three  to  five  minutes 
afterwards)  ;  Mayfield  v.  State,  lOi 
Tenn.  67 2,  49  S.  W.  742  (thirty  min- 
utes) ;  Pryse  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 
1908),  113  S.  W.  938  (thirty  minutes 
after  the  shooting)  ;  State  v.  Trusty, 
I  Penn.  (Del.)  319,  40  Atl.  766  (by 
deceased  five  minutes  after  receiving 
the  mortal  wound) ;  State  v.  Kel- 
leher,  201  ]\Io.  614,  100  S.  W.  470 
(two   or  three  minutes)  ;    Stanley   v. 


State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  482,  46  S.  W. 
645 ;  People  v.  ]\IcBride,  120  Mich. 
166,  78  X.  W.  1076;  State  v.  Birks, 
199  IVIo.  263,  97  S.  W.  578  (fifteen 
minutes  later)  ;  Williams  v.  State,  66 
Ark.  264,  50  S.  W.  517;  Williams  v. 
State,  147  Ala.  10,  41  So.  992. 

-°]\Iayes  v.  State,  64  Miss.  329,  333, 
I  So.  y2i2,  60  Am.  58.  "The  principle 
of  admission  is,  that  the  declarations 
are  pars  rci  gcstce,  and  therefore  it 
has  been  contended  that  they  must  be 
contemporaneous  with  it ;  but  this  has 
been  decided  not  to  be  necessary,  on 
good  grounds ;  for  the  nature  and 
strength  of  the  connection  are  the 
material  things  to  be  looked  to,  and, 
although  concurrence  of  time  can  not 
but  be  always  material  evidence  to 
show  the  connection,  yet  it  is  by  no 
means  essential."  Rouch  v.  Great 
West.  R.  R.  Co.,  I  Q.  B.  51,  60,  cited 
and  approved  in  Hunter  v.  State,  40 
X^.  J.  L.  495,  539;  Baker  v.  State,  85 
Ark.  300,  107  S.  W.  983. 

"  State  v.  Sexton,  147  Mo.  89,  48 
S.  W.  452. 


1/9       DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GESTAE.       §    97 

Declarations  made  immediately  after  the  principal  transaction 
liave  been  received  in  homicide  cases.^^ 

So,  too,  declarations  uttered  immediately  before  the  crime,  have 
been  received.  Most  of  the  cases  are  cases  of  homicide.  Indeed, 
the  rule  of  the  res  gestcu  is  most  frequently  invoked  in  that  crime. 
So.  an  exclamation  by  the  victim  of  the  homicide  to  a  police  of- 
ficer on  his  being  shot  that  the  accused  "shot  me  without  cause 
or  provocation"  was  received.^^  And  exclamations  uttered  by  by- 
slanders  before  or  during  the  commission  of  the  homicide  are 
admissible.-*  Any  conversation  taking  place  immediately  before 
the  homicide  between  the  accused  and  his  victim  is  res  gestco.^^ 
And  in  a  case  of  robbery,  a  declaration  by  the  person  robbed  to 
those  who  had  come  to  aid  him  to  the  effect  that  the  accused 
was  the  person  w^ho  robbed  him  has  been  received."'^ 

A  man  who  has  assaulted  may  state  on  the  witness  stand  that 
immediately  after  the  assault  he  was  asked  by  persons  who  came 
to  his  assistance  what  had  happened  and  he  stated  to  them  "he 
got  knocked  out,"  and  described  to  them  the  weapon  with  which  he 
was  struck  and  the  name  of  the  person  who  struck  him  and  told 
them  whence  he  had  fled."^  So,  generally  in  all  cases  of  homicide 
and  assault,  the  statement  by  the  person  injured  as  to  the  mode 

"Lambert  v.   People,  29  ]\Iich.  71;  "^Kennedy  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

DriscoU  V.  People,  47  Mich.  413,  415,  100  S.  W.  242,  30  Ky.  L.  1063. 

II   N.  W.  221;   Bateson  v.  State,  46  ""Fleming  v.  State,  150  Ala.  19,  43 

Tex.  Cr.-App.  34,  80  S.  W.  88;  Flores  So.  219. 

V.   State   (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  79  S.  W.  "'State  v.  Epstein,  25  R.  I.   131,  55 

808;    Franklin    v.    State     (Tex.    Cr.  Atl.  204.     In  a  recent  New  York  case 

App.),  88  S.  W.  357;  State  v.  Foley,  it  was  laid  down  as  a  rule  regulating 

113  La.  52,  36  So.  885,  104  Am.    St.  the    admissions    of    declarations    that 

493;  Selby  V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),  they    should    be    of    an    explanatory 

80  S.  W.  221,  25  Ky.  L.  2209;  Walker  character    and    describe    the    circum- 

V.    State,    146    Ala.    45,    41    So.    878;  stances  of  the  injury  where  they  were 

Commonwealth    v.    Hargis,    124    Ky.  uttered  by  the  injured  person.     The 

356,  99  S.  W.  348,  30  Ky.  L.  510.    In  point  was  also  dwelt  upon  that  they 

Commonwealth    v.    M'Pike,    3    Cush.  must  be  spontaneous  and  made  witli- 

(Mass.)    181,   184,   50   .\m.    Dec.  727,  in    such    period    after   the    injury    as 

a  declaration  by  the  victim  of  a  homi-  precludes  fabrication.     People  v.  Del 

ride    made    after    she    had    left    the  Vermo,  192  N.  Y.  470,  85  N.  F.  690. 

room   where  she  was   assaulted,   and  "^  State  v.   Harris    (R.   I.    1908),  69 

had  gone  upstairs,  was  received.  .Atl.  506. 

"''State  V.  Foley,  113  La.  52,  36  So. 
885,  104  Am.  St.  493. 


§  98 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


1 80 


by  which  the  assault  had  l)een  perpetrated  made  immediately  after 
the  assault  to  a  person  who  comes  to  the  assistance  of  the  j^erson 
assaulted,  is  competent  as  a  part  of  the  7'cs  gcstcu;  the  fact  that 
the  statement  was  illicited  by  a  question  does  not  exclude  it.-'* 

And  the  American  cases,  as  a  rule,  do  not  sustain  the  strict 
English  doctrine  that  the  declarations,  to  be  admissible,  must  be 
strictly  contemporaneous  with  the  main  transaction,  if  the  declara- 
tions are  illustrative  and  spontaneous  and  not  mere  narratives  of 
what  has  passed.-" 

§  98.  Mental  and  physical  conditions  as  influencing  declarations. — 
Many  crimes  involve  scenes  and  actions  which,  by  their  exciting 
character,  engross  the  mind  and  stir  it  deeply.  The  period  within 
which  a  declaration  may  be  uttered  and  yet  be  admissible  can,  to 
some  extent,  be  measured  by  the  character  of  the  passions  and 
emotions  which  exist  in  the  breast  of  the  speaker.  Thus,  in  order 
that  statements  should  be  res  gestce  on  a  trial  for  murder,  the 
speaker  must  have  been  prompted  to  speak  solely  from  the  ex- 
citement of  the  event  of  which  it  is  claimed  the  statement  formed 


^  State  V.  Lewis  (Iowa  1908),  116 
N.  W.  606. 

-'State  V.  Punshon,  133  Mo.  44,  34 
S.  W.  25 ;  Chalk  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  116,  32  S.  W.  534;  Moran  v. 
People  (III.  1896),  45  N.  E.  230; 
State  V.  Horan,  32  Minn.  394,  395,  20 
N.  W.  905,  50  Am.  583  (a  few  min- 
utes) ;  Smith  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
277,  305,  17  S.  W.  471  (fifteen  min- 
utes after) ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hacket,  2  Allen  (Mass.)  136;  Lovett 
V.  State,  80  Ga.  255,  4  S.  E.  912; 
United  States  v.  Noelke,  17  Blatchf. 
554,  570;  United  States  v.  Angell,  11 
Fed.  34,  41 ;  Evans  v.  State,  58  Ark. 
47,  22  S.  W.  1026;  State  V.  Frazier, 
I  Houst.  (Del.)  176;  Jones  v.  State, 
71  Ind.  66,  81;  State  v.  Walker,  77 
Me.  488,  491,  I  Atl.  357.  See,  also, 
the  remarks  of  the  court  in  Vicks- 
burg  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  O'Brien,  T19  U. 
S.  99,  105,  106,  30  L.  ed.  299,  7  Sup. 


Ct.  118;  Ferguson  v.  State,  141  Ala. 
20,  2)7  So.  448;  Bowles  v.  Common- 
wealth, 103  Va.  816,  48  S.  E.  527; 
People  V.  Del  Vermo,  192  N.  Y.  470, 
85  N.  E.  690;  State  v.  Bebb,  125 
Iowa  494,  loi  N.  W.  189;  Ludlow  v. 
State  (Ala.  1908),  47  So.  321;  State 
V.  Alton,  105  Minn.  410,  117  N.  W. 
617;  Martin  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  174,  82  S.  W.  657;  Wright  v. 
State,  88  Md.  705,  41  Atl.  1060;  Bice 
V.  State,  SI  Tex.  Cr.  App.  133,  100 
S.  W.  949;  McKinney  v.  State,  40 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  372,  50  S.  W.  708; 
Freeman  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
545,  46  S.  W.  641,  51  S.  W.  230.  A 
witness  may  state  that  he  gave  an 
alarm  after  a  burglary,  and  what  he 
said  in  connection  with  and  while 
giving  it  is  clearly  a  part  of  the  res 
gcstce.  State  v.  Moore,  117  Mo.  395. 
40 T,  22  S.  W.  1086.  Contra,  People 
V.  Ah  Lee,  60  Cal.  85,  87,  9i- 


l8l        DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST.E.       §    98 

a  part,  and  before  he  could  sufficiently  regain  his  self-possession 
to  be  suspected  of  having  made  the  statement  from  design.^" 

If  the  declarant  is  implicated,  either  as  agent  or  patient,  in  a 
murderous  assault,  the  fear,  hatred,  rage  or  other  passion  which 
customarily  accompanies  a  homicide,  or  attempted  homicide,  and 
engrosses  the  minds  of  all  participants,  may,  with  reason,  be 
considered  to  prolong  the  period  during  which  language  may  be 
presumed  to  be  spontaneous.  The  presence  of  these  passions  is 
not  conducive  to  the  mental  calmness  and  deliberation  necessary 
to  concoct  an  untrue  narrative  declaration.  On  the  other  hand 
the  mental  distraction  which  is  the  result  of  a  mortal  wound,  the 
physical  shock  or  nervous  excitement  which  is  the  result  of  serious 
bodily  injury,^^  the  pain  and  physical  anguish  of  the  sufferer,  the 
danger  of  death  and  the  urgent  need  for  procuring  speedy  relief 
or  aid  would  be  very  likely  to  prevent  the  language  of  the  victim 
from  assuming  a  narrative  or  retrospective  character. 

The  imperative  present  needs  of  the  body,  filling  the  mind  with 
apprehension  and  fear,  certainly  preclude  under  these  circum- 
stances much  mental  consideration  of  past  events,  or  mental 
preparation  or  intention  to  narrate  them ;  and  tend  to  make  all 
language  used  the  reflection  of  the  existing  mental  condition.^- 

The  mind,  even  when  thus  aroused  and  stirred,  is  still  open  to 
the  reception  of  new  thoughts  and  impressions  which  may  supply 
opportunity  for  fabricating  declarations  and  deprive  them  of 
their  character  as  part  of  the  res  gcsfcr.  If  some  time  elapses, 
whether  long  or  short  and  incidents  intervene  which  change  the 
declarant's  mental  condition  and  fill  his  mind  with  new  thoughts 

'"State  V.  Gianfala,  113  La.  463,  37  panying    declarations    not    otherwise 

So.  30.  admissible.     Statements,    from  what- 

^' Soto    V.    Territory    (Ariz.    1908),  ever    source,    to    be    thus    competent, 

94  Pac.  1 104.  must   be    contemporaneous    with    the 

""In  general,  subject  to  some  ap-  act  they  would  illustrate.     Perhaps  a 

parent    or    real    qualifications,    what  few  of  the  cases  require  them  to  be 

one    said    in    its    nature   explanatory,  so   in  the  strict  sense.     But  it  is  at 

while   performing  an  admissible  act,  least    better    doctrine    that    they    are 

whether  he  is  a  party  or  a  third  per-  competent,  whenever  near  enough  the 

son,  may  be  shown  in  evidence  when-  act,    either    before    or    after,    to    be 

ever  the  act  is  shown.     In   this  way  prompted   by   the    same   motive,    and 

a  defendant  may  even  be  entitled  to  apparently  to  constitute  a  part  of  it." 

introduce  in  his   own  behalf   accom-  i  Bishop  Cr.  Pro.,  §  1086. 


§    99  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  102 

and  ideas,  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  door  is  thereby  opened 
for  tlie  introduction  of  new  motives  which  may  suggest  or  in- 
fluence the  declarations  made. 

The  occurrences  which  may  bring  this  about,  depend  largely 
upon  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  actions  of  the  accused 
in  telephoning  for  a  physician  to  aid  the  deceased,  or  in  calling 
in  other  persons  to  his  aid,  in  going  to  his  own  room  or  home 
and  changing  his  clothing,  and  particularly  where,  after  doing 
this,  he  goes  to  the  sheriff's  office  or  to  a  police  station  and  sur- 
renders himself,  deprive  any  statements  which  he  may  make  after 
these  events  have  occurred  of  their  character  as  res  gestcc.  And 
it  is  immaterial  that  the  transactions  which  intervene  cover  but 
a  few  moments  of  time.^" 

The  same  principles  would  apply  to  declarations  by  one  who 
is  the  victim  of  the  crime.  His  statement  made  after  the  inter- 
vention of  incidents  calculated  to  prompt  him  with  new  motives 
would  be  rejected.  The  fact  that  bystanders  had  spoken  to  the 
deceased  and  that,  having  found  him  lying  badly  wounded,  had 
l)laced  him  in  a  more  comfortable  position,  and  the  further  fact 
that  the  accused  had  fled  from  the  scene  of  the  crime  will  not  ex- 
clude declarations  of  the  deceased  if  they  are  properly  of  the  res 
gesfce.^* 

§^99.  Admissibility  for  the  accused. — Declarations  which  are 
commonly  called  self-serving  cannot  be  given  in  evidence  in 
favor  of  the  accused  unless  they  are  part  of  the  res  gestce.^^  If, 
however,  the  accused  makes  a  statement  or  utters  an  exclama- 
tion which  is  spontaneous  and  which  is  connected  with  the  inci- 
dents of  the  criminal  transaction,  and  explanatory  of  it,  it  may 
be  received,  though  it  is  in  his  favor.  If  the  statement  is  rea- 
sonable and  consistent  with  innocence,  it  should  receive  due  con- 
sideration by  the  jury  and  may  have  considerable  weight  as  evi- 
dence. The  value  of  his  statements  as  evidence  is  diminished  as 
the  time  elapses  after  the  transaction  to  which  they  relate.^''    And 

^Johnson  v.    State,    129   Wis.    146,  ^'^  People  v.  Huntington   (Cal.  App. 

108  N.   W.   55,  5  L.  R.   A.    (X.   S.)  1908),  97   Pac.  760;   Mason  v.   State 

8o9n;  Davis  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  (Ind.  1908),  85  N.  E.  776. 

77  S.  W.  HOT,  25  Ky.  L.  1426.  ^°  State  v.  Jacobs  (Mo.  App.  T908). 

^  Price   V.   State    (Okla.    1908),  98  T13  S.  W.  244;  State  v.  Kane  (N.  J. 

Pac.  447.  L.  1909),  72  Atl.  39. 


183       DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST.E.    §    lOO 

it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  rule  of  the  res  gesfcc  is  based 
upon  the  principle  that  if  a  part  of  a  transaction  is  shown  by  one 
party  another  party  to  the  same  transaction  may  introduce  in 
evidence  all  or  any  part  of  a  remainder. 

Hence,  the  \Yhole  declaration  or  conversation  must  be  stated 
and  admitted,^"  If  the  declaration  was  made  by  the  accused  in 
answer  to  assertions,  questions  or  taunting  remarks  by  the  vic- 
tim of  a  homicide,  the  latter  are  competent  to  explain  the  declara- 
tion or  modify  its  force  and  meaning  by  showing  the  true  mo- 
tives which  prompted  it.  And  it  is  a  general  rule  that  whenever 
the  prosecution  shall  introduce  any  declarations  of  the  accused, 
under  the  rule  of  the  res  gestce,  he  may  offer  other  declarations 
forming  a  part  of  the  same  conversation  if  they  are  explanatory 
thereof,  though  they  might  not  have  been  competent  coming  from 
h.im  in  the  first  instance.^® 

§  100.  Declarations  uttered  prior  to  the  crime. — If  the  declaration 
meets  the  requirements  of  the  rule  now  under  consideration,  that 
is,  if  it  explains  or  illustrates  a  relevant  fact,  it  is  not  incompetent, 
merely  because  its  utterance  precedes  the  actual  commission  of 
the  crime.  Evidence  is  always  relevant  which  shows  that  the  ac- 
cused made  preparations  to  commit  a  crime,  and  from  such  pre- 
parative actions  a  criminal  intention  may,  with  justice,  be  in- 
ferred. 

Declarations  accompanying  these  acts  of  preparation  are  re- 
ceived to  explain  and  unfold  their  significance,  and,  indirectly, 
to  illuminate  the  subsequent  language,  conduct  and  state  of  mind 
of  the  accused.^'' 

Thus,  where  one  of  two  travelers  killed  the  other  while  e7i  route 
the   court   admitted   the    statements   of    the   deceased,    showing 

"M'Kee  v.   People,  36  N.  Y.   113;  Ga.  374,  410,  37  Am.  7611;   Schnicker 

People  V.  Potter,  5  Mich,  i,  5,  71  Am.  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  192,  195 ;  Carr  v. 

Dec.  763;  Liles  v.    State,  30  Ala.  24,  State,    43    Ark.    99,    104;     Common- 

26,  68  Am.  Dec.  108.  wealth    v.    Castles,    9    Gray    (Mass.) 

^  Shrivers    v.    State,    7    Tex.    App.  121,  69  Am.    Dec.   278;    Cluverius   v. 

450,  455-     See  supra,  §  119a.  Commonwealth,  81  Va.  787;  Wood  v. 

''Price   V.    State,    107    Ala.    161,    t8  State,   92    Tnd.    269,    272;    People    v. 

So.    130;    State   V.    Peffers,   80   Towa  Scott,  153  N.  Y.  40,  46  N.  E.  1028. 
580,  46  N.  W.  662;  Cox  V.  State,  64 


§    lOI  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  184 

whence  they  came  and  whither  they  were  going,  as  a  part  of  the 
res  gestae  leading  up  to  the  crime.*" 

The  declarations,  if  of  the  res  gestcc,  may  be  offered  by  the  ac- 
cused in  his  own  behalf  to  illustrate  or  to  show  his  motives,  or  to 
rebut  an  inference  of  a  criminal  intention  ;*^  and  before  any  part 
of  the  declaration  is  offered  against  him,  if  the  action  to  be  ex- 
plained is  clearly  relevant  and  is  already  in  evidence. 

The  subsidiary  or  preparative  act  to  be  explained  must  be  rele- 
vant to  the  guilt  of  the  accused.  Otherwise,  no  mere  suggestion 
or  probability  that  the  declaration  will  throw  light  upon  the  crime, 
will  avail  to  let  it  in,  if  the  accompanying  action  is  not  relevant.*" 

If  the  relevant  act  is  in  evidence,  the  accused  need  not  wait  to 
prove  a  declaration  in  his  own  favor,  until  another  declaration  is 
introduced  against  him.   He  may  prove  the  declaration  at  once.*'' 

§  101.  Declarations  by  bystanders  and  third  persons. — The  oral  or 
written  declarations  of  persons  other  than  the  accused  or  the 
passive  participant  in  the  crime,  if  they  possess  the  character  of 
declarations  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc,  are  receivable.  If 
the  act  of  a  third  party  is  relevant  and  is  in  evidence,  his  state- 
ment accompanying  and  explanatory  of  it.  which  is  the  natural 
concomitant  of  the  act,  and  is  prompted  by  the  identical  motive, 
should  be  admitted.** 

*"  State    V.    Vincent,    24    Iowa    570,  and  cases  in  note'i.  p.  124;  Morrow 

573,  574,  95  Am.  Dec.  753.  v.   State,  48  Ind.  432,  435;   Mack  v. 

"  State  V.  Walker,  77  Me.  488,  490,  State,  48  Wis.  271,  278,  280,  4  N.  W. 

I  Atl.  357;   Dukes  V.   State,   11   Ind.  449;  Schlemmer  v.  State,  51  N.  J.  L. 

557,  564,  71  Am.  Dec.  370;  State  v.  23,  29-31,  15  Atl.  836.    Contra,  State 

Daley,  53  Vt.  442,  445,  38  Am.  694;  v.   Hicks,  92  Mo.  431,  437,  4  S.  W. 

Monroe  v.  State,  5  Ga.  85;  Foster  v.  742;    Fleming    v.    State     (Tex.    Cr. 

State,  8  Tex.   App.  248;  Maddox  v.  App.),   114  S.   W.  383;   Douglass  v. 

State  (Ala.  1909),  48  So.  689;  State  State    (Tex.   Cr.    App.),    114    S.    W. 

V.  Kane  (N.  J.  L.)  72  Atl.  39;  Price  808;  Lj^les  v.  State,  130  Ga.  294,  60 

V.  State  (Okla.),  98  Pac.  447.  S.  E.  578. 

**  People  V.   Williams,  3   Park.   Cr.  **  Hunter  v.  State,  40  N.  J.  L.  495, 

(N.  Y.)  84;  Griffith  V.  State,  90  Ala.  535-540;  State  v.  Gabriel,  88  Mo.  631, 

583,  589,  8  So.  812:  Brumley  v.  State,  639;  Haines  v.  People,  138  111.  App. 

21  Tex.  App.  222,  239,  17  S.  W.  140,  49. 

57  Am.  612.  Admissibility     of     declarations     of 

*' Foster  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  248;  conspirators   as   part   of   res  gcstcs — 

Thomas   v.    State,   27   Ga.    287,   297;  note,  19  L.  R.  A.  745. 
State  V.  Abbott,  8  W.  Va.  741,  754, 


185       DECLARATIONS  WHICH  ARE  PART  OF  THE  RES  GEST^.    §     lOI 

But  if  the  declarations  of  a  third  person  are  merely  narrative 
and  unconnected  with  a  relevant  act,  so  that  by  no  proper  exten- 
sion of  the  rule  can  they  be  included  among  the  res  gestce,  they 
will,  with  some  few  exceptions,  be  rejected  as  hearsay,*^  though 
the  declaration  is  in  form  a  confession  that  the  declarant  com- 
mitted the  crime/" 

The  exclamations  of  persons  who  were  present  at  a  fracas  in 
Avhich  a  homicide  occurred,  showing  the  means  and  mode  of  kill- 
ing, are  admissible  for*'  or  against  the  accused,'**  because  of  their 
unpremeditated  character  and  their  connection  with  the  event  by 
which  the  attention  of  the  speaker  was  engrossed.  Presence  alone 
is  not  enough.  The  declarant,  whose  language  is  offered  as  evi- 
dence, must  have  been  more  than  a  mere  observer  or  bystander  at 
the  occurrence  he  describes.  It  must  not  only  appear  that  he  was 
present,  but  that  he  was  an  active  participant,  either  by  word  or 
act,  in  the  event.*'' 


*°  State  V.  Beaudet,  53  Conn.  536,  4 
Atl.  237,  55  Am.  155;  State  v.  Davis, 
77  N.  Car.  483;  State  v.  Badger,  69 
Vt.  216,  S7  Atl.  293.  Nor  can  the 
state  prove  threats  to  Ij-nch  defend- 
ant, made  by  a  crowd  to  show  the 
community  believe  him  guilty.  State 
V.  Sneed,  88  Mo.  138,  141,  147;  State 
V.  Kapelino,  20  S.  Dak.  591,  108  N. 
W.  335;  Casey  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  392,  97  S.  W.  496;  Perdue  v. 
State,  126  Ga.  112,  54  S.  E.  820. 

'"West  V.  State,  76  Ala.  98,  99; 
State  V.  Gallehugh,  89  Minn.  212,  94 
N.  W.  72;^.  But  narrative  statements 
by  third  persons,  assented  to  or  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  accused  on  his 
hearing  them  are  generally  received 
as  his  own  admissions  or  confessions, 
being  made  so  by  his  adoption.  See 
post,  §§  122-124,  3n<J  Underbill  on 
Ev.,  Chap.  TV. 

"Flanegan  v.  State,  64  Ga.  52; 
State  v.  Jones,  77  S.  Car.  385,  58  S. 
E.  8;  Haines  v.  People,  138  III.  App. 
49.     Where   a  homicide  occurred   in 


the  dark,  a  declaration  made  by  a  by- 
stander during  the  affra}-  that  he  had 
cut  the  accused  in  the  back  is  rele- 
vant for  the  latter  where  it  appears 
that  he  was  not  cut  in  the  back,  but 
that  the  deceased  had  received  sev- 
eral apparently  mortal  wounds  in  his 
back.  Flanegan  v.  State,  64  Ga.  S-< 
56. 

'^.Appleton  V.  State,  61  Ark.  590,  S3 
S.  W.  1066;  State  V.  Biggerstaff,  17 
Mont.  510,  43  Pac.  709;  State  v.  Dun- 
can, 116  Mo.  288,  22  S.  W.  699;  State 
V.  Hinson  (X.  Car.  1909),  64  S.  E. 
T24;  Shirley  v.  State,  144  Ala.  35,  40 
So.  269;  Grant  v.  State,  124  Ga.  757, 
53  S.  E.  334.  The  exclamation,  "Don't 
strike  him,  for  you  have  shot  him," 
by  a  participant,  addressed  to  the  ac- 
cused, was  received  against  him  in 
State  V.  Walker,  78  Mo.  380,  .386,  387. 

■■'Whart.  Cr.  Ev.,  §  262;  Roscoe's 
Cr.  Ev.,  §  23:  T  Bish.  Cr.  Pro., 
§  1087;  Bradshaw  v.  Commonwealth, 
10  Bush.  (Ky.)  576.  578:  State  v. 
Moore,  38  La.  Ann.  66;  State  v.  Riley, 


lOI 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


1 86 


42  La.  Ann.  995,  997,  8  So.  469; 
Flynn  v.  State,  43  Ark.  289,  292,  293 ; 
Benjamin  v.  State,  41  So.  739,  148 
Ala.  671,  not  reported  in  full ;  Baker 
V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  392,  'j^  S. 
W.  618.  Thus,  where  the  defendant 
had  given  evidence  that  he  had  been 
assaulted  by  a  mob  led  by  deceased, 
he  was  permitted  to  show  that  some 


unknown  person  in  the  crowd  ex- 
claimed "Kill  him!  Kill  him!"  mean- 
ing the  defendant.  Morton  v.  State, 
91  Tenn.  437,  19  S.  W.  225.  The  fact 
that  the  declarant  was  a  participant 
must  be  shown  by  independent  evi- 
dence. It  cannot  be  proved  by  the 
declaration  itself.  Flynn  v.  State,  43 
Ark.  289,  293;  State  v.  Draughon  (N. 
Car.,  1909),  65  S.  E.  913. 


CHAPTER  X. 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


§  102.  Definition — Religious  element.  io8.  Opinions     contained    in    dying 

103.  Consciousness    of    nearness    of  declarations   are    not    admis- 

death    as   shown   by   the   de-  sible. 

clarant's  language.  109.  Must  refer  to  the  res  gcstw  of 

104.  Sending   for   legal   or  spiritual  the  homicide. 

advisers,    nature    of    wounds  no.  Mode  of  proof,  credibility,  rele- 
or  other  circumstances  show-  vancy  and  weight. 

ing    a    consciousness    of    ap-  in.  Declaration  is  admissible  in  its 
proaching  death.  entirety — Contradictory  or  un- 

105.  Period  intervening  between  the  truthful  character. 

statement  and  the  death.  112.  The  form  of  the  declaration. 

106.  Dying   declarations   not  adniis-  113.  Declarations    by    signs — Mental 

sible  to  prove  all  crimes.  condition  of  the  declarant. 

107.  Dying     declarations      distin-  114.  Dying    declarations     made     by 

guished     from    those    which  children, 

are  a  part  of  the  res  gestce. 

§  102.  Definition — Religious  element. — Dying  declarations  con- 
stitute an  exception  to  the  rule  rejecting  hearsay  evidence.  Such 
declarations  are  those  made  by  the  victim  of  a  homicide,  refer- 
ring to  the  material  facts  which  concern  the  cause  and  circum- 
stances of  the  killing,  and  which  are  uttered  under  a  fixed  belief 
that  death  is  impending  and  is  certain  to  follow  immediately,  or 
in  a  very  short  time,  without  an  opportunity  for  retraction  and 
in  the  absence  of  all  hopes  of  recovery.^ 

And  dying  declarations  constitute  direct  evidence  of  the  facts 
they  are  relevant  to  prove  as  distinguished  from  circumstantial 
evidence  of  such  facts. ^ 

^Underbill     on     Evid.,     §     lOO;     I  96  Pac.  456. 

Greenl.   on    Evid.,    §    136;    Simons   v.  ^  State  v.  Sexton,  147  Mo.  8g,  48  S. 

People,  150  111.  66,  7i,  2)(>  N.  E.  1019;  W.  452;  People  v.  Morse,  196  N.  Y. 

Starkey  v.   People,  17  111.  17;  People  306,  89  N.  E.  816. 

V.    Cipolla    (Cal.),    100    Pac.   252.     In  Dcrinitif)n   and  admissibility  of  dy- 

Oregoii    the    matter    is    governed    by  ing  declaration — note,  86  Am.  St.  638, 

statute.     State  v.  Fuller,  52  Ore.  42,  668. 

(187) 


102 


CRIMINAL  EXIDEXCE. 


1 88 


The  certainty  of  tlie  declarant's  belief  that  he  is  in  extremis, 
and  that,  in  a  very  short  time,  those  immortal  and  spiritual  ele- 
ments which  inhabit  the  body  will  forsake  it,  to  encounter  the 
dread  possibilities  of  the  unknown  and  supernatural  world  beyond 
the  grave,  is  deemed  to  furnish  a  sanction  equivalent  to  that  of  a 
solemn  and  positive  oath  administered  in  a  court  of  justice. ""^ 

To  illustrate  or  to  explain  the  mental  condition  of  the  deceased, 
the  accused  should  be  permitted  to  show  that  the  language  of  the 
deceased  was  prompted  by  motives  of  revenge  or  malice ;  and 
that,  when  he  uttered  the  accusatory  statement,  he  entertained 
vindictive  feelings  towards  the  accused  and  was  in  a  reckless  and 
irreverent  frame  of  mind.  So  it  may  be  shown,  that  immediately 
prior  to  or  after  the  declaration,  the  deceased  had  used  profane 
language;*  and  such  evidence  furnishes  good  grounds  for  the  pre- 
sumption that  the  speaker  does  not  believe  that  he  is  soon  to  die. 
The  fear  of  punishment  for  perjury  in  this  world  is  wholly  ab- 


^  "The  general  principle  on  which 
this  species  of  evidence  is  admitted  is 
that  they  are  declarations  made  in 
extremity,  when  the  party  is  at  the 
point  of  death,  when  every  hope  of 
this  world  is  gone,  when  every  motive 
to  falsehood  is  silenced ;  and  the  mind 
is  induced  by  the  most  powerful  con- 
siderations to  speak  the  truth.  A  sit- 
uation so  solemn  and  so  awful  is  con- 
sidered as  creating  an  obligation  equal 
to  that  imposed  by  a  positive  oath  ad- 
ministered in  a  court  of  justice." 
Eyre,  J.,  in  Woodcock's  Case,  2  Leach 
C.  Law  563  (1789).  The  earliest  case 
is  Rex  v.  Ely,  in  1720,  12  Viner's  Abr. 
118;  Starkey  v.  People,  17  Til.  17; 
Hill  V.  State,  41  Ga.  484,  503.  It 
seems  that  an  instruction  that  dying 
declarations  are  to  receive  as  much 
credit  as  testimony  given  under  oath 
in  open  court  is  erroneous.  State  v. 
Vansant,  80  Mo.  67 ;  State  v.  Mathes, 
90  Mo.  571,  2  S.  W.  800;  Lambeth  v. 
State,  23  Miss.  322,  359.  The  ab- 
sence of  an  opportunity  to  cross- 
examine  the  declarant  or  for  the  jury 


to  observe  his  demeanor  upon  the 
witness  stand,  detracts  from  their 
credibility  as  evidence,  not  from  their 
competency.  People  v.  Kraft,  148  N. 
Y.  631,  43  N.  E.  80.  Hence,  if  the 
deceased  was  an  infidel  and  had  a 
contempt  for  the  church  or  totally  ir- 
religious, so  that  he  had  no  appre- 
hension of  punishment  for  lying  and 
no  belief  in  a  state  of  future  re- 
wards and  punishments,  that  fact, 
while  not  rendering  his  declaration 
inadmissible  (People  v.  Sanford,  43 
Cal.  29),  because  to  permit  this  would 
be  to  disqualify  a  witness  because  of 
his  religious  belief  or  want  of  it,  is 
competent  to  go  to  the  jury  as  affect- 
ing the  credit  to  be  given  to  it.  Gam- 
brell  V.  State  (Miss.  1908),  46  So. 
138;  Hill  v.  State,  64  Miss.  431,  432; 
People  V.  Chin  Mook  Sow,  51  Cal. 
597,  600;  Goodall  v.  State,  i  Ore.  333, 
334,  80  Am.  Dec.  396;  State  v.  El- 
liott, 45  Iowa  486,  487;  State  v.  Ah 
Lee,  8  Ore.  2x4,  218;  Pyle  v.  State, 
4  Ga.  App.  811,  62  S.  E.  540. 
^  Tracy  v.  People,  97  111.  loi,  106. 


189  DYIXG    DECLARATIONS.  §    IO3 

sent.  Unless,  therefore,  the  dying  man  possesses  and  is  controlled 
by  a  vivid  and  conscientious  feeling  of  accountability  to  God,  in 
whose  presence  he  expects  soon  to  appear,  it  is  very  probable  that 
he  may  be  materially  influenced  in  his  utterances  by  the  passions 
of  anger  and  revenge.  Hence,  these  declarations  ought  to  be 
received  with  the  greatest  caution  as  respects  the  primary  facts 
admitting  them.  All  men  are  prone  to  excuse  and  justify  their 
own  conduct  and  to  endeavor  to  revenge  themselves  on  those  who 
have  injured  them.  These  proclivities,  however,  in  the  case  of 
dying  declarations,  are  supposed  to  have  been  overcome  by  the 
apprehension  of  immediate  death  which  will  deprive  the  dying 
man  of  all  opportunity  for  repentance  if  he  lies  and  subject  him 
to  severe  punishment  beyond  the  grave.^ 

The  main  ground  for  admitting  dying  declarations  being  that 
the  danger  of  immediate  death  and  the  belief  of  the  declarant 
that  he  is  in  extremis  are  regarded  as  equivalent  to  an  oath,  it 
follows  that  every  dying  declaration  w^ll  be  presumed,  until  the 
contrary  appears,  to  be  made  under  a  solemn  and  religious  sense 
of  responsibility  to  a  Deity  who  will  punish  perjury.®  But  ac- 
cused may  show  on  cross-examination  that  deceased,  in  making 
the  statements,  w'as  in  a  reckless,  irreverent  state  of  mind,  and 
entertained  feelings  of  malice  and  hostility  toward  accused." 

§  103.  Consciousness  of  nearness  of  death,  as  shown  by  declarant's 
language. — The  deceased,  at  the  time  of  the  declaration,  must  have 
been  under  a  sense  of  approaching  death  without  any  hope  of  re- 

'  People  V.  Sanchez,  24  Cal.  17,  24;  "Lambeth    v.    State,   23    Miss.    322, 

People  V.  Hodgdon,  55  Cal.  72,  76,  36  355 ;  Solomon  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  92, 

Am.  30.     But  the   fact  that  the  de-  58  S.  E.  381 ;  Moody  v.  State,  i  Ga. 

clarant  believes,   as  a  matter  of   re-  App.    772,    58    S.    E.    262;    State    v. 

ligious    opinion,   that   he  may  repent  Knoll,  69  Kan.  767,  77  Pac.  580.     In 

of   his    sins,    lying   included,   at    any  State  v.  Hood,  63  W.  Va.  182,  59  S. 

moment  before  death,  does  not  alone  E.   971,   it  was   held   that  it  was   no 

render    his    declaration    inadmissible,  ground  for  excluding  a  dying  decla- 

Xorth  V.  People,  139  III.  81,  28  N.  E.  ration  that  it   did  not  appear  in  the 

966.     In   a   note   to    People    v.    Chin  evidence   that    the   declarant  believed 

Mock  Sow,  51  Cal.  597,  601,  will  be  in  God  and  in   rewards  and  punish- 

found  a  summary  of  the  religious  be-  ment  after  death, 

lief  of  the    Chinese   as   described   by  ^  Nordgren  v.   People,  211    111.  425, 

one  of  them  on  the  witness  stand.  71   N.  E.   1042. 


§  I03 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


190 


coyery.    He  must  believe  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  his  re- 
covery or  his  statement  will  not  be  competent.® 


^  Commonwealth  v.  Bishop,  165 
Mass.  148,  42  N.  E.  560;  ColHns  v. 
State,  46  Neb.  ZT,  64  N.  W.  432; 
People  V.  Kraft,  91  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
474,  36  N.  Y.  S.  1034;  Commonwealth 
V.  Brewer,  164  Mass.  577,  42  N.  E. 
92;  Commonwealth  v.  Mika,  171  Pa. 
St.  273,  33  Atl.  65;  White  v.  State, 
III  Ala.  92,  21  So.  330;  Jones  v. 
State  (Tex.  1897),  38  S.  W.  992; 
United  States  v.  Woods,  4  Cranch  C. 
C.  (U.  S.)  484,  28  Fed.  Cas.  16760; 
Archibald  v.  State,  122  Ind.  122,  123, 
23  N.  E.  758;  State  v.  Faile,  41  S. 
Car.  551,  19  S.  E.  690;  Ex  parte 
Meyers,  33  Tex.  Cr.  App.  204,  26  S. 
W.  196;  State  V.  Cronin,  64  Conn. 
293,  305,  29  Atl.  536;  State  V.  Wilson, 
121  Mo.  434,  442,  26  S.  W.  357;  Wal- 
ston  V.  Commonwealth,  16  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  15,  34;  Powers  v.  State,  87 
Ind.  144,  151 ;  Whitaker  v.  State,  79 
Ga.  87,  91,  3  S.  E.  403;  Mitchell  v. 
State,  71  Ga.  128,  141 ;  State  v. 
Schmidt,  "7^  Iowa  469,  35  N.  W.  590; 
State  V.  Daniel,  31  La.  Ann.  91,  95; 
State  V.  Blackburn,  80  N.  Car.  474, 
478;  State  V.  Mathes,  90  Mo.  571,  2 
S.  W.  800;  Peak  v.  State,  50  N.  J.  L. 
179,  182,  12  Atl.  701;  Vaughan  v. 
Commonwealth,  86  Ky.  431,  435,  6  S. 
W.  153,  9  Ky.  L.  644;  Hammil  v. 
State,  90  Ala.  577,  8  So.  380;  State 
V.  Johnson,  26  S.  Car.  152,  153,  i  S. 
E.  510;  State  V.  Banister,  35  S.  Car. 
290,  296,  14  S.  E.  678;  Cole  V.  State, 
105  Ala.  ^6,  16  So.  762;  State  v. 
Clark  (W.  Va.  1908),  63  S.  E.  402; 
Sutherland  v.  State,  i2t  Ga.  190,  48 
S.  E.  915;  State  v.  Daniels,  115  La. 
59,  38  So.  894;  Robinson  v.  State, 
130  Ga.  361,  60  S.  E.  T005 ;  Wilson 
V.  State,  140  Ala.  43,  Zl  So.  93 ;  Com- 


monwealth V.  Hargis,  124  Ky.  356,  99 
S.  W.  348,  30  Ky.  L.  510;  Delaney  v. 
State,  148  Ala.  586,  42  So.  815;  Kirk- 
ham  V.  People,  170  111.  9,  48  N.  E. 
465 ;  State  v.  Roberts,  28  Nev.  350,  82 
Pac.  100;  Brom  v.  People,  216  111. 
148,  74  N.  E.  790;  Fogg  V.  State,  81 
Ark.  417,  99  S.  W.  537;  People  v. 
Glover  (Cal.  1903),  74  Pac.  745; 
Grant  v.  State,  118  Ga.  804,  45  S.  E. 
603 ;  Oliver  v.  State,  129  Ga.  'j-jT,  59 
S.  E.  900;  Bricker  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  102  S.  W.  117s,  31  Ky.  L.  596; 
State  V.  McCoomer,  79  S.  Car.  (iZ, 
60  S.  E.  237 ;  Lj'les  v.  State,  48  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  119,  86  S.  W.  763;  Brown 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  83  S.  W. 
64s,  26  Ky.  L.  1269;  State  v.  Knoll, 
69  Kan.  767,  '/J  Pac.  580;  Brennan  v. 
People,  37  Colo.  256,  86  Pac.  79; 
Hunter  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  114 
S.  W.  124;  People  v.  Brecht,  105  N. 
Y.  S.  436;  State  v.  Boggan,  133  N. 
Car.  761,  46  S.  E.  in;  Pyle  v.  State, 
4  Ga.  App.  811,  62  S.  E.  540;  People 
V.  Del  Vermo,  192  N.  Y.  470,  85  N. 
E.  690;  Gardner  v.  State,  55  Fla.  25, 
45  So.  1028;  Smith  V.  State,  48  Fla. 
307,  yj  So.  573 ;  Sutherland  v.  State, 
121  Ga.  190,  48  S.  E.  915:  Bilton  v. 
Territory  (Okla.  1909),  99  Pac.  163, 
and  cases  cited  in  Underbill  on  Ev., 
p.  139.  "An  undoubted  belief  in  the 
mind  of  the  declarant  at  the  time  the 
declarations  are  made,  that  the  finger 
of  death  is  upon  him  is  indispen- 
sable." People  V.  Sanchez,  24  Cal. 
17,  24.  "If  there  is  the  least  hope, 
no  matter  how  faint,  the  requisite 
certainty  of  belief  does  not  exist." 
Peak  V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  179,  222,  12 
Atl.  70T. 
A   declaration  to  be  admissible   as 


191 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


lO- 


His  mental  condition  in  this  respect  must  be  shown  before  his 
declaration  is  received,  and  if  he  entertained  any  hopes,  however 
slight,  that  his  injury  is  not  mortal,  his  statement  should  be  re- 
jected. If,  however,  it  is  shown  that  he  was  conscious  of  near 
approaching  death,  it  is  immaterial  that  no  one  had  told  him  that 
he  was  about  to  die,  though  his  silence  and  conduct,  when  told 
he  must  die,  is  always  relevant  to  show  that  he  did  or  did  not 
believe  what  was  told  him.^ 

The  statement  of  the  accused  tending  to  show  his  knowledge 
or  belief  that  he  is  dying,  and  that  he  entertains  no  hope  of  re- 
covery, though  a  part  of  the  declaration,  is  always  admissible.^" 

It  is  perhaps  the  most  satisfactory  and  convincing  evidence  of 
a  consciousness  of  approaching  death  in  his  mind  but  it  is  not  the 
only  evidence,  nor  is  any  particular  form  of  words  required  of 
him." 


a  dying  declaration  must  have  been 
made  under  a  sense  of  impending  death 
(86  Am,  St.  655,  658),  and  without 
hope  of  recovery  (86  Am.  St.  660, 
661),  and  with  belief  in  its  immi- 
nence, 86  Am.  St.  660.  The  declara- 
tion need  not  state  belief  in  the  im- 
minence of  death,  86  Am.  St.  658,  660. 
Circumstances  under  which  may  be 
made,  86  Am.  St.  639,  640;  dying 
condition  of  person  making,  86  Am. 
St.  654,  663;  ratification  of  declara- 
tion previously  made,  86  Am.  St.  647. 

'Hammil  v.  State,  90  Ala.  577,  578, 
8  So.  380. 

"  State  V.  Cronin,  64  Conn.  293,  29 
Atl.  536;  State  V.  Vaughan,  22  Nev. 
285,  39  Pac.  733;  Commonwealth  v. 
Thompson,  159  Mass.  56,  59,  33  N.  E. 
iTii;  Pate  v.  State,  150  Ala.  10,  43 
So.  343;  State  V.  Bohanon,  142  N. 
Car.  69s,  55  S.  E.  797;  Moore  v. 
State,  40  So.  345,  146  Ala.  687,  not 
reported  in  full ;  State  v.  Biango  (N. 
J-.  1907), 68  Atl.  125;  State  v.  Nowells, 
135  Iowa  S3,  109  N.  W.  1016;  Jarvis 
v.  State,  T38  Ala.  17,  34  So.  1025; 
Lipscomb  v.   State,  75  Miss.  559,  23 


So.  210,  230;  People  V.  Brecht,  105 
N.  Y.  S.  436;  Rice  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  25s,  103  S.  W.  1 1 56;  Asher 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  91  S.  W. 
662,  28  Ky.  L.  1342;  Farmer  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  91  S.  W.  682,  28 
Ky.  L.  1 168;  Copeland  v.  State  (Fla., 
1909),  50  So.  621 ;  State  v.  Brady,  124 
La.  951,  50  So.  806. 

"  State  V.  Johnson,  26  S.  Car.  152, 
158,  I  S.  E.  510;  People  v.  Samario,  84 
Cal.  484,  485;  24  Pac.  283;  Lester  v. 
State,  37  Fla.  382,  20  So.  232 ;  Fulcher 
V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  465,  13  S.  W. 
750;  McLean  v.  State,  16  Ala.  672; 
State  V.  Newhouse,  39  La.  Ann.  862, 
865,  2  So.  799;  State  V.  Black,  42  La. 
Ann.  861,  863,  8  So.  594;  United 
States  V.  Heath,  20  D.  C.  (9  Mackey) 
272;  State  V.  Gillick,  7  Iowa  287; 
Mockabee  v.  Commonwealth,  78  Ky. 
380,  382;  State  V.  Mills.  91  N.  Car. 
581,  594;  State  V.  Dalton,  20  R.  I. 
114,  37  Atl.  673;  Long  V.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  17S,  88  S.  W.  203; 
State  V.  Brown,  188  Mo.  451,  87  S. 
W.  519;  Roberts  V.  State,  48  Tox.  Cr. 
App.  378,  88  S.  W.  221 ;  Bilton  v.  Ter- 
ritory (Okla.  1909),  99  Pac.  163. 


I03 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


192 


Thus,  if  the  deceased  states  that  it  is  useless  to  send  for  a  doc- 
tor/" that  he  is  sure  to  die/"  or  obhged  to  die/*  tliat  he  cannot 
live  and  wants  to  make  a  dying  declaration/''"'  that  he  does  not 
think/''  or  expect  that  he  will  recover  from  his  wounds/'  that 
he  has  no  hope  of  recovery/''  that  he  knows  he  is  going  to  die/'"* 
that  he  knows  that  he  cannot  live/-"  that  he  is  killed.-^  or  uses 
similar  expressions,  it  is  conclusively  presumed  that  he  has  a  full 
and  real  sense  of  approaching  death. 

But  if  the  declarant,  w^hen  making  his  statement,  merely  states 
that  he  ''has  no  hope  at  present,"--  or  says,  "Who  knows?  per- 
haps I  may  get  well/'"^  or  may  recover,-*  or  expresses  a  hope 


^-  State  V.  Jones,  47  La.  Ann.  1524, 
18  So.  515. 

^^  State  V.  Alclrich,  50  Kan.  666,  672, 
Ti2  Pac.  408;  State  v.  Turlington,  102 
Mo.  642,  656,  15  S.  W.  141 ;  State  v. 
Smith,  48  La.  Ann.  533,  19  So.  452; 
Crump  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  20 
S.  W.  390,  14  Ky.  L.  450;  Logan  v. 
State,  149  Ala.  11,  43  So.  10;  DuBose 
V.  State,  120  Ala.  300,  25  So.  185; 
Gregory  v.  State,  148  Ala.  566,  42  So. 
829;  Harper  v.  State,  129  Ga.  770,  59 
S.  E.  792;  State  v.  Gianfala,  113  La. 
463,  37  So.  30;  Newton  v.  State,  SI 
Fla.  82,  41  So.  19;  State  v.  Kelleher, 
201  Mo.  614,  100  S.  W.  470;  Titus 
V.  State,  117  Ala.  16,  23  So.  77; 
Walker  v.  State,  41  So.  878,  147  Ala. 
699,  not  reported  in  full ;  Rowsey  v. 
Commonwealth,  116  Ky.  617,  76  S.  W. 
409.  25  Ky.  L.  841. 

"  State  V.  Banister,  35  S.  Car.  290, 
295,  296,  14  S.  E.  678;  Rice  V.  State, 
49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  569,  94  S.  W.  1024. 

"  Pierson  v.  State,  2T  Tex.  App.  14, 
17  S.  W.  468:  Starks  v.  State,  137 
Ala.  9,  34  So.  687;  Payne  v.  State, 
45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  564.  78  S.  W.  934- 

'"  IMcQueen  v.  State,  94  Ala.  50,  52, 
10  So.  433,  434. 

"State  V.  Gay,  18  Mont.  51.  44  Pac. 
411;  State  V.  Nance,  25  S.  Car.  168, 


172;  Pate  V.  State,  150  Ala.  10,  43  So. 

343- 

'^  State  V.  Garrison,  147  Mo.  548, 
49  S.  W.  508. 

"  Heninburg  v.  State,  151  Ala.  26, 
43  So.  959. 

'"  People  V.  Callaghan,  4  Utah  49, 
6  Pac.  49;  Hunter  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App.),  114  S.  W.  124;  Pitts  V.  State, 
140  Ala.  70,  37  So.  loi ;  State  v. 
Mayo,  42  Wash.  540,  85  Pac.  251. 

■^  Simons  v.  People,  150  111.  66,  74, 
36  N.  E.  1019;  State  v.  Elkins,  lor 
Mo.  344,  350,  14  S.  W.  116;  State  v. 
Russell,  13  Mont.  164,  32  Pac.  854, 
856;  Luker  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
5  S.  W.  354,  9  Ky.  L.  385;  Patterson 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  613,  95  S. 
W.  129;  Smith  V.  State,  145  Ala.  17, 
40  So.  957;  Greer  v.  State  (Ala. 
1908),  47  So.  300.  See  also,  the  case 
of  Brown  v.  State,  150  Ala.  25,  43 
So.  194. 

"  Reg.  V.  Jenkins,  L.  R.  i  C.  C. 
187,  T91,  L.  J.  38  M.  C.  82;  Crockett 
V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  276,  77  S. 
W.  4- 

"'Jackson  v.  Commonwealth,  19 
Gratt.  (Va.)  656. 

"*  Bowles  V.  Commonwealth,  103  Va. 
8t6,  48  S.  E.  527. 


193  DYING   DECLARATIONS.  §    IO4 

that,  in  case  he  dies,  he  may  meet  a  person  in  heaven,-^  or  hopes 
that  the  attending  surgeon  will  do  what  he  can  for  the  sake  of  his 
family,-"  or  thinks  he  is  in  great  danger^^  and  may  not  recover,-^ 
his  declarations,  not  having  been  made  in  immediate  apprehen- 
sion of  death,  are  inadmissible.  The  competency  of  dying  declara- 
tions is  for  the  court,  and,  where  the  declarations  are  admitted 
in  evidence,  they  receive  only  such  weight  as  the  jury  may  deter- 
mine.-^ 

i<  104.  Sending  for  legal  or  spiritual  advisers,  nature  of  wounds 
or  other  circumstances  showing  a  consciousness  of  approaching  death. 
— As  in  all  cases  where  a  person's  mental  condition  is  relevant, 
this  condition  may,  and  from  the  very  nature  of  things  very  often 
must  be  shown  by  circumstances  and  not  proved  by  the  express 
declarations  of  the  deceased.^"  The  consciousness  of  approaching 
death  may  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances  surrounding  the 
dying  man.^^  He  need  not  state  expressly  that  he  thinks  or  be- 
lieves his  end  is  near,  or  that  he  is  at  peace  with  his  God,^^  while 
making  his  statement,  if  the  nature  of  his  wounds, ^^  or  his  gen- 
eral physical  condition,^'*  and  his  actions  and  language  are  such 
that  the  court  is  reasonably  satisfied  that  he  realized  that  he  was 
about  to  die  and  had  abandoned  all  hopes  of  recovery.^ ^ 

-^  State    V.    Medlicott,   9    Kan.   257,  ^-  State  v.   Black,  42  La.  Ann.  861, 

282,  285.  864,  8  So.  594. 

■"  Rex  V.  Crockett,  4  C.  &  P.  544.  ''  Hill   v.   Commonwealth,   2   Gratt. 

"Errington's  Case,  2  Lewin's  C.  C.  (Va.)     594,     595,     605;     Woodcock's 

148.  Case,  2  Leach  C.  Law  563,  567;  Du- 

-'  People   V.    Hodgdon,   55   Cal.   72,  mas  v.   State,  62  Ga.  58,  64 ;  State  v. 

76,  36  Am.  30 ;  State  v.  Knoll,  69  Kan.  Roberts,  28  Nev.  350,  82  Pac.  100. 

767,  77  Fac.  580.  =*  State  v.    Fuller    (Ore.    1908),   96 

"'■■State  V.    Fuller    (Ore.    1908),    96  Pac.  456,  where  decedent's   face  was 

Pac.  456.  pallid  or  yellow,  her  breath  short  and 

When  hope  of  recovery  entertained  pulse    weak    and     her     eyes     glassy, 

by  others  is  material,  and  when  not  State  v.  Roberts,  28  Nev.  350,  82  Pac. 

— note,  86  Am.  St.  661,  662,  663.  100. 

'"State  V.   Fuller    (Ore.    1908),   96  ''Fitzgerald  v.   State,  11   Neb.   577, 

Pac.  456.  10  N.  W.  495;   People  v.  Bemmerly, 

"State  v.  Evans,  124  Mo.  397,  407,  87  Cal.  117,  118,  25  Pac.  266;   People 

28  S.  W.  8;  People  v.  Chase,  79  Hun  v.  Kraft,  91  Hun  (N.  Y.)  474,  36  N. 

(.V.  Y.)   296,  299,  29  N.  Y.   S.  376;  Y.  S.  1034;  People  v.  Taylor,  59  Cal. 

Lester  v.   State,  37  Fla.  382,  20   So.  640,  646;  Dumas  v.  State,  62  Ga.  58, 

232;  White  V.  State,  in  Ala.  92,  21  62;  State  v.  Russell,  13  Mont.  164,  32 
So.  330. 

13 — UXDKRHII.L    CrIM.    Ev. 


104 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


194 


A  i^hysician  may  testify  to  declarant's  physical  condition."'^''' 

Perhaps  the  most  useful  and  important  circumstance  in  de- 
termining whether  the  consciousness  of  approaching  dissolution 
is  present  in  the  mind  of  the  declarant  is  his  sending  for  a  spir- 
itual adviser  that  he  may  receive  religious  consolation  preparatory 
to  death.^^  If  the  dying  person  was  a  Roman  Catholic,  evidence 
that  he  had  sent  for  a  priest  to  receive  his  confession  and  from 
whom  he  wished  to  receive  extreme  unction  and  absolution  would, 
in  the  absence  of  other  controlling  circumstances,  be  conclusive 
that  he  was  in  immediate  apprehension  of  death."^ 

But  the  silence  or  failure  of  the  declarant  to  make  a  reply  when 
he  is  told  by  his  attending  physician  that  he  cannot  be  cured  with 
his  pleading  to  God  for  mercy  is  not  conclusive  that  he  has  aban- 
doned all  hopes  of  recovery.^** 

Other  elements  may  be  considered.  So  the  actual  character  of 
the  wound  itself,  and  its  seriousness,^"  where  it  is  in  a  vital  part 
and  thus  calculated  to  justify  an  apprehension  of  mortal  danger 
in  the  mind  of  the  wounded  man ;  the  urgency  expressed  by  him 
that  a  surgeon  should  be  called,*^  the  use  of  religious  expressions 


Pac.  854,  856;  State  v.  Wilson,  24 
Kan.  186,  189,  197,  36  Am.  257 ;  Haw- 
kins V.  State,  98  Md.  355,  57  Atl.  27. 
Cf.  Radbourne's  Case,  2  Leach  C. 
Law  512,  520,  521. 

^* Heningburg  V.  State  (Ala.  1907), 
45  So.  246. 

"  Hammil  v.  State,  90  Ala.  577,  579, 
581,  8  So.  380 ;  State  v.  Kelleher,  201 
Mo.  614,  100  S.  W.  470.  It  is  proper, 
however,  to  exclude  evidence  on  the 
part  of  accused  to  show  that  the  de- 
clarant refused  to  send  for  a  priest 
about  the  time  he  uttered  the  state- 
ment which  is  offered  as  his  dying 
declaration.  State  v.  Zorn,  202  Mo. 
12,  100  S.  W.  591. 

^"'  Carver  v.  United  States,  164  U. 
S.  694,  41  L.  ed.  602,  17  Sup.  Ct.  228; 
Reg.  V.  Howell,  i  Den.  C.  C.  i ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Buettner,  233  111.  272,  84  N.  E. 
218;  People  V.  Stacy,  119  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  743,  104  N.  Y.  S.  615. 


^^  State  V.  Daniels,  115  La.  59,  38 
So.  894.  Though  deceased,  when  ad- 
vised of  a  change  for  the  worse,  said 
that  he  did  not  feel  any  worse,  and 
that  he  could  not  afford  to  die,  his 
statement  thereupon  made  that  he  be- 
lieved he  was  about  to  die,  and  that 
he  had  been  told  by  the  doctors  that 
he  was  about  to  die,  and  made  it  as 
his  dying  statement,  was  admissible ; 
it  appearing  that  he  had  confidence 
in  his  physician,  and  the  circum- 
stances tending  to  show  that  his  opin- 
ions as  to  his  recovery  had  under- 
gone a  change,  and  his  death  having 
occurred  within  three  hours  after  the 
statement  was  made.  State  v.  Craig, 
190  ^lo.  332,  88  S.  W.  641. 

^"Robinson  v.  State,  130  Ga.  361, 
60  S.  E.  1005 ;  Jones  v.  State,  130  Ga. 
274,  60  S.  E.  840. 

"  The   fact   that  the  deceased  sent 


195 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


10^ 


by  the  dying  declarant  looking  to  a  speedy  entrance  into  another 
world,  his  bidding  farewell  to  his  relatives  and  friends  gathered 
about  his  bedside/"  his  expressing  a  desire  to  execute  a  will  and 
sending  an  urgent  call  for  the  immediate  attendance  of  a  legal 
adviser  to  frame  it,  and  designating  the  minister  to  preach  the 
funeral  sermon,*^  are  facts  from  which,  taken  together  or  in  con- 
nection with  other  evidence,  the  existence  of  a  consciousness  of 
near  approaching  death  may  be  inferred.  But  the  opinion  of  a  wit- 
ness that  the  deceased  did  or  did  not  think  he  would  die  is  never 
admissible.^* 

So  the  fact  that  the  deceased  having  stated  that  he  thinks  he 
has  been  fatally  wounded  when  asked  who  shot  him  says  he  is 
too  weak  to  talk  now  but  he  will  tell  who  shot  him  next  morning 
does  not  render  his  dying  declaration  inadmissible/^ 

§  105.    Period  intervening  between  the  statement  and  the  death. — 

Though  a  statement  was  made  while  the  deceased  was  hopeful 
of  recovery,  it  is  receivable  if  he  subsequently  ratifies  it  when 
all  hope  is  gone.*°   On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  he,  after  he 


for  a  doctor  may  indicate  an  expecta- 
tion of  ultimate  recovery.  Mathedy 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  IQ  S.  W. 
977,  14  Ky.  L.  182.  But  in  State  v. 
Evans,  124  Mo.  397,  408,  28  S.  W.  8, 
it  is  said :  "The  mere  fact  that  the 
victim,  while  writhing  under  the  tor- 
ments of  a  murderous  blow,  seeks  re- 
lief from  anguish  by  sending  for  a 
physician  is  not  indicative  of  a  hope 
of  life,  but  of  a  natural  desire  to  be 
relieved  of  pain."  And  see,  on  con- 
senting to  an  operation,  State  v. 
Thompson,  49  Ore.  46,  88  Pac.  583, 
124  .^m.  St.  loisn;  Reg.  v.  Howell,  I 
Den.  C.  C.  I ;  McQueen  v.  State,  T03 
Ala.  T2,  T5  So.  824.  That  a  person 
mortally  wounded  consents  to  be  re- 
moved to  a  sanitarium  for  the  satis- 
faction of  his  family  is  not  incon- 
sistent with  his  own  abandonment  of 
the  hope  of  recovery.  State  v.  How- 
ard, T20  La.  3TT,  45  So.  260. 
"People  V.  Bemmerly,  87  Cal.   117, 


118,  25  Pac.  266;  Ward  v.  State,  85 
Ark.  179,  107  S.  W.  6-/T. 

^^  State  V.  Nelson,  loi  Mo.  464,  468, 
14  S.  W.  712;  Digby  v.  People,  113 
III.  123,  127,  55  Am.  402. 

**  State  V.  Tilghman,  11  Ired.  (N. 
Car.)  513,  551.  See  Davis  v.  State, 
120  Ga.  843,  48  S.  E.  305.  One  wit- 
ness may  testify  to  the  presence  of 
an  expectation  of  death  and  the  dec- 
laration may  be  shown  by  another. 
People  v.  Garcia,  63  Cal.  19,  20; 
Austin  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  40 
S.  W.  905,  19  Ky.  L.  474.  And  parol 
evidence  to  show  the  feeling  of  death 
being  imminent  is  always  proper. 
Cleveland  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
lOT  S.  W.  931,  3T  Ky.  L.  115. 

*'  State  v.  McCoomer,  79  S.  Car.  ds, 
60  S.  E.  237. 

'"  Bryant  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
394,  33  S.  W.  978,  36  S.  W.  70;  State 
V.  Evans,  T24  Mo.  397,  409,  28  S.  W. 
8;  Siicll  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  236, 


I05 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


196 


makes  the  statements,  gets  better  so  that  he  is  encom*aged  to  be- 
Heve  and  to  express  a  hope  that  he  will  recover,  will  not  exclude 
his  statement  actually  made  in  immediate  expectation  of  death. ^^ 

It  is  never  necessary  that  the  dying  declaration  should  have 
been  made  while  the  declarant  was  actually  drawing  his  last 
breath/^ 

The  fact  that  a  considerable  period  has  intervened  between  the 
making  of  the  declaration  and  the  death  of  the  declarant  is  im- 
material, and  furnishes  no  valid  ground  for  rejecting  the  declara- 
tion if  it  is  shown  that,  when  it  was  made,  the  speaker  was  in  fact 
fully  impressed  with  the  belief  that  he  would  die  in  a  short  time.^^ 
Thus,  declarations  which  were  uttered  forty-eight  hours, ^"  six 
days,^^  ten  days,''-  eleven  days,^^  fifteen  days,^*  seventeen  days,^^ 


15  S.  W.  722,  25  Am.  St.  723 
V.  Steele,  12  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  168 ;  Mock- 
abee  v.  Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  380; 
Johnson  v.  State,  102  Ala.  i,  16  So. 
99,  103;  Small  V.  Commonwealth,  91 
Pa.  St.  304;  Sims  v.  State,  139  Ala. 
74,  36  So.  138,  loi  Am.  St.  17. 

Ratification  of  declaration  previ- 
ously made — note,  86  Am.  St.  647. 

*' State  V.  Caldwell,  115  N.  Car. 
794,  804,  20  S.  E.  523 ;  State  v.  Tilgh- 
man,  11  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  513,  552; 
State  V.  Reed,  53  Kan.  767,  ^^z,  Z7 
Pac.  174,  42  Am.  St.  322;  State  v. 
Turlington,  102  Mo.  642,  657.  15  S. 
W.  141 ;  Swisher  v.  Commonwealth, 
26  Gratt.  (Va.)  963,  21  Am.  330; 
People  V.  Stacy,  192  N.  Y.  577,  85  N. 
E.  1 1 14,  aff'g  119  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
743,  104  N.  Y.  S.  615;  Rose  v.  State, 
143  Ala.  114,  42  So.  21;  Lowe  v. 
State  (Ga.),  63  S.  E.  11 14.  An  ex- 
press statement  that  the  deceased  has 
surrended  all  hope  of  recovery  is  in- 
dispensable where  from  the  evidence 
it  appears  that  his  mind  was  busy 
with  the  idea  of  prosecuting  those 
who  had  shot  him  at  the  time  he 
made  his  statement.  State  v.  Daniels, 
115  La.  59,  38  So.  894- 

**  Tohnson  v.   State,   102  Ala.   i,   16 


So.  99,  103 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ha- 
ney,  127  Mass.  455,  457 ;  Rice  v.  State, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  255,  103  S.  W. 
1 1 56;  Bricker  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  102  S.  W.  II7S,  31  Ky.  L. 
596;  Commonwealth  v.  Latampa,  226 
Pa.  23,  74  Atl.  736. 

Declaration  need  not  be  made  im- 
mediately before  death,  86  Am.  St. 
662,  665. 

^*  State  v.  Reed,  53  Kan,  767,  77Z, 
2,7  Pac.  174,  42  Am.  St.  322;  Ken- 
nedy V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  100  S. 
W.  242,  30  Ky,  L.  1063;  State  v. 
Brown,  iii  La.  696,  35  So.  818. 

Time  when  declaration  should  have 
been  made — note,  86  Am.  St.  663,  665, 
I  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  419- 

""  Woodcock's  Case,  2  Leach  C. 
Law  563. 

"  People  V.  Weaver,  108  Mich.  649, 
66  N.  W.  567;  Moore  v.  State,  96 
Tenn.  209,  2,Z  S.  W.  1046;  Daughdrill 
V.  State,  113  Ala.  7,  21  So.  378. 

^"Tinckler's  Case,  I  East  Pleas 
Crown  354. 

=^Rex  V.  Mosly,  i  Mood.  C.  C.  98, 

lOI. 

"State   V.    Blackburn,    80    N.    Car. 

474,  478. 
"Commonwealth  v.   Cooper,  5  Al- 


197 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


1 06 


seven  weeks^^  and  five  months,®^  before  the  death  of  the  declarant 
have  been  received. ^^ 

The  burden  of  proving  the  presence  in  the  mind  of  the  declarant 
of  the  sense  of  approaching  death  is  upon  the  prosecution.*^^ 

§  106.  Declarations  not  admissible  to  prove  all  crimes. — Declara- 
tions made  in  extremis  are  never  admissible  as  dying  declara- 
tions in  civil  cases,  though  they  may  be  received  upon  other 
grounds  than  their  ante  mortem  character,  as,  for  example,  where 
they  are  declarations  reciting  facts  of  pedigree,  or  where  they 
form  a  part  of  the  res  gestce.'^'^ 

The  declaration  of  a  deceased  person,  which  is  offered  in  evi- 
dence as  a  dying  declaration,  is  only  admissible  as  such  in  case  his 
death  is  the  subject  of  an  inquiry  which  is  made  because  of  an  ac- 
cusation of  homicide,  and  the  circumstances  accompanying  or 
leading  up  to  or  the  cause  of  that  death  are  the  subject-matter  of 
the  declaration.'^^ 


len  (Mass.)  495,  8r  Am.  Dec.  762; 
Commonwealth  v.  Roberts,  108  Mass. 
296. 

'"Fulcher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 
465,  472,  13  S.  W.  750. 

"  State  V.  Craine,  120  N.  Car.  601, 
27  S.  E.  72. 

°' State  V.  Crabtree,  iii  Mo.  136,  20 
S.  W.  7;  Boulden  v.  State,  102  Ala. 
78,  15  So.  341 ;  State  v.  Banister,  35 
S.  Car.  290,  14  S.  E.  678;  State  v. 
Daniel,  31  La.  Ann.  91 ;  People  v. 
Chase,  79  Hun  (N.  Y.)  296,  297,  29 
N.  Y.  S.  376;  Commonwealth  v.  Ha- 
ney,  127  Mass.  455,  457;  Kehoe  v. 
Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St.  127;  Mc- 
Ewen  V.  State,  152  Ala.  38,  44  So. 
619. 

""Peak  V.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  179, 
222,  223,  12  Atl.  701 ;  Digby  v.  People, 
113  Til.  123,  128,  55  Am.  402;  Wallace 
V.  State,  90  Ga.  117,  15  S.  E.  700; 
Reg.  V.  Jenkins,  L.   R.   i   C.  C.   187, 


191 ;  Lester  v.  State,  2i7  Fla.  382,  20 
So.  232.  A  statement  made  two  or 
three  minutes  before  death  is  admis- 
sible as  a  dying  declaration,  though 
the  deceased  did  not  say  that  he  was 
going  to  die  until  he  had  finished  his 
declaration.  People  v.  Lee  Sare  Bo, 
72  Cal.  622,,  625,  14  Pac.  310. 

"o  Daily  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co., 
32  Conn.  356,  87  Am.  Dec.  176; 
Friedman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  7  Phila. 
(Pa.)  203;  Marshall  v.  Chicago  &c. 
R.  Co.,  48  111.  475,  479,  480,  95  Am. 
Dec.  561 ;  Wilson  v.  Boerem,  15  John. 
(N.  Y.)  286;  Zipperian  v.  People,  23 
Colo.  134,  79  Pac.  1018;  State  v. 
Teachey,  138  N.  Car.  587,  50  S.  E. 
232;  Jones  V.  State  (Ark.  1909),  115 
S.  W.  166. 

"i  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  156;  Rex  v. 
Mead,  2  B.  &  C.  605 ;  People  v.  Fong 
Ah  Sing,  70  Cal.  8,  13,  11  Pac.  323; 


io6 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


198 


The  rule  admitting  chnng  declarations  does  not  apply  in  the  case 
of  any  crime,  except  homicide.  xAtnd  even  where  a  crime,  as  for 
example,  abortion,  is  by  statute  declared  to  be  murder,  if  the 
woman,  on  whom  it  has  been  performed,  dies,  dying  declarations 
are  inadmissible.  The  accused  is  not  indicted  for  the  murder  but 
for  the  abortion,  and  the  victim's  death  is  not  a  material  and  con- 
stituent element  of  the  abortion,  but  affects  the  punishment  alone. ''- 

An  exception  to  this  rule,  more  apparent  that  real,  is  sometimes 


Montgomery  v.  State,  80  Ind.  338,  347, 
41  Am.  815;  People  v.  Smith,  104  N. 
Y.  491,  50s,  10  N.  E.  873,  58  Am. 
S37n;  People  v.  Davis,  56  N.  Y.  95, 
96;  State  V.  Baldwin,  79  Iowa  714, 
45  N.  W.  297,  299;  McBride  v.  Peo- 
ple, 5  Colo.  App.  9T,  Z7  Pac.  953,  955, 
956;  State  V.  Shelton,  2  Jones  (N. 
Car.)  360,  364,  64  Am.  Dec.  587; 
State  V.  Nelson,  loi  Mo.  464,  14  S. 
W.  712;  Mitchell  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  14  S.  W.  489,  12  Ky.  L.  458; 
State  V.  McCoomer,  79  S.  Car.  63,  60 
S.  E.  237 ;  Connell  v.  State,  46  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  259,  81  S.  W.  746;  People 
V  Schiavi,  96  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
479,  89  N.  Y.  S.  564;  Lockhart  v. 
State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  589,  in  S. 
W.  1024;  Richards  v.  Commonwealth, 
107  Va.  881,  59  S.  E.  1 104;  State  v. 
Harris,  112  La.  937,  36  So.  810.  The 
d3nng  declaration  of  an  accomplice  in 
a  burglary  is  inadmissible  as  a  dying 
declaration  against  another  accom- 
plice, as  his  death  is  not  under  in- 
vestigation. People  V.  Hall,  94  Cal. 
595,  30  Pac.  7. 

*"  Railing  v.  Commonwealth,  no 
Pa.  St.  TOO,  103,  108,  I  Atl.  314;  Rex 
v.  Hutchison  (1822),  2  B.  &  C.  608; 
People  V.  Davis,  56  N.  Y.  95,  103,  104; 
Lyles  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  119, 
86  S.  W.  "/dz'^  People  v.  Stison,  140 
Mich.  216,  103  N.  W.  542,  112  Am. 
St.  397;  State  v.  Harper,  35  Ohio  St. 
78,  80,  35  Am.  596;  Reg.  v.  Hind,  8 


Cox  Cr.  Cas.  300,  301 ;  Wooten  v. 
Wilkins,  39  Ga.  223,  99  Am.  Dec. 
456;  Rex  v.  Mead,  2  B.  &  C.  605,  607. 
Contra,  Montgomery  v.  State,  80  Ind. 
338,  41  Am.  815;  3  Crim.  Law  Mag. 
523;  State  V.  Dickinson,  41  Wis.  299; 
Commonwealth  v.  Sinclair,  195  Mass. 
100,  80  N.  E.  799.  The  same  prin- 
ciple was  held  applicable  where,  upon 
an  indictment  for  robbery,  the  dying 
statement  of  the  person  robbed  was 
ofifered  to  prove  the  accused  guilty 
of  the  robbery.  Rex  v.  Lloyd,  4  C. 
&  P.  233.  "The  rule  that  dying  decla- 
rations should  point  distinctly  to  the 
cause  of  death,  and  to  the  circum- 
stances producing  and  attending  it,  is 
one  that  should  not  be  relaxed.  Dec- 
larations are  uncertain  evidence,  lia- 
ble to  be  misunderstood,  imperfectly 
remembered  and  incorrectly  related. 
As  to  dying  declarations  there  can  be 
no  cross-examination.  The  condition 
of  the  declarant  is  often  unfavorable 
to  clear  recollection,  and  to  the  giv- 
ing of  a  full  and  complete  account  of 
all  the  particulars  which  it  might  be 
important  to  know.  Hence,  all  vague 
and  indefinite  expressions,  all  lan- 
guage that  does  not  distinctl}'  point 
to  the  cause  of  death  and  its  attend- 
ant circumstances,  but  requires  to  be 
aided  by  inference  or  supposition  to 
establish  facts  tending  to  criminate, 
should  be  held  inadmissible."  State  v. 
Center,  35  Vt.  378,  386. 


199  DYIXG    DECLARATIONS,  §     IO7 

made  in  the  case  of  the  homicide  of  two  persons  by  one  who  is  on 
trial  for  the  murder  of  one  of  them  only.  If  the  circumstance  of 
the  deaths  are  so  closely  connected  that  they  may  be  regarded  as 
parts  of  a  single  transaction,  the  dying  declaration  of  A.  may  be 
admitted  on  a  trial  for  the  killing  of  B.,  in  a  case  where  A.  and  B. 
were  killed  in  the  same  transaction.  The  cases  in  which  this  ex- 
ception has  prevailed  have  been  homicides  by  poisoning,  where  the 
deaths  were  nearly  simultaneous  in  time  and  place,  and  where  they 
were  produced  by  the  same  means. *^^ 

This  exception  has  not,  however,  received  universal  recognition 
and  should  not  be  pressed  too  far.^*  And  the  mere  circumstance 
that  a  person's  death  occurred  in  a  disturbance  in  which  the  person 
for  whose  homicide  the  prisoner  was  indicted  was  killed,  is  insuffi- 
cient to  admit  his  declaration,  when  it  is  not  shown  that  the  decla- 
rants' death  was  directly  due  to  the  defendant's  act.''^ 

§  107.  Dying  declarations  distinguished  from  those  which  are  a 
part  of  the  res  gestae. — It  may  be  of  value  to  distinguish  clearly  and 
somewhat  in  detail  between  declarations,  whether  of  deceased,  or 
living  persons,  which  are  admissible  as  original  evidence  forming 
a  part  of  the  res  gestce  of  the  crime;  and  those  which  are  wholly 
hearsay  and  which  are  received  solely  because  they  are  dying  dec- 
larations/'*^ 

In  regard  to  the  former  class  of  declarations  it  need  only  be  said 
that  they  are  generally  admitted  whatever  the  crime  charged,  on 
account  of  their  unprompted,  natural,  contemporaneous  and  ex- 
planatory connection  with  the  main  transaction.'''  On  the  other 
hand  dying  declarations,  not  necessarily  constituting  any  part  of 
the  res  gesfcu,  but  being  usually  subsequent  in  time  and  always  nar- 
rative of  past  events,  both  in  their  form  and  nature,  are  mainl)^ 

^  Rex  V.  Baker,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  53 ;  road  three  hundred  j-ards  from  the 

State  V.  Terrell,    12  Rich.    (S.   Car.)  house.     Brown  v.  Commonwealth,  7^ 

321,  329;  State  V.  Wilson,  23  La.  Ann.  Pa.  St.  321,  329,  13  Am.  740. 
558,  559-     Where  the  declarant  was        "^  State  v.  Bohan,  15  Kan.  407. 
found  unconscious  in  a  house  which        "'  State  v.  Westfall,  49  Iowa  328. 
had  been  robbed,  her  dying  declara-        *^  See   Hill's   Case,  2  Gratt.    (Va.) 

tions  were  rejected  on  a  trial  for  the  594,  605. 

homicide  of  the  owner  of  the  house.         Dying  declarations   as  part   of  res 

who  was  her  husband,  and  who  was  rjcsfee — note.  86  Am.  St.  665. 
found   dead   at  the  same  time  on   a        "  See  ante,  §  94,  et  scq. 


§  I08  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  200 

admitted  that  homicide  may  not  go  unpunished,  where  the  death  of 
the  declarant  is  the  subject-matter  of  a  criminal  trial.*'^ 

In  such  a  case,  if  no  third  person  were  present  at  the  instant  of 
the  homicide  (and  this,  it  is  well  known,  is  very  frequently  the 
case),  it  would  be  impossible  to  procure  direct  evidence  upon  the 
main  fact  in  issue,  as  the  mouth  of  the  accused  is  closed  by  the  pol- 
icy of  our  law  unless  he  shall  see  fit  to  testify  for  himself.  But  the 
fact  that  the  evidence  is  received  from  the  necessity  of  the  matter 
furnishes  no  basis  for  its  exclusion  where  other  evidence  of  the 
cause  and  the  attendant  circumstances  of  the  death  is  to  be  had. 
This  is  so  even  if  the  other  proof  is  uncontradicted  or  conclusive."'* 
And  dying  declarations  are  not  admissible  only  in  cases  where  the 
evidence  is  wholly  circumstantial, 

§  108.    Opinions  contained  in  dying  declarations  are  not  admissible. 

— The  recitals  in  dying  declarations,  which  are  admissible  in  evi- 
dence, include  recitals  of  fact  which  might  have  been  given  by  the 
declarant  if  living  and  appearing  as  a  witness  at  the  trial,  and  may 
include  statements  of  facts  occurring  or  existing  coincident  with 
the  commission  of  the  homicide,  and  tending  to  establish  every  es- 
sential element  of  the  crime.  The  declarations  should  not  contain 
matter  which  would  be  excluded  if  the  declarant  were  a  witness.'" 
Dying  declarations  are  not  admissible  if  stating  opinions  only. 
He  is  beyond  the  reach  of  cross-examination  to  ascertain  the 
grounds  upon  which  his  opinion  may  be  based,  and  other  reasons 
may  exist  which  would  exclude  his  opinion  if  he  were  a  living 
witness. 

"'State  V.  Wood,   53  Vt.  560,  564;  30   Mich.  431;    People  v.   Taylor,  59 

Commonwealth    v,    Casey,    11    Cush,  Cal.   640,  645;   Gardner  v.    State,  55 

(jMass.)  417,  421,  59  Am.  Dec.  150.  Fla.  25,  45  So.  1028;  George  v.  State, 

™  Reynolds   v.   State,  68  Ala.   502;  145  Ala.  41,  40  So.  961,  117  Am.  St. 

People  V.  Beverb',  108  Mich.  509,  66  17;  Connell  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

N.  W.  379.     And  dying  declarations  259,  81  S,  W.  746, 
are    not    admissible    only    in    cases        Dying    declarations,    as    a    general 

where  the  evidence  is  wholly  circum-  rule,  must  consist  of   facts,  and  not 

stantial.  opinions,   86   Am.    St.   649,    652,   but 

""  State  V.  Black,  42  La.  Ann.  86r,  there  are  circumstances  under  which 

8  So.  594;  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ala.  opinion  may  be  shown  by  such  a  dec- 

618;  McBride  v.  People,  5  Colo.  App.  laration,  86  Am.  St.  649,  652. 
91,  37  Pac.  953;  People  v.  Olmstead, 


201  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  §     I08 

Opinions  in  dying  declarations  are  inadmissible.  It  is  indispen- 
sable that  the  dying  declaration  should  consist  solely  of  facts,  and 
not  of  conclusions,  mental  impressions  or  opinions.'^ 

Hence  it  is  proper  to  reject  from  evidence  a  statement  of  the  de- 
ceased to  a  witness  that  he  (the  witness)  knew  how  the  shooting 
was  done,  that  it  was  uncalled  for  and  that  the  trouble  was  between 
the  deceased  and  the  witness."-  Thus,  a  dying  statement  that  the 
deceased  thought  or  believed'^  the  accused  had  shot  him,  or  that 
he  expected  the  accused  would  try  to  kill  him,'^*  is  inadmissible 
where  the  deceased  did  not  see  his  assailant,  but  based  his  declara- 
tion wholly  upon  threats  which  had  been  made  by  the  accused. 
But  opinions  in  dying  declarations  are  admissible  whenever  they 
would  be  received,  if  the  declarant  were  himself  a  witness. '^  So  a 
declaration  that  as  the  accused  arose  he  was  reaching  in  his  pocket 
for  his  revolver  is  not  a  mere  statement  of  a  conclusion,  but  is  de- 
scriptive of  the  act  of  accused  in  getting  his  revolver  from  his 
pocket,  which  he  did."^  And  if  an  expression  of  an  opinion  or  of 
a  conclusion  or  of  some  belief  not  based  on  any  fact  within  the 
knowledge  of  declarant,  which  is  embraced  in  the  declaration,  can 
be  separated  from  it,  the  court  may  do  this  and  then  strike  out 

''  United  States  v.  Veitch,  i  Cranch  ""  Sanford  v.  State,  143  Ala.  78,  39 

C.  C.  (U.  S.)  115,  28  Fed.  Cas.  16614;  So.  370. 

People  V.   Shaw,  63  N.  Y.  2>^ ;   State  '^  Warren  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  619, 

V.  Mace,  118  N.  Car.   1244,  24  S.  E.  35  Am.  745;  Whitley  v.  State,  38  Ga. 

798;    Mose    V.    State,    35    Ala.    421;  50;    People  v.  Wasson,  65   Cal.   53S, 

State    V.    Williams,   67   N.    Car.    12;  539,  4  Pac.  555. 

State  V.  Elkins,  loi  Mo.  344,  351,  14  '^  People  v.  Shaw,  6z  N.  Y.  36,  38. 

S.   W.   116;    State   V.    Black,  42   La.  "  Brotherton  v.    People,   75   N.   Y. 

Ann.  861,  8  So.  594;  Moeck  v.  Peo-  159,    165;    Montgomery    v.    State,    80 

pie,    100    III.    242,    24s,    39    Am.    38;  Ind.  338,  346,  41   Am.  815;   Boyle  v. 

Matherly  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  19  State,  105  Ind.  469,  472,  5  N.  E.  203, 

S.  W.  977,  978,  14  Ky.  L.  182;  Berry  55  Am.  218;   Hall  v.   State,   132  Ind. 

V.  State  (Tex.  1897),  38  S.  W.  1038;  317,  323,  31  N.  E.  536;  State  v.  Foot 

Baker  v.    State,  85  Ark.  300,   107   S.  You,    24    Ore.    61,   32    Pac.    1031,   23 

W.  983 ;    Johnson   v.   Commonwealth  Pac.     537 ;     Cleveland     v.     Common- 

(Ky.),  107  S.  W.  768,  32  Ky.  L.  1117.  wealth   (Ky.),  loi   S.  W.  931,  31   Ky. 

An  objection  to  the   declaration   be-  L.  115.     See  also,  Underbill  on  Evi- 

cause    containing    opinions    must    be  dence,  §  186. 

promptly  made.     State  v.  O'Brien,  81  "State  v.  Brown,   188  Mo.  451,  87 

Iowa  88,  46  N.  W.  752.  S.  W.  519. 


§    109  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  202 

what  is  inadmissible  and  receive  what  is  admissible.'"  And  a 
statement  that  the  killing  was  intentional,"  or  without  reason  or 
provocation,'^,  or  for  nothing,**"  is  not  such  an  expression  of  an 
opinion  as  will  exclude  a  dying  declaration.  A  dying  declaration 
in  these  words,  "Oh,  Lordy!  Willie  shot  me  for  nothing,  without 
any  cause,"  was  not  objectionable  as  a  statement  of  a  conclusion 
rather  than  a  fact.^^ 

This  is  the  general  rule  and  has  been  sustained  by  the  majority 
of  the  cases.  But  in  Kentucky  it  has  been  held  that  a  declaration 
which  either  expressly  or  by  implication  states  that  the  accused 
killed  the  deceased  without  cause  is  not  competent.  In  that  state 
it  has  been  held  that  the  statement  of  the  decedent  that  the  trouble 
"came  up  over"  his  daughters,  and  that  there  was  some  talk  about 
the  daughters  which  displeased  the  decedent  and  that  the  accused 
then  shot  the  decedent  without  cause  is  not  admissible.^" 

§  109.  Must  refer  to  the  res  gestae  of  the  homicide. — The  declara- 
tion is  admissible  only  so  far  as  it  points  directly  to  the  facts  con- 
stituting the  res  gestcu  of  the  homicide ;  that  is  to  say,  to  the  act  of 
killing  and  to  the  circumstances  immediately  attendant  thereon.**^ 

A  dying  statement  showing  why  the  deceased  went  to  the  place 
where  the  homicide  was  committed,  or  that,  after  the  crime,  he 

"Lipscomb  v.  State,  76  Aliss.   223,  ^"Jackson  v.  State   (Miss.  1908),  47 

25  So.  158.  So.  502. 

"^  State  V.  Nettlebush,  20  Iowa  257.  "  IMcMillan  v.  State,  128  Ga.  25,  57 

"  State  V.  Black,  42  La.  Ann.  861,  S.  E.  309. 

8  So.  594;  Powers  v.  State,  74  Miss.  *"  Wagner  v.  Commonwealth  (Kj'.), 

•/"/J,  21    So.  657;    Wroe  v.    State,  20  108  S.  W.  318,  32  Ky.  L.  1185. 

Ohio  St.  460;  House  v.  State  (Miss.  *^  Starr   v.    Commonwealth,  97   Ky. 

1909),  48  So.   3;   Lockhart  v.   State,  193,30  S.  W.  397, 16  Ky.  L.  843;  State 

S3   Tex.    Cr.    App.    589,    11 1    S.   W.  v.    Johnson,    17    Ala.    618;    State    v. 

1024.      Contra,    Jones    v.    Common-  Johnson,  26  S.  Car.  152,  153,  i  S.  E. 

wealth    (Ky.),  46  S.  W.  217,  20  Ky.  510;  Wakefield  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 

L.    355.      A    statement    that    accused  App.    124,   94   S.    W.    1046;    State  v. 

shot  him  for  nothing  and  because  "of  Harris,  112  La.  937,  36  So.  810;  State 

the  crazy   fool  that  was  in   him,   or  v.    Doris    (Ore.    1908),   94    Pac.    44. 

because  he   was  just  a  crazy   fool,"  See  comprehensive   note   in   86   Am. 

were  inadmissible.      Johnson  v.  Com-  St.  647,  649.     The  death  of  declarant 

monwealth  (Ky.),  107  S.  W.  768,  32  and  not  of  another  should  be  under 

Ky.  L.  1117;  Craft  V.  State  (Tex.  Civ.  inquiry  to  render  declaration  admis- 

App.,  1909),  122  S.  W.  547.  sible,  86  Am.   St.  665,  666;    State  v. 

Kellcher  (Mo.,  1909),  123  S.  W.  55:. 


203 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


IIO 


stated  to  a  bystander  that  he  was  unarmed,^*  or  stating  actions  of 
the  accused  or  of  the  deceased  prior  to  the  circumstances  directly 
involved  in  the  homicide  as  the  possible  motive  for  it,  is  not  ad- 
missible.®^ Thus  a  statement  that  enmity  always  existed  be- 
tween the  prisoner  and  the  declarant,®*^  or  that  they  had  always 
been  friends,^"  or  describing  previous  altercations  between  them,®® 
or  detailing  threats  made  by  the  accused  against  the  deceased  long 
prior  to  the  crime,®^  has  been  rejected.  But  a  dying  declaration  de- 
scribing threats  is  admissible  if  the  threats  are  a  part  of  the  res 
gesfcu  of  the  homicide,''^  and  generally  the  fact  that  a  dying  dec- 
laration, whether  written  or  oral,  is  partly  inadmissible,  because  it 
contains  opinions  or  other  irrelevant  matter,  does  not  exclude  the 
whole  of  it  if  the  part  which  is  inadmissible  can  be  separated  from 
that  which  is  not.^^ 

§  110.  Mode  of  proof — Credibility,  relevancy  and  weight. — The 
determination  whether  a  statement  should  be  received  as  a  d3'ing 
declaration  is  for  the  court  upon  all  the  facts.*^-  A  prima  facie  case 


"  State  V.  Eddon,  8  Wash.  292,  36 
Pac.  139 ;  State  v.  Horn,  204  Mo. 
528,  103  S.  W.  69. 

*'  People  V.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  64  Cal. 
253,  28  Pac.  233;  Leiber  v.  Common- 
wealth, 9  Bush  (Ky.)   II. 

^  Mose  V.  State,  35  Ala.  421. 

*'  Starr  v.  Commonwealth,  97  Ky. 
193,  30  S.  W.  397,  398,  16  Ky.  L.  843 ; 
State  V.  Doris  (Ore.  1908),  94  Pac. 
44- 

**  State  V.  Shelton,  2  Jones  (N. 
Car.)  360,  64  Am.  Dec.  587;  Jones  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  46  S.  W.  217, 
20  Ky.  L.  355;  Foley  v.  State,  11 
Wyo.  464,  72  Pac.  627. 

**  North  V.  People,  139  111.  81,  28  N. 
E.  966;  State  V.  Wood,  53  Vt.  560; 
State  V.  Draper,  65  Mo.  335,  241,  27 
Am.  287;  Merrill  v.  State,  58  Miss. 
65.  67;  Hackett  v.  People,  54  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  370. 

•°  State  V.  Wood,  53  Vt.  560,  565. 

"State  V.  Bridgham  (Wash.  1908), 


97  Pac.  1096.  The  court  should 
charge  that  the  declaration  is  ad- 
mitted only  to  prove  the  fact  and 
manner  of  the  homicide  and  should 
direct  the  jury  to  disregard  parts  of 
it  referring  to  other  matters. 

°"  State  V.  Baldwin,  79  Iowa  714,  45 
X.  W.  297,  299;  People  V.  Kraft,  148 
N.  Y.  631,  43  N.  E.  80;  Whitaker  v. 
State,  79  Ga.  87,  92,  3  S.  E.  403 ;  Ke- 
hoe  V.  Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St.  127; 
Evans  v.  State,  58  Ark.  47,  22  S.  W. 
1026,  1027;  People  V.  Del  Vermo,  192 
N.  Y.  470,  8s  N.  E.  690;  State  v. 
Doris  (Ore.,  1908),  94  Pac.  44;  Bate- 
son  V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  34,  80 
S.  W.  88;  Park  v.  State,  126  Ga.  575, 
55  S.  E.  489 ;  State  v.  Crone,  209  Mo. 
316,  108  S.  W.  555;  Sims  V.  State,  139 
Ala.  74,  36  So.  138,  loi  Am.  St.  17; 
State  V.  Zorn,  202  Mo.  12,  100  S.  W. 
591 ;  Sailsbcrry  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  107  S.  W.  774,  32  Ky.  L.  T085 ; 
Tarvcr  v.   State,  137  Ala.  29,  34  So. 


§  no 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


204 


is  sufficient  to  authorize  a  submission  of  dying  declarations  to  the 
jyj.y  93  gy^  ^j^jg  prima  facie  proof  must  be  strong,  and  unless  the 
court  is  firmly  convinced  that  the  declaration  was  made  in  actual 
expectation  of  immediate  death  it  should  not  be  received.  To 
avoid  creating  prejudice  against  the  accused  in  the  minds  of  the 
jurors,  it  is  advisable,  as  a  matter  of  practice,  to  take  the  prelim- 
inary proof  out  of  their  presence  and  hearing,®*  though  evidence 
may  be  received  in  the  presence  of  the  jurors,  they  being  instructed 
that  it  must  be  dismissed  from  their  consideration  if  the  dying  dec- 
laration is  rejected.®^ 


627;  Coyle  V.  Commonwealth  (K5'.), 
93  S.  W.  584,  29  Ky.  L.  340;  Bilton 
V.  Territory  (Okla.,  1909),  99  Pac. 
163;  State  V.  Gallman,  79  S.  Car.  229, 
60  S.  E.  682;  State  V.  Franklin,  80  S. 
Car.  332,  60  S.  E.  953;  Brennan  v. 
People,  27  Colo.  256,  86  Pac.  79. 

''State  V.  Fuller  (Ore.,  1908),  96 
Pac.  456. 

Grounds  of  admissibility  of  dying 
declarations — note,  86  Am.  St.  638, 
639,  56  L.  R.  A.  353;  character  of 
to  be  admissible,  86  Am.  St.  647,  654; 
religious  belief  of  declarant  imma- 
terial, 86  Am.  St.  641,  642;  but  such 
fact  may  affect  weight  of  testimony, 
86  Am.  St.  642;  declarant  must  have 
been  sane,  86  Am.  St.  640;  whether 
actual  danger  of  death  essential  to 
admissibility,  86  Am.  St.  654,  655; 
right  of  jury  to  determine  existence 
facts  essential  to  admissibility,  16  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  660;  whose  declara- 
tions admissible,  86  Am.  St.  640; 
competency  of  declarant  as  witness, 
86  Am.  St.  640,  642;  intention  or  mo- 
tive cannot  generally  be  shown  by, 
86  Am.  St.  652,  654;  when  intention 
or  motive  may  be  shown  by,  86  Am. 
St.  652,  654;  written  dying  declara- 
tions admissible,  86  Am.  St.  642,  644; 
declarations  of  husband  or  wife, 
when  admissible  against  the  other,  86 
Am.  St.  641. 


What  admissible  as  dying  declara- 
tions and  in  what  cases,  86  Am.  St. 
637,  668;  in  prosecution  for  abortion, 
86  Am.  St.  666,  667;  in  prosecution 
for  burglary,  2  Am.  St.  398 ;  in  prose- 
cution for  homicide,  86  Am.  St.  665, 
666,  63  L.  R.  A.  916;  in  prosecution 
for  seduction,  86  Am.  St.  667,  668. 

**  Doles  V.  State,  97  Ind.  555,  559; 
State  V.  Furney,  41  Kan.  115,  13  Am. 
St.  262;  Swisher  v.  Commonwealth, 
26  Gratt.  (Va.)  963,  21  Am.  330; 
State  V.  Crone,  209  Mo.  316,   108  S. 

w.  555. 

*' Price  V.  State,  72  Ga.  441,  555; 
People;  v.  Smith,  104  N.  Y.  491,  493, 
498,  10  N.  E.  873,  58  Am.  537n; 
Johnson  v.  State,  47  Ala.  9;  Doles 
V.  State,  97  Ind.  555,  559,  560.  Dy- 
ing declarations  are  admissible  from 
the  necessities  of  the  case,  but  they 
should  be  received  with  caution, 
for  the  reason  that  the  declarant  has 
not  been  administered  an  oath,  and 
an  opportunity  for  cross-examination 
has  not  been  afforded  defendant,  and 
that  the  declarant  might  be  influ- 
enced against  defendant;  and  for  the 
further  reason  that  the  physical  con- 
dition of  the  declarant  might  render 
the  statement  more  or  less  unreliable. 
Circumstances  surrounding  the  decla- 
ration should  be  weighed  the  same  as 
those  surrounding  other   evidence" — 


205 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


IIO 


After  the  declaration  is  admitted,  its  credibility  and  weight  are 
wholly  for  the  jury,'"'  and  these  elements  are  to  be  determined  by 
the  same  rules  that  are  employed  in  judging  the  evidence  of  a  liv- 
ing witness.^^  So  an  instruction  that  dying  declarations  are  to  be 
received  or  considered  with  great  caution  may  properly  be  re- 
fused.^* 

The  dying  declaration  may  be  introduced  not  only  as  evidence 
against  the  accused,  but  as  evidence  in  his  favor  as  well,®^  though 


or  one  of  similar  import,  should  be 
given.  State  v.  Mayo,  42  Wash.  540, 
85  Pac.  251. 

""Lambeth  v.  State,  23  Miss.  322, 
329;  State  V.  McCanon,  51  Mo.  160; 
Walston  V.  Commonwealth,  16  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  15,  35;  Doles  v.  State,  97 
Ind.  555,  562;  McQueen  v.  State,  94 
Ala.  so,  ID  So.  433;  Evans  v.  State, 
58  Ark.  47,  55,  22  S.  W.  1026;  State 
V.  Zorn,  202  Mo.  12,  100  S.  W.  591 ; 
DuBose  V.  State,  120  Ala.  300,  25  So. 
185;  State  V.  Adams  (Del.,  1906),  65 
Atl.  510;  Willoughby  v.  Territory,  16 
Okla.  577,  86  Pac.  56;  Jackson  v. 
State  (Miss.,  1908),  47  So.  502;  Car- 
ter V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  254,  58  S.  E. 
532;  Gardner  v.  State,  55  Fla.  25,  45 
So.  1028 ;  State  v.  Davis,  134  N.  Car. 
633,  46  S.  E.  722. 

"'Justice  v.  State,  99  Ala.  180,  182, 
13  So.  658;  Jones  v.  State,  70  Miss. 
401,  404,  12  So.  444;  Nordgren  v. 
People,  211  111.  425,  71  N.  E.  1042; 
]\Ioody  V.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  772,  58 
S.  E.  262;  Smith  V.  State,  118  Ga.  61, 
44  S.  E.  817;  Gambrell  v.  State 
(Miss.,  1908),  46  So.  138;  Zippcrian 
v.  People,  33  Colo.  134,  79  Pac.  1018; 
State  V.  Davis,  134  N.  Car.  633,  46  S. 
E.  722;  State  V.  Adams  (Del.,  1906), 
65  Atl.  510;  State  V.  Doris  (Ore., 
1908),  94  Pac.  44;  DuBose  v.  State, 
120  .Ma.  300,  25  So.  185.  Indeed,  it 
lias  been  held  that  the  jury  may  also 
consider  whether,  as  a  matter  of  fact. 


the  deceased  was  in  extremis,  and  had 
lost  all  hopes  of  recovery.  State  v. 
Banister,  35  S.  Car.  290,  296,  14  S. 
E.  678;  Commonwealth  v.  Brewer, 
164  Mass.  577,  42  N.  E.  92.  A  prima 
facie  case  that  decedent  was  in  the 
article  of  death  and  conscious  of  his 
condition  is  sufficient  to  carry  a  state- 
ment offered  as  a  dying  declaration 
to  the  jury,  leaving  to  them  the  ulti- 
mate determination  as  to  whether  de- 
cedent was  in  the  article  of  death 
and  realized  his  condition.  Robinson 
V.  State,  130  Ga.  936,  60  S.  E.  1005; 
Bird  V.  State,  128  Ga.  253,  57  S.  E. 
320. 

"*  Brown  v.  State,  150  Ala.  25,  43 
So.  194. 

"  In  Brock  v.  Commonwealth,  92 
Ky.  183,  186,  17  S.  W.  337,  13  Ky.  L. 
450,  where  it  appeared  that  deceased 
was  drawing  a  pistol  when  killed,  his 
dying  statement  that  he  had  brought 
on  the  quarrel  and  was  wholly  to 
blame,  was  received  in  the  defendant's 
favor.  See,  also,  Felder  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  477,  5  S.  W.  145,  59  Am. 
777n ;  State  v.  Ashworth,  50  La.  .A.nn. 
94,  23  So.  270.  Dying  declarations 
are  admissible  on  the  ground  that 
they  are  made  under  a  solemn,  reli- 
gious sense  of  impending  death  con- 
cerning circumstances  of  which  de- 
ceased was  not  likely  to  have  been 
mistaken,  but,  since  an  accused  is  de- 
prived of  the  power  of  cross-e-xam- 


§  III  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  206 

declarations  of  the  deceased  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  ac- 
cused meant  to  kill  him/""  and  that  he  did  not  want  him  prosecuted 
for  the  homicide  have  been  rejected/  as  being  evidence  of  no  fact 
except  that  the  declarant  possessed  a  Christian  spirit  and  was 
ready  to  forgive  his  slayer. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  said  that  a  witness,  called  to  prove  a 
dying  declaration,  is  not  expected  to  repeat  the  exact  language 
used  by  the  deceased,  provided  he  can  give  the  substance  of  what 
he  heard  in  a  reasonably  connected  and  complete  form.- 

§  111.  Declaration  admissible  in  its  entirety — Contradictory  or  un- 
truthful character. — A  part  of  the  declaration  which  is  inadmissible 
may  be  stricken  out  on  motion,^  but  generally,  all  the  deceased  has 
said  relevant  to  the  guilt  of  the  accused  and  bearing  upon  the  facts 
of  the  homicide  should  be  admitted,  and  it  is  erroneous  for  the 
court  to  reject  any  portion  of  it.'* 

So,  wdiatever  was  said  by  third  parties  to  the  deceased,  if  it 
forms  a  part  of  the  conversation  containing  the  declaration,  should 
not  be  rejected.  The  accused  has  the  right  to  prove  whatever  was 
said,  explaining,  limiting  or  qualifying  the  declaration,  or  which 
will  rebut  the  inference  of  his  guilt  which  may  be  drawn  there- 
from. But  he  can  not  be  permitted  to  prove  statements  which, 
while  made  during  the  conversation  containing  the  declaration,  are 

ination,  they  should  not  be  given  great  489;  State  v.  Clark   (W.  Va.,   1908), 

weight,    where    deceased    had    not   a  63  S.  E.  402. 

deep   sense   of   accountability  to  her  ^  People  v.   Farmer,   77   Cal.    i,    18 

Maker,    and    an    unenlightened    con-  Pac.  800. 

science.      State    v.    Trusty,    i    Penn.  *  State  v.  Terrell,  12  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 

(Del.)  319,  40  Atl.  766.  321;  Archibald  v.  State,  122  Ind.  122, 

'~  McPherson  v.  State,  22  Ga.  478.  123,  23  N.  E.  758;  State  v.  Petsch,  43 

^  State  V.  Nelson,  loi  I\Io.  464,  468,  S.  Car.  132,  20  S.  E.  993,  999 ;  Ixlattox 

14  S.  W.  712;  Adams  v.   People,  47  v.  United  States,  146  U.  S.  140,  36  L. 

111.    276;     Slone    V.    Commonwealth  ed.   917,   13   Sup.   Ct.    50;    People  v. 

(Ky.),  no  S.  W.  235,  33  Ky.  L.  266.  Pong  Ah  Sing,  70  Cal.  8,  13,  n  Pac. 

-  People  V.  Chin  Mook  Sow,  51  Cal.  323;     Bennett    v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

597;    Roberts  v.   State,   5   Tex.   App.  App.),  75  S.  W.  314;  Commonwealth 

141;  Mattox  V.  United  States,  146  U.  v.  Spahr,  211  Pa.  542,  60  Atl.  1084. 

S.  140,  36  L.  ed.  917,  13  Sup.  Ct.  50;  Admissibility  of  partial  or  distinct 

Park  V.  State,  126  Ga.  575,  55  S.  E.  statements— note,  86  Am.  St.  646. 


207  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  §     III 

not  connected  with  the  declaration,  but  are  distinct  and  independ- 
ent in  their  character.^ 

The  admission  of  dying  declarations  does  not  violate  a  constitu- 
tional provision  that  the  accused  shall  be  confronted  with  the  wit- 
nesses against  him,  and  shall  have  an  opportunity  to  hear  their 
evidence.*^  The  contradictory,  fragmentary  or  incomplete  charac- 
ter,' or  even  the  manifest  untruthfulness  of  the  dying  declaration, 
is  no  valid  objection  to  its  admissibility,  however  much  these  de- 
tract from  its  credibility  as  evidence.  The  fact  that  the  deceased 
accuses  a  person  who  could  not  possibly  have  been  present  when 
he  was  slain,  does  not  exclude  his  statement  as  against  others  who 
could  have  been  present.® 

Declarations  made  by  the  deceased  contradicting  his  dying  dec- 
laration in  respect  to  the  party  accused  of  the  homicide  and  as  to 
the  cause  and  circumstances  of  the  crime  are  admissible  to  impeach 
it,  though  they  are  not  shown  to  have  been  made  under  a  sense  of 
impending  death,^  and  (as  it  is  generally  impossible  to  do  so),  it  is 
never  necessary  that  the  attention  of  the  deceased  should  have  been 
called  to  the  occasion  and  circumstances  of  the  contradictory 
statements."    A  statute  prescribing  the  mode  of  laying  a  founda- 

^  People   V.    Beach,   87   N.    Y.    508;  "Richards    v.    State,    82    Wis.    172, 

Xordgren  v.   People,  211   III.  425,  71  179,  51  N.  W.  652;    State  v.   Patter- 

X.  E.    1042.   On  the  question   of  the  son,  45  Vt.  308,  313,    12   Am.   20on; 

disconnected   and   fragmentary    char-  State  v.  Giroux,  26  La.  Ann.  582. 

acter   of  the  statement,  see   State  v.  *  White  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  652, 

Garrison,  147  Mo.  548,  49  S.  W.  508.  655,  18  S.  W.  462. 

"State  V.  Baldwin,  15  Wash.  15,  45  ^  State  v.   Lodge,  9  Houst.    (Del.) 

Pac.  650;   Robbins   v.    State,  8   Ohio  542,   S3   Atl.    312;    Carver  v.   United 

St.  131;  People  V.  IMurray,  52  Mich.  States,  164  U.  S.  694,  41  L.  ed.  602,  17 

288,  17  N.  W.  843;  State  v.  Price,  6  Sup.  Ct.  228;    Morelock  v.   State,  90 

La.  Ann.  691;  Commonwealth  v.  Ca-  Tenn.  528,  18  S.  W.  258;  Gregory  v. 

rey,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  246,  249;  State  State,  140  Ala.   16,  37  So.  259;   Pyle 

V.  Nash,  7  Iowa  347;   Woodsides  v.  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  811,  62  S.  E.  540; 

State,  2  How.   (Miss.)  655;  Walston  State  v.   Mills,  79  S.  Car.  187,  60  S. 

V.  Commonwealth,  16  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)  E.  664;  McCorquodale  v.  State  (Tex. 

15;   State  V.   Van    Sant,  80   Mo.   67;  Cr.   App.),  98    S.   W.  879;    State   v. 

Anthony  V.  State,  Meigs  (Tcnn.)  265,  Mayo,   42   Wash.    540,   85    Pac.    251; 

277,   33   Am.    Dec.    143;    Campbell   v.  State  v.  Fuller   (Ore.,  1908),  96  Pac. 

State,  II  Ga.  353;  Jones  v.  State,  130  456. 

Ga.    274,    60    S.    E.    840;    Burrell    v.  "People  v.  Lawrence,  2T  Cal.  368; 

State,  18  Tex.  713;  People  v.   Glenn,  Carver   v.    United    States.    164    U.    S. 

10  Cal.  32.  694,  41  L.  ed.  602,  17  Sup.  Ct.  228. 


§112  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  208 

tion  for  impeaching  a  witness  by  proof  of  contradictory  statements 
does  not  apply  to  dying  declarations."  On  the  other  hand,  evi- 
dence has  been  received  to  show  that  the  deceased  declarant  had 
been  convicted  of  the  crime  of  grand  larceny  and  that  he  had  been 
incarcerated  in  the  penitentiary,  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching 
the  credibility  of  the  dying  declaration.^"  Declarations  of  the  de- 
ceased, not  made  in  contemplation  of  death,  have  been  received  to 
corroborate  his  dying  declaration.^^ 

§  112.  The  form  of  the  declaration. — It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
deceased  should  have  been  formally  examined  or  questioned  as 
though  he  were  upon  the  witness  stand.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
dying  declarations  elicited  by  persistent  questioning  or  persuasion, 
or  by  the  most  urgent  solicitation  to  tell  the  truth,  are  always  re- 
ceivable.^* 

Dying  declarations  which  consist  simply  in  the  decedent  identi- 
fying certain  persons  as  those  who  killed  him  have  been  received. 
So,  where  several  men  were  brought  to  the  accused  and  he  was 
asked  if  he  could  recognize  his  assailant  among  them,  and  he 
picked  out  the  accused  from  a  number  of  persons  who  were  stran- 
gers to  him.  it  was  held  that  this  was  admissible.^^ 

"State  V.    Fuller    (Ore.,    1908),   96  taken    before    his    dying    victim    will 

Pac.  456.  not,  it  sccnis,  exclude  a  dying  decla- 

"  Alartin  v.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),  ration    identifying    him.      People    v. 

78  S.  W.  1 104,  25  Ky.  L.  1928.  Gardner,  144  N.  Y.  119,  128,  38  N.  E. 

^  State    V.    Blackburn,    80    N.    Car.  1003,   43    Am.    St.  741,  28   L.    R.    A. 

474,  478;  State  V.  Craine,  120  N.  Car.  699n.   The  fact  that  the  dying  declar- 

601,  27  S.  E.  72.  ant   was    under   oath   while   speaking 

"Commonwealth     v.     Hanej',     127  does     not     exclude     his     statements. 

]\Iass.  455,  458;  Anderson  v.  State,  79  State  v.  Talbert,  41  S.  Car.  526,  529, 

Ala.   5;  Jones  v.    State,   71    Ind.  66;  19  S.  E.  852;    i   Bicknell's  Cr.  Prac, 

State  V.  Wilson,  24  Kan.  189,  36  Am.  161 ;   State  v.  Bonar,  71  Kan.  800,  81 

257;    White  V.    State,   30   Tex.   App.  Pac.  484. 

652,  18  S.  W.  462;  North  V.  People,  Form  of  dying  declaration  usually 

139  111.   81,    28   N.   E.  966;    Long  V.  immaterial — note,    86    Am.     St.    642, 

State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  175,  88  S.  W.  647;  character  of  declaration,  86  Am. 

203;    Phillips    V.    State,    50   Tex.    Cr.  St.  647,  654;   declaration  in  form  of 

App.  481,  98  S.  W.  868;  AlcCorquo-  questions    and   answers,    86    Am.    St. 

dale  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  98  S.  644,  646;  declaration  should  be  com- 

W.  879;    State  V.   Ashworth.   50  La.  plete  in  itself,  86  Am.  St.  646. 

Ann.  94,  23  So.  270 ;   Park  v.    State,  "  State  v.  Roberts,  28  Nev.  350,  S2 

126    Ga.    575,    55    S.    E.    489.      The  Pac.  100. 
fact   that   the   accused    was    forcibly 


209  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  8    112 

If  the  declarant  had  sufficient  mental  consciousness  to  know 
what  he  was  saying,  the  fact  that  he  was  partially  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  narcotic  will  not  render  his  statement  inadmissible/®  But 
the  declaration  must  be  complete  in  itself,  and  nothing  should  re- 
main to  be  said  by  the  declarant  wdiich  will  materially  qualify,  en- 
large or  restrict  its  meaning/^ 

A  declaration  which  is  complete  in  itself,  is  not  incompetent  be- 
cause the  deceased  was  interrupted  while  he  was  speaking  or  be- 
cause he  attended  to  other  matters  during  the  conversation/*  The 
fact  also  that  included  in  the  statement  there  are  utterances  which 
are  incompetent  may  be  disregarded  if  the  statement  itself  is 
complete  and  contains  the  facts  which  are  properly  receivable/^ 
Nor  need  the  dying  declaration  relate  every  fact  which  constitutes 
the  res  gestcu  of  the  homicide,  if  the  statement  of  the  deceased  re- 
garding any  particular  detail  is  complete  and  apparently  a  full  ex- 
pression of  what  he  meant  to  say  regarding  that  detail."" 

In  case  the  declaration  was  committed  to  writing  by  a  witness 
who  was  present  when  it  was  made  it  is  very  proper  to  produce  the 
writing.  But  whether  the  writing  is  evidence  at  all  depends  on  a 
variety  of  circumstances.  If  it  was  signed  by  the  deceased,  or,  he 
being  physically  unable  to  sign  it,  was  assented  to  and  adopted  by 
him,  it  certainly  is  evidence  to  show  the  precise  language  used  by 
him,  no  matter  when  or  by  wdiom  it  was  prepared."^  It  is  not 
proper  to  limit  the  use  of  such  a  paper  to  refreshing  the  memory  of 
a  witness  who  heard  the  declaration,  nor  should  the  writing  be 
excluded  because  not  supplemented  by  the  oath  of  a  witness  that  it 
is  strictly  correct,"  or  because  it  does  not  precisely  reproduce  the 

'^  People  V.  Beverly,  io8  Mich.  509,  -"  State   v.    Patterson,   45   Vt,   308, 

66  X.  W.  379;  State  v.  Reed,  137  Mo.  3x3,  12  Am.  20on. 

125,  38  S.  W.  574;  Hays  v.  Common-  -'Perry  v.  State,  102  Ga.  365,  30  S. 

wealth    (K}'.),  14  S.  W.  833,  12  Ky.  E.   903;   Heningburg  v.    State    (Ala., 

L.  611.  1907),  45  So.  246. 

"Vass  V.  Commonwealth,  3  Leigh  "Turner  v.  State,  89  Tenn.  547,  15 

( Va.)  786,  24  Am.  Dec.  695 ;  State  v.  S.    W.    838.     Cf.    Commonwealth   v. 

Murdy,  81  Iowa  603,- 47  N.  W.  867.  Haney,  127  Mass.  455,  458;   Bennett 

"  State  V.  Ashworth,  50  La.   Ann.  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  52,  8r  S. 

04,  23  So.  270;  Park  v.  State,  126  Ga.  W.  30;  Commonwealth  v.  Spahr,  211 

575.  55  S.  E.  489.  Pa.  542,  60  Atl.  T084;  State  v.  Doris 

"State  V.    P.nnar,  71    K.'in.   800,  81  (Ore.,  1908),  94  Pac.  44. 
Pac.  484. 

14 — Underhh-l  Crim.  Ev. 


8     112  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  2IO 

language  of  the  oral  declaration,  if  it  was  read  to  the  deceased  and 
he  then  stated  that  it  was  all  he  wanted  to  say.-"  But  the  circum- 
stances of  its  preparation,  and  all  cjuestions  as  to  whether  the  de- 
ceased understood  the  meaning  and  contents  of  the  writing,  are 
wholly  for  the  consideration  of  the  jury,  to  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining what  weight  they  should  give  to  it."^  A  statement  added 
to  the  writing  by  another  after  the  accused  had  signed  it,  though 
a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc,  must  be  regarded  as  an  oral  declaration, 
and  proved  as  such.-^ 

Granting  that  the  writing  is  evidence,  and  that  its  sole  use  is  not 
merely  to  refresh  the  memory,  the  question  remains  to  be  consid- 
ered, is  it  the  best  or  primary  evidence  of  the  oral  declaration,  so 
that  its  absence  must  be  accounted  for  before  the  declaration  can  be 
proved  by  parol  evidence?  Upon  this  question  the  cases  are  di- 
vided. The  original  statements  were  oral,  and  the  mere  fact  that 
they  were  written  down  as  they  were  uttered  gives  the  writing  no 
greater  value  as  evidence  than  the  oral  statement.  On  these 
grounds  many  authorities  hold  that  the  writing,  even  though 
signed  and  sworn  to  by  the  deceased,  is  not  the  best  evidence  of  the 
declaration,^®  and  some  even  limit  its  use  to  refreshing  the  memory 
of  the  witness.  But  this  rule  is  not  of  universal  recognition,  and  it 
has  several  times  been  held  that  the  writing  is  primary  evidence, 
so  that  its  absence  must  be  accounted  for  before  its  contents  can 
be  proved  by  parol. '^ 

"^People  V.  Bemmerly,  87  Cal.   117,  State,  139  Ala. -74,  36  So.  138,  loi  Am. 

25  Pac.  266;  Foley  v.  State,  11  Wyo.  St.  17;  State  v.  Clark  (W.  Va.,  1908), 

464,  72  Pac.  627.  63  S.  E.  402;  Jarvis  v.  State,  138  Ala. 

"*  Perry  v.  State,  102  Ga.  365,  30  S.  17,  34  So.  1025.    Where  a  dying  dec- 

E.  903.  laration  was  made  under  oath  to  a 

^  State   V.    Doris    (Ore.,    1908),   94  justice  of  the  peace  which  the  justice 

Pac.  44.  reduced    to    writing    as    fully    as    he 

^  State  V.  Whitson,  iii  N.  Car.  695,  could,  it  was  proper  for  him,  in  addi- 

697,  698,  16  S.  E.  332;  Darby  v.  State,  tion   to   reading  his  notes,   to   supply 

92   Ala.   9,    IS,    9    So.    429;    State    v.  from   his   recollection  the   remainder 

Mathes,   90    Mo.    571,   2   S.    W.   800;  of  the  declarant's  statement.    Mitchell 

Commonwealth  v.   Haney,   127  Mass.  v.  State,  82  Ark.  324,  loi  S.  W.  763. 
455.  458;  Anderson  v.  State,  79  Ala.        "^King  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  617,  650, 

5,  8;   State  v.   Patterson,  45  Vt.  308,  20    S.   W.   169;    People  v.    Glenn,    10 

314,  12  Am.  200n;  State  v.   Sullivan,  Cal.  32;  State  v.  Parham,  48  La.  Ann. 

51  Iowa  142,  50  N.  W.  572;  Kirby  v.  1309,  20  So.  727;  People  v.  Callaghan, 

State,  151  Ala.  66,  44  So.  38;  Sims  v.  4  Utah  49,  6  Pac.  49;  Drake  v.  State, 


211  DYING   DECLARATIOXS.  §    113 

If  the  dying  declaration  was  committed  to  writing  by  an  official 
under  some  express  statutory  requirement,  it  partakes  of  the  char- 
acter of  a  public  writing  or  record,  and  must  be  proved  as  such. 

Where  the  written  declaration  is  not  read  to  or  signed  by  the 
deceased,  it  is  certainly  not  primary  evidence,  unless  it  be  a  record, 
as  for  example  a  statement  taken  by  a  coroner.*^ 

Indeed,  it  may  be  doubtful  if  a  writing  which  was  taken  down 
from  the  lips  of  the  deceased,  but  which  was  not  signed  by  him,  is 
competent  at  all.  It  may  unquestionably  be  used,  however,  to  re- 
fresh the  memory  of  the  witness  who  heard  the  declaration  while 
he  testifies  orally  to  what  he  heard. "^  Thus,  for  example,  a  justice 
of  the  peace  may  testify  to  an  oral  dying  declaration  made  to  him 
and  taken  down  by  him  in  writing.  It  is  not  improper  to  permit 
him  to  read  his  notes  to  the  jury,  though  they  were  never  signed 
by  the  deceased,  if  the  justice  will  swear  that  he  knows  them  to  be 
substantially  correct.^^ 

That  some  statements  were  committed  to  writing,  while  others 
were  not,  does  not  exclude  parol  proof  of  those  wholly  oral  when 
the  writing  can  not  be  produced  or  its  absence  accounted  for.^^ 

§  113.    Declarations  by  signs — Mental  condition  of  the  declarant. — 

The  declaration  is  usually  oral,  though  this  is  by  no  means  indis- 
pensable. It  may  be  made  by  signs,  where  the  dying  person  is 
speechless,  as  by  a  nod,  the  pressure  of  the  hand,  or  by  pointing  to 
visible  persons  or  objects  in  answer  to  leading  questions.^" 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  also  where  the  declaration  is 

25  Tex.  App.  293,  7  S.  W.  868;  Col-  '« Mitchell  v.  State,  82  Ark.  324,  lor 

lier  V.   State,  20  Ark.   36;   Jones  v.  S.  W.  763. 

State,  71   Ind.  66 ;   State  v.  Tweedy,  ^^  People  v.  Simpson,  48  Mich.  474, 

II    Iowa   350;    Merrill    v.    State,    58  12  N.  W.  662;  Rex  v.  Reason,  i  Str. 

Miss.  65,  (iT,    State  v.  Williams,   28  499,  500 ;   State  v.  Walton,  92   Iowa 

Xev.  395,  82  Pac.  353;  State  v.  Clark  455,   61    N.    W.    179,    i8r ;    State   v. 

(W.  Va.,  1908),  63  S.  E.  402.  Schmidt,  'jz  Iowa  469,  35  N.  W.  590; 

^  State  V.  Sullivan,  51  Iowa  142,  50  Underhill  on  Ev.,  p.  146.     Otherwise 

X.  W.  572;  Fuqua  v.  Commonwealth,  if  the  writing  is  produced.    Adams  v. 

118  Ky.  578,  81  S.  W.  923,  26  Ky.  L.  State    (Tex.   App.,   1892),    19  S.  W. 

420.  907.    Cf.  State  V.  Finley,  118  N.  Car. 

'■*  .Anderson    v.    State,    79    Ala.    5;  ii6t,   24   S.    E.   495;   State  v.   Doris 

Sailsherry  v.   Commonwealth    CKy.).  (Ore.,  1908"),  94  Pac.  44. 

107  S.  W.  774,  32  Ky.  L.  1085;  Card-  ''""If  the  injured  person  had  hut  the 

ncr  V.  State,  55  Fla.  25,  45  So.  1028.  action    of   a    single   finger   and   with 


§    114  -CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  212 

offered  in  writing.^"  it  must  appear  by  independent  evidence  that 
the  declarant  was  mentally  conscious,"''*  realized  his  dying  condi- 
tion,^^ possessed  memory,  consciousness  and  intelligence  sufficient 
to  know  what  he  was  doing  and  saying,  and,  where  a  declaration 
in  writing  is  oft'ered,  that  he  understood  clearly  its  contents. ^° 

These  are  all  questions  for  the  jury,  to  be  determined  upon  a 
consideration  of  all  the  facts.  And  a  non-professional  witness 
may  not  testify  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  declarant  was  delirious  at 
the  time  he  made  his  dying  statement  unless  he  can  state  all  the 
facts  upon  which  his  conclusion  is  based. ^^ 

§  114.  Dying  declarations  made  by  children. — It  is  always  neces- 
sary, in  order  that  a  dying  declaration  should  be  admitted,  to  show 
that  the  declarant,  if  living,  would  be  a  competent  witness.  If, 
therefore,  it  appears  from  the  facts  of  the  case  that  the  deceased 
was  a  child  of  tender  years,  who  was  not  possessed  of  sufficient 
memory  or  intelligence  to  comprehend  the  nature  and  religious 
sanction  of  an  oath,  or  that  he  did  not  expect  to  be  punished  in  a 
future  state  if  he  told  a  lie,  the  declaration  should  be  rejected.^'* 

that  pointed  to  the  words  yes  or  no  in  credibility  of  testimony  of  a  medical 

answer  to  questions  in  such  a  manner  witness  in  relation  to  the  condition  of 

as  to  render  it  probable  that  he  un-  deceased  at  the  time  of  making  dying 

derstood,  and  was  at  the  time  con-  declarations    is    a    question    for    the 

scious  that  he  could  not  recover,  it  jury.    State  v.  Davis,  134  N.  Car.  633, 

is     admissible."      Commonwealth     v.  46  S.  E.  722. 

Casey,  11  Cush.   (Mass.)  417,  422,  59  ^^  State   v.    Nowells,    135   Iowa   53, 

Am.  Dec.  150;  Mockabee  v.  Common-  109  N.  W.  1016. 

wealth,   78  Ky.  380,  382 ;  Walker  v.  ^  In  Rex  v.  Pike,  3  C.  &  P.  598,  the 

State,  139  Ala.  56,  35  So.  lOii.  declaration  of  a   four-year-old  child 

^' Tracy  v.  People,  97  III.  loi.  was    rejected   because,   while    it    was 

**  Mitchell  v.  State,  71  Ga.  128.    Ex-  shown  that  she  knew  she  would  die, 

pert  testimony  to  show  deceased  was  she  did  not  have  that  idea  of  a  fu- 

rational  when  he  made  his  statement  ture  state  which  is   needed  to   make 

has  been  rejected.    Lyles  v.  State,  48  such  a  declaration  admissible.    But  in 

Tex.  Cr.  App.  119,  86  S.  W.  763.  Reg.  v.   Perkins,  9  C.  &  P.  396,  the 

^  People  v.  Shaw,  63  N.  Y.  36,  40.  declaration  of  a  child  was  admitted 

^  McBride  v.  People,  5  Colo.  App.  upon  it  being  shown  that  he   had  a 

91,  37  Pac.  953,  956;  Binfield  v.  State,  proper  conception  of  a  future  exist- 

15  Neb.  484,  19  N.  W.  607.    See  Tra-  ence  beyond  the  grave. 

cy  V.  People,  97  111.  loi,  108-110.   The 


CHAPTER  XI. 


CONSCIOUSNESS    OF   GUILT. 


§  115.  Facts  showing  a  consciousness  §  120.  Resistance  to  arrest. 

of  guilt.  121.  Fabricating  or  suppressing  evi- 

116.  Falsehoods  by  accused  or  sus-  dence. 

pected  persons.  122.  Silence    under    accusations    of 

117.  Demeanor  subsequent  to  crime.  guilt. 

118.  The  flight  or  attempted  escape  123.  Attendant     circumstances     ex- 

of  the  accused.  plaining  motives  and  reasons 

119.  Explanation  by  accused  of  his  of  silence. 

flight  or  attempted  escape.  124.  The     accusing     statement      or 

119a.  Declarations    which    are    self-  question, 
serving  are  rejected. 

§  115.  Facts  showing  a  consciousness  of  guilt. — Any  statement  or 
conduct  of  a  person  indicating  a  consciousness  of  guilt,  where  at 
the  time  or  thereafter  he  is  charged  with  or  suspected  of  the 
crime,  is  admissible  as  a  circumstance  against  him  on  his  trial. 
Evidence  of  circumstances,  which  are  part  of  a  person's  behavior 
subsequent  to  an  event  with  which  it  is  alleged  or  suspected  he  is 
connected  with  or  implicated  in,  are  relevant  if  the  circumstances 
are  such  as  would  be  natural  and  usual,  assuming  the  connection 
or  implication  to  exist.  This  rule  of  circumstantial  evidence  may 
be  regarded  as  almost  universally  applicable.  Aiid  sometimes, 
but  not  universally,  evidence  of  actions  and  circumstances,  in- 
consistent with  such  an  assumption,  is  relevant  as  a  basis  for  an 
inference  that  tlie  person  accused  or  suspected  did  not  participate 
in  the  event.  Under  these  rules  evidence  will  be  received  to  prove 
or  di.sprove  facts  or  circumstances  which  indicate  a  consciousness 
of  guilt  on  the  part  of  the  accused,  existing  after  the  crime  with 
which  he  is  charged  was  committed. 

His  conduct  and  general  demeanor,  his  language,  oral  or  writ- 
ten, and  his  mental  anrl  ])hysical  condition,  attitude  and  relations 
towards  the  crime,  or  his  actions  in  the  presence  of  those  who  dis- 

(213) 


ii6 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE, 


214 


covered  the  crime. ^  or  ^vho  are  engaged  in  detecting  its  perpe- 
trator, are  relevant. - 

The  time  which  has  elapsed,  between  the  time  of  the  crime  and 
the  occurrence  of  the  incriminating  or  accusatory  actions  relied 
on  to  connect  the  accused  with  the  crime,  is  sometimes  an  import- 
ant element.  The  circumstances  of  the  conduct  of  the  accused 
must  not  be  so  remote  in  time  or  extend  over  so  long  a  period 
as  to  create  a  strong  probability  that  they  are  the  outcome  of  other 
motives  than  a  consciousness  of  guilt.^  On  the  other  hand  the 
reception  of  this  evidence,  whether  consisting  of  statements  or 
events,  never  depends  on  its  contemporaneous  connection  with  the 
crime  that  is  charged,  or  on  its  being  a  part  of  the  res  gestcu^ 

§  116.  Falsehoods  by  accused  or  suspected  persons. — Evidence  that 
the  accused  told  falsehoods,  or  avoided,  or  attempted  to  avoid, 
giving  information  of  himself,  his  actions  or  his  whereabouts,  at 
or  about  the  time  of  the  crime  either  in  describing  it  or  his  rela- 
tion to  it,^  as  when  he  has  given  false  testimony  at  a  coroner's  in- 


^  People  V.  Pyckett,  99  ]\Iich.  613, 
58  X.  W.  621;  State  V.  Jacobs,  106 
N.  Car.  695,  10  S.  E.  1031 ;  Hart  v. 
State,  15  Tex.  App.  202,  49  Am.  i88n. 
See  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2723. 

^McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala.  154; 
People  V.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113,  17  Am. 
40T :  People  v.  Welsh,  63  Cal.  167 ; 
State  V.  Hill,  134  Uo.  663,  36  S.  W. 
223. 

^  State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  12,  12 
Pac.  318;  State  v.  Hogan,  117  La.  863, 
42-  So.  352;  People  V.  Tubbs,  147 
]\Iich.  I,  no  N.  W.  132;  Parnell  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  419,  98  S.  W. 
269. 

*  People  V.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113,  119, 
17  Am.  401 ;  People  v.  Welsh,  63  Cal". 
167. 

^  State  V.  Williams,  66  Iowa  573, 
574,  24  N.  W.  52;  Cathcart  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 37  Pa.  St.  108,  113;  State 
V.  Williams,  27  Vt.  724,  726;  State  v. 
Bradley,  64  Vt.  466,  469,  24  Atl.  1053 ; 


Hicks  V.  State,  99  Ala.  169,  171,  13 
So.  375;  Huffman  v.  State,  28  Tex. 
App.  174,  12  S.  W.  588;  State  v.  Cro- 
nin,  64  Conn.  293,  305,  29  Atl.  536; 
Commonwealth  v.  Tolliver,  119  Mass. 
312;  Commonwealth  v.  Trefethen, 
157  Mass.  180,  31  N.  E.  961,  24  L.  R. 
A.  23s;  McCann  v.  State,  13  S.  & 
M.  (Miss.)  471,  497  (denial  of 
name)  ;  Reg.  v.  Miller,  18  Cox  Cr. 
Cas.  54;  Commonwealth  v.  Johnson, 
162  Pa.  St.  63,  29  Atl.  280;  Wilson 
V.  United  States,  162  U.  S.  613,  40  L. 
ed.  1090,  16  Sup.  Ct.  895 ;  Hamilton 
V.  State,  62  Ark.  543,  36  S.  W.  1054; 
People  V.  Cuff,  122  Cal.  589,  55  Pac. 
407;  People  V.  Moran,  144  Cal.  48. 
77  Pac.  777;  State  v.  Jennings,  48 
Ore.  483,  87  Pac.  524,  89  Pac.  421  ; 
VanWyk  v.  People  (Colo.,  1909),  99 
Pac.  1009;  Logan  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  29  S.  W.  632,  16  Ky.  L.  508: 
State  V.  Benner,  64  Me.  267;  State  v. 
Lambert  (Me.,  1908),  71  Atl.  1092. 


215  CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT.  §    Il6 

quest,®  or  before  the  grand  jury,"  is  always  relevant  to  show  a 
consciousness  of  guilt.^  Such  evidence  would  seem  to  have  greater 
relevancy,  cogency  and  force  if  the  falsehoods  were  uttered  after 
their  author  knew  he  was  suspected  or  accused  than  before.  Ex- 
tra judicial  statements  by  the  accused  may  be  proved  and  their 
falsity  may  then  be  shown.  It  may  be  shown  that  when  he  was 
arrested  the  accused  made  false  statements  of  his  prior  where- 
abouts to  the  ofiEicer  who  arrested  him.  It  may  be  proved  that  the 
accused  gave  false  reasons  for  his  presence  in  the  town  where  the 
crime  was  perpetrated.^ 

Conscious  innocence  has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  fullest  reve- 
lation of  the  truth.  The  intentional  fabrication  of  false,  incon- 
sistent or  contradictory  explanations  of  suspicious  circumstances, 
or  the  employment  of  evasion,  equivocation  or  falsehood  to  divert 
or  stifle  inquiry  into  the  facts  connected  with  the  commission  of 
the  crime  or  with  the  connection  of  the  accused  with  it,  is  always 
relevant  and  proper,  for  it  may  with  reason  be  presumed  that  an 
evil  intention  prompted  the  effort  to  hide  the  truth. ^'^ 

The  false  statements  of  the  accused  may  be  proved  by  the  state, 
and  their  falsity  may  then  be  shown  in  various  ways.^^  In  the 
first  place  the  falsity  of  the  statements  may  be  shown  in  a  very 
satisfactory  and  convincing  manner  by  direct  proof  that  the  re- 

'  Hays  V.  State,  40  Md.  633  ;  Lovett  "  People  v.  Conroy,  97  N.  Y.  62,  80; 

V.  State,  60  Ga.  257,  260.  Cathcart    v.    Commonwealth,    37    Pa. 

^  State  V.    Brougliton,  7   Ired.    (N.  St.      108,      113;      Commonwealth     v. 

Car.)  96,  lor,  45  Am.  Dec.  507.  Twitchell,    i    Brew.    (Pa.)    551,    608; 

*  State  V.  Lambert  (Me.),  71  Atl.  Crawford  v.  State,  ri2  Ala.  i,  21  So. 
1092;  State  V.  Jennings,  48  Ore.  483,  214;  United  States  v.  Randall,  Deady 
87  Pac.  524,  89  Pac.  421.  So,  too,  it  (N.  S.)  524,  27  Fed.  Cas.  16118;  Reg. 
may  be  shown  that  the  accused  has  v.  Thomas,  9  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  376,  i  L. 
sworn  to  a  falsehood  in  an  affidavit  &  C.  313,  33  L.  J.  M.  C.  22,  9  L.  T. 
made  and  used  to  procure  a  continu-  (N.  S.)  488,  12  W.  R.  108;  State  v. 
ancc.  State  v.  Bishop,  98  N.  Car.  Lambert  (Me.,  1908),  71  Atl.  1092. 
773.  4  S.  E.  357.  But  it  is  only  when  "  People  v.  Arnold,  43  Mich.  303, 
the  statement  is  relevant  to  the  issue  5  N.  W.  385,  38  Am.  182;  Smith  v. 
that  it  can  be  proved.  Its  falsity  can-  State,  29  Fla.  408,  10  So.  894;  Reg.  v. 
not  be  shown  merely  for  the  purpose  Miller,  18  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  54;  Burton 
of  showing  he  perjured  himself.  Far-  v.  State,  T07  Ala.  108,  18  So.  284; 
rell  V.  People,  103  Til.  17:  P.urris  v.  People  v.  Evans  (Cal.,  1895),  41  Pac. 
State,  38  Ark.  22 t.  444. 

*  People    v.    Cuff,    122   Cal.    589,    55 
Pac.  407. 


§     117  CRIAIINAL    EVIDENCE.  2l6 

verse  of  the  facts  alleged  in  the  statements  is  true.  So,  the  falsity 
of  a  statement  or  explanation  may  be  brought  out  by  showing  that 
the  facts  stated  are  absolutely  inconsistent  and  irreconcilable  with 
other  facts  proved  or  admitted,  or  that  the  particular  statement  in 
question  is  contradicted  by  other  statements  made  by  the  prisoner, 
and  finally  by  the  inherent  improbability  of  the  facts  asserted  in 
the  false  statement.^' 

Testimony  that  the  accused  has  been  guilty  of  falsehood  must 
always  be  somewhat  intrinsically  unreliable.  As  in  the  analogous 
cases  of  admissions  and  incriminating  conduct,  its  force  depends 
largely  upon  the  temperament,  education,  experience  and  habits 
of  life  and  business  of  the  prisoner.  If  the  evidence  of  the  alleged 
falsehood  is  not  satisfactory  to  the  jury  it  is  entitled  to  no  weight. 
That  the  accused  has  lied  should  be  established  beyond  cavil,  as 
it  is  only  circumstantial  and  collateral  to  the  main  issue.^' 

If  it  shall  be  proved  to  the  reasonable  satisfaction  of  the  jury 
that  statements  made  by  the  accused  of  material  facts  indicating 
clearly  his  guilt  th'e  jury  are  justified  in  discrediting  all  his  testi- 
mony.^* 

§  117.  Demeanor  subsequent  to  crime. — The  movements,  appear- 
ance and  bearing  of  the  accused  and  his  behavior  when  charged 
with  a  crime  or  confronted  with  the  consequences  or  with  the 
scene  or  the  surroundings  of  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged 
are  always  relevant.^^  So  the  conduct  of  the  prisoner  wdien  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  arrest  him.  shortly  after  the  commission  of  the 
offense,  was  properly  allowed  to  be  proved  to  show  his  criminal 

"  Burrill  on  Cir.  Ev.,  pt.  2,  ch.   i,  "  State  v.  Williams,  27  Vt.  724,  726 ; 

p.  491.    "Truth  is  the  reliance  of  in-  Weightnovel  v.    State,  46  Fla.    i,  35 

nocence.     Falsehood  is  the  resort  of  So.  856. 

crime.     All  true  facts  are  consistent  "  People  v.  Jackson,  182  N.  Y.  66; 

with  each  other.     If  the  prisoner  is  74  N.  E.  565. 

innocent  there  is  no  reason  for  with-  ^  Handline   v.   State,   6  Tex.   App. 

holding  a  true  fact.    Still  less  is  there  347 ;  State  v.  Hill,  134  Mo.  663,  36  S. 

for  uttering  a   falsehood.    Falsehood  W.  223;   People  v.  Weber,   149  Cal. 

is  evidence  of  crime.   Every  falsehood  325,    86    Pac.    671 ;    Knight    v.    State 

uttered    by   way    of    exculpation    be-  CTex.  Cr.  App.,  1909),  116  S.  W.  56; 

comes  an  article  of  circumstantial  ev-  Maddox  v.  State  (Ala.,  1909),  48  So. 

idence  of  greater  or  less  inculpatory  689. 
force."    State  v.  Benner,  64  Me.  267, 
285. 


217 


CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT. 


117 


intent.^"  It  may  be  shown  that  shortly  after  the  crime  he  drank  to 
excess/^  or  was  very  nervous,  worried/*  excited/^  mentally  pre- 
occupied,-*^ and  manifested  fear  and  turned  pale  on  being  arrested 
for  the  crime  f^  or,  while  in  custody,  that  he  attempted  suicide, '- 
or  showed  a  lack  of  feeling  as  the  result  of  a  homicide  with  which 
he  is  charged,  when,  from  his  near  relation  to  the  deceased,  the 
manifestation  of  great  and  sorrowful  emotion  would  naturally  be 
expected.  And  it  is  not  material  whether  the  movements  or  con- 
duct of  the  accused  after  the  crime,  which  are  proved  to  connect 
him  with  it,  are  or  are  not  of  part  of  the  res  gestcc  of  the  crime 
itself.^' 

It  cannot  be  shown  that  the  accused  refused  to  allow  his  house 
to  be  searched  without  a  warrant  as  his  insistence  upon  an  un- 
doubted constitutional  right  is  a  circumstance  perfectly  consistent 
with  innocence.^* 


"  State  V.  Jones,  118  La.  369,  42  So. 
967. 

"People  V.  O'Neill,  112  N.  Y.  355, 
363,  19  N.  E.  796,  aff'g  49  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  422,4  N.  Y.  S.  119. 

^'  State  V.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  194,  17 
Atl.  483 ;  State  v.  Bradley,  64  Vt.  466, 
470,  24  Atl.  1053. 

"  Miller  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  232 ; 
Prince  v.  State,  100  Ala.  144,  14  So. 
409,  411,  46  Am.  St.  28. 

"°  Xoftsinger  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 
30T. 

"  State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  12, 
12  Pac.  318;  Williams  v.  State  (Ark., 
1891),  16  S.  W.  816,  818;  Lindsay  v. 
People,  63  N.  Y.  143;  State  v.  Nash, 
7  Iowa  347;  Bollen  v.  State,  48  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  70,  86  S.  W.  1025.  Under 
certain  circumstances  it  may  be 
proved  that  an  accomplice  of  the  ac- 
cused on  trial  had  attempted  to  com- 
mit suicide.  It  must  be  shown  that 
the  accused  either  advised  or  knew 
of  the  suicidal  intention  of  his  ac- 
complice. Proof  that  the  accused 
had  expressly  advised  the  suicide  and 
had  supplied  or  attempted  to  supply 


the  means  for  the  accomplishment  of 
this  end  when  both  were  in  jail  is 
conclusive  of  his  connection  with  it 
and  furnishes  a  sufficient  basis  for  its 
admission  as  evidence.  People  v.  Pat- 
rick, 182  N.  Y.  131,  74  N.  E.  843. 

"^  State  v.  Jaggers  (N.  J.,  1904),  58 
Atl.  1014. 

"-^  Greenfield  v.  People,  85  N.  Y.  75, 
86,  39  Am.  636.  Such  evidence  is  not 
admissible  if  it  refers  to  a  date  sev- 
eral months  after  the  death.  State  v. 
Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  12  Pac.  318. 

^'''Murdock  v.  State,  68  Ala.  567. 
"Such  indications  are  by  no  means 
conclusive  and  must  depend  upon  the 
mental  characteristics  of  individuals. 
Innocent  persons,  appalled  by  a 
charge  of  crime,  will  sometimes  ex- 
hibit great  weakness  and  terror.  Per- 
sons under  a  great  weight  of  sorrow 
will  sometimes  manifest  the  greatest 
composure  and  serenity  and  shed  no 
tears."  Greenfield  v.  People,  85  N. 
Y.  75,  86,  39  Am.  636.  Cf.  People  v. 
Giancoli,  74  Cal.  642,  644,  16  Pac. 
510;  also,  Liles  v.  State,  30  Ala.  24, 
25,  68  Am.  Dec.  108. 


§    Il8  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  2l8 

But  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  threw  his  hands  behind 
him  and  drew  a  pistol  at  the  time  of  his  arrest.''*^  So  it  may  be 
shown  that  the  accused,  when  he  was  arrested,  was  pale  and  was 
trembling  greatly  and  appeared  as  though  he  w^ould  fall  to  the 
ground."'^ 

It  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  w'rote  to  the  prosecutor  offer- 
ing to  take  a  whipping  if  he  w^ould  let  him  off,""  or  that  he  offered 
to  pay  money  to  stifle  the  investigation  or  prosecution  of  the 
crime  of  which  he  is  suspected."'  The  rule  excluding  evidence  of 
compromises  in  civil  suits  does  not  apply  to  criminal  proceed- 
ings."^ 

§  118.  The  flight  or  attempted  escape  of  the  accused. — The  at- 
tempts of  the  accused  to  escape  while  confined  in  jail  may  be 
shown  as  circumstances  proper  to  be  considered,  and  to  be  given 
such  weight  as  they  are  fairly  entitled  to,  with  the  other  evidence, 
in  determining  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  accused.  The  prosecu- 
tion may  show  by  questions  put  to  the  accused  on  his  cross-exami- 
nation,-'' or  by  other  witnesses,  that  he  had  attempted  flight,  or 
that  he  had,  by  concealment  or  by  other  means, ^^  attempted  to 

"*a  Glass  V.  State,  147  Ala.  50,  41  So.  Neb.    402,   95   N.    W.    1014 ;    State  v. 

727   (homicide).  Taylor,  70  Vt.  i,  39  Atl.  447,  67  Am. 

■^  Bain  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Crim.  App.  St.   648,   42    L.    R.   A.    67311 ;    United 

96,  79  S.  W.  814.  States  v.  Greene,  146  Fed.  803.     See 

When   recent   possession   of    stolen  Eliott's  Ev.,  §  2724. 

goods   admissible  to  show  conscious-  ^°  Jamison  v.  People,  145  111.  357,  34 

ness  of  guilt,  Elliott's  Ev.,  §  2725.  N.  E.  486;  Fox  v.  People,  95  111.  71; 

"°  State  V.  De  Berry,  92  N.  Car.  800,  State  v.   Moore,   loi   Mo.   316,   14   S. 

801.  W.   182;   Clarke  v.  State,  8  Crim.  L. 

"'  State  V.  Soper,  16  Me.  293,  295,  33  Mag.  19 ;  People  v.  Petmecky,  2  N. 
Am.  Dec.  665 ;  Sanders  v.  State,  148  Y.  Cr.  450 ;  McCann  v.  State,  13  S. 
Ala.  603,  41  So.  466;  State  v.  Wide-  &  M.  (Miss.)  471,  475;  Common- 
man,  68  S.  Car.  119,  46  S.  E.  769;  wealth  v.  Brigham,  147  Mass.  414,  18 
State  V.  Farr  (R.  I.,  1908),  69  N.  E.  167;  Burris  v.  State,  38  Ark. 
Atl.  5.  221;  State  v.  Lambert  (Me.  1908),  71 

"^  Cf.  State  V.  Wright,  48  La.  Ann.  Atl.    1092 ;    Shumway  v.    State    ( Neb. 

1525,  21  So.  160.  1908),    117   N.    W.   407;   Kennedy  v. 

-'Ryan    v.    People,   79   N.    Y.   593;  State,   71    Neb.    765,   99   N.    W.  645; 

Manning  v.  State,  79  Wis.  178,  48  N.  State  v.   Baird,  13  Idaho  29,  88  Pac. 

W.  209;  Bell  V.  State,  115  Ala.  25,  22  233;  Carr  v.  State,  45  Fla.  11,  34  So. 

So.  526;  State  V.  Davis,  6  Idaho  159,  892;  State  v.  Rodgers   (Mont.,  1909), 

53    Pac.    678;    Williams   v.    State,   69  106  Pac.  3. 


219 


CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT. 


Il8 


escape  from  arrest  or  custody;"^  that  he  had  offered  a  bribe  to 
procure  his  escape,^-  that  he  had  requested  a  fellow  prisoner  or 
some  other  person  to  bring  him  tools  for  that  purpose,^^  or  that 
he  was  actually  in  possession  of  such  tools, ^*  and  that  the  accused 
have  fled  and  subsequently  been  arrested  out  of  the  state  then 
denied  his  identity,  s,ave  an  assumed  name  and  refused  to  return 


''  Allen  V.  United  States,  164  U.  S. 
492,  41  L.  ed.  528,  17  S.  Ct.  154;  State 
V.  Chase,  68  Vt.  405,  35  Atl.  336; 
State  V.  Evans,  138  Mo.  116,  39  S. 
W.  462,  60  Am.  St.  549;  McBride  v. 
People,  5  Colo.  App.  91,  37  Pac.  953; 
Anderson  v.  State,  104  Ind.  467,  472, 
4  N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  711;  State  v. 
Howell,  117  ]\Io.  307,  23  S.  W. 
263 ;  State  v.  Minard,  96  Iowa  267, 
65  X.  W.  147;  Williams  v.  State, 
24  Tex.  App.  17,  32,  5  S.  W.  655, 
658;  People  V.  Ogle,  104  N.  Y. 
511,  II  X.  E.  53,  4  N.  Y.  Cr.  349; 
Elmore  v.  State,  98  Ala.  12,  13  So. 
427;  State  V.  Harris,  48  La.  Ann. 
1 189,  20  So.  729;  State  V.  Palmer, 
65  X.  H.  216,  20  Atl.  6;  Ryan  v. 
State,  83  Wis.  486,  53  X.  W.  836; 
State  V.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa  268,  19 
X'.  W.  202;  Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 
Mahon,  145  Pa.  St.  413,  22  Atl.  971 ; 
State  V.  Foster,  136  Mo.  653,  38  S. 
W.  721 ;  Ryan  v.  People,  79  X.  Y. 
593;  People  v.  Ashmead,  118  Cal. 
508,  50  Pac.  681 ;  State  v.  Garrison, 
147  Mo.  548,  49  S.  W.  508;  State  v. 
Lambert  (Me.  1908),  71  Atl.  1092; 
State  V.  Marks,  70  S.  Car.  448,  50  S. 
E.  14;  State  V.  Wills,  106  Mo.  App. 
196,  80  S.  W.  311;  George  v.  State,  61 
Xeb.  669,  85  X.  W.  840;  Woodruff 
V.  State,  72  X'^eb.  815,  loi  X.  W. 
II 14;  State  V.  Ralston  Clowa,  1908), 
116  X.  W.  1058;  Andrews  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.  1904),  83  S.  W.  188; 
Commonwealth  v.  Bezck,  168  Pa.  St. 
603,  32   Atl.    109;   Commonwealth   v. 


]\IcManiman,  27  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  304; 
Allen  V.  State,  146  Ala.  61,  41  So.  624; 
Bolton  V.  State,  40  So.  409,  146  Ala. 
691,  without  opinion;  State  v.  Death- 
erage,  35  Wash.  326,  77  Pac.  504; 
Sherrill  v.  State,  138  Ala.  3,  35  So. 
129;  Dickey  v.  State,  86  Miss.  525,  38 
So.  776;  State  V.  Paisley,  36  Mont. 
237,  92  Pac.  566;  State  v.  Chase,  68 
Vt.  405,  35  Atl.  336;  Brown  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1909),  124  S.  W.  loi. 

^^Whaley  v.  State,  11  Ga.  123,  127. 
A  letter  written  by  the  accused  in 
which  he  states  that  the  prosecution 
means  to  send  him  to  prison,  but  that 
this  could  never  be  done,  as  he  meant 
to  break  jail,  is  competent.  Brad- 
ford V.  State,  147  Ala.  95,  41  So.  462. 
The  state  may  always  be  permitted  to 
prove  what  was  done  by  the  sheriff 
or  other  officer  to  ascertain  the 
whereabouts  of  the  accused  where  it 
appears  he  has  taken  flight.  Bennett 
V.  State,  47  Tex.  Crim.  App.  52,  81 
S.  W.  30.  But  in  the  absence  of 
proof  of  flight  on  the  part  of  the 
accused  it  is  improper  to  admit  evi- 
dence that  a  statutory  reward  for  the 
arrest  of  the  accused  was  claimed  and 
paid.  Boykin  v.  State,  89  Miss.  19, 
42  So.  601. 

^^  State  v.  Jackson,  95  Mo.  623,  8 
S.  W.  749;  People  V.  Petmecky,  2  X. 
Y.  Cr.  450. 

•■"^  State  V.  Duncan,  T16  Mo.  288,  22 
S.  W.  699;  Clark  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.  1896),  32  S.  W.  131,  17  Ky.  L. 
540. 


§     Il8  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  220 

without  a  requisition.'""  The  ilight  of  the  accused  after  the  crime 
cannot  be  proved  against  another  person  who  was  not  actually  im- 
plicated in  aiding  or  procuring  the  flight.^®  Nor  can  the  flight  of 
a  third  person,  whose  connection  with  the  crime  does  not  appear, 
be  proved  to  show  that  the  third  person  committed  it.^' 

An  attempt  by  a  prisoner  in  jail  awaiting  trial  for  two  distinct 
crimes  to  escape  is  not  relevant  to  show  that  he  is  guilty  of  either. 
It  may  be  impossible  to  determine  which  charge  he  fled,  or  at- 
tempted to  flee,  to  avoid. ^-  He  may  have  fled  because  conscious 
that  he  was  guilty  of  the  one  for  which  he  is  not  ofi  trial. 

It  may  usually  be  shown  by  proving  the  declarations  or  conduct 
of  the  accused  before  the  crime  that  he  was  preparing  for  leaving 
town.  The  evidence  of  preparations  for  departure  from  the  scene 
of  the  subsequent  crime  must  not  be  too  remote  in  point  of  time. 
Preparations  on  the  day  of  the  crime  or  on  the  day  before  are 
competent,  particularly  when  it  is  apparent  from  the  other  evi- 
dence that  the  accused  had  the  commission  of  the  crime  in  con- 
templation as  where  he  has  made  threats  that  he  will  commit  the 
crime. ^^ 

It  cannot  with  correctness  be  said  that  the  flight  or  the  at- 
tempted flight  of  the  accused  before  his  arrest,  taken  alone,  raises 
a  legal  presumption  of  guilt  that  an  inference  of  guilt  nuist  be 
drawn  therefrom, *°  or  that  his  flight,  ivithout  regard  to  the  mo- 

^  Johnson  v.  State,  120  Ga.  135,  47  ^'  People  v.   ]\IcKeon.   19   X.  Y.    S. 

S.  E.  510.  486,  487. 

^' People  V.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113,  118,  ^^  Hocker  v.  Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

17  Am.  401;   State  v.  Ruby,  61  Iowa  in  S.  W.  676,  2ii  Ky.  L.  944;  Teague 

86,   15   N.   W.  848.     But  on  the  trial  v.  State,  120  Ala.  309,  25  So.  209. 

of  the  accessory  evidence  of  the  con-  *"  In  Ryan  v.  People,  79  X.  Y.  593, 

cealment  and  flight  of  a  principal  not  19  Hun  {X.  Y.)   188,  the  court  said: 

yet  convicted  is  admissible  to  estab-  "The    evidence    that    the    defendant 

lish  the  guilt  of  the  principal.     State  made   an   effort   to  keep   out   of    the 

V.  Rand,  Z2i  ^'-  H.  216;  Cummins  v.  way  of   the   sheriff  was   very  slight, 

People,  42  Mich.    142,   143,  3   N.  W.  if  any  evidence  of  guilt.     There  are 

305;   IMcIntyre  v.  State    (Tex.  1895),  so   many    reasons    for   such    conduct, 

2,:^    S.  W.  347;    People   v.   Cleveland,  consistent     with     innocence,     that     it 

107   Mich.  367,  65   N.   W.   216.      See  scarcely  comes  up  to  the  standard  of 

contra.  Smith  v.  People,  38  Colo.  509,  evidence    tending    to    establish    guilt, 

88  Pac.  453.  but    this    and    similar    evidence    has 

'"  Owensby  v.    State,  82   Ala.   63,  2  been    allowed    upon    the    theory    that 

So.  764.  the  jury  will  give  it  such  weight  as  it 


221  COXSCIOUSXESS    OF    GUILT.  §    Il8 

tiz'c  idiich  prompted  it,  is,  in  law,  proof  of  guilt.  At  the  most 
it  is  only  one  of  a  series  of  circumstances  to  be  considered  by  the 
jury  with  the  reasons  that  prompted  it,  tending  to  show  guilt  or 
by  which  an  inference  of  guilt  may  be  raised,*^  and  it  has  no 
probative  force  unless  it  satisfactorily  appears  that  the  accused 
fled  to  avoid  arrest  or  imprisonment  for  the  crime  charged. 
Even  then,  its  force  is  slight,  depending  on  the  efforts  made,  the 
means  employed,  and  the  motives  and  knowledge  by  which  the 
act  was  accompanied.  The  departure  of  the  accused  may  have 
been  prompted  by  motives  consistent  with  innocence.  He  may 
have  feared  arrest  for  a  crime  totally  distinct  from  that  for  which 
he  is  indicted,  or  he  ma}^  have  apprehended  violence  at  the  hands 
of  the  police.  /\n  officer  who  goes  on  the  witness  stand  to  prove 
that  the  accused  has  left  the  state  may  state  how  long  he  has  been 
looking  for  the  accused,  may  relate  the  steps  he  has  taken  to 
ascertain  his  whereabouts  and  may  testify  to  the  answers  to  the 
inquiries  made  by  him.  But  all  this  evidence  is  only  competent 
where  the  officer  is  seeking  to  arrest  him  for  the  crime  for  which 
the  accused  is  actually  being  tried.  If  the  pursuit  of  the  officer 
has  for  its  object  an  arrest  for  another  crime  any  evidence  of  the 
officers  as  to  the  length  or  character  of  the  pursuit  or  as  to  its  in- 
cidents and  circumstances  is  inadmissible.*^  It  is  unnecessary  in 
proving  incidents  connected  with  the  flight  of  the  accused,  to 
produce  the  witness  who  actually  met  him  away  from  home.     It 

deserves,    depending    upon    the    sur-  Wash.    444,    74    Pac.    588;    Smith    v. 

rounding     circumstances."       To     the  State,   106  Ga.  673,  32   S.  E.  851,  71 

same    effect,    see,    Alberty   v.    United  Am.    St.   286;   Svveatt  v.    State    (Ala. 

States,  162  U.  S.  499,  40  L.  ed.  1051,  1908),  47  So.   194.     Flight,  if  shown, 

16  Sup.  Ct.  864;  United  States  v.  is  not  conclusive,  nor  does  it  raise  a 
Greene,  146  Fed.  803.  legal  presumption  of  guilt,  but  is  to 

"  Hickory  v.  United  States,  160  U.  be    given    the    weight    to    which    the 

S.   408,   40    L.    ed.   474,    16    Sup.    Ct.  jury  think  it  entitled,  under  the  cir- 

327;   State  V.   Rodman,  62  Iowa  456,  cumstances    shown.      In   this   conncc- 

17  N.  W.  663;  State  v.  Brooks,  92  tion  they  may  take  into  consideration 
Mo.  542,  5  S.  W.  257,  330;  Starr  v.  the  defendant's  age,  intelligence  and 
United  States,  164  U.  S.  627,  41  L.  financial  ability  to  make  a  defense, 
ed.  577,  17  Sup.  Ct.  223;  People  v.  United  States  v.  Greene,  146  Fed. 
Giancoli,   74   Cal.    642,    644,    16   Pac.  803. 

510;  Sylvester  v.  Slate,  71  Ala.  17,  ''People  v.  Vidal,  T2i  Cal.  221,  53 
26,  72  .'Ma.  20T,  206;  Fo.x  v.  People,  Pac.  558;  Bennett  v.  State,  47  Tc.x. 
95    111.   71,    76;    State    v.    Stentz,    zz     Cr.  App.  52,  81  S.  VV.  30. 


S  119  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  222 

is  permissible  for  one  who  has  made  a  search  for  the  accused  to 
testify  that  he  inquired  in  various  places  and  was  told  by  persons 
there  that  the  accused  was  not  there  or  that  he  was  there  and 
was  traveling-  under  an  assumed  name.  Indeed,  the  one  who 
has  done  the  searching  may  testify  to  what  anybody  told  him 
of  the  whereabouts  of  the  accused  over  the  objection  that  such 
evidence  is  hearsay/^ 

§  119.  Explanation  by  accused  of  his  flight  or  attempted  escape. — 
The  escape  or  attempt  of  the  accused  to  escape  from  actual  incar- 
ceration is  never  conclusive  evidence  of  guilt.  It  depends  upon  his 
motive.  His  actions  may  have  arisen  from  a  consciousness  of 
guilt,  the  fear  of  trial  and  the  dread  of  punishment.  But  it  is 
equally  probable  that  they  may  have  been  prompted  by  the  fear 
that,  though  innocent,  his  property  will  make  it  impossible  for 
him  to  defend  himself,**  or,  being  unable  to  give  bail,  and  suffer- 
ing from  illness,  he  may  seek  liberty  in  order  to  avoid  the  dis- 
comforts and  privations  of  imprisonment/ ° 

The  evidence  of  flight  or  escape  should  go  to  the  jury,  who  are 
the  sole  judges  of  its  weight  and  sufficiency,**'  and  of  the  motives 
which  prompted  the  flight.*^  It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  ac- 
cused actually  anticipated  an  immediate  arrest  at  the  moment  of 
his  escape.*^  But  the  mere  fact  that  the  accused  left  the  county 
is  not  relevant  if  it  is  not  shown  prima  facie  that  he  did  so  to 
avoid  arrest,*'*  and  the  motives  of  his  departure  may  be  inferred 

*^  People  V.  Colmey,  188  N.  Y.  573,  25,   19  So.  403;   Miller  v.   State,   no 

80  N.  E.  1 1 15.  Ala.  69,  20  So.  392;  White  v.   State, 

** United  States  v.  Greene,  146  Fed.  iii  Ala.  92,  21  So.  330;  Ryan  v.  Peo- 

803.  pie,  79  N.   Y.  593,  19  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

*"  State  V.  Mallon,  75  Mo.  355.   The  188;   Fox  v.   People,  95   111.   71,   77; 

character  of  the  offense  ought  to  be  State  v.  Baircl,   13  Idaho  29,  88  Pac. 

considered  in  determining  the  motives  233;   Evans  v.   State    (Tex.  Cr.   App. 

that   prompted  the  flight.     An  inno-  1903),  76  S.  W.  467;  State  v.  Adams 

cent  man  accused  of  a  capital  crime  (Del.),  65  Atl.  510;  United  States  v. 

may   flee   or   attempt   to    break    jail,  Greene,  146  Fed.  803. 

while,  if  the  charge  involved  a  mis-  "  Elmore  v.  State,  98  Ala.  12,  13  So. 

demeanor    only,    he   may   be   willing,  427. 

though    innocent,   to   stand   trial   and  *^  State  v.  Frederic,  69  Me.  400,  403. 

be  punished  if  convicted.  *°  State  v.  King,  78  Mo.  555 ;  State 

« Garden   v.    State,   84   Ala.   417,   4  v.    Marshall,    115  Mo.   383,  22  S.  W. 

So.  823;   Thomas   v.   State,    109  Ala.  452,  453. 


223 


CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT. 


119 


from  the  circumstances  of  his  flight/''''  The  means  used  to 
escape  may  be  shown  circumstantially,^^  and,  where  the  absence 
of  the  accused  is  shown,  inquiries  made  for  him  at  his  abode  or 
usual  places  of  resort  at  home  or  abroad,  by  police  officers  or 
others,  with  the  answers  given,  may  be  received  as  an  excep- 
tion to  the  hearsay  rule.^" 

The  accused  is  not  recjuired  to  explain  his  flight  or  conceal- 
ment by  evidence  proving  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  his 
motives  were  consistent  with  innocence.^^  The  fact  of  his  flight 
is  a  circumstance  whose  meaning  is  for  the  jury  alone  to  deter- 
mine, and  he  may  be  permitted  to  show  the  rectitude  of  his  mo- 
tives in  fleeing  to  enable  them  to  determine  its  meaning.^'*  He 
should  be  allowed  to  prove  that,  before  the  date  of  the  crime,  he 
had  intended  or  had  arranged  to  leave  the  state  i^'^  that  his  flight 
was  caused  by  threats^''  or  by  actual  mob  violence, ^^  if  he  fled 
so  soon  after  the  threats  coming  to  his  knowledge  as  to  show 
they  caused  it;^^  that  great  public  excitement  existed  in  the 
neighborhood  where  he  lived,   creating   apprehensions    of   vio- 


'°  Welch  V.  State,  104  Ind.  347,  353, 
3  N.  E.  850. 

"  State  V.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa  268, 
19  N.  W.  202. 

^People  V.  Ogle,  104  N.  Y.  511,  11 
N.  E.  53,  4  N.  Y.  Cr.  349;  Garden  v. 
State,  84  Ala.  417,  4  So.  823;  People 
V.  Fine,  77  Cal.  147,  19  Pac.  269; 
State  V.  Shipley,  171  Mo.  544,  74  S. 
W.  612;  State  V.  Lucey,  24  Mont. 
295,  61  Pac.  994. 

"^'Fox  V.  People,  95  111.  71. 

"  It  seems  that  where  there  is  no 
question  as  to  who  committed  the 
crime,  and  the  only  issue  is  the  degree 
of  the  ofifense,  the  accused  should 
not  be  allowed  to  explain  the  motives 
of  his  flight.  People  v.  Ah  Choy,  i 
Idaho  317.  See  also,  State  v.  Mel- 
ton, ^7  La.  Ann.  77. 

"  State  V.  Potter,  108  Mo.  424,  22 
S.  W.  89.     When  he  left  the  county 


immediately  after  the  crime  it  may 
be  shown,  to  illustrate  his  motive  in 
leaving  that,  prior  to  the  crime,  he 
had  entered  into  a  contract  which 
would  require  him  to  remain.  Welsh 
V.  State,  97  Ala.  i,  12  So.  275. 

^^  Lewallen  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  412,  26  S.  W.  832;  State  v.  Bar- 
ham,  82  Mo.  67;  Golden  v.  State,  25 
Ga.  527;  State  v.  Desmond,  109  Iowa 
72,  80  N.  W.  214. 

"'  State  V.  Griffin,  87  Mo.  608 ;  State 
V.  Brooks,  92  Mo.  542,  5  S.  W.  257, 
330;  Batten  v.  State,  80  Ind.  394; 
State  v.  Ma  Foo,  no  Mo.  7,  19  S.  W. 
222,  33  Am.  St.  414;  Arnold  v.  State, 
9  Tex.  App.  435.  Cf.  Kennedy  v. 
Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  447;  Brown 
v.  State,  88  Miss.  166,  40  So.  737. 

''State  v.  McDevitt,  69  Iowa  549, 
29  N.  W.  459. 


g    119  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  224 

lence  on  his  part;'^"  and  that  he  was  advised  or  warned  by  rela- 
tives and  friends  to  flee,*'"  because  his  life  was  menaced. 

But  evidence  to  show  that  the  accused  had  an  opportunity  to 
escape,  or  to  break  jail,  of  wdiich  he  did  not  avail  himself;"^  that 
he  surrendered  or  offered  to  surrender  himself  to  the  authori- 
ties,*'" or  telegraphed  to  the  sheriff  to  come  and  arrest  him,*'^  or 
when  arrested  out  of  the  jurisdiction  voluntarily  returned,*'*  is 
inadmissible  unless  perhaps  to  rebut  any  inference  of  guilt  which 
may  have  been  created  by  evidence  that  the  accused  has  fled.""' 
Such  actions  may  have  been  prompted  by  the  fear  of  recapture, 
or  by  his  confidence  that,  though  guilty,  he  would  be  acquitted 
because  of  the  ability  of  his  counsel,  the  insufficiency  of  the  evi- 
dence against  him,  or  through  the  employment  of  bribery,  or 
perjury  or  political  or  social  influence.*'*'  Where  it  is  proved  by 
the  prosecution  that  the  accused  ran  aw^ay  after  he  had  committed 

^^  State    V.    Phillips,    24    Mo.    475;  S.  W.  452;  People  v.  Cleveland,  107 

Brown  v.  State,  88  INIiss.  166,  40  So.  Mich.   367,   65    N.    W.  216;    Cole   v. 

737-  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  App.  225,  75  S.  W. 

•^^  State  V.  Moncia,  39  La.  Ann.  868,  527;   Pate  v.   State,   150  Ala.    10,   43 

2  So.  814;  Walters  v.  State,  17  Tex.  So.  343;  Walker  v.  State,  139  Ala.  56, 

App.    226,    50    Am.    128;    Arnold    v.  35  So.  loii;  Walker  v.  State,  13  Tex. 

State,    9   Tex.   App.   435.      See    Sim-  App.    618;    Upton   v.    State,   48  Tex. 

mons  V.  State  (Ala.  1909),  48  So.  606.  Cr.   App.   289,  88   S.   W.   212;    State 

*"  State    V.    Wilkins,    66   Vt.    i,   28  v.   Moncia,   39   La.   Ann.  868,   2    So. 

Atl.     323;     People    V.     Rathbun,     21  814;  State  v.  Taylor,  134  Mo.  109,  35 

Wend.  (X.  Y.)  509,  518,  519;  People  S.  W.  92;    State  v.   Smith,   114  Mo. 

V.    Montgomery,    53    Cal.    576,    578;  406,  21    S.  W.  827;   Barnett  v.   State 

Johnson  v.  State,  94  Ala.  35,  10  So.  (Ala.,  1909),  51  So.  299. 

667;   Delaney  v.   State,   148  Ala.   586,  »' Walker  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  618, 

42    So.    815 ;    Gardiner    v.    People,    6  643. 

Park.    Cr.    (X.    Y.)    155;    People    v.  **  State  v.  Taylor,   134  Mo.    109,  35 

Curtiss,   118  App.  Div.    (N.  Y.)   259,  S.  W.  92.    Cf.  State  v.  Good,  132  Mo. 

103  N.  Y.  S.  395;  Thomas  v.   State,  fi4,  33   S.  W.  790;  United   States  v. 

47  Fla.  99,  36  So.   161;  Lingerfelt  v.  Crow,    i    Bond    (U.    S.)    51,  25  Fed. 

State,  125  Ga.  4,  53  S.  E.  803;  State  Cas.  14895. 

V.  Wilcox,  132  N.  Car.  1120,  44  S.  E.  ^^  See  Brown  v.  State,  150  Ala.  25, 

625;  Commonwealth  v.  Hersey,  2  Al-  43    So.    194.     But   see  contra,   Craw- 

len   (Mass.)    173;  State  v.  Bickle,  53  ford  v.  United  States,  30  App.  D.  C.  i. 

W.  Va.  597,  45  S.  E.  917 ;  Harvey  v.  "'''  Defendant    cannot    be    permitted 

State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  545,  34  S.  W.  to    prove    that    his    conduct    in    jail 

623;  Jones  v.  State  (Ga.  1909),  63  S.  since  his  arrest  has  been  good.     State 

E.  1 1 14;  Jenkins  v.  State  (Fla.,  I909)»  v.  Fontcnot,  48  La.  Ann.  305,   19  So. 

50  So.  582.  iii;  Hill  V.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

"State  V.  }ilarshall,  115  'Slo.  383,  22  415,  35  S.  W.  660. 


225  CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT.  §    IIQa 

a  murderous  assault  it  is  proper  to  prove  that  the  accused  went 
to  the  house  of  the  witness  to  whom  the  accused  then  surrendered 
himself  and  by  whom  he  was  then  taken  to  the  sheriff.*'^  Nor 
can  the  accused  be  permitted,  unless  his  flight  is  shown  in  the 
first  instance,  to  testify  that  he  left  the  country  because  he  was 
too  poor  to  make  a  proper  defense.®'^ 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  illustrations  that  the  defendant 
cannot  be  permitted  to  manufacture  evidence  in  his  own  favor. 
Further  illustrations  may  be  found  in  the  court  refusing  to  permit 
the  defendant  to  show  that  he  appeared  surprised  or  astonished 
when  accused  of  having  committed  a  cpime,''^  or  that  he  behaved 
himself  in  an  orderly  manner  when  in  jail."^  And  while  evidence 
that  the  accused  offered  to  compromise  the  matter  is  always  rele- 
vant, he  will  not  be  allowed  to  show  that  he  refused  to  compro- 
mise."'^ So.  evidence  in  a  case  of  homicide  that  after  the  ac- 
cused had  inflicted  the  mortal  wound,  he  endeavored  to  aid  the 
deceased  or  went  to  procure  a  physician  for  him,  has  been  re- 
jected.'^ 

§  119a,    Declarations  which  are  self-serving  are  rejected. — The 

statements  or  declarations  of  the  accused  in  his  own  favor  which 
are  independent  of  the  res  gestcc  of  the  crime  and  which  are 
simply  narrative  in  their  character  are  not  relevant  as  a  part  of 
his  defense.'" 

"Allen  V.  State,  146  Ala.  61,  41  So.  So.  loii ;  Linnehan  v.  State,  120  Ala. 

624.  293,   25    So.    6;    Hill    V.    State    (Ala. 

^'aToliver  v.  State,  94  Ala.  iii,   10  1908),   46   So.   864;    ]\IcCoy  v.    State, 

So.  428.     The  appeal  bond  of  the  ac-  46  Ark.    141 ;   People   v.    Rodley,   131 

cused   and    its   forfeiture   are  admis-  Cal.  240,  63  Pac.  351 ;  People  v.  Tay- 

sible    to    prove    his    flight.      State   v.  lor,    4    Cal.    App.    31,    87    Pac.    215; 

Wingfield,  34   La.   Ann.    1200;    Gille-  State  v.   Swift,  57  Conn.  496,  18  Atl. 

land  V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  524,  7  S.  664 ;  West  v.  State,  53  Fla.  JJ,  43  So. 

W.  24T.  445;  Park  V.  State,  126  Ga.  575,  55  S. 

**  Campbell  v.  State,  23  Ala.  44.  E.    489;    Sullivan   v.    State,    loi    Ga. 

*  State   V.    Fontenot,    48    La.    Ann.  800,  29  S.  E.  16 ;  Carle  v.  People,  200 

305,  19  So.  I  IT.  111.  494,  66  N.  E.  32,  93  Am.  St.  208; 

™  Williams  v.  State,  52  Ala.  411.  Spittorff  v.  State,   108  Tnd.  171,  8  N. 

"  State  V.  Whitson,  III  N.  Car.  695,  E.  911;    State    v.    SchafFer,   70   Iowa 

16  S.  E.  332;  State  v.  Strong,  153  Mo.  371,  30  N.  W.  639;  State  v.  Gillespie, 

548,  55  S.  W.  78.  62  Kan.  469,  63  Pac.  742,  84  Am.  St. 

^"Walker  v.   State,  139   Ala.   56,  35  411;    Commonwealth    v.    Cosseboom, 

15 — U.VDERHILL    CkIM.    Ev. 


§    I20  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  226 

An  exception,  however,  is  made  where  the  prosecution  intro- 
duces in  evidence  declarations  of  the  accused  which  tend  to  in- 
criminate him.  The  accused  may  then  introduce  that  portion  of 
the  conversation  of  which  these  declarations  form  a  part  which 
relates  or  is  connected  with  wdiat  the  accused  said  in  the  first  in- 
stance, though  it  may  be  partly  or  wholly  in  his  favor.'"  A  part 
of  the  conversation  may  be  proved  by  one  witness  and  a  part  by 
another  witness  if  the  parts  thus  proved  form  a  connected  whole 
and  have  a  legitimate  bearing  on  the  statement  of  the  accused, ''* 

It  has  been  held  that  the  accused  shall  not  be  permitted  to 
prove  that  he  requested  or  demanded  to  be  taken  before  the  de- 
ceased for  identification  f^  that  he  had  declared  he  had  done  noth- 
ing wrong  and  w-anted  to  come  to  court  and  stand  his  trial, '^*'  or 
that,  being  charged  with  a  homicide,  he  stated  after  the  crime  that 
he  had  fired  the  first  shot  into  a  ditch  on  the  banks  of  "which  the 
crime  was  committed."'  But  the  accused  may,  however,  prove  that 
he  denied  an  accusation  of  crime  made  in  his  presence  and 
hearing. 

§  120.  Resistance  to  arrest. — An  innocent  person  has  nothing  to 
fear  from  an  arrest,  except  perhaps  the  inconvenience  of  the 
situation  and  the  often  unpleasant  notoriety  connected  with  it. 
Even  if  he  be  ill-supplied  with  means  to  secure  his  acquittal  when 
tried,  the  evidence  against  him  may  be  so  intrinsically  weak  that 

155  Mass.  298,  29  X.   E.  463;    State  Morrow     v.     State,     48     Ind.     432; 

V.  Long,  201  Mo.  664,  100  S.  W.  587;  Paulson    v.    State,    118    Wis.    89,    94 

State  V.  Speyer,  194  Mo.  459,  91  S.  W.  N.    W.     771 ;     State    v.     Napier,    65 

1075 ;  Smith  v.  State,  61  Neb.  296,  85  Mo.  462 ;    State  v.    Patterson,   63   N. 

N.  W.  49;  M'Kee  v.  People,  36  N.  Y.  Car.    520;    Lowry  v.    State,    53    Tex. 

113,  3  Abb.  Pr.  N.   S.  216,  34  How.  Cr.  App.  562,  no  S.  W.  911;  Rogers 

Pr.  (N.  Y.)  230;  State  v.  Ward,  103  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  404,  9  S.  W. 

N.    Car.  419,  8   S.   E.   814 ;   Rudy   v.  762 ;    State    v.    Mahon,    32    Vt.    241 ; 

Commonwealth,    128    Pa.    St.   500,    18  Fertig  v.   State,  100  Wis.  301,  75  N. 

Atl.  344;  State  V.  Green,  61   S.   Car.  W.  960. 

12,  39  S.  E.  185 ;  Colquit  v.  State,  107  '*  Fertig  v.   State,  100  Wis.  301,  75 

Tenn.   381,   64   S.    W.   713 ;    State  v.  N.  W.  960. 

Leuhrsman,  123  Iowa  476,  99  N.  W.  '°  Walker  v.   State,  139  Ala.  56,  35 

T40;  Glover  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  So.  toil 

1909),  122  S.  W.  396;  Garner  v.  State,  '"  Linnehan  v.    State,    120  Ala.  293, 

6  Ga.  App.  788,  65  S.  E.  842.  25  So.  6. 

'^ Burns     v.     State,    49     Ala.     370;  "People  v.  Taylor,  4  Cal.  App.  31, 

People     V.     Estrado,     49     Cal.      171  87  Pac.  215. 


227 


CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT. 


8    121 


the  grand  jury  will  fail  to  indict.  If  indicted,  at  least  in  crimes 
of  little  magnitude,  he  may,  by  securing  bail,  be  able  to  reduce  to 
a  minimum  the  annoyance  and  discomfort  he  suffers.  Hence  re- 
sisting arrest,  and  particularly  assaulting  or  attempting  to  kill 
the  officer  who  makes  or  attempts  to  make  the  arrest,  is  strong 
evidence  of  a  consciousness  of  guilt  ;^'^  and  the  fact  that  the  ar- 
resting officer  did  not  know  the  accused  was  charged  with  the 
crime  for  which  he  is  tried  will  not  exclude  evidence  of  his  re- 
sistance."^ 

It  ma}'  be  shown  that  the  accused  assaulted  a  bystander  who 
seized  him  on  the  occasion  of  the  crime, ^^  and  the  threats  of  the 
accused  that  he  would  kill  any  one  who  attempted  to  arrest  him, 
or  that  he  would  die  before  he  would  surrender,  are  also  rele- 
vant.^^ 

§  121.  Fabricating  or  suppressing  evidence. — Evidence  to  show 
that  the  accused  has  attempted  to  fabricate  or  procure  false  evi- 
dence,^- to  destroy  evidence  against  himself,^^  to  corrupt  the  wit- 
nesses for  the  state,**  or  to  procure  their  absence,*"  by  threats  of 


"State  V.  Taylor,  ii8  Mo.  153,  2^ 
S.  W.  449,  451 ;  State  v.  Moore,  loi 
Mo.  316,  14  S.  W.  182;  McKevitt  v. 
People,  208  111.  460,  70  N.  E.  693; 
Horn  V.  State,  102  Ala.  144,  15  So. 
278;  Commonwealth  v.  McManiman, 
27  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  304;  Jamison  v. 
People,  145  111.  357,  34  ^'■  E.  486; 
People  V.  Scalamiero,  143  Cal.  343,  y6 
Pac.  1098;  State  v.  Spaugh,  200  Mo. 
571,  98  S.  W.  55;  State  V.  Taylor, 
118  Mo.  153,  24  S.  W.  449;  State  v. 
Moore,  117  Mo.  395,  22  S.  W.  1086; 
Mitchell  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  .\pp. 
37,  106  S.  W.  124;  Ryan  v.  People, 
79  N.  Y.  593;  People  v.  Moore,  26 
Misc.  (N.  Y.)  r68,  56  N.  Y.  S.  802; 
Williams  v.  Commonwealth,  85  Va. 
607,  8  S.  E.  470;  State  v.  Lambert 
(Me.  1908),  71  Atl.  1092;  People  v. 
Haxer  CMich.  1906),  ro8  N.  W.  90. 

"State  V.  Grant,  79  Mo.  113,  136, 
49  Am.  218.    Cf.  Russell  v.  State,  Z7 


Tex.  Cr.  App.  314,  39  S.  W.  674; 
State  V.  Marks,  70  S.  Car.  448,  50  S. 
E.  14. 

*"  State  V.  Sanders,  76  Mo.  35; 
Lyles  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  119, 
86  S.  W.  763. 

"Horn  V.  State,  102  Ala.  144,  15 
So.  278,  281 ;  Ross  V.  State,  74  Ala. 
532. 

*"  See  Underhill  on  Evidence,  §  229. 
Dickey  v.  State,  86  I\Iiss.  525,  38  So. 
776;  Allen  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
82  S.  W.  589,  26  Kj'.  L.  807;  State  v. 
Marren  (Idaho,  1910),  107  Pac.  993. 

^  Cover  V.  Commonwealth,  6  Cent. 
585 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  23  Pa. 
.Super.  Ct.  470;  State  v.  Constantine, 
48  Wash.  218,  93  Pac.  317;  Sims  v. 
State,  146  Ala.  T09,  41  So.  413. 

^  People  V.  Marion,  29  Mich.  31 ; 
Eacock  V.  State,  169  Tnd.  488.  82  N. 
E.  1039;  State  V.  Constantine,  48 
Wash.  2t8,  93  Pac.  317. 

"Collins     V.      Commonwealth,      12 


§    121  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  228 

violence. '''''  or  otherwise,"'  is  always  admissible  as  showing  a  con- 
sciousness of  guilt,  and  is  of  particular  value  where  the  incrimi- 
nating evidence  is  mainly  circumstantial.*^ 

Thus,  the  state  may  prove  that  the  accused  attempted  to 
compel  a  person  who  testifies  against  him  to  sign  a  paper  pur- 
porting to  be  his  affidavit.  It  may  then  be  shown  that  the  paper 
was  not,  in  fact,  an  affidavit  at  all.  The  notary  whose  name  is 
signed  to  it  is  competent  to  show  that  the  witness  did  not  sign 
the  paper  alleged  to  have  been  signed  and  did  not  swear  to  it, 
but  that  the  notary  wrote  and  signed  the  affidavit  in  the  absence 
of  the  witness.^"  Attempts  by  persons  other  than  the  accused  to 
bribe  or  to  suppress  testimony  are  admissible  if  the  accused  had 
knowledge  of  or  was  in  any  way  connected  with  the  attempts.''^ 
It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  accused  had 
knowledge  of,  or  was  connected  wnth.  the  attempts  to  bribe  wit- 
nesses.'*" And  finally  it  may  be  shown  as  proving  the  guilt  of 
the  accused,  that  on  a  prior  trial  he  attempted  to  corrupt  a  mem- 
ber of  the  jury.^^ 

But  the  intentional  destruction  or  removal  of  written  evidence, 
or  of  a  witness  from  the  jurisdiction,  or  the  failure  or  neglect  by 

Bush  (Ky.)  271 ;  State  v.  Barron,  Z7  ^^  Williams  v.   State,  22  Tex.  App. 

Vt.  57.     Evidence  that  a  third  person  497,     505,    4     S.     W.    64;     State    v. 

paid  to  procure  the  absence  of  a  wit-  Mathews,   202    Mo.    143,    100    S.    W. 

ness  is  inadmissible  if  the  accused  is  420;  Maxey  v.  State,  76  Ark.  276,  88 

not  priv}^  thereto.     People  v.   Dixon,  S.  W.   1009;   Love  v.   State,  35  Tex. 

94  Cal.   255,   29   Pac.   504 ;   Common-  Cr.  App.  27,  29  S.  W.  790 ;  Whart.  Cr. 

wealth   V.   Robbins,   3    Pick.    (Mass.)  Ev.,    §    750.     It   may  be  proved  that 

63;  State  V.  Hamilton  (Del.),  67  Atl.  while    the    accused    was    in    jail    he 

836;   Crowell   V.    State,   79  Neb.   784,  threatened  to  kill  a  person  who  was 

113  N.  W.  262;  Reid  v.  State,  20  Ga.  sent  to  identify  him.     People  v.  Chin 

681;  Ward  V.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),  Hane,  108  Cal.  597,  41  Pac.  697. 

83   S.  W.  649,  26  Ky.  L.  1256;  Ezell  "".Minor  v.  State,  55  Fla.  ^7,  46  So. 

V.  State  (Tex.),  71  S.  W.  283.  297. 

'« Adams  v.  People,  9  Hun  (X.  Y.)  "'Rice  v.    State,   51   Tex.   Cr.   App. 

89,  95;  Commonwealth  v.  Smith,  162  255,  103  S.  W.  1156. 

Mass.    508,    39    N.    E.    iTi;    State    v.  '"  Eacock  v.   State,  169  Tnd.  488,  82 

Mathews,    202    Mo.    143,    100    S.    W.  N.  E.  1039. 

420;  Pitts  V.  State,  T02  Tenn.  141.  50  *^  Gassenheimer  v.  United  States,  26 

S.  W.   756;   State  V.    Rorabacher,    19  App.  D.  C.  432;  People  v.  Marion,  29 

Iowa  154.  Mich.  31 ;   State  v.   Case,  93   N.  Car. 

*^  Conway   v.    State,    118    Ind.    482,  545,  53  Am.  471. 
490,  21  N.  E.  285. 


229  CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT.  §    121 

the  accused  to  produce  evidence,  creates  no  legal  presumption  of 
his  guilt  or  that  the  evidence,  if  produced,  would  be  unfavorable 
to  him,  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  an  intention  to  suppress  the 
evidence.^*  The  intention  is  always  very  material  and  the  ac- 
cused must  be  permitted  to  testify  to  his  intent  in  doing  any  act 
which  is  suspicious  or  which  prima  facie  appears  to  be  a  destruc- 
tion or  suppression  of  evidence.  For  example,  he  may  be  al- 
lowed to  testify  to  his  intent  in  removing  documents  which  the 
prosecution  states  he  has  destroyed  or  concealed. ®° 

Whether  the  state  may  show  that  a  person  implicated  with  the 
accused,  or  a  person  who  had  a  very  full  or  a  complete  knowl- 
edge of  all  the  facts  of  the  crime  had  fled  from  the  reach  of 
process,  in  order  to  avoid  testifying  and  refused  to  return,  de- 
pends on  circumstances.  It  must  be  shown  that  the  accused  had 
procured  the  absence  of  such  person ;  or,  at  least,  that  he  had 
some  knowledge  of  his  intention  to  leave,  and  that  he  made  no 
effort  to  secure  his  attendance.'"' 

It  has  been  held  that  a  false  theory  of  defense  is  some  evi- 
dence of  guilt.  It  is  not  material  that  the  accused  did  not  him- 
self invent  it,  but  adopted  a  scheme  put  forward  by  others.  The 
court  may,  therefore,  charge  that  the  false  theory  of  defense  indi- 
cating a  consciousness  of  guilt  may  justify  the  jury  in  convicting 
the  prisoner,  if  the  incriminating  evidence,  in  connection  with 
the  false  defense,  satisfies  them  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his 
guilt.''' 

Evidence  that  the  accused  during  his  imprisonment  was  study- 
ing the  law  of  his  case  is  not  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  prov- 
ing an  intention  on  his  part  to  fabricate  a  defense."^ 

"To  use  the  fact  that  he  had  of-  "^Crawford    v.    United    States,    212 

fered   and   used   false   evidence   as   a  U.  S.  183,  29  Sup.  Ct.  260. 

circumstance    against    him,    the    jury  ®^  People  v.    Sharp,    107  N.   Y.  427, 

must  be  satisfied  beyond  all  question  463,    14   N.    E.   319,    i    Am.    St.    851; 

that  he  was  guilty  of   fabricating  it,  Commonwealth  v.  Costello,  119  ^lass. 

I.  e.,  introducing  it  knowing  it  to  be  214;  Bloomer  v.  State,  75  Ark.  297,  87 

false.      State    v.    Ward,    61    Vt.    153,  S.  W.  438. 

194.  17  Atl.  483;  State  V.  Magoon,  68  *' Pilger  v.  Commonwealth,  112  Pa. 

Vt.  289,  35  Atl.  310;  Allen  v.  United  St.  220,  230,  5  Atl.  309:   Rloomcr  v. 

States,  164  U.  S.  492,  41   L.  ed.   528,  State,  7S  Ark.  297,  87  S.  W.  438. 

17  Sup.  Ct.  154.  "'Cole  V.    State,  48  Te.x.   Cr.   App. 

439,  88  S.  W.  341. 


§  122  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  23O 

§  122,  Silence  under  accusations  of  guilt. — The  silence  of  the  ac- 
cused as  regards  statements  in  his  hearing  which  impHcate  him 
directly  or  indirectly  may  be  proved  with  the  statements,""  and 
from  his  acquiescence  the  jury  may  infer  that  the  statements  are 
true  and  that  they  prove  his  guilt.  Silence  is  assent  as  well  as 
consent,  and  may,  where  a  direct  and  specific  accusation  of  crime 
is  made,  be  regarded  under  some  circumstances  as  a  quasi-con- 
fession. 

An  innocent  person  will  at  once  naturally  and  emphatically 
repel  an  accusation  of  crime,  as  a  matter  of  self-preservation  and 
self-defense,  and  as  a  precaution  against  prejudicing  himself.  A 
person's  silence,  therefore,  particularly  wdien  it  is  persistent,  will 
justify  an  inference  that  he  is  not  innocent.  The  accused  may 
have  been  silent  when  he  was  interrogated  or  accused  before  a 
magistrate,  a  coroner  or  police  officers,  which  is  termed  judicial 
interrogation,  or  he  may  have  been  silent  extra-judicially,  /.  c, 
when  accused  or  questioned  by  private  persons  before  or  after 
his  arrest. 

For  silence  to  be  equivalent  to  a  confession,  it  must  be  shown 
that  the  accused  heard  and  understand  the  specific  charge  against 
him,"°  and  that  he  heard  it  under  circumstances  not  only  per- 

^^  State  V.   Suggs,  89  N.   Car.  527 ;  Brailey,    134    Mass.    527 ;    Bookser   v. 

Smith  V.  State,  147  Ala.  692,  40  So.  State,   26  Tex.   App.   593,   10   S.   W. 

959;  Rains  v.  Commonwealth   (K3'.),  219;  Franklin  v.  State,  69  Ga.  36,  47 

92  S.  W.  276,  29  Ky.  L.  66;  Davis  v.  Am.  748;   State  v.  Howard,  102  Mo. 

State    (Tex.    1908),    114    S.    W.   366;  142,  14  S.  W.  937;  State  v.  Pratt,  20 

State  V.  Worthen,  124  Iowa  408,  100  Iowa  267 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Harvey, 

N.  W.  330;  O'Hearn  v.  State,  79  Neb.  i   Gray   (Mass.)   487;  Long  v.   State, 

513,  113  X.  W.  130;  Musfelt  V.  State,  13   Tex.   App.  2x1;   Martin  v.    State, 

64  Xeb.  445,  90  X^.  W.  237;  Watt  v.  39  Ala.  523;  Roquemore  v.  State,  50 

People,  126  111.  9,  18  X.  E.  340,  i  L.  R.  Tex.    Cr.    App.    542,   99    S.    W.    547 ; 

A.  403;  Gilman  v.  People,  178  111.  19,  State  v.  Quirk,  loi  Minn.  334,  112  N. 

52  X^.  E.  967:  Commonwealth  v.  De-  W.  409;  Irving  v.  State  (Miss.  1908), 

whirst,  190  Mass.  293,  76  X.  E.  1052;  47    So.   518;    State   v.    Major,    70    S. 

Joiner  v.  State,  119  Ga.  315,  46  S.  E.  Car.  387,  50  S.  E.  13;  Jones  v.  State 

412;    State  V.   Johnson,   73   X\    J.   L.  (Ala.    1908),  47    So.    100;    People  v. 

199,  63   Atl.    12;    Lyon   v.    Common-  Long,   7  Cal.   App.  27,  93   Pac.   387; 

wealth   (Ky.),  96  S.  W.  857,  29  Ky.  People  v.  McCrea,  32  Cal.  98;  White 

L.  1020;  People  v.  Swaile  (Cal.  App.,  v.  State  (Tex.  1905),  85  S.  W.  1140; 

1909),  107  Pac.  134.  State   v.    Baruth,   47    Wash.    283,    91 

^"°  Brown  v.  Commonwealth,  86  Va.  Pac.    977 ;    Finch    v.    Commonwealth 

935,  II  S.  E.  799;  Commonwealth  v.  (Ky.)  92  S.  W.  940,  29  Ky.  L.  187. 


231 


COXSCIOUSXESS    OF    GUILT, 


122 


mitting  but  calling  on  him  for  a  denial/  taking  into  considera- 
tion all  the  circumstances  and  the  persons  who  were  present.^ 


^  Ettinger  v.  Commonwealth,  98  Pa. 
St.  338;  Surber  v.  State,  99  Ind.  71, 
'j2,  ;  Conwa\'  v.  State,  1 18  Ind.  482, 
485,  21  X.  E.  285 ;  Jones  v.  State,  107 
Ala.  93,  18  So.  237;  State  v.  Good, 
132  Vlo.  114,  z}>  S.  \V.  790;  Moore  v. 
State,  96  Tenn.  209,  ZZ  S.  W. 
1046;  People  V.  Young,  108  Cal.  8, 
41  Pac.  281 ;  Williford  v.  State,  36 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  414,  2,-j  S.  W.  761; 
State  V.  :\Iagoon,  68  Vt.  289,  35  Atl. 
310;  Loggins  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
434;  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  121 
I\Iass.  69;  Lawson  v.  State,  20  Ala. 
65,  56  Am.  Dec.  182 ;  Brister  v.  State, 
26  Ala.  107,  116;  Slattery  v.  People, 
76  111.  217;  Watt  V.  People,  126  111. 
9,  18  X.  E.  340,  I  L.  R.  A.  403 ;  Wil- 
liams V.  State,  42  Ark.  35 ;  Ford  v. 
State,  34  Ark.  649;  State  v.  Mullins, 
loi  IMo.  514,  14  S.  W.  625;  State  v. 
Smith,  30  La.  Ann.  457 ;  State  v.  Car- 
roll, 30  S.  Car.  85,  8  S.  E.  433,  14 
Am.  St.  883;  State  v.  Hasty,  121 
Iowa  507,  96  X.  W.  1 1 15;  Raymond 
V.  State,  154  Ala.  i,  45  So.  895; 
O'Hearn  v.  State,  79  Xeb.  513,  113 
X.  W.  130;  Graham  v.  State,  118  Ga. 
807,  45  S.  E.  616 ;  State  v.  Richardson) 
194  Mo.  326,  92  S.  W.  649;  State  v. 
Walker,  78  Mo.  380;  People  v.  Mc- 
Cue,  87  App.  Div.  CX.  Y.)  72,  83  X. 
Y.  S.  1088;  Lumpkin  v.  State,  125 
Ga.  24,  53  S.  E.  8to;  Jones  v.  State, 
2  Ga.  App.  433,  58  S.  E.  559;  Smith 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  App.  344,  106 
S.  W.  T161;  People  V.  Hossler,  135 
Mich.  384,  97  X.  W.  754,  10  Det. 
Leg.  X.  798;  State  v.  Taylor,  70  Vt. 
r,  39  Atl.  447,  ey  Am.  St.  648,  42  L. 
R.  A.  673n.  If  a  confession  is  inad- 
missible because  the  accused  was  not 
cautioned,  or  because  he  was  under 


duress,  his  silence  ought  in  like  cir- 
cumstances to  be  refused.  Fulcher 
V.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  465,  473,  13  S. 
W.  750 ;  Xolen  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App. 
474,  46  Am.  247n. 

■  Wharton  thus  broadly  and  liber- 
ally states  this  rule  in  Cr.  Ev.,  8th 
ed.,  §  679.  "If  A.,  when  in  B.'s  pres- 
ence and  hearing,  makes  statements 
which  B.  listens  to  in  silence,  inter- 
posing no  objection,  A.'s  statement 
may  be  evidence  against  B.,  whenever 
B.'s  silence  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
lead  to  the  inference  of  assent."  In 
Commonwealth  v.  Kenney,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  23s,  46  Am.  Dec.  672,  the 
court  says :  "The  admissibility  of  si- 
lence depends  on  whether  he  hears 
and  understands  the  statement  and 
comprehends  its  meaning;  whether 
the  truth  of  the  facts  embraced  in 
this  statement  is  within  his  own 
knowledge;  whether  he  is  in  such 
a  situation  that  he  is  at  liberty  to 
make  a  reply.  *  *  *  jf  majg  jn 
the  course  of  any  judicial  hearing,  he 
could  not  interfere  and  deny  the 
statement ;  it  would  be  to  charge  the 
witness  with  perjury  and  inconsistent 
with  decorum  and  the  rules  of  law 
*  *  *  or  if  he  is  restrained  by 
fear,  or  by  doubts  of  his  rights ;  by  a 
belief  that  his  security  will  be  pro- 
moted by  his  silence."  See  also,  Kel- 
ley  V.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565,  574,  14 
Am.  342.  It  is  for  the  court  to  de- 
termine whether  the  proceedings  are 
judicial.  People  v.  Willett,  92  X.  Y. 
29,  Z7)^  I  X^  Y.  Cr.  355.  See  also 
State  v.  Baruth,  47  Wash.  283,  91 
Pac.  977 ;  Hanna  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  5,  79  S.  W.  544;  Maloney  v. 
State  (Ark.,  1909),  121  S.  W.  728. 


>>     123  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  232 

And  if  it  be  proved  that  the  accused,  when  he  heard  the  in- 
criminating statement,  positively  denied  it,  the  statement  cannot 
be  proved.^ 

g  123.  Attendant  circumstances  explaining  motives  and  reasons  of 
silence. — The  silence  of  the  accused  may  spring  from  such  a  va- 
riety of  motives,  some  of  which  may  be  consistent  with  inno- 
cence, that  silence  alone  is  very  slight  evidence  of  guilt ;  and, 
aside  from  the  inferences  which  may  arise  from  the  attendant 
circumstances,  should  be  received  with  caution  as  proof  of  guilt.* 

The  accused  may  always  show  the  attending  circumstances  of 
his  silence,  and,  if  he  shall  show,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury, 
that  his  silence  was  caused  by  reasons  or  prompted  by  motives 
consistent  with  his  innocence,  the  accusatory  statements  and  his 
silence  should  be  disregarded.  Thus,  he  may  show  his  silence 
was  caused  by  threats  f  that  the  statements  made  did  not  impli- 
cate him  f  that  he  had  or  that  he  supposed  he  had  no  right  to 
reply, '^  as  when  the  accusations  were  made  in  a  judicial  or  quasi- 
judicial  proceeding,®  as  a  coroner's  inquest.^  So  he  may  prove 
that  he  had  promised  to  be  silent  under  accusations  made  at  a 
family  council  ;^°  and  generally  that,  under  the  circumstances,  he 
may  show  that  no  oral  reply  would  have  been  either  natural, 
proper  or  expedient." 

■''People  V.  Turner,  i  Cal.  App.  420,  The  refusal  by  defendant  to  testify  at 

82  Pac.  397.  a  preliminary  examination  cannot  be 

*  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.    112;   People  proved  against  him.    Broyles  v.  State, 

V.  Manasse,  153  Cal.  10,  94  Pac.  92.  47  Ind.  251,  253;   State  v.   Smith,  30 

^  Flanagin  v.  State,  25  Ark.  92.  La.  Ann.  457 ;  State  v.  Hale,  156  Mo. 

"  Loggins  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  434.  102,  56  S.  W.  881. 

"Commonwealth     v.      Kenney,      12  "  State  v.  Mullins,  loi   Mo.  514,  14 

Mete.   (Mass.)  235,  46  Am.  Dec.  672;  S.  W.  625;  People  v.  Willett,  92  N. 

Simmons  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.   App.  Y.  29,  r  N.  Y.  Cr.  355. 

527,  97  S.  W.  1052.  '"Slattery  v.  People,  76  111.  217. 

"  Bell  V.  State,  93  Ga.  557,  19  S.  E.  "  "Declarations   made   in   the  pres- 

244;  Kelley  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565,  ence  of  a  party  to  which  he  makes 

571,  14  Am.  342;  Comstock  v.  State,  no  reply  are  sometimes  competent,  as 

14  Neb.  205,  15  N.  W.  355;  Weaver  equivalent    to    a    tacit    admission    by 

V.   State,  77  Ala.  26;   People  v.  Hill-  him.      This    depends    on   whether    he 

house,  80  Mich.  580,  45  N.  W.  484;  heard  and  understood  them,  whether 

State  v.  Mullins,   loi   Mo.  514.  14  S.  he  is  at  liberty  to  reply,  whether  he 

W.  625;  Burrill  on  Cir.  Ev.,  p.  482.  is   in  custody,   or  under  restraint   or 


233  CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT.  §123 

The  mental  condition  of  the  person  who  made  the  accusing 
statements  which  were  not  denied  is  very  important.  If  the  per- 
son making  the  incriminating  statements  was  so  intoxicated  as 
not  to  reaHze  what  he  was  saying,  they  may  be  disregarded  and 
the  silence  of  the  accused  is  not  competent.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  accused  is  intimidated  by  the  conduct  of  the  party  making  the 
statements,  who  was  drunk  and  violent  in  his  conduct,  silence  is 
not  relevant.^- 

Upon  the  question  whether  the  silence  of  the  accused  under 
accusations  of  crime  made  in  his  presence  wdiile  he  is  under  arrest 
or  in  custody,  but  which  are  not  made  in  a  judicial  proceeding 
or  investigation,  where  it  would  have  been  improper  for  him  to 
speak,  is  admissible,  the  cases  are  inharmonious.  Some  cases 
hold  that  the  mere  fact  of  the  accused  being  in  custody  or  under 
arrest  excludes  any  inference  of  acquiescence  in  others'  state- 
ments from  his  silence,  though  he  had  the  right  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  speak. ^^  But  it  may  be  noted  that  it  has  never  been 
expressly  held  that  the  fact  that  the  accused  is  under  arrest  ex- 
cludes evidence  of  his  acts  and  conduct  other  than  mere  silence.^* 
On  the  other  hand,  where  the  accused  was  identified  by  the  in- 
jured person  or  by  any  other  witness  in  jail,^^  or  in  a  station- 
house  immediately  after  his  arrest, ^'^  or  on  being  brought  before 

duress,    and   whether    the    statements  in  which  case  statements  of  deceased 

are  made  by  such  persons  and  under  in   homicide  were  made  in  the  pres- 

such  circumstances   as   naturally  call  ence  and  hearing  of  the  accused.     See 

for     a     reply."       Commonwealth     v.  also  State  v.  Weaver,  57  Iowa  730,  11 

Brailey,  134  Mass.  527,  530;  Newman  N.  W.  675;  State  v.  Epstein,  25  R.  I. 

V.   Commonwealth    (Ky.),  88    S.   W.  131,   55   Atl.   204;    Hanger   v.   United 

1089,  28  Ky.  L.  8r.  States,  173  Fed.  54,  97  C.  C.  A.  372. 

"  Jones  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  433,  58        "  Fulcher   v.    State,    28    Tex.    App. 

S.  E.  559.  465,   472,   13   S.   W.  750;   Cordova  v. 

^^  State  V.  Diskin,  34  La.  Ann.  919,  State,  6  Tex.  App.  207;  Greenfield  v. 

921,  44  Am.  448 ;  State  v.  Carter,  106  People,  85  N.  Y.  75,  39  Am.  636. 
La.  407,  30  So.  895 ;  State  v.  Estoup,        ^'^  Ettinger  v.  Commonwealth,  98  Pa. 

39  La.  Ann.  906,  3  So.  124 ;  Common-  St.  338. 

wealth  V.   Kenncy,   12  Mete.    (Mass.)         '"  Kelley  v.    People,   55   N.    Y.   565, 

235,  46  Am.  672;    Commonwealth  v.  573,    14  Am.  342;   Ackerson  v.    Peo- 

McDermott,    123   Mass.   440,   25   Am.  pic,   124  111.  563,  16  N.  E.  847;  State 

T2o;    Commonwealth    v.    Walker,    13  v.    ^Murray,    126   Mo.    611,   29   S.    W. 

Allen   (Mass.)   570;  Gardner  v.  State  700;    Murphy   v.    State,  36   Ohio    St. 

(Tex.  1896),  34  S.  W.  945 ;  State  v.  62S;   Green  v.   State,  97  Tenn.  50,  36 

Kelleher,  201  Mo.  614,  100  S.  W.  470,  S.  W.  700. 


§123  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  234 

a  magistrate  in  his  private  office,  after  the  prehminary  examina- 
tion, solely  for  identification/'  it  was  held  that,  as  it  would  have 
been  proper  for  him  to  deny  the  identification,  his  silence  was 
admissible.  The  statements  identifying  a  person  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, though  made  to  a  police  officer  and  not  addressed 
directly  to  the  accused,  so  far  concern  the  latter  that  they  chal- 
lenge him  to  assert  his  innocence,  and  his  assertion  of  this  fact 
would  be  both  natural  and  proper. ^*^ 

But  it  has  been  held  that  a  statement  by  the  accused  made  by 
him  in  reply  to  a  question  by  a  police  officer  if  he  had  anything 
to  say  to  a  confession  of  an  accomplice,  that  he  would  make  his 
statement  at  the  proper  time,  and,  that  he  would  stand  trial  and 
tell  his  story  then,  is  not  such  acquiescence  as  to  render  the  con- 
fession admissible  against  the  accused.^" 

The  silence  of  the  accused  is  not  competent  unless  it  shall 
clearly  appear  that  the  witness  called  to  prove  the  statement  and 
the  silence  would  have  heard  a  response  had  any  been  made.-" 
The  witness  may  be  asked  if  he  would  have  heard  the  defendant 
speak,  if  he  had  said  anything.-^ 

The  mental  or  physical  condition  of  the  parties  to  the  conver- 
sation is  relevant  to  show  whether  the  accused  heard  the  state- 
ments. Deafness  or  an  unconscious  condition  on  the  part  of  the 
accused  when  the  statement  is  made  may  be  shown.  If  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  accused  heard  what  was  said  is  in  issue,  the 
jury  may  consider  these  facts  in  determining  the  value  of  the 
evidence  of  silence.--  Proof  that  the  accused  did  not  understand 
the  language  spoken  by  his  accuser  will  exclude  the  statement 
and  the  silence  of  the  accused  as  evidence.  Statements  made  by 
the  accuser  of  an  incriminating  character  have  been  excluded 
though  uttered  in  the  presence  of  the  accused  where  they  were 
made  through  an  interpreter."^ 

^'  State   V.   Suggs,  89  X.   Car.  527,  ""  Williams  v.  State,  42  Ark.  380. 

530.  ^  Maynard  v.   People,    135    111.  416, 

^^Kelley  v.   People,   55   X.   Y.   565,  25  X.  E.  740;  Raymond  v.  State,  154 

575,  14  Am.  342;   People  v.  Sullivan,  Ala.  i,  45  So.  895. 

3  Cal.  App.  502,  86  Pac.  834  (accusa-  "State    v.    IMarsh,    70   Vt.    288,   40 

tions  by  deceased  against  one  accused  Atl.  836. 

of  homicide).  "State  v.  Epstein,  25  R.  I.  131,  55 

"O'Hearn  v.  State,  79  Xeb.  513,  113  .A-tl.  204. 
N.  W.  130. 


235  COXSCIOUSXESS    OF    GUILT.  §    1 24 

§  124.  The  accusatory  assertion  or  question. — The  statement  to 
be  proved  should  be  directly  or  indirectly  relevant  to  the  guilt  of 
the  accused.  It  must  refer  to  matters  upon  which  he  is  likely 
to  be  informed,^*  as  for  example  a  statement  by  deceased  that  the 
accused  had  shot  him  while  running  and  that  "you  will  have  to 
die  some  day  and  give  an  account  of  this.""" 

His  silence  will  not  be  admissible  against  the  accused  if  there 
were  nothing  in  the  statement  which  required  or  demanded  a  de- 
nial from  him.  So,  vague  comments  on  the  crime,  or  rumors 
about  the  circumstances  of  it,  not  particularly  pointing  to  or  con- 
cerning the  accused  are  not  relevant  against  him,  though  he  was 
silent  when  he  heard  them."'' 

Every  sane  man  is  in  a  position  to  deny  or  affirm  statements 
regarding  his  own  acts.  But  it  is  both  unfair  and  absurd  to  con- 
strue his  silence  as  respects  other  men's  acts,  of  which,  probably, 
he  had  no  knowledge,  as  an  affirmance  or  approval  of  them,  or 
of  any  inference  which  may  be  drawn  therefrom.-" 

The  accusing  declaration  or  question  is  not  evidence  because 
of  the  veracity,  credibility  or  competency  of  its  author.  The 
assent  of  the  accused  makes  it  admissible,  the  statement  being 
put  in  his  mouth  by  the  assent  implied  from  his  silence,  and  its 
truth,  as  it  were,  guaranteed  by  the  acquiescence  of  the  accused, 

^*  Accusations  by  the  wife  of  a  man,  Pac.  281;  Conway  v.   State,  118  Ind. 

whom   defendant   is   alleged   to    have  482,  21  N.  E.  285 ;  Commonwealth  v. 

killed,   that    he    had   killed   her    hus-  Brown,     121     Mass.     69;     People    v. 

band,  that   he   had  told  her  so,  and  O'Brien,  68  Mich.  468,  z'^  ^-  W.  225 ; 

had  told  her  he  would  kill  her,  too,  if  State  v.  Murray,  126  Mo.  611,  29  S. 

she  revealed  the  crime,  made  in  de-  W.  700;  People  v.   Smith,  172  N.  Y. 

fendant's  presence,  to  which   he   re-  210,  64  N.  E.  814 ;  People  v.  Koerner, 

plied  that   he   would   answer    to    the  154  N.  Y.  355,  48  N.  E.  730;  Ettinger 

magistrates,   may  be   proved   by   any  v.    Commonwealth,   98    Pa.    St.    338; 

one  who  heard  them.     Such  charges  Moore  v.   State,  96  Tenn.  209,  Z'i   S. 

clearly  call  for  a  prompt  denial.    Mil-  W.  T046. 

ler  v.  State,  68  Miss.  22T,  8  So.  273;        -' Grigsby  v.  State,  4  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

Rains    V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.),    92  19;   Kelley  v.   People,   55   N.   Y.  565, 

S.  W.  276,  29  Ky.  L.  66.  14  Am.  342.     Hence,  the  admissions 

"  State  V.  Sudduth,  74  S.  Car.  498,  of  the  thief  not  made  in  the  presence 

54  S.  E.  1013.  of   the   defendant  are  not   receivable 

^'Franklin    v.    Commonwealth,    105  against  the  latter  on  the  trial  of  an 

Ky.  237,  48  S.  W.  986,  20  Ky.  L.  1137;  indictment  for  receiving  stolen  goods. 

Jones  v.    State,    107  Ala.  93,    18   So.  Dye  v.   State,   T30  Ind.   ^7,  29  N.   E. 

237;  People  v.  Young,  108  Cal.  8,  41  77'^-',  Reilley  v.  State,  14  Ind.  217. 


§    124  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  236 

l)ecaiise  it  containsi  facts  which  he  was  called  upon,  but  failed, 
to  deny.-*^ 

Thus,  for  example,  statements  made  in  the  presence  of  the  ac- 
cused which  lead  directly  to  the  crime  or  connected  him  directly 
with  it  called  for  a  denial  by  him  and  his  failure  to  deny  such 
statements  render  the  statements  admissible."^ 

The  incompetency  of  the  person  who  makes  the  accusation  as 
a  witness  against  the  accused  will  not  keep  out  his  statement.^" 
Thus  a  statement  .made  by  the  four-year-old  son  of  the  accused, 
in  his  presence  and  in  the  presence  of  a  police  officer,  showing 
the  circumstances  of  the  crime,  may  be  proved  by  the  police 
officer  with  the  fact  of  the  silence  of  the  accused. ^"^  But  a  state- 
ment by  an  accomplice  of  the  accused  made  in  his  presence  while 
in  custody  is  not  made  admissible  against  the  accused  by  his 
silence.^^  A  witness  may  testify  that  the  declaration  was  made 
in  the  presence  of  the  accused.  He  will  not  be  permitted,  how- 
ever, to  state  his  opinion  that  the  accused  must  have  heard  it,  for 
that  is  not  for  the  witness  to  determine.^^  The  person  who  made 
the  statement  is  not  an  indispensable  witness,  as  the  statement 
and  the  silence  of  the  accused  may  be  proved  by  anybody  who 
was  present  and  heard  the  conversation.^^  The  cases  are  not  har- 
monious upon  the  mode  of  proving  that  the  accused  heard  and 
understood  the  declaration,  or  whether  the  judge  or  jury  are  to 
determine  these  facts. 

On  the  one  hand  it  is  affirmed  that  the  facts  that  he  heard  and 
understood  may  be  inferred  by  the  jury  from  evidence  that  the 

^  Drumwright  v.  State,  29  Ga.  430;  ''"People   v.    McCrea,    32    Cal.    98; 

State  V.  Talmage,  107  Mo.  543,  17  S.  Richards  v.  State,  82  Wis.  172,  51  N. 

W.   990;   Johnson  v.    State,  90  Miss.  W.  652. 

317,  43  So.  435 ;   People  v.   Long,  7  ^"a  Geiger  v.   State,   25   Ohio   C.   C. 

Cal.   App.  27,  93   Pac.  387.     An  im-  742. 

plicating  letter,  written   by  a  person  '^  Merriweather   v.    Commonwealth, 

not    produced,    is    admissible    against  118   Ky.   870,  82   S.    W.   592,   26  Ky. 

the  accused,  though  neither  the  signa-  L.  793. 

ture  of  the  writer  nor  the  truth  of  ^"  People  v.  Holfelder,  5  N.  Y.  Cr. 

the  accusation  is  proved,  if  defendant  179;    State  v.   Khowrj',    149    N.    Car. 

refuses  to  deny  or  explain  it.     People  454,  62  S.  E.  638. 

V.   Lewis,   16  N.   Y.    S.  88t,  62  Hun  ''  State  v.  Monfre,  122  La.  251,  47 

(N.  Y.)  622  (without  opinion).  So.  543. 

^  People  V.    Sullivan,   3   Cal.    App. 
502,  86  Pac.  834. 


^Z7 


CONSCIOUSNESS    OF    GUILT. 


124 


Statement  was  made  in  his  physical  presence,  or  from  his  near- 
ness and  attitude  as  a  Hstener.^'*  On  the  other,  it  is  held  that  this 
is  not  enough,  and  that  affirmative  evidence  is  required  to  show 
prima  facie  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  that  the  attention  of 
the  accused  was  attracted,  and  that  he  did  actually  and  distinctly 
hear  and  understand,  before  the  statement  shall  be  permitted  to 
go  to  the  jury  as  his  admission/^  If  it  appears  indubitably  that 
the  accused  was  asleep,^''  or  was  unconscious  from  intoxication 
or  otherwise,  or  that  the  statement  was  in  a  language  he  did  not 
understand,"'  so  that  he  could  not  hear  or  understand,  his  silence 
is  not  competent.^^ 


**  State  V.  Perkins,  3  Hawks  (N. 
Car.)  ^yj;  Simmons  v.  State,  115  Ga. 
574,  41  S.  E.  983;  Commonwealth  v. 
Galavan,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  271;  Hall  v. 
State,  132  Ind.  317,  321,  31  N.  E.  536; 
Commonwealth  v.  Brailey,  134  Mass. 
527,  530;  Commonwealth  v.  Sliney, 
126  Mass.  49,  50;  Richards  v.  State, 
82  Wis.  172,  51  X.  W.  652;  State  v. 
Johnson,  y^  N.  J.  L.  199,  62,  Atl.  12; 
Kelley  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565,  14 
Am.  342;  People  v.  Bissert,  172  N. 
Y.  643,  65  N.  E.  1 120,  aff'g  71  App. 
Div.  CN.  Y.)  118,  75  N.  Y.  S.  630. 

^Hall  V.  State,  132  Ind.  317,  31  N. 
E.  536,  537;  Long  V.  State,  13  Tex. 
App.  211;  Williams  v.  State,  42  Ark. 


380;  Jones  V.  State,  65  Ga.  147,  150; 
People  V.  Ah  Yute,  54  Cal.  89;  Rose 
V.  State,  13  Ohio  C.  C.  342,  7  Ohio 
Cir.  Dec.  226;  State  v.  Blackburn 
(Del.  O.  &  T.,  1892),  75  Atl.  536. 
^'Lanergan  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  39, 

5  Abb.    Pr.   N.    S.    (N.    Y.)    113,   6 
Park  Cr.  (N.  Y.)   209. 

"  Territory  v.  Big  Knot  on  Head, 

6  Mont.  242,  II  Pac.  670. 

^  It  seems  that  if  the  accused, 
though  physically  present,  was  intoxi- 
cated, it  is  for  the  jury  to  decide  if 
he  was  qualified  to  hear  and  imder- 
stand,  and  if  he  did,  in  fact,  assent  by 
silence.  State  v.  Perkins,  3  Hawks 
(N.  Car.)  277,  378;  People  v.  Koer- 
ner,  154  N.  Y.  355,  48  N.  E.  730. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


CONFESSIONS. 


§  125.  Definition  and  classification.  §  138. 

126.  Voluntary  character  of  confes- 

sions. 

127.  Burden  of  proof  to  show  vol-        139. 

untary  character. 

128.  Circumstances      under      which        140. 

confession      becomes      invol- 
untary. 141. 

129.  Confessions  made  while  under 

arrest.  142. 

130.  Efifect    of    cautioning    the    ac-        143. 

cused. 

131.  Confessions  under  oath.  144. 

132.  Confessions    taken  at  the   pre- 

liminary examination.  145. 

133.  Mode  of  proving  a  confession 

made  at  the   preliminary  ex-        146. 
amination. 

134.  Confessions    of    persons    asso-        147. 

ciated  in  a  conspiracy. 

135.  Artifice  or  deception  used.  147a. 

136.  Confessions  by  intoxicated  per- 

sons. 

137.  Admissions    receivable    though 

involuntary. 


When  facts  discovered  admit 
parts  of  an  involuntary  con- 
fession. 

Confessions  procured  by  per- 
sons in  authority. 

Confession  need  not  be  spon- 
taneous. 

Confessions  made  by  signs  or 
gestures. 

Confessions  of  treason. 

Confessions  made  by  young 
children. 

Judicial  confessions — Plea  of 
guilty. 

Confessions  of  persons  not  in- 
dicted. 

The  value  of  confessions  as  ev- 
idence. 

Corroborations  of  extra  judi- 
cial confessions. 

,  Credibilit}'  of  confession  and 
use  of  in  favor  of  the  ac- 
cused. 


§  125.  Definition  and  classification. — A  confession  is  a  statement 
made  at  any  time  by  a  person,  admitting  or  suggesting  the  infer- 
ence that  he  has  committed,  or  participated  in  the  commission  of, 
a  crime.  The  statement  must  be  made  voluntarily  and  without  any 
fear  by  or  promise  to  him  before  it  will  be  admitted  as  evidence 
against  him  on  a  criminal  trial. ^ 

'People  V.  Miller,  122  Cal.  84,  54  wealth  (Ky.),  15  Ky.  L.  835,  26  S. 
Pac.  523;  AUred  v.  State,  126  Ga.  W.  i;  Taylor  v.  State,  Z"/  Neb.  788, 
537,  55  S.  E.  178;  Collins  V.  Common-     56    X.   W.   623;    State    v.    Porter,   32 

(238) 


239 


CONFESSIONS. 


§    125 


A  confession  is  distinguished  from  an  admission  by  the  fact 
that  an  admission  is  a  statement  of  a  fact  not  necessarily  incrimi- 
nating the  accused  person.-  The  necessity  for  drawing  a  Hue  l^e- 
tween  the  two  classes  of  statements,  confessions  and  admissions, 
arises  from  the  fact  that  admissions  are  always  admissible  as  an 
exception  to  the  rule  excluding  hearsay  irrespective  of  the  motive 
or  inducement  which  prompted  them,  provided  they  are  made 
against  the  interest  of  the  person  making  them,  while  confessions 
must  be  shown  to  be  entirely  unprompted,  either  by  the  motives 
of  hope  or  fear.  Thus  a  statement  by  the  accused  showing  how 
the  crime  was  committed  by  other  persons,  he  being  present,  but 
denying  that  he  took  part  in  it,^  or  a  statement  by  the  accused 
which  admits  the  commission  of  the  act  which  is  charged  against 
him,  but  which  denies  that  it  was  done  with  a  criminal  intent,* 
is  an  admission  merely,  and  not  a  confession.  An  offer  by  the  ac- 
cused to  compromise  the  charge  against  him  by  paying  money 
is  not  a  confession,   but  is  admissible  as  an  admission.^     The 


Ore.  135,  49  Pac.  964,  966;  State  v. 
Heidenreich,  29  Ore.  381,  45  Pac. 
755 ;  Runnels  v.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr. 
■^■•PP-  555,  61  S.  W.  479.  "A  confes- 
sion in  criminal  law  is  the  voluntary 
declaration  by  a  person  who  has  com- 
mitted a  crime  or  misdemeanor,  to 
another,  of  the  agency  or  participa- 
tion he  had  in  the  crime.  The  word 
confession  is  not  the  mere  equivalent 
of  the  words,  statements  or  declara- 
tions." People  V.  Strong,  30  Cal.  151. 
A  confession  of  guilt  is  an  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  criminal  act  or  of  the 
facts  that  constitute  the  crime.  State- 
ments of  facts  and  circumstances  that 
do  not  in  effect  or  by  inference  ad- 
mit the  commission  of  a  crime  do 
not  in  general  constitute  a  confession 
of  guilt.  Daniels  v.  State  (Fla.),  48 
So.  747.  "A  confession,  in  criminal 
law,  is  a  voluntary  statement  made  by 
a  person  charged  with  the  commis- 
sion of  a  crime  or  misdemeanor,  com- 
municated to  another  person,  wherein 
he  acknowledges  himself  to  be  guilty 
of  the  offense  charged,  and  discloses 
the  circumstances  of  the  act  and  the 


share  and  participation  he  had  in  it." 
Black's  Law  Dictionary,  aff'd  in 
Owens  V.  State,  120  Ga.  296,  298,  48 
S.  E.  21 ;  Spicer  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  SI  S.  W.  802,  21  Ky.  L.  528; 
State  v.  Brinkley  (Ore.,  1909),  105 
Pac.   708. 

■  State  v.  Campbell,  "]■>>  Kan.  688, 
85  Pac.  784,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  S33n. 

^  Jones  v.  State,  120  Ala.  303,  25  So. 
204;  Dumas  v.  State,  dz  Ga.  600; 
Boston  v.  State,  94  Ga.  590,  20  S.  E. 
98;  State  V.  Heidenreich,  29  Ore.  381, 
45  Pac.  755 ;  Bell  v.  State,  93  Ga.  557. 
19  S.  E.  244;  People  v.  Elliott,  8  N. 
Y.  St.  223;  State  v.  Oilman,  51  Me. 
206,  225;  Burnett  v.  State  (Neb., 
1910),  124  N.  W.  927;  State  v.  Knee- 
land  (Mont.,  1909),  104  Pac.  513. 

*  State  V.  Abrams,  131  Iowa  479, 
481,  108  N.  W.  1041 ;  State  v.  Thomas, 
135  Iowa  717,  725,  109  N.  W.  900; 
Owens  V.  State,  120  Ga.  296,  48  S. 
E.  21. 

"Michaels  v.  People,  208  III.  603. 
70  N.  E.  747;  State  v.  Richmond,  13S 
Iowa  494,  116  N.  W.  609. 


125 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


240 


Statement  of  one  accused  of  murder  by  poisoning,  that  he  had 
given  too  much  of  a  certain  (h'ug.  at  the  same  time  protesting 
that  it  was  done  by  mistake  and  that  the  homicide  was  uninten- 
tional is  not  a  confession  and  should  not  be  submitted  to  the  jury 
on  that  theory.*^ 

A  confession,  to  be  receivable  as  such,  must  be  an  admission 
by  the  accused  that  he  is  guilty  of  the  precise  crime  with  which 
he  is  charged.  The  prisoner's  declaration  that  he  is  guilty  of 
other  similar  crimes,  while  competent  to  show  the  existence  of 
a  criminal  intent,  never  amounts  to  a  confession  of  the  crime  for 
which  he  is  indicted,  nor  do  the  rules  and  principles  regulating 
confessions  apply  to  such  declarations." 


"^  State  V.  Thomas,  135  Iowa  717, 
725,  109  N.  W.  900.  "The  distinction 
in  all  our  cases  is  between  the  effect 
of  admissions  of  fact  from  which  the 
guilt  of  the  accused  may  be  inferred 
and  the  admission  of  guilt  itself.  In- 
criminating statements,  to  be  the 
equivalent  of  a  confession  of  guilt, 
must  be  so  comprehensive  as  to  in- 
clude every  fact  necessary  to  be 
proved  by  the  prosecution  in  order 
to  establish  the  defendant's  guilt.  An 
admission  of  the  main  fact,  from 
which  the  essential  elements  of  the 
criminal  act  may  be  inferred,  amounts 
to  an  admission  of  the  crime  itself. 
If  the  main  fact  is  admitted  with  a 
qualifying  exclusion  of  a  necessary 
ingredient  of  the  crime  charged,  the 
crime  is  not  confessed.  The  qualifi- 
cation is  a  part  of  the  admission,  and 
both  must  be  considered  in  interpret- 
ing the  meaning  of  the  statement. 
A  crime  consists  in  something  more 
than  the  commission  of  an  act.  There 
must  be  a  union  of  act  and  intention. 
One  may  admit  that  he  took  a  horse 
from  the  stable  of  another  and.  at 
the  same  time,  explain  that  he  pur- 
chased the  horse  from  a  named  per- 
son claiming  to  own  the  horse,  and 


that  there  was  no  criminal  intent  on 
his  part.  If  the  admission  that  he 
took  the  horse  was  without  explana- 
tion, the  intent  to  steal  could  be  in- 
ferred from  the  act  of  taking.  But 
where  the  taking  is  claimed  to  have 
been  in  good  faith  and  with  no  inten- 
tion to  commit  a  crime,  and  because 
of  a  purchase  from  one  whom,  in 
good  faith,  he  believed  to  be  the  true 
owner  the  admission  made  with  such 
qualification  cannot  mean  that  he  was 
intending  to  confess  his  guilt  of  the 
crime  of  horse  stealing.  An  admis- 
sion of  a  fact  not  in  itself  involving 
criminal  intent  is  not  a  confession. 
The  term  confession  is  restricted  to 
acknowledgment  of  guilt  and  is  not  a 
mere  equivalent  of  words  or  state- 
ments." Owens  V.  State,  120  Ga.  296, 
48  S.  E.  21. 

'^  Commonwealth  v.  Call,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  515;  Hardtke  v.  State,  67 
Wis.  552,  558,  30  N.  W.  723;  People 
V.  Hickman,  113  Cal.  80,  45  Pac.  175. 
Thus  an  offer  to  bribe  the  district  at- 
torney, coupled  with  an  admission  of 
having  committed  an  indecent  assault, 
cannot  be  construed  as  a  confession 
of  the  crime  of  rape.  Hardtke  v. 
State,  67  Wis.  552,  558,  30  X.  W.  '/2Z. 


241 


CONFESSIONS. 


125 


Confessions  may  be  either  judicial  or  extra-judicial;  the 
former  are  confessions  that  are  made  at  a  preliminary  examina- 
tion, at  the  coroner's  inquest  or  on  the  trial  of  the  accused. 
Extra-judicial  confessions  are  those  made  out  of  court  to  any 
person.  A  plea  of  guilty  on  a  prior  trial  ^  or  on  the  preliminary 
examination  "  is  an  extra-judicial  confession  and  may  be  proved 
as  such  on  a  subsequent  trial.  It  is  evidence  merely  and  not  con- 
clusive on  the  court.  This  is  the  rule  where  the  plea  was  ac- 
cepted by  the  court  and  for  some  reason  sentence  was  not  im- 
posed on  the  plea  of  guilty,  or,  being  imposed,  it  was  never  exe- 
cuted. But  a  plea  of  guilty  which  the  court  refused  to  receive  is 
not  subsequently  admissible  in  evidence  as  a  confession.^" 


Declarations  by  the  accused  of  an  in- 
tention to  commit  separate  offenses 
from  that  charged  are  not  confes- 
sions. Kinchelow  v.  State,  5  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  9,  12.  If  the  admission  by 
defendant  of  the  commission  of  other 
crimes  than  that  charged  is  so  insep- 
arably connected  with  the  confession 
of  the  crime  for  which  he  is  on  trial 
that  it  cannot  be  severed,  it  may  be 
received,  the  jury  being  warned  that 
it  is  in  no  sense  evidence  of  the  crime 
charged.  Gore  v.  People,  162  111.  259, 
44  N.  E.  500.  An  admission  by  the 
accused  that  he  killed  deceased  be- 
cause of  facts  which  even,  if  true  do 
not  justify  or  excuse  the  killing  is  a 
confession.  Jones  v.  State,  130  Ga. 
274,  60  S.  E.  840. 

*  Commonwealth  v.  Ervine,  8  Dana 
(Ky.)  30. 

"Green  v.  State  (Fla.),  24  So.  537; 
State  V.  Briggs,  68  Iowa  416,  424,  27 
X.  W.  358;  Commonwealth  v.  Brown, 
T50  Mass.  330,  331,  23  N.  E.  49. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Lannan,  13  Al- 
len (Mass.)  563;  State  v.  Meyers,  99 
Mo.  107,  12  S.  W.  516,  519.  A 
demurrer  to  the  indictment  can  never 
be  construed  as  a  confession.  The 
accused    may    always    he    allowed    to 

16 — Underhill  Ckim.  I'v. 


show  why  he  pleaded  guilty  and  to 
prove  that  he  was  not  in  fact  guilty 
wherever  a  prior  plea  of  guilty  is 
used  against  him  as  a  confession  on 
a  subsequent  trial.  In  State  v.  Por- 
ter, 32  Ore.  135,  49  Pac.  964,  the 
court  said  after  quoting  almost  all 
the  text  writers.  "From  these  au- 
thorities we  take  it  that  the  admis- 
sion of  a  fact,  or  a  bundle  of  facts, 
from  which  quiet  is  directly  deduci- 
ble,  or  which  within  and  of  them- 
selves impart  guilt,  may  be  denomi- 
nated a  confession,  but  not  so  with 
the  admission  of  a  particular  act  or 
acts  or  circumstances  which  may  or 
may  not  involve  guilt,  and  which  is 
dependent  for  such  result  on  other 
facts  or  circumstances  to  be  estab- 
lished." .A^n  admission  by  the  ac- 
cused that  he  is  in  possession  of 
property  alleged  to  be  stolen  coupled 
with  exculpating  declarations  is  not  a 
confession  of  the  larceny.  State  v. 
Heidenreich,  29  Ore.  381,  45  Pac.  755- 
So  in  State  v.  Red,  53  Iowa  69,  4  N. 
W.  831,  the  accused  on  trial  for  mur- 
der admitted  he  had  in  his  possession 
jewelry  of  the  victim,  a  woman.  The 
action  of  the  court  in  calling  this 
admission  a  confession  was  held  to  be 


s  126 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


242 


§  126.  Voluntary  character  of  confessions. — Before  a  confession, 
either  judicial  or  extra-judicial,  can  be  received  as  such,  it  must 
first  be  shown  that  it  was  in  every  respect  freely  and  voluntarily 
made."    This  means  that  the  confession  must  not  be  obtained  by 


error.  The  test  is,  are  the  facts  stated 
by  the  accused,  assuming  them  to  be 
true,  consistent  with  his  innocence? 
If  they  are,  his  statement  is  an  ad- 
mission only  and  the  rules  of  law 
relating  to  confessions  do  not  apply 
to  it.  The  admission  may  create  a 
presumption  against  the  accused 
which  it  will  require  evidence  to  re- 
move. But  unless  the  guilt  of  the 
accused  is  the  sole  and  necessary  re- 
sultant condition  proceeding  from  or 
growing  out  of  the  facts  admitted, 
the  statement,  however  criminating,  is 
merely  an  admission  and  not  a  con- 
fession. 

Confessions  in  criminal  cases,  6 
Am.  St.  242,  251 ;  admissibihty  in 
evidence,  6  Am.  St.  242,  251 ;  ques- 
tion of  admissibility  for  court,  6  Am. 
St.  249;  whole  confession  must  be 
admitted,  6  Am.  St.  251 ;  confession 
elicited  by  questions,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  799-801 ;  presumption  as  to  vol- 
untariness, 18  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  857; 
presumption  as  to  character  of,  18  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  783;  determination  of 
character  of  confession,  18  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  777-794;  confession  without 
proof  of  corpus  delicti,  6  Am.  St. 
252;  reason  for  exclusion  of  confes- 
sion, 18  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  772;  col- 
lateral inducement  for  confession,  6 
Am.  St.  249 ;  statements  made  in  sleep 
as  confession,  6  Am.  St.  249;  subse- 
quent confessions,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  857-859;  effect  of  language  as- 
suming guilt  addressed  to  accused,  18 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  802;  confession  in- 
duced by  hope  or  fear,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  804-832;  promise  of  accused  to 
turn  state's  evidence,  6  Am.  St.  251; 


extrinsic  facts  ascertained  througli  in- 
admissible confession,  6  Am.  St.  250, 
251 ;  confession  in  prosecution  for 
bribery,  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2907;  in  prose- 
cution for  counterfeiting,  Elliott  Ev., 
§  2957;  in  prosecution  for  homicide, 
Elliott  Ev.,  §  3034;  in  prosecution 
for  perjury,  Elliott  Ev.,  §  3088;  in 
prosecution  for  rape,  Elliott  Ev., 
§  3103. 

"People  v.  Ward,  15  Wend.  (X. 
Y.)  231;  Commonwealth  v.  Taylor,  5 
Cush.  (Mass.)  605,  610;  Common- 
wealth v.  Morey,  i  Gray  (Mass.) 
461,  463 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Preece, 
140  Mass.  276,  277,  5  X.  E.  494;  Col- 
lins V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  141.  5  S. 
W.  848 ;  State  v.  Chambers,  45  La. 
Ann.  36,  38,  II  So.  944;  Ross  v.  State, 
67  yid.  286,  289,  10  Atl.  218;  Xichol- 
son  V.  State,  38  Md.  140,  153;  People 
V.  Taylor,  93  I\Iich.  638,  641,  53  X.  W. 
777;  Smith  V.  State,  88  Ga.  627,  629, 
15  S.  E.  675 ;  State  v.  Carson,  36  S. 
Car.  524,  531,  532,  15  S.  E.  588;  State 
V.  Jones,  54  Mo.  478,  479;  State  v. 
Kinder,  96  Mo.  548,  10  S.  W.  77; 
People  V.  Soto,  49  Cal.  67 ;  People  v. 
Fox,  121  X^.  Y.  449,  24  X.  E.  923,  aff'g 
50  Hun  (X^.  Y.)  604,  3  X'.  Y.  S.  359; 
People  V.  Deacons,  109  X'.  Y.  374,  16 
X^.  E.  676;  Fife  V.  Commonwealth,  29 
Pa.  429,  436;  Alfred  v.  State,  37 
Miss.  296,  306;  State  v.  Chisenhall, 
106  X.  Car.  676,  680,  II  S.  E.  518; 
Walker  v.  State,  136  Ind.  663,  668,  36 
X.  E.  356;  State  v.  Poole,  42  Wash. 
192,  84  Pac.  727;  State  v.  Daly,  210 
Mo.  664,  109  S.  W.  53;  McAlpine  v. 
State,  117  Ala.  93,  23  So.  130;  People 
V.  Rogers,  192  X'.  Y.  331,  85  X'  E. 
135 ;  State  v.  Berry,  50  La.  Ann.  1309, 


243  CONFESSIONS.  §    1 26 

any  sort  of  threat  or  violence  nor  by  any  promise,  either  direct 
or  impHed,  however  slight  the  hope  or  fear  produced  thereby, 
nor  by  the  exertion  of  any  influence.  And  while  circumstances 
are  usually  invoked  to  determine  whether  the  confession  is  vol- 
untary, yet  as  a  safe  general  rule,  it  may  be  said  that  the  state- 
ment will  be  presumed  to  be  voluntary,  unless  it  appears  that  it 
was  inspired  by  a  threat  or  a  menace  or  procured  by  promises  or 
inducements  or  the  expectation  of  some  hope  or  benefit.^"  A 
basis  must  be  laid  for  the  admission  of  the  confession  by  ascer- 
taining whether  the  prisoner  had  been  told  that  it  would  be 
advantageous  for  him  to  confess,  or  whether  any  threat  or  prom- 
ise had  been  made  to  him  in  connection  with  the  crime,  which 
was  sufficient  to  make  the  confession  involuntary.  If  the  con- 
fession is  the  result  of  the  pressure  of  a  promise  of  some  benefit, 
or  was  procured  by  a  threat,  it  will  be  excluded.  In  other  words, 
the  fact  that  accused  was  influenced  by  hope  or  fear  to  make  a 
confession  is  regarded  as  creating  so  strong  a  presumption  that 
the  confession  is  untrue,  that  the  law  rejects  it  as  worthless. 

The  preliminary  question,  was  the  confession  voluntary?  bear- 
ing directly  upon  its  competency  as  evidence,  must  be,  according 
to  the  majority  of  the  cases,  decided  by  the  court  as  a  mixed 
question  of  law  and  fact.^^     And  the  court  may  hear  evidence 

24  So.  329;  Mitchell  v.  State   (Miss.  ^■Anderson  v.   State,  133  Wis.  6or, 

1898),  24  So.  312;  Pearsall  v.   Com-  114  N.  W.  112. 

monwealth  (Ky.  1906),  92  S.  W.  589,  "  Hauk  v.    State,    148   Ind.  238,  46 

29  Ky.  L.  222 ;  Watts  v.  State,  99  Md.  N.    E.    127,   47   N.   E.   465 ;   Ford   v. 

30,  57  Atl.  542;  People  V.  Silvers,  6  State,    75    Miss.     loi,    21    So.    524; 

Cal.  App.  69,  92  Pac.  506;  People  v.  Hunter  v.  State,  74  Miss.  515,  21  So. 

Brasch,  193  X.  Y.  46,  53,  85   N.  E.  305;    Palmer  v.   State,   136  Ind.  393, 

809 ;  Fouse  V.  State  (Neb.)  119  N.  W.  396,  36  N.  E.   130;   Brown  v.   State, 

478;  Morris  v.  State,  146  Ala.  66,  41  71  Ind.  470,  473;  State  v.  Patterson, 

So.  274.     See,  also,  Undcrhill  on  Ev.,  "/-^  j\Io.  695,  706;  State  v.  Kinder,  96 

§  89.    "Voluntary  is  not  always  used  Mo.  548,  550,  10  S.  W.  77;  Brister  v. 

in  contradistinction  to  compulsory.  In  State,  26  Ala.   107,   129 ;  Simmons  v. 

many  cases  voluntary  means  proceed-  State,    61    Miss.    243,    257 ;    Redd    v. 

ing  from  the  spontaneous   operation  State,   69    Ala.    255,    259:    People    v. 

of  the  party's  own  mind,  free  from  Fox,  50  Hun   (N.  Y.)   604,  3  N.  Y. 

the  influence  of  any  extraneous  dis-  S.  359,  24  N.  E.  923,  afF'g  121  X.  Y. 

turbinp  cause."    People  v.  McMahon,  449;  Thomas  v.  State,  84  Ga.  (-i\%  618, 

15  X.  Y.  384.  3R6:   State  v.  Bnhanon,  to  S.  E.  tot6:  Ellis  v.  State.  65  Miss. 

142  X.  Car.  695,  55  S.  E.  797.  44,  3  So.  188,  7  Am.  St.  634;  People 


§     126  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  244 

from  both  sides  to  show  the  circumstances  under  which  the  con- 
fession was  made.'''''  And  as  the  question  is  one  wholly  for  the 
court  to  determine,  the  witness  who  testifies  to  what  was  said 
and  to  the  circumstances  should  not  be  permitted  to  state  that 
the  confession  was  voluntary."  The  court  must  be  allowed  a 
considerable  measure  of  discretion  in  determining  this  question. 
No  particular  threat  or  promise  producing"  a  confession  can  safely 
be  said  as  matter  of  law  to  render  the  confession  inadmissible, 
for  the  effect  of  the  threat  or  promise  may  be  neutralized  by 
other  facts  and  conditions.  The  admissibility  of  confessions  so 
largely  depends  upon  the  special  circumstances  of  each  case  that 
it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  formulate  any  rule  which  will 
embrace  all  the  cases.  And  as  the  question  is  addressed  in  the 
first  instance  to  the  judge,  and  since  his  discretion  must  be  con- 
trolled by  all  the  attendant  circumstances  the  courts  have  wisely 
foreborne  to  mark  with  absolute  precision  the  limits  of  admission 
and  exclusion.^''  But  numerous  authorities  hold  that  in  case  a 
conflict  of  evidence  or  room  for  doubt  exists  as  to  the  voluntary 
nature  of  the  confession,  the  court  ought  to  submit  the  confession 
to  the  jury  with  an  instruction  that  they  may  determine  from 

V.   Howes,   Si    Mich.  396,  401,   45  N.  this  point,  out  of  the  hearing  of  the 

W.    961;    Burton    v.    State,    107   Ala.  jurors.     Anderson    v.    State,    ^2    Ga. 

108,   18   So.  284;   People  V.  Siemsen,  98;  State  v.  Kinder,  96  Mo.  548,  550, 

153   Cal.  387,  95  Pac.  863:   Draughn  10  S.  \V.  -j-] ;  State  v.  KelW,  28  Ore. 

V.   State,   76  Miss.   574,   25    So.    153;  225,   42   Pac.   217,    52  Am.    St.    T]"]; 

Commonwealth  v.  Antaya,  184  Mass.  Holland  v.  State,  39  Fla.  178,  22  So. 

326,  68  X.  E.  331 ;  State  v.  Berberick  298.     It   has  been  held  error  not  to 

(IMont.  1909),  100  Pac.  209;  State  v.  determine  this  before  the  confession 

Blodgett,   50  Ore.   329,  92   Pac.  820;  is   submitted  to  the   jury.     Smith  v. 

State  V.  Sherman,  35  Mont.   512,  90  State,  88  Ga.  627,  629;  Ellis  v.  State, 

Pac.  981,  119  Am.   St.  869;  Hintz  v.  65  Miss.  44,  47,  3  So.  188,  7  Am.  St. 

State,   125  Wis.  405,  104  N.  W.  no;  634;    King    v.    State,    40    Ala.    314; 

State  V.  Landers,  21  S.  Dak.  606,  114  Brown    v.    State,    71    Ind.    470,    473; 

N.    W.    717;    State    v.    Stibbens,    188  Nolen    v.    State,    8    Tex.    App.    585; 

Mo.  387,  87  S.  W.  460.    It  is  the  duty  Commonwealth  v.  Culver,   126  Mass. 

of  the  court  to  hear  all  the  prelimi-  464.  466. 

nary  evidence  before  deciding  to  ad-  "a  Zuckerman    v.     People,    213    111. 

mit  or  reject  the  confession.     People  114,  72  N.  E.  741. 

V.  Rogers,   192  N.   Y.  331,  85    N.  E.  "Jones  v.  State  C'\la.\  47  So.  too. 

13s,  and  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  89.    And  '"^  Hopt    v.    People,    no   U.    S.   574. 

the  court  may  and  perhaps  should,  on  583,   28   L.   ed.    262,   4    Sup.   Ct.   202, 

request,    examine    the    witnesses    on  207. 


245 


CONFESSIONS. 


127 


the  evidence  whether  it  was  or  was  not  free  and  voluntary  and 
that  if  they  beHeve  from  all  the  evidence  that  it  was  induced  by 
threats  or  promises,  or  was  not  free  and  voluntary,  they  must 
reject  it  from  their  consideration,  though  they  may  believe  it  to  be 
true.'*' 

§  127.  Burden  of  proof  to  show  voluntary  character. — The  cases 
are  not  harmonious  upon  the  question  whether  the  prosecution 
has  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  the  free  and  voluntary  character 
of  the  confession.  Many  of  the  cases  sustain  the  affirmative  of 
this  proposition,  and  require  the  state  to  show  before  the  con- 
fession is  received  in  evidence  by  some  evidence  that  it  was  freely 
and  voluntarily  made."  Other  authorities  sustain,  at  least  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  the  very  reasonable  theory 
that  a  confession,  like  most  of  the  acts  and  utterances  which  are 
the  result  of  human  agency,  is  presumed  to  have  been  voluntary 
until  the  contrary  is  shown. ^'^     This  view  casts  the  burden  of 


^^  Commonwealth  v.  Preece,  140 
Mass.  2^6,  5  N.  E.  494;  Common- 
wealth V.  Piper,  120  Mass.  185,  188; 
People  V.  Barker,  60  Mich.  277,  298, 
27  N.  W.  539,  I  Am.  St.  SOin;  Stal- 
lings  V.  State,  47  Ga.  572;  Thomas 
V.  State,  84  Ga.  613,  618,  10  S.  E. 
1016;  People  V.  Kurtz,  42  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  335,  345,  3  N.  Y.  St.  715 ;  People 
V.  Howes,  81  Mich.  396,  401,  45  N. 
W.  961 ;  Wilson  v.  United  States,  162 
U.  S.  613,  40  L.  ed.  1090,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
895;  People  V.  Cassidy,  133  N.  Y. 
612,  30  N.  E.  1003,  44  N.  Y.  St.  869; 
Commonwealth  v.  Shew,  190  Pa.  St. 
23,  42  Atl.  377;  Kennon  v.  State,  46 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  359,  82  S.  W.  518; 
State  V.  Foster,  136  Iowa  527,  114 
X.  W.  36;  People  V.  White,  176  N. 
Y.  331,  68  N.  E.  630;  Johnson  v. 
State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  314,  94  S. 
W.  224;  State  V.  Stebhpns,  188  Mo. 
.387,  87  S.  W.  460;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hudson,  185  Mass.  402,  70  N.  E. 
4.36;  State  V.  Westcott,  130  Iowa  T, 
104    N.    W.   341 ;    Clay    v.    State,    15 


Wyo.  42,  86  Pac.  17,  544;  State  v. 
Von  Kutzleben,  136  Iowa  89,  113  N. 
W.  484;  Johnson  v.  State,  89  Miss. 
"J-JZ^  42  So.  606. 

"  People  V.  Soto,  49  Cal.  (>"] ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Swetland,  ^y  Mich.  53,  60,  43 
N.  W.  779;  Nicholson  v.  State,  38 
Md.  140,  153;  Barnes  v.  State,  36 
Tex.  356,  363 ;  State  v.  Johnson,  30 
La.  Ann.  881 ;  Amos  v.  State,  83  Ala. 
I,  3  So.  749,  3  Am.  St.  682;  Travers 
V.  United  States,  6  App.  D.  C.  450; 
Johnson  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
423,  88  S.  W.  223;  State  v.  Stallings, 
142  Ala.  112,  38  So.  261;  Jackson  v. 
State,  83  Ala.  "jd,  3  So.  847;  Smith 
V.  State,  74  Ark.  397,  85  S.  W.  1123; 
State  V.  Storms,  113  Iowa  385,  85  N. 
W.  610,  86  Am.  St.  380.  Sec  ex- 
haustive note  in  6  Am.  St.  244,  245; 
admission  as  affecting  burden  of 
proof  and  right  to  open  and  close, 
6r  L.  R.  A.  562n. 

'^Rufer  V.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  464. 
470;  State  V.  Patterson,  "jt^  Mo.  695, 
705;    People    V.    Cassidy,    133    N.    Y. 


12/ 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


246 


proving-  that  the  confession  was  invokintary  upon  the  accused. 
In  any  case  it  is  his  right  to  show  by  prehminary  evidence  that 
the  confession  was  not  voluntary,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court, 
in  determining  the  competenc}^  of  the  confession,  not  only  to  con- 
sider the  evidence  for  the  state,  showing  the  confession  was  vol- 
untary, but  the  evidence  elicited  by  the  accused  to  prove  the  con- 
trary in  his  favor  as  well.^" 

A  refusal,  before  the  confession  is  admitted,  to  allow  counsel 
for  the  prisoner  to  cross-examine  the  witness  as  to  the  voluntary 
character  of  the  confession;-"  or  to  allow  the  accused  to  testify, 
and  to  explain  his  mental  condition  when  it  was  made;-^  or  to 


612,  613,  30  N.  E.  1003,  44  N.  Y.  St. 
869;  State  V.  Howard,  35  S.  Car. 
197,  14  S.  E.  481 ;  Williams  v.  State, 
19  Tex.  App.  276;  Commonwealth 
V.  Culver,  126  Mass.  464,  465;  Eber- 
hart  V.  State,  47  Ga.  598,  608;  State 
V.  Davis,  34  La.  Ami.  351,  353;  Jen- 
kins V.  State,  119  Ga.  431,  46  S.  E. 
628;  Sanchez  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  179,  78  S.  W.  504;  Thurman  v. 
State,  169  Ind.  240,  82  N.  E.  64; 
State  V.  Armstrong,  203  Mo.  554,  102 
S.  W.  503;  State  V.  Washing,  36 
Wash.  485,  78  Pac.  1019;  State  v. 
Icenbice,  126  Iowa  16,  loi  N.  W. 
273;  Richardson  v.  State,  145  Ala. 
46,  41  So.  82;  Campbell  v.  State,  150 
Ala.  70,  43  So.  743;  Stoddard  v. 
State,  132  Wis.  520,  112  N.  W.  453; 
Braham  v.  State,  143  Ala.  28,  38  So. 
919;  Smith  V.  State,  142  Ala.  14,  39 
So.  329. 

**  State  V.  Fidment,  35  Iowa  541 ; 
Geiger  v.  State,  25  Ohio  C.  C.  742. 

^''Riifer  V.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  464, 
471 ;  State  v.  Miller,  42  La.  Ann. 
1 186,  it88,  8  So.  309,  21  Am.  St. 
418;  People  V.  Fiori,  123  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  174,  185,  108  N.  Y.  S.  416; 
Willis  V.  State,  43  Xeb.  102,  61  N.  W. 
254,  205;  State  V.  Hill,  65  N.  J.  L. 
626,  47  Atl.  814,  815;  Roesel  v.  State. 
62  N.  J.  L.  216,  41  Atl.  408;   People 


V.  Fox,  121  N.  Y.  449,  24  N.  E.  923; 
People  V.  White,  176  N.  Y.  331,  350, 
68  N.  E.  630. 

"^  Simmons  v.  State,  61  Miss.  243. 
258;  Jackson  v.  State,  83  Ala.  76,  78, 
3  So.  847;  Palmer  v.  State,  136  Ind. 
393,  397,  2,^  N.  E.  130;  State  v.  Kin- 
der, 96  Mo.  548,  ID  S.  W.  77,  78; 
Lefevre  v.  State,  50  Ohio  St.  584. 
588,  35  N.  E.  52.  When  a  confession 
is  offered  by  the  state  in  a  criminal 
case,  it  is  the  right  of  the  counsel 
of  the  prisoner,  before  it  is  admitted, 
to  cross-examine  the  witness  who 
purposes  to  testify  to  it  as  to  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  the  making 
of  it,  and  the  defense  may  also  call, 
at  the  same  time,  independent  wit- 
nesses and  examine  them,  going  thor- 
oughly into  the  whole  matter,  as  to 
how  the  confession  came  to  be  made, 
the  parties  present,  the  physical  con- 
dition and  state  of  mind  of  the  pris- 
oner at  the  time  it  was  made,  and 
then  the  court,  with  all  these  fact? 
before  it,  is  to  pass  upon  its  admis- 
sion. State  v.  Hill,  65  N.  J.  L.  626. 
47  Atl.  814,  815.  In  Willis  v.  State, 
43  Xeb.  102,  61  X.  W.  254,  on  page 
255,  it  is  said :  "In  the  trial  of  a 
criminal  case,  where  the  state  calls 
a  witness  for  the  purpose  of  proving 
a    confession  made   by  the   prisoner. 


247 


CONFESSIONS. 


§    I2j 


show  by  the  evidence  of  others  that  it  was  improperly  obtained, 
is  reversible  error.-^ 


§  128.    Circumstances  under  which  confession  becomes  involuntary. 

• — It  is  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  lay  down  any  general 
rule  by  which  the  amount  or  degree  of  duress  or  improper  influ- 
ence which  will  destroy  the  voluntary  character  of  a  confession 
can  be  regulated  or  measured."^ 

The  statement  that  a  confession  which  has  been  extorted  by 
threats  or  procured  by  promises  is  not  voluntary,  and  hence  is 
inadmissible  as  likely  to  be  untrue,  is  not  difficult  to  understand. 
But  it  is  very  difficult  to  ascertain  what  language  used  to  the 
prisoner  would,  under  the  particular  circumstances  of  each  case, 
constitute  such  a  threat  or  promise.  The  sex,  age,  disposition, 
education,  experience,  character,  intelligence  and  previous  train- 
ing of  the  prisoner  are  elements  to  be  considered  in  determining 
whether  the  confession  was  or  was  not  free  and  voluntary.-*  For 
it  is  well  known  that  a  determined,  courageous  and  experienced 


before  the  witness  is  allowed  to  de- 
tail such  information  it  is  the  privi- 
lege of  defendant's  counsel,  and  the 
better  practice,  to  cross-examine  the 
witness  as  to  the  circumstances  un- 
der which  the  confession  proposed  to 
be  detailed  was  given.  Counsel  can- 
not wait  vmtil  the  witness  has  an- 
swered and  then  move  to  strike  the 
statement  from  the  record  if  the  an- 
swer is  responsive  to  the  inquiry." 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Culver,  126 
Mass.  464,  466,  467.  That  the  de- 
fendant may  himself  testify  to  the 
involuntary  character  of  the  confes- 
sion, see  State  v.  Kinder,  96  Mo.  548, 
55^  10  S.  W.  ^T,  People  v.  Fiori,  123 
App.  Div.  CN.  Y.)  174,  185,  T08  N. 
Y.  S.  416.  A  witness  who  testifies  to 
facts  showing  a  confession  was  vol- 
untary may  be  impeached  by  proof 
that  on  a  prior  occasion  he  had  stated 
the  contrary.     State  v.  Peter,  14  La. 


Ann.  521.  When  confession  is  vol- 
untary, see  note  in  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  758,  768. 

-^In  Hopt  v.  People,  no  U.  S.  574, 
28  L.  ed.  262,  4  Sup.  Ct.  202,  the 
court  says :  "The  admissibility  of 
such  evidence  so  largely  depends 
upon  the  special  circumstances  con- 
nected with  the  confession  that  it  is 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  formu- 
late a  rule  that  will  comprehend  all 
cases,  as  the  question  is  necessarily 
addressed  in  the  first  instance  to  the 
judge,  and  since  his  discretion  must 
be  controlled  by  all  attendant  circum- 
stances, the  courts  have  wisely  for- 
borne to  mark  with  absolute  precision 
the  limits  of  admission  and  exclu- 
sion. ' 

-'Williams  v.  State,  T03  Ala.  33,  15 
So.  662;  State  V.  Fredericks.  85  Mo. 
145 ;  Cain  v.  State,  18  Tex.  387. 


128  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  248 


man  is  not  so  susceptible  to  threats,  or  to  promises  of  immunity, 
as  a  feeble  woman,  or  a  person  of  weak  intellect  or  will  power.-^ 

Aside  from  the  circumstances  of  the  accused  as  determining 
the  voluntary  nature  of  the  confession,  many  things  are  held,  as 
matter  of  law,  to  render  a  confession  involuntary.  Thus,  if  there 
is  an  express  promise  that  a  confession  will  benefit  the  accused, 
or  a  threat,  though  somewhat  vague  and  indefinite  in  character, 
the  confession  will  l^e  involuntary.  This  was  held  in  a  case 
where  the  chief  of  police  told  the  accused  that  he  would  go  to 
the  penitentiary  and  advised  him  that  he  had  better  confess,  say- 
ing that  it  would  do  the  accused  good  if  he  would  admit  that  he 
was  at  the  place  of  the  crime.  "*^ 

So,  also,  confessions  made  while  the  accused  is  in  bodily  fear 
of  his  life,  are  involuntary,  though  it  may  be  difficult,  under  the 
circumstances,  to  connect  the  fear  with  the  confession:  thus  state- 
ments made  by  the  accused  while  he  was  in  custody,  with  a  howl- 
ing mob  around  him,  are  not  admissible  as  confessions.-' 

A  statement  made  by  the  accused  while  or  after  bystanders  were 
placing  or  had  placed  a  rope  around  his  neck  and  had  threatened  to 
hang  him  or  had  whipped  him  or  otherwise  physically  ill-treated 
him,  is  involuntary,  and  inadmissible.-^  So,  it  has  been  held  that 
a  confession  made  in  reply  to  the  charge  by  a  police  officer  that 
the  accused  had  been  lying  to  him  and  that  he  had  better  tell  the 
truth  is  inadmissible.-'' 

So,  where  the  father  of  the  accused  threatened  the  accused 
with  a  shotgun  and  said  to  him  "You  are  my  prisoner,  I  have  a 
right  to  arrest  you,  you  shall  go  and  tell  the  sheriff,  county  at- 
torney and  coroner's  jury  all  about  the  crime  and  you  will  get 
clear.  If  you  don't,  you  will  get  convicted,"  it  was  held  that  the 
confession  thus  obtained  was  involuntary.^"  And.  though  a  wit- 
ness in  testifying  to  a  confession  swears  that  no  promise  or  threat 
had  been  employed,   it  may  be   shown  by  other  e^■idence  that 

^Biscoe  V.    State,  67    Md.    6,    7,   8  S2   S.    W.   203;   Jackson   v.   State,   50 

Atl.  571.  Tex.  Cr.  App.  302,  97  S.  W.  312. 

^° Maxwell    v.    State    (Miss.    1906),  "'West   v.    United    States.    20   .-Xpp. 

40  So.  615.  D.  C.  347. 

"  Bruner  v.   United    States,   4    Ind.  ™  State  v.    Force,   69   Neb.    162,  95 

Ter.  580,  76  S.  W.  244-  N-  W.  42. 

**  Edmonson  v.  State,  72  Ark.  585, 


249 


CONFESSIONS. 


§    129 


threats  or  promises  were  used  sufficient  to  keep  out  the  confes- 
sion.^^ 

§  129.  Confessions  made  while  under  arrest. — The  mere  fact  that 
the  defendant  was  under  arrest,  or  was  in  the  charge  of  armed 
pohce  officers  when  he  made  his  confession,^"  or  was  handcuffed 
and  chained,^^  or  tied,^*  (if  he  is  not  tied  in  such  a  manner  as 


=' Hardin  v.  State,  66  Ark.  53,  48 
S.  W.  904,  907. 

^'Cox  V.  People,  80  N.  Y.  500,  515; 
Willis  V.  State,  93  Ga.  208,  19  S.  E. 
43;  People  V.  Rogers,  18  N.  Y.  9, 
T2  Am.  Dec.  484 ;  People  v.  Druse, 
103  N.  Y.  655.  656,  8  N.  E.  7ZZ,  i 
Silv.  Ct.  App.  182,  5  N.  Y.  Cr.  10,  3 
N.  Y.  St.  617:  Allen  v.  State,  12  Tex. 
App.  190;  State  V.  Sopher,  70  Iowa 
494,  497,  30  X.  W.  917;  Pierce  v. 
United  States,  160  U.  S.  355,  40  L. 
ed.  454,  16  Sup.  Ct.  321 ;  State  v. 
Jones,  47  La.  Ann.  1524,  18  So. 
515;  Jackson  v.  Commonwealth,  100 
Ky.  239,  38  S.  W.  422,  1091,  18 
Ky.  L.  795,  66  Am.  St.  336:  State 
V.  McClain,  137  Wo.  307,  38  S. 
W.  906;  Williams  v.  State,  yj  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  147,  38  S.  W.  999;  Carr  v. 
State,  81  Ark.  589,  99  S.  W.  831; 
State  V.  Worthen,  124  Iowa  408,  100 
N.  W.  330,  331 ;  People  v.  Walker, 
140  Cal.  153,  yz  Pac.  831,  833;  State 
V.  Berry,  50  La.  Ann.  1309,  24  So. 
329;  Commonwealth  v.  Williams,  171 
Mass.  461,  50  N.  E.  1035 :  State  v. 
Trusty,  i  Penn.  (Del.)  319,  40  .A.tl. 
766;  Carpenter  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  92  S.  W.  552,  29  Ky.  L.  107; 
State  V.  Banusik  (N.  J.  1906),  64 
Atl.  994;  Hamilton  v.  State,  147  Ala. 
no,  41  So.  940;  State  v.  Henderson, 
74  S.  Car.  477,  55  S.  E.  117;  State 
V.  Exum,  138  N.  Car.  599,  50  S.  E. 
283;  Ivey  V.  State.  4  Ga.  App.  828, 
62  S.  E.  565;  State  v.  Jones,  145  N. 
Car.  466,  59  .S.  E.  353:  Brown  v. 
State,  3  Ga.  App.  479,  60  S.  E.  216; 
Gibson   v.    State,   47   Tex.    Cr.    App. 


489,  83  S.  W.  1 1 19;  Reeves  v.  State, 
47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  340,  83  S.  W.  803; 
Follis  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  186, 
Id  S.  W.  242;  Fonseca  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  28,  85  S.  W.  1069; 
State  V.  Church.  199  Mo.  605,  98  S. 
W.  16;  Pearsall  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  92  S.  W.  589,  29  Ky.  L.  222; 
State  V.  Armstrong,  203  Mo.  554,  102 
S.  W.  503;  State  V.  Robertson,  iir 
La-  35,  35  So.  375;  McNish  v.  State, 
47  Fla.  69,  z^  So.  176:  Williams  v. 
State,  48  Fla.  65,  zi  So.  521 ;  State 
V.  Rugero,  117  La.  1040,  42  So.  495; 
Parrish  v.  State,  139  Ala.  16.  36  So. 
1012;  Stevens  v.  State.  138  Ala.  71, 
35  So.  122;  State  V.  Davis.  6  Idaho 
159.  53  Pac.  678;  State  v.  Icenbice, 
126  Iowa  16,  loi  X.  W.  273 ;  State 
V.  Westcott,  130  Iowa  i.  104  X.  W. 
341;  State  V.  Smith  (X.  Car.).  50  S. 
E.  859;  State  V.  Blodgett.  50  Ore. 
329,  92  Pac.  820.  Contra.  Binkley  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  54,  100  S.  W. 
780.  Confession  by  one  illegally  im- 
prisoned, 6  Am.  St.  244n,  or  by  one 
under  "restraint,  t8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
795-798n. 

''  State  V.  Whitfield.  109  X.  Car. 
876,  877,  13  S.  E.  726:  Young  V. 
State,  68  Ala.  569;  State  v.  George, 
S.Jones  (N.  Car.)  233:  Hathaway  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  82  S.  W.  400, 
26  Ky.  L.  630;  United  States  v.  Xar- 
dello,  4  Mackey  (D.  C.)  .503;  Dun- 
more  V.  State,  86  Miss.  788.  39  So. 
69.  Contra.  Xolcn  v.  State,  14  Tc.x. 
App.  474,  480,  46  .'\m.  247n. 

"State  V.  Rogers,  112  N.  Car.  874. 


129 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


2;o 


to  produce  pain  or  extort  a  confession),  or  in  prison/""'  will  not 
make  a  confession  involuntary.  But  the  confession  of  a  prisoner, 
a  boy  eighteen  years  of  age.  made  while  he  was  in  the  hands  of  a 
large  armed  mob  which  had  placed  a  rope  about  his  neck,  was 
rejected  as  involuntary.^'' 

The  practice  of  taking  the  accused  immediately  after  his  arrest 
before  the  prosecuting  attorney  and  then  and  there  obtaining  a 
confession  from  him  is  not  to  be  commended.  Any  confession 
made  under  such  circumstances,  however,  is  not  inadmissible  if 
it  is  voluntary.^' 

The  prosecuting  attorney  is  not  a  magistrate,  and  the  hearing 


^76,  17  S.  E.  297;  State  v.  Patterson, 
72,  Mo.  693,  707. 

^^Commonwealth  v.  Smith,  119 
Mass.  305,  311;  People  v.  Rogers,  18 
N.  Y.  9,  14,  72  Am.  Dec.  484;  Mur- 
phy V.  People,  63  N.  Y.  590,  597; 
Ward  V.  People,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.)  395; 
Cox  V.  People,  80  N.  Y.  500,  515,  19 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  430,  436.  If  by  statute 
a  confession  is  inadmissible  because 
at  the  time  the  defendant  is  in  jail, 
it  is  immaterial  that  he  is  confined  for 
another  crime  than  that  then  being 
tried.  Neiderluck  v.  State,  21  Tex. 
App.  320,  328,  17  S.  W.  467;  Nicks 
V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  i,  48  S.  W. 
186.  The  fact  that  the  prisoner  was 
held  without  process,  or  otherwise  in 
illegal  custody,  does  not  exclude  the 
confession.  Balbo  v.  People,  80  N. 
Y.  484,  499,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.)  424; 
State  V.  Carpenter,  32  Wash.  254, 
73  Pac.  357;  Green  v.  State,  40  Fla. 
19T,  2^  So.  851. 

^°  State  V.  Young,  52  La.  Ann.  478, 
27  So.  50;  State  V.  Revells,  34  La. 
Ann.  381,  384,  44  Am.  436.  A  deputy 
marshal  may  testify  to  a  voluntary 
confession.  Perovich     v.     LTnited 

States,  205  U.  S.  86,  51  L.  ed.  722,  27 


Sup.  Ct.  456.  The  confession  of  the 
accused  made  while  he  is  in  jail  to 
another  prisoner  who  is  also  in  the 
same  jail,  and  before  whom  the  ac- 
cused was  brought  that  he  might  be 
identified,  was  received  in  Clay  v. 
State,  IS  Wyo.  42,  86  Pac.  17.  "The 
fact  that  the  prisoner  was  tied  dur- 
ing his  preliminary  examination 
would  not  in  itself  constitute  a  valid 
objection  to  the  evidence,  unless  it 
appeared  that  he  was  tied  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  produce  pain,  or  to  tend 
to  induce  or  extort  from  him  a  con- 
fession. State  v.  Cruse,  74  N.  Car. 
491.  We  do  not  commend  the  prac- 
tice, however,  if  such  there  be,  of 
keeping  the  prisoner  shackled  or  tied 
while  before  the  committing  magis- 
trate on  the  preliminary  examination. 
The  law  should  be  the  same  there 
as  upon  the  trial.  The  dictates  of 
humanity  would  require  that,  unless 
there  should  be  some  strong  reason 
to  the  contrary,  he  should  be  freed 
from  such  physical  restraint."  State 
V.  Rogers,  112  N.  Car.  874,  17  S.  E. 
297. 

=>■  State  V.  Stibbens,  188  Mo.  387,  S7 
S.  W.  460. 


251  CONFESSIONS.  8    1 3© 

before  him  is  not  a  judicial  hearing  under  a  statute  which  entitles 
the  accused  to  counsel  and  a  warning.^®  The  suspicious  charac- 
ter of  a  confession  thus  procured  may  be  modified,  if  not  wholly 
removed,  wdien  the  accused  is  advised,  at  the  hearing  before  the 
prosecuting  attorney,  of  his  right  to  counsel  and  to  remain  silent 
and  is  warned  that  his  statements  may  be  used  against  him.^^ 
The  same  rule  applies  to  all  statements  made  by  the  accused  after 
his  arrest  to  persons  having  him  in  custody,  for,  however  strong 
the  testimony  of  the  police  officials  is  that  a  confession  was  free 
and  voluntary,  a  suspicion  and  a  doubt  of  its  voluntary  character 
remain  which  persist  until  it  shall  be  clearly  shown  that  the  ac- 
cused was  not  threatened  and  that  he  was  fully  advised  of  his 
rights.  The  evidence  showing  that  he  was  advised  of  his  rights 
ought,  under  such  circumstances,  to  be  affirmative,  for  in  spite 
of  the  presumption  that  every  one  knows  the  law,  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  accused  was  warned  and  that  he  was  informed  as 
to  his  legal  rights  to  remain  silent  while  under  arrest.^'' 

§  130.  Effect  of  cautioning  the  accused. — Aside  from  statute  the 
fact  that  a  confession,  which  is  otherwise  admissible,  is  made 
without  the  accused  having  been  cautioned  by  the  court  or  by 
the  person  to  whom  the  confession  is  made  that  what  he  says 
may  be  used  against  him,  does  not  render  it  incompetent.'*^ 

The  statute  in  Texas  requires  that  the  accused  shall  be  cau- 
tioned, and  a  confession  made  while  the  prisoner  is  in  jail,  in 
custody,  or  under  arrest,  is  inadmissible  where  it  is  not  shown 
that  the  accused  was  cautioned  that  what  he  said  might  be  used 
against  him  unless  the  fruits  of  the  crime  are  discovered  in  pursu- 
ance of  and  as  a  result  of  the  confession. ■*- 

''  People   V.   Randazzio,   194  N.   Y.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  App.  461,  80  S.  W. 

147,  87  N.  E.  112.  1008;  McDaniel  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 

""'State   V.    Berberick    (Mont.),    100  App.  560,  81   S.  W.  301;  Vaughn  v. 

Pac.  209.  State,  51  Tex-  Cr.  App.  180,  loi  S.  W. 

*"  Daniels  v.  State  (Fla.),  48  So.  747.  445. 

"  Reg.  V.  .Arnold,  8  C.  &  P.  621,  622;        •*-  Curry  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

Reg.   V.   Priest,  2  Cox  Cr.   Cas.  378;  158,  94  S.  W.  1058;  Vaughn  v.  State. 

Simon   v.    State,    36    Miss.    636,   639;  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  180,  lOi  S.  W.  445; 

State  V.  Hand,  71  N.  J.  L.  137,  58  Atl.  McKinney  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

641:  Commonwealth  v.  Mosler,  4  Pa.  372,  50  S.  W.  708;  Morales  v.  State. 

St.  264;  State  V.  Baker,  58  S.  Car.  in,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  234,  36  S.  W.  43.=;, 

36  S.  E.  501;   State  v.  Workman,   15  846;  Alanis  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.). 

S.  Car.  540,  545.    See  also  Parker  v.  81  S.  W.  709;  Black  v.  State,  46  Tex. 


.^     130  CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE.  252 

The  fact  that  the  accused  is  cautioned  that  what  he  says  will 
be  committed  to  writing  and  may  or  might  be  used  on  his  trial 
as  evidence  against  him,  does  not  render  a  voluntary  confession 
inadmissible." 

Under  the  Texas  statute  not  only  must  the  accused  be  cau- 
tioned, but  it  must  appear  from  the  evidence  that  the  confession 
was  made  within  such  a  time  after  the  caution  was  given  that  its 
effect  had  not  disappeared  from  the  mind  of  the  accused.**  The 
length  of  the  period  required  depends  upon  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances of  each  case  and  is  a  question  for  the  court.  The  effect 
of  the  caution  will  be  presumed  to  continue  for  a  reasonable 
period,  and  a  confession  made  a  day  or  two  after  the  caution  or 
warning  was  given  has  been  accepted. ^^ 

As  to  the  language  to  be  used  in  cautioning  the  accused,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  words  of  the  statute  shall  be  precisely  fol- 
lowed. The  simplest  and  plainest  language  is  advisable.  Any 
language  conveying  to  his  mind  the'  fact  that  the  statement  he 
makes  incriminating  himself  may  or  will  be  offered  in  evidence 
against  him  at  his  trial  is  usually  sufficient.*** 

But  a  warning  that  anything  he  may  say  can  be  used  either  for 
or  against  him  does  not  comply  with  the  statute,  and  renders  the 
confession  inadmissible.*^ 

Cr.  App.  590,  81  S.  W.  302;  White  v.  Baker  v.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  i,  8  S. 

State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  38  S.  W.  169.  W.  23,  8  Am.  St.  427. 

"Reg.  V.  Holmes,  i  C.  &  K.  248,  i  '"State  v.  DeGraff,  113  X.  Car.  638, 

Cox  Cr.  Cas.  9;   Reg.  v.  Attwood,  5  18  S.  E.  507,  508;  State  v.  Rogers,  112 

Cox  Cr.   Cas.   322,  223;   Calloway  v.  X.  Car.  874,  17  S.  E.  297,  298;  Ran- 

State,  103  Ala.  27,  15  So.  821;  Maples  som  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1902),  70 

V.   State,  3  Heisk.    (Tenn.)    408,  411,  S.  W.  960. 

413;  State  V.  Church,  199  Mo.  605,  98  "Perry  v.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

S.  W.  16;  Rizzolo  V.  Commonwealth,  540,  61  S.  W.  400;  Pryor  v.  State,  40 

126  Pa.  St.  54,  72,  17  Atl.  520;  Com-  Tex.  Cr.  App.  643.  51  S.  W.  375;  Guin 

monwealth    v.    Johnson,    217    Pa.    77,  v.   State    (Tex.   1899),   50   S.   W.   350. 

66  Atl.   233;   United   States  v.   Kirk-  The  silence  of  the  accused  after  the 

wood,  5  Utah  123,  13  Pac.  234;  State  caution  has  been  given  him  cannot  be 

V.  Carr,  37  Vt.  191.  used    against    him    as    a    confession. 

"Binkley  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Kirby  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  13.  5  S. 

54,  100  S.  W.  780.  W.  165.    So  generally  liis  cf^nduct  in- 

*^Maddox   v.    State,    41    Tex.    205;  dicating  guilt  occurring  after  lie  has 

.Adams  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  285,  been  cautioned  is  not  admissible.   Eul- 

33  S.  W.  354,  356:  Baldwin  v.  State  cher  v.  State.  28  Tex.  App.  465.  13  S. 

(Tex.    Cr.    App.),    28    S.    W.    951;  W.  750.   Generally,  unless  there  is  an 


253 


COXFESSIOXS. 


I.^O 


If  it  plainly  appear  that  a  confession  is  voluntary,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary, at  least  in  the  absence  of  suspicious  circumstances,  to 
prove  that  from  the  moment  of  the  prisoner's  arrest  to  that  of  his 
confession  no  improper  inducement  was  offered.**  A  voluntary 
confession  will  be  received,  though  it  may  appear  that  immedi- 
ately after  his  apprehension  the  accused  had  been  threatened,  but 
without  effect,  in  order  to  procure  a  confession.*^  It  must  be 
shown  that  the  promise  or  threat  has  been  withdrawn. 

Even  though  an  original  confession  may  have  been  obtained 
by  such  means  as  will  exclude  it,  a  subsequent  confession  of  the 
same  or  of  like  facts  may  and  should  be  admitted,  if  the  court 
shall  believe  from  the  length  of  time  intervening,  or  from  any 
other  facts  in  evidence,  that  the  improper  influence  has  been  re- 
moved.^*'  The  influence  of  the  threat  or  promise  under  which 
the  first  confession  has  been  made  and  because  of  which  the  con- 
fession will  be  excluded  will  be  presumed  to  continue  to  the  time 
of  a  subsequent  confession  unless  it  is  affirmatively  shown  to  have 
been  removed.'^    This  presumption  must  be  overcome  before  the 


express  statute  requiring  a  caution, 
mere  admissions  not  constituting  con- 
fessions are  received  without  the  cau- 
tion being  given.  People  v.  Simpson, 
48  Mich.  474,  12  X.  W.  662;  Roessel 
V.  State,  62  X.  J.  L.  216,  41  Atl.  408. 

*^Hopt  V.  People,  no  U.  S.  574,  584, 
28  L.  ed.  262,  4  Sup.  Ct.  202. 

"McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala.  154; 
Sarah  v.  State,  28  Ga.  576;  State  v. 
Chambers,  39  Iowa  179;  Walker  v. 
State,  7  Tex.  App.  245,  263,  32  Am. 
595 ;  State  v.  Jones,  54  Mo.  478,  480 ; 
People  V.  Jim  Ti,  32  Cal.  60,  63 ;  State 
v.  Potter,  18  Conn.  166,  179;  Common- 
wealth V.  Howe,  132  Mass.  250;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Crocker,  108  Mass.  464; 
Lynes  v.  State,  36  Miss.  617;  People 
V.  MacKinder,  80  Hun  fX.'Y.)  40,  29 
N.  Y.  S.  842,  9  X.  Y.  Cr.  267 ;  Moore 
V.  Commonwealth,  2  Leigh  (Va.)  701 ; 
State  V.  Gregory.  50  X.  Car.  315. 

=•  State  V.  Guild,  10  X.  J.  L.  163, 
18  Am.  404;  Simon  v.  State,  36  Miss. 


636,  639;  Hardy  v.  United  States,  3 
App.  D.  C.  35;  State  v.  Carr,  Z7  Vt. 
191,  195;  United  States  v.  Nardello, 
4  Mackey  D.  C.  503;  State  v.  Hash, 
12  La.  Ann.  895,  896;  Levison  v. 
State,  54  Ala.  520;  State  v.  Willis,  71 
Conn.  293,  41  Atl.  820;  State  v.  Fos- 
ter, 136  Iowa  527,  114  X^.  W.  36; 
Dixon  V.  State,  116  Ga.  186,  42  S.  E. 
357;  Andrews  v.  People,  23  Colo. 
I93>  79  Pac.   1031;  State  v.   Howard, 

17  N.  H.  171;  State  v.  Fisher,  51  X. 
Car.  478;  Jackson  v.  State,  39  Ohio 
St.  :i7;  Thompson  v.  Commonwealth 
20  Gratt.  (Va.)  724. 

"State  V.   Guild,   to  X.  J.   L.    163, 

18  Am.  Dec.  404;  Williams  v.  State, 
69  Ark.  599,  65  S.  W.  103,  105 ;  State 
V.  Lowhorne,  (^  X^.  Car.  638;  State 
V.  Hash,  12  La.  Ann.  895.  986 ;  State 
V.  Drake,  82  X.  Car.  592;  Murray 
V.  State,  25  Fla.  528,  6  So.  498 :  State 
V.  Pirown,  y;i  Mo.  631 ;  Rnhinson  v. 
People,    159    111.    115,  42    X.   E.    375; 


§  131 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


254 


later  confession  can  be  received  as  evidence.     And  evidence  to 
overcome  or  rebut  it  must  be  clear,  strong  and  satisfactory.'"^^" 

§  131,  Confessions  under  oath. — The  admissions  or  incriminating 
statements  of  the  accused  are  not  to  be  rejected  solely  because 
they  were  made  under  oath.  A  distinction  is  made  between  dec- 
larations made  under  oath  before  the  accused  was  arrested,  or 
before  suspicion  attached  to  him,  and  declarations  made  subse- 
quently to  his  arrest.  The  former,  though  in  fact  confessions, 
are  not  rejected.  Thus  the  testimony  of  the  accused,  if  it  was 
voluntarily  given  as  a  witness  on  a  prior  trial  of  himself;'"  or 


Commonwealth  v.  Knapp,  10  Pick. 
(Mass.)  477,  486,  20  Am.  Dec.  534; 
Thompson  v.  Commonwealth,  20 
Gratt.  (Va.)  724,  731;  Common- 
wealth V.  Harman,  4  Fa.  269;  Simon 
V.  State,  Z7  Miss.  288,  295;  Cofifee  v. 
State,  25  Fla.  501,  512,  6  So.  493,  2^ 
Am.  St.  525;  Redd  v.  State,  69  Ala. 
255,  260;  State  V.  Jones,  54  Mo.  478, 
480;  State  V.  Chambers,  39  Iowa  179; 
State  V.  Drake,  82  N.  Car.  592;  State 
V.  Wintzingerode,  9  Ore.  153 ; 
Thompson  v.  Commonwealth,  20  Gratt. 
(Va.)  724;  United  States  v.  Chap- 
man, 4  Am.  Law  J.  (N.  S.)  440,  25 
Fed.  Cas.  14783;  Reason  v.  State 
(Miss.  1909),  48  So.  820;  State  v. 
Wood  (La.  1909),  48  So.  438. 

'"-  Porter  v.  State,  55  Ala.  95 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Cullen,  iii  Mass. 
435,  437;  State  v.  Lowhorne,  66  N. 
Car.  638;  State  v.  Carr,  2>7  Vt.  191, 
195,"  Commonwealth  v.  Phillips, 
(Ky.),  82  S.  W.  286,  26  Ky.  L.  543; 
!Mathis  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  13 
S.  W.  360,  II  Ky.  L.  882;  State  v. 
Washington,  40  La.  Ann.  669,  4  So. 
864;  State  V.  Drake,  113  N.  Car.  624, 
628,  18  S.  E.  166;  Reg.  V.  Doherty, 
13  Cox  C.  C.  23.  It  is  a  well-settled 
rule  that  if  promises  or  threats  have 
been  used,  it  must  be  made  to  appear 
that  their  influence  has  been  entirely 


done  away  with  before  subsequent 
confessions  can  be  deemed  voluntary 
and  therefore  admissible.  State  v. 
Drake,  113  N.  Car.  624,  628,  18  S.  E. 
166,  and  see  Coffee  v.  State,  25  Fla. 
SOI,  512,  6  So.  493,  23  Am.  St.  525,  for 
a  full  citation  of  cases.  It  is  sufficient 
to  exclude  the  latest  confession  if  it 
may  have  proceeded  from  prior  ex- 
isting motives.  Commonwealth  v. 
Cullen,  III  Mass.  435,  437. 

"People  V.  McMahon,  15  N.  Y. 
384,  392;  Commonwealth  v.  Reyn- 
olds, 122  Mass.  454,  458;  Williams  v. 
Commonwealth,  29  Pa.  St.  102,  no; 
People  V.  Kelley,  47  Cal.  125 ;  Dick- 
erson  v.  State,  48  Wis.  288,  293,  4  N. 
W.  321;  State  V.  Oliver,  55  Kan.  711, 
41  Pac.  954;  State  v.  Campbell,  "^z 
Kan.  688,  85  Pac.  784,  788,  9  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  533n;  Miller  v.  People, 
216  111.  309,  74  N.  E.  743 ;  State  v. 
Finch,  71  Kan.  793,  81  Pac.  494  (tes- 
timony at  coroner's  inquest).  See 
notes  in  41  Am.  St.  522-524,  18  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  872.  In  State  v.  Brough- 
ton,  7  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  96,  45  Am. 
Dec.  507,  which  is  quoted  with  ap- 
proval in  State  v.  Campbell,  TZ  Kan. 
688,  85  Pac.  784,  on  p.  788,  9  L-  R-  A. 
(N.  S.)  S33n,  the  court  said,  the  ac- 
cused having  testified  before  the  grand 
jury  that  had  indicted  him,  "The  coun- 


255 


CONFESSIONS. 


§    131 


another  person^*  for  the  crime  \vith  which  he  is  now  charged, 
may  be  used  against  him. 

A  different  rule  is  apphcable  to  sworn  statements  made  after 
the  accused  is  under  suspicion.  Generahy  the  accused  is  not 
sworn  upon  the  preHminary  examination.  If  his  statement  is 
taken  under  oath  it  will  be  rejected  if  offered  as  a  confession, 
upon  the  ground  that  its  free  and  voluntary  character  has  been 
destroyed  by  adding  to  the  existing  embarrassments  of  his  posi- 
tion, the  apprehension  of  a  possible  punishment  for  perjury.^^ 

The  rule  that  a  confession  by  the  accused  is  competent,  though 
given  under  oath,  is  applicable  to  those  very  numerous  cases  in 
which  a  person,  being  tried  upon  a  charge  of  homicide,  has  tes- 
tified as  a  witness  at  the  coroner's  inquest.  The  mere  fact  that  at 
the  time  of  the  inquest  he  was  suspected  of  the  homicide  will 
not  exclude  his  incriminating  statements  voluntarily  made  if  it 
appears  that  he  knew  he  could  decline  to  answer  if  he  wished  to 
do  so  and  he  was  not  under  arrest  at  the  time.^°     They  may  be 


sel  for  the  prisoner  took  the  further 
ground  here  that  it  was  incompetent 
to  prove  the  evidence  of  the  pris- 
oner, because  it  was  in  the  nature 
of  a  confession,  which,  compelled  by 
an  oath,  was  not  voluntary.  It  is 
certainly  no  objection  to  the  evidence, 
merely,  that  the  statement  of  the 
prisoner  was  given  by  him,  as  a  wit- 
ness under  oath.  He  might  have  re- 
fused to  answer  questions,  when  he 
could  not  do  so  without  criminating 
himself,  and  the  very  ground  of  that 
rule  of  law  is  that  his  answers  are 
deemed  voluntary  and  may  be  used 
afterwards  to  criminate  or  charge 
him  in  another  proceeding,  and  such 
is  clearly  the  law." 

'^  People  V.  McMahon,  15  N.  Y. 
384,  390;  Burnett  v.  State,  87  Ga. 
622,  13  S.  E.  552;  People  v.  Mitchell, 
94  Cal.  550,  555,  29  Pac.  no6;  Peo- 
ple v.  Gallagher,  75  Mich.  512,  525, 
12  X.  W.  1063;  Harris  v.  State,  27 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  441,  36  S.  W.  88;  Peo- 
ple v.  Cokahnour,  120  Cal.  253,  52  Pac. 


505;  State  v.  Lewis,  39  La.  Ann.  11 10, 
3  So.  343 ;  People  v.  Burt,  51  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  106,  64  N.  Y.  417;  State  v. 
Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  391; 
Dickerson  v.  State,  48  Wis.  288,  4  N. 
W.  321. 

°^  People  V.  Gibbons,  43  Cal.  557 ; 
State  V.  Welch,  36  W.  Va.  690,  15  S. 
E.  4x9;  Schoeffler  v.  State,  3  Wis. 
^23,  839,  841 ;  United  States  v.  Basca- 
dore,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  30,  24  Fed.  Cas. 
14536;  Angling  v.  State,  137  Ala.  17, 
34  So.  846,  and  see  Underbill  on  Evi- 
dence, page  131 ;  Steele  v.  State,  76 
Miss.  387,  24  So.  910.  But  the  confes- 
sion of  a  person  who  voluntarily  goes 
before  a  magistrate  and  confesses  will 
be  received.  People  v.  McGloin,  91  N. 
Y.  241,  246;  Commonwealth  v.  Clark, 
130  Pa.  St.  641,  650,  18  Atl.  988. 

="  State  V.  David,  131  Mo.  380,  33  S. 
W.  28;  Wilson  V.  State,  iro  .Ma.  i, 
20  So.  415.  55  Am.  St.  77;  Jenkins 
V.  State,  35  I'-Ia.  737,  18  So.  182,  48 
Am.  St.  267;  People  v.  Strollo,  191 
X.  Y.  42,  83   N.   E.   573;   People  v. 


CRIMIXAL    EN'IDEXCE. 


2;6 


subse(inently  used  against  him  as  a  confession,  and  are  to  go  to 
the  jury  for  what  they  are  worth,  though  the  accused  was  not 
cautioned  that  they  might  be  used  against  him.  If,  however,  he 
is  under  arrest,  or  if  he  has  been  indicted,  or  formally  charged 
with  the  crime,  he  stands  in  the  position  of  a  prisoner  on  trial. 
He  is  then  entitled  to  the  same  privilege  of  declining  to  testify 
and  warning,  that  what  he  says  .may  be  used  against  him,  so  far 
as  his  sworn  statement  is  concerned,  as  a  prisoner  at  the  prelimi- 
nary examination.  He  cannot,  directly  or  indirectly,  be  com- 
pelled to  testify  against  himself.^' 

§  132.  Confessions  taken  at  the  preliminary  examination. — The 
preliminary  examination  of  an  accused  person  has  for  its  main 
objects  the  perpetuation  of  the  testimony  against  him,  the  ascer- 
tainment if  he  shall  be  held  to  await  the  action  of  the  grand  jury, 
and  if  so,  whether  he  shall  be  admitted  to  bail.  When  the  ac- 
cused is  brought  before  the  justice,  the  latter  must,  as  soon  as 


Chapleau,  121  X.  Y.  266,  24  N.  E. 
469;  People  V.  Mondon,  103  N.  Y. 
211,  8  N.  E.  496,  57  Am.  709;  People 
V.  Kent,  41  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  191,  83  N. 
Y.  S.  948,  17  N.  Y.  Cr.  461;  People 
V.  AIcGloin,  91  X.  Y.  241 ;  State  v. 
Finch,  71  Kan.  793,  81  Pac.  494; 
State  V.  Taylor,  36  Kan.  329,  13  Pac. 
550;  Anderson  v.  State,  133  Wis.  601, 
114  N.  \V.  112;  People  v.  Martinez, 
66  Cal.  278;  State  v.  Coffee,  56  Conn. 
399,  16  Atl.  151 ;  Kirby  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  13,  5  S.  W.  165;  Emery 
V.  State,  92  Wis.  146,  65  X.  W.  848; 
Reg.  V.  Wiggins,  10  Cox  Cr.  Cas. 
562;  Mc^Ieans  v.  State  (Tex.),  L14 
S.  W.  837;  People  V.  Molineux,  168 
X.  Y.  264,  61  X.  E.  286,  62  L.  R.  A. 
I93n. 

^'.'Kdams  v.  State,  129  Ga.  248,  58 
S.  E.  822,  17  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  468; 
State  V.  Senn,  32  S.  Car.  392,  402,  ir 
S.  E.  292:  State  v.  Carroll,  85  Iowa 
I,  51  X.  W.  T159:  Hendrickson  v. 
People,  10  X.  Y.  13,  61  Am.  Dec.  721, 
9  How.   Pr.    (X.  Y.)    155;  Teachout 


V.  People,  41  X.  Y.  7,  13;  People  v. 
Mondon,  103  X.  Y.  211,  214,  8  X.  E. 
496.  57  Am.  709,  2  X.  Y.  St.  713,  4 
X.  Y.  Cr.  552;  Clough  V.  State,  7 
Xeb.  320,  340.  Cf.  People  v.  Mc- 
Mahon,  15  X.  Y.  384;  State  v. 
O'Brien,  18  Mont,  i,  43  Pac.  1091, 
44  Pac.  399;  State  v.  Matthews,  66 
X^.  Car.  106.  But  where  he  volun- 
tarily appeared  and  was  properly 
cautioned,  it  was  held  otherwise  in 
State  V.  Leuth,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  94; 
State  V.  Mullins,  loi  Mo.  514,  14  S. 
W.  625 ;  Emery  v.  State,  92  Wis.  146, 
65  N.  W.  848.  See  Underbill  on  Evi- 
dence, §  93.  And  what  the  accused 
voluntarily  says  on  his  preliminary 
examination,  as  when  he  asks  for  the 
aid  of  counsel  or  requests  an  ad- 
journment, may,  though  not  amount- 
ing to  a  confession  of  guilt,  be 
proved  against  him  if  relevant  on  his 
trial.  State  v.  Fooks,  65  Iowa  196, 
452,  21  X.  W.  561,  773;  Gonzales  v. 
State,  12  Tex.  App.  657. 


257 


CONFESSIONS. 


132 


possible,  examine  the  witnesses  for  and  against  him  under  oath. 
The  accused  must  be  present  when  this  evidence  is  received, 
though  the  examining  magistrate  may  exclude  all  witnesses  ex- 
cept the  one  who  is  testifying.  The  accused  may  be  sworn  at 
his  own  request,  and  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf, 
under  the  restrictions  which  apply  to  the  examination  of  defend- 
ants in  criminal  trials.  He  should,  in  justice  to  himself,  be  in- 
formed of  his  right  to  refrain  from  testifying.  He  should  be 
told  that  he  need  not  answer  any  questions,  and  that  his  silence  or 
express  refusal  to  answer  incriminating  questions  cannot  be  used 
against  him  on  his  trial. °®  After  thus  having  been  warned,  any- 
thing he  may  say  in  the  nature  of  a  confession  and  which  is  not 
under  oath,  may  be  used  against  him  on  his  trial. ^'^  And  w^here, 
having  been  instructed  as  to  his  right  to  remain  silent  at  the  pre- 
liminary examination,  if  he  so  desires,  he  voluntarily  goes  on  the 
witness  stand  and,  under  oath,  testifies  to  his  version  of  the  facts 
in  the  case,  anything  he  may  say  of  an  incriminating  nature  un- 
der such  circumstances,  though  he  is  under  oath,  may  be  used 
against  him  subsequently  as  his  confession.*''' 


^'  The  failure  of  an  examining 
magistrate  to  inform  the  accused  of 
the  statute,  permit  him  to  waive  mak- 
ing a  statement  and  also  that  his 
waiver  cannot  be  used  against  him  on 
his  trial  excludes  his  statement  as  an 
involuntary  confession.  State  v. 
Hatcher,  29  Ore.  309,  44  Pac.  584, 
588;  State  V.  O'Brien,  18  Mont,  i,  43 
Pac.  1091,  44  Pac.  399.  "The  result 
of  these  several  provisions  is,  that 
now  an  accused  person,  with  his  con- 
sent, may  become  a  witness  either  for 
or  against  himself  at  the  preliminary 
examination  before  the  magistrate; 
and  if  he  voluntarily  becomes  a  wit- 
ness under  such  circumstances  as  to 
render  it  clear  that  his  testimony  was 
purely  voluntary,  and  free  from  re- 
straint or  undue  influence,  there  can 
be  no  reason  why  it  may  not  be 
given  in  evidence  against  him  on  his 
subsequent  trial  for  the  offense.  If 
17 — U.VDEKHii.L  Crim.  Ev. 


his  voluntary  unsworn  statement  may 
be  proved  against  him  as  a  confes- 
sion, his  voluntary  testimony  under 
oath,  given  in  a  proceeding  in  which 
he  elects  and  is  authorized  to  testify 
ought  to  stand  upon  at  least  as  fa- 
vorable a  footing."  People  v.  Kel- 
ley,  47  Cal.  125. 

■"^  State  V.  Bruce,  33  La.  Ann.  186; 
State  V.  Needham,  78  N.  Car.  474; 
State  V.  Hatcher,  29  Ore,  309,  44  Pac. 
584,  585 ;  Shaw  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  T5.=5.  22  S.  W.  588,  590. 

""  Green  v.  State,  46  Fla.  474,  24 
So.  537;  Daniels  v.  State  (Fla.  1909), 
48  So.  747;  People  V.  Butler,  in 
Mich.  483,  485,  69  N.  W.  734;  Steele 
V.  State,  76  Miss.  387,  394,  24  So. 
910;  State  V.  Lewis.  73  Mo.  App. 
619,  621 ;  State  v.  Xccdham,  78  X. 
Car.  474;  Commonwealth  v.  Clark. 
T30  Pa.  St.  641.  650.  18  Atl.  988: 
Preston   v.    State,   41    Tex.    Cr.   App. 


§    132 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


'^:)< 


This  is  the  general  rule  in  most  states,  but  there  are  exceptions 
either  by  statute  or  by  judicial  decision.  Thus,  in  some  of  the 
states,  it  is  expressly  required  that  the  accused  shall  be  cautioned 
on  his  preliminary  examination  that  anything  he  may  say  may 
subsequently  be  used  against  him.  Generally,  it  will  have  to  be 
shown  that  the  accused  has  been  properly  advised  of  his  right  to 
have  counsel,  of  his  right  to  decline  to  testify  at  all,  or,  if  he  sees 
fit  to  testify,  then  as  to  his  right  to  refuse  to  answer  incriminat- 
ing questions.  If  a  statute  requires  that  the  accused  shall  be  in- 
formed of  his  right  to  waive  making  a  statement,  anything  he 
may  say  will  be  inadmissible  against  him  if  the  record  does  not 
show  that  he  was  warned."^ 

Where  a  person  against  whom  a  charge  is  being  investigated 
by  the  grand  jury,  voluntarily  appears  and  testifies,  his  confes- 
sion thus  obtained  is  subsequently  admissible  on  his  trial.*'-  But 
if  the  accused  is  compelled  to  go  before  the  grand  jury  and  is 
compelled  to  answer  over  his  objections,  anything  he  may  admit 
is  subsequently  not  admissible  as  his  confession.''^ 


300,  53  S.  W.  127,  881 ;  State  v.  Lyts, 
25  Wash.  347,  65  Pac.  530;  State  v. 
Glass,  so  Wis.  218,  221,  6  N.  W.  500, 
36  Am.  84s ;  Wilson  v.  United  States, 
162  U.  S.  613,  624,  40  L.  ed.  1090,  16 
Sup.  Ct.  895. 

"  State  V.  Hatcher,  29  Ore.  309,  44 
Pac.  584;  People  v.  Butler,  11 1  Mich. 
483,  69  N.  W.  734;  Ford  V.  State,  75 
Miss.  loi,  21  So.  524;  State  v.  Mel- 
ton, 120  N.  Car.  591,  26  S.  E.  933; 
State  V.  Carpenter,  32  Wash.  254,  73 
Pac.  357;  State  v.  May,  62  W.  Va. 
129,  57  S.  E.  366.  The  admissibility 
of  the  statements  of  the  accused 
made  upon  his  preliminary  examina- 
tion is  a  deduction  from  the  modern 
statutory  legislation  making  the  ac- 
cused a  competent  witness  in  his  own 
behalf.  If  the  accused  were  not  per- 
mitted to  go  on  the  stand  of  his  own 
free  will  and  if  not  being  a  compe- 
tent witness  for  himself  he  is  sum- 
moned as  a  witness  by  the  prosecu- 


tion on  the  trial  of  another  person 
it  is  only  fair  to  exclude  what  he 
may  say  of  an  incriminating  char- 
acter because  he  is,  against  his  will, 
compelled  to  tell  the  truth  by  his 
oath,  and  this  is  a  sort  of  compul- 
sion. It  is  quite  otherwise  where  the 
accused  voluntarily  testifies  to  excul- 
pate himself  and  iwstead  of  wholly 
accomplishing  this  purpose  only  in- 
volves himself  in  greater  guilt. 
State  V.  Glass,  50  Wis.  218,  221,  6  N. 
W.  500,  36  Am.  845. 

"'  State  V.  Carroll,  85  Iowa  i,  51  N. 
W.  1 1 59;  Grimsingcr  v.  State,  44 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  i,  69  S.  W.  583;  Giles 
V.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  App.  561,  67  S. 
W.  411 ;  Thomas  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  178,  32  S.  W.  771 ;  United 
States  V.  Kirkwood,  5  Utah  123,  13 
Pac.  234. 

"  State  V.  Clifford,  86  Iowa  S50,  53 
N.  W.  299,  41  Am.  St.  518.  See 
note  in  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  533. 


259  CONFESSIONS.  §    133 

§  133.  Mode  of  proving  confessions  made  at  the  preliminary  ex- 
amination.— The  signature  of  the  accused  to  his  statement  wliich 
has  been  committed  to  writing  is  not  indispensable,  unless  it  is 
required  by  statute.*^*  But,  as  it  is  useful  as,  a  means  of  identi- 
fication, it  should  be  obtained  whenever  possible.  If  he  signs  the 
writing  voluntarily  he  waives  all  objections  to  its  admission  as  evi- 
dence (except,  perhaps,  the  objection  that  he  was  sworn),  and 
this  is  so,  though  it  is  in  a  language  not  understood  by  him,  if 
its  contents  were  translated  to  him.'^'^ 

The  writing  which  purports  to  contain  the  preliminary  exami- 
nation of  the  accused  must  be  properly  identified.  If  the  accused 
has  not  signed  the  writing  at  all,  or  if  he  has  only  affixed  his 
mark  thereto,  it  must  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court 
(necessarily  by  parol  evidence)  that  it  was  read  to  him  and  that 
he  assented  to  or  acquiesced  in  it.''"  The  record  of  the  examina- 
tion, if  otherwise  admissible,  should  be  produced  as  the  best  evi- 
dence.'" and  when  produced,  it  is  conclusive  of  the  fact  that 
everything  material  that  was  said  or  done  has  been  accurately 
stated."-  But  when  an  informal  examination  only  has  been  had, 
or  if  the  details  of  a  regular  and  formal  examination  have  not 

"  Lambe's  Case,  2  Leach  C.  C.  625,  letterheads  of  the  accused  and  signed 

629;   State  V.  Haworth,  24  Utah  398,  with  his  name,  are   admissible  with- 

68  Pac.  155.  out  proof  of  the  handwriting.     State 

'''"  Commonwealth  v.  Coy,  157  Mass.  v.  Soper,  148  Mo.  217,  49  S.  W.  1007. 

200,  212,  32  X.  E.  4;  State  v.  Dema-  As  to  the  admission  of  an  unsigned 

reste,    41    La.    Ann.    617,   6    So.    136.  letter    which    dropped    in    the    room 

In    a    case    of    a    confession    made  of  the   accused,   see   State  v.   Dilley, 

through   an    interpreter   the   prosecu-  44  Wash.  207,  87  Pac.  133. 
tion  should  show,  before  the  confes-         "State  v.  Branham,  13  S.  Car.  389; 

sion  is  admitted,  that  the  interpreta-  Wright  v.   State,   50   Miss.  332,  335 ; 

tion  is  true,  correct  and   full.     It  is  State  v.   Eaton,  3  Harr.    (Del.)    554; 

proper  to  require  the  interpreter  so  to  Williams  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.   App. 

testify.    State  v.  Abbatto,  64  N.  J.  L.  128,  41   S.  W.  645;   Bailey  v.   State, 

658,  47  Atl.  ID.  26  Tex.  App.  706,  9  S.  W.  270.     As 

"Harris  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  97;  to   a   presumption    that    a   confession 

State  V.  Mullins,  lox  Mo.  514,   14  S.  was  committed  to  writing,  see  Wright 

W.   625;   State  V.    Schmidt,   136  Mo.  v.    State,   50   Miss.   332,   335;   Under- 

644,  38  S.  W.  719;  Angling  v.  State,  hill  on  Ev.,  S§  36,  146,  147,  232. 
T37  Ala.  17,  34  So.  846.     Letters  con-         ""  Robinson    v.    State,    87    Ind.    292, 

stituting    a    confession    of    homicide  293. 
found  near  the  bodies,  written  on  the 


133 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


i6o 


been  committed  to  writing,""  or  if  the  record  is  inadmissible  be- 
cause of  a  lack  of  jurisdiction/"  or  irregularities^^  apparent  on 
its  face,  or  for  any  other  material  or  substantial  reason,  parol 
evidence  of  what  the  prisoner  voluntarily  said  on  the  preliminary 
examination  will  be  received.'"  So  a  coroner  may  testify  orally 
to  what  was  said  on  a  preliminary  examination  prior  to  the  final 
inquest.'^  So,  too,  parol  evidence  of  an  extra-judicial  confession 
is  never  incompetent  merely  because  the  judicial  examination  of 
the  prisoner  was  taken  down  in  writing,'*  or  because  the  prisoner 
himself  has  committed  a  prior  confession  to  writing."^  A  prose- 
cuting attorney  who  heard  a  confession  may  testify  orally  to  it. 
His  oral  testimony  is  the  best  evidence,  though  the  confession 
was  taken  down  by  a  stenographer  in  his  presence.  The  writing 
may  be  used,  however,  to  refresh  the  memory  of  the  witness. ^"^ 

The  practice  is,  in  reading  a  written  confession  to  the  jury,  to 
omit  the  names  of  accomplices  of  the  accused  jointly  indicted  but 
separately  or  jointly  tried,  but  it  is  not  error  to  read  all  the  con- 


"'  State  V.  Suggs,  89  N.  Car.  527, 
530. 

'"  See  Underhill  on  Ev.,  §  232,  as 
to  presumptions  of  jurisdiction.  State 
V.  Hatcher,  29  Ore.  309,  44  Pac.  584; 
Luera  v.  State  (Tex.  1895"),  32  S.  W. 
898.  Incriminating  interlineations 
with  pen  and  ink  in  a  typewritten 
transcript  signed  by  the  accused  may 
justly  be  regarded  with  suspicion, 
and  if  unexplained  as  to  time  and 
sources  ought  to  exclude  the  confes- 
sion. United  States  v.  Williams,  103 
Fed.  938. 

"Wright  V.  State,  50  Miss.  332; 
Guy  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  161. 

""Wright  V.  State,  50  Miss.  332, 
335 ;  Guy  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  t6i  ; 
Stevens  v.  State  (Tex.  1896),  38  S. 
W.  167 ;  Hightower  v.  State,  58  Miss. 
636;  Willis  V.  United  States,  6  Ind. 
Ter.  424,  98  S.  W.  147;  Austin  v. 
Commonwealth,  124  Ky.  55,  98  S.  W. 
295,  30  Ky.  L.  295;  Miller  v.  People, 
216  111.  309,  74  N.  E.  743.  But  such 
evidence    is     inadmissible    to     show 


what  the  prisoner  said  if  the  magis- 
trate states  that  he  refused  to  say 
anything.  The  record  cannot  be  con- 
tradicted by  parol.  Rex  v.  Walter, 
7  C.  &  P.  267. 

''People  v.  Strotto,  191  N.  Y.  42, 
83  N.  E.  573- 

'*  State  V.  Smith,  9  Houst.  (Del.) 
588,  33  Atl.  441 ;  State  v.  Rover,  13 
Nev.  17;  Commonwealth  v.  Dower, 
4  Allen  (Mass.)  297;  State  v.  Wells, 
I  N.  J.  L.  424,  I  Am.  Dec.  211 ;  Grim- 
singer  V.  State,  44  Tex.  Cr.  App.  i, 
69  S.  W.-  583. 

"  State  V.  Head,  38  S.  Car.  258,  16 
S.  E.  892;  State  v.  Leuth,  5  Ohio 
C.  C.  94.  The  fact  that  the  prisoner 
desired  to  waive  a  preliminary  ex- 
amination will  not,  if  he  has  been 
properly  cautioned,  render  any  state- 
ments he  may  make  inadmissible. 
Shaw  V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  155, 
22  S.  W.  588;  People  V.  Giro  (N. 
Y.,  1910),  90  N.  E.  432. 

™  People  V.  Silvers,  6  Cal.  App.  6g, 
92  Pac.  506. 


26l  CONFESSIONS.  §    134 

fession,  including  all  names,  if  the  court  shall  instruct  the  jury 
that  the  confession  is  not  evidence  against  any  one  except  the 
person  making  it/'^ 

§  134.  Confessions  of  persons  associated  in  a  conspiracy. — A  con- 
fession or  incriminating  statement  uttered  by  a  person  engaged 
with  others  in  a  conspiracy  to  commit  a  crime,  made  in  the  prose- 
cution of  the  common  enterprise,  and  during  its  existence,  is  ad- 
missible against  any  or  all  of  those  associated  together."  When 
the  common  undertaking  is  consummated  or  abandoned  the  com- 
munity of  interest  ceases.  A  confession  of  any  participant  made 
thereafter  is  receivable  only  against  him.  Usually  the  existence 
of  the  conspiracy  must  be  proved  before  the  confession  will  be  re- 
ceived. But  sometimes,  though  this  is  not  the  general  rule,  the 
confession  may  be  received  as  evidence  on  a  promise  by  the  pros- 
ecution to  establish  the  conspiracy  subsequently.'^" 

§  135.  Artifice  or  deception  used. — A  free  and  voluntary  confes- 
sion is  not  inadmissible  because  it  was  subsequently  retracted,*"  or 
because  it  was  originally  obtained  by  an  artifice  practiced  on  the 
accused  by  officers  having'  him  in  charge,  or  by  other  persons,  if 
the  means  employed  were  not  calculated  to  cause  him  to  make  an 
untrue  statement.**^  The  question,  how  was  the  confession  ob- 

"Rex  V.   Clewes,   4  C.   &   P.  221;  107  Ala.    108,    18    So.   284;    State   v. 

Howson  V.  State,  ■j'i  Ark.   146,  83  S.  Westcott,  130  Iowa  i,  104  N.  W.  341 ; 

W.    933;    State    V.    Brinte,    4    Penn.  State  v.   Harrison,    115   N.    Car.  706, 

(Del.)  55T,  58  Atl.  258.  20  S.  E.    175;    State  v.    Hopkirk,   84 

"""StQ  post,%  d,g2,  et  seq.  Mo.    278;    People    v.    White,    176    N. 

'"See   cases    cited   in    §    494,    post.  Y.  331,  68  N.  E.  630;  Commonwealth 

State  V.  Reed,  49  La.  Ann.  704,  21  So.  v.    Cressinger,    193    Pa.    326,   44    Atl. 

732;   Sorenson  v.  United   States,   143  433.      See  exhaustive  notes   in   t8  L. 

Fed.  820,  74  C.  C.  A.  468.  R.   A.    (X.   S.)    840,  6   Am.   St.   2-19. 

""Jones   V.    State,    13    Tex.    168,   62  A    confession,    otherwise    admissible, 

Am.  Dec.  550.  will    not   be    rejected  because  it   was 

*'  People    V.    McAIahon,    15    X.    Y.  made  to  a  detective  who  was  locked 

384;  Early  v.  Commonwealth,  86  Va.  in  a  cell  with  the  prisoner,  or,  who,  in 

921,  927,  928,  II  S.  E.  795;  Hardy  v.  the   guise   of   a    friend,    obtained   the 

United  States,  3  App.  D.  C.  35;  Peo-  confession  from  liim.    State  v.  Brooks, 

pie  v.  McGloin,  91   N.  Y.  241;  State  92   Mo.  542,  576,   5   S.   W.   257,  330; 

v.   Staley,    14    Minn.    105,    113;    State  Heldt  v.  State,  20  Neb.  492,  495,  30  N. 

v.  Fredericks,  85  Mo.   145,   149;  King  W.  626,  57  Am.  835n ;  Osborn  v.  Com- 

V.  State,  40  Ala.  314;  Burton  v.  State,  monweallh    (Ky.),  20   S.  W.   223,    14 


§  135 


CRIMINAL    FA'IDENCE. 


262 


tained?  is  of  minor  importance.  The  main  point  to  be  considered 
is,  was  the  confession  probably  true?''"  The  real  cjuestion  always 
turns,  not  so  much  upon  tlie  means  used  in  obtaining  the  confes- 
sion, as  upon  the  motives  which  prompted  the  prisoner  to  make 
it.^^  The  cases,  however,  are  not  harmonious,  and  in  the  most  re- 
cent cases  it  has  been  held  that  a  confession  procured  by  a  person 
who,  by  falsely  representing-  himself  to  be  an  attorney,  obtained 
the  confidence  of  the  prisoner,  was  inadmissible.^*    A  man  who 


Ky.  L.  246.  A  confession  procured 
from  a  prisoner  by  telling  him  an  ac- 
complice has  confessed,  which  state- 
ment is  untrue,  is  not  inadmissible  on 
that  account.  State  v.  Jones,  54  Mo. 
478,  481.  So  an  appeal  to  the  super- 
stitious nature  of  an  old  and  infirm 
woman  by  promising  her  a  charm 
which  would  prevent  detection,  will 
not  exclude  a  confession  elicited 
thereby.  State  v.  Harrison,  115  N. 
Car.  706,  20  S.  E.  175. 

'''People  V.  McMahon,  15  N.  Y. 
384.  387,  390. 

*^  So  a  confession  contained  in  a 
letter  given  to  a  jailer  or  other  per- 
son for  mailing  to  a  friend  or  a  wit- 
ness for  the  accused,  but  which  was 
retained  by  him  and  opened  and 
handed  to  the  prosecuting  officials, 
should  be  received.  Rex  v.  Derring- 
ton,  2  C.  &  P.  418;  State  v.  Renaud, 
50  La.  Ann.  662,  23  So.  894.  "While 
we  do  not  sanction  the  deception 
practiced  by  one  of  the  officers  in 
charge  of  the  defendant,  the  court 
could  not  exclude  the  confessions 
made  to  him  on  that  account.  De- 
ception was  used  in  order  to  induce 
the  defendant  to  tell  the  truth.  No 
inducement  was  held  out  to  him  to 
confess  guilt  unless  there  was  guilt. 
The  confession  to  the  under-sheriff' 
was  made  to  him,  not  as  a  public 
officer,  but  as  a  supposed  friend.  It 
is  not  sufficient  to  exclude  a  confes- 


sion by  a  prisoner,  as  we  have  held, 
'that  he  was  under  arrest  at  the  time, 
or  that  it  was  made  to  the  officer  in 
whose  custody  he  was,  or  in  answer 
to  questions  put  to  him,  or  that  it 
was  made  under  the  hope  or  promise 
of  a  benefit  of  a  collateral  nature.' 
(Cox  V.  People,  80  N.  Y.  500,  515.) 
Confessions  induced  by  the  use  of 
decoy  letters,  by  the  false  assertion 
that  some  of  the  accomplices  of  the 
prisoner  were  in  custody  or  made 
to  a  detective  disguised  as  a  confed- 
erate or  upon  the  promise  that  they 
will  not  be  disclosed,  have  been  re- 
ceived in  evidence  with  the  sanction 
of  courts  of  high  authority.  *  *  * 
Cautious  and  hesitating  as  courts 
have  always  been  in  regard  to  con- 
fessions made  by  a  person  when  un- 
der arrest  to  those  in  authority  over 
him,  they  have  not  gone  so  far  as  to 
exclude  them,  simply  because  they 
were  procured  by  deception,  provided 
they  were  voluntarily  made.  They  are 
careful,  however,  to  leave  the  credi- 
bility of  the  witness  who  practiced 
the  deception  and  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  confessions  were 
made  to  the  consideration  of  the 
jury."  By  Vann,  J.,  in  People  v. 
White,  176  N.  Y.  331,  349,  68  N.  E. 
630. 

'*  Cotton  V.  State,  87  Ala.  75,  6  So. 
396;  Tines  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
77  S.  W.  363,  25  Ky.  L.  1233. 


26^  CONFESSIONS.  §136 

\vill  deliberately  ingratiate  himself  into  the  confidence  of  another 
for  the  purpose  of  betraying  that  confidence,  and,  with  words  of 
friendship  npon  his  lips,  seek  by  every  means  in  his  power  to 
obtain  an  admission  which  can  be  tortured  into  a  confession  of 
guilt  which  he  may  blaze  to  the  world  as  a  means  of  accomplish- 
ing the  downfall  of  one  for  whom  he  professes  great  friendship, 
cannot  be  possessed  of  a  very  high  sense  of  honor  or  moral 
obligation."  Hence,  it  is  doubtful  if  anything  is  really  gained  in 
the  administration  of  justice  from  the  admission  of  such  evidence. 
A  person  who  may  overhear  the  remarks  of  a  prisoner  made  to 
himself  or  to  another  person,  as  his  wife,  or  an  attorney,  or  spir- 
itual adviser,  who  is  incompetent  as  a  witness  to  privileged  com- 
munications, may  testify  to  what  he  has  heard. ^"^ 

A  confession  constituting  a  part  of  a  prayer  may  be  proved  by 
one  who  overheard  it,  though  he  may  not  be  able  to  prove  the 
whole  prayer.®"  A  confession  made  to  another  prisoner,  under 
the  erroneous  impression  that  one  prisoner  cannot  testify  against 
the  other,  is  not  for  that  reason  inadmissible. ®® 

§  136.  Confessions  by  intoxicated  persons. — Confessions  made 
while  the  accused  is  intoxicated  are  not  thereby  rendered  inadmis- 
sible. This  is  the  rule,  even  where  the  intoxication  was  produced 
by  liquor  given  to  him  by  the  officers  having  him  in  charge  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  procuring  a  confession.*^  Some  of  the  recent  cases, 

*'Heldt  V.   State,  20  Neb.  492,  497,  man.     Stafford  v.   State,  55   Ga.  591, 

498,  30  X.  W.  626,  57  Am.  83511.  596. 

**°Rex   V.   Simons,  6   C.    &    P.    540.         '"  Eskridge    v.    State,    25    Ala.    30; 

But  not  to  incriminating  declarations  Jefferds   v.   People,   5   Park.   Cr.    (X. 

made  during  sleep,  for  the  declarant  Y.)  522,  561;  Rex  v.  Spilsbury,  7  C. 

is    then    unconscious    of   what    he    is  &    P.    187;    South   v.    People,   98    111. 

saying.     People  v.  Robinson,   19  Cal.  261,    265 ;    Lester    v.    State,    32    Ark. 

40.  727,  730;  People  V.  Ramirez,  56  Cal. 

"Woolfolk  V.   State,  85  Ga.  69,  11  533,   38  Am.   73;    State  v.    Grear,   28 

S.  E.  814.  Minn.  426,  10  N.  W.  472,  41  Am.  296 ; 

**  State     V.      Mitchell,      Phil.      (X.  State  v.  Berry,  50  La.  Ann.   1309,  24 

Car.)  L.  447.     A  confession  to  a  fel-  So.  329;  State  v.  Feltes,  5:  Iowa  495, 

low  prisoner  in  jail,  procured  by  the  i    N.   W.   755 ;    State  v.    Hopkirk,  84 

latter's      spiritual      exhortation      and  Mo.   278;    Leach    v.    State,   99   Tenn. 

reading  the  Bible  to  the  accused,   is  584,  42  S.  W.   195;   State  v.  Hogan, 

not  to  be   rejected  because  the  wit-  117    La.   863,  42    So.   352;    Licnpo  v. 

ncss  is   himself  a  grossly  irreligious  State,   28   Tex.    App.    179,    12   S.   W. 


^     136  CKIMIXAL    FA'IDEXCE.  264 

however,  reject  confessions  thus  ol)tained  because  of  tlie  trick- 
practiced.  But  the  general  rule  has  been  sustained,  even  where  the 
accused  was  suffering  from  dcliriiiui  trcuiciis,^"  if  he  was  mentally 
and  physically  able  to  describe  past  events  and  to  state  his  own 
participation  in  the  crime. ''^  The  jury  are  not  bound  to  believe  the 
prisoner's  confession  made  when  sober,  nor  to  reject  a  contra- 
dictory confession  made  when  he  was  drunk, ^-  for,  if  the  court  has 
ruled  that  the  confession  was  voluntary,  the  physical  or  mental 
condition  of  the  accused  is  merely  one  element  for  the  jury  in  de- 
termining what  reliance,  if  any,  is  to  be  placed  upon  the  confes- 
sion.®^ 

But  the  mental  and  physical  condition  of  the  accused  when  mak- 
ing the  confession  is  always  relevant.  Hence,  the  accused  may 
show  his  intoxication  to  determine  the  credit  and  weight  of  the 
confession,  by  his  own  testimony, °*  by  cross-examining  the  wit- 
ness who  is  called  to  prove  the  confession,  or  by  other  witnesses.''^ 

The  intoxication  of  the  accused  at  the  time  of  making  a  con- 
fession may  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  diminishing  the  value  of 
the  confession  as  evidence.  The  old  proverb  in  vino  Veritas  has 
never  been  a  rule  of  law.  It  is  by  no  means  of  universal  applica- 
tion. Indeed,  the  contrary  is  often  seen,  for  with  men  of  a  boastful 
disposition,  intoxication  is  apt  to  result  in  false  and  exaggerated 
statements  of  their  past  achievements.'"^ 

The  accused  may  be  permitted  to  show  that  what  purports  to 
be  his  confession  was  simply  boastful  statements  made  with  a 

588;    People   V.   Kent,  41   Misc.    (N.  (Mass.)     no;    People    v.    Kent,    41 

Y.)    191,  83  X.   Y.  S.  948,   I-  X-  Y.  Misc.   (X.  Y.)   191,  83  X.  Y.  S.  948, 

Cr.  461    (drugs).     See  note  in  6  Am.  17  X'.  Y.  Cr.  461. 

St.  249.  "^Jefferds    v.    People,    5    Park    Cr. 

*"  State  V.  Feltes,  51  Iowa  495,  i  X'.  (X.  Y.)   522,  547;  State  v.  Berry,  50 

W.  755.  La.  Ann.  1309,  24  So.  329;  People  v. 

''White  V.   State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  App.  Kent,  41  i\Iisc.  (N.  Y.)  191,  83  X.  Y. 

625,  25  S.  W.  784;  Eskridge  v.  State,  S.  948,  17  X.  Y.  Cr.  461. 

25  Ala.  30,  ss;  People  v.  Farrington,  '^  State  v.  Feltes,  51  Iowa  495,  i  X. 

140  Cal.   656,  74   Pac.   288;   State  v.  W.  755. 

Hogan,  117  La.  863,  42  So.  352.  '°  State  v.  Berry,  50  La.  Ann.  1309, 

'"Finch  V.   State,  81   Ala.  41,  50,   i  24  So.  329;  State  v.  Grear,  28  Minn. 

So.  56s ;  People  v.  Hutchings,  8  Cal.  426,  10  X.  W.  472,  41  Am.  296 ;  State 

App.  550,  97  Pac.  325 ;  People  v.  Ho-  v.   Bryan,  74  X.  Car.   351 ;  White  v. 

gan,  117  La.  863.  42  So.  352.  State,   32   Tex.    Cr.    .\pp.   625.   25    S. 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Howe,  9  Gray  W.  784. 


265 


CONFESSIOXS. 


§    137 


humorous  intention,  while  he  was  intoxicated,  and  when  he  has 
done  this,  the  prosecution  may  prove  by  witnesses  who  overheard 
him  speaking  that  he  appeared  to  be  perfectly  sincere  while  speak- 
ing." 

§  137.  Admissions  receivable  though  involuntary. — The  rule  that 
a  confession  procured  by  a  threat  or  a  promise  is  inadmissible  does 
not  apply  to  admissions®^  not  involving  the  existence  of  a  criminal 
intent,®''  if  the  influence  exerted  did  not  amount  to  duress,  or  to 
an  illegal  and  undue  degree  of  compulsion.^*'"  Some  cases  hold  that 
it  is  not  material  that  the  involuntary  admission,  when  connected 
with  other  evidence,  proves,  or  tends  to  prove,  the  guilt  of  the 
defendant.  So  long  as  it  does  not,  taken  by  itself,  directly  admit 
or  suggest  his  guilt,  that  it  was  voluntary  in  its  character  need  not 
be  shown.^  But  the  cases  are  not  harmonious,  and  it  seems  logical 
that  all  the  declarations  of  the  defendant  from  which  guilt  may  be 
inferred  should  come  under  the  rule.- 


*'  Horn  V.  State,  12  Wyom.  80,  TZ 
Pac.  705. 

**  An  admission  as  applied  to  a 
criminal  case  is  a  statement  of  de- 
fendant of  facts  pertinent  to  the  is- 
sues and  tending  in  connection  with 
proof  of  other  facts  to  prove  his 
guilt,  but  which  of  itself  is  insuf- 
ficient to  authorize  conviction.  Ran- 
som V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  826,  59  S. 
E.  lor. 

*' People  V.  Hickman,  113  Cal.  80, 
45  Pac.  175;  McLain  v.  State,  18 
Neb.  154,  161,  24  X.  W.  720;  Under- 
bill on  Ev.,  §  75 ;  People  v.  Stokes,  5 
Cal.  App.  205,  89  Pac.  997;  Fuller  v. 
State,  127  Ga.  47,  55  S.  E.  1047; 
Hutchinson  v.  State  (Ga.  App.),  dz 
S.  E.  597;  Watson  v.  State,  52  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  85,  105  S.  W.  509;  People 
V.  Jan  John,  144  Cal.  284,  "j^  Pac. 
950;  People  V.  Moran,  144  Cal.  48.  ^7 
Pac.  ^T];  People  v.  Weber,  149  Cal. 
325,  86  Pac.  671 ;  People  v.  Scala- 
miero,  143  Cal.  343,  76  Pac.  1098; 
State  V.   Barrington,   198  Mo.   23,  95 


S.  W.  23s ;  Burgess  v.  State,  148  Ala. 
654,  42  So.  681. 

^"^^  The  rule  in  civil  cases  that  ad- 
missions made  to  bring  about  a  com- 
promise are  inadmissible  does  not 
apply  in  criminal  cases.  State  v.  So- 
per,  16  Me.  293,  295,  2,2>  Am.  Dec. 
665 ;  State  v.  Campbell,  '/'>,  Kan.  688, 
85  Pac.  784,  9  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  S33n; 
Richburger  v.  State,  90  Miss.  806,  44 
So.  772.  Contra,  Mill  v.  State,  3  Ga. 
App.  414,  60  S.  E.  4.  Admissibility 
of  confessions,  see  note  in  "j^i  -^'ii-  St. 
942-946. 

^People  V.  Velarde,  59  Cal.  457; 
State  V.  Red.  53  Iowa  69,  74,  4  N.  W. 
831;  People  V.  Parton,  49  Cal.  632; 
Ferguson  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
93,  19  S.  W.  901 ;  People  v.  McCal- 
1am,  103  X.  Y.  587,  596,  9  X.  E.  502, 
3  X.  Y.  Cr.  189.  5  X.  Y.  Cr.  143,  4  X. 
Y.  St.  29T,  25  Wkly.  Dig.  2to. 

"  Marshall  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App. 
273,  293 ;  Quintana  v.  State,  29  Tex. 
App.  401,  407,  16  S.  W.  258,  25  Km. 
St.    730;    Commonwealth    v.    Myers, 


1-^8 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


266 


§  138.  When  facts  discovered  admit  parts  of  an  involuntary  con- 
fession.— The  main  reason  for  rejecting  confessions  uttered  under 
the  influence  of  hope  or  fear  is  the  great  probabiHty  that  the  pris- 
oner has  been  influenced  by  his  expectation  of  punishment,  or  of 
immunity,  to  speak  what  is  not  true.  If,  however,  the  existence 
of  extraneous  facts  is  discovered  through  the  statements  of  the 
accused,  no  reason  exists  for  rejecting  those  parts  of  the  confes- 
sion which  led  to  the  discovery,  and  which,  though  not  voluntarily 
made  or  obtained  by  improper  means  or  for  any  reason  inadmis- 
sible have  been  corroborated  convincingly  by  the  facts  discovered. 
The  proper  order  of  proof  is  for  the  facts  discovered  to  be  proved, 
and  then  to  receive  as  much  of  the  confession  as  leads  up  to  and 
as  relates  strictly  to  such  facts.^ 

It  is  no  objection  to  the  proof  of  the  facts  which  are  discovered 
that  their  discovery  was  brought  about  by  means  of  a  confession.* 


160  ]\Iass.  530,  36  N.  E.  481 ;  Murphy 
V.  People,  63  X.  Y.  590,  596.  In  Rex 
V.  Warickshall  (1783),  i  Leach  Cr. 
L.  298,  300,  which  is  a  leading  case, 
the  court  said :  '"This  principle  re- 
specting confessions  has  no  applica- 
tion whatever  as  to  the  admission  or 
rejection  of  facts,  whether  the  knowl- 
edge of  them  be  obtained  in  conse- 
quence of  an  extorted  confession,  or 
whether  it  arises  from  anj'  other 
source;  for  a  fact,  if  it  exist  at  all, 
must  exist  invariably  in  the  same 
manner,  whether  the  confession  from 
which  it  is  derived  be  in  other  re- 
spects true  or  false."  This  case  also 
holds,  though  the  modern  rule  is 
otherwise,  that  no  part  of  the  con- 
fession can  be  received,  but  the  facts 
though  obtained  by  a  confession  must 
be  satisfactorily  proved  without  di- 
vulging their  source.  Hence,  it  can- 
rot  be  legalh'  known  whether  the 
fact  had  been  confessed  or  not. 

^  Murphy  v.  State,  63  Ala.  i ;  Rice 
V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  215,  223- 
228;  State  V.  Crank,  2  Bailey  (S. 
Car.)   66,  23  Am.  Dec.  iiyn;  Daniels 


V.  State,  78  Ga.  98,  6  Am.  St.  238n; 
State  V.  Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 
391 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Knapp,  9 
Pick.  (Mass.)  496,  511,  20  Am.  Dec. 
491;  State  V.  Height,  117  Iowa  650, 
91  N.  W.  935,  94  Am.  St.  323n,  59 
L.  R.  A.  437;  United  States  v.  Rich- 
ard, 2  Cranch  C.  C.  439,  27  Fed.  Cas. 
16154;  Laros  v.  Commonwealth,  84 
Pa.  200;  People  v.  Hoy  Yen,  34  Cal. 
176;  Done  V.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  364,  396;  Gregg  v.  State,  106  Ala. 
44,  17  So.  321 ;  State  v.  Middleton,  69 
S.  Car.  72,  48  S.  E.  35;  Smith  v. 
State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  643,  11 1  S. 
W.  939;  Jones  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  329,  96  S.  W.  930;  State  v. 
Ruck,  194  Mo.  416,  92  S.  W.  706; 
State  V.  Hutchings,  30  Utah  319,  84 
Pac.  893 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Phillips 
(Ky.),  82  S.  W.  286,  26  Ky.  L.  543; 
Whitney  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  74 
S.  W.  257,  24  Ky.  L.  2524. 

*  State  V.  Moran,  131  Iowa  645,  109 
N.  W.  187;  Rusher  v.  State,  94  Ga. 
363,  21  S.  E.  593,  47  Am.  St.  175; 
Taylor  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  42 
S.  W.  1 125,  19  Ky.  L.  836;   State  v. 


267  CONFESSIONS.  §    1 39 

Sometimes,  however,  the  order  of  proof  has  been  reversed,  and 
the  court  has  allowed  the  language  of  the  prisoner  to  be  proved 
before  receiving  evidence  of  the  facts  discovered.^ 

Thus,  for  illustration,  it  may  properly  be  proved  in  a  prosecu- 
tion for  homicide  that  the  victim's  remains,*'  or  his  clothing,'^  or 
the  weapon  with  which  he  was  killed,^  were  actually  found  at  a 
particular  time  and  place  as  the  result  of  a  statement  by  the  ac- 
cused which  was  itself  inadmissible,  as  a  confession.  So,  in  a  lar- 
ceny trial,  it  may  be  proved  that  the  stolen  property  was  discov- 
ered as  the  result  of  an  inadmissible  confession ;  and  then  as  much 
of  the  confession  as  disclosed  the  hiding  place  of  the  stolen  prop- 
erty and  whatever  the  accused  said  in  conducting  persons  there 
or  in  pointing  out  or  describing  it,  or  which  is  in  any  way  con- 
nected with  the  discovery  is  admissible,  though  these  statements 
were  the  result  of  promises  or  threats.*^ 

§  139.  Confessions  procured  by  persons  in  authority. — A  distinc- 
tion is  made  by  many  of  the  cases  between  those  confessions  which 
are  procured  by  threats  made  or  promises  offered  by  some  person 
who  is  so  related  to  the  accused  as  to  be  able  to  exercise  authority 
over  him,  and  consequently  had  both  the  power  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  fulfill  the  threat  or  promise ;  and  confessions  made  in  re- 
sponse to  promises  by  persons  having  no  power  whatever  over  the 

George,  15  La.  Ann.  145;  Walrath  v.  "State  v.  Motley,  7  Rich.  (S.  Car.) 

State,  8  Neb.  80;  Duffy  v.  People,  26  327. 

N.  Y.  588,  590,  5  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  'State  v.   Willis,  71  Conn.  293,  41 

321.  Atl.  820;  Spearman  v.  State,  34  Tex. 

''Duffy  V.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Cr.  App.  279,  30  S.  W.  229. 

Y.)  321,  26  N.  Y.  588,  590;  Reg.  V.  *  Commonwealth  v.  James,  99  Mass. 

Gould,  9  C.  &  P.  364;  Deathridgc  v.  438. 

State,    I    Sneed    (Tenn.)    75,  80,   81;  "State   v.    Mortimer,    20    Kan.    93; 

Jordan   v.    State,   '^,2  Miss.   382.     But  Rector  v.    Commonwealth,  4   Ky.    L. 

in  South  Carolina   the  statements  of  323;    State    v.    Garvey,    28    La.    Ann. 

the  accused   made  where,   by   reason  925,  26  Am.   123 ;   Relote  v.  State,  ^t^ 

of  threats,  stolen  property  was  recov-  Miss.  96,  72  Am.    Dec.    163 ;   Fielder 

ered,  have  been  rejected,  although  it  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  184,  49  S. 

was   allowed  to  be   proved  that   the  W.  376;  Ranks  v.  State,  84  Ala.  430, 

stolen   property  had  been    found  be-  4  So.  382 :   State  v.  Winston,  t  16  N. 

cause    the    accused    had    pointed    out  Car.  990,  21  S.  E.  Zl- 
its  hiding  place.     State  v.  Middlcton, 
69  S.  Car.  72,  48  S.  E.  35. 


§    139  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  268 

prisoner,  and,  consequently,  unable  to  perform  what  they  promised 
to  do.  In  the  former  case  it  was  conclusively  presumed  that  the 
confession  was  forced  and  involuntary.^**  Hence,  where  the  in- 
ducement to  confess  proceeded  from  the  prosecuting  witness,  or 
liis  wife,  or  from  the  district  attorney,  or  some  member  of  a 
coroner's  jury,  or  from  a  police  officer  or  magistrate,  the  confes- 
sion was  rejected  as  presumably  extorted  by  fear  or  prompted  by 
hope  of  immunity. 

Upon  the  question  whether  any  presumption  was  to  be  recog- 
nized where  a  confession  was  made  in  response  to  a  promise  or 
threat  by  one  having  no  power  whatever  over  the  prisoner,  and 
who  was,  for  that  reason,  unable  to  fulfill  the  threat  or  promise, 
the  authorities  are  divided.  Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  a  threat 
or  promise  made  by  such  a  person  creates  a  conclusive  presump- 
tion that  the  confession  was  not  free  and  voluntary.^^  But  other 
authorities  hold,  and  these  perhaps  are  in  the  majority,  that  the 
threat  or  promise  must  proceed  from  some  one  in  authority,  and 
who  has  the  power  to  carry  it  into  execution,  or  it  must  be  made 
in  the  i)resence  and  with  the  implied  approval  of  such  a  person, 
to  justify  the  court  in  drawing  an  inference  that  the  confession 
was  involuntary.^^ 

These  distinctions,  however,  when  tested  by  the  actual  circum- 
stances of  each  case,  prove  of  very  little  value.  The  question  al- 
ways is,  was  the  will  of  the  prisoner  actually  subjugated  and 
overcome,  so  that  the  confession  is  not  the  free  product  of  his 
own  will  but  forced  from  his  lips  by  the  superior  will  of  another? 
This  is  a  question  of  mixed  law  and  fact,  to  be  answered  by  the 

"  State  V.   Carson,   36   S.  Car.  524,  f  essions,   see   2  Am.   St.   243-247,    18 

532,  15  S.  E.  588;  Clayton  v.   State,  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  843-855- 

31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  489,  21  S.  W.  255;  "State  v.  Revells,  34  La.  Ann.  381, 

Hoober  v.    State,   81    Ala.   51,    l    So.  44     Am.      436;      Commonwealth      v. 

574;  State  V.  Spaugh,  200  Mo.  571,  98  Knapp,  9  Pick.   (Mass.)  496,  500,  20 

S.   W.   55 :    People  V.  Thompson,   84  Am.  Dec.  491,  and  see  cases  cited  in 

Cal.  598,  24  Pac.  384;  Green  v.  State,  Underbill  on  Evidence,  p.  T36,  n.  i. 

88  Ga.  516,   15  S.  E.  10,  30  Am.   St.  "  Smith      v.      Commonwealth,      ro 

i67n;      Collins      v.      Commonwealth  Gratt.   (Va.)  734;  Early  v.  Common- 

(Ky.),  25  S.  W.  743,  15  Ky.  L.  691;  wealth,  86  Va.  921,  927,  928.  11  S.  E. 

Commonwealth  v.   Myers,   160   Mass.  795 ;     Commonwealth     v.     Morey,     i 

530,  2>^  N.  E.  481;  State  v.  York,  Z7  Gray    (Mass.)    461,   463;    Searcy   v. 

N.  H.   175;   People  v.   McMahon.   15  State,   28   Tex.   App.   513,    13   S.   W. 

N.  Y.  384.    Exhaustive  notes  on  con-  782,  19  Am.  St.  851. 


269  CONFESSIONS.  §    I40 

court  or  the  jury  according  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each 
particular  case.  No  presumption  should  be  recognized  based  upon 
the  official  position  of  the  person  who  heard  the  confession, 
though  this  may  be  taken  into  consideration  with  the  other  facts. 
Doubtless  the  fact  that  the  person  who  obtained  a  confession  by 
the  use  of  a  promise  or  a  threat  did  not  possess  the  power  and 
authority  to  carry  either  into  effect,  if  known  to  the  prisoner  at 
the  time  of  making  the  confession,  would  nullify  the  effect  in- 
tended to  be  produced  upon  his  mind,  and  the  confession  would 
be  regarded  as  his  free  act.^'"' 

g  140.  Confessions  need  not  be  spontaneous. — A  confession,  in 
other  respects  admissible,  is  not  inadmissible  because  it  is  not  the 
spontaneous  utterance  of  the  prisoner.  The  fact  that  the  con- 
fession was  obtained  by  the  employment  of  persistent  question- 
ing does  not  alone  exclude  it,^*  but  the  practice  of  eliciting  a  con- 
fession by  putting  question  after  question  to  the  accused  is  clearly 
not  conducive  to  the  procurement  of  truth,  and  the  mode  in  which 
the  confession  was  elicited  may  always  be  considered  by  the  jury 
to  determine  whether  they  shall  believe  it. 

This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  methods  employed  by  police  of- 
ficers and  other  in  practicing  upon  the  accused  after  his  arrest 
what  is  known  in  police  circles  as  the  "third  degree."  This  usu- 
ally consists  in  subjecting  the  accused,  after  his  arrest  and  while 
in  custody,  to  a  continuous  and  rigid  examination  accompanied 
with  intimidation  by  threats  and  other  means.  The  length  of  this 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Tuckcrman,  10  promise  made  by  a  person  who  inter- 
Gray  (Mass.)  173,  190;  State  v.  Fort-  feres  without  any  authority  of  this 
ner,  43  Iowa  494;  McAdory  v.  State,  kind  is  not  to  be  presumed  to  have 
62  Ala.  154,  161 ;  Ulrich  v.  People,  such  an  effect  on  the  mind  of  the 
39  Mich.  245,  250;  Underbill  on  Evi-  prisoner  as  to  induce  him  to  confess 
dence,  p.  136.  In  3  Russell  on  that  he  is  guilty  of  a  crime  of  which 
Crimes,  p.  393,  the  author  says :  he  is  innocent."  People  v.  Piner 
"The  result  of  the  cases  seems  to  be,  (Cal.  App.,  1909),  105  Pac.  780. 
that  a  confession  is  not  inadmissible,  "State  v.  Penney,  113  Iowa  691,  84 
although  made  after  an  exhortation,  N.  W.  509;  Young  v.  State,  90  Md. 
or  admonition,  or  other  similar  influ-  579,  45  Atl.  531 ;  Cox  v.  People,  80 
ence,  proceeding  at  a  prior  time  from  N.  Y.  500;  Aiken  v.  State  (Tex.), 
some  one  who  has  nothing  to  do  with  64  S.  W.  57 ;  Tidwcll  v.  State,  40 
the  apprehension,  prosecution  or  ex-  Tex.  Cr.  App.  38,  47  S.  W.  466,  48 
amination    of    the    prisoner;    for    a  S.    W.    184;    United    States    v.    Mat-. 

thews,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15741b. 


S    140  CRIMIXAL    EVIPEXCE.  27O 

process  and  the  manner  of  its  application  depend  largelv  upon 
the  character  of  the  official  who  administers  it  and  upon  that  of 
the  accused  to  whom  it  is  administered, 

\\'here,  on  the  one  hand,  the  police  official  is  sufficiently  hard- 
ened and  brutalized  by  his  past  experience  and  the  accused  is  a 
determined  and  courageous  person,  it  is  likely  to  continue  for 
some  lengthy  period  without  results,  but  where  the  accused  is 
weak  and  nervous  or  feeble  in  mind  or  body,  the  carrying  out 
of  this  method  of  modern  torture  will  generally  result  in  pro- 
ducing statements  in  answer  to  leading  questions  which  can 
readily  be  twisted  into  a  confession. 

The  worthlessness  as  evidence  of  such  statements  needs  but  to 
be  stated  in  order  to  be  appreciated.  Their  probative  force,  or 
rather  lack  of  force,  is  well  recognized  by  all  who  have  had  any 
experience  of  human  nature.  They  carry  no  weight,  usually,  in 
the  minds  of  the  average  juryman,  but,  in  all  probability,  police 
officials  will  continue  to  procure  so-called  confessions  by  this 
method  until  the  end  of  time. 

As  matter  of  law,  the  fact  that  confessions  are  obtained  by 
questions  which  assume  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  does  not  exclude 
them  if  they  are  in  all  respects  voluntary  confessions  and  pro- 
vided always  that  in  putting  the  question  which  assumes  that  the 
prisoner  is  guilty,  no  unfair  advantage  amounting  to  compulsion 
or  duress  was  exercised  over  him.^^ 

A  voluntary  confession  is  not  inadmissible  because  the  person 
to  whom  it  was  made  promised  under  oath  that  he  would  not  re- 
veal it,^°  or  it  was  procured  by  the  use  of  falsehood,^'  as,  for  ex- 

"  Hardy  v.    United   States,   3    App.  State  v.  Brinte,  4  Pen.  (Del.)  551,  58 

D.  C.  35 ;  People  v.  Wentz,  37  N.  Y.  Atl.    258 ;    State    v.    Barrington,    198 

303;    People   V.    McGloin,   91    N.    Y.  Mo.  23,  95  S.  W.  235. 

241,    246;    State   V.   Turner,   122   La.  "State  v.  Darnell,  i  Houst.   (Del.) 

371,  47  So.   685;    State  V.  Berry,   50  321. 

La.   Ann.    1309,  24   So.   329;    Birken-  "  State  v.  Darnell,  i  Houst.   (Del.) 

feld  V.    State,    104   Md.   253,   65   Atl.  321 :     Commonwealth     v.     Knapp,    9 

i;  State  v.  Banusik   (N.  J.),  64  Atl.  Pick.   (IMass.)  496,  20  Am.  Dec.  491; 

994;   State  V.  Blodgett,  50  Ore.  329,  Cox  v.  People.  80  X.  Y.  500,  515. 

92  Pac.  820;  People  v.   Siemsen,   153  "Burton  v.  State,  107  Ala.  108,  18 

Cal.  387,  95  Pac.  863:  Cox  v.  People,  So.   284:    Sanders   v.    State.    113    Ga. 

80  N.  Y.  500 ;  McClain  v.  Common-  267,  38  S.  E.  841 :   People  v.  Barker, 

wealth,   no   Pa.  263,  269,   i   Atl.   45:  60  ]\Iich.  277,  27  N.  W.  539.  i  Am.  St. 

Murphy  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  590,  597 ;  50in ;   State  v.   Rush,  95  ]Mo.    199,  8 


271  CONFESSIONS.  §    I4I 

ample,  by  telling  the  accused  that  his  accomplice  had  made  a  con- 
fession implicating  the  accused. 

Nor  should  an  admissible  confession  be  rejected  because  it  was 
the  result  of  some  benefit  having  no  connection  with  the  crime 
confessed.^^  Thus,  a  confession  which  has  been  induced  by  a 
promise  that  the  prisoner  may  see  his  wife,  who  was  confined 
in  another  cell,^°  or  have  his  shackles  removed,  and  permit  him 
to  associate  with  other  prisoners, ^°  or  be  permitted  to  take  exer- 
cise, or  be  released  from  a  rigorous  confinement,  or  to  protect 
him  from  others  alleged  to  be  implicated  in  the  crime,"^  should 
be  received."" 

§  141.  Confessions  made  by  signs  or  gestures. — Under  this  head 
we  may  group  direct  admissions  of  guilt  in  the  form  of  affirm- 
ative gestures,  nods  or  signs  made  in  response  to  leading  ques- 
tions or  to  questions  which  assume  the  guilt  of  the  person  ad- 
dressed. Can  a  witness  who  saw  the  incriminating  gesture  testify 
that  it  was  made,  the  question  which  called  it  out  being  also 
proved,  in  a  case  where  he  would  be  precluded  from  testifying 
to  an  express  confession  because  the  circumstances  rendered  it 
involuntary  ? 

An  affirmative  nod  in  response  to  a  direct  accusation  of  crime 
is  no  less  a  confession  than  an  oral  statement.  If  the  accusation 
is  coupled  with  a  threat  or  a  promise,  evidence  of  the  nod  or 
gesture  should  be  rejected  as  an  attempt  to  accomplish  by  indi- 
rection what  cannot  be  done  directly.    Actions  speak  louder  than 

S.  W.  221;  Heldt  V.   State,  20  Neb.  =^  Hunt  v.  State,  135  Ala.  i,  33  So. 

492,   30    N.    W.    626,    57    Am.   83511;  329. 

Commonwealth  v.  Goodwin,   186  Pa.  "^"On    the    whole    the    authorities 

218,    40   Atl.    412,    65    Am.    St.    852;  seem  to  be  in  favor  of  the  proposi- 

Commonwealth    v.    Wilson,    186    Pa.  tion  that  the  inducement  must  be  of 

St.  I,  40  Atl.  283.  a   temporal   nature.     Whether  or  no 

"  Stone  V.  State,  105  Ala.  60,  17  So.  it  must  have  reference  to  the  charge, 

114;   Price  V.   State,   T14   Ga.  815,  40  has  scarcely  been  fully  discussed.     It 

S.  E.  lois;  State  v.  Fortner,  43  Iowa  is  certainly  possible  to  conceive  cases 

494;   State  v.   Hopkirk,  84   Mo.  278;  in  which  a  much  stronger  inducement 

State   v.   Wentworth,  37  N.  H.   196;  might  be  held  out  to  a  prisoner  than 

Cox  V.  People,  80  N.  Y.  500.  one   having   reference    to   an    escape 

"Rex.  v.  Lloyd,  6  C.  &  P.  393.  from  a  charge  not  involving  any  very 

"'  State  v.  Tatro,  50  Vt.  483 ;  State  serious  consequences."    Roscoe  Crim. 

V.  Cruse,  74  N.  Car.  491.  Ev.,  46. 


§§    142-143  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  2^2 

words.  Expressive  gestures  often  manifest  more  clearly  the  emo- 
tion of  the  mind  than  the  most  forcible  and  vehement  language. 
A  direct  confession  by  an  act  is  therefore  inadmissible  whenever 
the'spoken  or  written  word  would  be  excluded.-'' 

§  142.  Confessions  of  treason. — Because  of  the  statutory  require- 
ment under  which  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  an  overt  act 
was  necessary  to  convict  one  of  the  crime  of  treason,  it  was  at 
one  time  doubted  whether  an  extra-judicial  confession  was  ad- 
missible against  one  on  trial  for  the  commission  of  that  crime."* 
It  is  now  the  law  that  while  no  one  can  be  convicted  of  treason 
upon  his  confession  not  made  in  open  court,  that  is,  by  a  plea  of 
guilty  to  the  indictment,  his  extra-judicial  confession  may  be  re- 
ceived against  him.  The  making  of  the  confession  and  the  con- 
fession itself  must,  to  be  admissible,  be  proved  by  two  witnesses.-^ 

g  143.  Confessions  made  by  young  children. — Where  a  young 
child  possesses  sufficient  mental  capacity,  or  is  of  such  an  age  as 
Avill  render  him  responsible  for  the  criminal  consequences  of  his 
actions,  his  confession  is  admissible,  under  the  same  circumstances 
which  will  admit  the  confession  of  an  adult  or  mature  person.-" 

It  is  enough  to  show  that  he  is  reasonably  intelligent  and  old 
enough  to  understand  the  character  and  effect  of  what  he  says 
and  to  comprehend  his  situation  generally."^ 

And  a  child,  under  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  may,  if  clearly 
and  fully  shown  to  be  able  to  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong 
as  respects  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  under  con- 

="Xolen  V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  474,  "i    East    P.    C,    131-133.    i    Burr's 

483,  46  Am.  247n;  Roscoe  Cr.  Ev.,  p.  Trial  196. 

5t;   I   Greenleaf  on  Evidence,   §  282.  ^"Commonwealth     v.      Smith,      119 

The  distinction  between  the  admissi-  Mass.  305,  311;  Earp  v.  State,  55  Ga. 

bility  of  evidence  of  facts  discovered,  136;    Stage's  Case,  5  City  Hall  Rec. 

through     an    involuntary    confession  (N.  Y.)   177. 

which   is  not  admissible,  and  an   act  =^  Rirkenfeld  v.  State,  104  Md.  253. 

not   admissible   because  itself   consti-  65  Atl.  i;  State  v.  Guild,  10  N.  J.  L. 

tuting     an     involuntary     confession,  163,    18   Am.    Dec.    404;    Grayson   v. 

should  not  be  overlooked.     Sec  ante,  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  573,  51  S.  W. 

§§  r37,  T38.  246;   Rex  v.  Thornton,  i  Moody  C 

■^  Underbill  on  Evidence,  §  98.  C.  2.T. 


273  coxFESsioxs.  §  144 

sideration.  be  convicted  of  murder  or  other  felony  upon  his  extra- 
judicial confession,  if  the  corpus  delicti  be  otherwise  proved."'' 

But  a  confession  by  a  stupid  negro  boy  twelve  years  of  age 
made  to  white  men  by  whom  he  was  privately  examined  is  inad- 
missible where  he  was  without  friends  or  counsel  to  advise  him.^^ 

§  144.  Judicial  confessions:  plea  of  guilty. — As  will  be  subse- 
quently pointed  out.  the  jury  may  convict  the  accused  upon  his 
extra-judicial  confession,  only  in  case  they  shall  believe  that  it 
is  corroborated  by  independent  proof  of  the  corpus  delicti.  But 
a  judicial  confession  in  the  shape  of  a  plea  of  guilty  by  the  ac- 
cused, he  having  sufficient  capacity  to  understand  the  nature  and 
meaning  of  his  act,  made  in  the  hearing  of  the  court  and  the  jury, 
is  equivalent  to  a  conviction  and  is  conclusive  on  the  jury.  The 
court  must  pronounce  judgment  and  sentence  as  in  a  case  of  a 
verdict  of  guilty  rendered  by  the  jury.^^ 

The  accused  has  an  absolute  right  to  plead  guilty  and,  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  the  court  is  bound  to  accept 
the  plea  even  in  capital  cases.^^  In  some  states,  there  are  statutes 
which  provide  that  no  plea  of  guilty  shall  be  accepted  in  capital 
cases  and  such  a  statute  is  constitutional. ^- 

^^'here  no  such  statute  prevails,  the  prisoner  may,  if  sane,  be 
convicted  at  once  and  sentenced  to  death  or  imprisonment.^^  The 
judge  may  in  his  discretion  permit  a  plea  of  guilty  to  be  with- 

^  Martin  V.  State,  90  Ala.  602,  8  So.  1092,  4  Bl.   Comm.    (Tucker)   329,   i 

858,    861,    24   Am.    St.    844;    Rex    v.  Chitty  Cr.  Law  429,  2  Hale  Pleas.  Cr. 

Thornton,   I   Moody  C.  C.  27;  Com-  225.    The  court  may  hear  evidence  to 

momvealth  v.   Smith,   119  Mass.  305,  determine  the  punishment.      State  v. 

311;   Bartley  v.    People,   156  111.  234,  Branner,   149   N.   Car.    559,  63    S.   E. 

40    X.    E.    831 ;     Commonwealth    v.  169. 

Preece,   140  Mass.  276,  5  N.   E.  494.  ^  State  v.  Branner,  149  X.  Car.  559, 

But  cf.  Ford  v.  State,  75  Miss.  loi,  63  S.  E.  169. 

2T  So.  524.  ^^  State  V.  Genz,  57  X.  J.  L.  459,  31 

^  Owsley    V.     Commonwealth,     125  Atl.  1037. 

Ky.  384,  loi  S.  W.  366,  31  Ky.  L.  5;  ""  Dantz  v.   State,  Sj  Tnd.  398.  399; 

Ford   V.    State,  75   ^liss.    lOi,  21    So.  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,   150  Mass. 

.S24.  330,  23  X.  E.  49;  Sellers  v.  People,  6 

'^  State  V.  Branner,  149  N.  Car.  559,  111.  183;  State  v.  Cowan,  7  Ired.  (N. 

63    S.    E.    169;    Green    v.    Common-  Car.)   239;  State  v.   Branner,  149  N. 

wealth,    T2  .Mien    (Mass.)    155:    Peo-  Car.  559,63  S.  E.  169. 
pie  V.  Luby,  99  Mich.  89,  57  X.  W. 

18 — UXDERHILL    CrIM.    Ev. 


$     144  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  274 

drawn  at  any  time  before  judgment,^*  and  a  plea  of  not  guilty  to 
be  substituted  in  its  place.^^ 

In  order  that  the  plea  of  guilty  may  be  accepted,  and  a  judg- 
ment and  sentence  pronounced  thereupon,  the  plea  must  be  en- 
tirely voluntary  and  given  under  circumstances  which  would  per- 
mit the  introduction  in  evidence  of  a  confession  made  out  of 
court.  It  must  be  shown  to  have  been  uninfluenced  by  fear  or  l^y 
liope.  It  must  not  be  the  result  of  misrepresentation  or  over- 
persuasion  ;  it  must  also  be  shown  not  to  have  been  the  outcome 
of  ignorance  or  of  a  misconception  of  the  rights  of  the  accused.^'' 

The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  state  to  satisfy  the  court  that  the 
plea  of  guilty  was  voluntary  and  that  the  accused  understood  the 
nature  of  the  plea.  Ordinarily,  this  w^ill  be  presumed  from  the 
absence  of  any  circumstances  showing  compulsion,  but  the  matter 
i=;  regulated  by  statutes  in  some  states.  In  Michigan,  it  is  pro- 
vided where  a  defendant  pleads  guilty,  that  the  court,  before 
pronouncing  sentence,  must  investigate  and  satisfy  itself  that  the 
plea  was  made  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  consequences  and 
without  undue  influence.^^ 

If  the  prisoner  had,  and  acted  under,  proper  legal  advice,  the 
discretion  of  the  court  is  not  abused  if  the  judge  shall  refuse  to 
allow  a  plea  of  guilty  to  be  withdrawn  after  sentence.^^ 

If,  how^ever,  the  refusal  to  permit  the  plea  of  guilty  to  be  with- 
drawn results  in  gross  and  manifest  injustice  to  the  prisoner,  as 
would  be  the  case  where  he,  by  mistake,  pleads  guilty  to  the  wrong 
indictment, ^^  or,  being  of  foreign  birth  and  training,  he  was 
densely  ignorant  of  the  language  and  of  the  judicial  institutions 

'^Reg.  V.  Sell,  9  C.  &  P.  346;  Kro-  State,  2  Coklw.   (Tenn.)  212,  88  Am. 

lage  V.  People,  224  111.  456,  79  N.  E.  Dec.   593;    O'Brien  v.   State    (Tex.), 

570 ;  State  v.  Hortman,  122  Iowa  104,  35  S.  W.  666. 

97    N.    W.    981 ;    Rex    v.    Pkimmer,  ^^  People   v.   Lepper,   51    Mich.    196, 

(1902)  2  K.  B.  339,  71  Law  J.  K.  B.  16   N.  W.   '>)']T,   People  v.  Lewis,  51 

805,   86  Law  T.  836,  51   Wkly.   Rep.  Mich.  172,  16  N.  W.  326. 

137,  66  J.  P.  647.  ''  Clark  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  383,  34 

^People  V.  McCrory,  41  Cal.  458.  Atl.  3:  People  v.  Lennox,  67  Cal.  113, 

^*  Gardner   v.    People,    106   III.    'jf);  114,   7    Pac.    260;    Commonwealth    v. 

Monahan   v.    State,    135   Ind.   216,  34  Hagarman,    10    Allen     fMass.)    401; 

N.   E.   967;   State  v.    Yates,   52  Kan.  United  States  v.  Bayand.  23  Fed.  721; 

,=i66,  35  Pac.  200;  Green  v.  Common-  Krolage  v.  People,  224  111.  456,  79  N. 

wealth,   T2  Allen    (^Mass.)    155;   State  E.  570. 

V.   Stephens,  71   Mo.  535;    Swang  v.  ^°  Davis  v.  State,  20  Ga.  674,  676. 


275 


CONFESSIONS. 


§    144 


of  the  jurisdiction/"  or  where  his  plea  was  caused  by  his  erroneous 
beHef,  based  upon  a  remark  by  the  judge  that  the  lowest  sentence 
would  be  imposed/^  or  where  there  is  any  doubt  of  the  sanity  of 
the  prisoner,*^  or  he  pleads  guilty  under  duress,  and  because  of 
the  intimidation  and  threats  of  being  lynched  by  a  mob/^  the 
conviction  should  be  reversed. 

But  the  mere  fact  that  the  punishment  is  greater  than  the  ac- 
cused anticipated  that  he  would  receive  if  he  pleaded  guilty,**  or 
that  the  district  attorney  or  other  prosecuting  official  was  per- 
mitted to  offer  evidence  of  facts  and  circumstances  to  aggravate 
the  guilt  of  the  accused  and  to  increase  his  punishment,  is  not 
sufficient  to  justify  permitting  a  voluntary  plea  of  guilty  to  be 
Vv'ithdrawn.*^ 

A  statute  which  requires  the  judge  to  satisfy  himself  that  a 
plea  of  guilty  was  freely  made,  uninfluenced  by  fear  or  the  de- 
lusive hope  of  pardon,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  charge  and 
without  undue  influence,  must  be  strictly  observed  with  a  view 
of  protecting  the  accused  against  unscrupulous  persons  who  might 
extort  a  plea  of  guilty  from  him  through  his  ignorance  or  by 
false  promises.**' 


'"  Gardner  v.  State,  106  111.  76. 

"  State  V.  Stephens,  71  Mo.  535, 
537- 

^"Commonwealth  v.  Battis,  i  Mass. 
95;  Burton  v.  State,  ss  Tex.  Ci.  App. 
138,  25  S.  W.  782;  People  V.  Scott,  59 
Cal.  341 ;  Deloach  v.  State,  77  Miss. 
691,  27  So.  618.  In  moving  to  amend 
the  record  after  a  conviction  by  strik- 
ing out  a  plea  entered  by  mistake,  it 
must  be  shovirn  when  the  mistake  was 
first  discovered.  The  accused  must 
be  free  from  laches.  The  testimony 
of  the  accused  that  a  mistake  has 
been  made  is  insufficient  to  justify 
the  amendment.  McKevitt  v.  People, 
208  111.  460,  70  N.  E.  693. 

*"  Sanders  v.  State,  85  Tnd.  318, 
320-334,  44  Am.  29. 

"  Mastronada  v.  State,  60  Miss.  86. 

■*■'  Mounts  V.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky. 
274,  12  S.  W.  311,  II  Ky.  L.  474. 


*^  People  V.  Lepper,  51  Mich.  196, 
199,  16  N.  W.  377 ;  Coleman  v.  State, 
35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  404,  33  S.  W.  1083 ; 
Frosh  V.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  280. 
When  a  statute  prescribes  certain  ab- 
solutely essential  preliminaries  are  to 
be  observed  before  the  plea  of  guilty 
can  be  accepted,  these  prerequisites 
must  be  made  manifest  by  the  record 
and  cannot  be  supplied  by  inference 
or  intendment.  Saunders  v.  State,  10 
Tex.  App.  336,  339 ;  Coleman  v.  State, 
35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  404,  33  S.  W.  T083. 
The  court  should  question  the  friends 
of  the  accused  and  his  counsel.  Hen- 
ning  v.  People,  40  Mich.  733.  This 
may  be  done  in  open  court  and  in 
presence  of  the  prosecuting  attorney. 
People  V.  Lewis,  51  Mich.  172,  16  N. 
W.  326. 


§    145  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  276 

A  plea  of  guilty  is  only  a  confession  of  guilt  in  the  manner  and 
form  as  charged  in  the  indictment.  It  admits  the  facts  charged 
and  no  others.  It  does  not  admit  that  the  facts  stated  in  the  in- 
dictment constitute  a  crime.  Hence  a  conviction  on  a  plea  of 
guilty  should  he  reversed  where  no  legal  crime  is  actually  charged 
in  the  indictment/'  or  where  the  crime  to  which  the  accused 
pleads  guilty  is  not  the  offense  described  in  the  indictment.''*' 

But  a  plea  of  guilty  waives  formal  defects  in  the  indictment 
upon  which  a  plea  in  abatement  might  be  based. ^" 

§  145.  Confessions  of  persons  not  indicted. — The  incriminating 
statements  of  a  third  person  that  he  committed  the  crime  for 
which  the  accused  is  on  trial  are  hearsay.  Such  persons  must  be 
produced  as  witnesses.^" 

Accordingly  evidence  on  a  trial  for  homicide  that  a  person  who 
w^as  present  wdien  the  deceased  w^as  killed  then  stated  that  he 
and  not  the  accused  had  shot  the  deceased,  is  properly  excluded 
unless  the  person  whose  statement  is  offered  shall  be  produced  as 
a  witness. ^^ 

The  prisoner  may,  of  course,  disprove  his  guilt  by  proving  the 
guilt  of  some  other  person.^-  But  he  cannot  do  that  by  introduc- 
ing the  extra-judicial  confession  or  declaration  of  that  person  that 
he  intended  to  commit,  or  that  he  had  committed,  the  crime.  The 
extra-judicial  declaration  is  never  conclusive  upon  the  declarant. 
He  may,  if  he  be  subsequently  indicted  because  of  this  so-called 
confession,  demonstrate  its  falsity  and  absolve  himself.  To  re- 
ceive such  statements  as  exculpatory  proof  w^ould  be  to  open  wide 
the  door  for  the  practice  of  fraud  whereby  the  acquittal  of  the 
real  criminal  w^ould  be  assured. ^^ 

*'Cro\v  V.   State,  6  Tex.  334,  355;  257;  Welsh  v.  State,  96  Ala.  92.  96, 

Fletcher  v.   State,  12  Ark.   169;   Fat-  11  So.  450;  State  v.  Duncan,  T16  Mo. 

rick  V.   State   (Wyo.,   1908),  98  Pac.  288,  22  S.  W.  699;  State  v.  Fletcher, 

588:  Commonwealth  v.  Kennedy,  131  24  Ore.  295,  33   Pac.   575,  577;   State 

Tilass.  584 ;  Boody  v.  People,  43  Mich.  v.  Haynes,  71  N.  Car.  79,  84 ;   State 

34,  4  N.  W.  349;  State  v.  Levy,  119  v.  Bishop,  73  N.  Car.  44. 

Mo.   434,  24  S.  W.   1026;   Moore  v.  ^^  Selby    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

State,  53  Neb.  831,  74  N.  W.  319.  80  S.  W.  221,  25  Ky.  L.  2209. 

■^  State  V.   Queen,  91   N.   Car.  659,  "  Brown  v.  State,  120  Ala.  342,  25 

660.  So.    182;    McDonald    v.    State    (Ala., 

*' Carper  v.  State,  27  Ohio  St.  572.  1910),  51   So.  629. 

'"Rhea  v.  State,  10  Yerg.   (Tenn.)  '=  Greenfield  v.  People.  85  N.  Y.  75, 

90,  39  Am.  636;  Daniel  v.   State,  65 


277  CONFESSIONS.  §    I46 

But  if  it  is  alleged  by  the  state  that  the  third  person  was  an 
accessory,  his  confession  that  he  was  the  principal  is  admissible 
in  favor  of  one  who,  being  tried  as  the  principal,  claims  he  is  not.^* 

§  146.  The  value  of  confessions  as  evidence. — The  evidential  value 
of  confessions  and  their  character,  cogency  and  force  as  proof  of 
crime  are  subjects  that  have  elicited  much  discussion.  Some, 
basing'  their  views  upon  the  natural  presumption  that  a  man  will 
not  voluntarily  incriminate  himself  by  uttering  falsehoods,  re- 
gard confessions  as  of  considerable,  if  not  of  paramount  value, 
in  determining  the  guilt  of  the  accused.^^ 

Still  it  is  usually  very  necessary  that  some  degree  of  care 
should  be  used  in  receiving  the  confession,  and  much  caution  em- 
ployed by  the  jury  in  ascertaining  its  weight  and  sufficiency.  Its 
credibility  is  entirely  for  their  determination,  and  though  they 
may  believe  it  to  have  been  wholly  free  and  voluntary,  they  may, 
and  indeed  must,  scrutinize  the  confession  closely,  keeping  in 
view  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  it  was  made.  For  it 
must  be  remembered  that  though  it  may  have  been  voluntary  the 
accused  was,  at  the  time  he  made  it,  embarrassed  by  the  present 
rigors  of  his  arrest  and  confinement  in  prison  and  menaced  with 
the  fear  of  death  or  a  term  of  imprisonment  in  the  future.    Such 

Ga.  199;  State  v.  Beaudet,  53  Conn,  testimony  of  the  injured  person,  in 
536,  540,  4  Atl.  2Z7,  55  Am.  155;  case  he  shall  testify  as  a  witness,  un- 
Smith  V.  State,  9  Ala.  990;  West  v.  less  they  form  a  part  of  the  res 
State,  "](>  Ala.  98,  99;  State  v.  Gee,  92  gcsta  of  some  relevant  act.  Williams 
N.  Car.  756,  760;  People  v.  Gillespie,  v.  State,  52  Ala.  411;  State  v.  Mai- 
iiT  Mich.  241,  69  N.  W.  490.  Defend-  tremme,  14  La.  Ann.  830;  Common- 
ant  will  not  be  permitted  to  show  wealth  v.  Densmore,  12  Allen 
that  a  third  person  whose  connection  (Mass.)  535;  People  v.  McLaughlin, 
with  the  crime  does  not  appear  fled  44  Cal.  435. 

on  the  night  it  was  committed.    Ow-        "  People  v.  Borgetto,  99  Mich.  336, 

ensby  v.  State,  82  Ala.  6z,  64,  2  So.  58   N.   W.   328.    See,   also,   Common- 

764.  wealth  V.  Shaffer,  178  Pa.  409,  35  Atl. 

^  Pace  V.  State   (Te.x-.,  1893),  20  S.  924;  People  v.  Bennett,  2>7  N.  Y.  117, 

W.  762.     The  admissions  and  decla-  93  Am.  Dec.  551;  Mercer  v.  State,  17 

rations  of  a  person  who  has  been  in-  Ga.    146;    Lipsey   v.    People,   227    III. 

jured  by  the  accused  in  the  perpetra-  364,   81    N.   E.   348.     Admissibility  of 

tion    of  the  crime,    either    in    person  confessions,  see  note.  6  .\\\\.  St.  242, 

or  property,   are   not  competent   cvi-  243 ;  against  whom  admissible,  6  Am. 

dencc  in  favor  of  the  accused,  except  St.  251. 
for    the    purpose    of    impeaching   the 


146 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


278 


circumstances  are  not  in  general  conducive  to  the  calmness  and 
deliberation  which  are  necessary  to  secure  a  truthful  and  accurate 
narrative  of  past  events  of  a  stirring-  nature  in  which  the  speaker 
was  the  principal  actor  and  participant.'^''' 

From  the  moment  of  his  arrest  an  accused  person  is  surrounded 
by  shrewd  and  experienced  police  officials,  whose  daily  business 
it  is  to  deal  with  hardened  criminals,  and  whose  interest  it  is,  not 
to  secure  the  acquittal  of  the  innocent,  but  to  bring  the  guilty  to 
justice.  The  fact  that  a  person  under  arrest  is  subsequently  proved 
to  be  innocent  of  the  crime  charged,  is  often  regarded  as  showing 
a  lack  of  judgment  or  experience  on  the  part  of  the  officials  caus- 
ing or  procuring  his  arrest.  Hence  it  commonly  happens  that 
detectives,  policemen  and  others  entrusted  with  the  detection  and 
apprehension  of  criminals  assume  that  every  one  who  is  placed 
under  arrest  is  guilty  of  the  crime  charged.  Such  a  mental  atti- 
tude often  leads  to  a  wilful,  and  sometimes  even  to  an  unconscious 
and  involuntary  suppression,  of  those  facts  which  indicate  that  the 
prisoner  is  innocent,  and  to  an  exaggeration  of  those  which  point 
to  guilt.^^ 


^Xobles  V.  State,  98  Ga.  73,  26  S. 
E.  64.  In  Commonwealth  v.  Tucker- 
man,  10  Gra}^  (Mass.)  173,  190,  the 
court  said :  "It  is  not  because  of  any 
breach  of  good  faith  in  admitting 
them,  nor  because  they  are  extorted 
illegally,  but  the  reason  is  that  in  the 
agitation  of  mind  in  which  the  party 
charged  is  supposed  to  be,  he  is  liable 
to  be  influenced  by  the  hope  of  ad- 
vantage, or  fear  of  injury,  to  state 
things  which  are  not  true.  The  in- 
fluence which  is  to  exclude  the  par- 
ty's confession  must  be  external  in- 
fluence, and  not  the  mere  operation 
of  his  own  mind."  Graham  v.  State, 
118  Ga.  807,  45  S.  E.  616;  State  v. 
Adams  (Del.),  65  Atl.  510. 

"  Priest  V.  State,  10  Xeb.  393,  400, 
2  X.  W.  468,  I  Green,  on  Ev.,  §  219. 
"It  is  a  rule  of  law  that  the  con- 
fessions of  parties  charged  with 
crime  should  be  acted  upon  by  courts 


and  juries  with  great  caution.  *  *  * 
The  wisdom  of  this  rule  cannot  be 
questioned,  for  the  reason  that  not- 
withstanding the  confessions  of  per- 
sons accused  of  crime  have  been  held 
to  be  evidence  of  the  very  highest 
character,  upon  the  theory  that  no 
man  would  acknowledge  that  he  had 
committed  a  grave  crime  unless  he 
was  actually  guilty,  but  experience 
teaches  that  this  theory  is  a  fallacy, 
for  it  is  a  fact  that  numbers  of  per- 
sons have  confessed  that  the}^  were 
guilt}-  of  the  most  heinous  crimes, 
for  which  they  suffered  the  most  hor- 
rible punishments  and  yet  they  were 
innocent.  In  the  sixteenth  and  sev- 
enteenth centuries,  in  enlightened 
England,  men  and  women  confessed 
that  they  were  guilty  of  witchcraft — 
communion  with  evil  spirits  and  suf- 
fered at  the  stake  therefore,  and  at 
this    day   men   through   fear   of   per- 


279 


CONFESSIONS. 


147 


So,  too,  the  accused  may  confess  that  he  is  guilty  in  order  to 
divert  suspicion  from  another,  or  to  enable  some  other  person  to 
escape,  and  when  he  is  himself  placed  on  trial  repudiate  all  he 
has  said,  and  conclusively  prove  his  innocence  by  unimpeachable 
evidence.  A  confession  made  to  free  another  from  suspicion  or 
arrest  is  not,  for  that  reason,  inadmissible,  particularly  where  the 
suspected  person  testifies  that  the  accused  substantially  acknowl- 
edged the  facts  confessed  in  his  hearing.^^  Such  cases  are,  how- 
ever, admittedly  rare,  and  can  hardly,  with  justice,  be  invoked 
to  impeach  confessions  made  under  ordinary  circumstances  ren- 
dering them  admissible. 

§  147.  Corroboration  of  extra-judicial  confessions. — A  naked  con- 
fession is  one  which  is  not  corroborated  by  independent  proof  of 
the  corpus  delicti.  Upon  such  a  confession  made  in  open  court, 
as,  for  example,  by  a  plea  of  guilty,  a  conviction  of  any  crime, 
and  sentence  may  be  had.  But  in  the  case  of  all  extra-judicial 
confessions  it  is  the  rule  that  the  corpus  delicti  must  be  proved 
by  additional  evidence  before  a  conviction  upon  the  naked  confes- 
sion alone  will  be  upheld. ^'^ 


sonal  punishment,  or  through  hope  of 
averting  such  punishment,  confess 
that  they  are  guilty  of  crime,  without 
the  slightest  foundation  in  truth  for 
such  confession,  and  for  these  rea- 
sons we  say,  that  the  theory  that  men 
will  not  confess  to  the  commission  of 
crimes  of  which  they  are  innocent,  is 
a  fallacy."  Coffee  v.  State,  25  Fla. 
501,  512,  6  So.  493,  23  Am.  St.  525. 

^'People  V.  Smalling,  94  Cal.  112, 
29  Pac.  421 ;   State  v.  Grant,  22  ]\Ie. 

171,  174- 

'"Harden  v.  State,  109  Ala.  50,  19 
So.  494;  Bartley  v.  People,  156  111. 
234, 40  X.  E.  831 ;  People  v.  Simonsen, 
107  Cal.  345,  40  Pac.  440;  Attaway 
V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  403,  34  S. 
W.  112;  People  V.  Tarbox,  115  Cal. 
57.  46  Pac.  896;  Laughlin  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  37  S.  W.  590.  18 
Ky.   L.  640;  Pitts  V.    State,  43  Miss. 


472,  480;  Bergen  v.  People,  17  111. 
426,  65  Am.  Dec.  672n ;  South  v.  Peo- 
ple, 98  111.  261 ;  State  v.  Laliyer,  4 
Minn.  368;  Johnson  v.  State,  59  Ala. 
37 ;  State  v.  Keeler,  28  Iowa  551 ; 
Stringfellow  v.  State,  26  Miss.  157, 
165 ;  Priest  v.  State,  10  Neb.  393,  399, 
6  N.  W.  468;  People  v.  Deacons,  109 
N.  Y.  374,  16  N.  E.  676,  IS  N.  Y.  St. 
526,  28  Wkly.  Dig.  545;  Holland  v. 
State,  39  Fla.  178,  22  So.  298;  Davis 
V.  State,  51  Neb.  30T,  70  N.  W.  984; 
Willard  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  386, 
II  S.  W.  453,  II  Am.  St.  197;  People 
V.  Lane,  49  Mich.  340,  13  N.  W.  622; 
People  V.  Ranney,  153  Mich.  293,  116 
N.  W.  999,  15  Det.  Leg.  N.  442;  State 
V.  Abrams,  131  Iowa  479,  T08  N.  W. 
1041 ;  State  v.  Banusik  (N.  J.),  64 
Atl.  994;  Allen  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App. 
458,  6t  S.  E.  840:  Jones  v.  State,  2 
Ga.  App.  433,  58  S.  E.  559;  Smith  v. 


§  147 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


280 


There  have  been,  however,  some  apparent  exceptions  to  this 
general  rule.  They  are  early  cases  and  most  of  them  were  decided 
in  England  where  the  probative  value  of  extra-judicial  confes- 
sions was  particularly  during  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  and 
the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  regarded  with  very  much 
greater  favor  than  it  is  at  the  present  time,  in  either  England  or 
America.  So.  also,  the  American  cases  sustaining  the  excep- 
tions are  all  early  cases  and  have  been  either  expressly  or  by  im- 
plication overruled  in  the  more  recent  decisions."** 

The  corroborative  evidence  must,  independently  of  the  con- 
fession, prove  or  tend  to  prove  that  a  crime  has  been  committed 
and  that  the  accused  committed  it  or  was  connected  with  it."^  The 
corpus  delicti  need  not  be  proved  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt 
independently  of  the  confession  itself.**- 


State,  125  Ga.  296,  54  S.  E.  127; 
Owen  V.  State,  119  Ga.  304,  46  S.  E. 
433;  Bines  v.  State,  118  Ga.  320,  45 
S.  E.  27(>,  68  L.  R.  A.  33n;  Marshall 
V.  State,  84  Ark.  88,  104  S.  W.  934; 
Ex  parte  Patterson,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
271,  95  S.  W.  1061 ;  People  v.  Brasch, 
193  N.  Y.  46,  85  N.  E.  809;  Wilson 
V.  State  (Ga.),  64  S.  E.  112;  Boyd  v. 
State,  4  Ga.  App.  58,  60  S.  E.  8ot  ; 
Burk  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  185, 
95  S.  W.  1064;  Rucker  v.  State,  2 
Ga.  App.  140,  58  S.  E.  295 ;  State  v. 
Rogoway,  45  Ore.  6or,  78  Pac.  987; 
Williams  v.  State,  125  Ga.  741,  54  S. 
E.  661 ;  State  v.  Knowles,  185  Mo. 
14T,  83  S.  W.  1083 ;  Green  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  83  S.  W.  638,  26 
Ky.  L.  1221 ;  Holland  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  82  S.  W.  596,  26  Ky. 
L.  790;  People  V.  Fallon,  149  Cal. 
287,  86  Pac.  689:  People  v.  Eldridge, 
3  Cal.  App.  648,  86  Pac.  832:  State 
V.  Marselle,  43  Wash.  273,  86  Pac. 
586;  Griffiths  V.  State.  163  Ind.  555, 
72  N.  E.  563;  McAllister  v.  State,  2 
Ga.  App.  654,  656,  58  S.  E.  IT  to; 
United  States  v.  Boese,  46  Fed.  917, 


919.  Evidence  of  the  finding  of  a 
body  showing  marks  of  violence  suf- 
ficient to  cause  death,  and  of  weap- 
ons or  articles  stained  with  blood 
near  it,  sufficiently  proves  that  a  mur- 
der has  been  committed  to  sustain  a 
conviction  based  on  an  extra-judicial 
confession.  Paul  v.  State,  65  Ga. 
TS2,  155;  People  v.  Deacons,  T09  N. 
Y.  374,  378,  16  K.  E.  676,  15  N.  Y.  St. 
526,  28  Wkly.  Dig.  545. 

•^  White  V.  State,  49  Ala.  344;  Ste- 
phen V.  State,  II  Ga.  225;  State  v. 
Cowan,  7  Ired.  (X.  Car.)  239;  Rex 
V.  Tippet,  R.  &  R.  509;  Reg.  v.  Un- 
kles,  Ir.  R.  8  C.  L.  50. 

**  State  V.  Jacobs,  21  R.  I.  259.  43 
Atl.  31 ;  People  v.  Ranney,  153  Mich. 
293,  116  N.  W.  999,  15  Detroit  Leg. 
N.  442;  Commonwealth  v.  Killion, 
194  Mass.  153,  80  N.  E.  222. 

"People  V.  Jones,  123  Cal.  65,  55 
Pac.  698;  People  v.  Harris,  IT4  Cal. 
575,  46  Pac.  602:  Gantling  v.  State, 
41  Fla.  587,  26  So.  737;  Sanders  v. 
State,  118  Ga.  329,  45  S.  E.  365;  State 
V.  Coats.  174  Mo.  396,  74  S.  W.  864; 
People  V.  Fanning,  131  N.  Y.  659,  30 


28 1  CONFESSIONS.  §    147a 

The  meaning  of  this  is  that  the  evidence  offered  in  corrobora- 
tion need  not  be  sufficient  alone,  aside  from  the  confession  to 
convince  the  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  all  reason- 
able doubt,  but  if  the  evidence  of  the  corpus  delicti  considered 
with  the  confession  of  the  accused,  the  jury  believe  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  that  the  prisoner  is  guilty  a  conviction  will  be  sus- 
tained.*^^ 

§  147a.    Credibility  of  confession  and  use  of  in  favor  of  the  accused. 

— The  witness  called  to  prove  an  oral  confession  need  not  repeat 
the  exact  words  of  the  accused.'''*  But  it  is  absolutely  essential 
that  he  should  remember  the  substance  of  what  was  said  in  the 
conversation*^^  and  be  able  to  state  it  accurately.  And  unless  it 
shall  affirmatively  appear  that  the  witness  thoroughly  understood 
the  language  in  which  the  prisoner  spoke. '^*'  the  confession  should 
be  rejected. 

The  burden  of  proving  that  the  language  of  the  accused  was 
properly  interpreted  in  the  case  of  an  alleged  confession  by  one 
who  speaks  no  English  is  upon  the  prosecution.  If  the  confes- 
sion is  taken  down  in  the  English  language,  reading  it  and  re- 
interpreting it  back  to  the  prisoner  added  to  the  oath  of  the  in- 
terpreter as  to  the  correctness  of  his  interpretation,  are  usually 
sufficient."' 

The  interpreter  need  not  be  chosen  by  the  accused.  He  may 
be  a  person  chosen  by  the  prosecuting  attorney  and  his  evidence 
is  not  hearsay  but  is  competent,  provided  he  will  swear  that  he 
correctly  interpreted  the  questions  and  answers.*'- 

The  confession  may  be  given  in  evidence  for  the  accused  as 

N.  E.  569,  8  N.  Y.  Cr.  363,  43  N.  Y.  '"  Berry  v.  Commonwealth,  10  Bush 

St.  771;  State  V.  Jacobs,  21  R.  I.  259,  (Ky.)    15;   Kendall  v.   State,  65  Ala. 

43  Atl.  31.  492. 

"  Davis    V.   State,    141    Ala.   62,   37  ""  State  v.  Buster,  23  Xev.   346.  47 

So.  676;  Flower  v.  United  States,  116  Pac.  194;  People  v.  Gelabert,  39  Cal. 

Fed.  241.  53   C.  C.  A.  271 ;    State  v.  663,    665.      Cf.    People    v.    Thorns,    3 

Knapp,  70  Ohio  St.  380,  71  N.  E.  705.  Park.  Cr.  (\.  Y.)  256. 

"State  V.    Berberick    (Mont.),    100  "State  v.  Banusik  (K.  J.),  64  .Atl. 

Pac.  209;  State  v.  Desroches,  48  La.  994. 

Ann.  428,  jg  So.  250;  State' v.  Avery,  '"People   v.    Randazzio,    194   N.    Y. 

31  La.  Ann.  181.  147.  87  N.  E.  112. 


^  147a 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


282 


well  as  against  him.""  The  whole  of  what  was  said  should  be  put 
in  evidence  by  the  prosecuting  officer,  and  if  he  shall  refuse  or 
neglect  to  do  so.  the  accused  has  the  right  to  prove  the  part 
omitted  which  may  be  favorable  to  him,'^"  and  the  confession  may 
be  partly  or  wholly  rejected  by  the  jury  if  it  is  not  believed  by 
them.'^ 

The  jury  are  bound  to  consider  the  confession  in  the  light  of 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  They  should  not  separate  it 
from  the  other  evidence  and  determine  its  credibility  indepen- 
dently of  all  the  other  evidence.  They  must  consider  it  in  con- 
nection with  all  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  having  done  this,  they 
may  believe  such  parts  of  it  as  they  find  sufficiently  corroborated 


'"  Conner  v.  State,  34  Tex.  659,  662 ; 
Rex  V.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221,  223, 
226. 

™  People  V.  Gelabert,  39  Cal.  663, 
665;  Conner  v.  State,  34  Tex.  659, 
666;  Griswold  v.  State,  24  Wis.  144, 
148;  Crawford  v.  State,  4  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  190,  192;  State  v.  Worthing- 
ton,  64  N.  Car.  594,  596;  State  v. 
Hollenscheit,  61  Mo.  302;  Dodson  v. 
State,  86  Ala.  60,  63,  5  So.  485;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Keyes,  11  Gray  (Mass.) 
323;  State  V.  Green,  48  S.  Car,  136, 
26  S.  E.  234;  State  v.  Busse  (Iowa), 
100  N.  W.  536;  Frazier  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  114  S.  W.  268;  Mad- 
dox  V.  State  (Ala.),  48  So.  689. 
"There  is  no  doubt  that  if  a  prose- 
cutor uses  the  declaration  of  a  pris- 
oner he  must  take  the  whole  of  it  to- 
gether, and  cannot  select  one  part 
and  leave  another;  and  if  there  be 
either  no  other  evidence  in  the  case, 
or  no  other  evidence  incompatible 
with  it.  the  declaration  taken  in  evi- 
dence must  be  admitted  as  true.  But 
if,  after  the  whole  of  the  statement 
of  the  prisoner  is  given  in  evidence, 
the  prosecutor  is  in  a  position  to  con- 
tradict any  part  of  it,  he  is  at  liberty 


to  do  so,  and  then  the  statement  of 
the  prisoner  and  the  whole  of  the 
other  evidence  must  be  left  to  the 
jury  for  their  consideration,  precisely 
as  in  any  other  case  where  one  part 
of  the  evidence  is  contradictory  of 
another."  The  court,  in  Rex  v.  Jones, 
2  C.  &  P.  629. 

"  Rex  v.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221,  225; 
Furst  v.  State,  31  Neb.  403,  409,  47 
N.  W.  "1116;  People  v.  Taylor,  93 
Mich.  638,  641,  S3  N.  W.  777;  Gris- 
wold V.  State,  24  Wis.  144,  148 ;  Han- 
rahan  v.  People,  91  111.  142,  147;  Long 
V.  State,  86  Ala.  36,  37,  5  So.  443; 
Johnson  v.  State  (Ga.,  1890),  12  S. 
E.  471 ;  People  v.  Cassidy,  133  N.  Y. 
612,  30  N.  E.  1003,  44  N.  Y.  St.  869; 
Blackburn  v.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  146; 
Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  149  Mass. 
35,  38,  20  N.  E.  458;  Hauk  v.  State, 
148  Ind.  238,  46  N.  E.  127,  47  N.  E. 
465;  State  V.  Brinte,  4  Pen.  (Del.) 
551,  58  Atl.  258;  State  V.  Blodgett.  50 
Ore.  329, 92  Pac.  820;  State  v.  LuSing, 
34  Mont.  31,  85  Pac.  521 ;  State  v. 
Tilghman  (Del.),  63  Atl.  772;  Brewer 
V.  State,  72  Ark.  145,  78  S.  W.  77.3; 
Nicks  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  App.  i, 
48  S.  W.  186. 


283  CONFESSIONS.  §    147a 

and  reject  the  rest;  but,  of  course,  they  should  not,  in  accepting 
or  rejecting  the  confession,  act  arbitrarily  or  without  reasons- 
All  that  the  accused  said  constituting  the  confession,  whether 
favorable  to  him  or  not,  ought  to  be  received  in  its  entirety.  To 
allow  the  introduction  of  fragments  of  a  conversation,  admitting 
those  indicative  of  the  prisoner's  criminality  and  suppressing 
others  which,  by  limiting  or  modifying  the  former,  may  establish 
his  innocence,  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  all  principles  of  justice 
and  humanity." 

'■  Gantling  v.  State,  40  Fla.  237,  23  an  answer  is  not  inadmissible  as  an 

So.    857;    Zuckerman   v.    People,   213  opinion.      State    v.    Williamson,    106 

111.  114,  ^2  N.  E.  741.  Mo.  162,  171,  17  S.  W.  172.     See,  as 

^^A  witness  called  to  identify  a  sustaining  text,  People  v.  Gelabert,  39 
written  confession,  on  being  asked  if  Cal.  663 ;  McCann  v.  State,  13  Sm.  & 
the  accused  said  anything  further,  M.  (Miss.)  471;  Brown  v.  Common- 
may  state  that  the  writing  contains  wealth,  9  Leigh.  (Va.)  633,  ZZ  Am. 
the  substance  of  what  was  said.   Such  Dec.  263. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


ALIBI. 


§  148.  Definition     and     character     of     §  151.  Impeaching  the   alibi — Defend- 
alibi — Burden  of  proof.  ant's  declarations. 

149.  Distance  and  period  of  absence.        152.  Reasonable  doubt. 

150.  Relevancy  of  evidence.  153.  Cautioning  the  jury  as  to  evi- 

dence of  alibi. 

§  148.  Definition  and  character  of  alibi — Burden  of  proof. — The 
plea  of  an  alibi  is  a  plea  of  not  guilty,  because  at  the  instant  of 
the  crime  the  accused  was  "elsewhere"  than  where  it  was  com- 
mitted. In  theory  this  plea  may  be  viewed  from  two  standpoints. 
First,  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  traverse  of  the  crime  alleged  rais- 
ing a  clear  and  direct  issue  of  the  defendant's  guilt  on  the  whole 
case  in  the  same  manner  as  any  defense  involving  the  assertion 
of  an  independent  and  distinct  fact,  as,  for  example,  the  plea 
of  insanity,  or  that  the  supposed  victim  of  a  homicide  is  alive. 
Or,  it  may  be  regarded  solely  as  traversing  a  single  element  in 
the  criminal  charge  against  the  accused,  i.  e.,  his  presence  at  the 
•place  and  time  of  the  offense.^ 

The  majority  of  the  cases,  adopting  the  former  view,  maintain 
that  the  burden  of  proving  the  alibi  is  upon  the  defendant,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  rule  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  always  upon 
the  party  asserting  an  affirmative  fact,  or  one  peculiarly  within 
his  own  knowledge.  Until  the  state  offers  rebutting  evidence  to 
overcome  the  alibi,  the  only  evidence  before  the  jury  to  counter- 
balance defendant's  evidence  is  the  incidental  proof  of  time  and 
place  contained  in  the  prima  facie  case  of  the  state.  But  suppose 
all  the  evidence  offered  by  the  state  showing  the  presence  of  the 
accused,  while  insufficient  to  convince  the  jury  of  that  fact  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt,  preponderates  over  the  evidence  of  the  de- 

'  Under  some'  circumstances  the  on  the  question  of  his  identity.  For 
proof  that  the  accused  was  elsewhere  evidence  of  identification,  see  supra, 
than  the  place  of  the  crime  must  turn     §§  53-56. 

284 


285 


ALIBI. 


§    148 


fendant  on  that  point?  Must  he  lose  the  benefit  of  this  evidence 
in  disproving  his  guilt  because  on  one  particular  point  it  is  out- 
weighed ?  The  jnry  have  no  right  to  disregard  any  evidence  un- 
less after  due  consideration  they  totally  disbelieve  it.  They  may 
and  should  consider  defendant's  evidence  of  an  alibi  in  connection 
with  all  the  evidence  in  the  case ;  and  the  general  rule  still  holds 
good  that  the  state  is  required  to  convince  them  of  his  guilty  par- 
ticipation in  the  crime,  time  and  place  being-  essential  ingredients 
in  this  participation,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  upon  all  the  evi- 
dence." 

If  the  alibi  be  regarded  solely  as  a  denial  of  a  single  necessary 
element  in  the  charge,  it  seems  as  illogical  in  such  case  to  place 
the  burden  of  proof  on  the  accused  as  it  would  be  to  require  him 
to  prove  the  absence  of  a  criminal  intent.  Time  and  place  are 
essential  elements  of  a  crime. ^   The  state  must  prove  them  prima 


•  State  V.  Conwaj',  56  Kan.  682,  44 
Pac.  627;  State  v.  Harvey,  131  Mo. 
339,  2>^  S.  W.  1 1 10;  State  V.  Lowry, 
42  W.  Va.  205,  24  S.  E.  561 ;  People 
V.  Pichette,  in  AUch.  461,  69  N.  W. 
739;  Borrego  v.  Territory,  8  N.  Mex. 
446,  46  Pac.  349 ;  Carlton  v.  People, 
150  111.  181,  2,7  ^^-  E.  244,  41  Am.  St. 
346;  Ackerson  v.  People,  124  111.  563, 
571,  16  N.  E.  847,  849;  Watson  v. 
Commonwealth,  95  Pa.  St.  418,  422; 
Ware  v.  State,  59  Ark.  379,  392,  27 
S.  W.  485 ;  Harrison  v.  State,  83  Ga. 
129,  134,  9  S.  E.  542;  Walters  v. 
State,  39  Ohio  St.  215,  217;  Chappel 
V.  State,  7  Coldw.  fTenn.)  92;  State 
V.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  192,  17  Atl.  483; 
Beavers  v.  State,  103  Ala.  36,  15  So. 
616;  Parham  v.  State,  147  Ala.  S7,  4~ 
So.  I ;  Bennett  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
34T,  17  S.  W.  545:  State  v.  Chee 
Gong,  t6  Ore.  534,  538,  19  Pac.  607. 
In  Watson  v.  Commonwealth,  95  Pa. 
St.  418,  422,  the  court  says:  ".An  alibi 
is  as  much  a  traverse  of  the  crime 
charged  as  any  other  defense,  and 
proof  tending  to  establish  it,  though 
not   clear,   may,   with  other    facts   of 


the  case,  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of 
the  guilt  of  the  accused.  When  the 
evidence  is  so  imperfect  as  not  to  sat- 
isfy the  jury  they  will  not  find  the 
fact.  Where  the  commonwealth  rests 
upon  positive  and  undoubted  proof  of 
the  prisoner's  guilt,  it  should  not  be 
overcome  by  less  than  full,  clear  and 
satisfactory  evidence  of  the  alleged 
alibi.  But  the  evidence  tending  to  es- 
tablish an  alibi,  though  not  of  itself 
sufficient  to  work  an  acquittal,  shall 
not  be  excluded  from  the  case,  for 
the  burden  of  proof  never  shifts,  but 
rests  upon  the  commonwealth 
throtighout,  upon  all  the  evidence 
given  in  the  cause,  taken  together,  to 
convince  the  jury,  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt,  of  the  prisoner's  guilt." 
Notes  on  proof  and  burden  of  proof 
of  alibi,  4T  L.  R.  A.  S30-541,  68  L.  R. 
A.  222. 

'  The  prosecution  may  always  with 
propriety  prove  that  the  accused  was 
near  the  scene  of  the  crime  about  the 
time  it  was  committed  though  he  does 
not  allege  an  alibi.  State  v.  Mahcr, 
74  Iowa  77,  2>7  ^-  W.  2;   Linsday  v. 


§    149  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  286 

facie,  at  least  and  may  do  so  inferentially,  that  is  by  circumstan- 
tial evidence,  as  it  may  prove  the  intent.  If  no  alibi  is  alleged, 
the  burden  of  proof,  under  a  plea  of  not  guilty,  to  show  the  place 
of  the  crime  is  on  the  state,  but  is  sufficiently  sustained  by  its 
prima  facie  case.  The  issue  of  the  defendant's  guilt  then  turns 
upon  other  essentials,  and  the  necessity  for  evidence  directly  ap- 
plicable to  the  issue  of  place  does  not  arise. 

§  149.  Distance  and  period  of  absence. — The  accused  is  not  con- 
fined in  his  evidence  to  proving  that  he  was  elsewhere  at  the 
instant  of  the  offense  or  during  the  whole  of  it,  if  it  is  a  lengthy 
transaction.  The  important  and  necessary  facts  to  be  considered 
in  alibi  evidence  and  which  the  accused  may  prove  are  the  distance 
between  the  scene  of  the  crime  and  the  prisoner's  whereabouts; 
the  time  of  the  crime,  as  compared  with  that  of  the  alibi,  allowing 
for  differences  in  time-pieces,  and  in  opinions  respecting  time; 
and  the  available  means  and  celerity  of  travel.*  The  farther  away 
the  accused  was  the  more  doubtful  is  his  guilt,  until  mere  distance 
becomes  conclusive  if  it  be  so  great  as  to  render  his  participation 
impossible.  If  he  could  have  participated,  though  he  were  remote, 
distance,  though  relatively  great,  is  not  conclusive,  but  time  and 
means  of  travel  must  also  be  considered.^  The  evidence  of  the 
alibi  may  fairly  be  required  to  cover  the  whole  time  of  the  criminal 
transaction  in  question,  and  it  has  been  held  also  but  by  a  minority 
of  the  cases  that  the  accused  may  be  required  to  show  his  where- 
abouts during  such  a  period  as  will,  by  its  length,  convince  the 
jury  that  it  w^as  absolutely  impossible  for  him  to  have  been  on  the 
scene  of  the  crime  when  it  was  committed.*'    This  seems  almost 

People,  63  N.  Y.  143 ;  Angley  v.  State,  State,  94  Ala.   76,   10  So.  426 ;  Wil- 

35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  427,  34  S.  W.  116.  liams  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  App.  375, 

*  Klein  v.  People,  113  111.  596,  599-  iii  S.  W.  729;  Kinnemer  v.  State,  66 

602.     Note  on  time  covered  by  proof,  Ark.  206,  49  S.  W.  815 ;   Fortson  v. 

see  41  L.  R.  A.  541.  State,  125  Ga.  16,  53  S.  E.  767;  How- 

°  State  V.  Fenlason,  78  Ale.  495,  502,  ard  v.  State,  50  Ind.  190.     Where  de- 

7  Atl.  385.  fendant    was    charged    with    burning 

^  Beavers  v.   State,    103  Ala.  36,   15  hay  stacks  which  were  some  distance 

So.  616;  Wisdom  v.  People,  11  Colo,  apart,  the  evidence  should  cover  the 

I70>    175.    17    Pac.    519;   Briceland   v.  whole  time,  so   as  to   render  it  very 

Commonwealth,  74  Pa.    St.  463,  469;  improbable  that  the  defendant  could 

Ware  v.  State,  67  Ga.  349;  Miller  v.  have  burned  them.     Creed  v.  People, 

People,  39  111.  457,  464;  Albritton  v.  81  111.  565. 


287 


ALIBI. 


149 


equivalent  to  requiring  him  to  prove  his  innocence  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt.  Hence  it  is  generally  sufficient  if  the  evidence, 
though  not  absolutely  covering  the  whole  time  of  the  transaction,' 
shall  tend  fairly  to  show  that  he  was  elsewhere  at  the  moment  of 
the  crime,  and  that  he  remained  there  such  a  period  of  time  as  will 
reasonably  exclude  the  probability  that  he  was  in  the  place  of  the 
crime  when  it  was  committed.®  The  length  of  the  period  is  for 
the  jury  to  determine  upon  the  facts,  including  the  distance  and 
the  time  and  the  customary  mode  of  travel.^  If  the  time  necessary 
to  go  from  the  place  of  the  alibi  to  the  place  of  the  crime  is  in 
issue,  a  witness,  who  has  traveled  from  the  one  place  to  the  other, 
may  state  the  time  occupied  and  at  what  gait  he  walked."  Dis- 
similarity of  conditions  and  modes  of  travel  may  affect  the  weight, 
but  they  cannot  the  competency  of  such  evidence.^^  If  the  precise 
time  a  train  left  a  certain  place  on  a  certain  date  is  material  on  the 
question  of  alibi  the  evidence  of  the  railroad  officials  that  the 


^  An  instruction  "that  to  render  an 
alibi  satisfactory  the  evidence  must 
cover  the  whole  of  the  time  of  the 
transaction  in  question"  was  held 
proper  in  Barr  v.  People,  30  Colo. 
522,  71  Pac.  392.  What  the  "trans- 
action" is,  of  course,  depends  on  the 
facts  of  each  case.  Hence  the  period 
to  be  covered  by  the  alibi  will  be 
more  or  less  elastic,  as  the  court  ex- 
pands or  contracts  the  time  limits  of 
the  transaction. 

*  Where  an  alibi  depends  upon  the 
agreement  of  time-pieces,  a  disagree- 
ment of  a  few  minutes  being  vital,  a 
disagreement  may  be  presumed,  rath- 
er than  to  assume  that  the  witnesses 
on  either  side  testified  falsely.  Painter 
v.  People,  147  111.  444,  35  N.  E.  64. 
The  accused,  it  has  been  held,  must 
show  that  he  was  present  at  some 
other  place  before  the  time  of  the  al- 
leged crime  for  such  a  length  of  time 
that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  have 
been  at  the  place  where  the  crime  was 
committed,  either  before  or  after  the 


time  he  was  at  such  other  place. 
Mays  V.  State,  72  Neb.  723,  loi  N.  W. 
979- 

"  People  V.  Worden,  113  Cal.  569,  45 
Pac.  844;  State  v.  Fenlason,  78  Me. 
495,  502,  7  Atl.  38s ;  lohnson  v.  State, 
59  Ga.  142,  144;  Pollard  v.  State,  53 
Miss.  410,  24  Am.  703 ;  Stuart  v.  Peo- 
ple, 42  Mich.  255,  261,  3  N.  W.  863; 
State  V.  Maher,  74  Iowa  "jy,  2i7  N.  W. 
2 ;  West  V.  State,  48  Ind.  483,  485 ;  Al- 
britton  v.  State,  94  Ala.  '/t,  79,  10  So. 
426;  State  V.  Powers,  130  Mo.  475,  32 
S.  W.  984.  It  is  not  absolutely  essen- 
tial that  the  evidence  of  the  alibi 
should  cover  the  whole  time  of  the 
transaction,  though  it  may  be  proper- 
ly regarded  with  suspicion,  if  it  does 
not.  State  v.  Jayncs,  78  N.  Car.  504, 
506;  Henry  v.  State,  51  Neb.  149,  70 
N.  W.  924,  (i6  Am.  St.  450. 

'"People  v.  Kelly,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
295.  .305;  State  V.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304,  14 
Atl.  T78. 

"  State  V.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304,  317,  14 
Atl.  178. 


§150  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  288 

company's  rules  do  not  permit  trains  to  arrive  before  their  sched- 
ule time  is  inadmissible  as  hearsay.^- 

§  150.  Relevancy  of  evidence. — The  accused  may  prove  he  con- 
versed with  persons  who  were  at  the  place  where  he  claims  to  have 
been,  and  he  may  give  a  general  outline  of  what  was  said.  But  he 
cannot  give  all  the  details  of  what  was  said  on  a  pretext  that  he 
can  thereby  show  how  much  time  was  occupied  in  the  conversation 
as  measuring  the  period  of  the  alibi. ^^  Evidence  that  residents  of 
the  town,  where  the  defendant  is  alleged  to  have  been,  asserted 
from  the  time  of  his  arrest  that  he  was  there  at  the  date  of  the 
crime  is  inadmissible  as  hearsay,^*  nor  can  he  show  that  he  was 
in  the  habit  of  frequenting  the  locality  of  the  alibi. ^'^  A  witness 
called  to  prove  an  alibi  may  be  asked  when  his  attention  was  called 
to  the  charge  against  the  accused,  and  what  was  the  date  of  the 
crime.  He  cannot,  however,  be  asked,  to  impeach  him,  what  he 
did  to  inform  the  prosecuting  attorney  of  the  whereabouts  of  the 
accused. ^'^  Evidence  that  the  accused  could  not  have  left  the  house 
where  he  was  sleeping  on  the  night  of  the  crime  without  arousing 
the  inmates  with  evidence  that  no  one  was  aroused  is  competent 
under  a  plea  of  alibi. ^' 

§  151.  Impeaching'  the  alibi — Defendant's  declarations. — The  ac- 
cused may  be  asked  whom  or  what  he  saw  while  in  the  place  he 
swears  he  was.  and  the  state  may  then  show,  to  impeach  him,  by 
witnesses  who  were  present,  what  persons  or  things  were  actually 
to  be  seen  there.^*   The  state  may  also  show  where  the  accused 

'■  People  V.    Mitchell,   94   Cal.   550,  "  State  v.  Delaney,  92  Iowa  467,  61 

554,  29  Pac.  1 106.  N.  W.  189. 

"State  V.  Bedard,  65  Vt.  278,  284,  "People  v.   Gibson,   58   Mich.   368, 

26  Atl.  719,  721 ;  People  v.  Hare,  57  371,  25  N.  W.  316.     If  the  description 

?klich.  505,  24  N.  W.  843 ;  Elliott  Ev.,  of   other   witnesses   agreed   with   de- 

§  2726;  note  on  measure  of  proof,  41  fendant's,  it  would  certainly  do  him 

L.  R.  A.  537.  no  harm;  if  it  disagreed  radically,  it 

"  Schuster    v.    State,    80   Wis.    107,  would  be  proper  for  the  jury  to  con- 

118,  49  N.  W.  30.  sider  it  as  a  circumstance  bearing  up- 

^'  State  V.  Wilkins,  66  Vt.  i,  28  Atl.  on  the  question  whether  he  saw  it  as 

323.  he  had  testified.     See,  also,  People  v. 

'"  Schuster   v.    State,    80   Wis.    107,  La  IMtmion,.  64  Mich.  709,  31   N.  W. 

ro8,  49  N.  W.  30.  593.    See,  also.  People  v.  Zimmerman, 

3  Cal.  App.  84,  84  Pac.  446. 


289  ALIBI.  §§    1 51-152 

has  testified  that  he  was  not  in  the  city  where  the  crime  was 
committed  during  a  long  period  that  certain  witnesses  had  seen 
him  there  at  dates  near  the  date  of  the  crime/^  It  may  always  be 
shown  that  the  accused  was  at  or  near  the  scene  of  the  crime.  This 
evidence  must  come  from  some  one  who  saw  him  there.  Hearsay 
evidence  that  on  the  day  of  the  crime  the  accused  had  been  seen 
in  the  locality  where  it  was  committed  is  not  admissible.^"  Any 
witness  who  testifies  that  he  saw  the  accused  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  crime  within  such  a  period  thereafter  as  would  indicate  that 
he  participated  in  it  should  be  permitted  to  testify  to  his  conduct, 
language  or  appearance  as  indicating  that  he  did  or  did  not  par- 
ticipate in  the  crime.  A  witness  who  immediately  after  a  man  was 
shot  saw  the  accused  running  toward  the  place  of  the  crime  should 
be  permitted  to  state  that  he  seemed  excited,  was  running  or  walk- 
ing fast  and  that  he  panted  for  breath."^  Nor  are  self-serving 
declarations  of  the  accused  not  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc,  received 
to  prove  an  alibi.  The  danger  of  permitting  the  accused  thus  to 
fabricate  evidence  for  himself  is  clear.  Hence,  his  statements  as 
to  his  whereabouts  made  on  returning  to  his  home  after  an  ab- 
sence covering  the  date  of  the  crime  are  inadmissible."'  Nor  can 
the  accused  prove  that  about  six  hours  before  the  crime  he  invited 
another  person  to  spend  the  night  with  him  at  his  home  about 
three  miles  from  the  locus  in  quo.~^ 

§  152.  Reasonable  doubt. — The  cases  generally  hold  that  the  ac- 
cused need  not.  in  order  that  his  evidence  of  an  alibi  may  be  by  the 
jury  considered  sufficient  to  acquit  him,  establish  it  by  a  prepon- 
derance of  the  evidence.-*    But  the  alibi  must  be  sustained  by 

"  People  V.  Pembroke,  6  Cal.  App.  is   offered   to  prove   something  ante- 

588,  92  Pac.  668.  cedent    to   the   return   in    no   manner 

^^  Commonweahh     v.     Ricker,     131  pertaining  to  the  character,  motive  or 

Mass.  581,  583.     In  this  case  a  police  object  of  it. 

sergeant  was  permitted  to  testify  that         ^  Sasser   v.   State,    129  Ga.   541,  59 

a  police  officer  reported  to  him   that  S.  E.  255. 

he   had   seen   defendant   in   a  certain         ''*  State  v.  Rivers,  68  Iowa  611,  616, 

place  on  a  given  date.     Held  error.  27  N.  W.  781 ;  State  v.  Rowland,  72 

"State   V.    Matthews,    119   La.   665,  Iowa  ^27,  328,  33  N.   W.   137;   State 

44  So.  336.  V.  Howell,  100  Mo.  628,  664,  14  S.  W. 

"  State  V.  McCrackcn,  66  Iowa  569,  4 ;  People  v.  Lee  Sare  Bo,  72  Cal.  623. 

573.  24  X.  W.  43.    The  declaration  is  629,  14  Pac.  310:  Walters  v.  State.  .39 

a  mere  narration  of  a  past  event.     It  Ohio  St.  215,  217;  Miles  v.  State,  93 
19 — Unuerhill  Cri.m.  Ev. 


152 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


290 


credible  evidence  which  will  reasonably  satisfy  the  jury  of  the 
truth  of  this  defense."'^  What  evidence  will  be  reasonably  satis- 
factory depends  wholly  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  case  as 
disclosed  by  all  the  evidence,  the  jury  being  the  sole  judges  of  its 
weight  and  sufficiency.  If  it  clearly  and  cogently  appears  from 
the  evidence  offered  by  the  prosecution  that  the  accused  was  pres- 
ent at  the  crime,  proof  of  an  alibi  ought  to  be  equally  clear,  cogent 
and  convincing.^"  But  the  evidence  of  the  alibi,  even  though  not 
clear,  may,  with  other  facts,  raise  enough  doubt  of  guilt  to  acquit. 
A  reasonable  doubt  that  the  accused  was  present  at  the  time  and 
place  of  the  crime  is  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt.-^  Hence,  to 
require  the  fact  of  his  absence  to  be  fully  established  and  found 
as  a  fact  by  the  jury  is  to  disregard  all  evidence  falling  short  of 
full  proof  and  to  require  him  to  prove  the  alibi  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt.  This  is  certainly  not  the  law.'*'  If  the  accused  suc- 
ceeds by  his  evidence  of  an  alibi  in  connection  with  all  the  evidence 
in  raising  a  reasonable  doubt  that  he  was  present  he  should  be 
acquitted. ^^ 


Ga.  117,  19  S.  E.  805,  44  Am.  St.  140; 
State  V.  Child,  40  Kan.  482,  485,  20 
Pac.  275.  Contra,  State  v.  Ward,  61 
Vt.  153,  192,  17  Atl.  483;  State  v. 
Fenlason,  78  Me.  495,  502,  7  Atl.  385 ; 
State  V.  Hamilton,  57  Iowa  596,  598, 
II  N.  W.  5;  Glover  v.  United  States, 
147  Fed.  426,  77  C.  C.  A.  450.  Ex- 
haustive note  on  proof  of  reasonable 
doubt,  see  41  L.  R.  A.  530. 

■'Ackerson  v.  People,  124  111.  563, 
16  N.  E.  847;  Watson  v.  Common- 
wealth, 95  Pa.  St.  418,  420,  422;  Al- 
britton  v.  State,  94  Ala.  76,  10  So. 
426;  Garrity  v.  People,  107  111.  162, 
166;  Ransom  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  826, 
59  S.  E.  loi ;  State  v.  Davis,  6  Idaho 
159,  53  P'ic.  678;  Smith  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.),  78  S.  W.  516.  Contra, 
Hoge  V.  People,  117  111.  35,  44,  6  N. 
E.  796;  State  V.  Hardin,  46  Iowa  623, 
628,  26  Am.  174. 

-"Klein  v.  People,  113  111.  596. 

"  See  Harrison  v.  State,  83  Ga.  129, 


135,  9  S.  E.  542;  People  v.  Fong  Ah 
Sing,  64  Cal.  253,  28  Pac.  233,  5  Cr. 
L.  Mag.  64. 

"*  People  V.  La  Munion,  64  Mich. 
709,  31  N.  W.  593;  Briceland  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 74  Pa.  St.  463;  State  v. 
Jaynes,  78  N.  Car.  504;  Landis  v. 
State,  70  Ga.  651,  659,  660,  48  Am. 
588;  People  V.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  64  Cal. 
253,  255,  28  Pac.  233,  5  Cr.  L.  Mag. 
64;  State  V.  Sanders,  106  Mo.  188, 
195.  17  S.  W.  223;  State  V.  Woolard, 
III  Mo.  248,  256,  20  S.  W.  27;  State 
V.  Fenlason,  78  Me.  495,  502,  7  Atl. 
385;  State  V.  Howell,  100  Mo.  628,  14 
S.  W.  4;  People  V.  Pearsall.  50  Mich. 
233,  236,  15  N.  W.  98;  Miles  V.  State, 
93  Ga.  117,  19  S.  E.  805,  44  Am.  St. 
140;  State  V.  Hardin,  46  Iowa  623, 
628,  26  .A^m.  174;  Hauser  v.  People, 
2T0  Hi.  253,  71  N.  E.  416;  Jais  v.  Ter- 
ritory (N.  Mex.,  1908)  94  Pac.  947. 

-"Kaufman  v.  State,  49  Ind.  248; 
Towns  V.   State,  iii  Ala.   i,  20  So. 


291 


ALIBI. 


§    153 


§  153.    Cautioning  the  jury  as  to  evidence  of  an  alibi. — The  de- 
fense of  an  alibi,  it  cannot  be  denied  is  regarded  with  some  sus- 


598;  People  V.  Resh,  107  Mich.  251,  65 
N.  W.  99;  People  v.  Pichette,  iii 
Mich.  461,  69  N.  W.  739;  Ware  v. 
State,  59  Ark.  379,  392,  27  S.  W.  485 ; 
State  V.  Reed,  62  Iowa  40,  17  N.  W. 
150;  State  V.  Fry,  67  Iowa  475,  478, 
25  N.  W.  738;  Binns  v.  State,  46  Ind. 
311,  312;  Watson  V.  Commonwealth, 
95  Pa.  St.  418,  422;  Klein  v.  People, 
113  111.  596,  599,  602;  Sheehan  v.  Peo- 
ple, 131  111.  22,  22  N.  E.  818;  French 
V.  State,  12  Ind.  670,  674,  675,  74  Am. 
Dec.  229;  State  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153, 
192,  17  Atl.  483 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Choate,  105  Mass.  451 ;  State  v.  Mc- 
Cracken,  66  Iowa  569,  24  N.  W.  43; 
State  V.  Jennings,  81  Mo.  185,  51  Am. 
236;  Johnson  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
368,  381,  17  S.  W.  252;  State  V.  Reitz, 
83  N.  Car.  634,  635;  People  v.  Pear- 
sail,  SO  Mich.  233,  15  N.  W.  98;  Peo- 
ple V.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  64  Cal.  253,  255, 
28  Pac.  233;  Ware  v.  State,  67  Ga. 
349;  Garrity  v.  People,  107  111.  162, 
167;  Beavers  v.  State,  103  Ala.  36,  15 
So.  616;  Commonwealth  v.  Webster, 
5  Cush.  (Mass.)  295,  52  Am.  Dec. 
71  in;  McLain  v.  State,  18  Neb.  154, 
160,  24  X.  W.  720;  Ackerson  v.  Peo- 
ple, 124  111.  563,  574,  16  N.  E.  847.  In 
State  V.  Hamilton,  57  Iowa  596,  599, 
II  N^.  W.  5,  the  court  said,  by  Adams, 
Ch.  J.,  dissenting:  "This  court  has 
never  undertaken  to  abrogate  the  rule 
that  a  reasonable  doubt  of  guilt  justi- 
fies an  acquittal.  It  has,  indeed,  rec- 
ognized this  rule  in  the  very  cases  re- 
lied upon  by  the  majority  as  holding 
that  when  the  defendant  relies  upon 
proving  an  alibi  he  must  prove  it  by 
a  preponderance  of  evidence.  Both 
rules  cannot  be  correct,  because  they 
arc  inconsistent  with  each  other.  No 
jury  can  follow  both.    Let  us  suppose 


a  case  where  the  evidence  of  an  alibi 
does  not  preponderate,  but  does  raise 
a  reasonable  doubt  of  guilt.  What 
shall  a  jury  do?  If  they  follow  the 
instruction  that  the  evidence  of  an 
alibi  must  preponderate,  they  must 
convict  and  disobey  the  instruction  as 
to  reasonable  doubt.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  they  follow  the  instruction 
as  to  reasonable  doubt  they  must  ac- 
quit and  disobey  the  instruction  as  to 
the  evidence  of  an  alibi.  I  cannot  re- 
gard the  rule  adopted  by  the  majority 
as  to  evidence  of  an  alibi  as  being 
the  established  doctrine  of  this  court, 
so  long  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  an- 
other rule  to  which  the  court  still  ad- 
heres. If  the  court  adopts  the  rule  in 
question  as  to  an  alibi,  then  to  be 
consistent  it  should  modify  the  rule 
as  to  reasonable  doubt.  The  rule  as 
modified  would  be  as  follows :  A  rea- 
sonable doubt  of  guilt  is  sufficient  to 
justify  an  acquittal,  unless  it  is  raised 
by  evidence  of  an  alibi,  and  if  it  is 
then  it  is  not  sufficient."  In  State  v. 
Taylor,  134  Mo.  109,  35  S.  W.  92,  the 
jury  was  correctly  instructed  that,  al- 
though the  evidence  of  an  alibi  falls 
short  of  the  weight  of  moral  certain- 
ty, yet  if  it  leaves  in  the  minds  of 
the  jury  such  a  doubt  or  uncertainty 
that,  if  taken  by  itself,  they  could  not 
find  for  or  against  an  alibi,  then  the 
jury  must  carry  such  doubt  into  the 
case  of  the  prosecution  and  array  it 
there  as  an  element  of  reasonalile 
doubt,  beyond  which  the  prosecution 
must  establish  guilt,  that  the  defend- 
ant is  entitled  as  much  to  the  benefit 
of  such  doubt  as  to  any  other  doubt 
raised  by  the  evidence,  and  if  its 
weight  alone,  or  with  any  other  doubt, 
be  sufficient  to  raise  a  doubt  of  dc- 


§  153  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  2g2 

picion  by  the  courts.  This  suspicion  is  doubtless  warranted  by  the 
ease  witli  which  evidence  to  support  an  ahbi  can  be  manufactured. 
In  the  case  of  a  confirmed  criminal  who  has  had  experience  in 
prior  attempts  to  avoid  the  consecjuences  of  his  criminal  conduct : 
and  who  possesses  no  appreciation  of  the  sanctity  of  an  oath,  an 
alibi  offers  a  ready  defense,  particularly  where  the  evidence 
against  him  is  wholly  circumstantial  so  that  he  will  be  confronted 
on  his  trial  with  no  eye-witness- of  his  crime.  If  he  has  a  reason- 
able expectation  that  no  one  will  testify  that  he  was  actually  seen 
to  commit  the  crime,  the  temptation  is  almost  irresistible  to  pro- 
cure from  persons  of  easy  conscience  testimony  that  at  the  time 
the  crime  was  committed,  the  accused  was  at  some  place  at  such 
a  distance  from  the  place  of  the  crime  that  he  could  not  have  com- 
mitted it. 

If  the  place  chosen  for  the  alibi  is  sufficiently  removed  from  the 
place  of  the  crime;  and  if  the  prosecution  has  not  been  informed 
as  to  the  witnesses  the  accused  will  produce  to  prove  his  alibi,  he 
may  reasonably  expect  that  his  testimony  of  an  alibi  will  not  be 
directly  controverted  by  the  prosecution.  It  then  remains  for  the 
prosecution  only  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses  called  to  prove  the 
alibi  and  by  this  means  to  shake  their  testimony  in  the  minds  of 
the  jury.  Nevertheless,  these  considerations  are  not  sufficient  as 
matter  of  law  to  disparage  the  testimony  of  the  defendant  to  his 
alibi  in  the  eyes  of  the  jury.  A  charge  which  in  substance  dispar- 
ages the  testimony  tending  to  support  the  alibi,  or  which  casts  any 
suspicion  upon  an  alibi,  as  a  legitimate  defense,  is  erroneous.^" 

And  it  is  an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury  for  the  court 
in  its  charge  to  instruct  them  that,  as  a  rule  of  the  criminal  law, 
the  defense  of  alibi  is  open  to  great  and  manifest  abuse,  because 

fendant's  guilt,  the  jury  must  acquit,  v.   Pearsall,  50   Mich.  233,   15  N.  W. 

See,  also,  sustaining  the  text:    Legere  98;  State  v.  Crowell,  149  J\Io.  391.  50 

V.  State,  iTi  Tenn.  368,  77  S.  W.  1059,  S.  W.  893,  73  Am.  St.  402;  People  v. 

102   Am.   St.   781 ;    State  v.    Thomas,  Hare,   57   Mich.  505,  24  N.  W.   843 ; 

135  Iowa  717,  109  N.  W.  900;  Schultz  People  v.  Kelly,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.)  295; 

V.  Territory,  5  Ariz.  239,  52  Pac.  352;  People  v.  Lattimer,  86  Cal.  403,  405, 

State  V.  MacQueen.  69  N.  J.  L.  522,  24  Pac.  1091 ;  Albin  v.  State,  63  Ind. 

55   Atl.    1006;    State   V.    Gadsden,   70  598.  600:  Sater  v.  State,  56  Ind.  378; 

S.  Car.  430,  so  S.  E.  16.  Albritton  v.  State,  94  Ala.  76,  79.  10 

^^  Prince  v.  State,  100  .A.la.   144,  14  So.  426 :  State  v.  Chee  Gong,  16  Ore. 

So.  409,  410,  46  Am.   St.  28;   People  534,  538,  19  Pac.  607. 


293  ALIBI.  ^    153 

of  the  comparative  ease  with  which  testimony  in  support  of  this 
defense  may  be  fabricated ;  or  that  this  defense  is  often  resorted 
to  by  those  who  are  guilty;  or  that. perjury,  mistake,  contrivance 
and  deception  are  frequently  employed  and  involved  in  support- 
ing it.^^ 

It  is  proper,  however,  to  warn  the  jury  in  the  charge  or  to  in- 
struct them  that  they  should  consider  the  evidence  in  support  of  an 
alibi  with  great  caution  and  care,^^  and  that  the  evidence  to  prove 
an  alibi  sho;.ild  be  subjected  to  a  rigid  scrutiny.  This  is  true  of  all 
evidence."^  But  this  caution  or  warning  should  always  be  accom- 
panied by  an  instruction  to  the  effect  that  if  the  accused  should 
raise  a  reasonable  doubt  of  his  guilt  by  reason  of  the  evidence  of 
his  alibi,  the  jury  must  acquit.  So,  too,  it  is  not  error  for  the  court 
to  tell  the  jury  that  they  must  consider,  in  determining  the  cred- 
ibility of  the  alibi,  that  witnesses  may  be  honestly  mistaken  in  or 
forgetful  of  times  and  places, ^^  or  that  an  alibi,  like  any  other 
defense,  may  be  easily  fabricated.^^ 

The  failure  on  the  part  of  the  accused  to  prove  an  alibi  should 
not  have  any  more  weight  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  than  his  failure 
to  prove  any  other  defense.  The  rule  is  that  if  it  appears  to  the 
jury  that  a  witness  has  wilfully  testified  falsely  to  any  material 
fact,  they  may  reject  all  his  testimony.  But  this  rule  is  not  a  rule 
of  law  and  simply  permits  a  presumption  of  fact  to  arise  in  the 
minds  of  the  jurors.  This  presumption  may  arise  against  the 
accused  where  the  jurors  detect  him  in  deliberately  giving  false 
testimony  to  an  alibi. ^'^  However,  aside  from  deliberate  perjury 
on  the  part  of  the  accused  or  one  of  his  witnesses,  in  endeavoring 
to  prove  an  alibi,  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  substantiate  his  de- 

"  State  V.  Chee  Gong,  16  Ore.  534,  wealth  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.    (Mass.) 

.S.38,  19  Pac.  607;  Murphy  v.  State,  31  295,  319,  52  .Am.  Dec.  yiin:  People  v. 

Fla.  166,  12  So.  453;  Dawson  v.  State,  Tice,  115  Mich.  219,  ^z  ^'-  ^-  ^08.  69 

62  Miss.  241.     And  see  cases  cited  in  Am.  St.  560. 

last  note.  "^  State  v.  Blunt,  59  Iowa  468,  13  N. 

■'"People  V.  Tice,  115  Mich.  219,  ^z  W.  427. 

N.  W.    108,  69  Am.  St.  560;   People  ''People  v.  Wong  Ah  Foo,  69  Cal. 

V.  Lee  Gam,  69  Cal.  552,  11  Pac.  183.  180,  183,  184,  10  Pac.  375,  707 ■ 

"Albrifton  v.  State,  94  Ala.  76,   10  ^'' State  v.  Johnson,  91  Mo.  439,  444, 

So.  426 :   State  v.  Rowland,  72  Towa  445,  3  S.  W.  868. 
Z^l,   329,    33    N.    W.    137;    Common- 


§  153  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  294 

fense  of  an  alibi  is  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  a  circumstance  of  much 
weight  against  the  accused/'' 

The  deliberate  fabrication  of  evidence  is  always  a  circumstance 
pointing,  though  never  conclusively,  to  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner,""'** 
But  the  mere  fact  that  the  prisoner  or  one  of  his  witnesses  has 
sworn  falsely  by  no  means  warrants  the  presumption  that  the 
evidence  of  the  state  is  in  all  respects  true."^  And  generally  a 
failure  by  the  accused  to  prove  an  alibi  does  not  differ  in  its  effect 
from  a  failure  on  his  part  to  prove  any  other  material  fact  alleged 
by  him/**  Where  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to  prove  the  alibi, 
it  is  sometimes,  though  not  universally,  held  to  be  reversible  error 
for  the  court  to  refuse  to  charge  specially  thereon,'*^  or  to  refuse 
to  charge  expressly  that  a  reasonable  doubt  may  arise  therefrom.*^ 

In  view  of  the  apparent  irreconcilable  conflict  of  opinion  as  to 
the  character  of  this  plea  and  of  the  right  of  the  court  to  comment 
upon  the  evidence  which  is  offered  to  sustain  it,  it  is  advisable  for 
the  court,  when  cautioning  the  jury,  to  accompany  its  cautionary 
admonitions  with  a  statement  that  the  alibi  is  sufficiently  proved 
by  the  accused  if  upon  all  the  issues  he  has  succeeded  in  raising  a 
reasonable  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  jurors  that  he  w'as  present 
at  the  time  and  place  of  the  crime.  That  fact  is  exclusively  for 
the  jurors  to  determine.*" 

^'Parker  v.  State,  136  Ind.  284,  293,  136  Ind.  284,  35  N.  E.  1105;  Adams 

35  N.  E.   1 105;   Miller  v.   People,  39  v.    State,    28   Fla.    511,    10    So.    106; 

111.  457;  People  V.  Malaspina,  57  Cal.  Landis  v.  State,  70  Ga.  651,  48  Am. 

628,  629 ;  Albritton  v.   State,  94  Ala.  588 ;  Turner  v.  Commonwealth,  86  Pa. 

76,  10  So.  426 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Mc-  St.  54,  27  Am.  683-  People  v.  Mala- 

Mahon,  145  Pa.  St.  413,  416,  22  Atl.  spina,  57  Cal.  628. 

971 ;  Ransom  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  826,  ^  Bennett   v.    State,   30   Tex.    App. 

59  S.  E.  loi;  Landis  v.  State,  70  Ga.  341,  17  S.  W.  545;  Fletcher  v.  State, 

651,  48  Am.  588;  Prince  v.  State,  100  85  Ga.  666,  667,  11  S.  E.  872.    Contra, 

Ala.  144,  14  So.  409,  46  Am.  St.  28;  State   v.   Ward,  61   Vt.    153,    194,    17 

Adams  v.  State,  28  Fla.  511,  10  So.  Atl.  483;   Conrad  v.   State,   132  Ind. 

106.  254,  258,  31  N.  E.  805.     If  the  alibi 

^'  State  V.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  17  Atl.  turns  on  a  question  of  disputed  iden- 

483.  tity,    a    separate    instruction    on    the 

^°  Sawyers  v.  State,  15  Lea  (Tenn.)  former  is  unnecessary.    Dale  v.  State, 

694.  88  Ga.  552,  15  S.  E.  287. 

*°  Miller  v.  People,  39  111.  457,  465 ;  *'  Fleming   v.    State,    136    Ind.    149. 

Prince  v.  State,  100  Ala.  144,  14  So.  36  N.  E.  154,  41  L.  R.  A.  539n. 

409,  46  Am.  St.  28;  Parker  v.   State,  ''In  State  v.  Blunt,  59  Iowa  468,  13 


295 


ALIBI. 


153 


N.  W.  427,  the  court  said:  "It  is 
recognized  in  the  law  that  the  defense 
of  alibi  is  one  easily  manufactured, 
and  jurors  are  generally  and  properly 
advised  by  the  courts  to  scan  the 
proofs  of  an  alibi  with  care  and  cau- 
tion. *  *  *  That  this  proposition 
is  correct  there  can  be  no  doubt.  It 
accords  with  the  observation  of  every 
one  of  experience  in  criminal  trials. 
Besides,  there  can  be  no  prejudice  in 
cautioning  the  jury  to  closely  and 
carefully  scan  the  proof  in  every 
case."  There  was  no  prejudice  to  the 
defendant  in  such  instructions.  So, 
in  the  case  of  Miller  v.  People,  39  111. 
457 :      "Failing    to     prove     an     alibi 


should  have  no  greater  weight  to 
convince  a  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the 
prisoner  attempting  it  than  the  failure 
to  prove  any  other  important  item  of 
defense.  A  prisoner  is  entitled  to 
rely  on  the  facts  in  his  favor,  he  may 
suppose  he  is  able  to  prove,  and  if  he 
is  so  unfortunate  as  to  fail  in  his 
proof,  it  should  not,  generally  speak- 
ing, operate  to  his  prejudice.  Proof 
of  an  alibi  is  a  defense  as  legitimate 
as  any  other,  and  the  court  should  not 
say,  lest  it  prejudice  the  minds  of 
the  jury,  that  failing  to  establish  it, 
should  have  great  weight  against  the 
prisoner." 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


EVIDENCE   OF   INSANITY    AND   INTOXICATION, 


i  154.  Mental  capacity  to  know  right 
and  wrong  as  a  test  of  in- 
sanity. 

155.  Uncontrollable  impulse  and  in- 

sane delusions. 

156.  Presumption  of  continuance  of 

insanity. 

157.  Burden  of  proof  to  show  san- 

ity and  insanity. 

158.  Proof    of    insanity    beyond    a 

reasonable  doubt  not  re- 
quired. 

159.  The    character    and    range    of 

evidence  to  show  insanity. 

160.  Evidence   showing  the  appear- 

ance, conduct  and  language 
of  the  accused  after  the 
crime — Evidence  of  insanity 
in  familj-  of  accused. 

161.  Non-expert  evidence. 


§  162.  Xon-expert  must  relate  in  evi- 
dence facts  on  which  his  im- 
pression is  based — Degree  of 
knowledge  required. 

163.  Expert     evidence — What     con- 

stitutes an  expert — Physical 
examination  of  accused  to 
ascertain  sanitj'. 

164.  Evidence  of   voluntary   intoxi- 

cation— When  irrelevant. 

165.  Insensibility    or    insanity    from 

indulgence  in  intoxicants 
nia}^  be  shown. 

166.  Evidence     of     into.xication     as 

bearing  on  a  specific  intent, 
or  on  premeditation. 

167.  Mode  of  proving  or  disproving 

intoxication. 

168.  Morphine  habit. 


§  154.  Mental  capacity  to  know  right  and  wrong  as  a  test  of  in- 
sanity.— Every  man  is  presumed  by  the  law  to  be  sane  and  re- 
sponsible for  his  actions  until  the  contrary  appears.  The  author- 
ities are  by  no  means  harmonious  as  regards  the  amount,  quality 
or  degree  of  proof  which  will  be  required  to  overcome  this  pre- 
sumption. But  the  tendency  of  the  most  recent  cases  is  to  give 
the  prisoner,  who  pleads  insanity  as  a  defense,  every  reasonable 
opportunity  to  secure  an  acquittal  by  the  employment  of  the 
means  which  modern  scientific  investigation,  into  the  domain  of 
mental  disease,  has  placed  within  his  reach.  The  accused  must, 
however,  according  to  a  large  majority  of  the  cases,  prove  that 
"he  was  laboring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason  from  disease  of 
the  mind  as  not  to  know"  (i.  e.,  as  not  to  have  sufficient  mental 
capacity  to  know)  "the  nature  and  quality  of  the  act  he  was  do- 

296 


297 


INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION. 


§    154 


ing;  or,  if  he  did  know  it,  that  he  did  not  know  he  was  doing 
wrong."^  This  rule,  which  has  been  followed  by  a  majority  of  the 
cases  in  America,  may  be  considered  as  a  settled  rule  regulating 
the  degree  of  mental  derangement  which  must  be  shown  in  a  crim- 
inal trial  to  overcome  the  presumption  of  sanity.^ 


^  This  is  the  rule  laid  down  in  Mc- 
Naghten's  Case  in  1843,  10  CI.  &  F. 
200;  I  C.  &  K.  130;  8  Scott  N.  R. 
595.  In  that  case  the  court  said : 
"The  jurors  ought  to  be  told  in  all 
cases  that  every  man  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  sane,  and  to  possess  a 
sufficient  degree  of  reason  to  be  re- 
sponsible for  his  crimes,  until  the  con- 
trary be  proved  to  their  satisfaction; 
and  that  to  establish  a  defense  on  the 
ground  of  insanity,  it  must  be  clearly 
proved  that,  at  the  time  of  the  com- 
mitting of  the  act,  the  party  accused 
was  labouring  under  such  a  defect  of 
reason,  from  disease  of  the  mind,  as 
not  to  know  the  nature  and  quality  of 
the  act  he  was  doing,  or,  if  he  did 
know  it,  that  he  did  not  know  he  was 
doing  what  was  wrong."  Again,  in 
Moett  V.  People,  85  N.  Y.  2>72>,  380, 
the  court,  by  Earl,  J.,  said :  "The 
laws  of  God  and  the  land  are  the 
measure  of  every  man's  act  and  make 
it  right  or  wrong,  and  it  is  right  or 
wrong,  as  it  corresponds  with  such 
laws.  When  it  is  said  that  a  prisoner 
must,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  crim- 
inal act,  have  sufficient  capacity  to 
distinguish  between  right  and  wrong 
with  respect  to  such  act,  it  is  implied 
that  he  must  have  sufficient  capacity 
to  know  whether  such  act  is  in  viola- 
tion of  the  law  of  God  or  of  the  land, 
or  of  both.  It  is  not  the  duty  of  the 
trial  judge  to  present  the  matter  to 
the  jury  in  every  possible  phase  and 
in  every  form  of  language  which  the 
ingenuity  of  counsel  can  devise." 
*  Mangrum        v.        Commonwcaltli 


(Ky.),  39  S.  W.  703,  19  Ky.  L.  94; 
Mackin  v.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  495,  36 
Atl.  1040;  People  v.  Riordan,  117  N. 
Y.  71,  75,  22  N.  E.  455;  People  v. 
Downs,  123  N.  Y.  558,  565,  25  N.  E. 
988;  Tiffany  v.  Commonwealth,  121 
Pa.  St.  165,  180,  15  Atl.  462,  6  Am. 
St.  775 ;  Rudy  v.  Commonwealth,  128 
Pa.  St.  500,  18  Atl.  344;  Howard  v. 
State,  50  Ind.  190;  State  v.  Wingo,  66 
Mo.  181,  183,  186,  27  Am.  329;  Ogle- 
tree  v.  State,  28  Ala.  693;  Tweedy  v. 
State,  5  Iowa  433;  State  v.  Flye,  26 
Me.  312;  People  v.  Potter,  5  Mich,  i, 
7,  71  Am.  Dec.  763;  Dale  v.  State,  10 
Yerg.  (Tenn.)  550;  Goodwin  v.  State, 
96  Ind.  550,  560;  Conway  v.  State,  118 
Ind.  482,  490,  21  N.  E.  285;  Plake  v. 
State,  121  Ind.  433,  435,  23  N.  E.  273, 
16  Am.  St.  408;  Willis  v.  People,  Z- 
X.  Y.  715,  719;  People  v.  Taylor,  138 
N.  Y.  398,  406,  34  N.  E.  27s ;  State  v. 
Harrison,  36  W.  Va.  729,  744,  755,  15 
S.  E.  982;  Flanagan  v.  People,  52  N. 
Y.  467,  469,  470,  II  Am.  731 ;  People  v. 
Carpenter,  102  N.  Y.  238,  250,  6  X.  E. 
584;  State  V.  Alexander,  30  S.  Car. 
74,  84,  8  S.  E.  440,  14  Am.  St.  879; 
United  States  v.  Holmes,  i  Clif.  (U. 
S.)  98,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15382;  State  v. 
Pagels,  92  Mo.  300,  314,  4  S.  W.  931 ; 
State  V.  Hockett,  70  Iowa  442,  30  N. 
W.  742 ;  Leache  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App. 
279,  308,  3  S.  W.  539,  58  Am.  638; 
State  V.  Xixon,  32  Kan.  205,  211,  212, 
4  Pac.  159;  State  v.  Brandon,  8  Jones 
(N.  Car)  463,  467,  468;  People  v. 
IToin,  62  Cal.  T20,  45  Am.  651;  State 
V.  T.awrence,  57  Me.  574,  577.  581 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Gcradc,  145  Pa.  St. 


§    155  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  298 

§  155.  Uncontrollable  impulse  and  insane  delusions. — Some  re- 
cent cases  have  departed  from  this  rule.  This  repudiation  of  the 
right  and  wrong  test  is,  doubtless,  due  to  the  desire  of  the  judges 
to  harmonize  the  legal  rules  which  determine  what  facts  must  be 
proved  as  a  necessary  basis  for  an  inference  of  insanity  with  the 
views  of  the  medical  profession.  In  almost  every  trial  where  san- 
ity is  an  issue,  medical  witnesses  are  produced,  who,  viewing  the 
question  of  sanity  from  a  medical  standpoint,  give  evidence  tend- 
ing to  set  up  some  other  test  than  that  of  a  capacity  to  distinguish 
and  to  choose  between  right  and  wrong.  It  is  well  recognized 
that  the  moral  sense  is  highly  developed  in  many  whose  mental 
powers  are  greatly  impaired,  and  that  some  faint  gleam  of  moral 
judgment  may  be  discovered,  even  in  the  most  idiotic.  The  medi- 
cal treatment  of  the  insane  in  asylum  proceeds  largely  upon  the 
theory  that  the  majority  of  such  persons  possess  the  capacity  to 
distinguish  between  right  and  wrong,  and  the  testimony  of  medi- 
cal witnesses  is  very  apt  to  be  colored  thereby  and  to  lead  the  jury 
to  believe  that  other  elements,  than  a  capacity  to  judge  of  the 
moral  character  of  the  act,  are  to  be  considered  in  determining  if 
the  accused  was  insane.  Thus,  it  is  said,  that  though  the  accused 
may  have  been  capable  of  appreciating  the  moral  character  of  his 
act,  and  may  have  been  able  to  choose  the  right  and  to  avoid  the 
Avrong,  yet  he  should  be  absolved  from  punishment  for  his  act  if, 
knowing  it  was  wrong,  he  was  prompted  to  do  it  by  some  uncon- 
trollable or  irresistible  influence,  or  was  under  some  insane  delu- 
sion that  made  him  choose  the  wrong  in  preference  to  the  right. 

289,  296,  22  Atl.  464,  27  Am.  St.  689;  64;  State  v.  O'Neil,  51  Kan.  651,  33 

Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  170,  205,  Pac.  287,  24  L.  R.  A.  555;   State  v. 

II  So.  618,  17  L.  R.  A.  484n;  Jamison  Lewis,  20  Nev.  333,  23  Pac.  241;  Feo- 

V.  People,  145  111.  357,  34  N.  E.  486;  pie  v.  Taylor,  138  N.  Y.  398,  34  N.  E. 

State  V.  Murray,  6  Cr.  L.  Mag.  255;  275;  People  v.  Farmer,  194  N.  Y.  251, 

State  V.  Spencer,  21  N.  J.  L.  196,  206;  87  N.  E.  457;  Maas  v.  Territory,  10 

Genz  V.  State,  59  N.  J.  488,  37  Atl.  69,  Okla.  714,  63  Pac.  960,  53  L.  R.  A. 

59  Am.  St.  619;  Parsons  v.  State,  81  814;  Bennett  v.  State,  57  Wis.  69,  14 

Ala.  577,  2  So.  854,  60  Am.  193;  Green  N.  W.  912,  46  Am.  26;  United  States 

V.  State,  64  Ark,  523,  43  S.  W.  973;  v.   Chisholm,   153  Fed.  808;   State  v. 

State  V.  Swift,  57  Conn.  496,  18  Atl.  Craig    (Wash),   lOO   Pac.   167;   State 

664;  Lee  V.  State,  116  Ga.  563,  42  S.  v.   Barker,   216   Mo.   532,   115   S.   W. 

E.   759;    Hornish   v.    People,    142  111.  T102;  Thomas  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 

620,  32  N.  E.  677,   18  L.  R.  A.  237:  1909),  116  S.  W.  600. 
State  V.  Arnold,  (Kan.  1909)  100  Pac. 


299  INSANITY   AND   INTOXICATION.  §    1 56 

After  the  jury  have  heard  such  a  statement  from  a  medical  wit- 
ness, they  are  extremely  apt  to  be  puzzled  by  a  seemingly  contra- 
dictory instruction  setting  up  the  right  and  wrong  test.  Accord- 
ingly many  of  the  cases  have  held  that  though  the  evidence  shows 
the  defendant  had  capacity  to  know  the  right  from  the  wrong  in 
that  particular  case,  yet,  if  from  the  facts  it  appears  that  he  was 
acting  under  an  irresistible  impulse  preventing  the  choosing  of 
the  right  or  compelling  wrong-doing,  he  should  be  acquitted.^ 

§  156.  Presumption  of  continuance  of  insanity. — No  presumption 
of  law  is  recognized  that  insanity  proved  to  exist  is  always  con- 
tinuous down  to  the  date  of  the  crime.  The  presumption  is  one  of 
fact,  and  clearly  the  continuance  of  the  insanity  depends  entirely 
upon  the  nature  of  the  mental  malady.  Insanity  is  undoubtedly 
often  chronic  and  permanent.  This  is  the  case  in  congenital  men- 
tal infirmity,  as  idiocy,  or  in  senile  dementia,  and  it  may  require 
very  clear  proof  to  overcome  the  presumption  that  such  insanity 
is  continuous.*  If  there  is  proof  that  the  accused  had  been  insane 
since  childhood,  he  is  entitled  to  an  instruction  that  if  he  were  in- 
sane at  any  time  before  the  commission  of  the  crime,  his  insanity 
was  presumed  to  continue,  and  that  the  burden  is  on  the  state  to 
show  that  he  became  sane  and  was  so  when  he  committed  the 
crime.^  But  the  reverse  is  true  where  insanity  is  the  result  of  de- 
lirium, ensuing  from  physical  disease  or  indulgence  in  intoxi- 
cants. The  circumstances  of  each  case  should  be  considered,  and 
the  matter  is  wholly  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  a  mental 
condition  shown  to  exist  continued  down  to  any  specific  later  pe- 
riod.*'  Where  an  insane  person  has  lucid  intervals,  and  no  proof 

"  Parsons  v.  State,  8r  Ala.  577,  2  So.  18  N.  E.  833;  State  v.  Snell,  46  Wash. 

854,    60    Am.    i93n    (leading    case)  ;  327,  89  Pac.  931,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

State  V.  Jones,  50  N.  H.  369,  9  Am.  1191,  35  L.  R.  A.  117  note. 

242;   Leache  v.   State,  22  Tex.   App.  ^  Allams  v.   State,   123   Ga.   500,   51 

•279,  3  S.  W.  539,  58  Am.  638;  Dacey  S.  E.  506;  Wooten  v.  State,  51  Tex. 

V.  People,   ir6  111.  555,  556,  6  N.  E.  Cr.  App.  428,  102  S.  W.  416. 

165;    State    V.    Felter,    32    Iowa    49;  "Armstrong  v.    State,   30  Fla.    170, 

Plake  V.  State,  121  Ind.  433,  435,  23  N.  204,    11    So.  618,    17   L.   R.   A.   484n ; 

E.   273;   but  cf.   Grubb   v.    State,    117  Langdon  v.  People,  133  111.  382,  24  N. 

Ind.  277,  280,  20  N.  E.  257,  725.  E.  874;  State  v.  Wilncr,  40  Wis.  304; 

*  State  V.  Reddick,  7  Kan.  143,  151;  State   v.    Reddick,   7    Kan.    143,    151; 

Goodwin  v.    State,  96  Ind.   550,   560;  State  v.   Lowe,  93  Mo.  547,  5  S.  W. 

Wagner  v.    State,   116   Ind.    181,    187,  889;  Whart.  Cr.  L.,  §  56.     It  is  only 


157 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


300 


of  insanity  existing  at  the  instant  of  the  offense  is  offered,  it  will 
be  presumed  to  have  been  committed  during  a  lucid  interval.' 

§  157.  Burden  of  proof  to  show  sanity  and  insanity. — The  cases 
are  inharmonious  upon  the  question  on  whom  does  the  burden  of 
proof  rest  when  insanity  is  in  issue  in  a  criminal  trial  ?  The  pris- 
oner's sanity  is  an  essential  and  requisite  ingredient  in  any  crime 
with  which  he  may  be  charged,  for,  if  his  mental  soundness  is  not 
shown,  there  certainly  cannot  be  a  criminal  intent  present  to 
lender  the  act  with  which  he  is  connected  a  crime.  It  is  the  gen- 
eral rule  that  the  state  has  the  burden  of  proving  all  the  necessary 
ingredients  of  a  crime,  including  the  criminal  intention,  and  this 
rule  logically  casts  the  burden  of  proving  the  sanity  of  an  accused 
person  upon  the  prosecution  in  the  first  instance.*  We  must  dis- 
tinguish clearly  between  the  burden  of  proof,  that  is,  the  obliga- 


where  the  insanity  of  the  accused  is 
of  an  apparently  permanent  or  con- 
tinuing type,  having  the  characteris- 
tics of  a  confirmed  disorder  of  the 
mind  as  distinguished  from  spasmod- 
ic mania  or  delirium,  the  product  of 
disease  that  any  presumption  of  the 
continuance  of  insanity  is  recognized. 
People  V.  Francis,  38  Cal.  183;  Arm- 
strong V.  State,  30  Fla.  170,  204,  11 
So.  618,  17  L.  R.  A.  484n;  Langdon  v. 
People,  133  111.  382,  24  N.  E.  874. 

'  Leache  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  279, 
313,  3  S.  W.  539,  58  Am.  638;  I  Rus- 
sell on  Crimes,  p.  11. 

*  Ford  V.  State,  72>  Miss.  734,  19  So. 
665,  35  L.  R.  A.  iT7n;  O'Connell  v. 
People,  87  N.  Y.  2,77,  4i  Am.  379; 
People  V.  Holmes,  iii  Mich.  364,  69 
N.  W.  501;  People  v.  McCarthy,  115 
Cal.  255,  46  Pac.  1073;  Chase  v.  Peo- 
ple, 40  111.  352,  358;  Langdon  v.  Peo- 
ple, 133  111-  382,  403,  24  N.  E.  874; 
People  V.  McCann,  16  N.  Y.  58,  64,  67, 
69  Am.  Dec.  642n ;  Walter  v.  People, 
32  N.  Y.  147;  Walker  v.  People,  88 
X.  Y.  81,  88:  State  v.  Davis,  109  N. 
Car.  780,  14  S.  E.  55;  State  v.  West, 


I  Houst.  Cr.  (Del.)  371;  State  v. 
Bartlett,  43  N.  H.  224,  80  Am.  Dec. 
154;  Ogletree  v.  State,  28  Ala.  693, 
702;  Polk  V.  State,  19  Ind.  170,  172, 
8r  Am.  Dec.  382 ;  Armstrong  v.  State, 
30  Fla.  170,  204,  II  So.  618,  17  L.  R. 
A.  484n;  State  v.  Schaefer,  116  Mo. 
96,  22  S.  W.  447;  State  V.  Coleman, 
20  S.  Car.  441,  454;  Wright  v.  People, 
4  Neb.  407,  410;  Commonwealth  v. 
Pomeroy,  117  Mass.  143,  148,  149,  fol- 
lovi^ed  in  Davis  v.  United  States,  160 
U.  S.  469,  40  L.  ed.  499,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
353;  State  v.  Johnson,  40  Conn.  136; 
Guetig  V.  State,  66  Ind.  94,  105-109; 
State  V.  Speyer,  207  Mo.  540,  106  S. 
W.  505;  Fults  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
App.  502,  98  S.  W.  1057;  State  v. 
Fressler,  16  Wyo.  214,  92  Pac.  806; 
State  V.  Quigley,  26  R.  I.  263,  58  Atl. 
905,  67  L.  R.  A.  222;  People  v.  Casey, 
231  111.  261,  83  N.  E.  278;  Knights  v. 
State,  58  Neb.  225,  78  N.  W.  508,  7^^ 
Am.  St.  78n ;  Allams  v.  State,  123  Ga. 
SCO,  51  S.  E.  506;  Wooten  v.  State, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  428,  102  S.  W.  416, 
76  Am.  St.  92,  97,  note :  Underbill  on 
Ev.,  §  249.    Ante,  §§  2Z,  24. 


30I 


INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION. 


157 


tion  imposed  upon  a  party  who  alleges  a  fact  to  establish  it  by 
proof,  and  the  mode  and  order  of  proof." 

The  state  need  not  prove  the  prisoner's  sanity  by  positive  and 
direct  evidence.  Presumptions  often  stand  for  proof  until  re- 
butted. The  presumption  of  law  that  every  one  is  sane,  which 
holds  good  and  is  the  full  equivalent  of  express  proof  until  it  is 
rebutted,"  will  be  sufficient  to  sustain  the  burden  of  proving  the 
prisoner's  sanity  where  the  evidence  of  the  state  suggests  nothing 
to  the  contrary.  If  the  state  shall  prove,  even  prima  facie,  that 
the  accused  committed  an  act  which  is  criminal  by  law,  and  no 
other  evidence  is  given,  his  sanity  will  be  presumed,  and  if  the 
prisoner,  in  the  defense  made  by  him,  offers  no  evidence  or  offers 
unconvincing  or  unsatisfactory  evidence  on  this  point,  his  sanity 
may  be  regarded  as  proved. ^^  When  the  accused  offers  evidence 
tending  to  show  insanity,  the  state  must  produce  evidence  in  re- 


'  People  V.  McCann,  16  N.  Y.  58, 
66,  69  Am.  Dec.  64211. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Gerade,  145  Pa. 
St.  289,  297,  22  Atl.  464,  27  Am.  St. 
689;  Ford  V.  State,  73  Miss.  734,  19 
So.  665,  35  L.  R.  A.  11711;  State  v. 
Cloninger,  149  X.  Car.  567;  63  S.  E. 
154;  Montag  V.  People,  141  111.  75;  30 
N.  E.  2)27 ;  United  States  v.  Cliisholm, 
153  Fed.  808;  Commonwealth  v.  Ed- 
dy, 7  Gray  (Mass.)  583.  See  cases 
cited  in  next  note.  Under  this  rule, 
it  has  been  held  proper  to  refuse  to 
charge  that  the  burden  is  on  the  ac- 
cused to  prove  by  a  preponderance  of 
the  evidence  that  he  was  not  of  sound 
mind  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of 
the  crime.  State  v.  Pressler,  16  Wyo. 
214,  92  Pac.  806. 

"  Boiling  V.  State,  54  Ark.  588,  602, 
16  S.  W.  658;  O'Brien  v.  People,  48 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  274,  280;  Armstrong  v. 
State,  30  Fla.  170,  197,  11  So.  618,  17 
L.  R.  A.  484n;  O'Connell  v.  People, 
87  N.  Y.  Z77,  384,  41  Am.  379;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  St.  289, 
296,  297,  22  Atl.  464,  27  Am.  St.  689; 
Dove  V.  State,  3  Heisk.   (Tenn.)  348, 


371 ;  Walker  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  81 ; 
Casat  V.  State,  40  Ark.  511,  513,  523; 
Brown  v.  State,  40  Fla.  459,  25  So. 
63 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  190 
Pa.  St.  138,  42  Atl.  542,  70  Am.  St. 
625 ;  State  v.  Clark,  34  Wash.  485,  76 
Pac.  98,  loi  Am.  St.  1006;  People  v. 
Suesser,  142  Cal.  354,  75  Pac.  1093. 
"Insanity,  when  it  is  relied  on  as  a 
defense  to  a  charge  of  crime,  must  be 
proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury 
to  entitle  the  accused  to  be  acquitted 
on  that  ground,  though  such  proof 
may  be  furnished  by  evidence  intro- 
duced by  the  commonwealth  to  sus- 
tain the  charge,  as  well  as  by  evi- 
dence introduced  by  the  accused  to 
sustain  the  defense.  *  *  *  The  com- 
monwealth having  proved  the  corpus 
delicti,  and  that  the  act  was  done  by 
the  accused,  has  made  out  her  case. 
If  he  relies  on  the  defense  of  insanity, 
he  must  prove  it  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  jury.  If,  upon  the  whole  evi- 
dence, they  believe  he  was  insane, 
when  he  committed  the  act,  the}'  will 
acquit  him  on  that  ground."  Boswell's 
Case,  20  Gratt.  (Va.)  860,  876. 


157 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


302 


buttal,  to  revive  and  strengthen  the  presumption  of  sanity.  Then 
the  duty  of  proving  the  sanity  of  the  accused,  his  possession  of 
mental  capacity  and  sense  of  moral  responsibility,  is  deemed  to 
be  upon  the  state.  The  presumption  of  sanity,  having  been  over- 
thrown by  the  evidence  for  the  defense,  is  no  longer  to  be  consid- 
ered, but  the  prosecution  must  prove  the  sanity  of  the  accused 
upon  the  whole  evidence  and  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.^"  But 
the  prevailing  rule  seems  to  be  that  an  allegation  that  the  de- 
fendant is  insane  is  a  statement  of  an  independent  fact,  and  is, 
in  its  nature,  a  plea  of  confession  and  avoidance.  Hence,  if  insan- 
ity is  pleaded  as  a  defense,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  defendant, 
in  conformity  with  the  general  rule  that  he  who  asserts  any 
affirmative  fact  has  the  burden  of  proof.^^ 


^"  Where  habitual  insanity  was 
proved  by  the  defendant,  it  was  held 
that  the  state  must  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  a  lucid  interval  at  the  instant 
of  the  crime  by  direct  evidence.  Ford 
V.  State,  yz  Miss.  734,  19  So.  665,  35 
L.  R.  A.  ii7n;  Thomas  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.  1909),  116  S.  W.  600;  State 
v.  Craig  (Wash),  100  Pac.  167. 

"Boswell's  Case,  20  Gratt.  (Va.) 
860,  875;  State  V.  Starling,  6  Jones 
(N.  Car.)  366;  People  v.  Myers,  20 
Cal.  518;  State  v.  Smith,  53  Mo.  267; 
Montag  v.  People,  141  111.  75,  30  N. 
E.  ZZT,  Walker  v.  People,  88  N.  Y. 
81 ;  McKenzie  v.  State,  26  Ark.  334, 
340;  State  V.  Sticklej^,  41  Iowa  232, 
237;  Dove  V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
348,  371 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Eddy,  7 
Gray  (Mass.)  583;  Bergin  v.  State, 
31  Ohio  St.  Ill;  People  v.  Travers, 
88  Cal.  233,  238,  26  Pac.  88;  State  v. 
Coleman,  27  La.  Ann.  691,  692;  Mey- 
ers v.  Commonwealth,  83  Pa.  St.  131 ; 
Graham  v.  Commonwealth,  16  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  587;  People  v.  Ta}'lor, 
138  N.  Y.  398,  406,  34  N.  E.  275 ;  Mc- 
Leod  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  331, 
20  S.  W.  749 ;  State  v.  Pagels,  92  Mo. 
300,  315,  4  S.  M.  931 ;  Sanders  v. 
State,  94  Ind.  147,  148;  McDougal  v. 


State,  88  Ind.  24,  26;  Plake  v.  State, 
121  Ind.  433,  435,  23  X.  E.  2-jy,  Keen- 
er V.  State,  97  Ga.  388,  24  S.  E.  28; 
State  V.  Wright,  134  Mo.  404,  35  S. 
W.  1 145;  Brotherton  v.  People,  75 
X.  Y.  159,  163;  People  v.  McCann,  16 
X.  Y.  58,  59,  69  Am.  Dec.  642n ;  State 
V.  Scott,  49  La.  Ann.  253,  21  So.  271, 
36  L.  R.  A.  72in;  People  v.  McCarthy, 
115  Cal.  255,  46  Pac.  1073;  Loeffner  v. 
State,  10  Ohio  St.  598;  United  States 
V.  McGlue,  I  Curt.  (U.  S.)  i,  26  Fed. 
Cas.  15679;  State  v.  Brandon,  8  Jones 
(X^.  Car.)  463;  Commonwealth  v. 
Heidler,  191  Pa.  St.  375,  43  Atl.  211; 
People  V.  Willard,  150  Cal.  543,  89 
Pac.  124;  Porter  v.  State,  140  Ala.  87, 
2,7  So.  81;  State  v.  Johnston,  118  La. 
276,  42  So.  935;  Talbert  v.  State,  140 
Ala.  96,  n  So.  78;  Kroell  v.  State, 
139  Ala.  I,  36  So.  1025;  Parrish  v. 
State,  139  Ala.  16,  36  So.  1012;  State 
v.  Cloninger,  149  X.  Car.  567,  63  S. 
E.  154.    Ante,  §§  2Z,  24. 

The  question  on  whom  is  the  bur- 
den of  proof  when  insanity  is  alleged 
is  one  of  some  diff^cult3^  It  lies  in  a 
narrow  compass.  The  difficulty  is  the 
starting  point.  By  some  it  is  main- 
tained that  sanity  is  an  essential  of 
the  crime  and  a  necessary  part  of  its 


o^j 


INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION. 


§  158.  Proof  of  insanity  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  not  required. — 
If  it  be  granted  that  the  defendant  has  the  burden  of  proving  his 
insanity,  it  remains  to  be  considered  what  amount  or  degree  of 
proof  is  sufficient.  The  safest  rule,  and  one  that  is  sustained  by  a 
large  majority  of  the  cases,  is  that  a  reasonable  preponderance  of 
evidence  upon  this  particular  point  should  acquit  the  defendant.^* 
Though  this  is  a  general  rule,  the  verbal  forms  in  which  it  has 
been  expressed  have  resulted  in  throwing  the  matter  into  some 


definition,  and  that  it  must  be  proved 
to  the  jury  in  the  same  way  as  any 
other  part.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  we  start  with  the  presump- 
tion that  all  men  are  sane  and  re- 
sponsible for  their  acts,  in  the  same 
waj'  that  we  start  with  the  proposition 
that  no  man  can  legally  do  that  which 
is  a  crime.  All  the  elements  which 
enter  into  the  definition  of  any  crime 
assume  a  responsible  agent  to  exist, 
and  sanity  is  assumed  and  treated  as 
an  essential  attribute  of  crime.  The 
indictment  says  nothing  of  his  capac- 
ity, and  as  it  is  only  as  regards  the 
facts  therein  alleged,  that  he  is  pre- 
sumed innocent,  they  must  be  proved 
and  nothing  more.  By  a  plea  of  not 
guilty  alone  he  has  the  negative  of  the 
issue.  If  he  shall  plead  insanity,  he 
assumes  the  affirmative,  for,  though 
such  a  plea  is  usually  coupled  with  a 
plea  of  not  guilty,  it  is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, a  confession  and  avoidance.  It 
admits  the  allegations  of  the  indict- 
ment, but  claims  that  the  accused  is 
mentally  irresponsible.  It  raises  an 
affirmative  issue  outside  of  the  indict- 
ment. Even  so  far  as  malice  is  con- 
cerned, using  that  word  in  its  legal 
sense,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  plea 
o*  insanity  denies  its  existence.  It  ad- 
mits its  presence,  but  claims  the  ac- 
cused was  mentally  unsound.  State 
V.  Lawrence,  57  Me.  574,  584. 
"Gcnz  V.  State,  58  X.  J.  L.  482,  34 


x\tl.  816;  People  V.  Nino,  149  N.  Y. 
317,  43  N.  E.  853;  State  v.  Larkins, 
5  Idaho  200,  47  Pac.  945 ;  State  v. 
Scott,  49  La.  Ann.  253,  21  So.  271, 
36  L.  R.  A.  72in;  King  v.  State, 
74  Miss.  576,  21  So.  235;  State  v. 
Redemeier,  71  Mo.  173,  176,  36  Am. 
462;  Graves  v.  State,  45  N.  J.  L. 
347,  360,  46  Am.  778;  Fisher  v. 
State,  30  Tex.  App.  502,  18  S.  W. 
90;  Ford  v.  State,  71  Ala.  385;  State 
v.  Felter,  32  Iowa  49,  54;  People  v. 
McCann,  16  N.  Y.  58,  69  Am.  Dec. 
642n ;  People  v.  McElvaine,  125  X.  Y. 
596,  26  X.  E.  929;  State  v.  Coleman, 
20  S.  Car.  441,  454;  Polk  v.  State,  19 
Ind.  170,  81  Am.  Dec.  382 ;  Loef¥ner  v. 
State,  10  Ohio  St.  598,  616;  Green  v. 
State,  88  Tenn.  614,  14  S.  W.  43°; 
Smith  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  95,  in; 
Graham  v.  Commonwealth,  16  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  587;  People  v.  Myers,  20 
Cal.  518;  People  v.  Bawden,  90  Cal. 
I95>  199,  27  Pac.  204;  Commonwealth 
V.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  St.  289,  296,  22  Atl. 
464;  Commonwealth  v.  Rogers,  7  Met. 
(Mass.)  500,  41  Am.  Dec.  458;  Dove 
v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  348,  373: 
Hopps  v.  People,  31  111.  385,  83  Am. 
Dec.  231;  Langdon  v.  People,  133  111. 
382,  403,  24  N.  E.  874;  People  v. 
Barthleman,  120  Cal.  7,  52  Pac.  112; 
Schultz  V.  Territory,  5  Ariz.  239,  52 
Pac.  352;  Braham  v.  State,  143  Ala. 
28,  38  So.  919. 


§  158 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


304 


confusion  .  Thus  it  has  been  said  that  insanity  must  be  estabHshed 
to  the  entire  or  reasonable  satisfaction  of  the  jury,  or  by  evidence 
satisfactory  to  them,  or  which  satisfies  their  minds  or  clearly  pre- 
ponderating. Such  expressions  are  misleading  and  may  be  con- 
strued to  mean  that  insanity  must  be  established  by  proof  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt.  This,  however,  is  not  required.  Reasonably, 
not  extraordinarily,  clear  and  substantial  proof  is  required.  Evi- 
dence fairly  preponderating  is  necessary,  but  never  proof  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt.  ^^  To  state  this  doctrine  in  another  way  by 
which,  perhaps,  the  lack  of  harmony  and  the  confusion  in  the 
authorities  may  be  avoided,  while  the  burden  of  proof  to  show 
insanity  is  on  the  defendant,  yet  if  he  introduces  evidence  on  that 
point  sufficiently  preponderating  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  in 
the  minds  of  the  jury  it  is  their  duty  to  acquit. ^^ 


"Walker  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  81; 
Smith  V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  14,  19 
S.  W.  252;  Commonwealth  v.  Gerade, 
14s  Pa.  St.  289,  298,  22  Atl.  464,  27 
Am.  St.  689 ;  Coyle  v.  Commonwealth, 
100  Pa.  St.  573,  45  Am.  397;  People 
V.  Bawden,  90  Cal.  195,  199,  27  Pac. 
204;  People  V.  Willard,  150  Cal.  543, 
89  Pac.  124;  Commonwealth  v.  Heid- 
ler,  191  Pa.  St.  375,  43  Atl.  211;  Al- 
lams  V.  State,  123  Ga.  500,  51  S.  E. 
506;  State  V.  Barker,  216  Mo.  532,  115 
S.  W.  1 102;  People  V.  Egnor,  175  N. 
Y.  419,  67  N.  E.  906;  Reed  v.  State, 
75  Neb.  509;  106  N.  W.  649. 

"Brotherton  v.  People,  75  N.  Y. 
I59»  163;  Casey  v.  People,  31  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  158;  Armstrong  v.  State,  30 
Fla.  170,  196,  II  So.  618,  17  L.  R.  A. 
484n.  See  also,  17  Am.  Law  Rev.  922, 
TO  Crim.  Law  Mag.  182.  State  v. 
Shuff,  9  Idaho  115,  72  Pac.  664;  Caf- 
fey  V.  State  (Miss.  1898),  24  So.  315; 
State  V.  Barker,  216  Mo.  532,  115  S. 
W.  1 102.  In  Brotherton  v.  People, 
75  N.  Y.  159,  the  court,  by  Church,  C. 
J.,  remarks  as  follows :  "Crimes  can 
only  be  committed  by  human  beings 


who  are  in  a  condition  to  be  respon- 
sible for  their  acts,  and  upon  this 
general  proposition  the  prosecutor 
holds  the  affirmative,  and  the  burden 
of  proof  is  upon  him.  Sanity  being 
the  normal  and  usual  condition  of 
mankind,  the  law  presumes  that  every 
individual  is  in  that  state.  Hence  a 
prosecutor  may  rest  upon  that  pre- 
sumption without  other  proof.  *  *  * 
Whoever  denies  this  or  interposes  a 
defense  based  upon  its  untruth,  must 
prove  it ;  the  burden,  not  of  the  gen- 
eral issue  of  crime  by  a  competent 
person,  but  the  burden  of  overthrow- 
ing the  presumption  of  sanity  and  qf 
showing  insanity,  is  upon  the  person 
who  alleges  it,  and  if  evidence  is  giv- 
en tending  to  establish  insanity,  then 
the  general  question  is  presented  to 
the  court  and  jury  whether  the  crime, 
if  committed,  was  committed  by  a 
person  responsible  for  his  acts,  and 
upon  this  question  the  presumption  of 
sanity,  and  the  evidence,  are  all  to  be 
considered,  and  the  prosecutor  holds 
the  affirmative,  and  if  a  reasonable 
doubt  exists  as  to  whether  the  pris- 


305  INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION.  8    159 

§  159.  The  character  and  range  of  evidence  to  show  insanity. — 
Evidence  to  show  insanity  is  not  confined  to  evidence  of  the  men- 
tal condition  of  the  accused  at  the  instant  of  the  act,  though  what- 
ever facts  are  adduced  must  tend  to  show  his  mental  state  at  that 
moment.  ]\Iind  can  only  be  known  by  outward  acts.  By  these  we 
read  the  thoughts,  the  motives  and  the  emotions,  and  as  one's 
acts  conform  to  the  practice  of  people  of  sound  mind  or  contrast 
therewith  we  form  our  judgment  of  sanity.  Evidence  is  compe- 
tent to  prove  conduct  and  language  at  various  times  and  places 
indicating  an  unhealthy  mental  condition,  and  the  more  extensive 
the  view,  the  safer  is  the  determination  reached.  It  is  proper  to 
allow  considerable  latitude  in  the  examination  of  the  witness.^' 
Every  fact  wdiich  shows  or  tends  to  show  that  the  mental  or 
physical  condition  of  the  accused  was  abnormal  at  the  date  of  the 
crime,  is  competent.^^  Thus,  a  witness  may  testify  that  on  a  cer- 
tain occasion  when  the  accused  was  in  his  presence,  his  actions 
were  unusual,  peculiar  or  unnatural,^''  and  that  he  talked  discon- 
nectedly and  appeared  absent  minded.-"  The  evidence  in  point  of 
time  may  cover  an  extensive  period ;  the  family  history  of  the 
accused,  his  relations  with  the  deceased  in  the  case  of  a  homicide 
and  his  actions  towards  the  deceased  are  relevant.  In  the  case  of 
a  homicide,  where  the  relations  of  the  deceased  with  the  wife  of 
the  accused  were  of  such  a  character  that  they  might  reasonably 
affect  the  nervous  or  mental  condition  of  the  accused,  those  rela- 
tions may  be  thoroughly  inquired  into."^  Under  the  above  rule, 
it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  evidence  of  the  mental  condition 
of  the  accused  prior  and  subsequent  to  the  crime,-"  and  of  his 
conduct  at  the  time  of  the  crime,  and  within  a  reasonable  period 
before  and  after  it,-"*  is  competent.  All  the  previous  mental  and 
])hysical  history  of  the  accused  is  relevant  where  insanity  is  the 
defense  as  an  inference  of  insanity  must  rest  upon  many  facts."* 

oner  is  sane,  or  not,  he  is  entitled  to  "  Braham  v.  State,  143  Ala.  28,  38 

the  benefit   of  the  doubt,   and  to   an  So.  919. 

acquittal."  '"Braham  v.   State,   143  Ala.  28,  ,38 

"  Dejarnctte  v.   Commonwealth,   75  So.  919. 

Va.  867.  ''State  v.  McGowan,  36  Mont.  422. 

"State  V.   Porter,  213   Mo.  43,   in  93  Pac.  552. 

S.  W.  529,   127  Am.   St.  589;  People  "People  v.  Koerncr,  191  N.  Y.  528, 

V.  Brent    fCal.   App.,   1909),   106   Pac.  84  N.  E.  11 17. 

no.  -■'People    V.    Willard,    150    Cal.    543, 

89  Pac.   T24. 

-' Guiteau's  Case,   10  Fed.    161,    167. 
2z — UxrinuiiiLL  Ckim.   I-.v. 


§    l60  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  306 

It  may  always  be  shown  that  he  was  insane  prior  to  the  crime.""' 
and,  though  this  fact  is  never  conclusive  of  his  insanitv  at  the 
date  of  the  crime,  it  may  be  received  as  tending  to  render  the  truth 
of  independent  evidence  of  that  fact  more  probable.""  The  evi- 
dence of  the  insanity  or  mental  weakness  of  the  accused  prior  to 
the  crime  ought  to  be  rejected  if  too  remote  in  point  of  time.  So 
where  accused  who  has  reached  adult  years  pleads  insanity  evi- 
dence tending  to  show  that  when  he  was  a  child  he  was  mentally 
weak  ought  to  be  rejected."' 

§  160.  Evidence  showing-  the  appearance,  conduct  and  language  of 
the  accused  after  the  crime — Evidence  of  insanity  in  family  of  ac- 
cused.— The  appearance  and  conduct  of  the  accused  while  testify- 
ing may  be  considered  by  the  jury,"*  aided  by  the  opinions  of  ex- 
perts thereon.  The  hideous,  unnatural  and  barbarous  character 
of  the  crime,  or  the  absence  of  adequate  motive,  though  either 
may  be  shown  and  be  considered  by  the  jury,-^  does  not  alone 
justify  an  inference  of  insanity.^"  The  demeanor  of  a  prisoner 
after  a  homicide  perpetrated  by  him,  his  coolness  and  lack  of  re- 
gret for  his  act,  his  physical  appearance  and  condition,  his  lan- 
guage showing  a  motive  or  the  lack  of  one,  his  attempt  to  conceal 
his  crime  or  to  escape,  or  his  open  boast  that  he  committed  the 
homicide  and  the  reason  for  it,  may  be  proved  to  show  his  mental 
condition.    None  of  these  facts  is  conclusive  however,  and  the 

"^  People  V.   Wood,   126  N.  Y.  249,  tending   school.    Rogers    v.    State,   77 

257,  27  N.  E.  362,  365;  United  States  Vt.  454,  61  Atl.  489. 

V.  Guiteau,  10  Fed.  160,  172;  People  v.  ""State  v.  Spencer,  21  N.  J.  L.  196, 

Manoogian,  141  Cal.  592,  75  Pac.  177 ;  203 ;   State  v.   Newman,  57  Kan.  705, 

Pratt  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  227,  47  Pac.  881. 

96  S.  W.  8;  Braham  v.  State,  143  Ala.  "People  v.   Carlin,  194  X.   Y.  448, 

28,  38  So.  919;  People  V.  Willard,  150  87  X.  E.  805. 

Cal.  543,  89  Rep.  124;  State  v.  Porter,  ^Commonwealth    v.    Buccieri,    153 

213  Mo.  43,  III  S.  W.  529;  127  Am.  Pa.  St.  535,  26  Atl.  228;  Elliott  Ev., 

St.  589;  People  V.  Koerner,  191  X.  Y.  §  2728. 

528,  84  X.  E.  1 1 17.    Evidence  that  the  "Commonwealth    v.    Buccieri,    153 

accused   was   or   is   weak  minded   or  Pa.  St.  535,  536,  544,  26  Atl.  228. 

easily    influenced    should    not   be    re-  ^"United    States   v.   Lee,  4   Mackey 

ceived  when  insanity  is  not  the  de-  (D.  C.)  489;  State  v.  Stark,  i  Strobh. 

fense.    State  v.  Flowers,  58  Kan.  702;  (S.  Car.)  479;  Guiteau's  Cas.  10  Fed. 

50  Pac.  938.    See,  also,  as  to  evidence  161,  168. 
of  the   fantastic  and   ridiculous   con- 
duct of  the  accused  while  a  girl  at- 


307  INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION.  §    160 

jury  may  discredit  them  and  find  the  accused  guilty.^^  Indeed 
isolated  facts  are  of  Httle  weight  to  prove  insanity  if  a  person  has 
been  generally  considered  sane,  for  it  may  be  that  the  peculiar  or 
eccentric  conduct  was  caused  otherwise  than  by  mental  weakness. 
Thus,  if  the  insanity  is  claimed  to  have  been  the  result  of  epilepsy, 
and  the  accused  states  that  he  frequently  fell  to  the  ground  in  a 
fit  and  lay  for  some  time  unconscious,  the  state  may  be  permitted 
to  produce  witnesses  who  knew  him  well  and  who  had  often  seen 
him  in  a  drunken  stupor.^"  The  conversations  and  the  declarations 
of  the  accused  uttered  within  a  reasonable  period  before  or  after 
the  crime  are  admissible  to  show  his  mental  condition  at  the  date 
of  the  crime.^'^  The  length  of  the  period  within  which  evidence  to 
show  the  sanity  or  insanity  of  the  accused  may  be  permitted  de- 
pends on  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case.  If  it  is  alleged 
by  the  accused  that  his  insanity  existed  for  a  long  period  before  the 
crime  and  it  is  apparently  of  a  permanent  character,  his  sanity 
may  be  shown  by  any  relevant  conduct  or  conversations  within 
the  same  period.  In  one  case,  the  state  was  permitted  to  prove 
conduct  and  conversations  which  impressed  witnesses  as  being 
entirely  rational  which  occurred  a  year  before  the  crime. ^'* 

The  jury  may  consider  the  cunning  and  sagacity  displayed  by 
the  accused  in  planning  the  crime,  the  promptitude  and  courage 
shown  in  using  a  deadly  weapon  and  the  skill  exhibited  in  effect- 
ing an  escape.  Evidence  that  the  accused  was  generally  reputed, 
prior  to  the  commission  of  the  alleged  crime,  to  be  of  unsound 
mind  is  not  admissible,  being  hearsay  merely. ^^   It  may  be  shown 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  testimony  of  the  accused  on   former 

St.  289,  297,  22  Atl.  464,  27  Am.  St.  trials  was  received  to  show  his  san- 

689;  State  V.  Jones,  64  Iowa  349,  354,  ity.     State  v.  Speyer,  207  Mo.  540,  106 

I-  X.  W.  911,  20  X.  W.  470;  Sanchez  S.  W.  505,  14  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   836. 

V.    People,  22   X.   Y.    147;    People   v.  ^*  People  v.  Koerner,  154  X.  Y.  355, 

Thurston,  2   Park.    Cr.    (X.   Y.)    49;  48  X.  E.  730. 

Jacobs  V.  Commonwealth,  121  Pa.  St.  "  Brinkley    v.    State,    58    Ga.    296; 

586,  15  Atl.  465,  6  Am.  St.  802;  Peo-  People  v.   Pico,  62  Cal.   50;   Walker 

pie  V.  Koerner,  191  X.  Y.  528,  84  X^.  v.   State,   102  Tnd.   502,  507,   I    X.   E. 

E.  1117,  aflf'g  117  App.  Div.   (X.  Y.)  856;  State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518,  36 

40,  102  N^.  Y.  Sup.  93.  See  §§  116-120.  Am.  89n;  Choice  v.  State.  31  Ga.  424. 

"Commonwealth    v.    Ruccieri,    153  Cf.   State  v.  Leuth,  5  Ohio  C.  C.  94, 

Pa.  St.  535,  26  Atl.  228.  2  Grecnl.  §  371 ;  State  v.  Church,  199 

"Taylor  v.   United   States,  7   .App.  Mo.   605,   98   S.   W.    t6;    Womble   v. 

Cas.  D.  C.  27.     Under  this  rule,  the  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  App.  24,  44  S.  W. 


§     l6o  CRI-MIXAL    EVIDENCE.  308 

that  an  ancestor  or  the  progeny  of  the  accused  was  insane  if  there 
is  independent  evidence  directly  tending  to  show  he  is  insane, "'"' 
but  evidence  of  the  insanity  of  collateral  relations  is  irrevelant,"^ 
and  evidence  of  insanity  in  an  ancestor  may  be  excluded,  if  it  is 
not  also  shown  that  the  insanity  was  hereditary.^^  The  cause  of 
such  insanity  is  always  relevant  to  prove  it  was  not  hereditary.^" 

In  proving  hereditary  insanity,  the  practice  is  to  permit  wit- 
nesses who  Avere  accjuainted  with  the  ancestor  of  the  accused  to 
testify  orally  to  his  peculiar  and  irrational  actions,  and  then  to 
testify  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  witness,  based  upon  such  peculiar 
conduct,  the  ancestor  in  question  was  insane.  In  other  words,  a 
non-expert  witness  may  testify  to  the  insanity  of  an  ancestor  of 
the  accused  from  his  opinion  based  on  the  same  class  of  facts  and 
in  the  same  manner  that  he  may  testify  to  the  insanity  of  the  ac- 
cused himself.  It  is  not  permissible,  however,  for  a  witness, 
though  she  be  the  wife  or  other  relation  or  a  friend  of  the  accused. 
to  testify  orally  that  an  ancestor  of  the  accused  had  been  adjudged 
insane :  this  is  not  the  best  evidence.  The  record  must  be  pro- 
duced." Nor  can  the  fact  of  the  insanity  of  the  accused  be  proven 
as  a  matter  of  family  pedigree  by  the  testimony  of  a  witness  or 
the  declarations  of  the  relatives  of  the  accused  to  his  insanity. 
The  kindred  of  the  accused  who  are  in  a  position  to  prove  his 
insanity  must  be  produced  as  witnesses.*^ 

§  161.  Non-expert  evidence. — By  the  weight  of  authority,  a  non- 
expert witness  who  has  had  adequate  means  of  becoming  ac- 

827;      Demaree      v.      Commonwealth  9,    17,  97  Am.   Dec.    16211;    Common- 

(Ky.)   91   S.  W.   1 131;  28  Ky.  L.  R.  wealth  v.  Johnson,  188  Mass.  382,  74 

1374;  Porter  v.  State,  140  Ala.  87,  Z1  ^-   E.   939;    Watts   v.    State,  99   Md. 

So.  81;  People  V.  Koerner,  154  N.  Y.  30,  57  Atl.  542. 

355,  48  N.  E.  730;   Parrish  v.   State,  '^  State  v.    Soper,   148   ]\Io.   217,  49 

139  Ala.   16,  36   So.   1012;   People  v.  S.  W.  1007. 

Barthleman,  120  Cal.  7,  52  Pac.   112;  ^' Walsh  v.    People,  88  N.   Y.  458; 

State    V.    Lagoni,    30    Mont.    472,    76  State  v.  Quigley,  26  R.  I.  263,  58  .\\\. 

Pac.   1044;   State  v.   Penna,  35  Mont.  905,  67  L.  R.  A.  322. 

535,  90  Pac.  787;  State  v.  Speyer,  194  '"State   v.   Hoyt,  47  Conn.   518,  36 

Islo.  459,  91  S.  W.  1075.  Am.  89n. 

""Shaeffer  v.  State,  6r  Ark.  241,  32  '"State   v.    Steidley,    135   Iowa   512, 

S.  W.  679;  Hagan  v.   State,  5  Baxt.  113  N.  W.  333. 

(Tenn.)  615,  618;  Guiteau's  Case,  10  "People  v.  Koerner,  154  X.  Y.  355, 

Fed.  161 ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  48  X.  E.  730. 


309 


INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION. 


quainted  with  the  mental  state  of  a  person  whose  sanity  is  in  issue 
may  give  his  opinion  uj)on  the  question  whether  such  person  was 
insane  at  the  time  of  a  specific  occurrence  which  is  also  in  evi- 
dence.*" Thus,  for  illustration,  an  attorney  who  has  acted  in  a 
professional  capacity  for  the  accused  may  testify  as  to  his  conduct, 
whether  rational  or  irrational  at  a  particular  time.*^  So,  an  official 
stenographer  who  was  present  and  took  down  the  testimony  of 
the  accused  at  a  trial  in  which  the  accused  was  a  defendant  may 
state  whether  or  not  the  answers  of  the  accused  impressed  him  as 
rational  or  otherwise.  And  it  is  immaterial,  under  such  circum- 
stances, that  the  stenographer  prior  to  the  trial  was  not  personally 
acquainted  with  the  accused,  and  that  his  opinion  as  to  the  rational 
character  of  the  answers  of  the  accused  was  based  solely  upon  the 


*"  State  V.  Williamson,  io6  Mo.  162, 
i/i,  17  S.  W.  172;  Phelps  V.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  32  S.  W.  470,  17  Ky. 
L.  706;  Pflueger  v.  State,  46  Neb. 
493,  64  N.  W.  1094;  Genz  v.  State,  59 
N.  J.  L.  488,  34  Atl.  816,  59  Am.  St. 
619;  People  V.  Strait,  148  N.  Y.  566, 
42  N.  E.  1045 ;  Dove  v.  State,  3  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  348,  367;  State  v.  Maier,  36 
W.  Va.  757;  Schlencker  v.  State,  9 
Xeb.  241,  251,  I  N.  W.  857;  Sage  v. 
State,  91  Ind.  141,  143;  Armstrong  v. 
State,  30  Fla.  170,  201,  11  So.  618,  17 
L.  R.  A.  484n;  Boiling  v.  State,  54 
Ark.  588,  16  S.  W.  658 ;  McClackey  v. 
State,  5  Tex.  App.  320;  Wood  v. 
State,  58  Miss.  741,  743;  People  v. 
Levy,  71  Cal.  618,  623;  State  v.  Hay- 
den,  51  Vt.  296;  Clark  v.  State,  12 
Ohio  483,  487,  40  Am.  Dec.  481 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Conroy,  97  N.  Y.  62;  Holconibe 
v.  State  (Ga.  App.),  62  S.  E.  647; 
State  V.  Banner,  149  N.  Car.  519,  63 
S.  E.  84;  Atkins  v.  State  (Tenn.), 
T05  S.  W.  353;  Taylor  v.  United 
States,  7  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  27 ;  People 
V.  Manoogian,  141  Cal.  592,  75  Pac. 
177;  Leaptrot  v.  State,  51  Fla.  57,  40 
So.  616;  Watts  V.  State,  99  Md.  30, 
57  Atl.  542;  Lowe  v.  State,  118  Wis. 
641,  96  X.  W.  417;  People  V.  Kocrn- 


er,  191  N.  Y.  528,  84  N.  E.  11 17,  aff'g 
117  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  40,  102  N.  Y.  S. 
93 ;  State  v.  Beuerman,  59  Kan.  586,  53 
Pac.  874;  State  v.  Montgomery,  121 
La.  1005,  46  So.  997;  Rice  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.),  112  S.  W.  299; 
State  V.  Bell,  212  Mo.  iii,  iii  S.  W. 
24;  State  V.  Bronstine,  147  Mo.  520, 
49  S.  W.  512;  Byrd  v.  State,  76  Ark. 
286,  88  S.  W.  974;  Burton  v.  State, 
Sr  Tex.  Cr.  App.  196,  loi  S.  W.  226; 
People  V.  Clark,  151  Cal.  200,  90  Pac. 
549;  State  V.  Penna,  35  Mont.  535,  90 
Pac.  787;  Commonwealth  v.  Wire- 
back,  190  Pa.  St.  319,  42  Atl.  542,  70 
Am.  St.  625;  State  v.  Shuff,  9  Idaho 
115,  72  Pac.  664;  Parrish  v.  State,  139 
Ala.  16,  36  So.  1012;  Glover  v.  State, 
129  Ga.  717,  59  S.  E.  816;  Porter  v. 
State,  140  Ala.  87,  37  So.  81 ;  Kroell 
V.  State,  139  Ala.  i,  36  So.  1025 ;  Bra- 
ham  V.  State,  143  Ala.  28,  38  So.  919; 
State  V.  Berberick  (Mont.),  100  Pac. 
209.  See,  also,  Hardy  v.  Merrill,  56 
X.  H.  227,  22  Am.  441,  and  Common- 
wealth V.  Pomeroy,  117  Mass.  143, 
overruling  earlier  cases,  contra.  Pat- 
terson V.  State,  86  Ga.  70. 

*■'  Bishoff     V.     Commonwealtii,     123 
K'y-  340,  9O  S.  VV.  538,  29  Ky.  L.  770. 


§    l62  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  ^JO 

minutes  of  the  testimony  as  made  by  him  and  without  any  recol- 
lection of  the  manner  of  the  accused  in  testifying.**  The  expert 
may  not  state  his  present  opinion  as  distinguished  from  the  opin- 
ion he  had  or  the  impression  made  upon  his  mind  at  the  time  of 
the  occurrence  observed.'*^  He  must  state  the  facts  first,  and  then 
on  this  evidence  he  may  express  his  opinion  or  impression  formed 
at  the  time  as  to  the  sanity  of  the  accused.**^  Though,  the  opinion 
of  the  non-expert  witness  is  in  its  effect  the  opinion  as  to  the 
sanity  of  the  accused  at  a  particular  time,  he  is  not  usually  per- 
mitted to  state  his  opinion  in  that  shape.  All  that  he  is  permitted 
to  do,  after  he  has  described  the  facts  upon  which  the  opinion  is 
based,  is  to  state  whether  in  his  opinion  on  the  facts  which  he  tes- 
tified to  the  conduct  of  the  accused  was  rational  or  irrational.*^ 

§  162.  Non-expert  must  relate  in  evidence  facts  on  which  his  im- 
pression is  based — Degree  of  knowledge  required. — The  opinion  of  a 
non-expert,  on  facts  related  to  him,  is  never  received.  But  where 
he  has  seen  the  actions  of  the  person,  and  conversed  with  him, 
the  law  considers  it  easily  within  the  mental  ability  of  any  ordi- 
nary person  to  distinguish  the  mental  condition  of  an  insane  per- 
son. The  influence  and  value  of  his  opinion  will  depend  largely  on 
the  intelligence  he  shows  on  his  examination,  and  upon  his  oppor- 
tunities for  acquiring  the  knowledge  on  which  his  opinion  is  based. 

"  People  V.  Koerner,  191  N.  Y.  528,  wealth  v.  Wireback,  190  Pa.  St.  138, 

84  N.  E.  1117,  aff'g  117  App.  Div.  (N.  42  Atl.  542,  70  Am.  St.  625;  State  v. 

Y.)  40,  102  N.  Y.  S.  93.  Constantine,   48  Wash.   218,   93    Pac. 

*^  O'Brien  v.  People,  36  N.  Y.  276,  317;  Fults  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

282;  Hickman  v.  State,  38  Tex.  190.  502,  98  S.  W.  1057;  Bothwell  v.  State, 

^  Armstrong  v.   State,  30  Fla.   170,  71  Neb.  747,  99  N.  W.  669 ;  People  v. 

201,   II    So.  618,   17   L.   R.   A.  484n;  Koerner,    191    N.    Y.    528,   84   N.   E. 

State  V.  Williamson,  106  Mo.  162,  171,  1117;   Parrish   v.    State,    139  Ala.    16, 

17  S.  W.  172;  State  V.  Pennyman,  68  36   So.    1012.     Where   a   laj^  witness, 

Iowa  216,  26  N.   W.  82;   Hoover  v.  after  describing  the  symptoms  he  ob- 

State,  48  Neb.    184,  66  N.  W.   11 17;  served,  characterized  a  man's  conduct 

Com.  V.  Buccieri,  153  Pa.  St.  535,  26  as  irrational,  expert  testimony  show- 

Atl.  228;  Ellis  V.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  ing  that  people  may  exaggerate  such 

App.  86,  24  S.  W.  894;  State  v.  Beuer-  symptoms     is     inadmissible.      People 

man,  59  Kan.  586,  53  Pac.  874;  Hen-  v.    Webster,    59    Hun    (N.    Y.)    398, 

derson  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App.  511,  400,  13  N.  Y.  S.  414. 

93  S.  W.  550;  State  V.  Bell,  212  Mo.  ''People  v.  Spencer,  179  N.  Y.  408, 

III,   III    S.   W.   24;   Atkins  v.    State  72  N.  E.  461. 
(Tenn.),    105    S.   W.   353;    Common- 


311  INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION.  §    162 

And  his  previous  personal  acquaintance  with  the  accused,  its  char- 
acter and  the  length  of  time  it  existed,  his  freedom  from  bias  or 
interest,  the  absence  of  finely  spun  theories  from  his  conception  of 
the  whole  matter,  the  fullness  of  the  facts  within  his  knowledge, 
and  the  accuracy  of  his  memory,  are  also  to  be  regarded  in  esti- 
mating the  value  of  his  evidence.*^  The  mental  unsoundness  or  de- 
rangement of  the  accused  may  have  been  very  marked.  It  may 
have  been  so  apparent,  from  his  actions,  that  any  person,  though 
possessing  but  weak  and  inadequate  powers  of  observation,  may 
be  as  competent  to  express  an  opinion  as  the  most  skillful  and 
learned  physician.  Here  it  may  be  said  that  the  insanity  is  matter 
of  fact  rather  than  of  opinion,  and  the  testimony  of  the  witness  is 
only  an  opinion  in  form.  If,  when  stating  it  in  a  criminal  trial,  he 
narrates  with  particularity  the  minor  details  from  which  it  is  de- 
duced or  inferred,  and,  it  being  made  to  appear  that  he  was  per- 
sonally acquainted  with  the  accused  for  a  long  time,  he  details  the 
furious  acts  and  gestures,  the  foolish  and  incoherent  talk,  or  the 
absurd  and  unnatural  conduct  of  the  accused,  there  can  be  no  ob- 
jection to  his  adding  an  inference  that  any  man  would  draw  from 
them,  i.  e.,  that  the  accused  was  insane.  No  rule  can  be  laid  down 
as  regards  the  amount  of  knowledge  which  the  non-expert  witness 
must  possess.  The  weight  the  opinion  shall  have  is  for  the  jury 
alone.  If  he  has  full  knowledge  of  the  previous  life,  antecedents 
and  surroundings  of  the  prisoner  his  opinion  ought  certainly  to 
have  more  value  than  that  of  a  witness  who  has  only  meager 
knowledge  of  these  subjects.*^ 

**  "It  is  true  that  a  non-expert  wit-  cannot  decide  whether  the  opinion  is 

ness  must  always  state  the  facts  upon  of  much  or  little  weight;  its  duty  is 

which  he  bases  his  opinion  as  to  the  merely  to  decide  whether  such  knowl- 

mental  capacity  of  a  defendant  in  a  edge  is  shown  and  such  facts  stated 

criminal    prosecution,    and   it   is    also  as  entitle  the  witness  to  express  any 

true  that  it  must  appear  that  he  has  opinion   at   all."     Colee   v.    State,   75 

some  knowledge  of  the  acts  and  con-  Ind.  511,  514;   State  v.  Von  Kutzle- 

duct  of  the  person  upon  whose  mental  ben,    136   Iowa   89,    113    N.    W.    484; 

condition  he  declares  his  opinion.  The  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §   197,  p.  285. 
extent   of  this  knowledge  has  never        **  McLeod  v.   State,  31   Tex.   Crim. 

been    defined,   and   we   cannot    frame  App.  331,  20  S.  W.  749;  Armstrong  v. 

any  general  rule  which  will  determine  State,  30  Fla.  170,  205,  it  So.  6x8,  17 

just  how  much  or  how  little  knowl-  L.  R.  A.  484n:  Clark  v.  State,  12  Ohio 

edge  will  entitle  the  witness'  opinion  483,  489,  40  Am.  Dec.  481 ;  Colee  v. 

to     admission.    *    *    *    The     court  State,  75  Ind.  511,  514;  Sage  v.  State, 


§  l62  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  312 

The  question  whether  a  witness  who  is  a  non-expert  is  compe- 
tent to  testify  is  for  the  court  to  determine.  He  must  have  had 
some  acquaintance  with  the  accused  prior  to  the  crime  and  he 
must  have  had  some  opportunity  to  observe  his  conduct  upon 
which  is  based  his  opinion  whether  it  was  rational  or  irrational. 
If  it  shall  appear  prima  facie  that  the  witness  did  not  have  suffici- 
ent time  for  observation,  his  evidence  should  be  excluded.^''  Thus 
the  witness  cannot  give  his  opinion  as  to  the  rational  conduct  of 
the  accused  where  his  only  knowledge  of  the  accused  was  such  as 
was  derived  from  business  relations  subsequent  to  the  crime. ^^ 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  a  police  officer  who  talked 
with  the  accused  after  his  arrest  might  testify  that  he  then  talked 
rationally  where  the  defense  was  insanity.^-  And  under  the  rule 
that  the  non-expert  witness  must  have  had  sufficient  opportunity 
for  observations,  the  prosecution  may  properly  be  refused  permis- 
sion to  put  witnesses  on  the  stand  from  among  bystanders  to  ex- 
press their  opinion  as  to  the  rational  conduct  of  the  accused,  where 
the  only  basis  for  such  an  opinion  is  observations  made  during 
the  trial." 


g  163.  Expert  evidence — What  constitutes  an  expert — Physical 
examination  of  accused  to  ascertain  sanity. — The  rule  governing  the 
admission  of  expert  testimony  is  the  same  in  criminal  as  in  civil 
cases.^'*  When  the  insanity  of  the  accused  is  in  issue,  the  opinions 
of  competent  physicians  or  of  expert  alienists  are  generally  admis- 
sible. The  opinion  given  may  be  brought  out  by  a  hypothetical 
question  containing  the  facts  proved,  or  assumed  to  be  proved,  on 
one  side  or  the  other. ^^    The  putting  of  a  hypothetical  question 

91  Ind.   141;  Choice  v.  State,  31   Ga.  98  S.  W.  851;  Young  v.  State  (Tex. 

424;  McClackey  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  Cr.  App.  1907),  102  S.  W.  1144. 

320;   Pflueger  v.    State,  46  Neb.  493,  °' Queenan  v.   Territory,    190  U.   S. 

64  N.  W.  1094;  Braham  v.  State,  143  548,  47  L.  ed.   1175.  23  Sup.  Ct.  762, 

Ala.  28,  38  So.  919;  Watts  v.  State,  aff'g  11  Okla.  261,  71  Pac.  218. 

99  Md.  30,  57  Atl.  542;  United  States  ®^  Parrish  v.   State,   139  Ala.   16,  2^ 

V.  Chisholm,  153  Fed.  808;  Lawson  v.  So.  1012. 

State  (Ind.),  84  N.  E.  974.  ""State  v.  Von  Kutzleben,  136  Iowa 

'"Hite  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  20  89,  113  N.  W.  484- 

S.  W.  217,   14  Ky.   L.  308:   Blake  v.  "State   v.    Webb,    56    Pac.    159,    18 

Rourke,  74  Iowa  519,  38  N.  W.  392;  Utah  441. 

Wells  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  499,  "  Cowley  v.   People,  83  X.   Y.  464. 


313 


INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION, 


163 


and  the  giving  of  an  opinion  on  it  is  the  better  and  customary 
practice,  but  where  the  expert  has  heard  all  the  testimony  bearing 
on  the  mental  condition  of  the  accused,  and  there  is  no  conflict  in 
the  evidence,  it  is  not  error  to  permit  him  to  give  his  opinion  based 
solely  upon  the  evidence  as  heard  by  him,^''  So,  also,  an  expert 
may  give  his  opinion  based  on  the  evidence  as  stated  in  a  hypo- 
thetical question  and  also  upon  an  examination  of  the  accused 
made  by  the  expert  as  a  physician.^'  An  expert  may  give  his  opin- 
ion upon  knowledge  obtained  and  facts  observed  by  the  witness 
in  treating  or  examining  the  accused  professionally.^*  Generally 
an  expert  witness  will  not  be  allowed  to  give  an  opinion  on  the 
evidence,  unless  it  is  embodied  in  a  hypothetical  question.  To  al- 
low this  would  be  to  usurp  the  exclusive  province  of  the  jury  and 
enable  him  to  decide  upon  the  credibilit}'  of  the  testimony.  But  an 
expert  witness  may,  where  the  evidence  is  not  conflicting,  and  if 
he  has  heard  all  of  it  bearing  on  insanity,  be  permitted  to  give  his 
opinion  as  regards  the  mental  condition  of  the  accused,  based 
upon  the  facts  in  evidence,  if  true.^**    And  where  a  hypothetical 


470,  38  Am.  464;  Dejarnette  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 75  Va.  867 ;  State  v. 
Pagels,  92  Mo.  300,  315,  4  S.  W.  931 ; 
Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  287,  n.  4.  People 
V.  James,  5  Cal.  App.  427,  90  Pac.  561 ; 
State  V.  Bell,  212  Mo.  iii,  in  S.  W. 
24;  People  V.  Koerner,  117  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  40,  102  N.  Y.  93;  Parrish  v. 
State,  139  Ala.  16,  36  So.  1012;  State 
V.  Dunn,  179  Mo.  95,  "]■]  S.  W.  848; 
Schissler  v.  State,  122  Wis.  365,  99 
X-  W.  593. 
'^  State  V.   Privitt,   175   Mo.  207,  75 

S.  w.  457. 

■'•  People  V.  Koerner,  191  N.  Y.  528, 
84  N.  E.  1 1 17,  aff'g  117  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  40,  102  N.  Y.  S.  93,  20  N.  Y. 
Cr.  515. 

'^Commonwealth  v.  Johnson,  188 
Mass.  382,  74  N.  E.  939. 

"  Sanchez  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  147, 
154;  People  V.  Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358, 
362;  Commonwealth  v.  Rogers,  7 
Mctc.  (Mass.)  500,  41  .\m.  Dec.  458; 
State   V.   Wright,    134   Mo.  40^,   35   S. 


W.  114s;  State  V.  Reidel,  9  Houst. 
(Del.)  470,  14  Atl.  550;  State  v.  Hay- 
den,  51  Vt.  296;  People  V.  Wood,  126 
N.  Y.  249,  27  N.  E.  362,  366;  State  v. 
Baber,  74  Mo.  292,  41  Am.  314;  State 
V.  Hockett,  70  Iowa  442,  30  N.  W. 
742;  Commonwealth  v.  Buccieri,  153 
Pa.  St.  535,  26  Atl.  228;  People  v. 
Schuyler,  106  N.  Y.  298,  305,  306,  12 
N.  E.  783 ;  People  v.  Smiler,  125  N.  Y. 
T'^ly  719.  26  N.  E.  312;  Parrish  v. 
State,  139  Ala.  16,  36  So.  10x2;  State 
V.  Soper,  148  Mo.  217,  49  S.  W.  1007; 
State  V.  Ayles,  120  La.  661,  45  So. 
540.  The  expert  may  give  an  opinion 
on  an  admitted  state  of  facts,  or  may 
state  facts  within  his  knowledge  as  a 
witness  and  express  an  opinion  on 
them;  or  a  state  of  facts  supported 
in  some  degree  ])y  the  evidence  might 
be  assumed  on  which  he  may  give  an 
opinion;  if  tlic  assumed  facts  are 
proved  the  statement  of  the  opinion 
is  evidence,  otherwise  it  is  not  to  be 


§163  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE,  3I4 

question  is  put  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  permit 
the  expert  to  make  an  explanation.*"'  But  the  expert  who  testifies 
as  to  the  insanity  of  the  accused  should  not  be  permitted  to  testify- 
that  in  his  opinion,  the  accused  was  or  was  not  capable  of  deter- 
mining- between  right  and  wrong."^  A  witness  to  be  regarded  as 
an  exjiert  must  have  made  insanity  a  subiect  of  special  study.  He 
should  also  have  had  such  practical  experience  in  the  care  and 
treatment  of  the  insane""  as  will  render  him  conversant  with  the 
subject  and  able  to  recognize  its  peculiar  subtle  manifestations."^ 
A  medical  student  whose  knowledge  of  mental  diseases  is  wholly 
derived  from  lectures  he  has  heard  cannot  be  accepted  as  an  ex- 
pert."* But  a  physician  attached  to  a  hospital  or  asylum  may  tes- 
tify to  the  mode  of  treating  insane  persons  and  as  to  the  methods 
of  his  hospital  though  he  is  not  an  expert  on  insanity."'^  But  it 
has  been  held  that  if  he  has  had  experience  in  treating  cases  of 
insanity,  and  if  he  has  practiced  as  a  physician  and  surgeon,  he  is 
not  incompetent  because  he  has  not  made  insanity  a  special 
stud)^°"  In  the  absence  of  a  mandatory  statute  the  appointment 
by  the  court  of  a  physician  to  examine  an  accused  person,  alleged 
to  be  insane  at  the  time  of  his  arraignment,  is  wholly  discretion- 
ary, and  usually  the  necessity  for  the  examination  must  be  made 
to  appear."^  The  jury  are  never  concluded  by  the  report  of  exam- 
considered.  It  is  not  necessary  in  °' Reese  Med.  Juris.,  p.  19;  State  v. 
stating  a  hypothetical  case  to  assume  Bell,  212  Mo.  iii,  iii  S.  W.  24;  Lowe 
all  the  facts  which  the  evidence  tends  v.  State,  118  Wis.  641,  96  N.  W.  417. 
to  prove,  but  all  facts  assumed  must  The  physician  had  treated  four  insane 
be  supported  by  some  evidence,  persons  during  a  practice  of  18 
Guetig  V.   State,  66  Ind.  94,   104-105,     months. 

32  Am.  99n ;  and  cf.  Burt  v.  State,  38        '^^  Hamilton    v.    United     States,    26 
Tex.  Cr.  App.  397,  40  S.  W.  1000,  43    App.  Cas.  D.  C.  382. 
S.  W.  344,  39  L.  R.  A.  305n;  Schissler        "^People  v.  Koerner,  154  N.  Y.  355, 
V.  State,  122  Wis.  365,  99  N.  W.  593.    48  N.  E.  730. 

°° Commonwealth  v.  Parsons,  195  ""State  v.  Reddick,  7  Kan.  143,  151; 
Mass.  560,  81  N.  E.  291.  Lowe  v.   State,   118  Wis.  641,  96  N. 

"  State  V,  Brown,  181  Mo.   192,  79    W.  417. 
S.  W.  nil.  "'People  v.   McElvaine,   125   N.   Y. 

""  A  physician  in  active  practice  who  596,  604,  608,  26  N.  E.  929.  See,  also, 
has  made  a  study  of  insanity  and  has  Wel)ber,  v.  Commonwealth,  119  Pa, 
averaged  15  cases  a  year  is  an  expert.  St.  223,  13  Atl.  427,  4  Am.  St.  634; 
Hamilton  v.  United  States,  26  App.  State  v.  Arnold,  12  Iowa  479,  483; 
Cas.  D.  C.  382.  People  v.  Ah  Ying,  42  Cal.  18. 


315  INSANITY    AND   INTOXICATION.  §    1 63 

iners  to  the  effect  that  the  accused  is  insane.  The  evidence  of  such 
examiners  is  merely  that  of  experts  and  its  credibihty  is  for  the 
jury.  So,  also,  a  judgment  which  declared  the  accused  insane 
based  upon  an  examination  following  his  commitment  to  the  state 
asylum  for  the  insane  is  not  conclusive  on  the  question  of  his  in- 
sanity. And  while  the  commitment  of  the  accused  to  a  state  asy- 
lum may  be  admissible  as  tending  to  prove  his  insanity,  the  writ- 
ten reports  of  the  examining  physicians,  and  their  certificates 
upon  which  the  commitment  was  based,  are  not  competent  evi- 
dence of  his  insanity/®  Where  the  expert  has  made  a  physical  ex- 
amination he  may  be  required  to  describe  the  facts  and  symptoms 
observed,*^^  as  well  as  the  conversation  which  he  had  with  the  de- 
fendant,'*^ but  he  cannot  be  allowed  to  narrate  what  the  attendants 
said.'^  The  expert  for  the  state  who  is  appointed,  or  who  is  re- 
quested by  the  prosecuting  attorney  to  examine  the  accused  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  his  sanity,  should  conduct  himself  in 
a  fair  and  impartial  manner  during  the  examination.  He  need 
not  tell  the  accused  the  purpose  of  the  examination  but  the  fact 
that  he  does  so,  asking  the  accused  to  be  open  and  free  with  him, 
but  that  he  need  not  tell  him  anything  that  would  incriminate 
him,  does  not  exclude  the  evidence  secured  by  the  expert.  Such 
a  statement  is  not  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the  physician  that  he 
will  not  testify  against  the  accused,  and  he  may  testify  to  any  fact 
ascertained  by  him  or  admitted  to  him,  even  though  he  has  not 
warned  the  accused  that  his  statements  made  on  the  examination 
may  be  used  against  him.'"  A  physician  who  has  examined  the 
accused  may,  after  giving  an  opinion  based  on  the  knowledge  thus 

°*  People  V.   Willard,   150  Cal.   543,  United  States,  165  U.  S.  373,  41  L.  ed. 

89  Pac.  124.  750,  17  Sup.  Ct.  360.    See  post,  §  181 ; 

'"'  Commonwealth  v.  Gerade,  145  Pa.  Braham  v.  State,  143  Ala.  28,  38  So. 

St.  289,  291,  296,  22  Atl.  464,  27  Am.  919;   Commonwealth  v.  Johnson,   188 

St.   689;    White   V.    Bailey,    10   Mich.  Mass.    382,    74    N.    E.   939.     But   not 

155 ;     Puryear    v.     Reese,    6    Coldw.  that  the  accused  had  told  the  examin- 

(Tenn.)  21 ;  Commonwealth  v.  John-  ing  physician  that  he  believed  himself 

son,    t88   Mass.   382,   74   N.    E.   939;  going  crazy.     State  v.  Dunn,  179  Mo. 

Cordes  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1908),  95,  77  S.  W.  848. 

112  S.  \V.  943.  "  Heald  v.  Thing,  45  Me.  392.  396. 

'"  People  V.  Nino,  149  X.  Y.  317,  43  "  People  v.  Hill  (N.  Y.  1909),  87  N. 

N.    E.   853;    People   v.    Shattuck,    109  E.  813. 
Cal.  673,  42  Pac.  315.    Cf.   Davis  v. 


164 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


316 


acquired,  be  asked  a  hypothetical  question  upon  facts  occurring- 
prior  to  the  examination,'''  and  the  fact  that  the  witness  fears  his 
opinion  in  answer  to  such  question  may  be  influenced  by  the  facts 
observed  by  him  will  not  exclude  it."*  The  opinion  which  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  expert  must  be  positive  in  form  and  character.  If 
he  cannot  or  will  not  give  such  an  opinion  his  doubts  that  the 
accused  was  sane,  or  his  conjectures  that  he  was  insane,  must  be 
rejected.'^ 

§  164,  Evidence  of  voluntary  intoxication — When  irrelevant. — At 
common  law  voluntary  intoxication,  as  distinct  from  mania  a 
potii,  furnishes  no  excuse,  justification  or  extenuation  for  a  crime 
committed  under  its  influence.'"    Intoxication  as  a  mental  and 


"  People  V.  Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358,  362 ; 
State  V.  Church,  199  Mo.  605,  98  S. 
W.  16;  Commonwealth  v.  Woelfel, 
121  Ky.  48,  88  S.  W.  1061,  28  Ky.  L. 
16;  Ince  V.  State,  "jy  Ark.  426,  93  S. 
W.  65. 

"  People  V.  Schuyler,  43  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  88. 

"'  Sanchez  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  147, 
154.  As  a  general  rule,  neither  books 
of  established  reputation,  whether 
written  by  physicians  or  lawyers,  nor 
statistics  on  the  increase  of  insanity, 
can  be  read  to  the  jury.  Common- 
wealth  V.    Wilson,    I    Gray    (Mass.) 

2Z7,  339- 

'"  4  Bl.  Com.  25,  26,  I  Hale  P.  C.  32 ; 
Bacon's  Maxims,  rule  5 ;  Colee  v. 
State,  75  Ind.  511,  515;  Hopt  v.  Peo- 
ple, 104  U.  S.  631,  633,  26  L.  ed.  873; 
Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind.  550,  556; 
State  V.  Murphy,  118  Mo.  7,  25  S.  W. 
95;  McCook  V.  State,  91  Ga.  740,  17  S. 
E.  1019;  People  V.  Rogers,  18  N.  Y. 
9,  16-23,  72  Am.  Dec.  484;  People  v. 
Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9,  19,  97  Am.  Dec. 
i62n ;  Sanders  v.  State,  94  Ind.  147, 
148;  Wagner  v.  State,  116  Ind.  181, 
186,  18  N.  E.  833;  Conly  v.  Common- 
wealth, 98  Ky.  125,  32  S.  W.  285,  17 


Ky.  L.  678;  People  v.  Miller,  114  Cal. 
10,  45  Pac.  986;  Commonwealth  v. 
Gentry,  5  Pa.  Dist.  703;  Cribb  v. 
State,  118  Ga.  316,  45  S.  E.  396;  State 
V.  Brown,  181  Mo.  192,  79  S.  W.  iiii ; 
State  V.  Hogan,  117  La.  863,  42  So. 
352;  Morris  v.  Territory  (Okla.  Cr. 
App.  1909),  99  Pac.  760.  Elliott  Ev., 
§  2729.  See,  also,  as  sustaining  the 
text,  Cleveland  v.  State,  86  Ala.  i,  5 
So.  426;  People  V.  Blake,  65  Cal.  275, 
4  Pac.  I ;  State  v.  ]\Iowr}-,  37  Kan. 
369,  15  Pac.  282;  State  v.  O'Neil,  51 
Kan.  651,  23  Pac.  287;  24  L.  R.  A. 
555;  State  v.  Lowe,  93  Mo.  547,  5  S. 
W.  889;  State  V.  Murphy,  118  Mo. 
7,  25  S.  W.  95 ;  Cline  v.  State,  43  Ohio 
St.  332,  I  N.  E.  22;  State  v.  Bundy, 
24  S.  Car.  439,  58  Am.  262;  Garner 
V.  State,  28  Fla.  113,  9  So.  835,  29 
Am.  St.  232;  Springfield  v.  State,  96 
Ala.  81,  II  So.  250,  38  Am.  St.  85; 
McCook  V.  State,  91  Ga.  740,  17  S.  E. 
1019;  Aszman  v.  State,  123  Ind.  347, 
24  N.  E.  123,  8  L.  R.  A.  33n:  Shan- 
nahan  v.  Commonwealth,  8  Bush. 
(Ky.)  463,  8  Am.  465:  Flanigan  v. 
People,  86  N.  Y.  554,  40  Am.  556n; 
People  V.  Leonardin,  143  N.  Y.  360, 
38  N.  E.  272;  State  v.  McDaniel,  115 


31/  INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION.  §    1 65 

physical  condition  may  be  easily  simulated.  \\'hile  if  the  accused 
was  really  intoxicated  when  he  committed  the  crime,  if  he  has 
cast  aside  the  restraints  of  sobriety  and  voluntarily  contracted 
madness,  his  drunken  condition  is  not  relevant  to  excuse  him. 
This  is  true  though  he  may  have  been  in  a  frenzy  from  indulgence 
in  drink,  for,  if  he  has  capacity  remaining  to  appreciate  and  rec- 
ognize the  moral  character  of  his  acts,  he  is  responsible.  Hence 
evidence  of  mere  intoxication  voluntarily  acquired,  and  not 
claimed  to  involve  mental  derangement,  existing  when  the  crime 
was  committed,  is  inadmissible  where  its  sole  purpose  and  ob- 
ject are  to  furnish  an  excuse  for  or  extenuation  of  the  crime, 

§  165.  Insensibility  or  insanity  from  indulgence  in  intoxicants  may 
be  shown. — Evidence  of  intoxication  is  sometimes  relevant,  not 
strictly  as  a  defense,  but  to  show  the  condition,  either  mental  or 
physical,  of  the  prisoner.  Thus  if  the  bodily  powers  of  the  accused 
were  so  far  subjugated  by  his  indulgence  in  intoxicating  drink, 
or  in  stupefying  drugs,  that,  at  the  time  of  the  crime  alleged,  he 
was  physically  unable  to  make  the  motions  involved  in  its  com- 
mission, his  drunkenness  may  be  proved  to  show  he  was  not  and 
could  not  have  been  implicated  in  the  crime.'^'  Evidence  of  intox- 
ication at  the  time  of  the  offense,  or  prior  thereto,  is  admissible 
under  a  plea  of  insanity  caused  by  over-indulgence  in  intoxicating 
liquors.  But  the  fact  of  the  prisoner's  intoxication  is  mainly  rele- 
vant to  show  his  mental  condition.  It  is  never  conclusive.  The 
question  of  his  insanity  is  for  the  jur}-  to  determine  upon  all  the 
circumstances.  His  prior  dissipation  and  actual  drunkenness  at 
the  date  of  the  crime  are  merely  facts  for  them  to  consider  in  de- 
termining whether  he  was,  at  the  instant  of  the  crime,  suffering 
from  such  a  degree  of  mental  unsoundness  as  to  destroy  his  capac- 

X.  Car.  S07,  20  S.  E.  622;  Common-  time  he  was  so  incapable,  as  thoiif?h 

wealth  V.   Cleary,   135   Pa.   St.  64,  19  he  had  been  so  rendered  incapable  by 

Atl.   1017;  26  W.  N.  C.  137,  8  L.  R.  paralysis    of    his    limbs    from    some 

A.  30in ;  Terrill  v.  State,  74  Wis.  278,  cause  over  which  he  had  no  control. 

42  X.  W.  243.  The  cause  of  the  incapacity  in  such 

'"'If  a  man  by  voluntary  drunken-  case  is  immaterial;  the  material  ques- 

ness     renders    himself    incapal)le    of  tion  is,  was  he  in  fact  incapable  of 

walking  for  a  limited  time,  it  is  just  doing  the  acts  charged?"     Ingalls  v. 

as  competent  evidence  tending  to  State,  48  Wis.  647,  651,  4  X.  W.  785. 
show  that  he  did  not  walk  during  the 


§  l66  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  318 

ity  to  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong  in  that  particular 
case.'^  A  witness  cannot  express  an  opinion  as  to  whether  the 
accused  can  or  cannot  control  his  appetite  for  intoxicating  drink."'* 

§  166.  Evidence  of  intoxication  as  bearing  on  a  specific  intent  or  on 
premeditation. — Where  the  existence  of  a  particular  specific  intent 
is  necessary  to  constitute  a  given  act  a  crime,  evidence  that  the  ac- 
cused was  intoxicated  when  he  committed  the  alleged  criminal 
act  is  relevant  to  show  the  accused  could  not  have  entertained  the 
intent.^"  This  does  not  mean  that  drunkenness  is  an  excuse  for  the 
commission  of  crime.  If  the  mental  condition  of  the  accused  at 
the  time  of  the  alleged  criminal  act  is  such  that  he  was  incapable 
of  having  any  intent  his  act  is  not  a  crime  at  all.  And  it  is  always 
competent  to  show  his  excessive  intoxication  by  which  the  ac- 
cused was  wholly  though  temporarily  deprived  of  his  reason  if 
it  was  not  indulged  in  to  commit  the  crime  and  such  evidence  is 
for  the  jury  to  consider  in  determining  whether  there  was  an  in- 
tent to  commit  a  crime.®^  So,  where  one  is  indicted  for  assault 
with  intent  to  rob,^-  to  commit  rape,  or  to  do  great  bodily  harm,^^ 
evidence  that  he  was  very  much  intoxicated  at  the  date  of  the 
assault  is  relevant  to  show  that  he  did  not  entertain  the  intent 

"' People   V.   Blake,  65   Cal.   275,   4  v.  State,  130  Ga.  361,  60  S.  E.   1005, 

Pac.  I ;  Erwin  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  8  L.  R.  A.  33,  note. 

700.  ^Williams  v.  State,  81  Ala.  i,  i  So. 

"Goodwin    V.    State,    96    Ind.    550,  179,  60  Am.  133;   Cleveland  v.  State, 

566.  86  Ala.  I,  5  So.  426;  People  v.  Wil- 

*"  State  V.  Zorn,  22  Ore.  591,  30  Pac.  Hams,  43  Cal.  344;  People  v.  Vincent, 

371;     Commonwealth    v.    Hagenlock,  95  Cal.  425;  30  Pac.  581;  Chrisman  v. 

140  Mass.   125,  3  N.  E.  36;  Cline  v.  State,  54  Ark  283,  15  S.  W.  889,  26 

State,  43  Ohio   St.  332,  i   N.  E.  22;  Am.  St.  44;  People  v.  Lane,  100  Cal. 

Reg.  V.  Moore,  3  C.  &  K.  319,  16  Jur.  379,  34   Pac.   856 ;    People  v.   Young, 

750;    People  V.   Rogers,   18  X.   Y.  9,  102  Cal.  411,  36  Pac.  770;  Schlencker 

17,  72  Am.  Dec.  484;  Wood  v.  State,  v.   State,  9  Neb.  241,   i   X.   \V.  857; 

34  Ark.   341,  36  Am.    13;    Garner  v.  O'Grady  v.  State,  36  Neb.  320,  54  N. 

State,  28  Fla.  113,  155,  9  So.  835,  29  W.   556;   Wilcox  v.   State,  94  Tenn. 

Am.    St.  232;   Aszman  v.   State,   123  106,  28  S.  W.  312;  Clore  v.  State,  26 

Ind.  347,  24  N.  E.  123,  8  L.  R.  A.  33n;  Tex.  App.  624,  10  S.  W.  242. 

People  V.  Walker,  38  Mich.  156;  Peo-  "Scott  v.   State,   12  Tex.   App.   31, 

pie  V.   Odell,   I    Dak.    197,  46  N.  W.  39;  Keeton  v.  Commonwealth,  92  Ky. 

601;   Mooney  v.   State,  33  Ala.  419;  522,  18  S.  W.  359,  13  Ky.  L.  748. 

Chrisman  v.   State,  54  Ark.  283,  288,  *^  State    v.    Garvey,    11    ]\Iinn.    154. 

15  S.  W.  889,  26  Am.  St.  44;  Robinson  Contra,  Jeffries  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App. 

598,  605. 


319  INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION.  §    1 66 

charged.**  If,  from  such  evidence  the  jury  are  convinced  the  ac- 
cused was  so  intoxicated  as  to  be  unable  to  form  the  specific  in- 
tent, a  conviction  of  any  crime  other  than  simple  assault  must  be 
reversed.  The  specific  intent  to  deprive  the  owner  of  his  property, 
as  well  as  the  taking  away,  are  essential  ingredients  of  larceny. 
If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  accused  while  carrying  away  the  goods 
was  too  drunk  to  entertain  the  intent  of  depriving  the  owner  of 
his  property,  he  must  be  acquitted. ^^  So,  the  defendant's  intoxi- 
cation is  relevant  to  disprove  the  felonious  intention  which  must 
be  present  in  the  act  of  breaking  in  and  entering  to  constitute 
burglary.*^  In  all  these  cases  the  question  of  intent  is  for  the  jury 
alone  and  the  intoxication  of  the  accused,  however  great,  is  never 
conclusive  but  is  merely  a  circumstance  for  the  jury  to  consider 
in  determining  the  intent.  Evidence  of  intoxication  may  be  rele- 
vant to  show  the  absence  of  guilty  knowledge.  Thus,  the  existence 
of  knowledge  of  the  falsity  of  the  testimony  given,  when  perjury 
has  been  committed,  or  of  the  spurious  character  of  the  notes  or 
money  forged  in  the  crime  of  counterfeiting  may  both  be  rebutted 
by  evidence  that  the  mind  of  the  accused  was  so  overcome  by  drink 
that  he  did  not  possess  the  guilty  knowledge  necessary  to  these 
crimes.**  But  where  some  act,  innocent  in  itself,  as  for  example, 
voting  more  than  once  at  an  election,  is  made  criminal  by  statutes 
if  voluntarily  done,***  or  where  no  specific  intent  is  required  by 
law,  evidence  of  intoxication  is  irrelevant.''"  Sometimes  by  statute 
the  existence  of  a  premeditated  design  to  cause  death  on  the  part- 
of  the  accused  is  essential  to  constitute  a  homicide  murder  in  the 
first  degree.  In  such  case  drunkenness  is  relevant  and  may  be 
considered  by  the  jury  to  determine  the  mental  condition  of  the 

"  State   V.    Donovan,   61    Iowa   369,  *^  See   §  397.     Breaking  in  and  cn- 

16    N.    W.    206;    State    v.    Fiske,    63  tering. 

Conn.  388,  392,  28  Atl.  572;   State  v.  '' Pigman  v.  State,  14  Ohio  555,  557, 

Gut,    13    Minn.    341,    361;    People    v.  45    Am.    Dec.    558    (counterfeiting); 

Harris,  29  Cal.  678,  683.  Lytle  v.   State,  31    Ohio   St.   196,  200 

'^Ingalls  V.  State,  48  Wis.  647,  651,  (perjury). 

4  X.  W.  785;  Wood  V.  State,  34  Ark.  *"  State  v.  Welch,  21   jNIinn.  22,  26- 

.341.  36  Am.  13;  People  v.  Walker,  38  28. 

Mich.  156.     Contra,  Dawson  v.  State,  ""  People   v.    Marseiler,   70   Cal.   98, 

16  Ind.  428,  439,  79  Am.  Dec.  439,  36  lOO. 
Am.  13. 


§   1 66  CRnnxAL  evidence.  320 

accused,  that  is.  to  ascertain  whether  he  liad  mental  capacity  to 
form  a  premechtated  design,  and  from  the  fact  of  his  drunkenness, 
if  excessive,  they  may  infer  that  his  intellect  was  so  befogged  that 
the  formation  or  execution  of  a  deliberate  intention  or  a  premed- 
itated design  to  kill  was  impossible.''^  In  other  words  an  allega- 
tion that  the  accused  acted  with  premeditation  or  deliberation  lets 
in  evidence  that  he  was  intoxicated  at  the  time.  But  proof  of  his 
intoxication  does  not,  as  matter  of  law,  rebut  a  presumption  of 
premeditation  arising  in  the  circumstances,  nor  is  an  instruction 
to  that  effect  warranted.  It  is  only  a  circumstance  for  the  jury, 
and  its  effect  in  negativing  premeditation  is  for  them,  as  they 
measure  the  degree  of  intoxication  upon  all  the  facts. ^-  Evidence 
of  voluntary  intoxication,  not  producing  complete  insensibility, 
is  sometimes  relevant  and  may  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  de- 
termining the  meaning  of,  and  motive  for,  words  uttered,  as,  for 
example,  to  determine  whether  threatening  language  used  by  the 
accused,  or  the  victim  of  a  homicide  was  the  outcome  of  deliberate 
h.atred,  or  the  idle  vaporings  of  a  drunken  man.''^ 

^^  167.  Mode  of  proving  or  disproving  intoxication. — A  non-expert 
witness  may  testify  that  the  accused  or  some  other  person  was 
intoxicated  on  a  given  date,'**  and  that  he  was  habitually  intem- 

^^  Garner  v.  State,  28  Fla.  113,  155,  pie  v.  Rogers,  r8  N.  Y.  9,  26,  ^2  Am. 

9  So.  835,  29  Am.  St.  232 ;  Shannahan  Dec.  484 ;  Keenan  v.  Commonwealth, 

V.  Commonwealth,  8  Bush  (Ky.)  463,  44  Pa.  St.  55,  84  Am.  Dec.  414;  State 

8  Am.  465;  Boswell's  Case,  20  Gratt.  v.  McCants,  i  Speers   (S.  Car.)   384; 

(Va.)  860;  Hopt  V.  People,  104  U.  S.  State  v.  Robinson,  20  W.  Va.  713,  43 

631,  26  L.  ed.  873;  State  v.  Donovan,  Am.  799;  State  v.  Hertzog,  55  W.  Va. 

61   Iowa  369,  16  N.  W.  206;   Scott  V.  74,  46  S.  E.  792. 

State,    \2    Tex.    App.    31 ;    People    v.  "■  People  v.  Mills,  98  N.  Y.  176,  182. 

Cummins,   47   JNIich.   334 ;    Tidwell   v.  °"  People  v.  Rogers,  18  N.  Y.  9,  19, 

State,   70  Ala.  :i,2, ;    Kelly  v.    State,   3  'j2  Am.  Dec.  484 ;  Friery  v.  People,  54 

Sm.    &    Isl.    (Miss.)     518;    Common-  Barb.     (N.    Y.)    319,    326;    Hopt    v. 

wealth    V.    Dorsey,    103    Mass.    412;  People,  104  U.  S.  631,  26  L.  ed.  873; 

Haile   v.    State,    11    Humph.    (Tenn.)  State  v.   Welch,  21    Minn.  22;    Davis 

153;  People  V.  Belencia,  21   Cal.  544;  v.    State,   25    Ohio    St.   369;    State   v. 

State  V.  Johnson,  40  Conn.  136;  Rob-  Johnson,  40  Conn.  136. 

erts    V.    People,    19    Mich.    401,    417;  "'People  v.  Sanford,  43  Cal.  29,  Z'^, 

State   V.    Mewry,   iy   Kan.   369,   yjT,  33;  People  v.  Monteith,  T^  Cal.  7,  14 

Bernhardt   v.    State.    82    Wis.    22,,    51  Pac.  ZTi'-  People  v.  Eastwood,  14  X. 

X.  W.  1009:  Malone  v.  State,  49  Ga.  Y.  562;   State  v.  Pierce,  65  Iowa  85, 

210;  Cluck  v.  State,  40  Ind.  263;  Peo-  21    X.    W.    195;    Commonwealth    v. 


321  INSANITY    AND    INTOXICATION.  §§    167-168 

perate.""  Evidence  of  the  conduct  of  the  accused  on  previous  oc- 
casions when  he  was  intoxicated  is  competent  as  bearing  on  his 
intoxication  when  he  committed  the  crime  charged,  and  as  illus- 
trating his  usual  manner  of  acting  when  drunk.^"  The  witness 
will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  that  the  defendant's  intoxication 
was  or  was  not  sufficient  to  prevent  the  formation  of  intent  or 
premeditation,  as  that  is  a  question  for  the  jury  alone.^'  It  is  not 
relevant  for  the  defense  to  show  that  the  prisoner  had  liquor  in 
his  house  which  he  might  have  drunk,**^  or  that  he  was  easily  af- 
fected by  liquor  and  had  drunk  more  than  usual, ^^  or  to  prove 
experiments  made  with  liquor  which  is  not  positively  identified 
by  independent  evidence  as  the  liquor  drunk  by  the  accused  prior 
to  the  crime/"*' 

§  168.  Morphine  habit. — Though  habitual  indulgence  in  mor- 
phine is  by  no  means  as  common  as  indulgence  in  intoxicating 
liquors,  the  use  of  morphine,  cocaine  and  similar  drugs  is  suffic- 
iently common  to  justify  an  inquiry  into  what  circumstances  evi- 
dence of  their  use  is  competent.  The  habitual  use  of  morphine 
may  be  shown,  and,  if  proved,  is  a  circumstance  for  the  jury  to 
■consider  in  determining  the  mental  condition  of  the  accused.  If 
on  all  the  circumstances  they  shall  determine  that  the  faculty  of 
understanding  the  moral  quality  of  the  act  has  been  destroyed  by 
the  use  of  the  deleterious  drugs  they  should  acquit.  Many  petty 
crimes  spring  from  the  morphine  habit.  Those  who  use  it  habit- 
ually will  resort  to  any  method,  however  criminal,  to  attain  it,  such 
as  forging  a  prescription  for  it,  or  stealing  it  from  the  office  of  a 
physician.  In  all  such  cases,  evidence  of  experts  is  competent  to 
show  the  peculiar  symptoms  which  are  inseparable  from  the  con- 
tinued use  of  the  drug.^"^ 

Sturtivant,    117    Mass.    122,    19    Am.  175.        Contra,      Commonwealth      v. 

40in;  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  269,  n  8.  Cloonen,  151  Pa.  St.  605,  25  Atl.  145. 

■"^Gallagher  v.   People,   120  III.   179,  "Armor  v.  State,  63  Ala.  173,   176. 

182,  II  N.  E.  335;  Smith  v.  State,  55  "'Commonwealth    v.    Cloonen,     151 

Ala.   I,   10;   Tatum  v.   State,  63  Ala.  Pa.  St.  605,  25  Atl.  145. 

147,    150;    Heningburg   v.    State,    153  ""State  v.  Smith,  49  Conn.  376. 

Ala.  13,  45  So.  246;  State  v.  Cather,  '"*  People  v.  Slack,  90  Alich.  448,  51 

121  Iowa  106,  96  N.  W.  722.  N.  W.  533. 

**  Upstone   V.    People,    109    Til.    169,  ""  System   of    Legal    Medicine,    vol. 


2,  p.  207. 


21 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS. 


§  169.  Foundation  of  the  doctrine  and 
classification  of  communica- 
tions. 

170.  Executive  communications  and 

transactions. 

171.  Communications  to  police  offi- 

cials. 

172.  Communications    to    attorneys- 

at-law. 

173.  Communications  made  by  or  to 

the  agent  of  the  attorney. 

174.  Character  and  date  of  the  com- 

munications. 

175.  Communications  made  in  con- 

templation of  crime. 

176.  Permanency  of  the  privilege — 

Waiver. 

177.  Writings,  when  privileged. 

178.  Communications      to      spiritual 

adviser. 

179.  Communications     passing     be- 

tween   medical    practitioners 
and  their  patients. 

180.  Death  of  the  patient — Purpose 

of  the  communication — Con- 
templated crime. 


§  181. 


85. 


87. 


T89. 
190. 

191. 

192. 

193- 


Communications  made  during 
an  examination  to  detect  or 
ascertain  sanity. 

Secrecy  of  telegrams. 

Indecency  of  the  facts  to  be 
proved. 

Privileged  communications  be- 
tween husband  and  wife. 

Husband  and  wife  as  witnesses 
in   criminal   proceedings. 

Statutory  competency  of  hus- 
band and  wife. 

Confidential  communications 
between  husband  and  wife. 

Husband  or  wife  of  co-defend- 
ant as  a  witness  for  or 
against  his  associate  in  crime 
— Testimony  of  husband  or 
wife  on  trial  of  a  third  per- 
son tending  to  criminate. 

Valid  marriage  is  necessary. 

Privilege  as  relating  to  the  evi- 
dence to  judicial  officers. 

Privilege  as  relating  to  grand 
jurors. 

Statutory  regulations  of  the 
competency  of  grand  jurors. 

Evidence  of  traverse  jurors. 


§  169.  Foundation  of  the  doctrine  and  classification  of  communica- 
tions.— The  welfare  of  society  and  the  proper  and  orderly  adminis- 
tration of  justice  require  that  certain  evidence,  or,  more  correctly 
speaking,  the  evidence  of  certain  classes  of  witnesses,  shall  be  ab- 
solutely inadmissible,  in  criminal  trials.  The  advantage  which 
would  be  gained  in  punishing  any  particular  crime  would  be  more 


322 


^2^  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    1 69 

than  counterbalanced  by  the  injury  to  society  as  a  whole.  Thus 
it  is  recognized  that,  because  of  the  complexity  of  modern  juris- 
prudence, both  criminal  and  civil,  any  person  who  has  to  defend 
himself  against  a  criminal  accusation,  or  to  protect  or  enforce  a 
right,  must  secure  and  receive  the  assistance  of  counsel  who,  be- 
cause of  their  skill  and  experience,  are  fitted  to  aid  and  advise 
him.  To  enable  members  of  the  legal  profession  to  render  ef- 
ficient aid,  and  to  bring  the  matters  entrusted  to  them  to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion,  it  is  usually  an  absolute  necessity  that  the 
client  should  make  a  full  and  complete  disclosure  of  every  fact 
bearing  on  the  criminal  transaction.  It  is  a  maxim  of  the  crimi- 
nal law  that  no  man  can  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself. 
Hence,  no  fact  or  admission  can  with  justice  be  used  against  the 
accused  which  he  was  under  the  necessity  of  imparting  confiden- 
tially to  his  counsel.  The  law  regards  it  as  extremely  wise  to 
encourage  and  sustain  the  high  and  unlimited  confidence  which 
should  exist  between  persons  who  bear  the  peculiar  and  intimate 
relations  towards  one  another  of  attorney  and  client.  Upon  simi- 
lar considerations  the  knowledge  acquired  by  a  physician  while 
attending  a  patient,  by  a  clergyman  during  the  performance  of 
his  spiritual  duties,  or  the  communications  passing  between  hus- 
band and  wife,  are  also  privileged.  Writers  upon  the  law  of  evi- 
dence have  divided  privileged  communications  into  four  classes, 
viz..  professional,  judicial,  political  and  social.  In  the  first  class 
are  included  disclosures  to  attorneys,  physicians  and  priests. 
Communications  privileged  because  of  their  judicial  character 
comprise  the  oral  deliberations  of  grand  and  trial  juries,  the  evi- 
dence given  before  the  grand  jury,  communications  passing  be- 
tween judges,  and  all  information  in  the  hands  of  prosecuting 
officials  or  others  which  leads  to  the  detection  or  punishment  of 
crime.  The  third  class,  or  political  communications,  is  composed 
of  the  transactions  of  the  executive  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment and  all  communications  passing  between  the  departmental 
officials.  By  social  communications  are  meant  the  communica- 
tions passing  between  husl)and  and  wife  in  the  intimacy  and  con- 
fidence of  tlie  marriage  relation. 

These  restrictions  upon  the  capacity  of  certain  classes  of  per- 
sons as  regards  the  evidence  which  they  will  be  allowed  to  give, 
are  not  founded  on  any  peculiar  respect  which  the  law  entertains 


§  170  CRIMIXAL  EVIDENCE.  324 

for  their  calling  or  character.  They  have  their  origin  in  the  de- 
sire to  procure  a  pure  and  unembarrassed  administration  of  the 
law,  to  subserve  justice,  and  to  protect  the  innocent,  while  secur- 
ing the  punishment  of  the  guilty. 

§  170.  Executive  communications  and  transactions. — The  com- 
mon law  has  always  regarded  as  privileged  all  information  in  the 
possession  of  executive  officials  as  such ;  and  has  uniformly  de- 
clined to  compel  them  to  divulge  facts  of  which  they  have  ob- 
tained knowledge  in  any  official  capacity.  This  rule  has  been 
most  frequently  invoked  in  civil  cases. ^  In  this  country  the  various 
executive  departments  of  the  government,  both  federal  and  state, 
acting  under  the  power  conferred  by  the  legislative  branch  to 
formulate  rules  for  the  proper  conduct  of  departmental  affairs, 
have  forbidden  their  subordinate  officials  to  disclose  official  in- 
formation, unless  permitted  or  required  to  do  so  by  their  official 
superiors.  The  true  rule,  therefore,  now  is  that  the  chief  execu- 
tive officer  is  the  sole  judge  of  the  propriety  of  refusing  to  testify 
or  producing  papers  and  of  permitting  his  subordinates  to  do  so.- 

The  privilege  as  regards  executive  communications  is  not  ab- 
solute in  the  sense  that  professional  communications  are  abso- 
lutely privileged  and  cannot  be  divulged.  Thus  the  governor  of 
a  state  may  or  he  may  not  with  perfect  propriety  refuse  to  state 
his  reasons  for  signing  a  bill  passed  by  the  legislature  or  any 
facts  which  were  communicated  to  him  in  connection  with  his 

'  Thompson   v.    German    Valley    R.  court  where  obedience  to  the  orders 

Co.,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  Ill,  113;  Totten  v.  of    these   courts    would    require    such 

United  States,  92  U.  S.  105,  107,  2^  L.  officials   to   disobey   the  rules   of   the 

ed.  605.     (Action  to  recover  for  serv-  general  government. 

ices  as  spy  during  rebellion  dismissed.)  "i  Burr's  Trial,  182;  Gray  v.  Pent- 

Huttman,    In    re,    70    Fed.    699,    705.  land,  2  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  22,,  31.  In  which 

In  this  case  the  refusal  to  permit  an  it  was  held  that  parol  evidence  could 

official  of  the  United   States  internal  not  be  given  of  a  libellous  deposition 

revenue  to  testify  in  a  state  court  for  which  had  been  sent  to  the  governor 

the  trial  of  criminals  to  the  contents  of    Pennsylvania    containing    charges 

of  the  records  of  his  office,  was  based  against  an  officer  he  had  appointed  in 

upon  the  regulations  of  the  commis-  an  action  for  libel,  though  the  court 

sioner  of  internal  revenue  forbidding  had  refused  a  subpoena  duces  tecum, 

the  disclosure  of  these  records.     And  and  the  governor  could   exercise  his 

the  court   held  that   internal   revenue  own  discretion  in  producing  the  depo- 

officials  were  not  subject  to  the  state  sition. 


325  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  8    I?! 

action  in  the  premises.  And  no  valid  reason  exists  why  he  may 
not  testify  when  or  by  whom  it  was  dehvered  to  him,  for  that  is 
a  bare  fact  implying  no  action  on  his  part.  The  propriety  and 
advisability  of  testifying  to  any  fact  which  the  executive  official 
may  have  acquired  while  acting  in  an  official  capacity  are,  how- 
ever, always  exclusively  for  his  determination.^ 

§  171.  Communications  to  police  officials. — The  proper  adminis- 
tration of  justice  and  the  protection  of  society  against  criminals 
imperatively  require  that  persons  should  be  encouraged  in  per- 
forming the  duty,  incumbent  upon  all,  of  communicating  to  the 
proper  officials  any  information  which  they  may  possess  regard- 
ing the  commission  of  a  crime,  or  the  identity  or  whereabouts  of 
the  criminal.  To  this  end  the  disclosure  in  court  of  the  names  of 
persons  who  gave  such  information,  either  by  a  police  official 
who  made  the  arrest,*  by  the  informer  himself,  or  by  any  other 
person,  will  not  be  permitted. ° 

Under  the  original  rule  not  only  was  the  name  of  the  informer 
and  the  name  of  the  magistrate  or  other  person  to  whom  informa- 
tion was  given  excluded,  but  every  communication  made,  or  act 
done,  leading  up  to  the  detection  of  a  crime,  or  to  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  criminal,  was  excluded  from  evidence  in  a  criminal 
trial."  This  is  doubtless  a  just  rule  in  civil  cases  where  the  ques- 
tion of  guilt  is  involved  collaterally,  as  in  an  action  for  slander 
or  libel  contained  in  a  communication  to  the  police.     But  when 

^Appeal    of    Hartranft,   85    Pa.    St.  16    Me.   293,    295,    33   Am.    Dec.   665. 

433,  447,  27  Am.  66711.  "The  general  rule  is  that  persons  en- 

*  United  States  v.   Moses,  4  Wash,  gaged  in  the  detection  of   crime  are 

C.    C.    (N.    S.)    726,    27    Fed.    Cases  not  bound  to  disclose  the  sources  of 

15825.                                                        .  the  information  which  led  to  the  ap- 

^  Attorney-General  v.  Briant,  15  M.  prehension  of  the  prisoner.  The  reason 
&  W.  169,  IS  L.  J.  Exch.  265;  Rex  v.  for  the  rule  is  that  such  disclosure 
Akers,  6  Esp.  i25n ;  Rex  v.  Hardy,  24  can  be  of  no  importance  to  the  de- 
How.  St.  Tr.  199;  Rex  v.  Watson,  32  fense,  and  may  be  highly  prejudicial 
How.  St.  Tr.  I,  105,  2  Stark.  104,  116,  to  the  public  in  the  administration  of 
136;  State  V.  Brown,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  justice  by  deterring  persons  from 
380,  36  Atl.  458.  The  owner  of  stolen  making  similar  disclosures."  People 
property  is  not  bound  to  disclose,  on  v.  Laird,  102  Mich.  135,  60  N.  W. 
the  witness  stand,  the  names  of  per-  457. 

sons  who  wrote  to  him  in  regard  to  "  Rex  v.   Watson,  32  How.    St.   Tr. 

his  missing  property.     State  v.  Sopcr,  i,  105,  2  Stark.  104,  116. 


§172  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  326 

the  question  arises  in  a  criminal  trial,  and  the  information  is  ma- 
terial to  determine  the  defendant's  innocence,  it  would  seem  both 
reasonable  and  just  that  the  necessity  and  desirability  of  the  dis- 
closure and  the  question  whether  the  public  interests  would  be 
benefited  or  would  suffer,  should  be  solely  for  the  judicial  discre- 
tion upon  the  circumstances  of  the  case.'' 

§  172.  Communications  to  attorn eys-at-law. — At  common  law  an 
attorney  could  not  be  compelled,  nor  would  he  be  allowed,  to  dis- 
close any  communication  made  to  him  by  a  client,  or  the  advice 
given  by  him  in  the  course  of  his  professional  employment.*  In 
very  many,  if  not  in  a  majority  of  the  states,  this  rule  has  been 
confirmed  by  statute.  It  is  also  often  expressly  provided  that 
the  privileged  character  of  the  communication  may  be  waived  by 
the  client.**  The  modern  tendency  of  the  courts  is  to  give  the 
rule  its  fullest  possible  application,  and  to  apply  it  in  both  civil 
and  criminal  proceedings,  not  only  to  oral  or  written  communi- 
cations passing  between  attorney  and  client,  but  to  all  information 
which  is  acquired  by  the  former  because  of  the  existence  of  the 
professional  relation.  It  matters  not  whether  the  information 
has  been  derived  from  the  client's  words,  actions  or  personal  ap- 
pearance. Thus,  where  the  accused  was  on  trial  for  stealing  a 
quantity  of  current  silver  coin,  it  was  held  error  to  compel  his 

'  People  V.  Davis,  52  Mich.  569,  573,  practice  sign  the  complaint  and  testify 

18  N.  W.  362;  Reg.  V.  Richardson,  3  as  a  witness. 

F.  &  F.  693;  People  v.  Laird,  102  *  Best  on  Ev.,  §§  53,  581;  Reg.  v. 
Mich.  135,  139,  60  N.  W.  457;  United  Hankins,  2  C.  &  K.  823,  825  (a  writ- 
States  V.  Moses,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  ing  in  the  hands  of  the  attorney)  ; 
S.)  726,  27  Fed.  Cases  15825.  The  Rex  v.  Dixon,  3  Burr.  1687;  i  Phill. 
matter  is  now  sometimes  regulated  by  on  Ev.,  171 ;  Casey  v.  State,  Zl  Ark. 
statute,  Cal.  Code.  Civ.  Proc.  §  1881 ;  (y"],  83,  84.  See  civil  cases  Underhill 
Colo.,  Acts  1883,  p.  289;  Minn.  Stat.,  on  Ev.,  §  169  ct  scq. 
§  5094.  The  disclosure  of  the  name  "  See  Tennessee  Code,  1884,  §  4748, 
of  the  informer  may  be  necessary  in  a  p.  897 ;  Georgia  Code,  1882,  p.  987, 
case  where  the  accused  claims  he  is  §  3797 ;  Pennsylvania,  2  Pur.  Dig.  pp. 
the  victim  of  false  accusations  by  an  1493,  1495 ;  California  Code  Civ.  Proc. 
enemy,  or  where  he  claims  he  is  the  §  1881 ;  Indiana  Rev.  St.  1881,  §§  497, 
victim  of  a  groundless  arrest  or  per-  1796;  Missouri  Rev.  St.,  1879,  P-  690, 
secution  by  the  police.  And  the  rule  §  4017;  Wisconsin  An.  St.  1898,  § 
of  silence  is  in  modern  times  of  very  4076;  Texas  Code  Cr.  Proc.  1906,  § 
little  importance  where  a  complainant  jj^. 
must   imder   local    rules   of   statutory 


327  PRIV'ILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    1/2 

attorney  to  testify  to  the  fact  that  he  had  received  silver  coin  as 
a  part  of  his  retainer/"  And  in  some  states  the  statute  expressly 
provides  that  all  information  coming  to  the  attorney  and  relating 
to  the  matter  upon  which  he  has  been  consulted  by  the  client  is 
privileged."  The  rules  and  statutes  regulating  privileged  com- 
munications are  generally  regarded,  both  by  legislators  and  by 
the  courts,  as  applicable  to  the  examination  of  witnesses  in  crimi- 
nal trials,  even  where  this  is  not  expressly  provided  for  in  the 
statute.^"  An}^  communication  which  passes  between  the  client 
and  the  attorney  or  between  the  attorney  and  the  witnesses  for  the 
client*  before  the  trial  is  usually  privileged.  It  is  not  only  the 
right  of  the  accused  to  have  his  witnesses  interviewed  by  his 
attorney  before  the  trial,  but  it  is  the  duty  of  the  attorney  to 
confer  with  the  witnesses  for  his  client  and  ascertain  what  they 
will  testify.  Anything  passing  between  them,  aside  from  the 
privilege,  is  not  material,  but  it  is  always  material  and  proper  to 
show  that  the  attorney  attempted  to  corrupt  or  influence  a  wit- 
ness to  color  his  testimony  in  favor  of  the  accused  or  to  testify 
falsely;  and  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  the  privilege  could 
be  pleaded  by  the  accused  to  protect  him  against  evidence  that  his 
attorney  had  with  his  consent  attempted  to  bribe  a  witness  to 
testify  falsely  or  to  absent  himself  from  the  reach  of  process.^" 
The  fact  that  the  client,  being  an  accomplice,  turns  state's  evi- 
dence does  not  waive  the  privilege.  Even  such  a  course  on  his 
part  does  not  open  his  attorney's  lips  as  regards  professional 
communications." 

'"  State  V.  Dawson,  go  Mo.  149,  154,  483.    Cf.  People  v.  West,  106  Cal.  89, 

I  S.  W.  827 ;  State  v.  Douglass,  20  W.  39  Pac.  207. 

Va.  770,  781.  "Eads  v.   State    (Wyo.   1909),   loi 

'^  Texas    Code    Cr.    Proc,    1906,    §  Pac.  946. 

773-  "  Sutton  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  490. 

'"Wharton  Cr.  Ev.  §  496,  ct  scq.;  Contra,  Alderman  v.  People,  4  Mich. 
Milan  v.  State,  24  Ark.  346,  355 ;  Ben-  414,  69  Am.  Dec.  321.  A  letter  writ- 
edict  V.  State,  44  Ohio  St.  679,  688,  11  ten  by  an  attorney  for  the  defendant 
X.  E.  125;  State  v.  Hazleton,  15  La.  was  inadmissible,  since  if  it  was  auth- 
Ann.  72;  Hernandez  v.  State,  18  Tex.  orized  by  the  defendant  it  was  priv- 
App.  134,  152,  51  Am.  295;  Poison  v.  ileged,  and  if  not,  it  was  merely  the 
State,  137  Ind.  519,  35  N.  E.  907;  Gra-  act  of  a  third  party.  Taylor  v.  State, 
iiam  V.  People,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  468,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  381,  97  S.  W.  474. 


§    173  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  328 

§  173.    Communications  made  by  or  to  the  agent  of  the  attorney. — 

The  communication  need  not  have  been  made  directly  to  a  mem- 
ber of  the  legal  profession.  But  it  must  have  been  made  to  a  per- 
son who,  whatever  his  character,  was  actually  occupying  the 
position  of  legal  adviser.  If  a  communication  was  made  to  an 
attorney  whom  the  accused  has  requested  to  act  for  him,  and  who 
has  not  at  once  expressly  refused  to  do  it  will  be  privileged, 
though  he  subsequently  refuse  to  act.^^  The  rule  does  not  re- 
quire that  a  retainer  should  have  been  paid,^''  or  any  particular 
form  of  application  made  to  the  attorney,  if  he  was  consulted 
with  the  intention  of  obtaining  his  professional  services  atid  he 
by  implication  or  expressly  has  consented  to  act.  A  communica- 
tion to  or  advice  from  the  representative  of  an  attorney  is  no  less 
privileged  than  a  communication  by  or  to  the  attorney.  Thus, 
a  clerk,  interpreter,  or  agent  of  the  attorney,  will  not  be  allowed 
to  testify  to  any  communication  made  to  him  in  a  professional 
capacity  by  a  client  of  his  employer.^'^  One  present  during  a 
conversation  between  attorney  and  client,  but  who  was  not  the 
medium  of  conversation  or  who  did  not  stand  in  a  position  of 
peculiar  confidence  to  the  client  may  testify  to  what  he  saw  and 
heard. ^^  Thus  a  friend  of  the  accused  who  took  him  to  the  office 
of  a  lawyer  may  testify  to  what  passed  between  the  lawyer  and 
the  accused  at  the  interview.^^  So,  also,  a  mere  bystander  who 
took  absolutely  no  part  in  the  conversation  between  the  attorney 
and  the  client  may  testify  to  what  he  heard  though  all  his  knowl- 
edge of  what  was  said  was  acquired  by  reason  of  the  carelessness 

^^Peek  V.  Eoone,  90  Ga.  ■j6-],  17  S.  Hoy  v.  Morris,  13  Gray  (Mass.)  519, 

E.  66,  67;  Young  v.  State,  65  Ga.  525.  74  Am.  Dec.  650;  Holman  v.  Kimball, 

"  Bacon   v.   Frisbie,   80   N.   Y.   394,  22    Vt.    555.      The    presence    of    the 

399,  36  Am.  627n ;  Thayer  v.  Thayer,  mother  of  a  prosecutrix  in  a  trial  for 

lOi  Mass.  Ill,  100  Am.  Dec.  iion.  the  crime  of  seduction  at  an  interview 

"Underbill    on    Evidence,    §     169;  betw^een  her  daughter  and  the  daugh- 

Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  zi,  68,  7  So.  ter's    attorney    does    not    destroy    the 

302 ;  I  Green,  on  Evid.,  §  239 ;  Studdy  privilege  as  the  daughter's  youth,  in- 

V.  Sanders,  2  Dowl.  &  R.  347.  nocence  and  modesty  would  impera- 

^'  People  V.  Buchanan,  145  N.  Y.  l,  tively  require  the  mother  to  be  pres- 

26,  39  N.  E.  846,  64  N.  Y.   St.  427;  ent  at  the  interview.    Bowers  v.  State, 

State  V.  Perry,  4  Idaho  224,  38  Pac.  29  Ohio  St.  542,  546. 

655;   Tyler  v.   Hall,   106  Mo.  313,   17  "People  v.  Buchanan,  145  N.  Y.  i, 

S.  W.  319,  27  Am.  St.  327n;  Walker  26,  39  N.  E.  846. 
V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  176,  181,  182; 


329  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    1/3 

and  inadvertence  of  the  parties  to  the  conversation  in  overlooking 
the  fact  that  the  witness  was  within  hearing  distance. "''  And, 
generally,  every  person  of  whom  legal  advice  is  asked  may  be 
compelled  to  testify  regarding  information  divulged,  if,  at  that 
time  and  in  reference  to  that  matter,  he  did  not  occupy  the  posi- 
tion of  an  attorney."^ 

The  authorities  are  not  harmonious  upon  the  question  whether 
communications  are  privileged  which  are  made  to  a  person  who 
is  not  in  fact  an  attorney  where  they  were  made  because  the  party 
making  them  supposed  the  person  to  whom  they  were  made  was 
an  attorney. 

It  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts  and  in  England  that  com- 
munications though  of  a  confidential  character  made  to  a  person 
whom  the  communicant  supposed  was  an  attorney  are  not  privi- 
leged where  in  fact  that  person  was  not  an  attorney.-"  But  the 
contrary  has  been  held  in  other  jurisdictions.  Thus  it  has  been 
held  that  confidential  communications  of  facts  constituting  a  con- 
fession of  crime  made  in  reliance  on  the  supposed  relation  of  at- 
torney and  client  should  be  excluded  upon  the  plainest  principles 
of  justice  whether  the  person  assuming  to  act  as  such  is  an  at- 
torney or  not.-^ 

So  where  a  man  though  never  actually  admitted  to  the  bar  has 
practiced  for  many  years  before  justices  of  the  peace,  communi- 
cations made  to  him  by  the  accused  not  merely  as  a  friend  but 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  his  professional  advice  and  assistance 
are  privileged."'*  It  is  very  well  settled  that  communications 
between  an  employer  and   a  confidential   clerk  or  steward  are 

-"  State   V.    Perry,   4    Idaho   224,   38  Walker  v.    State,    19  Tex.   App.  ,176, 

Pac.  655.  181;  In  re  Monroe,  20  N.  Y.  82,  84; 

^  "It  is  equally  well  established  law  Schubkagel  v.   Dierstein,   131    Pa.   St. 

that     an     interpreter,     intermediary,  46,  54,   18  Atl.  1059,  6  L.  R.  A.  48111 

agent  or  clerk  of  an  attorney,  through  (law  student)  ;  Brungger  v.  Smith,  49 

whom    communications    between    at-  Fed.  124. 

torney  and  client  are  made,  stands  up-  "Barnes  v.  Harris,  7  Cush.  (Mass.) 

on  the  same  footing  as  his  principal,  576,  578,  54  Am.  Dec.  734;  Fountain 

and   will   not  be   allowed   to    divulge  v.  Young,  6  Esp.  113. 

any    fact    coming    to    his    knowledge  ^  People  v.    Barker,   60   ]\Iich.   2yj, 

as    the    conduit    of    information    be-  27  X.  W.  539,  i  Am.  St.  50m. 

tween    them.      But    the    rule    extends  -''  Benedict  v.  State,  44  Ohio  St  679, 

no  further  than  this."     In   Hawcs  v.  688,  11  N.  E.  125. 
State,    88    Ala.    ^y,    68,    7    So.    302; 


§  174 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


330 


never  pri\-ileged."'^  And  information  disclosed  in  friendly  con- 
fidence to  a  non-professional  person,  even  though  under  a  pledge 
of  secrecy,  is  not  privilege."" 

If  there  is  any  doubt  whether  the  communication  is  intended 
to  be  privileged  or  not,  the  accused  in  a  criminal  trial  should 
have  the  benefit  of  the  doubt."' 


v<  174.  Character  and  date  of  the  communications. — The  presence 
of  certain  elements  is  indispensable  to  all  classes  of  privileged 
communications.  In  the  first  place  the  communication  must  have 
been  made,  the  advice  given  or  the  information  divulged  while 
the  confidential  relation  existed.  Anything  said  afterwards  is 
not  within  the  rule.""'  The  accused  must  show  that  the  relation 
of  attorney  and  client  existed  in  any  case  where  he  claims  that 
evidence  is  admissible  because  the  witness  who  is  called  on  to 
disclose  it  was  his  attorney.  He  must  show  that  the  witness  had 
agreed  to  be  his  attorney  and  that  he  had  agreed  to  have  him  as 
such.  So  that  where  a  lawyer  and  friend  of  the  accused,  without 
express  employment  or  promise  or  hope  of  compensation,  was 
asked  by  the  accused  while  in  the  jail  visiting  another  client  to 


-"State  V.  Charity,  2  Dev.  (N.  Car.) 
543,  545,  549:  Sample  v.  Frost,  10 
Iowa  266,  Gartside  v.  Outram,  26  L. 
J.  Ch.  113. 

■"  McManus  v.  Freeman,  2  Pa.  Dist. 
144;  Cady  V.  Walker,  62  Mich.  157, 
158,  28  N.  W.  805,  4  Am.  834 ;  Wilson 
V.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753. 

"  People  V.  Atkinson,  40  Cal.  284, 
286. 

=' People  V.  Hess,  8  App.  Div,  (X. 
Y.)  143,  40  X.  Y.  S.  486,  aff'g  6 
Misc.  (X.  Y.)  246,  56  X.  Y.  St.  267, 
26  X^.  Y.  S.  630  (construing  Xew 
York  statute  which  requires  the  com- 
munication to  have  been  made  in  the 
course  of  professional  employment)  ;. 
Long  V.  State,  86  Ala.  36,  5  So.  443 ; 
Reg.  V.  Hayward,  2  C.  &  K.  234,  236 ; 
Reg.  V.  Farley,  2  C.  &  K.  313.  315; 
Basye  v.  State,  45  Neb.  261.  63  N.  W. 
811;  State  V.  Hedgepeth,  125  Mo.  14, 


20,  21,  28  S.  W.  160,  162;  Hernandez 
V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  134,  51  Am. 
295 ;  State  v.  Cummings,  189  Mo. 
626,  88  S.  W.  706.  Under  a  statute 
exempting  "confidential  communica- 
tion properly  entrusted  to  him  in  his 
professional  capacity,  and  necessary 
and  proper  to  enable  him  to  discharge 
the  functions  of  his  office,"  it  has  been 
held  that  the  relation  of  attorney  and 
client  need  not  exist,  but  that  com- 
munications made  to  the  prosecuting 
attorney  by  a  witness  for  the  state 
are  within  the  statute.  State  v.  House- 
worth,  91  Iowa  740,  60  X.  W.  221,  the 
court  saying  that  under  the  statute  it 
makes  no  difference  from  whom  the 
communication  comes.  State  v. 
Hedgepeth,  125  Mo.  14,  21,  28  S.  W. 
160.  See,  also,  State  v.  Smith,  138  N. 
Car.  700,  703,  so  S.  E.  859;  State  v. 
Stafford  (Iowa,  1909),  123  N.  W. 
T67. 


331  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    1/4 

convey  a  message  to  the  chief  of  poHce  to  the  effect  that  the  ac- 
cused would  plead  guilty  if  he  were  let  off  with  light  punishment, 
the  communication  is  not  privileged  and  may  be  proved  by  the 
attorney.""  So  the  communications  must  have  been  made  by  or 
to  the  attorney,  physician  or  priest  while  he  was  acting  profes- 
sionallv.  Information,  such  as  belongs  to  ordinary  intercourse, 
is  not  privileged.  The  communication  must  relate  to  the  attor- 
ney's professional  duty,  though  it  is  never  necessary  that  it 
should  be  expressly  stated  to  him  by  the  client  that  it  is  confiden- 
tial,^" for  this  fact  is  always  inferred  and  presumed  until  the  con- 
trary is  shown  whenever  the  relation  of  attorney  and  client  is 
proved  to  exist. 

The  attorney  has  been  permitted  in  civil  cases  to  identify  his 
client,'"'^  to  disclose  the  name  of  a  person  who  retained  him.'""  to 
prove  his  client's  handwTiting,^"  or  address,^*  the  date  when  he 
received  a  certain  instrument,^^  the  fact  that  he  drew  a  deed  for 
his  client,"^  or  paid  money  to  him,^'  or  to  a  third  person  on  his 
client's  account.  So  an  attorney  may  be  compelled  to  answer  a 
question  designed  solely  to  ascertain  whether  he  had  ever  been 
consulted  in  his  professional  capacity  by  the  accused, ^^  or  whether 
he  had  acted  for  him  without  authority."'' 

And  generally  when  an  attorney,  though  acting  as  such,  ob- 
tains knowledge  of  any  fact,  not  by  means  of  his  professional 
character  but  by  his  powers  of  observation  as  a  man,  i.  e.,  by  the 

^  State  V.   Hedgepeth,   125   Mo.    14,  Mass.   521,  524;   State  v.    Houston,  3 

21,  28  S.  W.  160.  Harr.    (Del.),    15;   Martin  v.   Ander- 

^  Wheeler  v.  Hill,   16  Me.  329.     A  son,  21  Ga.  301,  309. 

letter  written  by  an  attorney  to   his  ^^  Wheatley  v.  Williams,  i  M.  &  W. 

client  informing  him  of  the  terms  of  533,  2  Gale  140,  5  L.  J.  E.x.  237. 

an  injunction  is  not  a  privileged  com-  ""Barry  v.  Coville,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

munication  because  it  is  in  no  sense  620,  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  36,  afifirmed  in  129 

confidential.     Aaron  v.  United  States,  N.  Y.  302,  29  N.  E.  307,  41  N.  Y.  St. 

155  Fed.  833,  84  C.  C.  A.  67.  628. 

^'  Studdy  V.  Sanders,  2  Dowl  &  Ry.  "  Chapman  v.  Peebles,  84  Ala.  283, 

347-  284,  4  So.  273. 

"  Brown   v.   Payson,  6   X.   H.  443,  ''  White  v.  State,  86  Ala.  69,  75,  5 

448.  So.   674 ;   Leindecker  v.   Waldron,   52 

""Hurd  V.   Moring,  i  C.  &  P.  272\  111.  283,  285. 

Brown  v.  Jewett,  120  Mass.  215,  218.  ^"Cox  v.  Hill,  3  Ohio  411,  424. 

'*  Commonwealth     v.     Bacon,     135 


§175  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  332 

same  means  any  one  in  a  like  situation  would  employ,  the  infor- 
mation is  not  privileged/" 

It  is  never  essential  to  create  the  privilege  that  any  proceed- 
ings, criminal  or  civil,  should  be  pending  or  even  in  contempla- 
tion. That  the  relation  of  attorney  and  client  exists  is  enough ; 
for,  whatever  the  transaction  (unless  some  future  infraction  of 
the  criminal  law  is  contemplated),  and  whether  or  not  it  is  likely 
to  be  subsequently  litigated,  the  communication  or  advice  is  privi- 
leged.'*^ In  conclusion,  it  may  be  noted  as  not  within  the  rule, 
that  an  attorney  may  testify  that  a  person  alleged  to  be  his  client 
had  made  no  communication  to  him  or  received  no  advice  ;■*"  and 
he  may  repeat  a  statement  made  to  him  (though  made  while  he 
was  acting  professionally)  by  a  third  person,  to  whom  he  was 
referred  by  his  client,*^  or  communications  by  the  client  which 
he  meant  should  be  imparted  to  others  by  the  attorney,**  or  a 
conversation  between  two  persons  which  took  place  in  his  pres- 
ence, though  both  were  his  clients.*^ 

§  175.  Communications  made  in  contemplation  of  crime. — Com- 
munications made  by  a  client  who  contemplates  the  future  com- 
mission of  a  felony,  or  advice  given  by  an  attorney  to  enable  his 
client  to  escape  the  consequences  of  a  future  infraction  of  the 

^°  State   V.    Fitzgerald,    68   Vt.    125,  543,  43  Am.  604;  In  re  Whitlock,  51 

34  Atl.  429;  i\Iilan  v.  State,  24  Ark.  Hun  (N.  Y.)  351,  353-355,  3  N.  Y.  S. 

346,   355 ;    Swaim   v.    Humphreys,    42  855,  rev'g  2  N.  Y.  S.  683 ;  Bingham  v. 

111.  App.  370;  State  V.  Merchant  (N.  Walk,  128  Ind.  164,  172,  27  N.  E.  483; 

H.),  18  Atl.  654;  Theisen  v.  Dayton,  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Selby,  72  Fed. 

82  Iowa  74,  47  N.  W.  891.    So  an  at-  980,  19  C.  C.  A.  331. 

torney  may  testify   from  his  knowl-  *'  Daniel  v.   Daniel,  39  Pa.   St.   191. 

edge  of  his  client's  handwriting  that  ^^  Mellen,  /;;   re,  6;^   Hun    (N.   Y.) 

an  instrument  was  written  by  him  if  632,  18  N.  Y.  S.  515. 

his  knowledge  was  gained  by  handling  ■"  White  v.  State,  86  Ala.  69,  5  So. 

documents  written  by  his  client.  John-  674 ;  Roper  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  420, 

son  V.    Daverne,    19   Johns.    (N.   Y.)  ^s  Atl.  969;  Ferguson  v.  McBean,  91 

134;  Coates  V.  Birch,  2  Q.  B.  252,  i  Cal.  63,  27  Pac.  518,  14  L.  R.  A.  65; 

G.  &  D.  647,  II  L.  J.  Q.  B.  I,  5  Jur.  Hughes   v.    Boone,    102   N.   Car.    137, 

1009;  Chant  V.  Browne,  12  Eng.  L.  &  159,  160,  9  S.  E.  286;  Cady  v.  Walker, 

E.  299.     See  civil  cases,  Underbill  on  62  Mich.   157,   158,  28  N.   W.  805,  4 

Ev.,  §  170.  Am.  St.  834. 

"  Arnold   v.    Chesebrough,   41    Fed.  ''^  Weaver's    Estate,   9    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

74;  Snow  V.  Gould,  74  Me.  540,  542,  516. 


333  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  _        §1/5 

criminal  law,  are  not  privileged.**'  An  accused  person  may  claim 
privilege  for  any  information  communicated  by  him  to  an  attorney 
or  physician  after  the  date  of  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged.'*' 
He  cannot  claim  to  have  the  mouth  of  an  attorney  closed  with 
whom  he  consults  to  ascertain  how  he  may  commit  a  crime  and 
escape  the  detection  and  punishment. 

It  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  an  attorney  to  counsel  as  to  the 
best  methods  of  violating  the  law.*^ 

The  cases  make  a  distinction  between  a  confidential  communica- 
tion which  states  the  intention  to  do  a  treasonable  or  felonious 
act,  which  both  client  and  attorney  know  to  be  such,  with  a  re- 
quest for  advice  to  enable  the  client  to  execute  the  act  in  such  a 
way  as  to  escape  punishment ;  and  the  communication  of  an  in- 
tention to  commit  an  act  which,  under  certain  circumstances  and 
with  a  particular  intention,  may  become  criminal  accompanied 
by  a  request  for  advice  as  to  how  far  the  client  may  go  without 
exceeding  the  limits  beyond  which  the  act  would  become  criminal. 
In  the  first  case,  where  the  act  is  palpably  and  clearly  criminal, 
a  communication  which  seeks  to  be  advised  in  order  that  criminal 
consequences  may  be  avoided  is  not  privileged.  Thus,  where  a 
victim  of  a  homicide  had  advised  with  an  attorney  how  he  might 
kill  the  accused  and  escape  the  consequences  of  his  crime,  it  was 
held  that  the  communication  was  not  privileged  and  might  be 
proved  by  the  attorney.*® 

So,  also  where  two  persons  accused  of  crime  had  consulted  an 
attorney  upon  the  best  method  by  which  they  might  fraudulently 
conceal  their  property  as  against  a  judgment  creditor  and  the 
attorney  had  advised  them  against  doing  so,  the  attorney  was 

*^The  lawfulness  of  the  purpose  of  pregnant  woman,  which,  under  some 

the    communication    will,    in    the    ab-  circumstances,    might    be    lawful    as 

sence  of  contrary  proof,  be  presumed,  necessary  to   save   the  mother's   life. 

If  the  client's  purpose  be  to  commit  a  Guptill  v.  Verback,  58  Iowa  98,  100, 

felony    or    to    do    any    act    which    is  12  N.  W.   125.     See,  State  v.   Smith, 

vialuvi  in  se,  the  privilege  is  at  once  138  X.  Car.  700,  50  S.  E.  859. 

destroyed.     Bank  of  Utica  v.  Merse-  ■*' Covcney  v.  Tannahill,   i  Hill   (N. 

reau,  3  Barb.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  528;  Peo-  Y.)  33,  36,  Z7  Am.  Dec.  287n. 

pie  v.  Blakeley,  4  Park  Cr.    (N.  Y.)  "« Taylor  v.  Evans   (Te.x.  1894),  29 

176,  181.     It  is  otherwise  if  the  intent  S.  W.  172,  174. 

is   doubtful,   and   if   the   act   contem-  *•  Everett  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  682, 

plated  might  be  lawful,  e.  g.,  produc-  68s,  18  S.  W.  674. 
ing  a   miscarriage   or   abortion   on   a 


§    175  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  334 

permitted  to  reveal  on  the  witness  stand  what  had  been  said  to 
him.'° 

In  another  case  it  was  held  that  an  attorney  who  had  been 
consulted  as  to  the  possibility  of  forging  a  deed  might  testify  on 
the  trial  of  his  client  for  the  forgery  to  what  had  been  said  to 
him  indicating  an  intention  to  forge/^ 

There  are  man}^  other  cases  to  the  same  effect,  for  the  rule  is 
that  the  prostitution  of  the  honorable  relation  of  attorney  and 
client  will  not  be  permitted  under  the  guise  of  privilege,  and 
every  communication  made  to  an  attorney  by  a  client  for  a  crimi- 
nal purpose  is  a  conspiracy  or  attempt  at  a  conspiracy  which  is 
not  only  law^ful  to  divulge,  but  which  the  attorney  under  certain 
circumstances  may  be  bound  to  disclose  at  once  in  the  interest  of 
justice. ^^ 

In  accordance  with  this  rule,  where  a  forged  will  or  other  in- 
strument has  come  into  the  possession  of  an  attorney  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  accused,  with  the  hope  or  expectation 
that  the  attorney  would  take  some  action  in  reference  thereto, 
and  the  attorney  does  act,  in  ignorance  of  the  true  character  of 
the  instrument,  there  is  no  privilege,  in  as  much  as  full  confidence 
has  been  withheld.  The  attorney  is  then  compellable  to  produce 
the  forged  writing  against  his  client. ^^ 

'°  Reg.  V.  Cox,  L.  R.  14  Q.  B.  Div.        ''  Reg.  v.  Hayward,  2  C  &  K.  234 ; 

153,  168,  which  is  a  very  well  consid-  Reg.  v.  Tylney,   i   Den.  C.   C.  319,  3 

ered  case  in  which  all  the  prior  cases  Cox  C.  C.  160,  18  L.  J.  J\I.  C.  36,  37, 

are  cited  and  commented  on.     See  al-  38.     "If  any  man  should  confide  to  a 

so,   Cromack  v.   Heathcote,  4   Moore  professional    person    that    he    had    a 

357,  2  Br.  &  B.  4    (1820),  22  R.   R.  treasonable  or  felonious  intention  and 

638;  Gartside  v.  Outram,  26  L.  J.  Ch.  wished  to  know  how  he  might  execute 

113;   Annesley  v.  Anglesea,   17  How.  it    so    as    to    escape    punishment,    it 

St.   Tr.    1139    (1743);    Rex   v.    Dixon  would  be  too  much  to  say  that  such 

(1765),  3  Burr.  1687.  communication  which  might  make  the 

°^  People  V.  Van  Alstine,  57  Mich,  man    consulted   guilty    of    misprision, 

69,  79,  23  N.  W.  594.  was   privileged,  but   if   a   man   medi- 

^'  Orman  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  604,  tates  an  act  which,  exceeding  certain 

617,  3  S.  W.  468,  58  Am.  662;  Green-  limits,    would    become    criminal,    and 

ough  V.  Gaskell,  i   M.  &  K.  98,   104;  confined  within  certain  bounds  would 

People  V.   Blakeley,  4  Park.   Cr.    (N.  be    perfectly    justifiable,    the    person 

Y.)   176,  181 ;  Coveney  v.  Tannahill,  i  asking  the  advice  nnist  be  considered 

Hill.    (N.  Y.)   S3,  36;  People  v.  Ma-  as  seeking  how  he  may  avoid  and  not 

hon,  I  Utah  205 ;  Russell  v.  Jackson,  how  he  may  commit  a  crime,  and  it 

9  Hare  387,  68  Eng.  Ch.  Rep.  558.  is  impossible  that  an  attorney  should 


335 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


176 


The  fact  that  the  attorney  is  not  cognizant  of  the  criminal  or 
wrongful  purpose,  or,  knowing  it,  attempts  to  dissuade  his 
client, °*  is  immaterial.  The  attorney's  ignorance  of  his  client's 
intentions  deprives  the  information  of  a  professional  character 
as  full  confidence  has  been  withheld. ^^ 

§  176.  Permanency  of  the  privilege — "Waiver. — The  termination 
of  the  transaction  pending  when  the  communication  was  made, 
or  the  termination  of  the  relation  of  attorney  and  client  by  the 
death  of  the  client,  or  for  any  other  cause,  does  not  unseal  the 
lips  of  the  attorney.^®  The  privilege  is  designed  to  protect  the 
interests  of  the  client.  He  may  waive  it  if  he  deems  it  to  his 
advantage  to  do  so.  His  representative  may,  after  his  decease, 
waive  the  privilege,  but  only  when  the  application  of  the  rule 
would  be  disadvantageous  to  his  estate."  The  privilege  may  be 
waived  by  the  client,  either  by  implication  arising  from  his  silence 
or  failure  to  make  prompt  objection  and,  a  fortiori,  by  an  express 
waiver.^®     The  doctrine  of  an  implied  waiver  arising  from  cir- 


be  obliged  to  disclose  such  communi- 
cation. *  *  *  j(-  cannot  be  said  to 
amount  to  the  meditation  of  a  crime, 
if  a  man  adopts  a  course  by  which  he 
seeks  to  avoid  the  commission  of 
one."    Rex  v.  Haydn,  2  F.  &  S.  379. 

"  Orman  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  604, 
617,  3  S.  W.  468,  58  Am.  662;  Reg.  v. 
Hayward,  2  C.  &  K.  234. 

'=Reg.  V.  Cox,  L.  R.  14  Q.  B.  Div. 
153,  163,  165,  5  Am.  Cr.  140;  Mat- 
thews V.  Hoagland,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  455, 
21  Atl.  1054.  "In  order  that  the  rule 
may  apply  there  must  be  both  profes- 
sional confidence  and  professional 
employment,  but  if  a  client  has  a 
criminal  object  in  view  in  his  com- 
munications with  his  solicitor,  one  of 
these  elements  must  necessarily  be  ab- 
sent. The  client  must  either  con- 
spire with  his  solicitor  or  deceive  him. 
If  his  criminal  object  is  avowed,  the 
client  does  not  consult  his  adviser 
professionally,    for   it   cannot   be    the 


solicitor's  business  to  further  a  crim- 
inal object.  If  the  client  does  not 
avow  his  object  he  reposes  no  con- 
fidence, for  the  state  of  facts,  which 
is  the  foundation  of  the  supposed 
confidence,  does  not  exist."  Reg.  v. 
Cox,  L.  R.  14  Q.  B.  Div.  153,  168. 

''  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  172. 

"  Layman's  Will,  /;;  re,  40  Minn. 
37^;  373,  42  N.  W.  286;  Morris  v. 
Morris,  119  Ind.  341,  343,  21  N.  E. 
918;  Blackburn  v.  Crawford,  3  Wall. 
fU.  S.)  175,  18  L.  ed.  186.  Contra, 
Loder  v.  Whelpley,  in  N.  Y.  239, 
245,  19  N.  Y.  St.  631,  I  Dem.  Surr. 
368;  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  172,  note  5. 
The  privilege  is  wholly  personal  to 
the  client  while  be  is  living.  It  can- 
not be  waived  by  any  person  merely 
because  he  stands  in  privity  with  him. 
State  V.  James,  34  S.  Car.  579,  13  S. 
E.  325- 

™  Blackburn  v.  Crawford,  3  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  175,  194,  18  L.  ed.  186:  State 


§  176  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  336 

cumstances  is  doubtless  a  safe  rule  iu  civil  litigation,  though  very 
dangerous  doctrine  in  a  criminal  trial.  An  express  waiver  is  always 
allowed  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  particularly  where  the  accused 
is  desirous  of  having  his  counsel  testify  in  his  behalf.^"  But  it  is 
doubtful  if  any  waiver  would  be  implied  in  a  criminal  trial."" 
The  privilege  of  the  accused  is  certainly  not  waived  because  he 
goes  on  the  stand  as  a  witness.  In  civil  cases  it  has  been  held  that 
a  party  is  privileged  from  disclosing  what  his  attorney  would  be 
prevented  from  divulging,''^  and  the  same  rule  w'ould  doubtless 
apply  to  the  cross-examination  of  the  accused.*^"  But  an  accom- 
plice who  consents  to  be  a  w-itness  for  the  prosecution  cannot 
claim  the  privilege  for  his  statements  to  his  attorney.  He  must, 
under  his  arrangement  with  the  state,  tell  all  he  knows,  and  if 
he  knowingly  keeps  back  any  relevant  fact  he  loses  his  right  to 
the  immunity  promised.  And  the  fact  that  he  may  be  compelled 
to  state  what  he  divulged  to  his  attorney  regarding  his  own 
guilt  may  be  the  only  means  left  to  an  innocent  man  accused  of 
crime,  of  meeting  the  perjury  of  the  real  criminal,  posing  as  a 
penitent  accomplice  on  the  witness  stand. "^  The  privilege  be- 
longs to  the  client  and  ought  to  be  promptly  claimed  by  him  or 
for  him  by  his  attorney  or  representative.  But  it  seems  that, 
particularly  in  a  criminal  trial,  the  court  may  and  perhaps  should 
interpose  of  its  own  motion  for  the  protection  of  an  accused 

V.  Depoister,  21  Nev.  107,  25  Pac.  puts  his  attorney  on  the  witness  stand 
1000,  1002,  holding  that  a  client  who  he  may  be  compelled  to  relate  rele- 
requests  his  attorney  to  act  as  a  sub-  vant  communications  on  his  cross-ex- 
scribing  witness  to  his  will  waives  his  amination. 

privilege  by  implication,  and  the  at-  "  Hemenway  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  701 ; 

torney  is  compellable  to  testify  to  all  Bigler   v.    Reyher,   43   Ind.    112,    114; 

facts  which  may  be  proved  by  a  sub-  Baker  v.  Kuhn,  38  Iowa  392,  395. 

scribing   witness,   though   confidential  "-Alderman  v.  People,  4  Mich.  414, 

communications  may  be  included.  422,  69  Am.  Dec.  321. 

'^'Whart.     Cr.     Ev.,     §§    498,    500;  "^Alderman  v.  People,  4  Mich.  414, 

Walker  v.   State,   19  Tex.   App.   176,  423,  69  Am.  Dec.  321 ;  Foster  v.  Peo- 

182;    Hamilton   v.    People,   29    Mich,  pie,  18  Mich.  265;  Hamilton  v.   Peo- 

'^73,  179-  pie,  29  Mich.    173,  184;   Wharton   on 

*°  Duttenhofer  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  Cr.  Ev.,  §  502;   People  v.  Gallagher, 

91,  95,  32  Am.  362.    The  calling  of  the  75    Mich.    512,   516,  42   N.    W.    1063; 

attorney  as  a  witness   for  the  client  Contra,  Sutton  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App. 

is  of  course  a  waiver.   Where  accused  490,  495. 


337  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  8    1/7 

person  who  may  be  entirely  ignorant  of  his  right  to  remain  silent 
when  he  is  called  upon  to  state  what  he  said  to  his  attorney.*'* 

§  177.  Writings  when  privileged. — A  communication  to  or  ad- 
vice given  by  an  attorney  in  writing  is  always  privileged,  nor 
can  an  attorney  be  compelled  to  produce  a  client's  papers  de- 
posited with  him  for  safe-keeping  or  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
his  professional  opinion.  He  may  always  be  permitted  to  prove 
that  a  paper  is  in  existence,  that  he  has  searched  for  it,  and  that 
it  is  or  is  not  in  his  possession,  to  enable  the  other  party  to  prove 
it  by  parol.  He  cannot  be  compelled  to  produce  the  papers,  or 
to  disclose  their  contents,  if  the  papers  are  no  longer  in  his  cus- 
tody.''^ Not  only  is  the  attorney  prohibited  from  producing  the 
writing,  but  he  is  also  forbidden  to  disclose  all  information, 
whether  names,  dates,  or  other  facts  which  he  may  have  derived 
therefrom.  So,  if  a  forgery  is  under  investigation  by  the  grand 
jury,*"'  or  a  person  accused  of  that  crime  is  on  trial,  an  attorney, 
who  may  have  the  alleged  forged  writing  in  his  possession  can- 
not be  compelled  to  produce  it  as  evidence  against  the  accused  if 
the  attorney  received  it  professionally,*''  and  not  as  a  part  of  the 
preparation  to  commit  the  crime.  The  object  of  the  privilege  is 
to  promote  justice  and  to  protect  the  innocent.  But  the  law 
frowns  upon  all  attempts  to  use  it  to  defeat  justice  by  shielding 
guilty  persons.     Hence,  writings  are  not  privileged  which  are 

"*  "The  communications  between  a  v.  Benjamin,  g  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
party,  or  his  legal  adviser,  and  wit-  419,  423;  Selden  v.  State,  74  Wis.  271, 
nesses,  are  also  privileged.  There  is,  274,  275,  42  N.  W.  218,  17  Am.  St. 
in  those  cases,  the  same  necessity  for  144;  State  v.  Hazleton,  15  La.  Ann. 
protection;  otherwise  it  would  be  im-  72;  Neal  v.  Patten,  47  Ga.  73;  Jack- 
possible  for  a  defendant  to  write  a  son  v.  Denison,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
letter  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  558,  and  cases  cited  in  Underbill  on 
information  on  the  subject  of  a  suit,  Ev.,  §  173. 
without  incurring  the  liability  of  hav-  '"Anon.,  8  Mass.  370,  371. 
ing  the  materials  of  his  defense  dis-  ""Rex  v.  Smith,  i  Phill.  on  Ev.  (gth 
closed  to  the  adverse  party."  Hare  on  ed.)  171 ;  Reg.  v.  Tylney,  i  Den.  C. 
Discovery  of  Evid.,  151.  C.  319,  3  Cox  Cr.  Cas.   160,   18  L.  J. 

"''Brandt   v.    Klein,    17   Johns.    (N.  (M.  C)   36,  324;   State  v.   Squires,   r 

Y.)  335;  Brard  v.  Ackerman,  5  Esp.  Tyler    (Vt.),   147,   152;  Reg.  v.   Hay- 

119;    Wright    v.    Mayer,   6   Ves.    Jr.  ward,  2  C.  &  K.  234,  2  Cox.  Cr.  Cas. 

280;  Covcney  v.  Tannahill,  i  Hill  (X.  23;  Reg.  v.  Cox,  L.  R.  14  Q.  B.  153, 

Y.)  33,  35.  37  Am.  Dec.  287n ;  People  I74- 
22 — Undf.rhii.l  Crim.  Ev. 


§178  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  33S 

not  given  to  the  attorney  in  good  faith  and  in  liis  professional 
capacity.  He  may  be  compelled  to  produce  forged  writings 
which  he  received  without  knowing  their  true  character  in  the 
execution  of  a  proposed  scheme  to  defraud,^*  or  writings  which 
were  given  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  evidence.®" 

A  communication  to  an  attorney  acting  as  a  conveyancer  is 
privileged. '°  though  he  act  for  both  parties.'^ 

§  178.  Communications  to  spiritual  adviser. — By  the  early  com- 
mon law,  following  the  rule  of  the  modern  Roman  and  the 
canon  law,  statements  made  to  a  priest  in  a  confession  were  privi- 
leged, except,  perhaps,  in  case  of  high  treason."-  But  the  common 
law.  since  the  Reformation,  has  only  protected  the  information 
divulged  by  the  penitent  to  his  spiritual  adviser  to  the  extent  that 
the  latter  was  under  no  legal  compulsion  to  reveal  the  evidence 
to  a  magistrate  and  to  denounce  the  evil-doer.'" 

The  priest  could  be  compelled,  however,  when  placed  upon  the 
witness  stand,  to  divulge  any  confession  of  crime  made  to  him, 
though  it  was  received  in  the  course  of  religious  discipline,  and 
though  the  law  of  his  church  sealed  his  lips  under  penalty  of 
suspension  from  or  loss  of  office.''*    In  this  respect  a  communica- 

^  Reg.  V.  Farley,  2  C.  &  K.  313,  319;  Ev.    254;    Rex    v.    Sparkes,    cited    in 

Reg.  V.   Hayward,  2  C.   &  K.  234,  2  Peake  N.  P.  78.     In  Broad  v.  Pitt,  3 

Cox  Cr.  Cas.  23.  C.  &  P.  518,  Best  C.  J.,  said:  "I,  for 

*  People   V.    Sheriff,    29   Barb.    (N.  one,  will  never  compel  a  clergyman  to 

Y.)  622.  disclose  communications,  made  to  him 

"°  Bingham   v.   Walk,    128   Ind.    164,  by  a  prisoner,  but  if  he  chooses  to  dis- 

27  N.  E.  483;   Getzlaff  v.  Seliger,  43  close  them  I  shall  receive  them."   See, 

Wis.  297.     Contra,   In   re   Smith,   61  also,  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  §  247. 

Hun  (N.  Y.)  loi;  15  N.  Y.  S.  425.  '*  Rex   v.    Gilham,    i    Moody   C.    C. 

"Clay  V.  Williams,  2  Munf.   (Va.)  186;   Smith's   Case,  2  City  Hall  Rec. 

IDS,   122,  5  Am.   Dec.  453.     It  is   for  (N.    Y.)    77,    80;    Commonwealth   v. 

the  court  to  determine  in  what  capac-  Drake,  15  Mass.  161   (confession  of  a 

ity  and  for  what  purpose  documents  church  member  was  admitted)  ;  Reg. 

were  left  with  an  attorney.     Reg.  v.  v.  Ha\',  2  F.  &  F.  4  (where  a  priest 

Jones,  I  Den.  C.  C.  166,  2  Car.  &  K.  refused  to  reveal  from  whom  he  re- 

234.      See    cases    cited    Underbill    on  ceived  a  stolen  watch  and  was  com- 

Ev.,  §  173.  mitted  for  contempt).    Contra.  Rex  v. 

"2  Best  on  Ev.,  §§  583,  584.     See  Griffin,  6  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  219.    See,  also, 

note  to  Reg.  v.  Hay,  2  F.  &  F.  4.  Greenlaw  v.   King,   i   Beav.   137,  145 ; 

"  Wilson   V.    Rastall,   4   T.    R.    753,  Russell  v.  Jackson,  9  Hare  387,  391 ; 

759;    Anon.,    Skin.    404;    MacXally's  Anderson  v.  Bank,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  D.  644, 


339  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  8    I/O 

tion  made  to  a  priest  is,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  on  a  par  with 
one  made  to  a  layman. 

Many  of  the  states  have  sought  to  remedy  the  unfairness  of 
this  rule  by  statutory  enactments  by  which  priests  and  clergy- 
men are  absolutely  prohibited  from  disclosing  any  fact  becom- 
ing known  to  them  while  acting  in  a  professional  capacity,  or 
in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined  by  the  rules  of  the  religious 
body  to  which  they  belong. '^^  But  a  communication  to  a  priest 
made  otherwise  than  in  his  ecclesiastical  capacity  is  not  pri^•i- 
leged/*' 

So,  where  the  accused  met  the  priest  on  a  railroad  train  and, 
with  no  intent  of  receiving  his  professional  advice,  assistance  or 
consolation,  told  his  story,  incriminating  himself,  it  was  held 
that  there  was  no  privilege  under  the  statute.'''^  And  inasmuch 
as  the  privilege  is  by  the  statute  directly  or  indirectly  limited  to 
confessions  of  sins  made  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  spiritual 
advice,  or  assistance,  it  was  held  in  a  prosecution  for  the  crime 
of  bigamy  that  the  statements  of  the  accused  made  to  a  clergy- 
man who  was  to  communicate  them  to  the  first  wife  in  order  to 

651,  45  L.  J.  Ch.  449,  35  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  an  objection  is  plainly  untenable,  as 

76,   24   Wkly.   Rep.   624;    Wheeler   v.  the  statutes  are  universally  applicable 

Le   Marchant,  L.   R.    17,  Ch.   D.  675,  to  communications  made  by  the  ad- 

681.  herents  of  any  religion,  and  their  pur- 

'^ California    (Code    Civ.    Proc.)    §  pose  is  plainly  neither  to  protect  the 

1881 ;    Colorado,    Acts    1883,    p.    290;  priest,  nor  to  promote  any  particular 

Michigan,    2    Howell's    An.    Stat.,    §  form  of  religion.     Such  statutes  are 

7515;  Kansas  Gen.  Stat.  1901,  §  4771;  evidently  intended  to  protect  all  per- 

lowa  Rev.   Code,   1888,   §  4893;   Mis-  sons  in  the  exercise  of  their  religious 

souri   Rev.   St.    1879,   P-  690,   §   4017;  belief    according    to    the    dictates    of 

Nebraska  An.  St.  1901,  §  5902;  Wis-  their  conscience. 

consin  An.  Stat.,  1898,  §  4074.     Sim-  '"People   v.    Gates,    13    Wend.    (X. 

ilar  statutes  exist  in  Arizona,  Arkan-  Y.)    311,  ^22;   Gillooley  v.    State,   58 

sas,  Idaho,  Montana,  Nevada,  Oregon,  Ind.    182,   184;   State  v.   Morgan,   196 

Utah,     Washington     and     Wyoming.  Mo.    177,  95   S.   W.  402.     Under  the 

The  question  of  the  constitutionality  principles  of  the  text  it  is  very  doubt- 

of  such  statutes  has  been  raised,  but,  ful  if  communications  to  a    priest  re- 

up    to    the    present,    never    judicially  lating  to  a  marriage  to  be  performed 

determined.     The  only  possible  objec-  by  him  would  be  privileged, 

tion   that   can  be  raised  on  constitu-  '"a  State  v.  Brown,  95  Iowa  381,  64 

tional   grounds   is   that   they   tend   to  N.  W.  Rep.  277. 
establish  some  form  of  religion.  Such 


§    1/9  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  34O 

influence  her  to  abandon  the  prosecution  for  bigamy  are  not 
privileged."^ 

§  179.  Communications  passing  between  medical  practitioners  and 
their  patients. — At  common  law  communications  to  medical  men 
were  not  privileged.  Although  a  physician  who  voluntarily  dis- 
closes professional  secrets  would,  from  a  medical  and  moral 
standpoint,  be  guilty  of  a  gross  indiscretion,  the  law  does  not 
treat  them  as  privileged,  and,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  he  may 
be  compelled  to  testify  upon  the  witness  stand."  Every  con- 
sideration that  furnishes  a  basis  for  affixing  a  privilege  to  com- 
munications or  information  passing  between  attorney  and  client 
applies,  with  equal  force,  to  the  relation  of  physician  and  patient. 
Aside  from  the  benefit  to  the  patient  in  encouraging  him  to  make 
a  full  disclosure,  by  means  of  which  he  may  receive  better  treat- 
ment, the  danger  that  the  truth  will  be  perverted  or  concealed, 
perhaps  unconsciously,  by  the  physician  who  is  compelled  to  dis- 
close medical  secrets  on  the  witness  stand,  in  the  struggle  between 
professional  duty  and  legal  duty,  is  removed. 

It  is  now  often  provided  by  statute  that  no  physician  or  sur- 
geon shall  be  allowed  or  compelled  to  disclose  any  information 
which  he  has  acquired  while  attending  a  patient,  or  which  was 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  act  as  such.'^ 

"Gillooley   v.    State,    58    Ind.    182,  sell  v.  Jackson,  9  Hare  387,  391;  An- 

184;   Hills  V.   State,  61    Neb.   589,  85  derson  v.  Bank,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  D.  644, 

N.  W.  836,  57  L.  R.  A.  i55n.  650,  45  L.  J.  Ch.  449,  35  L.  T.  (N.  S.) 

•'  Baker  v.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  76,  24  Wkly.  Rep.  624. 

3  Q.  B.  91 ;  Duchess  of  Kingston's  "  "A  person,  duly  authorized  to 
Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  573-580  (1776);  practice  physic  or  surgery,  shall  not 
II  Harg.  St.  Trials  243;  People  v.  be  allowed  to  disclose  any  infonna- 
Stout,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  670,  673;  tion  which  he  acquired  in  attending 
Pierson  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424,  433,  a  patient,  in  a  professional  capacity, 
35  Am.  524;  People  v.  Lane,  loi  Cal.  and  which  was  necessary  to  enable 
513,   36   Pac.    16;   Wilson   v.    Rastall,  him  to  act  in  that  capacity."     N.  Y. 

4  T.  R.  753,  760,  2  R.  R.  515;  Fal-  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  834;  California 
mouth  V.  Moss,  11  Price  455,  470,  25  Code,  Civ.  Proc.  §  1881 ;  Indiana  Rev. 
R.  R.  753;  Reg.  V.  Powell,  i  C.  &  P.  St.  1881,  §  497;  Michigan,  2  Howell's 
97  (where  a  surgeon  who  attended  An.  St.  §  7516;  Missouri  R.  S.  1879, 
the  accused  who  was  indicted  for  the  p.  690,  §  4017;  Ohio  R.  S.  1884,  p. 
murder  of  her  child  could  not  refuse  1096,  §  5241 ;  Wisconsin  An.  S.  1898, 
to  testify  to  her  confession)  ;  Green-  §  4075-  Similar  statutes  exist  in  many 
law  V.  King,  i  Beav.  137,  145;  Rus-  other  states;  17  Am.  St.  570,  note. 


341  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §179 

These  statutes  are  designed  to  protect  the  patient,  not  the 
physician,  and,  being  remedial  in  their  nature,  ought  to  receive 
a  Hberal  construction  which  will  fully  effectuate  their  wise  and 
humane  provisions.  The  principles  of  law  applicable  to  privi- 
leged communications  in  the  case  of  attorney  and  client  may  be 
invoked  here.  No  regular  contract  of  hiring  or  payment  of  a 
fee  by  the  patient  need  be  proved.  It  is  unnecessary  to  show  that 
the  patient  called  him  or  procured  his  attendance.  If  the  physi- 
cian was  summoned  by  a  friend  or  a  relative,  or  even  by  a 
stranger  standing  by,  or  by  an  attending  physician,  it  is  sufficient, 
provided  he  attended  as  a  physician.®"  If  a  physician  attend  a 
person  under  circumstances  calculated  to  produce  the  impression 
that  he  does  so  professionally,  and  his  visit  is  so  regarded  and 
acted  upon  by  the  person,  it  is  enough  to  establish  the  relation.*^ 

These  statutes  expressly  confer  the  privilege  upon  such  in- 
formation only  as  "it  was  necessary  to  communicate  to  enable 
the  physician  or  surgeon  to  act  or  prescribe."  He  will  be  com- 
pelled to  testify  to  all  facts  with  which  he  became  acquainted 
which  were  not  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  his  professional 
skill.®"  The  mere  existence  of  the  professional  relation  of  physi- 
cian and  patient  is  not  enough.  He  must  testify  to  all  informa- 
tion acquired  while  attending  the  patient,  if  the  information  was 
not  necessary  to  enable  him  to  act  or  to  prescribe.®^ 

*°Renihan  v.  Dennin,  103  N.  Y.  573,  view  to  medical  treatment,  though  not 

579,  9  N.  E.  320,  4  N.  Y.  St.  261 ;  18  expressly   so    stated,    and   though   no 

Abb.  N.  Cas.  loi,  25  Wkly.  Dig.   (N.  medicine  was  given  or  prescribed.  The 

Y.)   172,  57  Am.  770;  ^tna  Life  Ins.  physicians  were  not  permitted  to  tes- 

Co.  V.  Deming,  123  Ind.  384,  395,  24  tify  to  the  physical  condition  of  the 

N.  E.  86,  375 ;  Raymond  v.  Burling-  accused.    Compare  Babcock  v.  People, 

ton  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  Iowa  152,  154,  21  15  Hun  (N.  Y.)  347,  355. 

N.  W.  495.  "■  Meyer  v.   Standard  &c.   Ins.   Co., 

*' People  V.  ^lurphy,  lOi  N.  Y.  126,  8  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  74,  40  N.  Y.  S. 

129,  4  N.  E.  326,  54  Am.  661,  4  N.  Y.  419;  Campau  v.  North,  39  Mich.  606, 

Cr.  95;   People  v.  Stout,  3  Park.  Cr.  609,  33  Am.  433n ;   Briggs  v.   Briggs, 

(N.  Y.)   670,  675-680.     In   People  v.  20  Mich.  34,  40;  People  v.  Sliney,  137 

Stout,   a  prisoner,  while  in  jail  and  N.  Y.  570,  580,  33  N.  E.  150,  50  N.  Y. 

suffering  bodily  injuries,  was  exam-  St.  391 ;  Feeney  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 

ined  by  the  jail  physician,  and  after-  116  N.  Y.  375,  22  N.  E.  402,  5  L.  R. 

wards,  with  his  consent,  by  two  phy-  A.  544;  Collins  v.  Mack,  31  /\rk.  684, 

sicians   sent  by   the  coroner.     It   ap-  693,  694. 

peared  that  all  parties  understood  that  "'Hewitt  v.    Prime,   2T    Wend.    (N. 

the  examinations  were  made  with  a  Y.)    79,   81;    Babcock   v.    People,    15 


1/9 


CRIAIINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


342 


He  may  testify  that  he  attended  a  patient,  the  number  of  visits 
he  made;'''*  the  persons  whom  he  found  present  and  generally 
what  the  patient  said  to  him  not  strictly  in  reference  to  his  physi- 
cal or  mental  condition. 

But  where  the  statute  expressly  excludes  all  information  com- 
municated to  or  acquired  by  a  medical  man  in  the  course  of  his 
professional  duties,  or  "while  attending  a  patient  professionally," 
all  knowledge  of  whatever  description  gained  from  the  physician's 
observation,  or  from  the  examination  of  the  patient,  or  from 
the  latter's  statements,  is  excluded.^^ 

The  privilege  may,  at  least  in  civil  cases,  be  waived  by  the  pa- 
tient or  by  his  personal  representative  who  is  expressly  author- 
ized to  do  so.*''  So,  in  a  prosecution  for  rape,  the  general  rule 
is  that  the  physician  who  attended  the  woman  may  testify  to  any 
facts  within  his  knowledge.  His  calling  as  a  witness  for  the 
prosecution  is  an  implied  waiver  of  the  privilege.  Where  the 
statute  requires  that  the  patient  shall  consent  that  the  physician 


Hun  (N.  Y.)  347,  354;  Hoyt  v.  Hoyt, 
112  N.  Y.  493,  515,  20  N.  E.  402, 
21  N.  Y.  St.  593;  Westover  v.  ^tna 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  N.  Y.  56,  60,  i  N. 
E.  104,  52  Am.  in.  On  the  other  hand 
it  has  been  said  that  as  soon  as  the 
relation  of  physician  and  patient  is 
shown  to  exist,  it  will  be  conclusively 
presumed  that  all  oral  communica- 
tions were  made  for  the  purpose  of 
enabling  the  physician  to  prescribe. 
The  necessit}-  and  purpose  of  the  com- 
munication need  not  be  proved.  Feen- 
ey  V.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  116  X.  Y. 
375.  380,  381,  22  N.  E.  402,  5  L.  R.  A. 
544;  Edington  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  67  N.  Y.  185,  194;  Grattan  v. 
Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  80  N.  Y. 
281,  297,  36  Am.  617. 

**Cooley  v.  Foltz,  85  Mich.  47,  49, 
48  N.  W.  176. 

'"'If  the  knowledge  is  acquired  in 
the  chamber  of  the  patient,  and  in  the 
discharge  of  professional  duty,  the 
physician  can  make  no  disclosure. 
This  is  true,  whether  the  knowledge 


is  communicated  by  the  words  of  the 
patient,  or  is  gained  by  observation, 
or  is  the  result  of  a  professional  ex- 
amination." It  is  immaterial  by  what 
method  the  physician  acquires  his 
knowledge.  Heuston  v.  Simpson,  115 
Ind.  62,  63,  17  N.  E.  261,  7  Am.  St. 
409;  Renihan  v.  Dennin,  103  N.  Y. 
573,  578,  9  N.  E.  320,  57  Am.  770; 
Edington  v.  .Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  77 
N.  Y.  564 ;  Grattan  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  281,  36  Am. 
617;  People  V.  Stout,  3  Park.  Cri.  (N. 
Y.)  670,  675;  Morris  v.  New  York 
&c.  R.  Co.,  148  N.  Y.  88,  42  N.  E.  410, 
51  Am.  St.  675. 

^^  Carrington  v.  St.  Louis,  89  Mo. 
208,  216,  I  S.  W.  240,  58  Am.  108; 
Valensin  v.  Valensin,  72  Cal.  106,  107, 
14  Pac.  397 ;  State  v.  Depoister,  21 
Nev.  107,  25  Pac.  1000,  1003.  A  death 
certificate  made  out  by  an  attending 
physician  is  not  privileged.  Adreveno 
V.  Mutual  &c.  Life  Assn.,  34  Fed.  870; 
State  V.  Pabst  (Wis.  1909),  121  N.  W. 
351. 


343  PRIVILEGED    COMMUXICATIOXS.  §     l8o 

testify,  consent  may  be  inferred  in  the  case  of  a  minor  on  whom 
a  rape  had  been  committed,  from  the  action  of  the  minor's  par- 
ents, in  prosecuting  the  criminal.*" 

§  180.  Death  of  the  patient — Purpose  of  the  communication — Con- 
templated crime. — The  statutes  of  privilege  are  usually  applicable 
both  to  civil  and  criminal  trials.  This  is  the  rule  even  when  the 
statute  is  couched  in  the  most  general  terms.^^*  But  in  some  of 
the  states  the  statutes  are  expressly  limited  to  civil  cases.*^ 
Where  the  statutory  privilege  is  applicable  to  criminal  trials  in 
a  homicide  trial,  it  would  seem  that  the  testimony  of  the  attend- 
ant physician,  proving  the  dying  declaration  of  the  victim,  ought 
to  be  excluded,  for  it  is  clear  that  his  statement  that  he  is  dying 
and  his  description  of  the  manner  of  his  wounding  are  necessary 
to  enable  the  physician  to  prescribe.  The  statute  was  never  in- 
tended as  a  defense  for  criminals.  Its  plain  purpose  is  not  to 
protect  murderers,  but  to  shield  the  memory  of  the  dead.^^ 
Hence  a  physician  who  has  been  consulted,  in  advance,  by  the 
accused,  as  to  the  best  mode  of  procuring  an  abortion  on  a  third 
person  may  state  what  was  said,'*''  as  for  example  that  he  was 
asked  by  the  accused  to  procure  an  abortion  and  that  he  refused 
to  do  so,^^  upon  the  theory  that  the  relation  of  physician  did  not 
exist  between  them  and  that  no  disgrace  is  cast  upon  the  object 
of  the  contemplated  crime. 

But  a  communication  made  by  the  accused  that  a  woman,  for 

*'  State  V.  Depoister,  21  Nev.  107,  25  may  testify.    The  question  is  without 

Pac.    1000,    1003;   Hauk  v.   State,    148  any   judicial    adjudication    so    far    as 

Ind.  238,  46  X.  E.  127,  47  N.  E.  465.  the  author  can  ascertain. 

"aPeopIe  V.  Murphy,  loi  N.  Y.  126,  "' Babcock  v.    People,    15   Hun    (\. 

129,  4  N.  E.  326,  54  Am.  661.  Y.)    347,    354;    Hewitt   v.    Prime,    21 

^People  V.  Lane,  loi  Cal.  513,  516,  Wend.    (N.  Y.)    79;   Hauk   v.    State, 

36  Pac.  16;  People  v.  West,  106  Cal.  148  Ind.  238,  46  N.  E.  127,  47  N.  E. 

89,  39  Pac.  207.  465.    Cf.  People  v.  West,  106  Cal.  89, 

*°  Pierson  v.   People,  79  N.   Y.  424,  39  Pac.  207 ;  State  v.  Smith,  99  Iowa 

35   Am.    524.      It    is    usually    easy   to  26,   68    N.    W.    428,   61    Am.    St.    219 

prove  dying  declarations  and  all  the  (causing  miscarriage), 

attendant    circumstances    by    the    evi-  "^  Seifert  v.   State,   160  Ind.  464,  67 

dence   of  laymen.     Where  the   state-  N.  E.  100,  98  Am.  St.  340,  which  e.x- 

ments  to  the  physician  are  made  in  the  pressly    states    that    a    "request    to    a 

presence    of    a   third    party    they    are  physician  to  commit  a  crime  is  never 

not  usually  privileged,  for  the  layman  privileged." 


§§    181-182  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  344 

whom  he  engages  the  physician's  professional  services,  was  preg- 
nant by  him  and  that  either  she  or  he  had  attempted  to  produce 
a  miscarriage,  in  which  he  had  assisted  her,  is  privileged  when 
made  to  enable  the  physician  to  give  the  woman  proper  and  legal 
medical  treatment.^^  So  a  physician  who  has  attended  profes- 
sionally a  person  who  died  from  poison,  alleged  to  have  been  ad- 
ministered by  the  accused,  may  in  testifying  for  the  prosecution 
describe  the  patient's  condition  both  from  his  own  observation 
and  from  what  the  patient  told  him."^ 

A  construction,  which  would  operate  to  convert  a  statutory 
provision,  intended  to  protect  a  patient  from  a  damaging  or  ob- 
jectional  disclosure,  into  a  protection  for  a  person  accused  of  the 
murder  of  the  patient,  cannot  be  admitted  nor  can  we  believe 
that  such  w^as  the  legislative  intent."* 

§  181,  Communications  made  during  examination  to  detect  or  as- 
certain sanity. — A  physician  who  is  sent  by  the  court  to  examine 
into  the  mental  or  physical  condition  of  a  person,  c.  g.,  of  the  ac- 
cused, while  in  jail,  merely  to  determine  his  sanity,  may  testify 
to  his  mental  or  physical  condition,"^  and  even  to  what  the  ac- 
cused said  to  him  about  the  crime,""  but  only  if  it  is  conclusively 
shown  that  the  relation  of  physician  and  patient  did  not  and  was 
not  supposed  by  the  accused  to  exist."" 

§  182.  Secrecy  of  telegrams. — Telegraphic  dispatches  are  not 
privileged  communications.     But  in  many  of  the  states  statutes 

^°  People  V.  Brower,  7  N.  Y.  Cr.  292,  "'  People  v.  Kemmler,  119  N.  Y.  580, 

294.  585,  24  N.  E.  9;   People  v.  Schuyler, 

®^  Pierson  v.   People,  79  N,  Y.  424,  7  N.  Y.  Cr.  262,  267,  106  X.  Y.  298, 

432    (which,  however,  refuses  to  lay  12  N.  E.  783,  8  X.  Y.  St.  860,  2y  Wkly. 

down  any  general  rule),  35  Am.  524.  Dig.   (X.  Y.)   i. 

"**  People  V.  Harris,   136  X.  Y.  423,  '"'  People  v.   Sliney,   137  X.   Y.  570, 

437,  448,  2Z  N.   E.  65,  49  X.   Y.   St.  580,  32,  X.  E.  150,  50  X.  Y.  St.  391- 

751.     In  this  case  a  physician  testified  ''^  In  Harrison  v.  Sutter  St.  R.  Co., 

to  the  removal  of  a  dead  fostus  from  116  Cal.  156,  47  Pac.  1019,  it  was  held 

a  woman  of  whose  homicide  the  pris-  under  a  statute  conferring  the  priv- 

oner  was   accused,   and  that  the   de-  ilege    on   "information    *    *   *   which 

fendant   at    the    time    stated    he    had  was    necessary    to    enable    him    (the 

twice   procured   an    abortion    on    her,  physician)  to  prescribe,"  that  informa- 

she  being  his  wife.     See,  also,  Hauk  tion    obtained   by   a    physician,    when 

V.  State,  148  Ind.  238,  46  X.  E.  127,  47  conducting   an    autopsy,    is   not   priv- 

X.  E.  465.  ileged.     See,  also,  ante,  §  164. 


345  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIOXS.  §    183 

exist  which  forbid  any  clerk,  messenger  or  other  employe  from 
divulging  to  any  person  except  the  person  addressed  the  contents 
of  a  telegraphic  message.  These  statutes  do  not  apply  to  the  pro- 
duction of  telegrams  in  court  which  may  be  secured  by  serv- 
ing a  subpoena  duces  tecum  upon  the  officer  or  employe  having 
them  in  custody.^^  The  rules  of  the  telegraph  company  forbid- 
ding disclosure  of  dispatches  do  not,  of  course,  avail  to  prevent 
the  production  of  telegrams  when  needed  in  court.^^ 

The  subpoena  must  identify  the  particular  papers  required  by 
naming  the  parties  sending  or  receiving  them,  the  subject-matter 
and  the  dates  if  known/""  But  the  particularity  of  the  demand 
and  the  sufficiency  of  the  language  are  wholly  discretionary  with 
the  court.  No  definite  rule  can  be  laid  down.  But  it  may  be 
said  that  the  subpoena  cannot  be  used  to  obtain  an  indiscriminate 
production  of  telegrams  not  material  to  the  inquiry,  and  which 
may,  perhaps,  be  only  effectual  in  disclosing  private,  social  and 
business  matters  which  every  man  has  a  right  to  conceal.  So  a 
grand  jury  has  no  power  to  compel  the  production  of  telegrams 
passing  between  parties  during  a  period  of  fifteen  months  past.^ 
A  telegraph  official  may  be  compelled  to  testify  orally  to  the 
contents  of  a  dispatch  where  the  writing  is  lost  or  its  absence  is 
otherwise  accounted  for." 

§  183.  Indecency  of  the  facts  to  be  proved. — Evidence  relevant  to 
the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  prisoner,  and  which  is  necessary  for 

^  Croswell    on    Electricity,    §    437 ;  ^'^  Jaynes,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  638,  639, 

State  V.   Sawtelle,  66  N.   H.  488,  32  12  Pac.  117;  Storror,  In  re,  63  Fed. 

Atl.  831;  Storror,  In  re,  63  Fed.  564,  564;  United  States  -'.  Hunter,  15  Fed. 

distinguishing  Boyd  v.  United  States,  712,  715. 

116  U.  S.  616,  29  L.  ed.  746,  6  Sup.  Ct.  ^  Brown  Ex  parte,  72  Mo.  83,  94> 
524;  Brown,  Ex  parte,  72  Mo.  83,  88,  2i7  Am.  426,  7  Mo.  App.  484. 
37  Am.  426,  7  Mo.  App.  484;  State  v.  "State  v.  Litchfield,  58  Ivle.  267.  If 
Litchfield,  58  Me.  267 ;  United  States  the  federal  government  shall  take  con- 
V.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  (U.  S.)  566,  24  trol  of  the  telegraph  it  is  reasonable 
Fed.  Cas.  14484,  3  Cent.  Law  J.  lOi ;  to  assume  that  the  rule  by  which  in- 
National  Bank  v.  National  Bank,  7  formation  in  the  hands  of  executive 
W.  Va.  544,  547;  United  States  v.  officials  is  privileged  would  apply. 
Hunter,  15  Fed.  712,  715;  Woods  v.  So,  doubtless,  Congress  now  has 
Miller  Co.,  55  Iowa  168,  170,  7  N.  W.  power  by  virtue  of  its  control  of  in- 
484,  39  Am.  170;  People  v.  Webb,  5  terstate  commerce,  of  which  the  tele- 
N.  Y.  855.  graph   is   a  component   part,  to  pass 

•"  State  v.  Litchfield,  58  Me.  267.  such  a  statute. 


§  184  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  346 

the  purposes  of  criminal  justice,  will  not  be  excluded  or  regarded 
as  privileged,  merely  because  of  its  indecency.  In  the  trial  of 
certain  rare  and  abnormal  crimes  caused  by  a  perversion  of  the 
sexual  instinct,  the  most  shocking  revelations  of  human  depravity 
are  frequently  met  with ;  while  in  the  frequent  criminal  prosecu- 
tions for  abortion,  rape,  adultery,  seduction  and  bastardy,  the 
evidence  is  utterly  unfit  for  repetition  before  a  miscellaneous 
ofatherino^.  Thoup'h  relevant  evidence  cannot  be  excluded  be- 
cause  of  its  indecency,  it  is  always  in  the  discretion  of  the  court 
to  exclude  from  the  court-room  all  persons  not  concerned  in  the 
proceedings,  either  as  jurors,  witnesses,  counsel,  or  court  officers.^ 

§  184.    Privileged  communications  between  husband  and  wife. — At 

common  law,  neither  a  husband  nor  a  wife  was  a  competent  wit- 
ness for  or  against  the  other  in  any  judicial  proceedings,  civil  or 
criminal,  to-  which  the  other  was  a  party.*  This  incompetency, 
so  far  as  civil  actions  were  concerned,  was  largely  (though  by 
no  means  wholly)  based  upon  the  common  law  identity  of  inter- 
est in  property  rights  existing  between  the  parties.  The  rule 
that  excluded  a  party  as  a  witness  because  of  interest  logically 
excluded  another  who  was  merely  his  or  her  alter  ego. 

And  in  criminal  trials  it  was  conceived  that  to  permit  husband 
or  wife  to  testify  for  the  other  would  be  to  admit  a  witness  who 
would  be  sure  to  perjure  himself  or  herself  because  of  interest 
in  and  bias  and  friendship  for  the  accused.^  If  either  were  recog- 
nized as  a  competent  witness  against  the  other  who  was  accused 
of  crime,  besides  the  temptation  to  shield  the  accused,  a  very 

^  Greenleaf  on  Ev.,  §  253 ;  i  Elliott  State  v.  Richardson,  194  Mo.  326,  92 

Ev.,  §  647;  2  Elliott  Ev.,  §  818.  S.  W.  649. 

*  Cases  cited  in  Underbill  on  Ev.,  '  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  334;  2  Best  on 
§  166;  State  v.  Smith,  5  Pen.  (Del.)  Ev.,  §  586.  Under  a  statute  permit- 
I,  57  Atl.  368;  Finklea  v.  State  (Miss,  ting  husband  or  wife  to  testify  in  a 
1909),  48  So.  i;  State  v.  Wooley,  215  prosecution  for  a  crime  committed  by 
Mo.  620,  115  S.  W.  417;  Baker  v.  one  against  the  other  the  crime  must 
State,  120  Wis.  135;  97  N.  W.  566.  have  been  committed  while  the  rela- 
Where  the  wife  is  incompetent  to  tes-  tion  of  husband  and  wife  existed.  A 
tify  against  her  husband,  the  testi-  wife  cannot  testify  against  her  hus- 
mony  of  the  third  person  as  to  her  band  on  a  prosecution  for  rape  com- 
declarations  in  the  presence  of  her  mitted  by  him  on  her  prior  to  mar- 
husband  is  not  admissible  against  him.  riage.     State  v.  McKay,  122  Iowa  658, 

98  X.  W.  510. 


347  PRIV'ILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    185 

serious  injury  would  be  done  to  the  harmony  and  happiness  of 
husband  and  wife  and  the  confidence  which  should  exist  between 
them.  In  other  words,  the  common  law  incompetency  of  the 
husband  and  wife  as  witnesses  in  criminal  trials  arose  mainly 
from  considerations  of  public  policy  having  respect  to  the  con- 
fidential nature  of  the  marital  relation,  and  the  interest  which 
the  public  have  in  the  preservation  of  domestic  peace  and  con- 
fidence between  married  people/'  Under  tiie  rules  of  the  common 
law  a  wife  is  not  competent  to  testify  for  her  husband  in  a  prose- 
cution for  violating  a  municipal  ordinance,  since  such  a  proceed- 
ing is  subject  to  the  rules  of  evidence  governing  criminal  pro- 
ceedings.' 

§  185.    Husband  and  wife  as  witnesses  in  criminal  proceedings. — 

At  the  common  law  a  wife  is  never  a  competent  witness  for  her 
husband  in  a  criminal  trial,  though  she  may,  in  one  or  two  ex- 
ceptional cases,  be  a  competent  witness  against  him.^  The  in- 
competency of  the  husband  or  the  wife  to  testify  for  the  other, 
where  either  is  tried  for  a  crime  committed  upon  some  third 
person,  is  sometimes  confirmed  by  statute.® 

A  husband  or  wife  may,  if  willing  to  do,  testify  against  each 
other  without  the  consent  of  the  other  though  there  is  a  statute 
providing  that  neither  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  against  the 
other.'** 

"Turpin  v.  State,  55  Md.  462,  477;  man,  15  S.  Car.  540,  546;  Merriwether 
Stapleton  v.  Crofts,  83  End.  C.  L.  367,  v.  State,  81  Ala.  74,  i  So.  560 ;  People 
369;  Lucas  V.  Brooks,  18  Wall.  (U.  v.  Reagle,  60  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  527,  547; 
S.)  436.  453,  21  L.  ed.  779;  Steen  v.  Lucas  v.  State,  23  Conn.  18,  20;  El- 
State,  20  Ohio  St.  sss;  Uriited  States  more  v.  State,  140  Ala.  184,  37  So. 
V.  Jones,  32  Fed.  569,  570;  Williams  156;  State  v.  Vaughan  (Mo.  App. 
V.  State,  44  Ala.  24;  Lucas  v.  State,  1909),  118  S.  W.  1186;  Wesoky  v. 
23  Conn.  18,  20;  Taulman  v.  State,  37  United  States,  175  Fed.  333. 
Ind.  353,  355.  "United   States  v.   Bassett,  5  Utah 

■'Barron  v.  Anniston  (Ala.  1908),  48  131,  13  Pac.  237;  State  v.  Parrott,  79 

So.  58.  N.  Car.  615,  617;  Johnson  v.  State,  27 

*Turpin  v.  State,  55  Md.  462,  475;  Tex.  App.   135,  11   S.  W.  34;  People 

Randall's  Case,  5  City  Hall  Rec.   (N.  v.  Gordon,  100  Mich.  518,  519,  59  N. 

Y.)   141,  153;  State  V.  Wright,  41  La.  W.  322.    The  privilege  of  silence  may 

Ann.   600,  603,  6   So.    135 ;    State   v.  be  claimed  by  the  accused  as  well  as 

Pain,  48  La.   Ann.   311,    19   So.    138;  by  the  witness.    People  v.  Wood,  126 

Hussey  v.   State,  87  Ala.   121,   135,  6  N.  Y.  249,  264,  27  N.  E.  362,  36  N.  Y. 

So.  420;    Johnson   v.    State,   27  Tex.  St.  952. 

App-  135,  II  S.  W.  34;  State  V.  Work-  "Commonwealth     v.     Barker,     185 

Mass.  324,  70  N.  E.  203. 


1 85 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


■348 


A  statute  declaring  in  general  terms  that  a  husband  or  a  wife 
is  competent  as  a  witness^^  in  an  action  for  or  against  the  other, 
or  a  statute  which  removes  the  common  law  incompetency  of 
interested  persons  as  witnesses  in  civil  proceedings  ( and  even 
in  criminal  proceedings)  will  not  be  effective  to  make  husband 
and  wdfe  a  competent  witness  against  the  other  in  a  criminal 
trial/-  An  exception  is  made  on  the  trial  of  the  husband  for  a 
personal  injury  inflicted  by  him  on  his  wife,  and  she  is  permitted 
to  testify  against  him.  Such  an  exception  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  promote  justice  and  to  protect  the  wife  from  violence  at 
the  hands  of  her  husband  in  circumstances  where,  from  the  rela- 
tion and  surroundings  of  the  parties,  no  third  person  could  be 
present. ^^ 

It  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  extend  the  right  of  the  wdfe  to 
testify  against  the  husband  in  such  cases/'* 


^  See  People  v.  Reagle,  60  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  527,  547;  Wilke  v.  People,  53 
N.  Y.  525,  526. 

"State  V.  Evans,  138  Mo.  116,  39 
S.  W.  462,  60  Am.  St.  549;  Steen  v. 
State,  20  Ohio  St.  333,  334;  Turpin  v. 
State,  55  Md.  462,  477;  United  States 
V.  Crow  Dog,  3  Dak.  106,  14  N.  W. 
437-  Cf.  Everett  v.  State,  33  Fla.  661, 
673,  15  So.  543;  State  v.  Orth,  79 
Ohio  St.  130,  86  N.  E.  476;  Bryan 
v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  114  S.  W. 
811.  The  incompetency  is  based  on 
public  policy,  not  on  interest  on  the 
action.  Burrell  v.  Bull,  3  Sandf.  Ch. 
(N.  Y.)  15;  Knowles  v.  People,  15 
]\Iich.  408,  413 ;  Dixon  v.  People,  18 
Mich.  84,  92.  Cf.  People  v.  Fultz,  109 
Cal.  258,  41  Pac.  1040;  State  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 48  S.  Car.  384,  26  S.  E.  679. 

"i  Bl.  Com.  (Brown)  p.  655;  i 
East  P.  C.  455;  Lord  Audley's  Case, 
3  How.  St.  Tr.  401,  402;  I  Whart.  Cr. 
L.,  §  767;  State  V.  Sloan,  55  Iowa  217, 
220,  7  N.  W.  516;  State  v.  Bennett, 
31  Iowa  24;  United  States  v.  Bassett, 
5  Utah  131,  13  Pac.  237;  Bramlette  v. 
State,  21  Tex.  App.  6it,  718,  2  S.  W. 
765,  57  Am.  622;  Baxter  v.  State,  34 


Tex.  Cr.  App.  516,  31  S.  W.  394,  53 
Am.  St.  720;  Whipp  v.  State,  34  Ohio 
St.  87,  89,  32  Am.  359;  Navarro  v. 
State,  24  Tex.  App.  378,  6  S.  W.  542; 
State  V.  Pennington,  124  Mo.  388,  391, 
27  S.  W.  1 106;  People  V.  Chegaray, 
18  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  637,  642;  Turner 
V.  State,  60  Miss.  351,  354,  45  Am. 
412 ;  United  States  v.  Smallwood,  5 
Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  35,  27  Fed.  Cas. 
16316;  I  Russell  on  Crimes  (9th  Am. 
Ed.)  948;  People  v.  Carpenter,  9  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  580-584;  State  v.  Dyer,  59 
Me.  303,  307  (abortion)  ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Kreuger,  17  Pa.  Co.  Cf.  181 ; 
State  V.  Boyd,  2  Hill  (S.  Car.)  288, 
27  Am.  Dec.  376n;  People  v.  Hough- 
ton, 24  Hun  (N.  Y.)  501;  People 
V.  Hovey,  29  Hun  (N.  Y.)  382,  389; 
Rex  v.  Jagger,  i  East  P.  C.  455  (at- 
tempt to  poison  wife).  This  excep- 
tion is  recognized,  even  if  other  wit- 
nesses testify  to  material  facts.  Bent- 
ley  v.  Cooke,  3  Doug.  422;  Taulman 
V.  State,  37  Ind.  353.  355;  State  v. 
Vaughan  (Mo.  App.  1909),  nS  S.  W. 
1 186. 

"People  V.   Sebring,  66  Mich.  705, 
707,  33  N.  W.  808.    In  all  cases  where 


349  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    l86 

The  dying  declarations  of  a  wife  are  always  competent  on  a 
trial  of  her  husband  accysed  of  her  homicide,  and  may  be  used 
for  or  against  him/^ 

Where  a  husband  and  wife  are  jointly  indicted  for  the  com- 
mission of  the  same  crime,  the  confession  of  the  wife  may  be  re- 
ceived against  the  husband  so  far  as  it  admits  or  suggests  his 
guilt.  The  statute  excluding  privileged  communications  between 
husband  and  wife  does  not  render  this  evidence  inadmissible ;  the 
same  rule  would  apply  to  the  confession  of  a  husband  implicated 
with  his  wife  in  a  crime  against  a  third  person/®  In  all  cases 
where  the  statute  permits  a  husband  or  wife  to  testify  against 
the  other  in  a  criminal  trial,  the  credibility  of  the  husband  or  wife 
thus  testifying  is  to  be  considered  and  determined  by  the  same 
rule  which  applies  to  other  witnesses.  The  fact  of  the  relation- 
ship of  the  witness  to  the  accused  may  be  considered  as  bearing 
upon  his  or  her  credibility,  but  this  relationship  should  not  cause 
the  evidence  of  the  witness  to  be  regarded  with  suspicion  or 
scrutinized  with  more  than  ordinary  care.^' 

§  186.  Statutory  competency  of  husband  and  wife. — The  compe- 
tency of  a  husband  or  wife  as  a  witness  for  or  against  the  other 
is  now,  to  a  large  extent,  if  not  altogether,  regulated  by  statute 
in  this  country.  The  general  effect  of  this  legislation  has  been 
to  render  the  husband  or  wife  competent  in  civil  cases  by  remov- 

a  wife  may  testify  against  her  hus-  5    Penn.    (Del.)    145,    58    Atl.    1042; 

band  she  may,  with  equal  reason,  tes-  where   he   is   the   owner  of   property 

tify  for  him.     State  v.   Patterson,  2  for  the  arson  of  which  the  wife  is  on 

Ired.    (N.  Car.)    L.  346,  355,  38  Am.  trial.     Jordan  v.   State,   142  Ind.  422, 

Dec.  699;   State  v.  Neill,  6  Ala.  685,  41  N.  E.  817;  People  v.  Johnson  (Cal. 

686;    People   v.    Fitzpatrick,   5    Park.  App.),  98  Pac.  682. 

Cr.    26,    28 ;     Com.    v.     Murphy,    4  "  i  East  P.  C.  357 ;  State  v.  Belcher, 

Allen  (Mass.)  491,  492;  Rex  v.  Ser-  13  S.  Car.  459,  462;  People  v.  Green, 

jeant,  i  Ry.  &  Mood.  352,  3  Russ.  on  i    Denio    (N.   Y.)    614,  615;   Whart. 

Cr.  (9th  Am.  Ed.)  633.    The  question  Cr.   Ev.,   §  393;   Rose.   Cr.   Ev.    (7th 

usually   arises   where   the   wife    is   a  ed.).i26. 

witness.    The  exception  is  also  recog-  "  State  v.  Mann,  39  Wash.  144,  81 

nized  where  the  husband  is  a  witness  Pac.  561. 

for  or   against   the  wife.     Whipp   v.  "  State  v.  Collins,  20  Iowa  85,  92 ; 

State,  34  Ohio  St.  87,  89,  32  Am.  359;  State  v.  Bernard,  45  Iowa  234;  State 

State  V.  Davidson,  yj  N.  Car.  522,  523,  v.  Lingle,  128  Mo.  528,  31  S.  W.  20, 

as  in  the  case  of  an  assault  by  the  22. 

wife  on  the  husband.  State  v.  Harris, 


187  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  35O 


ing  any  disqualification  either  may  have  been  under  because  of 
the  merger  of  the  legal  personality  of  the  wife  into  that  of  the 
husband.  This  principle  applied  in  civil  cases  only,  and  in  such 
cases  a  husband  or  wife  is  now  competent  as  a  witness  to  the 
same  extent  as  any  other  person  witl*  this  exception  (which  is 
recognized  in  all  the  states  which  have  legislated  upon  the  sub- 
ject), that  neither  can  be  permitted  to  disclose  confidential  com- 
munications which  passed  between  them  during  coverture/^ 

The  rule  of  the  statute  is  applicable  to  confidential  communi- 
cations which  are  contained  in  letters  or  other  writings  as  well 
as  to  those  which  are  of  ail  oral  nature.  Hence,  it  follows  that 
letters  passing  between  husband  and  wife  are  inadmissible  against 
either  of  them  on  trial  for  a  crime  where  by  accident  or  design 
they  have  been  delivered  by  the  person  wdio  received  them  to  the 
prosecuting  official.^''  But  it  must  appear,  to  bring  the  case  under 
the  statute,  that  the  letters  or  writings  contained  something  of  a 
confidential  nature.  This  fact  is  to  be  determined  by  the  reading 
of  the  writing  itself,  and  is  a  preliminary  question  for  the  court. 
If  the  communication  in  writing  is  not  confidential  per  se,  it  can- 
not be  made  so  by  the  accused  claiming  that  he  wrote  it  in  con- 
fidence. The  mere  objection  that  the  writing  is  confidential  will 
not  exclude  it  if  the  court  shall  decide  otherwise."" 

It  seems  that  a  written  communication  from  a  husband  to  his 
wife  may  lose  its  privileged  character  by  her  letting  it  go  out  of 
her  hands.  The  writing  is  no  longer  confidential  if  both  husband 
and  wife  have  relinquished  control  over  it."^ 

§  187.  Confidential  communications  between  husband  and  wife. — 
The  statutory  rule  forbidding  a  husband  or  wife  to  disclose  con- 
fidential communications  made  during  marriage  is  applicable  to 
criminal  trials.  Where  the  statute  declares  in  express  language 
that  "the  husband  or  wife  cannot  be  compelled  to  disclose  con- 
fidential communications,"  either  may  do  so  voluntarily  if  the 
other  consents  thereto, ^^^  though  the  privilege  is  absolute  and 

''  See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  167 ;  Cole  St.  538,  70  Atl.  865 ;  Hearne  v.  State, 

V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  App.  439,  88  S.  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  431 ;  97  S.  W.  1050. 

W.    341.      Comprehensive    notes    on  ""Caldwell  v.  State,  146  Ala.  141,  41 

questions   of  competency  of  husband  So.  473. 

or  wife  to  testify  for  or  against  each  "^  State  v.   Buffington,  20  Kan.  599, 

other  in  criminal  proceedings,  24  Am.  614,  27  Am.  193. 

St.  663,  106  Am.  St.  763-770.  ^a  Emmons  v.  Barton,  109  Cal.  662, 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Fisher,  221  Pa.  42  Pac.  303 ;  Southwick  v.  Southwick, 


351 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


187 


caniiot  be  waived  if  the  statute  declares  the  communication  to 
be  incompetent.^"  Where  a  communication  is  not  confidential 
(and  this  will  be  presumed  where  it  was  made  to  a  third  person 
by  the  husband  or  wife  in  the  presence  of  the  other-^),  or  where 
a  third  person  is  present,  or  is  concealed  and  overhears  an  inter- 
view between  husband  and  wife,  it  will  not  be  privileged,"*  and 
the  third  party  or  the  husband  or  wife  may  testify  to  what  was 
said.  But  sometimes  it  has  been  held  that  a  communication  need 
not  be  expressly  confidential  to  be  privileged,"^  and  this  certainly 
is  the  rule  when  the  statute  refers  to  all  communications  made 
during  marriage. ^° 

Under  such  a  statute  by  which  all  communications  made  during 
the  marriage  relation  are  excluded ;  either  party  may  testify  as 
to  the  fact  of  marriage  or  as  to  any  other  fact  which  is  not  con- 
tained in  a  communication  passed  between  the  parties."' 

A  conversation  between  husband  and  wife  is  no  less  confiden- 
tial because  children  were  present  who  took  no  part  in  it."^  The 
cessation  of  the  marital  relation  by  annullment,  divorce  or  death 
will  not  let  in  a  confidential  communication  made  while  it  existed. 


2  Sweeny  (N.  Y.  Super.)  234.  Thus, 
a  confession  by  a  wife  to  her  husband 
that  she  has  committed  incest,  extort- 
ed by  his  threats  to  leave  her,  and  its 
repetition,  under  similar  threats,  to  a 
third  person,  in  her  husband's  pres- 
ence, are  confidential  communications 
and  incompetent.  State  v.  Brittain, 
117  N.  Car.  783,  23  S.  E.  433.  Cf. 
ante,  §§  173,  174. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Cleary,  152 
Mass.  491,  25  N.  E.  834;  Head  v. 
Thompson,  ~7  Iowa  263,  42  N.  W. 
188.  The  prosecutor  in  a  trial  for  an 
assault  cannot  be  compelled  to  state 
whether  or  not  he  told  his  wife  that 
the  accused  had  acted  in  self-defense. 
The  law  regards  such  a  communica- 
tion as  confidential  and  will  not  com- 
pel its  disclosure.  Murphy  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 23  Graft.    (Va.)  960,  965. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Griffin,  no 
Mass.  181 ;  Mainard  v.  Reider,  2  Ind. 
App.  115,  28  N.  E.  196. 


"Commonwealth  v.  Griffin,  no 
Mass.  181 ;  Reynolds  v.  State,  147  Ind. 
3,  46  N.  E.  31 ;  State  v.  Center,  35 
Vt.  378;  People  V.  Lewis,  62  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  622,  16  N.  Y.  S.  881,  afif'd  in  136 
N.  Y.  633,  32  N.  E.  1014,  49  N.  Y.  St. 
913,  and  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §   168. 

"^  Commonwealth  v.  Hayes,  145 
Mass.  289,  293,  14  N.  E.  151 ;  Howard 
V.  Commonwealth,  118  Ky.  i,  80  S.  W. 
21  r,  81  S.  W.  704,  25  Ky.  Law  2213, 
where  a  wife  was  not  permitted  to 
testify  to  the  identity  of  a  letter  from 
her  husband. 

"-"  Campbell  v.  Chace,  12  R.  I.  2Z2> ', 
King  V.  King,  42  Mo.  App.  454;  Cole 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  xApp.  439,  88  S. 

w.  341. 

"  Chase  v.  United  States,  7  App.  D. 
C.  149- 

^Jacobs  V.  Hesler,  113  Mass.  157, 
160.  So  business  communications  are 
privileged.  Commonwealth  v.  Hayes, 
145  Mass.  289,  14  N.  E.  151.    A  boast- 


§  187  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE,  352 

A  divorced  husband  or  wife  cannot  testify  to  an  adulterous  act 
by  either,  or  any  other  fact  occurring  during  coverture."^ 

The  termination  of  the  marriage  relation  permits  either  party 
thereto  to  testify  thereafter  against  the  other  party  as  to  any 
incriminating  fact  occurring  after  the  termination  of  the  mar- 
riage.^" This  would  be  the  effect  of  a  decree  of  divorce  but  not 
of  a  mere  separation  by  decree  or  otherwise,  for  it  is  well  settled 
that  separation  and  non-cohabitation,  either  by  agreement  or  by 
a  decree  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  do  not  remove  the 
restriction  that  a  husband  and  wife  shall  not  testify  against  each 
other  on  a  criminal  trial, ^^ 

An  appeal  from  a  decree  of  divorce  does  not  prevent  the  decree 
from  putting  an  end  to  the  marriage  relations  as  of  the  date  of 
its  entry.  Though  an  appeal  has  been  taken,  either  party  may 
testify  on  a  criminal  trial  against  the  other  as  to  all  facts  arising 
after  the  decree.^" 

It  is  not  always  necessary  to  produce  the  decree  of  divorce  to 
show  that  the  witness  has  become  competent.  The  question  be- 
ing a  collateral  question,  the  rule  of  the  best  evidence  does  not 
apply  and  the  witness  may  testify  that  she  was  divorced  from  the 
accused  and  may  also  tesify  to  the  date  of  the  divorce. 

The  fact  that  she  has  been  divorced  may  be  implied  as  where, 
for  example,  in  a  homicide  case  a  witness  testifies  orally  that 
she  is  the  widow  of  the  victim  of  the  homicide.  Upon  such  a 
statement  by  a  woman  in  a  Kentucky  case,  it  was  held  that  she 
might,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  be  presumed  to 

ful  and  defiant  declaration  by  a  hus-  the  marriage  on  the  trial  of  his  wife 

band  to  his  wife  of  his  misconduct,  for    adultery    committed    during    the 

and  of  his  intention  to  openly  persist  coverture.     State  v.   Dudley,   7   Wis. 

in    it,    accompanied    by    insolent    and  664.     See,  also,   State  v.   Marvin,  35 

brutal    threats,    is    not    a    confidential  N.   H.   22,  26;    Stanley  v.   Montgom- 

communication.      Seitz   v.    Seitz,    170  ery,  102  Ind.  102,  26  N.  E.  213;  French 

Pa.  St.  71,  2,2  Atl.  578.  v.  Ware,  65  Vt.  338,  26  Atl.  1096.   Cf. 

'^  State  v.   Jolly,  3  Dev.   &  B.    (N.  ante,%  176;  State  v.  Nelson,  39  Wash. 

Car.)    no,    113.     How   far  this   case,  221,  81  Pac.  721. 

which   expressly   assumes  all   marital  ^"Tompkins  v.  Commonwealth,   117 

transactions  to  be  confidential,  would  Ky.  138,  77  S.  W.  712,  25  Ky.  L.  1254. 

apply  where  the  statute  restricts  the  ^*  Johnson   v.    State,   27   Tex.    App. 

privilege   to    confidential  -communica-  135,  11  S.  W.  34. 

tions,  is  by  no  means  certain.     A  di-  ""  State  v.   Leasia,  45   Ore.   410,   78 

vorced  husband  is  competent  to  prove  Pac.  328. 


353  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  8    loo 

ha\'e  been  divorced  from  her  former  husband  before  her  mar- 
riage to  the  deceased. ^^ 

And  either  party  to  the  marriage  relation  after  the  death  of  the 
other  may  testify  to  facts  which  he  or  she  learned  from  other 
sources  and  not  by  reason  of  such  relations. 

In  all  cases  where  the  question  of  the  competency  of  the  wife 
of  the  accused  to  testify  against  him  arises,  the  court  should  de- 
cide against  the  competency  of  the  witness  if  it  has  a  reasonable 
doubt  on  that  point. ^* 

§  188.  Husband  or  wife  of  co-defendant  as  a  witness  for  or  against 
Ids  associate  in  crime — Testimony  of  husband  or  wife  on  trial  of  a 
third  person  tending  to  criminate. — Whether  a  husband  or  wife  is 
competent  to  testify  as  a  witness  upon  the  trial  of  a  third  person 
for  a  crime  (where  the  spouse  of  the  witness  is  not  a  party  to 
the  record),  if  his  or  her  testimony  may  incriminate  the  other 
party  to  the  marriage  relation,  is  a  question  which  was  formerly 
much  discussed.  It  was  at  one  time  almost  universally  held  that 
such  evidence,  though  it  only  tended  to  incriminate  collaterally 
and  in  connection  with  other  circumstances,  was  inadmissible. 
But  the  rule  is  now  well  settled  that  this  evidence  is  to  be  re- 
ceived, not  only  as  to  those  facts  which,  though  innocent  in  them- 
selves, constitute  links  in  a  chain  of  proof  which  will  implicate 
the  husband  or  wife  of  the  witness,  but  also  as  to  those  facts 
which  are  directly  incriminating,^"  always  provided  the  spouse 
of  the  witness  is  not  a  party  to  the  record. 

Where  several  persons,  jointly  indicted  for  the  same  crime, 
are  tried  together,  a  different  rule  applies.  Then  the  husband 
or  wife   of  no  one   of  them   is   a  competent  witness   for,^*^   or 

''Tompkins  v.  Commonwealth,   117  Maule  &  Selw.   194;  State  v.  Welch, 

Ky.   138,  Tj  S.  W.  712,  25  Ky.  Law  26  Me.  30,  45  Am.  Dec.  94;  Common- 

1254.  wealth   V.    Gordon,    2    Brewst.    (Pa.) 

^  Porter   v.    United    States,  7   Ind.  569 ;   State  v.   Bridgmen,  49  Vt.  202, 

Terr.  616,  104  S.  W.  855.  209,  24  Am.  124.     But  compare  State 

''^Commonwealth  v.  Sparks,  7  Allen  v.  Gardner,  i  Root  (Conn.)  485;  State 

(Mass.)  534,  543;  Pruett  v.  State,  141  v.  Wilson,  31  N.  J.  L.  'JT. 
Ala.  69,  2)7  So.  343;  State  v.  Dudley,        ''Rex  v.  Frederick,  2  Stran.  1095; 

7  Wis.  664,  668;  State  v.  Marvin,  35  Rex  v.  Locker,  5  Esp.  107;  Common- 

N.   H.   22;    State  v.   Briggs,  9  R.   L  wealth  v.  Easland,  i  Mass.  15;  Com- 

361,  II  Am.  270;  Rex  v.  All  Saints,  6  monwealth     v.     Robinson,     i     Gray 
23 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


354 


against,^"  any  co-defendant.  Thus,  for  example,  where  two  or 
more  are  indicted  for  a  conspiracy,  the  wife  of  none  of  them  can 
testif}^  against  the  others  if  the  evidence  connects  her  husband 
with  the  common  plan  or  scheme. ^^  But  this  rule  of  exclusion 
should  be  thus  qualified.  The  wife  of  a  co-defendant  is  only 
excluded  in  cases  where  the  defendants  are  jointly  tried,  or 
where,  though  separately  tried,  the  nature  of  the  crime  charged 
is  such  that  the  acquittal  of  one  defendant  would  exonerate  her 
husband,  as  in  riots  and  conspiracies,  in  which  the  participation 
of  two  or  more  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  crime.^^ 

Hence,  where  several  are  indicted  for  a  crime  which  could 
have  been  committed  by  one  person,  as  well  as  by  several,  the 
husband  or  wife  of  either  may  testify  for  or  against  an  accom- 
phce,  jointly  indicted,  but  only  when  his  or  her  spouse  is  not 
a  party  to  the  record.'*'*  And  generally  where  a  wife  may  testify 
against  an  accomplice  of  her  husband  because,  under  the  circum- 
stances, her  testimony  will  not  injure  the  latter,  she  may  testify 
for  him,  when  he  is  separately  tried. "'^ 


(Mass.)  555,  560;  Moffit  v.  State,  2 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  99,  loi,  36  Am.  Dec. 
301 ;  Mask  v.  State,  32  Miss.  405,  410 ; 
State  V.  Smith,  2  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  402, 
405 :  Woodward  v.  State,  84  Ark.  1 19, 
104  S.  W.  1 109;  State  V.  Sargood,  -^ 
Vt.  80,  58  Atl.  971. 

^'  Whart.  Crim.  Ev.,  §  391 ;  Woods 
V.  State,  76  Ala.  35,  2>7,  38,  52  Am.  314 ; 
Rex  V.  Smith,  i  Mood.  C.  C.  289 :  Dill 
V.  State,  I  Tex.  App.  278,  283.  Contra, 
State  V.  Adams,  40  La.  Ann.  213,  3 
So.  733. 

**  Johnson  v.  State,  47  Ala.  9:  Rex 
V.  Smith,  I  Mood.  C.  C.  289;  United 
States  V.  Hanway,  2  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.) 
139,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15299,  4  Am.  Law  J. 
(X.  S.)  458. 

''  Workman  v.  State,  4  Sneed. 
(Tenn.)  425;  Moffit  v.  State,  2 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  99,  lOi,  36  Am.  Dec. 
301.  The  wife  of  one  of  several  de- 
fendants indicted  jointly  for  a  con- 
spiracy is  competent  against  the  con- 
spirators   other    than    her    husband 


when  he  has  pleaded  guilty.  Graff  v. 
People,  108  111.  App.  168. 

*"  I  Greenl.  on  Ev.  335 ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Manson,  2  Ashm.  (Pa.)  31. 
Against  an  accomplice,  State  v.  Dyer, 
59  Me.  303;  State  v.  Anthony,  i  Mc- 
Cord  (S.  Car.)  285:  Smith  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 90  Va.  759.  19  S.  E.  843 ; 
People  V.  Langtree,  64  Cal.  256,  30 
Pac.  813;  Moffit  V.  State,  2  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  99,  loi.  36  Am.  Dec.  301; 
Grimm  v.  People.  14  ]\Iich.  300:  BIu- 
man  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Crim.  App.  43, 
21  S.  W.  1027.  26  S.  W.  75 ;  State  v. 
Goforth,  136  Mo.  in,  37  S.  W.  801; 
State  v.  Rainsbarger,  71  Iowa  746,  31 
N.  W.  865:  State  v.  Wright,  41  La. 
Ann.  600,  603,  6  So.  135.  Contra, 
State  V.  Smith,  2  Ired.  (X.  Car.)  402, 
405;  Munyon  v.  State,  62  X.  J.  L.  i, 
42  Atl.  577;  Smartt  v.  State.  112  Tenn. 
539,  80  S.  W.  586:  State  V.  Smith,  5 
Penn.  (Del.)   i.  57  Atl.  368. 

"  Powell  V.  State.  58  Ala.  362 ;  Mof- 
fitt  V.  State,  2  Humph.  (Tenn.)  99,  36 


355  PRIVILEGED    COMMUXICATIOXS.  §    189 

§  189.  Valid  marriage  is  necessary. — The  burden  of  proving  that 
the  marriage  relation  exists  between  the  witness  and  the  accused 
rests  upon  the  party  opposing  the  competency  of  the  witness. 
Unless  a  marriage,  valid  or  at  least  apparently  valid  in  all  re- 
spects, is  shown  to  exist  at  the  time  the  witness  is  offered,  his 
or  her  testimony  must  be  received.  It  is  not  enough  that  the 
parties,  supposing  the  marriage  to  be  valid,  had  lived  together 
for  years  as  man  and  wife,  and  had  introduced  each  other  to  the 
world  as  such.  The  marriage  must  be  actually  and  in  fact  valid, 
and  must  have  existed  in  full  force  and  vigor  down  to  the  date 
of  the  crime  alleged.*^  The  validity  of  the  marriage  will  be  in- 
Cjuired  into  on  the  voir  dire  examination  of  the  witness,  and,  if 
the  relation  of  husband  and  wife  is  not  found  to  exist,  the  wit- 
ness is  competent  and  must  be  permitted  to  testify.*"  And  the 
fact  that  the  parties  have  lived  together  in  illicit  relations,  though 
holding  themselves  out  to  the  world  as  husband  and  wife,  is  com- 
petent and  admissible  as  an  objection  to  the  credibility  of  the 
witness.** 

§  190.    Privilege  as  relating  to  the  evidence  of  judicial  officers. — 

Because  of  the  peculiar  scope  and  nature  of  the  duties  of  a  judge 
presiding  at  a  criminal  trial  it  is  usually  considered  objectionable, 

Am.     Dec.    301 ;     Commonwealth    v.  616,  104  S.  W.  855 ;  State  v.  Rocker, 

Manson,  2  Ashm.   (Pa.)   31;  State  v.  130  Iowa  239,  106  N.  W.  645.    But  in 

Anthon3%    i    McCord    (S.    Car.)    285,  Dixon  v.  People,   18  Mich.  84,  91,  it 

286;    United     States    v.    Addatte,    6  was  said  that  evidence  that  an  actual 

Blatchf.    (U.    S.)    76,    24    Fed.    Cas.  marriage  existed,  though  only  prima 

14422.    Where  a  co-defendant  is  com-  facie  valid,  and  on  which  the  prisoner 

petent,  his  wife  is  also.     Blackburn  v.  had,  with  reason,  relied  and  acted  as 

Commonwealth,  12  Bujh  (Ky.)  181.  such,    will    preclude    the    prosecution 

"  State  V.  Samuel,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  (X.  from    attacking    the    validit\^    of    the 

Car.)    177-184;  Flanagin  v.   State,  25  marriage  collaterall}-. 

Ark.  92;   Rickerstricker  v.    State,   31  ^^  Peat's    Case,   2    Lew.    C.    C.    288; 

Ark.  207;  State  v.  Patterson,  2  Ired.  State  v.  Hancock,  28  Nev.  300,  82  Pac. 

(N.  Car.)  346,  355,  38  Am.  Dec.  699;  95;  People  v.  Anderson,  26  Cal.  129; 

Wells  v.  Fletcher,  5  C.  &  P.  12 ;  Wrye  People  v.  Alviso,  55  Cal.  230. 

V.    State,  95   Ga.  466,  22    S.    E.   273;  "Mann  v.   State,  44  Tex.  642,  643, 

People  v.  McCraney,  6  Park.  Cr.   (N.  citing  Ros.  Cr.  Ev.,  p.  148:  t  Phill.  on 

Y.)    49;    Commonwealth   v.    iMudgett,  Ev.,  pp.  69,  70;  i  Whart.  Am.  Cr.  Law 

174  Pa.  St.  211,  34  Atl.  588;  State  v.  (6th  Ed.)  §  772;  Hill  v.  State,  41  Ga. 

Hancock,   28   Nev.   300,  82   Pac.   95 ;  484,  503 ;  State  v.  Brown,  28  La.  Ann. 

Porter  v.  United  States,  7  Ind.  Ter.  279,  280. 


§    IQO  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  356 

if  not  incieed  erroneous,  for  him  to  take  tlie  witness  stand  on  the 
same  trial.  Aside  from  the  general  objection  that  judicial  con- 
duct should  not  be  subject  to  cross-examination  or  comment,  the 
peculiar  duties  of  the  judge  in  administering  oaths  to  the  witnesses 
in  case  the  court  has  no  clerk,  and  in  deciding  upon  their  com- 
petency, with  his  power  to  commit  for  contempt,  render  it  unfair 
that  he  should  assume  the  dual  character  of  witness  and  judge 
in  a  criminal  trial. ^^  This  rule,  which  is  based  rather  upon  the 
official  character  of  the  witness  than  upon  the  nature  of  the  testi- 
mony \vhich  he  may  give,  is  not  absolute,  and  if  the  judge  shall 
testify,  without  objection  from  the  accused,  no  error  has  been 
committed. *° 

And  these  considerations,  while  they  are  reasonable,  do  not 
apply  upon  the  trial  of  an  indictment  where  the  witness,  though 
a  judge,  is  not  presiding.  Hence  it  is  the  rule  that  a  judge  may 
testify  under  such  circumstances  to  any  matters  which  took  place 
before  him  in  open  court,*'  as,  for  example,  to  prove  the  evidence 
of  an  absent  or  deceased  witness  given  at  a  previous  trial. *^ 

In  some  states  there  are  statutes  providing  that  a  judge  may 
be  called  as  a  witness  by  either  party.  Under  such  a  statute  it 
has  been  held  that  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  judge  who  is 
called  to  be  a  witness,  either  to  suspend  the  trial  or  to  direct  that 

*'Rapalje  on  Witnesses,  §  45;  Peo-  tempt,  and  the   session  of  the  court 

pie  V.  Miller,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  197;  suspended?     Either  result  must  logic- 

Underhill  on  Ev.,  §  313.  ally  ensue,  and  both  are  equally  im- 

^^  People  V.  Dohring,  59  N.  Y.  374,  practicable.      People    v.    Dohring,    59 

17  Am.  349.    Even  to  permit  one  of  N.    Y.   374,    17   Am.   349;    Rogers    v. 

several  judges   to  testify  may  result  State,  60  Ark.  76,  87,  29  S.  W.  894,  46 

in  embarrassment  and  judicial   scan-  Am.  St.  164,  31  L.  R.  A.  465n;  State 

dal,  and  impede  the  course  of  justice,  v.   DeMaio,  69  N.  J.  L.  590,  55  Atl. 

A  judge  upon   the   witness    stand   is  644. 

subjected  to  all  the  duties  of  a  wit-  *' State  v.  Duffy,  57  Conn.  525,   18 

ness,  while  at  the  same  time  possess-  Atl.  791 ;  People  v.  Dohring,  59  N.  Y. 

ing  his  rights  and  privileges.     Who,  374,   17  Am.  349;   Reg.  v.  Harvey,  8 

then,   shall   decide  what  course  shall  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  99. 

be  taken  if,  for  reasons  sufficient  in  ^  Reg.  v.  Gazard,  8  C.  &  P.  595.  But 

his   opinion,   he   shall   decline   to    an-  a  judge  cannot  be  interrogated  as  to 

swer  a  question  put  to  him  as  a  wit-  privileged    communications    with    his 

ness?    Shall  he  ascend  the  bench,  and  colleagues,     i  Wharton  on  Ev.,  §  600. 

with  unseemliness  and  illegality  pass  Or  as  to  the  grounds  upon  which  he 

judicially  upon  his  own  conduct?  Or  decided  a  case.    Agan  v.  Hey,  30  Hun 

ought  he  to  be  committed   for  con-  (X.  Y.)  591. 


357  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  §    IQI 

it  shall  proceed  before  another  judge  or  not.  In  either  case  the 
judge  is  a  competent  witness  under  the  statute,  and  he  may,  under 
such  circumstances^  testify  to  the  same  facts  as  other  witnesses, 
except  that  he  cannot  be  questioned  as  to  consultations  with  his 
colleagues  or  similar  matters. 

For  example,  the  judge  holding  the  trial  may,  under  the  stat- 
ute, testify  that  the  testimony  of  the  witness  which  he  has  just 
heard  is  or  is  not  consistent  with  that  given  on  a  prior  trial,  and 
he  may,  if  he  can  do  so  orally,  state  the  evidence  or  state  it  after 
consulting  the  transcript  made  by  the  stenographer.*^ 

§  191.  Privilege  as  relating  to  grand  jurors. — Proceedings  before 
grand  jurors  may  be  regarded  as  privileged  communications. 
The  law  requires  that  the  preliminary  inquiry  into  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  accused  should  be  secret,  in  order  that  perfect 
freedom  of  discussion  may  be  had,  and  that  suspected  persons 
may  not  be  warned  of  their  danger  and  enabled  to  make  their 
escape.^'' 

Hence,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  permitting  a  disclosure,  a 
grand  juror  is  not  compellable  to  testify  as  a  witness  to  anything 
which  took  place  in  the  jury  room,  and  particularly  to  the  testi- 
mony which  was  heard,  unless  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  him 
to  do  so  in  order  to  prevent  a  miscarriage  of  justice.^^ 

He  cannot  be  compelled  to  disclose  as  a  witness  the  number 
of  grand  jurors  concurring  in  the  finding  of  an  indictment, °^  or 
to  state  the  evidence  on  which  it  was  found  in  order  to  impeach 

"State   V.   Houghton,  45  Ore.    no,  140,    and    see    remarks    of    court    in 

75  Pac.  887.  State  v.  Baker,  20  Mo.  338,  345- 

"  Little      V.       Commonwealth,      25  "  State  v.  Oxford,  30  Tex.  428,  431 ; 

Gratt.     (Va.)     921,    930;     Common-  State   v.   Hamlin,   47   Conn.   95,    114, 

wealth  V.   Scowden,  92  Ky.   120,   123,  115,  ^6  Am.   54;    State  v.    Davis,  41 

17   S.   W.  205,    13   Ky.   L.  404.     The  Iowa    311,    316;    Underhill    on    Evi- 

free,  impartial  and  unbiased  adminis-  dence,    §    176.     It   is   immaterial   that 

tration  of  justice   requires  that  pro-  the  juror  was  not  sworn  to  secrecy, 

ceedings  of  grand  jurors  shall  be  kept  Little    v.    Commonwealth,    25    Gralt. 

secret  in  order  that  perfect  freedom  (Va.)  921,  930. 

of    deliberation    and    opinion    among  ^°  Reg.  v.   Marsh,  6  Ad.   &  E.   236, 

jurors    may    be    effectually    obtained  250,  i  N.  &  P.  187,  2  H.  &  W.  366,  6 

and    an    energetic    administration    of  L.   J.    M.   C.   153;   Reg.  v.   Russell,    i 

criminal  justice  be  secured.  Common-  Carr.  &  M.  247;    State  v.   Baker,   20 

wealth  V.  Hill,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)   137,  Mo.  338,  345;   State  v.  Johnson,   115 


§  igi  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  358 

it,^''  or  wliat  opinion  any  juror  expressed,  or  how  any  juror  voted 
on  any  question. 

It  is  the  poHcy  of  the  law  that  ah  facts  which  are  brought  out 
in  the  preHminary  inquiry  before  tlie  grand  jury  should  be  for- 
ever secret.  Persons  who  are  present  in  the  grand  jury  room 
but  not  under  an  oath  of  secrecy,  as  the  clerk  to  the  grand  jury,°* 
or  the  state's  attorney,^^  the  witnesses  or  any  other  persons,^*"* 
are  not  competent  as  witnesses  to  prove  anything  that  w^as  said 
or  done. 

An  indictment  when  found  by  the  grand  jury  and  filed  in  court 
is  a  judicial  record  presumptively  true  and  correct.  It  cannot 
be  collaterally  impeached  by  evidence  on  the  trial  after  the  de- 
fendant has  pleaded.  But  where  justice  requires  it,  an  indict- 
ment or  presentment  will  be  set  aside  by  the  court  on  motion  for 
proper  cause.  On  such  a  motion  a  grand  juror  may  testify  that 
the  indictment  was  indorsed  "a  true  bill"  by  mistake, '^"  or  that 
the  jury  acted  upon  evidence  and  not  upon  their  own  knowledge 
or  observation  in  making  a  presentment,^®  or  that  some  mistake, 
misunderstanding  or  irregularity  has  occurred  which  would  jus- 
tify setting  it  aside. '"'^  The  secrecy  imposed  by  the  common  law 
and  statutes  on  proceeding  before  a  grand  jury  will  not  prevent 
the  public  or  an  individual  from  proving  by  members  of  the  jury 
what  passed  before  it  when,  after  the  purpose  of  secrecy  has  been 
effected,  such  disclosure  becomes  necessary  in  the  furtherance  of 
justice  or  the  protection  of  public  or  individual  rights.*^''     So,  a 

Mo.  480,  22  S.  W.  463.     See,  contra,        °^  McLellan  v.    Richardson,    13   Me. 

Low's  Case,  4  Greenl.  (Me.)  439,  446,  82. 

453,   16  Am.   Dec.  27111,  holding  that        '*"  Chit.    C.    L.    317;    Rose.    Cr.    Ev. 

the   concurrence   of    twelve   or   more  (7th    ed.)     154;    State    v.    Fasset,    16 

in  a  bill  is  not  a  secret,  but  a  result  Conn.  457,  470. 

which    the    grand    jury    of    necessity        ^"  State  v.  Horton,  63  N.  Car.  595. 

disclose  publicly  every  time  they  pro-        ^*  Commonwealth  v.  Green,  126  Pa. 

mulgate  their  decision  on  any  bill  be-  St.  531,  536,  17  Atl.  878,  12  Am.  St. 

fore  them.     See,  also,  Sparrenberger  894n. 

v.  State,  S3  Ala.  481,  486,  25  Am.  643.        ^'People   v.    Hulbut,   4   Denio    (N. 

°' People    v.    Hulbut,   4    Denio    (N.  Y.)   133,  136,  47  Am.  Dec.  244;  Com- 

Y.)   133,  135,  47  Am.  Dec.  244;  State  monwealth   v.    McComb,    157    Pa.    St. 

v.  Comeau,  48  La.  Ann.  249,   19  So.  611,  27  Atl.  714;  People  v.  Briggs,  60 

130.     See,  ante,  §§  25^29.  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  17. 

"12  Vin.  Abr.  38.  "^  State   v.    Campbell,   73   Kan.   688, 

8s  Pac.  784,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  S33n. 


359  PRIVILEGED    COMMUXICATIOXS.  g    I92 

grand  juror  has  been  permitted  to  testify  to  what  the  defendant 
stated  and  confessed  to  the  grand  jury;*"^  that  he  manifested 
great  anxiety  to  fix  the  charge  upon  another,*^-  and  that  a  person 
named  was  not  a  witness  before  the  grand  jury/" 


63 


§  192.    Statutory  regulation  of  the  competency  of  grand  jurors. — 

The  common  law  obhgation  of  secrecy  incumbent  upon  grand 
jurors  is  generally,  if  not  universally,  confirmed  by  statutes  in 
the  several  states,  which,  being  remedial  in  their  character,  should 
be  strictly  construed.  Their  operation  is  usually  confined,  in  ex- 
press terms,  to  the  evidence  and  the  names  of  the  witnesses  who 
appear  before  the  grand  jury.  As  to  other  matters  within  the 
knowledge  of  its  members,  the  common-law  rules  still  suffice. 
Some  states  have,  in  recent  years,  enacted  statutes  permitting 
evidence  given  before  the  grand  jury  to  be  disclosed,  and  making 
a  grand  juror  a  competent  witness  in  certain  cases.  First,  where 
it  is  material  to  ascertain  w^hether  the  testimony  of  a  witness 
before  the  grand  jury  is  consistent  with  or  different  from  the  evi- 
dence of  the  same  w^itness  at  the  trial,"*  and,  second,  to  disclose 
the  testimony  given  before  them  of  any  witness  upon  a  charge 
against  him  of.  perjury.  Statutes  of  this  sort  must  be  strictly 
construed,  and  it  is  doubtless  the  rule,  that  if  such  a  statute  ex- 
pressly states  in  what  cases  a  grand  juror  may  disclose  evidence 
which  he  has  heard,  he  can  do  so  in  no  other.''^    The  cases,  how- 

"  United  States  v.  Porter,  2  Cranch  certain  statements   before   the   grand 

C.    C.    60,    63,    27    Fed.    Cas.    16072;  jury.      Jones     v.     Turpin,    6    Heisk. 

United   States   v.    Charles,   2   Cranch  (Tenn.)    181,    185;    Gordon   v.   Com- 

C.  C.  76,  ^T,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14786.  monweahh,   92   Pa.    St.   216,   221,   3-7 

^^  State  V.   Broughton,  7  Ired.    (N.  Am.  672;  Reg.  v.  Gibson,  i  Carr.  & 

Car.)  96,  loi,  45  Am.  Dec.  507.  M.  672. 

°^  Commonwealth  v.   Hill,   11   Cush.  "^  State  v.  Gibbs,  39  Iowa  318,  322; 

(Mass.)   137.  Commonwealth   v.    Scowden,   92    Ky. 

"Little      V.      Commonwealth,      25  120,    122,    17    S.   W.   205,    13   Ky.   L. 

Gratt.     (Va.)     921,     931;     Common-  404;    State   v.    Hayden,   45    Iowa    11, 

wealth  V.  Mead,  12  Gray  (Mass.)   167,  15;  Ruby  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  353, 

170,    171,   71    Km.    Dec.    741;    United  356;  Spratt  v.  State,  8  Mo.  247;  State 

States  V.  Reed,  2  Blatchf.  C.  C.  435,  v.    Beebe,    17    Minn.    241 ;     State    v. 

465,   27    Fed.    Cas.    16134;    People    v.  Grady,  84  Mo.  220;  Jenkins  v.  State, 

Hulbut,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.)   133,  135,  47  35   Fla.   T^l,    18  So.    182,  48  Am.   St. 

Am.  Dec.  244;  Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  267;  State  v.  Campbell,  Tz  Kan.  688, 

Ind.  334,  47  X.'e.  157.     The  witness  85  Pac.  784. 
must   be   asked   if    he   has   not   made 


§193  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  360 

ever,  are  not  harmonious  in  construing  such  statutes,  and  in  some 
of  the  states  grand  jurors  have  been  permitted  to  divulge  evi- 
dence given  before  them  in  cases  that  could  by  no  means  be 
brought  under  the  statute.*'*' 

Prosecutions  for  perjury  committed  by  witnesses  testifying 
before  the  grand  jury  have  been  comparatively  rare.  It  is  a  well- 
settled  rule,  however,  both  at  common  law*'^  and  by  statute,  that 
any  member  of  the  grand  jury  may  be  compelled  to  testify  to  the 
evidence  of  the  accused  given  before  the  grand  jury.  If  this 
were  not  permitted  it  is  very  possible  that  untruthful  witnesses 
would  be  able  to  commit  perjury  before  the  grand  jury  with 
perfect  impunity,  while  subjecting  all  persons  against  whom 
they  might  cherish  animosity  to  accusations  and  arrest.*'^  The 
secrecy  of  the  grand  jury  proceedings  is  due  to  the  public  alone 
and  is  to  protect  the  jurors.  It  cannot  be  claimed  as  a  privilege 
by  a  witness  who  testifies  falsely  before  a  grand  jury  and  who  is 
subsequently  indicted  for  the  perjury.*'^ 

§  193.  Evidence  of  traverse  jurors. — As  regards  traverse  jurors 
the  rule  seems  now  to  be  that  they  may  testify  only  to  facts  or 
communications  referring  to  their  actions  as  individuals  while 
separated  from  their  associates.  They  may  testify  to  what  third 
persons  said  or  did  to  them  as  individual  jurors.  But  the  motives 
and  reasons  of  the  jury  and  the  transactions  and  communications 
referring  to  the  subject-matter  under  their  consideration  as  an 
official  body,  and  which  were  made  in  their  capacity  as  jurors, 
are  privileged,  whether  made  in  the  jury  room  or  elsewhere.'" 

*^  State  V.   Moran,   15  Ore.  262,   14  ler  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  632,  58  S.  E. 

Pac.  419;  State  v.  Broughton,  7  Ired.  1066;    State   v.    Benner,   64    Me.   267, 

(N.  C.)g6,  45  Am.  Dec.  507;  People  285. 

V.  Young,  31  Cal.  563;  State  v.  Wood,  "^People  v.  Young,  31  Cal.  563,  564. 

53  N.  H.  484;  Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  On  the  incompetency  of  grand  jurors 

Ind.  334,  47  N.  E.  157.  as  witnesses,  see,  Thompson  &  Mer- 

°'Thomp.    &    M.    on    Juries,    744;  riam  on  Juries,  §  701-707,  where  the 

State    V.    Fasset,    16   Conn.   457,  468;  subject  is  exhaustively  discussed.  Pil- 

United  States  v.  Reed,  2  Blatchf.   C.  grim  v.  State  (Okla.  Cr.  App.,  1909), 

C.  435,  466,  27  Fed.  Cas.  16134;  Peo-  104  Pac.  383. 

pie  V.  Young,  31  Cal.  563.  ™  Commonwealth     v.     White,     147 

^  State  V.   Broughton,  7  Ired.    ( N.  Mass.   76,  80,    16  N.   E.    707.     For   a 

C.)   96,  lOi,  45  Am.  Dec.  507;  Zeig-  general  discussion  of  this  subject  and 

cases,  see  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  176. 


36i 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


193 


Evidence  from  the  jurors  to  show  their  ignorance,"^  or  miscon- 
duct/" or  to  impeach  their  verdict  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
a  new  trial,  cannot  be  received/^  The  admission  of  such  evidence 
is  contrary  to  pubHc  poHcy  and  injurious  to  the  administration 
of  justice.  It  would  expose  the  jurors  to  offers  of  bribes  if  a 
new  trial  could  be  procured  for  the  accused  upon  the  affidavits 
of  jurors.  But  the  evidence  of  a  juror  may  be  introduced  to 
show  the  misconduct  or  mistakes  of  others.  Thus  the  affidavit 
of  a  juryman  has  been  received  to  show  that  the  foreman  made  a 
mistake  in  announcing  a  verdict,  or  the  clerk  a  mistake  in  enter- 
ing it,  or  to  show  the  misconduct  of  the  officer  having  the  jury 
in  charge.  And  the  general  rule  that  a  verdict  may  not  be  im- 
peached is  not  without  exceptions,^'*  as  for  example  where  it  ap- 
peared that  a  verdict  of  guilty  was  rendered  on  insufficient  evi- 
dence with  the  expectation  of  executive  clemency.  So  it  may  be 
shown  by  a  juror's  testimony  that  the  trial  judge  promised  them 
if  they  would  convict  they  might  rely  upon  him  to  be  clement  to 
the  prisoner.^^ 


"  State  V.  Cobbs,  40  W.  Va.  718,  22 
S.  E.  310. 

"  State  V.  Wood,  124  Mo.  412,  417, 
27  S.  W.  1 1 14;  State  V.  Best,  11 1  N. 
Car.  638,  643,  15  S.  E.  930;  State  v. 
McLeod,  I  Hawkes  (N.  Car.)  344, 
346;  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth,  90 
Va.  109,  117,  17  S.  E.  812;  State  v. 
Dusenberry,  112  Mo.  277,  295,  20  S. 
W.  461 ;  State  v.  Plum,  49  Kan.  679, 
31  Pac.  308;  Mattox  v.  United  States, 
146  U.  S.  140,  36  L.  ed.  917,  13  Sup. 
Ct.  50;  Heller  v.  People,  22  Colo.  11, 
43  Pac.  124;  Carr  v.  State,  96  Ga. 
284,  22  S.  E.  570;  Mitchell  v.  State, 
36  Tex.  Cr.  App.  278,  33  S.  W.  367. 

"In  Woodward  v.  Leavitt,  107 
Mass.  453,  461,  9  Am.  49,  where  this 
subject  is  fully  discussed,  the  court 
says :  "The  proper  evidence  of  the 
decision  of  the  jury  is  the  verdict  re- 
turned by  them  upon  oath  and  af- 
firmed in  open  court;  it  is  essential 


to  the  freedom  and  independence  of 
their  deliberations  that  their  discus- 
tions  in  the  jury  room  should  be  kept 
secret  and  inviolable."  No  affidavit 
or  other  sworn  statement  will  be  re- 
ceived to  impeach  a  verdict,  to  ex- 
plain it  or  to  show  on  what  grounds 
it  was  rendered.  Kelh^  v.  State,  39 
Fla.  122,  22  So.  303;  Weatherford  v. 
State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  530,  536,  21 
S.  W.  251,  37  Am.  St.  828;  McTyier 
V.  State,  91  Ga.  254,  260,  18  S.  E. 
140;  Smith  V.  State,  59  Ark.  132,  140, 
43  Am.  St.  20;  State  v.  Senn.,  32  S. 
Car.  392,  408,  II  S.  E.  292;  State  v. 
Bennett,  40  S.  Car.  308,  311,  18  S.  E. 
886.  As  to  testimony  of  judges  and 
jurors  as  to  identity  of  crime  and 
prisoner,  see  §  197,  post. 

'*  Crawford  v.  State,  2  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  60,  67,  24  Am.  Dec.  467n. 

"McBean  v.  State,  83  Wis.  206, 
211,  53  N.  W.  497. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

EVIDENCE    OF    FORMER    JEOPARDY. 

§  194.    Pica   of   former  conviction   or  196.  Essential  facts  to  be  shown, 

acquittal.  197.  Identity  of  crime  and  person. 

195.    The  record  of  the  former  trial  198.  Criminal  judgments  as  admis- 
as  evidence.  sions. 

§  194.  Plea  of  former  conviction  or  acquittal. — The  pleas  of 
autrefois  acquit  and  autrefois  convict  are  pleas  in  bar  which  are 
favorably  regarded  by  the  law.  By  a  plea  of  autrefois  acquit 
the  accused  in  effect  claims  that  he  has  already  been  acquitted  of 
the  identical  crime  with  w^hich  he  now  stands  indicted,  while  by 
the  plea  of  autrefois  convict  he  declares  that  he  was  formerly 
convicted  of  the  same  crime.  Any  extended  consideration  of  the 
form  of  such  pleas  or  of  the  order  or  method  in  which  they  must 
be  made  is  manifestly  out  of  place  here.  They  will  be  found 
sufficiently  discussed  in  works  treating  of  the  details  of  criminal 
trial  procedure.^  Here  we  can  only  consider  what  facts  must  be 
alleged  and  proved  under  these  pleas  and  the  mode  of  proving 
them. 

§  195.  The  record  of  the  former  trial  as  evidence. — In  most  of  the 
states,  a  plea  of  former  acquittal  or  conviction  must  be  specially 
pleaded  in  bar.  Such  a  plea  is  not  proper  as  a  defense  nor  can 
evidence  be  offered  to  show  a  former  conviction  or  acquittal  un- 
der a  plea  of  not  guilty.  In  other  states  it  has  been  held  that  a 
defense  of  former  acquittal  or  conviction  may  be  shown  under  a 
plea  of  not  guilty.  A  special  plea  in  those  states  is  unnecessary. 
A  plea  of  former  acquittal  or  conviction  can  only  be  pleaded  after 
an  actual  acquittal  or  conviction.  It  cannot  be  based  upon  the 
fact  that  another  indictment  is  pending  for  the  same  crime. ^ 

If  a  statute  provides  that  a  prosecution  shall  be  suspended  upon 
the  accused  making  restitution  so  far  as  he  can,  it  will  be  pre- 

■^  Elliott    Ev.,    §    2730 ;    burden    of         "  i  Chitty  Cr.  L.  463. 
proof  of  jeopardy,  Elliott  Ev.,  §  2731. 

362 


363  FORMER    JEOPARDY.  §    195 

sumed,  where  the  accused  in  a  subsequent  prosecution  for  the 
same  offense  alleges  former  jeopardy,  that  he  consented  to  the 
suspension,  and  the  prosecution  need  not  prove  an  express  consent 
on  his  part.^ 

Though  it  is  never  necessary  to  prove  a  formal  sentence  to 
sustain  a  plea  of  former  acquittal  or  conviction,*  it  is  always 
necessary  to  show  that  the  trial  came  to  an  actual  end.^  The 
best  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  trial  was  terminated  is  the  ju- 
dicial record  of  the  prior  proceedings.  Ordinarily,  this  must  be 
produced  to  show  the  former  conviction  or  acquittal  and  parol 
evidence  of  its  contents  is  usually  not  received,  unless  its  loss  or 
destruction  is  shown.*' 

If  the  record  has  not  been  made  up.  a  continuance  must  be 
granted  in  order  that  the  accused  may  have  an  opportunity  by 
means  of  a  mandamus  to  compel  the  clerk  to  make  it  up."  Under 
all  circumstances,  the  accused  should  have  a  reasonable  time  to 
enable  him  to  produce  the  record.^  While  it  is  true  that  the  fact 
of  former  acquittal  or  conviction  cannot  be  proved  by  parol, 
there  are  certain  facts  in  connection  with  the  former  trial  that 
must  necessarily  be  proved  by  oral  evidence.®^  For  example,  it 
may  be  shown  orally  that  the  verdict  was  not  properly  received  f 
that  the  jury  were  discharged  because  they  could  not  agree  upon 
a  verdict,^"  or  that  the  indictment  was  not  maintained  by  the 
evidence  at  the  trial. ^^ 

*  Burnett  v.  State,  76  Ark.  295,  88  ^  Rex  v.  Bowman,  6  C.  &  P.  loi,  25 
S.  W.  956.  E.  C.  L.  342. 

*  State  V.  Elden,  41  Me.  165,  168 ;  ^  Brady  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Bibb. 
State  V.  Benham,  7  Conn.  414;  Shep-  (Ky.)  517. 

herd  v.  People,  25  N.  Y.  406,  420,  421.  *a Jacobs   v.    State,   4   Lea    (Tenn.) 

*  Lipscomb  v.  State,  76  Miss.  223,  196 ;  Bailey  v.  State,  26  Ga.  579,  581 ; 
25  So.  158;  State  v.  Williams  (N.  Brown  v.  State,  72  Miss.  95,  97,  16 
Car.,  1909),  65  S.  E.  908.  So.   202;    Walter   v.    State,    105    Ind. 

"Walter  v.  State,  105  Ind.  589,  593,  589,  593,  5  N.  E.  73s;  Farley  v.  State, 

5  N.  E.  735;  Rocco  V.  State,  37  :\Iiss.  57    Ind.    331;    but   compare,    Durland 

357;  State  V.  Orr,  64  Mo.  339;  Peo-  v.  United  States,  161  U.  S.  306,  40  L. 

pie  V.  Benjamin,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  ed.  709,  16  Sup.  Ct.  508. 

201 ;    Robbins    v.    Budd,    2    Ohio    16,  *  State  v.  Scott,  i  Kan.  App.  748,  42 

docket  of  justice;   State  v.  Hudkins,  Pac.  264. 

35  W.  Va.  247,  13  S.  E.  367;  Re.x  v.  ^"  Helm  v.  State,  67  Miss.  562,  7  So. 

Bowman,  6  C.  &  P.  loi,  25  E.  C.  L.  487. 

342.  "  State  V.  Judge,  42  La.   Ann.  414, 

7  So.  678. 


§  196  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  364 

Parol  evidence  is  always  admissible  to  show  that  there  were 
fraud  and  collusion  on  a  prior  trial  where  the  conviction  or  ac- 
quittal was  the  result  of  such  fraud  or  collusion.^^  If  it  shall 
appear  that  the  verdict  of  guilty  on  a  former  trial  was  subse- 
quently set  aside,  the  record  is  not  admissible,  for  the  verdict  and 
all  incidents  stand  or  fall  together.  ^^ 

The  record  of  the  former  trial  so  far  as  it  is  admissible  is  con- 
clusive upon  both  parties,  as  to  all  issues  which  were  raised  or 
could  have  been  raised  on  a  former  proceeding/* 

The  general  rule  that  a  prior  judgment  on  the  merits  is  con- 
clusive upon  the  parties  thereto,  and  that  it  will  be  deemed  to 
have  established  all  facts  which  were  essential  to  the  rendition  of 
the  judgment  in  any  subsequent  proceeding  between  the  same 
parties,  is  applicable  to  criminal  trial/^ 

§  196.  Essential  facts  must  be  proved. — The  fact  that  a  valid  in- 
dictment was  found  against  the  accused,  and  that  on  pleading 
thereto  he  was  regularly  acquitted  or  convicted  must  be  proved  by 
relevant  evidence  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court.  In  the  first  place, 
it  may  be  said  that  a  plea  of  former  acquittal  or  conviction  is  not 
good  unless  it  shall  substantially  appear  in  evidence  that  the  pre- 
vious trial  was  upon  the  merits.^® 

Thus,  the  discharge  of  the  accused  on  his  prior  trial  because 
the  prosecution  was  not  commenced  within  the  statute  of  limita- 
tion,^^ or  for  failure  tO'  admonish  the  jury  before  their  separa- 

"  State    V.    Reed,    26    Conn.    202;  the  same  court,  but  no  judgment  has 

Commonwealth  v.  Dascom,  in  Mass.  been  entered,  accused  must  move  that 

404.  judgment  be  entered  before  he  pleads 

"  Bailey  v.  State,  26  Ga.  579,  581.  a  prior  conviction.     De  Leon  v.  State 

"Myers  v.  State,  92  Ind.  390,  396;  (Tex.),  114  S.  W.  828. 

Smurr  v.   State,  105  Ind.   125,   133,  4  "  Commonwealth  v.  Curtis,  Thach. 

N.  E.  445;  Commonwealth  v.  Evans,  Cr.    Cas.    (Mass.)    202;    Halloran    v. 

loi   Mass.  25,  27;   Commonwealth  v.  State,    80    Ind.    586,    591;    State    v. 

Goddard,  13  Mass.  455,  457;  State  v.  Hodgkins,  42  N.   H.  474,  477;   State 

Kelsoe,  11  Mo.  App.  91,  92;  State  v.  v.  White,  8  Wash.  230,  35  Pac.  iioo; 

Taylor  (Miss.  1898),  23  So.  34.  Ballowe  v.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  44 

"Commonwealth     v.      Evans,     loi  S.  W.  646,  19  Ky.  L.  1867;  People  v. 

Mass.  25,  27;  Commonwealth  v.  Aus-  Fishman,  64  Misc.    (N.  Y.)   256,   119 

tin,  (yj  Mass.  595,  597 ;  State  v.  Lang,  N.  Y.  S.  89. 

63   Me.  215,  220.     If   the  prior   trial  ''  Xagel   v.    People,  229  111.  598,  82 

was   on  the  same  indictment  and   in  N.  E.  315. 


365 


FORMER   JEOPARDY. 


197 


tion/^  or  because  the  jury  could  not  agree  after  repeated  instruc- 
tions/® is  not  sufficient  to  sustain  a  plea  of  former  jeopardy. 

So,  also,  it  is  a  general  rule  well  sustained  by  the  cases  that  a 
judgment  in  criminal  and  in  civil  cases  in  order  to  be  conclusive 
as  a  bar  on  the  parties  in  a  subsequent  proceeding,  must  have  been 
rendered  by  a  court  having  proper  jurisdiction  and  whose  pro- 
ceedings were  wholly  regular.-"  If  the  indictment  on  a  former 
trial  was  bad,  so  that  a  conviction  thereon  would  be  set  aside  be- 
cause of  the  insufficiency  of  the  indictment,  a  plea  of  former  ac- 
quittal or  conviction  is  not  sustained.-^ 

Usually  the  record  Is  proper  evidence  to  prove  that  the  court 
had  jurisdiction  and  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  its  loss  or  destruc- 
tion, its  production  to  prove  jurisdiction  may  be  required  as  the 
best  evidence  of  that  fact."" 

§  197.  Identity  of  crime  and  person. — The  accused  must  show 
by  evidence  independently  of  the  record  the  identity  of  the  crime 
for  which  he  was  convicted  or  acquitted  with  that  for  which  he  is 
now  on  trial  as  regards  time,^^  place  and  character.^* 


^'  State  V.  McKinney,  76  Kan.  419, 
91  Pac.  1068. 

"Johnson  v.  State,  54  Fla.  45,  44 
So.  760;  Keerl  v.  State,  213  U.  S.  135, 
53  L.  ed.  — ,  29  Sup.  Ct.  469,  afif'g 
State  V.  Keerl,  33  Mont.  501,  85  Fac. 
862. 

■"  McNeil  V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  48, 
14  S.  W.  393 ;  Blyew  v.  Common- 
wealth, 91  Ky.  200,  15  S.  W.  356,  12 
Ky.  L.  742;  Alford  v:  State,  25  Fla. 
852,  6  So.  857;  Smith  v.  State,  67 
Miss.  116,  7  So.  208;  State  v.  Phil- 
lips, 104  N.  Car.  786,  ID  S.  E.  463; 
People  V.  Hamberg,  84  Cal.  468,  24 
Pac.  298;  State  v.  Hodgkins,  42  N. 
H.  474,  477 ;  State  v.  Odell,  4  Blackf . 
(Ind.)  156;  Commonwealth  v.  Peters, 
12  Met.  (Mass.)  387;  Commonwealth 
V.  Bosworth,  113  Mass.  200,  202,  18 
Am.  467;  Brown  v.  State,  105  Ala. 
117,  16  So.  929;  People  V.  Connor, 
142  N.  Y.  130,  133,  36  N.  E.  807; 
Dulin  V.   Lillard    (Dulin's  Case),  91 


Va.  718,  20  S.  E.  821,  822;  State  v. 
Sommers,  60  Minn.  90;  61  N.  W. 
907.    Underhill  on  Ev.,  §  152. 

"  Timon  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
363,  30  S.  W.  808,  1063;  State  V. 
Littschke,  27  Ore.  189,  40  Pac.  167; 
United  States  v.  Barber,  21  D.  C. 
456;  Shepler  v.  State,  114  Ind.  194, 
198,  16  N.  E.  521;  Ford  v.  State,  7 
Ind.  App.  567,  570,  35  N.  E.  34. 

"  State  V.  Salge,  2  Nev.  321 ;  State 
V.  Spencer,  10  Humph.  (Tenn.)  431, 
432;  Brill  V.  State,  i  Tex.  App.  152. 

^  People  V.  Gault,  104  Mich.  575,  62 
N.  W.  724;  Reed  v.  State  (Tex. 
1895),  29  S.  W.  1085;  Bickham  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  150,  loi  S. 
W.  210. 

'-' Wilkinson  v.  State,  59  Ind.  416, 
26  Am.  84;  Nagel  v.  People,  229  111. 
598,  82  N.  E.  315;  Brown  v.  State,  72 
Miss.  95,  16  So.  202;  Henry,  In  re, 
(Idaho)  99  Pac.  1054;  State  v.  Hud- 
kins,  35  W.  Va.  247,   13  S.  E.  367; 


§  197 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


366 


The  identity  of  the  person  who  stands  accused  with  the  person 
formerly  acquitted  or  convicted  must  also  be  shown,  and  may  be 
proved  by  parol  evidence,  though  identity  of  name  may  usually  be 
sufficient  proof  of  identity  of  person  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to 
the  contrary.'^  The  burden  of  proof  to  show  the  fact  of  the  for- 
mer acquittal  or  conviction  and  also  to  show  the  identity  of  the 
person  and  of  the  crime  is  always  upon  the  accused.  "^ 

Whether  the  proof  of  former  acquittal  or  conviction  is  suffi- 
cient is  a  question  for  the  court  to  determine  upon  all  the  facts 
and  usually,  unless  it  is  evident  that  gross  injustice  has  been  done, 
the  determination  of  the  court  will  not  be  reviewed."^ 

If  the  accused  offers  no  proof  to  sustain  a  plea  of  former  ac- 
quittal or  conviction,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  direct  the  jury 
to  find  for  the  prosecution.^^ 

Parol  evidence  from  a  judge,  juror  or  witness  at  the  former 
trial  is  admissible  to  show  the  identity  both  of  the  person  and  of 
the  crime.*'' 


Durland  v.  United  States,  161  U.  S. 
306,  40  L.  ed.  709,  16  Sup.  Ct.  508; 
Inman  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  36, 

30  S.  W.  219;  State  V.  Chinault,  55 
Kan.  326,  40  Pac.  662;  State  v.  Rob- 
inson, 116  N.  Car.  1046,  21  S.  E.  701; 
Reddy  v.  Commonwealth,  97  Ky.  7S4, 

31  S.  W.  730,  17  Ky.  L.  536;  State  v. 
Waterman,  87  Iowa  255,  54  N.  W. 
359;  State  v.  Wister,  62  Mo.  592; 
Burk  V.  State,  8r  Ind.  128;  King  v. 
State,  43  Tex.  351 ;  State  v.  Atkin- 
son, 9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  677;  David- 
son V.  State,  99  Ind.  366,  367;  Foster 
V.  State,  39  Ala.  229,  234;  Vowells  v. 
Commonwealth,  83  Ky.  193,  7  Ky. 
L.  176;  Sims  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
649,  I  S.  W.  465;  Faulk  V.  State,  52 
Ala.  415,  417;  Jenkins  v.  State,  78 
Ind.  133,  134;  Beyerline  v.  State,  147 
Ind.  125,  45  N.  E.  772. 

"^  State  V.  Kelsoe,  11  Mo.  App.  91, 
92. 

■•'Faulk  V.  State,  52  Ala.  415;  Em- 
erson V.  State,  43  Ark.  372;  State  v. 
Norman,   135   Iowa   483,    113   N.   W. 


340;  Vowells  V.  Commonwealth,  S3 
Ky.  193,  7  Ky.  L.  176;  Cooper  v. 
State,  47  Ind.  61 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Wermouth,  174  Mass.  74,  54  N.  E. 
352;  Brown  v.  State,  72  Miss.  95,  97, 
16  So.  202 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Daley, 

4  Gray  (Mass.)  209;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hoffman,  121  Mass.  369;  State  v. 
Ackerman,  64  N.  J.  L.  99,  45  Atl.  27; 
People  V.  Cramer,  5  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)   171. 

"'  State  V.  Bradley,  45  Ark.  31.  See 
Allen  V.  State,  70  Ark.  22,  65  S.  W. 
933;  Daniels  v.  State,  78  Ga.  98,  6 
Am.  St.  238n ;  People  v.  Richards,  44 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  278;   State  v.  Bronkol, 

5  N.  Dak.  507,  67  N.  W.  680. 

""  Territory  v.  West  (N.  Mex. 
1909),  99  Pac.  343- 

^  Bainbridge  v.  State,  30  Ohio  St. 
264;  Rocco  V.  State,  37  Miss.  357; 
Brown  v.  State,  72  Miss.  95,  97,  16 
So.  202;  Page  V.  Commonwealth,  27 
Gratt.  (Va.)  954;  Commonwealth  v. 
Chilson,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  15;  Com- 
monwealth V.   Austin,  97   Mass.   595, 


367  FORMER    JEOPARDY.  §    198 

§  198.  Criminal  judgments  as  admissions. — A  judgment  in 
a  criminal  trial  may  under  some  circumstances  be  admissible 
in  a  subsequent  civil  proceeding.  Thus,  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  an  assault  and  battery,  the  plaintiff  may  prove  that 
the  defendant  v^^as  arrested  and  placed  on  trial  for  the  same,  and 
also  that  he  was  tried  and  found  guilty,  or  that  he  pleaded  guilty 
and  was  sentenced.  Such  a  determination,  deliberately  made,  is  of 
the  highest  value  as  evidence  on  the  issue  in  the  civil  proceeding.^** 

597;    Commonwealth    v.    Dillane,    11  47,  49;  Walter  v.  State,  105  Ind.  589, 

Gray    (Mass.)    67;    State    v.    Water-  593,  5  N.  E.  735;   State  v.  Mclntyre 

man,  87  Iowa  255,  257,  54  N.  W.  359;  (Wash.    1909),    loi    Fac.  710.     Ante, 

State  V.  Maxwell,  51  Iowa  314,  i  N.  §§  190,  193. 

W.  666;   Emerson  v.   State,  43  Ark.  '"Green   v.    Bedell,  48   N.   H.   546, 

372;   Swalley  v.  People,   116  111.  247,  549. 

4  N.  E.  379;  Dunn  v.  State,  70  Ind. 


CHAPTER  XVIL 

THE  COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES. 

§  199.    Definition  and  formal  require-     §  206.    Incompetency      of      witnesses 
ments  of  the  oath.  caused  by  conviction  of   in- 

200.  When  witness  may  affirm.  famous  crime. 

201.  Religious  belief  of  the  witness.        207.    The    pardon    of   the   convict — 

202.  Insanity — When     disqualifying  When  restoring  competency. 

a  witness.  208.    Mode     of     proving     pardon — 

203.  Mode   of   proving   insanity   of  Parol  evidence. 

witness.  209.    Statutory  regulations  removing 

204.  Deaf  mutes  as  witnesses.  the  incompetency  of  persons 

205.  Children  on  the  witness  stand.  convicted  of  crime. 

210.    Statutes  construed. 

§  199.    Definition    and    formal   requirements    of    the    oath. — An 

oath  has  been  defined  as  an  "outward  pledge  given  by  the  juror 
that  his  attestation  [or  promise]  is  made  under  an  immediate 
sense  of  his  responsibility  to  God."^  The  definition  just  given, 
it  may  be  noted,  wholly  omits  the  imprecatory  elements  of  the 
oath  which  were  so  prominent  in  the  definitions  of  the  common 
law."  It  is  certainly  consistent  with  the  most  modern  ideas  upon 
the  subject,  and  less  calculated  to  offend  persons  who  may  enter- 
tain conscientious  scruples  against  invoking  God's  wrath  upon 
themselves. 

In  criminal  courts  of  inferior  jurisdiction,  where  the  issues  of 
fact  are  determined  by  the  magistrate  without  the  intervention 
of  "a  jury,  the  oath  is  usually  administered  by  the  judge  himself. 
In  the  higher  courts  this  duty  is  performed  by  the  clerk,  the 
formula  employed  being  usually  "you  do  solemnly  swear  that  you 
will  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  as 
a  witness  in  this  issue  now  joined  between  A.  and  B." 

^  Tyler  on  Oaths,  London,  p.  15.  asseveration    by   which   a   person    re- 

- 1  Stark.  Ev.,  22.    In  Rex  v.  White,     nounces    the    mercy,    and    imprecates 

2  Leach  Cr.  L.  482  (1786),  the  court    the  vengeance  of  heaven,  if  he  do  not 

thus   defines   an   oath :   "A   religious    speak  the  truth." 

368 


369  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  §    200 

The  witness  expresses  his  assent  to  this  affirmation  by  raising 
his  hand  only,  or  by  placing  it  upon  a  copy  of  the  Bible  while  the 
oath  is  being  administered,  and  by  kissing  the  book  at  its  con- 
clusion.^ 

But  the  main  requirement  is  that  the  witness  shall  feel  that  he 
is  bound  by  the  oath,  and  if  he  feels  that  he  is  bound  the  formula 
is  immaterial.'*  If  the  court  is  informed  by  the  witness  or  by  any 
other  person  that  the  witness  is  an  adherent  of  a  religious  system 
other  than  Christianity,  he  must  be  asked  what  form  of  oath  he 
considers  most  binding  on  his  conscience.  If  the  court  is  satisfied 
that  there  is  any  peculiar  form  which  the  witness  regards  as  more 
obligatory  than  that  usually  employed  he  should  be  sworn  accord- 
ingly.' 

A  Chinaman  is  not  incompetent  as  a  witness  oh  account  of  his 
inability  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  oath  which  is  ordinarily 
taken  by  witnesses.  Usually  he  will  or  may  be  sworn  according 
to  the  oath  which  he  states  is  most  binding  on  his  conscience.*' 

§  200.  When  witness  may  affirm. — The  scriptural  injunction, 
"Swear  not  at  all"  is  considered  by  many  as  an  express  prohi- 
bition of  oaths  of  every  sort.  Such  persons  on  this  account 
decline  to  participate  in  or  give  their  assent  to  any  form  of  words 
Avhich  involves  or  implies  an  invocation  of  God.  The  wishes  and 
conscientious  scruples  of  all  such  persons  are  carefully  respected 
by  the  law,  both  common  and  statutory,  and  to  them  a  question  in 
the  following  form  is  put :  "You  do  solemnly,  sincerely  and  truly 
declare  and  affirm  that  you  will  state  the  truth,  the  whole  truth 
and  nothing  but  the  truth,  in  the  issue  now  joined  between  the 

^  See  Underbill  on  Ev.,   §  315,  and  laws,    religion    and    constitution    of 

cases  there  cited.  those    countries.      But    still    the    sub- 

*  In  Omichund  v.  Barker,  Willes,  p.  stance  is  the  same,  which  is  that  God 

547,  the  court  said :  "It  is  very  plain  in  all  of  them  is  called  upon  as  a  wit- 

from  what  I  have  said  that  the  sub-  ness  to  the  truth  of  what  we  say." 
stance  of  an  oath  has  nothing  to  do        °  People  v.  Green,  99  Cal.  564,  570, 

with    Christianity,    only    that    by   the  34  Pac.  231 ;  State  v.  Chyo  Chiagk,  92 

Christian    religion    we    are    put    still  Mo.  395,  410,  48  S.  W.  704;  i  Greenl., 

under    great    obligations    not    to    be  §    371;    Whart.    Cr.    Ev.    (9th    cd.), 

guilty  of  perjury.     The  forms  indeed  §  354. 

of  an  oath   have   been   since  varied,        "State  v.  Lu  Sing,  34  Mont.  31,  85 

and  have  been  always  different  in  all  Pac.  521. 
countries,   according  to   the   different 
24 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


§    20I 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


6/' 


people  of  the  state,  etc.,  and  the  defendant."  The  affirmative 
answer  of  the  witness  given  to  this  question  is  equivalent  to  an 
oath/  and  renders  him  liable  to  a  prosecution  for  perjury  if  he 
testifies  falsely.® 

A  witness  who  is  sworn  before  a  separate  trial  is  ordered, 
where  several  are  jointly  indicted,  must  be  re-sworn  when  testify- 
ing at  the  separate  trial  of  each.** 

§  201.  Religious  belief  of  the  witness. — The  common  law, 
because  of  the  great  importance  which  in  early  times  was  attached 


'State  V.  Welch,  79  Me.  99,  103,  8 
Atl.  348. 

*  State  V.  Whisenhurst,  2  Hawks 
(N.  Car.)  458,  459.  If  the  witness, 
when  sworn,  fails  to  object  to  the 
form  of  oath  as  taken  by  him,  he  is 
still  liable  for  perjury,  though  he  did 
not  consider  himself  bound  thereby. 
State  V.  Whisenhurst,  2  Hawks  (N. 
Car.)  458,  459.  It  is  not  error  in  a 
criminal  trial,  if  the  accused  has  as- 
sumed various  aliases,  for  the  clerk 
to  repeat  them  in  swearing  a  witness, 
stating  also  his  true  name.  If  the 
aliases  are  set  forth  in  the  indict- 
ment, it  is  difficult  to  understand  how 
their  repetition  by  the  clerk  in  the 
hearing  of  the  jurors  will  prejudice 
the  accused.  People  v.  Everhardt, 
104  N.  Y.  591,  596,  II  N.  E.  62,  5  N. 
Y.  St.  793,  2  Sil.  App.  (N.  Y.)  506, 
6  N.  Y.  Cr.  231. 

*  Abbott  Trial  Brief  (Cr.  Causes), 
§  3371  Babcock  v.  People,  15  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  347.  On  a  trial  for  felony, 
it  is  error  to  swear  a  witness  while 
the  accused  is  not  m  court.  Bearden 
V.  State,  44  Ark.  331.  See  Underbill 
on  Ev.,  §§  346,  367.  But  the  objec- 
tion that  a  witness  was  not  properly 
sworn  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first 
time  when  a  motion  is  made  for  a 
new  trial.  Goldsmith  v.  State,  32 
Tex.  Cr.  112,  115,  22  S.  W.  405. 

In  Omichund  v.  Barker,  i   Atkyns, 


p.  S3>  the  court  quotes  Puffendorf, 
4th  book,  §  4,  p.  122:  "That  part  of 
the  form  in  oaths  under  which  God  is 
invoked  as  a  witness,  or  as  an  aveng- 
er, is  to  be  accommodated  to  the  re- 
ligious persuasion  which  the  swearer 
entertains  of  God;  it  being  vain  and 
insignificant  to  compel  a  man  to 
swear  by  a  God  whom  he  doth  not 
believe,  and  therefore  doth  not  rever- 
ence; and  no  one  thinks  himself 
bound  to  the  Divine  Majesty  in  any 
other  words,  or  under  any  other 
titles,  than  what  are  agreeable  to  the 
doctrines  of  his  own  religion,  which, 
in  his  judgment  is  the  only  true  way 
of  worship.  And  hence,  likewise,  it 
is,  that  he  who  swears  by  false  gods, 
yet  such  as  were  by  him  accounted 
true,  stands  obliged,  and  if  he  de- 
ceives, is  really  guilty  of  perjury; 
because,  whatever  his  peculiar  notions 
are,  he  certainly  had  some  sense  of 
the  Deity  before  his  eyes,  and  there- 
fore by  willfully  forswearing  himself, 
he  violated,  as  far  as  he  was  able, 
that  awe  and  reverence  he  owed  to 
Almighty  God;  yet  when  a  person, 
requiring  an  oath  from  another,  ac- 
cepts it  under  a  form  agreeable  to 
that  worship  which  the  swearer  holds 
true,  and  he  himself  holds  for  false, 
he  cannot  in  the  least  be  said  hereby 
to  approve  of  that  worship." 


371  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  8    20I 

to  the  religious  element  of  an  oath,  declared  all  persons  to  be  in- 
competent as  witnesses  who  did  not  believe  in  a  Deity  who  would 
punish  perjury/"  And  it  was  said  with  much  vehemence  that  to 
require  an  oath  to  be  taken  by  a  person,  who,  like  the  atheist,  de- 
nied his  existence,  was  a  mockery  of  justice.  But  every  one  born 
in  a  Christian  land  and  educated  under  the  influence  of  Chris- 
tianity was  presumed,  until  the  contrary  was  shown,  to  possess 
sufficient  religious  faith  to  qualify  him  as  a  witness.  In  any  case 
he  was  only  required  to  believe  in  a  God  who  would  punish  per- 
jury, and  it  was  immaterial  whether  he  believed  that  the  culprit 
would  be  punished  in  this  life  by  the  pangs  of  remorse  or  other- 
wise, or  whether  punishment  would  be  inflicted  beyond  the 
grave.  ^^ 

The  witness  could  not  usually  be  asked  directly  as  to  his  pos- 
session or  lack  of  possession  of  a  religious  belief.  His  atheism 
or  infidelity  must  always  be  shown  by  the  evidence  of  other  wit- 
nesses in  whose  presence  and  hearing  he  had  voluntarily  declared 
his  irreligion,^^  though  the  fact  that  he  had  subsequently  acquired 
sufficient  religious  faith  to  render  him  competent  might  also  be 
shown.  ^^ 

In  almost  every  state  of  the  Union  statutes  have  been  enacted, 
providing  in  substance  that  no  person  shall  be  incompetent  as  a 
witness  because  of  his  belief  or  disbelief  in  the  tenets  of  any  sys- 
tem of  religious  teaching,  provided  he  understands  the  nature  of 
an  oath. 

Where  such  statutory  provisions  prevail  in  conformity  there- 
with, and  having  regard  to  the  existing  federal  and  state  consti- 
tutional enactments  which  are  intended  to  secure  freedom  of  re- 
ligious belief  and  worship,^*  any  question  intended  to  discredit  a 
witness  by  showing  him  to  be  an  atheist  or  an  agnostic  would  be 
very  objectionable.^^ 

"Rex  V.  White,  2  Leach  Cr.  L.  482.  ^"Commonwealth  v.   Smith,  2  Gray 

"Cubbison  v.  McCreary,  2  W.  &  S.  (Mass.)   516,  61  Am.  Dec.  478. 

(Pa.)    262;    Bush   V.    Commonweahh,  "Atwood  v.  Welton,  7  Conn.  66;  as 

80   Ky.    244,    248;    Commonweahh   v.  regards  the  reception  of  declarations 

Hills,    10    Cush.     (Mass.)     530,    532;  to  prove  mental   conditions,  see  Un- 

Chappell   V.    State,   71    Ala.   322,  324;  derhill  on  Ev.,  §§  51,  52. 

State  V.  Powers,  51  N.  J.  L.  432,  433,  "  U.  S.  Const.  Amend.,  Art.  i. 

17  Atl.  969,  14  Am.  St.  693.  "  People  v.  Copsey,  71  Cal.  548,  550, 

12  Pac.  721. 


§    202  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  372 

So,  where  it  had  been  provided  in  the  state  constitution  that  no 
person  shall  be  denied  the  enjoyment  of  any  civil  right  or  privi- 
lege on  account  of  his  religious  principles,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  accused  is  not  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf 
because  he  does  not  belief  in  a  God  who  will  punish  him  if  he 
perjures  himself/'' 

So,  usually,  where  the  competency  of  witnesses  is  regulated  by 
a  statute  which  fails  to  specify  any  religious  test,  the  same  rule 
will  apply  and  the  fact  that  the  witness  is  an  atheist  or  a  disbe- 
liever in  a  future  state  of  existence  beyond  the  grave  will  not  ren- 
der him  incompetent." 

§  202.  Insanity — When  disqualifying  a  witness. — Very  little 
distinction,  if  any,  was  made  by  the  common  law  between  the 
numerous  forms  which  insanity  assumes.  As  regards  the  com- 
petency of  a  person  as  a  witness,  insanity  of  any  kind,  once  estab- 
lished, seems  to  have  been  an  insurmountable  objection.  It  was 
immaterial  whether  the  person  mentally  unsound  was  an  imbecile 
or  idiot,  a  furious  maniac,  or  a  quiet  sufferer  from  melancholia, 
senile  dementia,  or  from  some  harmless  and  perhaps  temporary 
monomania. ^^ 

It  is  now  held  universally  that  the  insanity  or  intellectual  weak- 
ness of  a  witness,  no  matter  what  form  it  assumes,  is  not  a  valid 
objection  to  his  competency  if,  at  the  time  he  is  testifying,  he  has 
mental  capacity  to  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong,  so  far 
as  the  facts  in  issue,  and  his  testimony  thereon,  are  involved,  un- 
derstands the  nature  and  obligation  of  an  oath,  and  can  give  a 
fairly  intelligent  and  reasonable  narrative  of  the  matters  about 
which  he  testifies.  ^^ 

^®  Perry  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Gratt  Greenleaf  on   Evidence,   §   365;  Ros- 

(Va.)  632;  Hronek  V.  People,  134  111.  coe's  Crim.  Evidence,  118;  Best  Ev., 

139,    152,  24  N.   E.  861,  23  Am.   St.  168. 

652;    Ewing  V.    Bailey,   36   111.   App.  "Tucker  v.   Shavir,   158  111.  326,  41 

191 ;  Colter  v.  State,  2,1  Tex.  Cr.  App.  N.  E.  914 ;   State  v.  Brown,  2  Marv. 

284,  39  S.  W.  576;   State  V.   Powers,  (Del.)  380,  36  Atl.  458;  Reg.  v.  Hill, 

SI  N.  J.  L.  432,  433-436,  17  Atl.  969,  s  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  547,  5  Cox.  C.  C.  259, 

14  Am.  St.  693.  266,  15  Jur.  470;  District  of  Columbia 

"State  V.  Williams,  in  La.  179,  35  v.  Amies,  107  U.  S.  519,  520-524,  2-] 

So.  505.  L.  ed.  618,  2  Sup.  Ct.  840;  Coleman 

"2     Elliott     Ev.,     §§     750-771;     I  v.    Commonwealth,    25    Gratt.    (Va.) 


373  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES,  §    2O3 

An  inquisition  of  insanity,^"  or  the  fact  that  a  person  alleges 
and  endeavors  to  prove  his  own  insanity,^^  does  not  conclusively 
render  him  incompetent  as  a  witness. 

A  witness  is  not  incompetent  to  testify  upon  the  grounds  of  his 
insanity  merely  because  he  has  been  adjudged  insane  and  has  been 
confined  in  an  insane  asylum.  Evidence  of  these  facts  is  not  con- 
clusive of  his  insanity.  They  raise  a  prima  facie  presumption  of 
incompetency  which  the  party  offering  the  witness  must  over- 
come. The  question  is  one  wholly  for  the  trial  court  in  determin- 
ing the  competency  of  the  witness.  There  is  no  presumption  that 
insanity  shown  to  have  existed  has  continued  down  to  the  date  of 
the  trial.  The  court  should  consider  the  conduct  and  actions  of 
the  witness  in  the  court  room  and  may  also  take  into  consideration 
his  manner  of  giving  testimony.  If  the  witness  appears  rational 
and  meets  the  tests  imposed  by  law  in  case  of  the  alleged  insanity 
of  a  witness,  he  is  competent,  though  it  may  appear  that  at  one 
time  he  was  in  an  asylum  for  the  insane.^^ 

A  witness  examined  out  of  court  by  a  commission  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  sane.  If  evidence  of  his  insanity  is  introduced  when 
his  deposition  is  offered  to  be  read,  the  jury  will  be  permitted  to 
determine  his  mental  capacity.-^ 

§  203.  Mode  of  proving  insanity  of  witness. — The  objecting 
party  may  prove  the  insanity  of  the  witness  either  by  examining 
him,"*  or  by  other  witnesses."^  or  by  written  proof  showing  that 
he  has  been  legally  pronounced  a  lunatic. 

The  question  of  competency  is  of  course  judicial,  while  the 
credibility  of  the  testimony  is  for  the  jury  alone.     If  the  inca- 

865,  874,  875,  18  Am.  711;  Walker  v.  "^  Mayor,   etc.,  v.  Caldwell,  81   Ga. 

State,  97  Ala.  85,  86,  12  So.  83 ;  State  76,  80,  7  S.  E.  99. 

V.  Simes,  12  Idaho  310,  85  Pac.  914;  "^  Reg.  v.  Hill,  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  547; 

Covington    v.    O'AIeara    (Ky.    1909),  5  Cox  C.  C.  259,  15  Jur.  470.    On  his 

119  S.  W.   187.  examination  by  the  court  in  this  case 

'"Kendall  v.  May,  10  Allen  (Mass.)  the  witness   claimed  to  be  possessed 

59-  of  spirits  who  guided  all  his  affairs 

"'  Dickson  v.  Waldron,  135  Ind.  507,  yet     recognizing    the     meaning    and 

34  N.  E.  506,  35  N.  E.  I,  41  Am.  St.  soundness  of  his  oath  his  testimony 

440,   24   L.    R.    A.    483.      See   Ante,  was  received. 

§§  159-163.  -^Livingston  v.  Kiersted,   10  Johns 

"Covington      v.      O'Meara      (Ky.  (N.  Y.)  362. 
1909),  119  S.  W.  187. 


§  204  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  374 

pacity  has  intervened  since  the  occurrence  which  the  witness  is 
called  on  to  relate;  if  it  is  temporary,  and  a  speedy  restoration  to 
sanity  seems  probable,  the  court  may  direct  an  adjourmnent.-" 

If,  in  the  course  of  the  examination  of  a  witness,  it  becomes 
apparent  to  the  court  that  he  is  incompetent  because  of  insanity, 
the  court  may  stop  the  examination  and  instruct  the  jury  to  disre- 
gard his  evidence,  though  it  had  on  the  preliminary  examination 
to  ascertain  competency,  pronounced  him  sane.^^ 

The  testimony  of  insane  witnesses  has  usually  been  received 
because  of  the  necessity  of  the  case  and  the  absence  of  other  wit- 
nesses. The  jury  may  consider  the  mental  condition  of  the  wit- 
ness at  the  time  of  the  transaction  he  describes,  and  while  he  is 
testifying,  in  order  to  determine  his  capacity  for  observation,  his 
powers  of  recollection  and  his  disposition  and  ability  to  describe 
events  correctly."^  If  they  disbelieve  him,  and  his  testimony  is 
uncorroborated,  the  jury  should  reject  it  altogether.-? 

§  204.  Deaf  mutes  as  witnesses. — The  early  common  law  re- 
garded the  deaf  mute  as  an  idiot. ^'^  He  was  prima  facie  devoid 
of  intelligence  or  understanding,  so  that  he  was  presumptively 
incompetent  as  a  witness  until  it  was  clearly  and  affirmatively 
shown  that  he  possessed  a  sufficient  degree  of  intelligence  to 
qualify  him.  The  burden  of  proving  him  competent  was  on  the 
party  calling  him  to  testify. 

The  intelligence  of  an  ordinary  deaf  mute  witness  is  for  the 
jury  and  where  the  facts  are  placed  before  the  jury,  it  is  improper 
to  permit  another  witness  to  express  an  opinion  that  the  deaf  mute 
is  or  is  not  intelligent.  A  witness  may  testify  to  any  facts  from 
which  the  condition  of  the  deaf  mute  may  be  inferred,  and  while 

*nVharton  on  Ev.,   §  402;   Rex  v.  512,   513,  where   a  cross-examination 

White,  2  Leach  Cr.   L.  482;   Rex  v.  was  impossible  because  of  the  serious 

Wade,    I    Moody   C.   C.   86;    Rex   v.  illness  of  the  witness. 

Kinloch,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  395,  402.  ^  People  v.  New  York  Hospital,  3 

"Reg.  V.  Whitehead,  L.  R.  i  C.  C  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  229,  249;  Hol- 

R.  33.     If  insanity,  first  showing  it-  comb  v.  Holcomb,  28  Conn.  177,  181. 

self    during   the    direct    examination,  ^  Worthington   v.   Mencer,  96  Ala. 

results  in  depriving  either  side  of  the  310,  11  So.  72,  17  L.  R.  A.  407;  Reg. 

right  to  cross-examine,  all  the  testi-  v.  Hill,  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  547,  5  Cox 

mony  of  the  witness  must  be  stricken  C.  C.  259,  15  Jur.  470. 

out.     People  V.   Cole,  43   N.   Y.  508,  ^"*  i  Bl.  Com.  304. 


375  COMPETEXCY    OF    WITNESSES.  §    2O5 

by  the  ancient  common  law  the  deaf  mute  was  presumed  to  be 
incompetent  because  of  lack  of  intelligence,  the  modern  rule  is 
that  there  is  no  presumption  either  way  but  that  the  question  is 
for  the  jury. 

The  party  alleging  lack  of  intelligence  on  the  part  of  a  deaf 
mute  witness  will  have  to  produce  some  evidence  and  then  the 
jury  must  decide  upon  the  facts  where  there  is  a  conflict  of  evi- 
dence as  to  the  intelligence  of  the  witness.^^ 

At  the  present  day  the  examination  of  a  deaf  mute  upon  the 
witness  stand  may  be  carried  on  by  the  use  of  signs,  with  the 
aid  of  an  interpreter,  properly  qualified,^"  and  this  may  be  done 
even  where  the  witness  can  write.^^  His  evidence  is  oral  evi- 
dence, provided  the  writing  is  written  or  the  signs  made  in  open 
court."*  Expert  testimony  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  a  deaf 
mute  is  sufificiently  intelligent  in  the  opinion  of  the  witness  to  tes- 
tify as  a  witness.  His  competency  can  be  proved  by  the  testimony 
of  a  former  employer  or  any  other  person  who  is  acquainted  with 
him  who  can  testify  to  his  intelligence  and  his  knowledge  of  the 
sign  language.  ^^ 

§  205.  Children  on  the  witness  stand. — The  competency  of  a 
child  under  the  age  of  fourteen  years  to  testify  in  a  criminal  trial 
must  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court.  He  is  presump- 
tively incompetent,  but  if  he  is  shown  to  be  competent  it  is  imma- 
terial how  young  he  may  be  when  he  testifies.  He  is  competent 
if  he  possesses  mental  capacity  and  memory  sufficient  to  enable 
him  to  give  a  reasonable  and  intelligible  account  of  the  transaction 
he  has  seen,  if  he  understands  and  has  a  just  appreciation  of  the 

^^  State  V.   Rohn    (Iowa   1909),   iig  ^  State   v.    Howard,    118    Mo.    127, 

N.  W.  88.  144,  24  S.  W.  41 ;  Morrison  v.  Len- 

"  Skaggs  V.  State,   108  Ind.  53,  56,  nard,  3  C.  &  P.  127. 

57.  8  X.   E.  695;   Commonwealth   v.  '*  Stephen's  Digest,  art.  106;  Ritch- 

Hill,  14  Mass.  207;  Ruston's  Case,  i  ey   v.    People,   47   Pac.   272,   384,   23 

Leach  Cr.  L.  455,  456;  State  v.  De-  Colo.  314. 

Wolf,  8  Conn.  93,  99,  20  Am.   Dec.  "^  State  v.  Weldon,  39  S.  Car.  318. 

90;    State  V.   Howard,   118  Mo.    127,  322,  17  S.  E.  688,  24  L.  R.  A.  i26n; 

144,    24    S.    W.    41;    Kirk    v.    State  Underhill    on    Ev.,    §    186;   2   Elliott 

CTex.),  37  S.  W.  440;  People  v.  Wes-  Evid.,  §  764. 
ton,  236  111.   104,  86  N.  E.   188.     See 
Underhill  on  Ev.,  §  318. 


§  205  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  376 

difference  between  right  and  wrong,  and  comprehends  the  char- 
acter, meaning  and  obHgation  of  an  oath.^" 

If  the  witness  fulfills  these  requirements,  it  is  immaterial  as 
bearing  upon  his  competency  that  he  is  unable  to  define  the  oath 
or  to  define  testimony.^^  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  examine 
the  child  witness  in  order  to  ascertain  if  he  or  she  is  competent. 
This  is  usually  done  by  putting  leading  questions  to  the  child  and 
the  answers  to  the  questions  are  not  objectionable  because  they 
may  be  couched  in  childish  language.  A  child  should  be  per- 
mitted to  explain  his  understanding  of  the  meaning  and  character 
of  an  oath  in  simple  words  and  it  would  be  unfair  to  reject  such 
a  witness  because  he  does  not  state  his  meaning  in  the  same  lan- 
guage employed  by  adults  or  because  the  witness  does  not  define 
the  oath  in  the  language  that  an  attorney  or  other  person  educated 
in  the  law  would  employ.  Intelligence  and  not  age  is  the  test  of 
a  child  witness.^^ 

No  fixed  rule  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  age  a  child  under  the 
age  of  fourteen  must  have  attained  to  entitle  him  to  testify.  The 
question  of  his  competency  must  be  left  to  the  legal  discretion  of 
the  trial  judge,^^  leaving  it  to  the  jury  to  determine  the  weight 
and  credit  of  his  evidence.  In  the  absence  of  clear  abuse  the  judi- 
cial discretion  is  not  reviewable.'*" 

^2  Elliott  Evid.,  §§  766-771,  Bras-  549,  60  Atl.   1089,   107  Am.   St.   574; 

ier's  Case,  i  Leach  Cr.  L.  237;  Davis  Gordon  v.  State,  147  Ala.  42,  41  So. 

V.  State,  31  Neb.  247,  47  N.  W.  854;  847;  Young  v.  State,  122  Ga.  725,  50 

McGuff  V.  State,  88  Ala.  147, 151,  7  So.  S.  E.  996;   Clinton  v.   State,   53  Fla. 

35,  16  Am.  St.  25;  McGuire  v.  People,  98,  43   So.   312;   Moore  v.   State,  49 

44  Mich.  286,  287,  6  N.   W.  669,  38  Tex.   Cr.   App.   449,  96   S.   W.    327; 

Am.  265 ;  Hoist  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  Eatman  v.  State,  139  Ala.  ^T,  36  So. 

I,  8,  3  S.  W.  757,  59  Am.  770 ;  Moore  16. 

V.  State,  79  Ga.  498,  503,  s  S.  E.  51;  ^' State  v.  Meyer,  135  Iowa  507,  113 

Commonwealth     v.     Hutchinson,     10  N.  W.  ^'^■'2.,  124  Am.  St.  29in. 

]\Iass.  225 ;  State  v.  Whittier,  21  Me.  ^  Shannon  v.  Swanson,  208  111.  52, 

341,  347,  38  Am.  Dec.  272;  Williams  69  N.  E.  869,  aff'g  109  III.  App.  274; 

V.  United  States,  3  App.   D.  C.  335;  Clinton  v.   State,  SZ  Fla.  98,  43   So. 

Williams  v.  State,  109  Ala.  64,  19  So.  312. 

530;  People  V.  Craig,  in  Cal.  460,  44  ^'People   v.    Bradford    (Cal.    App. 

Pac.  186;  State  v.  Cadotte,  17  Mont.  1905),  81  Pac.  712;  People  v.  Stouter, 

315,  42  Pac.  857;  Gaines  v.  State,  99  142  Cal.  146,  75  Pac.  780. 

Ga.  703,  2^   S.   E.   760;   Territory  v.  *"  People    v.    Frindel,    58    Hun    (X. 

DeGutman,  8  N.  Mex.  92,  42  Pac.  68;  Y.)  482,  484,  12  N.  Y.  S.  498;  Hawk- 

Commonwealth   v.    Furman,  211    Pa.  ins  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  2-j2),  11  S. 


Z77 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


205 


It  is  not  only  necessary  to  show  that  the  child  understands  the 
nature  and  application  of  an  oath,  but  it  must  also  appear  that  the 
child  is  sufficiently  intelligent  to  testify  with  an  understanding 
mind  of  what  he  or  she  has  seen  or  heard. 

If  the  child  does  not,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  appear  to  un- 
derstand the  nature  and  obligation  of  an  oath,  the  court  may  in 
its  discretion  if  the  child  seems  to  have  the  age  and  mental  capa- 
city to  receive  and  profit  by  the  instruction'*^  allow  him  to  be  in- 
structed by  a  proper  person  as  to  the  signification  and  obligation 
of  a  judicial  oath.'*-  For  the  child  is  a  competent  witness  if  he 
is  reasonably  intelligent,  though  he  may  not  have  learned  those 
facts  which  enable  him  to  understand  the  obligation  of  an  oath 
until  he  learns  them  in  court. *^ 


W.  409;  Commonwealth  v.  Robinson, 
165  ]\Iass.  426,  43  X.  E.  121 ;  State  v. 
Sawtelle,  66  X.  H.  488,  32  Atl.  831; 
State  V.  Reddington,  7  S.  Dak.  368, 
64  X.  W.  170.  "Children  of  this  age 
usually  have  not  sufficient  develop- 
ment to  understand  the  nature  and 
effect  of  an  oath,  more  especially  if 
their  parents  have  been  neglectful  of 
their  care  and  education  in  religious 
and  moral  truths.  They  may  have 
some  knowledge  that  it  is  wrong  to 
tell  a  lie,  yet  this  may  be  so  slight 
as  to  produce  no  decided  or  lasting 
impression  on  their  minds,  but  leave 
them  in  a  decidedly  chaotic  state,  in 
which  they  may  easily  be  led  to  be- 
lieve that  the  things  that  others  in 
authority  over  them  instruct  them  to 
say  are  the  indistinct  thing  called 
'truth';  and  therefore  they  must  re- 
peat just  what  they  are  told  to  say,  or 
what  has  often  been  repeated  in  their 
presence.  X'ot  being  amenable  to  the 
law  for  false  swearing,  and  having 
no  knowledge  of  moral  responsibility, 
designing  and  wicked  people  may 
easily  use  them  to  further  intrigues 
of  their  own,  without  fear  of  punish- 


ment for  subornation  of  perjury. 
They  are  as  clay  in  the  potter's  hand, 
to  be  moulded,  some  to  honor  and 
some  to  dishonor.  Lacking  con- 
scientiousness, they  repeat  with  phon- 
ographic precision  the  things  that 
have  been  told  them  to  say,  be  they 
true  or  false."  State  v.  Michael,  37 
\V.  Va.  565,  569,  16  S.  E.  803,  19  L. 
R.  A.  6o5n.  Leading  questions  are 
always  admissible  when  propounded 
to  a  very  young  witness  to  ascertain 
his  intelligence,  competency  and  un- 
derstanding of  an  oath.  Hodge  v. 
State,  26  Fla.  11,  7  So.  593.  See  as 
regards  the  discretionary  power  of 
the  court,  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  386. 

*^  Clinton  v.  State,  53  Fla.  98,  43 
So.  312. 

**Rex  v.  White,  2  Leach  Cr.  L. 
482;  Rex  V.  Wade,  i  Mood.  C.  C. 
86,  87;  Commonwealth  v.  Lynes,  142 
Mass.  577-580,  8  N.  E.  408,  56  Am. 
709,  2  Russ.  Cr.  (8th  Am.  Ed.)  969. 
Contra,  Rex  v.  Williams,  7  C.  &  P. 
320,  321 ;  Reg.  v.  Xicholas,  2  C.  & 
K.  246,  2  Cox  C.  C.  136. 

•■'Landthrift  v.  State,  140  Ala.  114, 
27  So.  287. 


§    206  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  .378 

The  I'liry  may  consider  the  yoiithfuhiess  and  intelhgence  of 
the  witness. 

^  206.  Incompetency  of  witnesses  caused  by  conviction  of  infamous 
crimes. — \\' itnesses  who  had  been  convicted  of  murder,  arson,  per- 
jury, piracy,  forgery  or  other  great  and  infamous  crimes  were  by 
the  common  law  regarded  as  incompetent  to  testify. 

The  commission  of  a  crime  of  this  character  was  conclusively 
presumed  to  indicate  such  a  condition  of  moral  perversion  on 
the  part  of  the  person  who  had  been  convicted  that  his  absolute 
incapacity  to  tell  the  truth  could  safely  be  assumed. 

In  other  words,  the  probability  that  every  witness  who  was 
guilty  of  the  crimes  above  enumerated  would  perjure  himself 
if  he  were  permitted  to  testify  was  considered  to  be  so  great 
that  the  interests  of  truth  and  justice  imperatively  demanded  his 
exclusion  from  the  witness  stand.'** 

The  common  law  required  that  the  witness  should  have  been 
convicted  of  some  infamous  crime,  and  the  early  writers  usually 
denominated  as  such  the  offenses  of  treason,  felony  and  the 
crimen  falsi^'^  As  regards  treason,  and  that  very  large  number 
of  offenses  which,  in  England,  until  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  constituted  felony  at  common  law  or  by  statute,  little 
uncertainty  existed.  A  conviction  of  perjury,  of  forgery  or  of 
a  conspiracy  to  suppress  testimony  or  to  obstruct  justice  was  al- 
ways sufficient  to  exclude  the  guilty  person  from  the  witness 
stand. ^"^  Persons  convicted  of  the  crimen  falsi  were  also  incom- 
petent. But  the  boundaries  of  this  offense  were  somewhat 
vaguely  defied  at  common  law.  Under  the  term  crimen  falsi 
many  minor  offenses  such  as  criminal  libel,  barratry,  maintenance 
and  the  like  were  grouped. 

These  crimes,  while  not  amounting  to  felony  at  the  common 
law,  indicate  such  an  inherent  lack  of  respect  for  truth,  or  a  de- 

"i  Greenleaf  on  Ev.,  §  372;  2  El-  such  a  nature  as   would  presumably 

liott  Evid.,  §  787.  exclude   the   guilty   person    from   the 

*^  7  Com.  Dig.  461 ;  Co.  Lit.,  6  b. ;  2  stand.  A  conviction  of  statutory  em- 
Hale  P.  C.  277.  bezzlement    is    a    misdemeanor    only. 

*'^  Rex  V.  Priddle,  2  Leach  C.  L.  496,  Such  a  crime  is  a  breach  of  trust  and 

497 ;  Rex  V.  Edwards,  4  T.  R.  440,  2  does    not    come    within    any    of    the 

R.  R.  427.     Under  the  common  law,  classes  mentioned  in  the  text.   United 

the  conviction  of  crime  must  be   of  States  v.  Sims,  161  Fed.  1008. 


379 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


207 


liberate  intention  to  interfere  with  and  obstruct  the  administra- 
tion of  justice,  or  to  employ  the  machinery  of  the  law  for  im- 
proper purposes,  that  it  was  considered  safe  and  proper  to  exclude 
the  evidence  of  all  persons  convicted  of  having  perpetrated  them.'*^ 
The  conviction  of  a  witness  of  a  crime  which  will  render  him 
incompetent  must  be  proved  by  producing  the  judgment  of  con- 
viction or  a  certified  copy  thereof,  and  cannot  be  proved  by  his 
oral  testimony  on  cross-examination.'*'^ 

§  207.    The  pardon  of  the  convict,  when  restoring  competency. — 

The  incompetency  to  testify  caused  by  a  conviction  of  an  infa- 
mous crime  was  always  removable  at  common  law  by  a  full  and 
unconditional  pardon  of  the  witness,*®  by  the  reversal  of  the  judg- 
ment against  him,  and  by  a  suspension  of  sentence. 

But  a  pardon  will  not  restore  competency  if  the  statute  which 
prescribes  the  punishment  for  the  crime  also  expressly  provides 
that  every  person  who  is  convicted  under  it  shall  forever  be  in- 
competent as  a  witness.^" 


^^3  Russ.  on  Crimes  (9th.  Am.  Ed.) 
620;  I  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  375.  In  Rex 
V.  Priddle,  2  Leach  C.  L.  496,  497,  the 
court  said :  "It  is  now  settled  that  it 
is  the  infamy  of  the  crime  which 
destroys  the  competency,  and  not  the 
nature  or  mode  of  punishment."  Cf. 
State  V.  Green,  48  S.  Car.  136,  26  S. 
E.  234. 

^'Grabill  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App. 
1906),  97  S.  W.  1046;  United  States 
V.  Sims,  161   Fed.   1008. 

''Boyd  V.  United  States,  142  U.  S. 
450,  453,  454,  35  L-  ed.  1077,  12  S. 
Ct.  292,  citing  United  States  v.  Wil- 
son, 7  Pet.  (U.  S.)  150,  162,  8  L.  ed. 
640;  Singleton  v.  State,  38  Fla.  297, 
21  So.  21,  56  Am.  St.  177,  34  L.  R.  A. 
25in;  Ex  parte  Wells,  18  How.  (U. 
S.)  307,  315,  15  L.  ed.  421;  Ex  parte, 
Garland,  4  Wall.  (U.  S.)  z^^,  380, 
18  L.  ed.  2>'^;  Martin  v.  State,  21 
Tex.  App.  I,  II,  17  S.  W.  430;  United 
States  V.  Hall,  53  Fed.  352,  354;  State 
V.  Blaisdell,  :iz  N.   H.  388;   Rivers  v. 


State,  10  Tex.  App.  177,  182;  Hester 
V.  Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St.  139, 
155.  See,  also.  Commonwealth  v. 
Bush,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)  264,  266;  State 
V.  Baptiste,  26  La.  Ann.  134,  136;  2 
Hawks  P.  C.  547.  A  witness  may  be 
restored  to  competency  even  after  he 
has  suffered  the  whole  punishment 
for  his  crime.  United  States  v.  Jones, 
2  Wheeler  Cr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  451; 
State  V.  Dodson,  16  S.  Car.  453,  461 ; 
State  V.  Foley,  15  Nev.  64,  69,  ^7  Am. 
458;  People  V.  Bowen,  43  Cal.  439, 
442,  13  Am.  148;  Hunnicutt  v.  State, 
18  Tex.  App.  498,  518,  51  Am.  330; 
United  States  v.  Hughes,  175  Fed. 
238. 

"Rex  V.  Ford,  2  Salk.  690;  Blanc 
V.  Rodgers,  49  Cal.  15;  3  Russell  on 
Crimes  (9th  Am.  Ed.)  621.  In  some 
states  it  is  provided  that  no  person 
convicted  of  perjury  shall  be  render- 
ed competent  by  a  pardon.  Virginia 
Code,  1904,  §  3898;  Florida,  Thomp- 
son   Digest,    334-5;     West    Virginia 


§  208  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  380 

A  pardon  may  be  granted  for  the  sole  purpose  of  rendering  a 
convict  competent  to  testify.  And  a  pardon,  if  full  and  uncondi- 
tional, is  not  ineffectual  or  in  any  way  open  to  attack  merely 
because  it  was  granted  solely  to  enable  a  witness  to  testify  for  the 
state  in  a  criminal  prosecution  pending  in  a  court  which  is  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  pardoning  power.^^  An  absolute  pardon 
is  irrevocable  as  soon  as  it  is  delix'ered  and  accepted  by  the  grantee 
or  his  agent."'"  If.  however,  the  pardon  is  conditional,  and  some- 
thing must  be  done  before  the  pardon  shall  operate  to  restore 
competency,  the  party  who  calls  the  witness  will  be  required  to 
show  that  the  condition  has  been  performed. °^ 

Sometimes  the  statute  ]irovides  that  no  person  convicted  of 
crime  shall  be  a  witness  unless  he  has  been  pardoned  or  punished. 
Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  a  person  convicted  of  felony 
shall  not  be  a  witness  unless  he  has  been  punished  therefore ,  a 
person  who  has  been  fined,  but  who  has  not  paid  his  fine,  is  not  a 
competent  witness.^* 

§  208.  Mode  of  proving  pardon — Parol  evidence. — In  accordance 
with  the  rule  that  the  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  all  public 
laws,  a  proclamation  or  statute  granting  a  general  amnesty  need 
not  be  proved,''^  though  an  executive  pardon  of  any  particular 
individual,  being  in  its  nature  a  private  deed  or  release,  must  be 
proved.  This  must  be  done  by  the  production  in  court  of  the  in- 
strument itself  or  a  certified  or  exemplified  copy.^*^ 

Code,  ch.   152.     The  incompetency  of  ^''  Waring   v.    United    States,    7   Ct. 

a    witness   because    of    conviction    of  Q.    (U.   S.)    501;   State  v.   Keith,  63 

crime   is   not    removed   by   a   pardon  N.  Car.  140,  142. 

which   merely   remits   a   part   of   the  "  Quillin  v.  Commonwealth,  105  Va. 

penalty.     State  v.  Richardson,  18  Ala.  874,  54  S.  E.  333. 

109,  or  which  may  be  revoked  by  the  °^  United    States    v.    Hall,    53    Fed. 

pardoning  power  in  case  the  convict  352,  354;  United  States  v.  Wilson,  7 

is  again  convicted.     McGee  v.   State,  Pet.    (U.  S.)    150,  162,  8  L.  ed.  640; 

29  Tex.  App.  596,  16  S.  W.  422.  C/.  State    v.    Blalock,    Phil.     (N.    Car.) 

People  V.  Pease,  3  John.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  242;   State  v.  Keith,  63  N.  Car.   140, 

^^1^,  143.     On  Judicial  notice,  see  Under- 

"Boyd  V.  United  States,  142  U.  S.  hill  on  Ev.,  §§  240,  242. 

450,  453,  454,  35  L.  ed.  1077,  12  Sup.  "'Hunnicutt  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 

Ct.  292.  498,    51    Am.    330;    United    States    v. 

^' Rosson  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  287,  Wilson,  7   Pet.    (U.    S.)    150.    161,   8 

289,  4  S.  W.  897,  6  Cr.  L.  Mag.  480.  L.    ed.    640;    State    v.    Baptiste,    26 


381  COMPETEXCY    OF    WITNESSES.  §    2O9 

A  pardon  is  valid,  though  it  incorrectly  state  the  date  of  the 
conviction,  or  even  state  an  impossible  date,  if  it  was  intended  to 
cover  and  does  cover  the  offense.^^  Parol  evidence  is  admissible 
to  identity  the  person  and  the  particular  conviction  of  crime  named 
in  the  pardon.^^ 

The  incompetency  resulting  from  a  conviction  of  crime  is  no 
part  of  the  punishment.  Nor  does  a  conviction  disqualify  the 
convicted  person  as  a  witness  beyond  the  geographical  limits  of 
that  state  wherein  judgment  was  rendered.  Hence  a  person  con- 
victed in  one  state  is  not  incompetent  to  testify  in  the  courts  of 
another  state,  unless  the  statutes  of  the  latter  declare  that  persons 
convicted  of  crime  are  not  competent. ^^ 

§  209.  Statutory  regulations  removing  the  incompetency  of  per- 
sons convicted  of  crime. — The  common-law  incompetency  of  per- 
sons convicted  of  crime  to  testify  as  witnesses  is  generally  abol- 
ished by  statute  in  this  country.  In  many  of  the  states  the  fact 
that  the  witness  has  been  convicted  of  any  crime,  however  his 
offense  may  show  or  imply  an  absolute  lack  of  respect  for  the 
truth,  is  not  a  valid  objection  to  his  competency.  But  it  is  always 
permissible  to  prove  the  fact  of  his  conviction  by  proper  evidence, 
that  the  jury  may  be  enabled  the  better  to  estimate  his  moral 
character,  as  a  man,  and  the  credibility  of  his  evidence.®^ 

La.  Ann.  134,  137;  Underbill  on  Ev.,  632n.      Contra,    Pitner    v.    State,    23 

§§  142b,  320,  citing  cases.     Parson  v.  Tex.  App.  366,  5  S.  W.  210. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  112  S.  W.  617,        ""Tbis   is   the   statute  law   in   New 

33  Ky.  L.  1051.  York  (Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  832),  Rhode 

^i  Bish.  Cr.  L.,  §  906;  Martin  v.  Island     (Gen.    Laws    1896,    ch.    244, 

State,  21   Tex.  App.  i,  11,   17  S.   W.  §  40),  Utah  (Comp.  Laws  1888,  Vol. 

430;  Hunnicut  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  2,  tit.    10,  ch.   2),   Colorado    (§  7266, 

498,  521,  51  Am.  330.  R.  S.  1908),  Georgia  (Code,  §  5269), 

'^^ Martin  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  i,  Michigan    (Comp.  Laws   1897,  §§   10, 

II,  17  S.  W.  430.  210),  Illinois   (R.  S.,  ch.  51,  §   1058, 

"Logan   V.   United    States,   144  U.  ed.  1909),  Massachusetts  (Rev.  Laws 

S.  26s,  303,  36  L.  ed.  429,  12  Sup.  Ct.  1902,  ch.   175,   §§   20,  21),  Minnesota 

617,  citing  Wisconsin  v.  Pelican  Ins.  (Rev.     Laws     1905,     §     4780),     New 

Co.,   127  U.   S.  265,  32  L.  ed.  239,  8  Hampshire  (Pub.  Stat.,  ch.  224,  §  26), 

Sup.    Ct.     1370;     Commonwealth    v.  Ohio    (Bates'   R.   S.,   §§   5240,  7284), 

Green,  17  Mass.  515;   Sims  v.  Sims,  Iowa     (Rev.    Code     1897,     §    4601), 

75  N-  Y.  466;  National  Trust  Co.  v.  Maine  (Rev.  St.  1903,  ch.  84,  §  119), 

Gleason,  77  N.  Y.  400,  410,  33  Am.  Missouri    (R.    S.    1899,    §   4680,   con- 


§  209  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  382 

These  statutes  are  not  usually  retroactive.  So  where  a  person 
is  convicted  of  a  crime  which,  under  an  existing  statute  renders 
him  incompetent  as  a  witness,  a  subsequent  statute  permitting 
those  convicted  of  criminal  crimes  to  testify,  does  not  make  him 
a  competent  witness.*'^  But  where  a  statute  provides  that  a  con- 
\-iction  of  any  crime  is  not  a  valid  objection  to  the  competency  of 
the  person  convicted  one  under  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life, 
may  testify  even  though  by  statute  he  is  deemed  to  be  civilly 
dead.®- 

A  conviction  of  some  crimes,  as  perjury,  the  commission  of 
which  involves  an  utter  disregard  for  the  obligation  of  an  oath  is 
still,  in  some  states,  an  insuperable  objection  to  the  competency 
of  a  w^itness.*'^  In  a  few  of  the  states  a  witness  who  has  been  con- 
victed of  a  capital  crime  or  of  certain  felonies  which  involve  or 
indicate  great  moral  degeneration,  such,  for  example,  as  burglary, 
forgery,  rape,  arson,  perjury,  bigamy,  sodomy,  etc.,  is  by  statute 
absolutely  incompetent  to  testify.^* 

These  statutes  are  to  be  construed  with  strictness.  The  terms, 
descriptive  of  crimes,  mentioned  in  them,  will  be  presumed  to 
have  been  used  in  the  sense  they  possessed  at  common  law.*'^    Nor 

strued    in    State   v.    Myers,    198    Mo.  ""Arkansas     (Rev.    Stat.,    §    2482), 

225,  94  S.  W.  -^42),  Delaware  (Laws,  Tennessee     (Code,     §     5595),     Texas 

Vol.   17,  ch.  598,  §  3),  Kansas    (Gen.  (Code   Crim.    Pro.,    §   768),   Virginia 

St.   1905,  §  5219),  Nebraska   (Comp.  (Code   of    1904,   §   3898)  ;   Quillin  v. 

St.   1903,  title  X,  ch.   I,  §§  328,  330),  Commonwealth,  105  Va.  874,  54  S.  E. 

Nevada   (Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  3471),  333.     In   Pennsylvania,  a  person  iin- 

^lontana    (Code   Civ.    Pro.,    §    647),  der  sejitence  of  death   for  murder  is 

Oregon     (Ann.    Codes,    St.,    §    722),  a   competent   person   to   testify    as    a 

Florida  (Gen.  St.  1908,  §  1506),  Con-  witness.       Commonwealth     v.     Clem- 

necticut   (Gen.  St.,  §   1098).  mer,  190  Pa.  St.  202,  42  Atl.  675. 

"^  State  v.  Landrum,  127  ]\Io.   App.  ^  Williams    v.    Dickenson,    28    Fla. 

653,  106  S.  W.  nil.  90,  9  So.  847;  Commonwealth  v.  Mi- 

"■  Martin  v.  Territory,  14  Okla.  593,  nor,  89  Ky.  555,  560,  13  S.  \V.  5,  11 

78  Pac.  88.  Ky.  L.  775.     It  seems  that  a  person 

"^  This     is     the    case    in     Alabama  convicted  of  felonj'  is  competent,  pro- 

(Code    1907,    §  4008),   Florida    (Gen.  vided    he    has    not    been    sentenced. 

St.    1906,    §    1504),    r^Iaryland    (Pub.  Hurley   v.    State,    35    Tex.    Cr.    App. 

Gen.  Laws,  Art.  35,  §  i),  Mississippi  282,   33   S.   W.  354;   Evans  v.    State, 

(Code  of  1906,  §  1920),  Pennsylvania  35  Tex.  Cr.  App.  485,  34  S.  W.  285; 

(Code,  §  2859),  Vermont  (R.  S.  1880,  Robinson  v.   State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  App. 

§     1008),    Washington     (Ball.     Code,  104,  35  S.  W.  651;  State  v.  Dalton,  20 

§§  5992-6940).  R.  I.  114,  37  Atl.  673;  Underwood  v. 


383  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  §    2IO 

should  any  of  these  statutes  be  construed  to  prevent  the  accused 
from  testifying  in  his  own  behalf.*^*^ 

§  210.  Statutes  construed. — The  authorities  are  divided  upon  the 
question  whether,  under  the  existing  statutes,  the  conviction  of 
a  witness  for  a  crime  which  would  not  have  rendered  him  incom- 
petent at  common  law  can  be  shown  for  the  sole  purpose  of  im- 
peaching his  credibility.  A  great  deal  depends  upon  the  express 
terms  of  the  statute.  On  the  one  hand  it  has  been  held  that  the 
witness  may  be  discredited  by  showing  him  to  have  been  guilty 
of  a  misdemeanor,*^^  though  of  course,  if  a  statute  provides  ex- 
pressly that  the  witness  may  be  interrogated  as  regards  his  "con- 
viction of  felony/'  proof  of  a  conviction  of  misdemeanor  is  in- 
admissible.^^ 

But  the  current  of  the  decisions  supports  the  more  logical  doc- 
trine that  a  conviction  of  those  infamous  crimes  only  can  be 
shown  which  would  have  destroyed  his  competency  at  the  com- 
mon law.**^  Where  a  statute  removes  the  common  law  disability 
arising  from  a  conviction  of  infamous  crime,  the  confession  of 
a  witness  that  he  has  perjured  himself  in  the  same  matter  as  that 
in  which  he  is  now  testifying  constitutes  no  objection  to  his  com- 
petency. ^° 

State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  App.  193,  41  S.  W.  (N.  S.)  45111;  competency  of  defend- 

618.  ant  as  witness,  38  Am.  St.  895,  897n; 

^  The   interpretation   and   construe-  competency    as   witness    of    declarant 

tion  of  writings  are  discussed  in  Un-  of  dying  declaration,  86  Am.  St.  640- 

derhill  on  Ev.,  §  206.  642n. 

°'  State  V.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90,  95,  ""  Bennett  v.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  ~z, 

12  Pac.  406 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ford,  5  S.  W.  527,  5  Am.  St.  875 ;  Bartholo- 

146    Mass.    131,    133,    15    N.    E.    153;  mew  v.   People,   104  111.  601,  44  Am. 

Commonwealth     v.     Hall,     4     Allen  97;  Coble  v.   State,  31  Ohio  St.   100; 

(Mass.)  305;  Helm  v.  State,  67  Miss.  Commonwealth     v.     Dame,    8     Cush. 

562,     573,     7     So.     487;      State     V.  (Mass.)    384;    People  v.  Carolan,  71 

Heusack,  189  Mo.  295,  88  S.  W.  21.  Cal.    195,    12    Pac.    52;    Williams    v. 

**Hanners  v.   McClelland,  74  Iowa  State  (Ala.  1906),  40  So.  405. 

318,   322,   2>7   N.    W.    389;    People   v.  '"People  v.  O'Neil,   109  N.  Y.  251, 

White,    142    Cal.    292,    75    Pac.    828.  16  N.  E.  68,  6  N.  Y.  Cr.  48,  14  N.  Y. 

Testimony  as  to  facts  learned  while  St.  829. 
spying  or  eavesdropping,  17  L.  R.  A. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


THE    EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


§2iT.  Direct  •examination  —  Leading       222. 
questions. 

212.  When    leading    questions    may 

be   asked    on   the    direct   ex- 
amination. 

213.  Forgetful      witness      may      be 

asked  leading  questions.  223. 

214.  Questions    put    to    the   witness        224. 

by  the  court.  225. 

215.  Judicial   remarks  upon  the  de- 

meanor or  credibility  of  a  226. 
witness  during  his  examina-  227. 
tion. 

216.  Answers  must  be  responsive.  228. 

217.  Refreshing    the    memory    of    a 

forgetful  witness  by  memo-  229. 
randum. 

218.  Character  of  the  memorandum        230. 

employed      to      refresh      the 
memory.  231. 

219.  Purpose     and     importance     of 

cross-examination. 

220.  When   right  to  cross-examina-        232. 

tion    is    lost — Cross-examina- 
tion     confined      to     matters        233. 
brought  out  on  direct. 

221.  Cross-examination  to  test  cred- 

ibility. 


When  answers  to  questions  in- 
volving collateral  matters 
asked  in  cross-examination 
may  be  contradicted — Hos- 
tility or  friendship  towards 
the  accused. 

Re-direct  examination. 

Recalling  witnesses. 

Exclusion  and  separation  of 
witnesses. 

Refusal  to  testify. 

Interpreting  the  language  of 
the  witness. 

Improper  reception  of  evidence 
by  the  jurors. 

View  by  the  jurors — Discre- 
tionary power  of  the  court. 

Purpose  of  the  view  is  to  af- 
ford evidence. 

The  right  of  the  accused  to  be 
present  during  the  taking  of 
the  view. 

Presence  of  the  accused  while 
taking  testimony. 

Experiments  in  and  out  of 
court. 


§  211.  Direct  examination — Leading  questions. — The  witness, 
after  being  sworn,  is  asked  his  name  and  address,  that  his  identity 
may  be  ascertained  or  confirmed.  He  may  then  be  interrogated 
as  to  facts  within  his  knowledge  relevant  to  the  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  accused. 

Usually  in  criminal  cases,  the  material  facts  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  a  witness  are  elicited  by  questions  put  to  him  by  the  coun- 

384 


385  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    211 

sel  calling  him.  By  this  means,  the  evidence  is  readily  limited  and 
confined  within  the  issue  for  the  reason  that  the  relevancy  of  the 
answer  can  in  most  cases  be  ascertained  from  the  character  of  the 
question.  But  this  is  a  matter  of  practice  only  and  there  is  no 
legal  principle  which  prevents  a  witness  from  giving  his  testimony 
in  narrative  form  if  he  is  requested  to  do  so  by  counsel.  The 
danger  of  giving  testimony  in  narrative  form  is  that  irrelevant 
and  other  improper  evidence  may  be  interjected  and  a  motion  to 
strike  out  may  become  necessary.  Even  though  evidence  given 
is  stricken  out,  it  has  had  its  effect  and  for  this  reason,  testimony 
given  in  narrative  form  must  be  closely  watched  and  the  improper 
portion  of  it  promptly  objected  to.^ 

It  is  not  usually  allowable,  on  the  direct  examination,  to  ask 
leading  questions,  '/.  e.,  questions  which,  by  their  form  or  charac- 
ter, "suggest  to  the  witness  the  answer  desired;"'  as,  for  exam- 
ple, questions  which  are  a  statement  of  fact,  and  suggest  that  the 
witness  is  to  deny  or  affirm  its  truth  by  answering  "yes"  or  "no." 
Somewhat  similar  and  equally  inadmissible  are  questions  which 
assume  the  truth  of  facts  which  are  in  issue,  or  which  are  mate- 
rial, which  have  not  been  proved,  or  certain  answers  to  have  been 
given  to  prior  questions,  when  such  answers  have  not  been  given. ^ 

Except  in  the  examination  of  experts,  it  is  not  permissible  on 
the  direct  examination  to  question  a  witness  upon  matters  not 
within  his  personal  knowledge,  or  to  endeavor,  by  assuming  ques- 
tions, to  elicit  his  opinion  on  or  inference  from  any  matters  of 
fact.  Sometimes,  however,  leading  questions  may  be  asked  on 
the  examination-in-chief.    The  matter  is  largely  in  the  control  of 

^Horton   v.   State,   120   Ga.  307,  47  443;    and    see    Underbill    on    Ev.,    p. 

S.  E.  969.  470. 

^  I  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  434.  Accused    as     Witness. — Compelling 

^  State    V.    Johnson,    29    La.    Ann.  accused  to  cover  or  uncover  his  head 

717;  Hays  V.  State  (Tex.),  20  S.  W.  or  face,  94  Am.  St.  339.     Compelling 

361 ;    Chambers    v.    People,   4    Scam,  accused    to    utter    certain    words    or 

(111-)   351;   State  V.   Duffy,  57  Conn,  sounds,  94  Am.  St.  341.     Compelling 

525,  18  Atl.  791 ;   Bostic  v.  State,  94  accused  to  exhibit  marks  on  his  per- 

Ala.  45,  10  So.  602;  People  v.  Lange,  son,  94  Am.  St.  340.    Compelling  ac- 

90  Mich.  454,  51  N.  W.  534;  People  v.  cused  to  make  footprints,  94  Am.  St. 

Fong  Ah  Sing,  70  Cal.  8,  i  r  Pac.  323 ;  343.     Compelling  accused   to   try   on 

Andrews  v.  State  (Ala.),  48  So.  858;  shoes,   94   Am.    St.    344.     Compelling 

People    V.    Brow,   90    Hun    (N.    Y.)  accused  to  give  specimen  of  his  hand- 

509,  35  N.  Y.  S.   1009,  II  N.  Y.  Cr.  writing,  94  Am.  St.  344,  345. 

25 — Underbill  Crim.  Ev. 


212 


CRI.MINAL    EVIDENCE. 


386 


the  judge,  who  may  and  should  exercise  a  sound  (Hscretion.  The 
general  rule  should  not  be  departed  from  without  good  reason. 
Least  of  all  should  the  state  he  allowed  to  make  out  its  case  by 
putting  evidence  in  the  mouths  of  its  witnesses.  If  the  witness  is 
intelligent,  he  must  be  asked  general  questions  to  save  time  and 
facilitate  justice;  and  where  leading  questions  on  vital  and  mate- 
rial points  are  permitted  to  be  put  by  the  state,  and  no  reason  or 
necessity  appears  for  them,  the  judicial  discretion  will  be  deemed 
to  have  been  abused  and  a  new  trial  may  be  ordered  for  this 
alone.'* 

^212.  When  leading  questions  may  he  asked  on  the  direct  exami- 
nation.— The  general  rule  is  subject  to  some  important  exceptions. 
An  exception  is  recognized  in  the  case  of  an  unwilling  witness,  or 
one  who,  on  the  direct  examination,  is  hostile  to  the  party  calling 
him  and  refuses  to  answer  fully,  or  one  who  colors  his  testimony 
to  favor  the  opposing  party,  or  attempts  to  conceal  what  he  knows 
by  ambiguous  language.^ 


*Coon  V.  People,  99  111.  368,  39 
Am.  28;  Cannon  v.  People,  141  111. 
270,  30  N.  E.  1027:  Brassell  v.  State, 
gi  Ala.  45,  8  So.  639;  McCain  v. 
Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  263,  i 
Atl.    45;    Commonwealth   v.    Chaney, 

148  Mass.  6,  18  N.  E.  572;  Harvey 
V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  545,  34  S.  W. 
623;  App.  V.  State,  90  Ind.  73;  An- 
derson V.  State,  104  Ala.  83,  16  So. 
108;  Barnes  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
320,  39  S.  W.  684 ;  State  v.  Knost,  207 
Mo.  18,  105  S.  W.  616;  Craddick  v. 
State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  385,  88  S.  W.  347; 
State  V.  Bateman,  198  Mo.  212,  94  S. 
W.  843;  State  V.  Napper,  141  Mo. 
401,  42  S.  W.  957;  Lyles  V.  State, 
130  Ga.  294,  60  S.  E.  578;  State  v. 
Kendall,  143  N.  Car.  659,  57  S.  E. 
340;  People  V.  Way,  119  App.  Div. 
344,  104  N.  Y.  S.  277,  21  N.  Y. 
Cr.  149;  State  v.  George,  214  Mo. 
262,  113  S.  W.  1 1 16;  People  V.  Weber, 

149  Cal.   325,  86   Pac.  671 ;    State  v. 


Dalton,  43  Wash.  278,  86  Pac.  500; 
Shaffer  v.  United  States,  24  App. 
Cas.  (D.  C.)  417;  Taylor  v.  State, 
82  Ark.  540,  102  S.  W.  367.  For  a 
very  strong  case  where  a  witness  who 
refused  to  answer  was  plied  with 
leading  questions  by  both  the  counsel 
and  the  court  and  was  finally  com- 
mitted for  his  persistent  contempt  in 
refusing  to  answer,  see  State  v.  Dal- 
ton, 43  Wash.  278,  86  Pac.  590. 

°  People  v.  Caldwell,  107  Mich.  374, 
65  N.  W.  213;  Fitzpatrick  v.  State, 
37  Tex.  Cr.  20,  38  S.  W.  806;  People 
v.  Gillespie,  in  jNIich.  241,  69  N.  W. 
490;  Schuster  v.  State,  80  Wis.  107, 
49  N.  W.  30;  State  v.  Tall.  43  Minn. 
273,  45  N.  W.  449;  State  v.  Benner, 
64  Me.  267;  People  v.  Bernor,  115 
Mich.  692,  74  N.  W.  184;  Hughes  v. 
State,  29  Ohio  C.  C.  237;  Johnson 
V.  State,  133  Wis.  453,  113  N.  W. 
674;  Caswell  v.  State  (Ga.  App.),  63 
S.  E.  566;  Territory  v.  Meredith  (N. 


387  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    212 

And  where  a  witness  is  very  ignorant  or  refuses  to  answer,  or 
answers  in  such  a  way  that  his  answer  is  likely  to  be  misunder- 
stood by  the  jurors,  or  where  for  any  reason  the  interests  of  jus- 
tice seem  to  require  it,  a  leading  question  or  indeed,  several  lead- 
ing questions,  put  by  the  court  itself  are  not  error.*^ 

This  exception  to  the  general  rule  excluding  leading  ques- 
tions is  of  particular  value  and  is  most  often  invoked  where  the 
prosecution  must  necessarily  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  by  the 
testimony  of  his  friends  or  associates.  So  the  prosecution  may 
put  leading  questions  to  an  accomplice'  who  has  turned  state's 
evidence,  but  who  equivocates  or  refuses  to  give  his  evidence  in 
full  under  the  belief  that  his  answers  may  incriminate  him.  The 
exception  is  of  the  greatest  importance  where  the  material  wit- 
nesses against  the  accused  are  members  of  his  family,  or  his  col- 
lateral kindred,  or  persons,  not  being  of  his  kindred  or  family, 
with  whom  he  has  been  on  terms  of  intimate  friendship.  For  ex- 
ample, a  very  slight  unwillingness  to  answer,  coupled  with  the 
fact  that  the  unwilling  witness  is  the  wife  or  child  of  the  accused, 
or  his  brother  or  sister  will  be  sufficient  to  permit  leading  ques- 

^lex.),  91  Pac.  731;  Underbill  on  shows  a  strong  interest  or  bias  in 
Ev.,  §  335.  P-  474-  In  Moody  v.  favor  of  the  cross-examining  party, 
Rowell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  490,  28  Am.  and  needs  only  an  intimation  to  say 
Dec.  317,  the  court  said:  "The  court  whatever  is  most  favorable  to  that 
have  no  doubt  that  it  is  within  the  party.  The  witness  may  have  pur- 
discretion  of  a  judge  at  the  trial,  un-  posely  concealed  such  bias,  in  favor 
der  particular  circumstances,  to  per-  of  one  party,  to  induce  the  other  to 
mit  a  leading  question  to  be  put  to  call  him  and  make  him  his  witness ; 
one's  own  witness,  as  where  he  is  or  the  party  calling  him  may  be  com- 
manifestly  reluctant  and  hostile  to  pelled  to  do  so,  to  prove  some  single 
the  interests  of  the  party  calling  him,  fact  necessary  to  his  case.  This  dis- 
or  where  he  has  exhausted  his  mem-  cretionary  power  to  vary  the  general 
ory  without  stating  the  particular  re-  rule  is  to  be  exercised  only  so  far  as 
quired,  where  it  is  a  proper  name,  or  the  purposes  of  justice  plainly  re- 
other  fact,  which  cannot  be  signifi-  quire  it,  and  is  to  be  regulated  by  the 
cantly  pointed  to  by  a  general  inter-  circumstances  of  each  case." 
rogatory,  or  where  the  witness  is  a  "People  v.  Bernor,  115  Mich.  692, 
child  of  tender  years,  whose  atten-  74  N.  W.  184;  Hughes  v.  State,  29 
tion  can  be  called  to  the  matter  re-  Ohio  C.  C.  237;  Johnson  v.  State, 
quired,  only  by  a  pointed  or  leading  133  Wis.  453,  113  N.  W.  674;  Caswell 
question.  So  a  judge  may,  in  his  v.  State  (Ga.  App.),  63  S.  E.  566; 
discretion,  prohibit  certain  leading  Territory  v.  Meredith  (N.  Mex.),  91 
questions  from  being  put  to  an  ad-  Pac.  731. 
versary's  witness,  where  the  witness 


§    213  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  .  388 

tions.^  And  so  where  a  woman  with  whom  the  accused  had 
maintained  ilHcit  relations  was  called  to  testify  to  a  conversation 
she  had  had  with  him,  any  unwillingness  on  her  part  to  disclose 
the  answers  of  the  accused  may  justify  leading  questions.'* 

As  a  general  rule,  the  latitude  allowed  the  state  in  respect  of 
leading  questions  in  the  examination  of  a  witness  apparently  hos- 
tile is  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court." 

§  213.    Forgetful  witnesses  may  be  asked   leading   questions. — 

Leading  questions  may,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  be  put  to  a 
forgetful  witness,  or  to  one  who  simulates  forgetfulness.  And  if, 
by  reason  of  the  stupidity  or  ignorance  of  the  witness,  real  or 
assumed,  or  his  inclination  to  prevaricate,  the  general  questions 
which  have  been  put  fail  to  bring  specific  answers,  leading  ques- 
tions may  lawfully  be  propounded.^"  Leading  questions  are  often 
allowed  in  the  examination  of  witnesses  of  tender  years  who  may 
be  incapable,  because  of  inexperience  and  the  embarrassment  at- 
tendant on  a  public  judicial  examination,  of  framing  their  knowl- 
edge in  intelligible  language.^^    But  this  exception  is  not  univer- 

^  People  V.   Sexton,  187  N.  Y.  495,  the  extent  to  which  this  may  be  done 

80  N.  K  396,  116  Am.  St.  621.  depends  upon  judicial   discretion  ex- 

^  State   V.    Walker,    133    Iowa   489,  ercised   in   the   light   of   the  circum- 

iro  N.  W.  925.  stances  in  which  the  question  arises. 

"  Ward  V.   State,  85  Ark.   179,  107  That    these    two    persons,    wife    and 

S.    W.    677.     "The   district    attorney  daughter  of  the  defendant,  were  un- 

was  permitted  to  cross-examine  and  willing    witnesses    against    him    was 

impeach   his   own  witnesses,   the   de-  manifest  from  their  relations  to  him 

fendant's    wife    and    daughter.      The  and  from  their  apparent  lack  of  rec- 

reason  of  the  rule  upon  which   that  ollection.     It  was,  therefore,  permis- 

contention  is  based  suggests  the  ex-  sible  for  the  district  attorney  to  ply 

ceptions    that    are    necessary    to    its  them  with  leading  questions,  and  even 

practical  application.     The  party  who  to   cross-examine   them."     People   v. 

calls  a  witness  certifies  his  credibil-  Sexton,  187  N.  Y.  495,  80  N,  E.  396, 

ity.     Therefore,   a   witness   may   not  116  Am.  St.  621. 

be  impeached  by  the  party  at  whose  ^"Coon    v.    People,   99    111.    368,    39 

instance    he    testifies.      This    general  Am.  28;  Mann  v.  State,  23  Fla.  610, 

rule  is   subject,  however,  to   the  ex-  3  So.  207;  Navarro  v.  State,  24  Tex. 

ception  that,  when   a  witness   proves  App.   378,   6   S.    W.   542;    Cassem   v. 

hostile  or  unwilling,  the  party  calling  Galvin,    158   111.   30,   41    N.    E.    1087; 

him  may  probe  his  conscience  or  test  Barker  v.   State,   i  Ga.  App.  286,  57 

his  recollection,  to  the   end  that  the  S.  E.  989. 

whole  truth  may  be   laid  bare;   and  "Hodge  v.  State,  26  Fla.  11,  7  So. 


389  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    2I3 

sally  recognized,  and  it  would  seem  that  the  tender  age  of  a  wit- 
ness may  furnish  a  reason  why  leading  questions  should  not  be 
asked,  because  of  the  ease  with  which  young  persons  and  children 
may  be  misled  thereby/" 

Leading  questions  may  also  be  put  to  a  witness  whose  memory, 
while  clear  and  strong,  as  regards  the  main  facts  of  a  complicated 
transaction,  is  weak  and  indistinct  as  to  minor  accompanying 
facts,  such  as  places  or  dates/^ 

So,  to  refresh  the  memory  of  one's  own  witness,  counsel  may 
ask  if  the  witness  did  not  at  some  prior  date  state  facts  which  may 
be  inconsistent  with  his  present  testimony.^*  If  the  memory  of  a 
witness  is  faint,  he  may  be  plied  with  leading  questions  on  unim- 
portant and  irrelevant,  but  suggestive  facts.  He  may  be  asked 
what  his  uniform  habit  or  routine  of  acting  was  in  connection 
with  certain  transactions,  if  the  evidence  of  the  unimportant  fact 
or  routine  suggests  to  him  a  relevant  but  forgotten  fact.^^  In  the 
introductory  portion  of  the  direct  examination,  leading  questions 
are  allowed.  Thus  counsel  are  permitted,  instead  of  asking  what 
was  said,  to  ask  a  witness  whether  specific  statements  were  made 

593;  Poison  V.  State,  137  Ind.  519,  male,  who  is  usually  the  principal 
35  N.  E.  907 ;  Proper  v.  State,  85  witness  for  the  state,  to  relate  the 
Wis.  615,  55  N.  W.  1035 ;  Paschal  v.  details  of  the  crime,  because  of  the 
State,  89  Ga.  303,  15  S.  E.  322 ;  State  natural  timidity  and  female  modesty, 
V.  Megorden,  49  Ore.  259,  88  Pac.  which  prompt  her  to  remain  silent 
306;  Leak  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  97  S.  as  regards  these  indelicate  details, 
W.  476;  McCann  v.  People,  226  III.  proof  of  which  is  necessary  to  con- 
562,  80  N.  E.  1061 ;  ante,  §  205.  In  vict,  leading  questions  are  very  prop- 
State  V.  Megorden,  49  Ore.  259,  88  erly  put  to  her.  State  v.  Bauer- 
Pac.  306,  it  is  said :  "Considering  kemper,  95  Iowa  562,  64  N.  W.  609 ; 
the  youth  of  these  witnesses,  one  be-  Callison  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  211,  39 
ing  18  years  of  age  and  the  other  14,  S.  W.  300;  State  v.  Simes,  12  Idaho 
and  the  fact  that  they  were  testify-  310,  85  Pac.  914. 

ing    upon    the    trial    of    their    father  "  Schuster   v.    State,   80   Wis.    107, 

for    killing    their    mother,    we    think  49  N.  W.  30;   State  v.  Cummins,  76 

there    was    no    error    in    permitting  Iowa   133,  40   N.  W.   124;    People   v. 

such  questions.  Durrant,  116  Cal.  199,  48  Pac.  75. 

"^  Coon   V.    People,    99    111.    368,    39  "  Prentis  v.  Bates,  88  Mich.  567,  50 

Am.  28.  N.  W.  637;   People  v.   Sherman,  133 

''  In  a  prosecution  for  rape  or  se-  N.  Y.  349,  31  N.  E.  107,  16  N.  Y.  S. 

duction,   or   for  an   indecent   assault,  782,    40    N.    Y.    St.    831,    lO    N.    Y. 

where  it  is  difficult  to  induce  the  fe-  Cr.  53. 


§214  CRIMINAL    EV'IDENCE.  39O 

in  his  hearing,  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  a  witness  who 
had  testified  that  they  were  not  made."' 

The  objection  to  the  question  as  leading  is  an  objection  to  the 
form  of  the  question,  not  to  the  competency  of  the  evidence  which 
may  be  given  in  answer  to  it.  If  the  court  rules  that  the  question 
which  is  alleged  to  be  leading  is  proper,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
the  answer  is  competent  in  the  absence  of  an  objection,  to  its  com- 
petency. If  the  counsel  desires  to  object  to  the  competency  of  the 
answer,  he  should  do  so,  before  it  is  given  or  having  objected  on 
one  ground  only,  he  cannot  subsequently  take  advantage  of  an- 
other." 

§  214.  Questions  put  to  the  witness  by  the  court. — The  interests 
of  public  justice  and  the  punishment  and  prevention  of  crime  on 
the  one  hand,  and  principles  of  fairness  toward  the  prisoner  on 
the  other,  demand  that  the  presiding  judge  should  not  entertain, 
or,  at  least,  should  not  manifest,  any  partiality  for  or  against  the 
accused  during  the  examination  of  the  witnesses. 

It  is  necessary  here  to  distinguish  carefully  between  the  compe- 
tency of  evidence  and  its  credibility.  The  admissibility  of  evi- 
dence is  usually  a  judicial  question  with  which  the  jury  has  no 
concern.^'*  It  is  the  right,  therefore,  of  the  judge  in  a  criminal 
trial  to  determine  all  preliminary  questions  bearing  on  the  compe- 
tency of  evidence  or  of  a  witness,  and  to  enable  him  to  do  this  he 
may  have  to  question  the  witness.  And  the  court,  in  ruling  on 
the  competency  of  evidence,  may  state  the  reasons  and  grounds 
for  offering^^  and  receiving  or  rejecting  it,  or  may  declare  its 
probable  effect  if  it  had  been  received  where  it  is  excluded,  if  no 
language  is  employed  which  will  improperly  influence  the  minds 
of  the  jurors  against  the  prisoner.-^ 

"  Shultz  V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  390 ;  amining  to  disclose  the  substance  of 

Cannon  v.  People,  141  111.  270,  30  N.  what   is   proposed   to   prove.     People 

E.    1027.      See   Underhill   on    Ev.,   p.  v.    White,    14    Wend.    (N.    Y.)    11 1; 

475,  §  335,  note  3.    If  a  question  calls  State  v.  Small,  26  Kan.  209;  Wood  v. 

for  evidence  which  may  or  may  not  State,  92  Ind.  269. 

be     relevant,     and     sometimes     even  "  Sweet  v.  State,  75  Neb.  263,  106 

when   no    question    has   been    asked,  N.  W.  31. 

and    the    witness    has    neither    been  "Underhill  on  Ev.,  §§  11-13. 

sworn  nor  examined,  the  court  may,  "  Armstrong  v.  State,  14  Ind.  App. 

in    its    discretion,    on    application    by  566,  43  N.  E.  142. 

the  other  party,   require  counsel  ex-  ""  State   v.    Milling,   35    S.   Car.    16, 


391  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  8    214 

With  these  qualifications  no  rule  of  law  exists  which  limits  the 
power  of  a  judge  in  a  criminal  trial  to  interrogate  a  witness  dur- 
ing his  examination.  He  may  ask  any  question  which  either  the 
state  or  the  accused  had  a  right  to  ask,  or  which  it  was  their  duty 
to  ask.  but  which  has  been  omitted,  if  the  answer  may  be  relevant. 
\\'here  anything  material  has  been  omitted,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  bring  it  out.-^  But  the  court  should  be  very  careful  to  let 
fall  no  remarks,  and  to  put  no  questions  which  assume  the  prison- 
er's guilt,  for  experience  teaches  all  persons  that  jurors,  particu- 
larly in  evenly  balanced  cases,  are  extremely  prone  to  be  influ- 
enced by  such  judicial  intimations,  and  to  defer  to  them  in  ren- 
dering their  verdict.'' 

The  court  may,  in  a  criminal  case,  properly  cross-examine  the 
witnesses  for  the  accused.  Questions  put  by  the  court  should 
follow  the  rules  as  to  form  observed  on  criminal  trials.'^  The 
judicial  power  to  cross-examine  should  be  carefully  exercised  so 
as  not  to  prejudice  the  accused.  Questions  by  the  court  on  exam- 
ination or  cross-examination  w4iich  assume  the  prisoner's  guilt, 
or  which  assume  his  witnesses  are  testifying  falsely,  or  which  give 
to  jury  the  impression  that  the  court  has  determined  that  ^the 
accused  is  guilty,  furnish,  in  most  cases,  a  basis  for  a  reversal.'* 

For  example,  where  the  defense  was  an  alibi,  the  action  of  the 
court  in  questioning  at  very  great  length  a  witness  who  swore  to 
the  alibi,  asking  him  inter  alia  if  he  were  absolutely  sure  and  cer- 
tain he  had  seen  the  defendant  at  a  certain  place,  telling  him  to 

14    S.    E.    284;    Hodge    V.    State,    26  contra,   State   v.    Milling,  35    S.    Car. 

Fla.  II,  7  So.  593.  16,  14  S.  E.  284. 

■' Colee  V.    State,   75   Ind.  511;    De  "^  Hopperwood    v.    State,    39    Tex. 

Ford  V.  Painter,  3  Okla.  80,  41   Fac.  Cr.  15,  44  S.  W.  841. 

96,    30    L.    R.    A.    722 ;    Bowden    v.  "*  Komp  v.   State,   129  Wis.  20,  108 

Achor,  95  Ga.  243,  22  S.  E.  254;  Epps  N.    W.  46.     To  an  objection  on  ap- 

V.  State,  ig  Ga.  102;  State  v.  Lee,  80  peal  that  the  manner  of  the  judge  in 

N.  Car.  483;  State  v.  Caron,  118  La.  asking   a ,  proper    question    was    sucli 

349,    42    So.    960;    Caswell    v.    State  as  to  convince  the  jury  that  he  be- 

(Ga.  App.),  63  S.  E.  566;  Miller  v.  lieved    the    accused    was    guilty,    the 

Territory,  15  Okla.  422,  85  Pac.  239.  court  said:    "It  is  as  yet  impossible 

"People  V.  Williams,   17  Cal.   142;  for  the  tone  and  manner  of  a  presid- 

Durham  v.   State,  2  Ga.  App.  401,  58  ing    judge    to    be    transmitted    to    a 

S.  E.  555 :  Rouse  V.  State,  2  Ga.  .App.  court    of    review."    Caswell    v.    State 

184,   58   S.   E.  416;    Holt  V.   State,  2  (Ga.  App.),  63  S.  E.  566. 
Ga.    App.    383,    58    S.    E.    511.      Cf. 


§  214  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  392 

think  carefully  a  moment  and  see  if  he  were  not  mistaken,  assur- 
ing him  at  the  same  time  that  he  had  a  right  to  correct  his  testi- 
mony if  he  were  wrong  and  advising  him  to  do  so  if  there  were 
any  doubt  in  his  mind,  was  very  prejudicial  to  the  rights  of  the 
accused  and  he  is  entitled  to  a  new  trial  where  the  jury  find  him 
guilty.-^ 

But  no  remark  by  the  judge  made  during  the  examination 
of  a  witness  can  be  urged  as  ground  for  a  new  trial  which  re- 
fers solely  to  competency,  to  the  relevancy  of  testimony,  or  to  the 
reason  for  its  exclusion  or  admission.-''  The  active  participation 
of  the  court  in  the  examination  of  a  witness,  even  to  suggesting 
the  proper  form  of  a  question,  is  not  reversible  error.^^ 

The  witness  may  always  be  asked  by  the  court  whether  he  un- 
derstands a  question  which  has  been  put  to  him,^^  and  the  court 
may,  in  order  to  facilitate  and  expedite  the  administration  of 
justice,  peremptorily  check  or  silence  the  irrelevant  evidence  of 
a  voluble  or  abusive  witness,^''  or  interpose  sua  sponte  to  stop  the 
prolonged  and  unnecessary  examination  of  a  witness,^''  to  exclude 
incompetent  evidence,  particularly  where  the  accused  has  no 
counsel,  or  he  is  a  child  of  tender  years. ^^ 

Sometimes  jurors  are  permitted  to  interrogate  a  witness  and 
his  answers,  if  relevant,  are  not  incompetent  because  thus  infor- 
mally obtained.    A  lengthy  examination  by  a  juror,  during  which 

^  Glover  v.  United  States,  147  Fed.  minutes  after  an  order  had  been  made 

426,  77  C.  C.  A.  450.  excluding  the  witnesses  was  not  er- 

"°  State  V.  Young,   105  Mo.  634,  16  ror. 

S.  W.  408;  Patterson  v.  State,  86  Ga.  =' Hodge  v.  State,  26  Fla.  11,  7  So. 

70,  12  S.  E.  174;  Lewis  v.  State,  90  593;    Sanders  v.   Bagwell,  Z7  S.  Car. 

Ga.  95,  15  S.  E.  697;  Commonwealth  145,  15  S.  E.  714,  16  S.  E.  770. 

V.  Ward,  157  Mass.  482,  32  N.  E.  66z ',  '^  State  v.  Mathews,  98  Mo.  125,  10 

Arnold  v.  State,  81  Wis.  278,  51   N.  S.  W.  144,  11  S.  W.  1135;  Washing- 

W.  426;  Butler  v.  State,  91  Ga.  161,  ton  v.   State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  184,  79  S. 

16  S.  E.  984;  State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  W.  811. 

Car.    534,    15    S.    E.    602;    State    v.  "®  Robinson  v.   State,  82  Ga.  535,  9 

Barnes,  48  La.  Ann.  460,  19  So.  251;  S.  E.  528;  Bowden  v.  Bailes,  loi  N. 

State  V.  Hayward,  62  Minn.  474,  65  Car.  612,  8  S.  E.  342. 

N.  W.  63;  Carter  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  ="  People  v.  Turcott,  65  Cal.   126,  3 

254,   58   S.    E.    532,   in  which  case  it  Pac.  461 ;   State  v.   Southern,  48  La. 

was  held  that  the  action  of  the  court  Ann.  628,  19  So.  668;  State  v.  Caron, 

in  rebuking  one  of  the  witnesses  for  118  La.  349,  42  So.  960. 

the    accused   in   the   presence    of   the  ^'  McClure    v.     Commonwealth,    8r 

jury  for  remaining  in  court  for  a  few  Ky.  448. 


393 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


215 


his  mental  attitude  or  bias  towards  the  accused,  or  towards  the 
issue  is  exhibited,  should  not  be  permitted  or  encouraged.^- 

§  215.  Judicial  remarks  upon  the  demeanor  or  credibility  of  a  wit- 
ness during  his  examination. — The  credibility  and  weight  of  evi- 
dence are  for  the  jury  exclusively.  All  judicial  observations  or 
remarks  upon  the  personal  character  of  a  witness  or  the  nature, 
credibility  or  weight  of  his  evidence,  made  during  his  examina- 
tion, are  improper,  and  furnish  grounds  for  objection.^^  It  is 
immaterial  that  the  judicial  observations  were  inadvertently  made 
if  the  accused  was  substantially  prejudiced,^*  though  it  seems  that 
the  error  may  be  cured  by  a  prompt  withdrawal  or  retraction  of 
the  objectionable  words,^^  or  by  an  instruction  to  the  jury  to  dis- 
regard them.^® 


^"  The  accused  is  sometimes  allowed 
by  statute  to  make  a  personal  state- 
ment of  his  defense  under  oath.  He 
is  not  a  witness  in  such  a  case,  and 
cannot  be  examined  or  cross-exam- 
ined by  jurors  or  counsel.  The  court 
must  protect  him  sua  sponte  from  the 
questioning  or  interference  of  coun- 
sel, or  of  others,  and  its  neglect  to  do 
this,  if  objection  is  promptly  made,  is 
ground  for  reversing  a  conviction. 
Bond  V.  State,  21  Fla.  738;  Miller  v. 
State,  15  Fla.  575;  Hawkins  v.  State, 
29  Fla.  554,  ID  So.  822. 

^'  State  V.  Philpot,  97  Iowa  365,  66 
N.  W.  730;  Sharp  v.  State,  51  Ark. 
147,  10  S.  W.  228,  14  Am.  St.  27n; 
State  V.  Raymond,  53  N.  J.  L.  260, 
21  Atl.  328;  People  V.  Wood,  126  N. 
Y.  249,  27  N.  E.  362;  Shepherd  v. 
State,  31  Xeb.  389,  47  N.  W.  11 18; 
State  V.  Jacobs,  106  N.  Car.  695,  10 
S.  E.  1031 ;  Campbell  v.  State,  30  Tex. 
App.  64s,  18  S.  W.  409;  People  v. 
Xino,  149  X.  Y.  317,  43  X.  E.  853; 
State  V.  Lucas,  24  Ore.  168,  33  Pac. 
538;  People  V.  Hull,  86  Mich.  449,  49 
X.  W.  288 ;  Bone  v.  State,  86  Ga.  108, 
12  S.  E.  205.  A  remark  by  the  court 
that   "witness    has   contradicted   him- 


self several  times,"  is  very  objection- 
able. People  V.  Willard,  92  Cal.  482, 
28  Pac.  585;  Grant  v.  State,  122  Ga. 
740,  50  S.  E.  946. 

^*  Garner  v.  State,  28  Fla.  113,  9  So. 
835,  29  Am.  St.  232. 

''^Johnson  v.  State,  94  Ala.  35,  10 
So.  667;  Reinhold  v.  State,  130  Ind. 
467,  30  N.  E.  306;  Ryan  v.  State,  83 
Wis.  486,  53  X.  W.  836;  Common- 
wealth V.  Ward,  157  Mass.  48a,  32  X. 
E.  663;  State  V.  Black,  42  La.  Ann. 
861,  8  So.  594. 

^^  People  V.  Xorthey,  77  Cal.  6r8,  19 
Pac.  86s,  20  Pac.  129;  Vann  v.  State, 
83  Ga.  44,  9  S.  E.  945. 

"The  more  serious  question  relates 
to  the  remarks  made  by  the  court,  in 
passing  upon  the  objection.  The  re- 
marks were  made,  it  is  true,  in  the 
heat  of  the  trial,  and  were,  no  doubt, 
called  out  by  something  that  was  said 
by  counsel,  either  in  the  objections  in- 
terposed, or  in  the  arguments  made  in 
support  thereof,  and  were  not  uttered 
with  intent  to  prejudice  the  case,  or 
prejudice  the  effect  of  the  witness' 
testimony.  But  it  is  a  matter  of  com- 
mon knowledge  that  jurors  liang 
tenaciously    upon    remarks    made    by 


§    2l6  CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE.  394 

*  §  216.  Answers  must  be  responsive. — The  questions  put  should 
be  neither  vague  nor  ambiguous."''  So  the  answers  should  be  re- 
sponsive, stating  all  facts  called  for,  and  no  more,  and  generally 
without  any  expression  of  opinions,  inferences  or  conjectures.*^ 
If  the  answer  given  is  so  irresponsive  that  it  wholly  or  in  part 
fails  to  convey  all  the  facts  which  were  required,  or  if  it  states 
facts  or  opinions  not  required,  it  may  be  stricken  out  on  motion 
as  far  as  it  is  not  responsive,  and  the  refusal  of  this  motion  when 
seasonable  objection  is  made  by  the  accused  is  reversible  error.^'' 
The  court  may  always  in  its  discretion  direct  a  witness  to  an- 
swer a  relevant  question  responsively  if  he  persists  in  replying 
evasively,'**'  and  should  promptly  rebuke  a  witness  who  persists  in 
stating  his  opinion  as  to  the  gnilt  of  the  prisoner.*^ 

§  217.  Refreshing  the  memory  of  a  forgetful  witness  by  memoran- 
dum.— A  witness  will  generally  be  permitted  to  speak  of  those 
facts  only  that  are  within  his  personal  knowledge  and  recollec- 
tion. There  are^  however,  two  sorts  of  recollection  which  the 
witness  may  employ  on  the  stand.  They  may  be  concisely  de- 
scribed as  past  recollection  and  present  recollection.  In  the  case 
of  past  recollection,*  the  witness  has  no  present  recollection  of 
relevant  facts,  while  he  is  on  the  witness  stand,  but  remembers 
that  at  sometime  in  the  past  he  did  have  knowledge  and  recollec- 
tion of  certain  events  and  that  he  made  a  record  thereof.  Having 
no  present  recollection,  however,  he  cannot  use  this  record  to  re- 
fresh his  recollection,  but  if  he  can  swear  that  when  he  made  it, 

the  court  during  the  progress  of  the  ^°  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Wood- 
trial,  and  if,  perchance,  they  are  en-  ward,  47  Kan.  191,  27  Pac.  836. 
abled  to  discover  the  views  of  the  *°  State  v.  Farley,  87  Iowa  22,  53  N. 
court  regarding  the  effect  of  a  wit-  W.  1089.  Whether  the  answer  is  or 
ness'  testimony,  or  the  merits  of  the  is  not  responsive  is  for  the  court 
case,    they    almost    invariably    follow  alone. 

them."    State  v.  Philpot,  97  Iowa  365,  "  A  witness,  in  his  excitement,  ac- 

66  N.  W.  730.  cused  the  prisoner  of  being  guilty  of 

^  Hill  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  521,  19  S.  the  murder  for  which  he  was  being 

W.  674;  Mann  v.  State,  23  Fla.  610,  tried.     The   court  need  not   stop  the 

3  So.  207.  trial    if   the    jury    are    properlj'    cau- 

^  People  V.  Smith,  106  Mich.  431,  64  tioned    to    disregard    the    accusation. 

N.  W.  200.     See  Underbill  on  Ev..  p.  Commonwealth  v.  Gilbert,   165  ^lass. 

476,    note   2;    Smith    v.    State    (Tex.  45,  42  N.  E.  336. 
Cr.),  99  S.  W.  100. 


395  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    21J 

it  was  a  true  statement  of  the  facts  as  he  then  recollected  them, 
the  record  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  be  admissible  as 
evidence  in  itself  and  aside  from  an3^thing  the  witness  may  testify 
to  orally.  The  using  of  the  evidence  of  a  past  recollection  embod- 
ied in  a  writing-  which  the  witness  swears  was  true  to  his  knowl- 
edge when  he  made  it,  but  about  which  he  has  no  present  recol- 
lection whatever,  depends  upon  certain  rules  which  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  use  of  memorandmn  to  refresh  the  recollection  and 
consecjuently  demand  no  discussion  in  this  place. 

A  present  recollection  of  past  events  may  be  strong  or  weak 
according  to  circumstances.  These  circumstances  are  the  charac- 
ter of  the  events,  whether  of  striking  interest  or  of  mere  com- 
monplace routine ;  and  also  on  the  remoteness  of  the  events  in 
point  of  time.  In  the  case  of  events  of  great  importance  and  in- 
terest, particularly  if  the  witness  was  himself  an  interested  person, 
the  present  recollection  is  apt  to  be  vivid  and  no  refreshing  is  re- 
quired. Events  of  routine  or  commonplace  character  are  very 
apt  to  be  faint  in  the  recollection  of  a  witness  who  may  have  par- 
ticipated in  them  and  for  this  reason,  the  rule  that  he  may  refresh 
his  memory  when  necessary  was  enunciated.  For  a  witness  inay 
aid  or  refresh  his  memory,  meaning  thereby  his  present  recollec- 
tion of  past  events,  if  he  has  a  present  recollection  where  it  is 
weak  or  faint  by  consulting,  on  the  witness  stand,  a  writing  or 
memorandum  whether  it  was  made  by  himself  or  some  other  per- 
son; if  after  examining  the  memorandum  and  because  of  what 
he  has  read  thereon,  he  is  able  to  testify  of  his  present  recollec- 
tion thus  renewed  and  revived.*" 

If  the  memorandum  is  one  whose  sole  use  is  to  refresh  the 
memory,  it  is  not  usually  competent  evidence  and  a  memorandum 
or  other  writing  which  is  admitted  to  be  incompetent  may  always 
be  used  to  refresh  the  memory.  The  question  of  its  relevancy 
and  materiality  should  not  be  considered.''^  It  ought  not  to  be 
read  to  the  jury  as  evidence,**  though  it  has  been  held  that  the 

*^  Jenkins  v.   State,  31  Fla.   196,   12  E.  184;  O'Brien  v.  United  States,  27 

So.  dTj;  Kingory  v.  United  States,  44  App.  Cas.  D.  C.  263. 
Fed.  669;   Commonwealtii   v.   Clancy,         '''Flood  v.  Mitchell,  68  N.  Y.   507; 

154  Mass.   128,  2.-J  N.  E.   looi  ;    State  Pickard   v.    Bryant,  92  Mich.  430,  52 

V.  Collins,  28  R.   I.  439,  67  Atl.  796;  N.  W.  788. 
Johnson  v.   State,  125  Ga.  243,  54  S.        "  Raynor  v.  Norton,  31  Mich.  210. 


§    217 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


396 


jurors  may  examine  it,  not  as  evidence  in  the  case  but  to  test  the 
credibility  of  the  witness  by  seeing  from  it  whether  it  was  of 
such  a  nature  that  it  could  have  refreshed  the  recollection  of  the 
witness.*'^ 

The  opposite  party  is  always  entitled  to  cross-examine  the  wit- 
ness in  order  to  ascertain  if  he  has  testified  truthfully  after  con- 
sulting the  memorandum,  but  he  cannot  introduce  the  memoran- 
dum for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the  facts  therein  or  for  the 
purpose  of  contradicting  the  witness.  And  inasmuch  as  the  writ- 
ing is  solely  to  aid  the  memory  if  the  witness  can  swear  that  he 
has  a  full  present  recollection  of  the  facts  he  should  not  be  allowed 
to  inspect  the  writing.^*' 

A  witness  in  a  criminal  trial  will  be  allowed  to  consult  a  writ- 
ing to  refresh  his  memory  under  the  following  circumstances: 
First.  If  he,  while  retaining  no  independent  recollection  of  the 
facts  transcribed,  remembers  having  made  the  memorandum,  or, 
when  it  was  made  by  another,  if  he  remembers  having  seen  it, 
and  that,  when  he  saw  it,  he  knew  it  was  correct.*^ 


^^Commonwealth  v.  Halej^  13  Al- 
len (Mass.)  587. 

^^  State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  12 
Pac.  318. 

"The  opposite  party  is  entitled  to 
inspect  it,  and  he  may  cross-exam- 
ine the  witness  in  regard  to  it ;  and 
it  may  be  shown  to  the  jury,  not  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  the  facts 
therein  contained,  but  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  it  could  not 
properly  refresh  the  memory  of  the 
witness."  Commonwealth  v.  Jeffs, 
132  Mass.  5.  "But  by  resort  to  some 
memorandum  or  writing,  his  memory 
may  be  so  stimulated  and  refreshed 
as  to  enable  him  to  recollect  the  fact, 
and  where  this  is  so,  it  is  not  proper 
to  introduce  the  writing  in  evidence, 
or  read  it  in  the  presence  of  the  jury, 
because  it  forms  no  part  of  the  testi- 
mony, being  used  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  aiding  the  mental  effort  of 
the  witness  to  recollect  the  particular 


transaction.  State  v.  Legg,  59  W.  Va. 
315,  53  S.  E.  545,  3  L-  R-  A.  (N.  S.) 
ii52n. 

*''  State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  12 
Pac.  318;  State  v.  Palmberg,  199  Mo. 
222,  97  S.  W.  566;  Watters  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.),  94  S.  W.  1038,  116  Am. 
St.  476;  State  V.  Colwell,  3  R.  I.  132; 
Woodruff  V.  State,  61  Ark.  157,  32  S. 
W.  102;  Owens  V.  State,  67  Md.  307, 
10  Atl.  210,  302;  Baum  v.  Reay,  96 
Cal.  462,  29  Pac.  117,  31  Pac.  561; 
Hartley  v.  Cataract,  etc.,  Co.,  64  Hun 
634,  19  N.  Y.  S.  121 ;  Card  v.  Foot,  56 
Conn.  369,  15  Atl.  371,  7  Am.  St.  311. 
See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  478.  In  Du- 
gan  V.  Mahoney,  11  Allen  (Mass.) 
572,  the  court  said :  "It  is  obvious 
that  this  species  of  evidence  must  be 
admissible  in  regard  to  numbers, 
dates,  sales,  and  deliveries  of  goods, 
paj'ments  and  receipts  of  money,  ac- 
counts, and  the  like,  in  respect  to 
which  no  memory  could  be  expected 


397  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    2l8 

The  other  class  of  cases  includes  writings  which  the  witness 
does  not  remember  having  seen  before,  and  of  whose  contents  he 
has  no  present  recollection,  but,  being  able  to  identify  the  hand- 
writing as  his  own  or  as  that  of  some  other  person,  and  knowing 
it  to  be  genuine,  he  is  able  on  consulting  the  writing,  and  because 
of  its  aid  and  his  confidence  in  its  genuineness,  to  swear  independ- 
ently, and  of  his  own  knowledge,  to  the  facts.  Suppose,  for  ex- 
ample, a  subscribing  witness  recognizes  his  signature  to  an  at- 
testation clause  of  a  will.  His  memory  refreshed,  he  may  be  able 
to  testify  to  the  facts  of  acknowledgment  or  publication  and  sub- 
scription by  the  testator  and  to  other  accompanying  circum- 
stances, though  he  may  have  no  independent  memory  thereof.  In 
regard  to  the  first  class  of  writings,  it  is  clear  that,  under  certain 
circumstances,  they  may  be  admissible  as  independent  evidence 
forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc.  What  the  requirements  are, 
which  must  be  fulfilled  before  declarations  will  be  receivable  as  a 
part  of  the  res  gestce,  is  fully  explained  elsewhere. 

§  218.  Character  of  memoranda  employed  to  refresh  the  memory. — 

The  writing  used  to  refresh  the  memory  should  ordinarily  be  con- 
temporaneous with  the  transactions  or  facts  which  are  mentioned 
in  it.^^  This  is  the  rule  which  has  received  the  support  of  the  ma- 
jority of  cases.  But  many  authorities  hold  that  the  writing  need 
not  have  been  made  precisely  at  the  time  of  the  events  it  describes, 
if  it  was  made  before  the  memory  of  the  person  making  it  had 
become  weakened  and  unreliable  by  lapse  of  time.*^ 

to    be    sufficiently    retentive,    without  *"  Sisk  v.   State,  28  Tex.  App.  432, 

depending     upon     memoranda,     and  13   S.   W.  647;  Culver  v.   Scott,  etc., 

even  memoranda  would  not  bring  the  Lumber  Co.,  53  Minn.  360,  55  N.  W. 

transaction     to    present     recollection.  552;  McGowan  v.  McDonald,  iii  Cal. 

In  such  cases,  if  the  witness  on  look-  57,  43  Pac.  418,  52  Am.  St.  149;  Ad- 

ing  at  the  writing  is   able  to  testify  ams   v.    Board   of    Trustees,   Z7   Fla. 

that   he  knows  the   transaction  took  266,  20  So.  266;   Wilber  v.   Scherer, 

place,  though  he  has  no  present  mem-  13    Ind.    App.    428,    41    N.    E.    837 ; 

ory  of  it,  his  testimony  is  admissible."  Dwight  v.  Cutting,  91  Hun  38,  36  N. 

"Williams   v.   Wager,   64  Vt.   326,  Y.   S.  99,  71    N.   Y.   St.    114.    Testi- 

24   Atl.    765;    Weston    v.    Brown,   30  mony   before   the   grand   jury,    taken 

Neb.   609,   46   N.   W.  826;    Common-  four  months  after  the  occurrences  to 

wealth   V.   Clancy,    154  Mass.    128,  27  which  it  relates,  cannot  be  used  to  re- 

N.    E.    looi,    and   Underbill    on   Ev.,  fresh  the  memory  of  witnesses  called 

§  338.  to  prove  those  occurrences.    Putnam 


219  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  398 


Sometimes  copies  of  a  writing  or  memorandum  made  at  the 
time  of  the  facts  which  are  transcribed  have  been  used  to  refresli 
the  memory  when  the  copy  was  made  after  the  original,  but  only 
if  the  witness  could  swear  of  his  own  knowledge  to  their  accu- 
racy,^*^  and  the  absence  of  the  original  is  properl}'  accounted  for.^^ 
So  a  newspaper  reporter,  testifying  as  a  witness,  may  refresh  his 
memory  by  reading  a  printed  article  published  from  manuscript 
furnished  by  him.  on  proof  that  the  original  was  destroyed. '^^ 

If  on  the  examination  of  a  witness  for  the  i)rosecution,  it  turns 
out  that  his  memory  is  actually  or  apparently  weak  and  particu- 
larly where,  as  very  frequently  happens,  he  outlines  the  frame- 
work of  his  evidence  for  the  prosecution  but  omits  details  such  as 
dates  and  places,  his  memory  may  be  refreshed  by  asking  him 
whether,  on  prior  occasions  he  has  not  made  statements  contain- 
ing the  forgotten  facts  before  the  grand  jury  or  to  some  of  the 
prosecuting  officials  or  to  police  officials.  His  memory,  having 
been  refreshed,  he  may  then  testify;  but  if  he  denies  having  made 
the  statements  he  cannot  be  contradicted  by  the  prosecution  by 
proof  that  he  has  made  them.^^ 

§  219.  Purpose  and  importance  of  cross-examination. — As  a  means 
of  ascertaining  truth,  cross-examination  is  correctly  deemed  to  be 
at  once  effective  and  impartial.^*    Writers  on  evidence  have  fre- 

V.  United   States,   162  U.   S.   687,  40  46  Tex.   Cr.   267,  81   S.  W.  936,   108 

L.    ed.    1 1 18,    16    Sup.    Ct.    923,    52  Am.  St.  991. 

Am.     St.     149.      Counsel    have    been  ""  Stavinow    v.    Home    Ins.    Co.,   43 

permitted  to   refresh  the  memory  of  AIo.  App.  513;  Watson  v.   ]\Iiller,  82 

a    forgetful    witness    by    reading    or  Tex.  279,   17  S.  W.    1053;   Bonnet  v. 

having  the  witness  read  his  evidence  Gladfelt,    24   111.    App.    533 ;    Flint   v. 

on     a     former     trial     or     from     the  Kennedy,  33  Fed.  820;  People  v.  Mun- 

stenographer's    notes.      Ehrisman    v.  roe,  100  Cal.  664,  35  Pac.  326,  38  Am. 

Scott,  5  Ind.  App.  596,  32  N.  E.  867 ;  St.  323,  24  L.  R.  A.  33n  ; 

Battishill  v.  Humphrej^s,  64  Mich.  514,  ^^  Anderson  v.  Imhoff.  34  Neb.  335, 

38  X.  W.  581.    The  same  rule  applies  51  N.  W.  854;  Birmingham  v.  McPo- 

to  evidence  taken  on  the  preliminary  land,  96  Ala.  363,  11  So.  427. 

examination.     State   v.   Legg,   59   W.  ^"  Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  37,  7  So. 

Va.  315,  S3  S.  E.  545-  3  L-  R-  A.  (N.  302. 

S.)    ir52n;    and   to    notes   taken   by  ^Thomasson  v.  State,  80  Ark.  364, 

counsel    or    other    persons.     State    v.  97  S.  W.  297.    Supra,  p.  397,  note  40. 

Dean,  72  S.  Car.  74,  51  S.  E.  524,  or  '*  "Cross-examination  is  the  right  of 

a  statement  made  and  signed  by  him  the  party  against  whom  the  witness 

before  the  grand  jury.   Smith  v.  State,  is  called,  and  the  right  is  a  valuable 


399  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    220 

quently  adverted  to  its  peculiar  efficacy  and  excellence,  as  a  means 
of  investigating  the  motives  and  personal  prejudices  of  the  wit- 
ness, his  relation  to  the  accused  or  to  the  prosecution,  or  to  the 
criminal  transaction  which  is  under  investigation. 

By  this  process  his  knowledge  and  general  intelligence,  the 
vividness  of  his  memory,  his  impartiality  or  bias  towards  the  ac- 
cused, his  means  of  observation  and  his  opportunities  for  obtain- 
ing accurate  and  full  information  may  all  be  explored  and  ascer- 
tained for  the  consideration  of  the  jurors  to  assist  them  in  deter- 
mining the  weight  they  shall  give  to  his  evidence.^^  Whether  a 
witness  has  been  examined  so  that  the  opposite  party  shall  be 
entitled  to  cross-examine  is  sometimes  an  important  question.  A 
witness  who  has  been  sworn,  but  to  whom  no  questions  have  been 
put,  cannot  be  cross-examined.^*^  This  is  the  case  where  the  only 
object  of  calling  the  witness  is  to  procure  a  writing  which  is  to  be 
proved  by  another  witness. ^^ 

One  of  several  jointly  indicted  and  tried  may  be  required  to 
cross-examine  the  state's  witnesses  and  produce  his  own  before 
the  same  is  done  by  his  co-defendants.^® 

^  220.  When  right  to  cross-examine  is  lost — Cross-examination 
confined  to  matters  brought  out  on  direct. — Where  either  party  has 
a  right  to  cross-examine  in  civil  cases,  it  is  reversible  error  for 
the  court  to  refuse  to  permit  the  exercise  of  the  right.  But  the 
right  of  cross-examining  is  usually  but  not  universally  waived 
by  the  party  making  the  witness  his  own.^'* 

one  as  a  means   of  separating  hear-  criminal  prosecutions,  see  38  Am.  St. 

say     from     knowledge,     error     from  895-897.     Right  to  cross-examine  ac- 

truth,   opinion    from   fact,  and  infer-  cused    who    has    taken    the    witness 

ence  from  recollection,  and  is  a  means  stand  as  to  a  confession  not  admis- 

of     ascertaining    the    order    of     the  sible  in  evidence,  see  10  L.  R.  A.  (X. 

events  as  narrated  by  the  witness  in  S.)  604. 

his  examination  in  chief,  and  the  time  "  i  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  446 ;  i   Stark, 

and  place,  when  and  where  they  oc-  on  Ev.,  §§  160,  161. 

curred,    and    the    attending    circum-  "^  Austin  v.  State,  14  Ark.  555. 

stances;    and    of    testing    the    intelli-  "Rush  v.  Smith,  i  Cr.  M.  &  R.  94: 

gence,    memory,     impartiality,    truth-  Underhill  on  Evid.,  p.  481. 

fulness  and  integrity  of  the  witness."  °*  State  v.  Howard,  35  S.  Car.   197, 

The  Ottawa,  3  Wall.   (U.  S.)  268,  18  14  S.  E.  481. 

L.   ed.    165.  ^'''  Hemmingcr    v.     Western     Assur. 

Cross-examination    of    accused    in  Co.,  95  Mich.  355,  54  N.  W.  949. 


§    220 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


400 


A  party's  right  to  cross-examine  is  not  lost  because  he  fails  to 
object  to  a  direct  examination  had  out  of  the  regular  order.*^'^ 
The  remedy  for  a  defendant  who  has,  for  any  reason,  been  de- 
prived of  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine  is  to  move  to  strike 
out  the  evidence  given  on  the  direct  examination  and  to  request 
an  instruction  that  the  jury  should  disregard  it.*^^ 

Though  a  party  cannot  usually  cross-examine  his  own  witness, 
in  criminal  cases  it  has  been  held  discretionary  with  the  court  to 
permit  the  prosecuting  attorney  to  do  so  where  the  witness  is  un- 
expectedly hostile,  or  where  the  prosecuting  attorney  can  show 
that  he  is  disappointed  by  the  testimony  of  a  witness  whom  he 
expected  to  testify  to  facts  showing  the  guilt  of  the  accused.*'^ 

The  scope  and  right  of  a  cross-examination  are  generally  lim- 
ited to  subjects  upon  which  the  witness  has  been  interrogated 
on  the  direct  examination.  That  is,  counsel  cross-examining  will 
not  be  permitted  to  ask  leading  or  general  questions  on  matters 
which,  though  involved  in  the  general  issue  of  the  prisoner's 
guilt,  were  not  touched  on  in  the  direct  examination.**^ 


*"  Graham  v.  Larimer,  83  Cal.  173, 
23  Pac.  286. 

''  People  V.  Cole,  43  N.  Y.  508. 

*^  State  V.  Church,  199  Mo.  605,  98 
S.  W.  16;  State  V.  Hughes,  8  Kan. 
App.  631,  56  Pac.  142. 

"Wood  V.  State,  92  Ind.  269;  Brit- 
ton  V.  State,  115  Ind.  55,  17  N.  E. 
254;  Adams  v.  State,  28  Fla.  511,  10 
So.  106;  State  V.  Chamberlain,  89 
Mo.  129,  I  S.  W.  145;  State  v.  Zeil- 
man,  75  X.  J.  L.  357,  68  Atl.  468 ;  Saf- 
fer  V.  United  States,  87  Fed.  329,  31 
C.  C.  A.  I,  59  U.  S.  App.  311;  State 
V.  Rodriguez,  115  La.  1004,  40  So. 
438;  Morse  v.  Odell,  49  Ore.  118,  89 
Pac.  139;  State  v.  Nugent,  116  La. 
99,  40  So.  581 ;  Harrold  v.  Territory, 
18  Okla.  395,  89  Pac.  202,  10  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  6o4n;  Linnehan  v.  State,  120 
Ala.  293,  25  So.  6;  State  v.  Heidel- 
berg, 120  La.  300,  45  So.  256;  Stewart 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  273,  106  S.  W. 
685;  Stone  V.  White,  55  Fla.  510,  45 


So.  1032;  State  V.  Williams,  iii  La. 
205,  35  So.  521 ;  State  v.  Farrington, 
90  Iowa  673,  57  N.  W.  606;  Gale  v. 
People,  26  Mich.  157;  State  v.  Wil- 
lingham,  ss  La.  Ann.  537;  People  v. 
Durrant,  116  Cal.  179,  48  Pac.  75; 
Sheehan  v.  People,  131  111.  22,  22  N. 
E.  818;  People  V.  Van  Ewan,  11 1  Cal. 
144,  43  Pac.  520 ;  Gemmill  v.  State,  16 
Ind.  App.  154,  43  N.  E.  909;  State 
V.  Case,  96  Iowa  264,  65  N.  W.  149; 
State  V.  Judiesch,  96  Iowa  249,  65  N. 
W.  157;  State  V.  Zimmerman,  3  Kan. 
App.  172,  42  Pac.  828;  State  v.  Lewis, 
136  Mo.  84,  27  S.  W.  806;  People  v. 
Edwards  (Cal.),  73  Pac.  416;  Brown 
V.  State,  46  Fla.  159,  35  So.  82;  Lewis 
V.  State,  55  Fla.  54,  45  So.  998,  and 
cases  fully  cited  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p. 
482.  In  Texas,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  prosecution  cannot  go  outside  of 
the  direct  examination  of  a  witness 
for  the  accused  who  testifies  in  her 
husband's  favor,  under  the  statute  in 


40I  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  S    220 

Whether  a  question  put  on  the  cross-examination  calls  for  a 
collateral  fact,  or  whether  it  is  within  the  scope  of  the  direct 
examination,  is  always  for  the  court  to  determine.  Its  discretion, 
where  properly  exercised,  will  not  be  interfered  with.  The  test 
to  determine  whether  a  question  is  or  is  not  collateral  seems  to 
be  that  if  the  party  cross-examining  would  under  the  rules  of  prac- 
tice be  entitled  to  prove  it,  as  a  part  of  his  case,  it  is  collateral  to 
the  cross-examination  and  cannot  be  inquired  into.  Thus,  for  illus- 
tration, if  the  plea  of  the  defendant  in  a  case  of  homicide  is  self- 
defense,  counsel  cross-examining  a  witness  for  the  state  will  not 
be  permitted  to  question  him  as  to  facts  tending  to  establish  that 
plea,  unless  the  direct  examination  of  that  witness  relates  ex- 
clusively to  the  sanity  of  the  accused."* 

In  all  cases  where  a  witness  testifies  to  part  of  a  conversation 
on  his  direct  examination,  the  other  side  must  be  permitted  on 
cross-examination  to  bring  out  the  entire  conversation  so  far  as 
it  is  relevant  to  the  facts  in  issue. *'^  But  this  rule  does  not  permit 
or  encourage  the  bringing  out  of  evidence  not  within  the  scope 
of  the  direct  examination  by  asking  the  witness  to  make  experi- 
ments in  court  which  will  call  upon  him  to  give  evidence  which 
the  state  should  prove  as  part  of  its  case.*'*' 

While  counsel  may  cross-examine  on  relevant  facts  gone  into 
on  the  direct  examination,  he  may  not  open  his  own  case  and 
present  evidence  to  support  it  by  cross-examining  the  adverse  wit- 
nesses. If  he  wants  their  evidence  he  must  call  them  as  wit- 
nesses.^^ This  rule,  as  we  shall  see,  is  qualified  by  the  principle 
which  permits  seemingly  irrelevant  questions  on  cross-examina- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  testing  credibility  and  bias. 

A  witness  may  be  pressed  for  an  answer  when,  on  cross-exami- 

that  state  which  provides  that  a  hus-  "*  Ferguson   v.    State,   ^2   Xeb.    350, 

band  and  wife  shall  not  testify  against  100  N.  W.  800. 

each   other.     If   the  wife  of  the   ac-  "^Lahue  v.   State,  51   Tex.   Cr.   159, 

cused  goes  on  the  stand  to  testify  in  lOi   S.  W.   1008. 

favor    of    her    husband    she    may    be  ""  State  v.   Snyder,  67  Kan.  801,  74 

cross-examined  as  to  all  matters  in-  Pac.  231. 

volved  in  her  direct  examination.  She  '"  Eacock  v.  State,   169  Ind.  488,  82 

cannot  under  the  statute  be  cross-ex-  N.   E.    1039.     This  rule  obtains  in  a 

amined  on  matters  not  touched  on  in  criminal  prosecution  as  well  as  in  a 

her   direct    examination.      Stewart   v.  civil  action.     Poston  v.  State,  83  Neb. 

State,    52   Tex.    Cr.    273,    106    S.    W.  240,  no  N.  W.  520. 

685. 

26 — Underiiill  Crim.  Ev. 


§  221  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  402 

nation,  he  avoids  replying  or  parries  the  questions.  And  counsel 
should  not  be  allowed  to  interpose  frivolous  objections  in  order 
to  prevent  a  rapid  cross-examination  and  to  afford  the  witness  an 
opportunity  to  fabricate  evidence.^*  The  extent,  however,  to 
which  the  same  question  may  be  asked,  is  largely  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court.®® 

§  221.  Cross-examination  to  test  credibility. — Though  the  refusal 
or  allowance  of  cross-examination  upon  irrelevant  matters  bear- 
ing wholly  on  credibility  is  largely  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court,  the  right  to  cross-examine  upon  transactions  directly  rele- 
vant which  have  been  brought  out  in  the  examination-in-chief 
is  absolute.  And  the  fact  that  relevant  evidence,  which  is  elicited 
by  a  proper  question  put  on  the  direct  examination,  has  been  im- 
properly stricken  out,  furnishes  no  basis  for  a  claim  that  other 
strictly  competent  evidence  of  the  same  transaction  should  be 
expunged  when  stated  by  the  witness  on  the  cross-examination.^*' 

The  limits  within  which  either  party  may  cross-examine  upon 
matters  not  strictly  relevant,  but  which  affect  the  credibility  of 
the  evidence,  is  largely  discretionary,^^  and  a  reasonable  exercise 
of  this  discretion  in  limiting  the  duration  or  modifying  the 
method  of  the  cross-examination,  or  in  admitting  seemingly  im- 
material questions  tending  to  explain  the  motives,"^  opportuni- 

**  State  V.  Duncan,  ii6  ]\Io.  288,  22  State  v.  Weems,  96  Iowa  426,  65  N. 

S.  W.  699.  W.  387;  Commonwealth  v.  Flynn,  165 

*^  Brown   v.   State,   ^2   Md.   477,  20  IMass.  153,  42  N.  E.  562:  State  v.  Rut- 

Atl.  140;  McGuire  v.  Lawrence  Mfg.  ledge,  135  Iowa  581,  113  X.  W.  461; 

Co.,  156  Mass.  324,  31  N.  E.  3;  Wood  State   v.    High,    116   La.    79,    40    So. 

V.  State,  92  Ind.  269.  538 ;  State  v.  Smith,  106  Iowa  701 ;  77 

™Turnbull  v.  Richardson,  69  ]\Iich.  N.  W.  499;   Bess  v.   Commonwealth, 

400,  37  N.  W.  499-  118  Ky.  858,  26  Ky.  L.  839,  82  S.  W. 

'^  State  V.  Morris,  109  X.  Car.  820,  576;  Hill  v.  State,  146  Ala.  51,  41  So. 

13  S.  E.  877;  State  v.  Miller,  93  Mo.  621;  State  v.  Caron,   118  La.  349,  42 

263,  6  S.  W.  57 ;  Bessette  v.  State,  loi  So.  960 ;   State  v.  Stukes.  TZ  S.  Car. 

Ind.  85;  Wachstetter  v.  State,  99  Ind.  386,  53  S.  E.  643;  Harrold  v.  Terri- 

290,    50   Am.    94n ;    United    States    v.  tory,  18  Okla.  395,  89  Pac.  202,  10  L. 

Ball,  163  U.  S.  662,  41  L.  ed.  300,  16  R.  A.    (X.   S.)    6o4n;    State  v.   Ross, 

Sup.    Ct.    1 192;    Davidson   v.    People,  "/■/  Kan.  341,  94  Pac.  270,  and  see  Un- 

90  111.  221;  People  V.  Knight   (Cal.),  derhill  on  Ev.,  p.  483. 
43    Pac.    6 ;    State    v.    McGowan,    66        "  People  v.  Thomson,  92  Cal.  506 ; 

Conn.  392,   34  Atl.  99;    State  v.   Os-  Sims  v.  State,  88  Tex.  Cr.  637,  44  S. 

borne,  96  Iowa  281,  65  X.   W.   159;  W.  522. 


403 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


221 


ties,^^  and  powers  of  observation,  the  knowledge/*  memory  or 
recollection,'^  reliability  or  good  faith  of  the  witness,"''  will  always 
be  allowed.  Questions  put  to  the  witness  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  his  relations,  business,  social  or  otherwise,  with  the 
accused  and  his  state  of  mind,  whether  hostile  or  friendly  towards 
him,  are  unobjectionable." 

Thus,  for  example,  on  cross-examination  a  witness  for  the 
prosecution  may  be  asked  if  he  has  not  contributed  money  to  aid 
in  the  prosecution,'®  or  if  he  does  not  expect  to  receive  a  share  of 
the  reward  offered  for  the  conviction  of  the  prisoner,  or  if  he  has 
not  been  promised  payment  for  his  services.'®  Where  evidence 
from  which  an  inference  unfavorable  to  the  prisoner  is  given  upon 
the  direct  examination,  everything  within  the  knowledge  of  the 


"For  example,  a  witness  to  a  noc- 
turnal homicide  may  be  asked  if  the 
moon  was  shining,  to  ascertain  his 
facilities  for  observing  the  move- 
ments of  deceased  and  all  the  sur- 
rounding circumstances.  State  v. 
Avery,  113  Mo.  475,  21  S.  W.  193. 
The  courts,  while  guarding  against 
any  abuse  of  the  right  to  cross-ex- 
amine, must  watch  with  care  against 
attempts  to  evade  or  restrict  it.  Rob- 
nett  V.  People,  16  111.  App.  299;  Tracy 
v.  People,  97  111.  loi ;  Holmes  v. 
State,  88  Ala.  26,  7  So.  193,  16  Am. 
St.  17. 

'*  Williams  v.  State,  32  Fla.  251,  13 
So.  429. 

"  State  V.  Duffy,  57  Conn.  525,  18 
Atl.  791 ;  Sewall  v.  Robbins,  139 
Mass.  164,  29  N.  E.  650;  Harrold  v. 
Territory,  18  Okla.  395,  89  Pac.  202, 
10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  6o4n;  State  v. 
Brown,  in  La.  170,  35  So.  501.  A 
witness  may  be  required  to  repeat  on 
cross-examination  his  evidence  to  a 
particular  point  given  on  his  direct 
examination  to  test  his  memory  and 
to  ascertain  if  he  will  contradict  him- 
self. Zucker  v.  Karpeles,  88  Mich. 
413,  50  N.  W.  373. 


'"  State  v.  Philpot,  97  Iowa  365,  66 
N.  W.  730;  Commonwealth  v.  Flynn, 
165  Mass.  153,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  562; 
State  V.  Hayward,  62  Minn.  474,  65 
N.  W.  63;  State  v.  Weems,  96  Iowa 
426,  65  N.  W.  387;  Bessette  v.  State, 
lOi  Ind.  85 ;  Murray  v.  Great  Wes- 
tern Ins.  Co.,  72  Hun  282,  25  N.  Y. 
S.  414,  55  X.  Y.  St.  748;  Heninburg 
V.  State,  151  Ala.  26,  43  So.  959. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Lyden,  113 
Mass.  452 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Shaw, 
4  Cush  (Mass.)  593;  People  v.  Thom- 
son, 92  Cal.  506,  28  Pac.  589;  United 
States  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  365 ;  Holmes 
V.  State,  88  Ala.  26,  7  So.  193,  16  Am. 
St.  17,  and  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  483; 
State  V.  Rutledge,  135  Iowa  581,  113 
N.  W.  461 ;  Isaac  v.  United  States, 
7  Ind.  T.  196,  104  S.  W.  588:  Kipper 
V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  377,  77  S.  W. 
611;  Beal  V.  State,  138  Ala.  94;  35 
So.  58;  Sylvester  v.  State,  46  Fla.  166, 
35  So.  142;  Jackson  v.  State  (Ala.), 
47  So.  77. 

'*  Miller  v.  Territory,  15  Okla.  422, 
85  Pac.  239. 

'"  State  V.  Mulch,  17  S.  Dak.  321,  96 
X.  W.  loi. 


§221  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  4O4 

witness  and  which  may  raise  an  inference  to  rebut,  may  be 
brought  out  on  cross-examination.®" 

Questions  on  the  cross-examination  of  a  witness  tending  to 
show  that  some  particular  person  had  tampered  with  him.  are 
competent;  but  a  question  to  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  if 
some  person  interested  in  the  case  had  not  tried  to  get  him  to 
testify  falsely,  was  too  general.  The  question  should  point  out 
the  particular  person  who  is  alleged  to  have  tampered  with  the 
witness. ^^  A  prosecuting  witness  may  always  be  asked  on  cross- 
examination  any  question  which  tends  to  show  that  he  had  made 
a  mistake  in  bringing  the  charge  against  the  accused.^" 

The  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  refuse  to  permit  the  cross- 
examination  to  be  unreasonably  prolonged, ^^  or  it  may  refuse  to 
allow  a  question  to  be  repeated  when  it  has  been  answered  satis- 
factorily,'''* or  may  exclude  questions  designed  solely  to  ascertain 
what  witnesses  it  may  be  advantageous  to  call.'^^ 

The  rule  under  which  evidence  of  collateral  facts  is  excluded 
during  the  direct  examination  is  not  applied  with  strictness  to 
the  cross-examination.  The  theory  upon  which  the  latter  is  con- 
ducted is  that  its  primary  object  is  the  ascertainment  of  truth,  not 
by  eliciting  positive  evidence  directly  bearing  on  the  facts,  but 
by  furnishing  a  means  of  testing  the  truthfulness  and  credibility 
of  the  witness. 

*"  State  V.  Harvey,  130  Iowa  394,  Carothers  v.  State,  75  Ark.  574,  88 
106  N.  W.  938.  Questions  on  cross-  S.  W.  585 ;  State  v.  Blee,  133  Iowa 
examination  put  to  the  witness  as  to  725,  in  N.  W.  19.  Though  a  liberal 
whether  he  told  the  truth  in  making  cross-examination  should  be  allowed 
certain  statements  on  the  direct  ex-  where  a  witness  is  called  to  impeach 
amination  should  be  excluded,  or  sustain  another  by  proof  of  gen- 
Wright  V.  State,  149  Ala.  28,  43  So.  eral  character,  the  extent  to  which 
575.  it  may  go  is  largely  within  the  discre- 

*^  Sue    V.    State,    52    Tex.    Cr.    122,  tion  of  the  trial  court.     State  v.  Har- 

105  S.  W.  804.  ris,  209  Mo.  423,  108  S.  W.  28. 

"State  V.  Dalcourt,  112  La.  420,  36  "  Gutsch   v.    Mcllhargey,    69    Mich. 

So.  479.  2>11,  y?  N.  W.  303;  Hughes  v.  Ward, 

^'Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Newmeyer,  38  Kan.  452,   16  Pac.  810;   Mason  v. 

129  Ind.  401,  28  N.  E.  860;  State  v.  Hinds,  19  N.  Y.  S.  996,  47  N.  Y.  St. 

Wren,   121  La.  55,  46  So.  99:   State  163. 

V.   Rodriguez,    115   La.    1004,   40   So.  -°  United  States  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C. 

438;    Fuqua    v.    Commonwealth,    118  365. 
Ky.  578,  81  S.  W.  923,  26  Ky.  L.  420; 


405 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


Ouestions  may  be  put  to  an  adverse  witness  on  his  cross-exami- 
nation to  show  his  prejudice  in  favor  of,  or  against  the  accused 
without  laying  any  predicate  fo'-  them.'^" 


§  222.  When  answers  to  g^uestions  involving  collateral  matters 
asked  in  cross-examinatio^j-^y  be  contradicted — Hostility  or  friei 
ship  towards  the  accu&eu. — It  is  never  permissible  to  cross-examine 
upon  matters  wholly' irrelevant  and  collateral  to  the  crime  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  the  witness  on  those  points  by 
other  evidence.  And  if  the  cross-examiner  shall  happen  to  bring 
out  irrelevant  facts  he  is  concluded  thereby,  and  cannot  contra- 
dict thenT^^^^it  is  proper,  however,  to  ask  the  witness  if  he  did 
not  at  a  particular  time  and  place,  which  must  be  mentioned,  give 
a  different  account  of  relevant  facts  to  that  which  he  gave  on  his 
direct  examination.  If  he  denies  that  he  has  done  so.  a  sufficient 
foundation  is  laid  for  his  impeachment,  which  may  then  be  ac- 
complished by  the  testimony  of  a  witness  who  was  present  and 
heard  the  contradictory  statement.^^ 

The  feelings,  bias  and  relationship  of  the  witness  are  never 
collateral.^^     A  witness  may  be  interrogated  on  cross-examina- 


^^ Telfair  v.  State  (Fla.),  47  So. 
863;  State  V.  Nieuhaus,  217  Mo.  332, 
117  S.  W.  -jz. 

'^  I  Greeiil.  on  Ev.,  p.  484 ;  State  v. 
Ellwood,  17  R.  I.  763,  24  Atl.  782; 
Moore  v.  People,  108  111.  484;  Bres- 
sler  V.  People,  117  111.  422,  8  N.  E. 
62 ;  People  v.  Hillhouse,  80  Mich.  580, 
45  X.  W.  484;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hourigan,  89  Ky.  305,  12  S.  W.  550, 
II  Ky.  L.  509;  Batten  v.  State,  80 
Ind.  394;  Crittenden  v.  Common- 
wealth, 82  Ky.  164;  State  v.  Reick, 
43  Kan.  635,  23  Pac.  1076;  Peo- 
ple V.  Tiley,  84  Cal.  651,  24  Pac. 
290;  People  V.  Dye,  75  Cal.  108,  16 
Pac.  537;  State  v.  Dunn  COre.),  100 
Pac.  258;  People  v.  Darr,  3  Cal.  App. 
SO,  84  Pac.  457;  People  v.  Van  Tas- 
sel, 26  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  445,  so  X.  Y. 
S.  53 ;  Smalls  v.  State,  102  Ga.  31, 29  S. 
E.  153 ;  Ferguson  v.  State,  72  Neb.  350, 


100  N.  W.  800;  Saffer  v.  United 
States,  S9  U.  S.  App.  311,  87  Fed  329, 
31  C.  C.  A.  I. 

''People  V.  Williams,  18  Cal.  187; 
State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  12  Pac. 
318;  State  V.  Talbott,  T2>  Mo.  347; 
State  V.  Zimmerman,  3  Kan.  App. 
172,  42  Pac.  828.  See  Underbill  on 
Ev.,  §  350,  for  civil  cases.  Where  a 
witness  makes  a  statement  on  cross- 
examination  he  may  be  asked  if  he 
did  not  give  different  testimony  on  a 
former  trial. 

*"  Crumpton  v.  State,  52  Ark.  273, 
12  S.  W.  S63;  United  States  v.  Post, 
128  Fed.  950;  Cook  v.  State,  152  Ala. 
(^,  44  So.  549;  People  V.  Manasse, 
153  Cal.  ID,  94  Pac.  92;  Brown  v. 
State,  1 19  Ga.  572,  46  S.  E.  833 ;  State 
V.  Nieuhaus,  217  Mo.  332,  117  S.  W. 

n- 


§  222  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  406 

tion  as  to  his  interest,  bias  or  prejudice,  that  is  to  say,  if  the  sole 
purpose  of  the  question  is  to  ehicidate  the  existing  or  previous 
relationship,  feeling  or  conduct  of  the  witness  toward  the  crime, 
the  accused,  or  the  prosecutors. 

The  witness  may  be  asked  generally,  if  he  has  not  expressed 
or,  perhaps,  entertained  feelings  of  hostility,  or  acted  in  an  un- 
friendly manner  towards  or  cjuarreled  with  the  accused.  So,  for 
example,  a  prosecuting  witness  may  be  asked  if  he  has  not  had 
the  accused  arrested  before, °**  or  if  he  has  not  quarreled  with  the 
accused,^^  and  if  he  has  not  retained  counsel  to  aid  the  state  in 
the  trial  which  is  pending.*^-  He  should  be  allowed  to  explain  his 
motives  in  hiring  counsel. °^ 

If  the  witness  refuses  to  answer  such  questions,^'*  or  answers 
them  in  the  negative,  the  contrary  fact  may  be  shown  by  the  evi- 
dence of  others.''^  But  where  a  witness  states  that  though  once 
hostile  he  is  so  no  longer,  evidence  of  his  previous  hostility,  being 
too  remote,  is  irrelevant."** 

On  the  cross-examination  of  a  witness  for  the  state  it  may 
properly  be  shown  that  he  had  come  a  long  distance  without  a 
subpoena  and  that  his  railroad  fare  had  been  paid  by  the  prose- 
cution.''^ The  general  rule  is  that  where  a  witness  on  his  direct 
examination  shows  a  violent  hatred  towards  the  accused,  or  where 
he  has  been  very  active  in  securing  evidence  against  him,  the  ac- 

^  People  V.  Lee  Ah  Chuck,  66  Cal.  State,    64     Ind.     400 ;     Crumpton    v. 

662,  6  Pac.  859.  State,  52  Ark.  273,  12  S.  W.  563 ;  Peo- 

"^  Sasser  v.    State,    129  Ga.   541,   59  pie  v.  Thompson,  92  Cal.  506,  28  Pac. 

S.  E.  255.  589 ;  Newcomb  v.  State,  37  Miss.  383 ; 

°^  People  V.  Blackwell,  27  Cal.  65 ;  People  v.  Goldenson,  76  Cal.  328,  19 

United  States  v.  Ball,  163  U.  S.  662,  Pac.     161 ;     Cornelius     v.     Common- 

41  L.  ed.  300,  16  Sup.  Ct.  1 192:  Miller  wealth,  15  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)  539;  Com- 

V.    Territory,    15    Okla.    422,    85    Pac.  monwealth  v.  Byron,  14  Gray  (Mass.) 

239.  31 ;  Kent  v.  State,  6  Cr.  L.  Mag.  520. 

*'  People  V.  Blackwell,  27  Cal.  65.  In  People  v.  Brooks,  131   N.  Y.  321, 

"*  State  V.   McFarlain,  41   La.   Ann.  30   N.   E.    189,   it  was    held   that   the 

686,  6  So.  728.  hostility  of  an  adverse  witness  might 

^'  State    V.    Johnson,    48    La.    Ann.  be    shown    without    questioning    him, 

437,  19  So.  476;  Lyle  v.  State,  21  Tex.  and  see  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  354  b. 

App.    153,    17   S.   W.   425;    People   v.  "^Consaul  v.   Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247, 

Gillis,  97  Cal.  542,  32  Pac.  586;  Bon-  52  N.  W.  1104. 

nard   v.    State,   25   Tex.   App.    173,   7  "Sylvester  v.  State,  46  Fla.   166,  35 

S.  W.  862,  8  Am.   St.  431;   Scott  v.  So.  142. 


407  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    223 

cused  should  be  permitted  the  widest  latitude  on  cross-examina- 
tion.^^ 

And  a  witness  who  is  called  to  contradict  a  statement  by  a 
prosecuting  witness  that  he  is  not  hostile  to  the  accused  must 
do  so  by  evidence  of  facts  within  his  own  knowledge  showing  the 
disposition  and  attitude  of  the  prosecuting  witness.  He  may 
prove  declarations  or  acts  showing  hostility,  but  his  opinion  that 
the  witness  is  hostile  is  not  admissible.''^ 

§  223.  Re-direct  examination. — A  party  calling  a  witness  may  re- 
examine him  after  he  has  been  cross-examined.  On  this  re- 
examination the  witness  may  be  questioned  as  to  contradictions, 
and  inconsistent  statements  made  on  his  cross-examination ;  and 
he  may  state  and  explain  the  motives  for  his  acts  which  he  de- 
scribed on  cross-examination.^"*' 

And  where  on  the  cross-examination  of  a  witness  for  the  prose- 
cution new  testimony  develops  which  is  unfavorable  to  the  state, 
on  the  re-direct  examination  it  is  permitted  for  the  prosecution 
to  go  fully  into  the  new  matter  testified  to  on  the  cross-examina- 
tion.^ Thus,  if  on  cross-examination  the  prosecuting  witness 
admits  that  he  has  charged  another  than  the  accused  with  the 
crime,  the  court  must  on  the  re-direct  permit  him  to  explain  why 
he  did  so." 

The  introduction  on  cross-examination  of  any  evidence  which 
tends  to  impeach  the  witness  cross-examined  permits  counsel  on 
the  other  side  on  the  re-direct  to  introduce  questions  which  will 
tend  to  overcome  the  prejudicial  inference  thus  created.  For 
example,  when  the  witness  admits  on  cross-examination  that  im- 
mediately after  the  crime  he  left  the  state,  his  reasons  for  doing 
so  may  be  shown  on  the  re-direct.^     So,  too,  where  a  witness, 

"'State  V.  Griffin,  43  Wash.  591,  86  v.    Tubbs,    147    Mich,    i,    no   N.    W. 

Pac.  951.  132;   State  v.  Lymens,  138  Iowa  113, 

""Burnett  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  515,  115  N.  W.  878. 

112  S.  W.  74.  ^  State  V.  Williams,  in  La.  179,  35 

""  Commonwealth  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  So.  505 ;   State  v.  Banner,   149  N.  E. 

226,  30  N.   E.   1016;   Wilson  v.   Peo-  519,  63  S.  E.  84. 

pie,  94  111.  299;  State  v.  Flicks,  20  S.  'People  v.  Darr,  3  Cal.  App.  50,  84 

Car.  341;  Kroell  v.  State,  139  Ala.  i,  Pac.  457. 

36   So.    1025 ;    Carwile   v.    State,    148  ^  Sims  v.  State,  146  Ala.  109,  41  So. 

Ala.  576,  39  So.  220;  Craig  v.   State,  413. 
78  Neb.  466,  III  N.  W.   143;  People 


22-^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  408 


being  a  police  officer,  stated  on  his  cross-examination  by  counsel 
for  the  accused  that  he  was  desirous  of  convicting  accused,  the 
prosecution  can  show  on  the  re-direct  examination  of  the  wit- 
ness that  he  had  no  interest  in  convicting  the  accused  except  that 
of  a  public  officer.*  A  prosecuting  witness,  having  been  asked  on 
his  cross-examination  and  having  answered  a  question  which 
showed  or  tended  to  show  that  he  had  employed  money  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  evidence  against  the  accused,  should  be  al- 
lowed on  his  re-direct  examination  to  explain  the  whole  transac- 
tion."' 

Questions  may  be  put  on  the  re-direct  examination  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  the  real  meaning  of  the  language  used  on 
the  cross-examination.  From  this  it  will  often  appear  that  the 
inconsistent  or  contradictory  character  of  the  statements  is  more 
apparent  than  real.** 

The  party  calling  the  witness  ought  on  the  examination-in- 
chief  to  interrogate  him  on  all  material  matters.  No  new  ques- 
tions can  be  put  on  the  re-direct  examination  which  are  not  con- 
nected in  some  way  with  the  cross-examination.  But  the  courts 
of  original  jurisdiction  have  varied  this  rule,  and  it  remains  for 
them  to  determine  whether  in  any  particular  case  the  facts  war- 
rant a  departure  therefrom.  This  discretion  the  appellate  court 
will  not  interfere  with  except  in  the  case  of  its  gross  abuse,  when 
manifest  injustice  would  surely  ensue.^  But  on  the  re-direct  ex- 
amination counsel  will  be  permitted  to  ask  questions  which  will 
explain  all  answers  which  were  brought  out  on  the  cross-examina- 
tion from  which  wrong  inferences  might  be  drawn  by  the  jury, 
or  which  have  a  tendency  to  cast  doubt  upon  the  credibility  of 
the  evidence  of  the  witness.** 

*  People  V.  Wenzel,  189  N.  Y.  275,  Iowa  567,  57  N.  W.  418;   Springfield 
82  N.  E.  130.                            ■  V.  Dalby,  139  III.  34,  29  N.  E.  860. 

*  Wheeler  v.  State,  79  Neb.  491,  113        'People    v.    Buchanan,    145    X.    Y. 
N.  W.  253.  I,  39  N.  E.  846;  State  v.  McGahey,  3 

"  Smith  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  277,  N.  Dak.  293,  55  N.  W.  753 ;  Bracken 

17  S.  W.  471;  State  V.  Reed,  89  Mo.  v.  State,  in  Ala.  68,  20  So.  636,  56 

168,  I  S.  W.  225;  People  V.  Ryan,  152  Am.  St.  23;  Collins  v.  State,  46  Neb. 

Cal.  364,  92  Fac.  853.  ^7,  64  N.  W.  432 ;  United  States  v.  18 

^  Sartorious  v.  State,  24  Miss.  602,  Barrels    of    High    Wines,    8    Blatchf. 

609;    Schaser  v.    State,   36  Wis.   429.  (U.   S.)   475;  Kidd  v.  State,   lOi  Ga. 

Cf.  Miller  v.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  89  528,  28  S.  E.  990.     When  the  pros- 


409  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  g    223 

Where  the  defendant  brings  out  on  the  cross-examination  a 
part  of  a  conversation  which  is  material  to  the  crime,  the  prosecu- 
tion on  the  re-direct  may  bring  out  all  the  conversation.^  One 
who  on  cross-examination  admits  one  conversation  with  the  ac- 
cused may  be  cjuestioned  on  his  re-direct  examination  as  to  an- 
other conversation  if  the  latter  is  material.^''  If  an  incriminating 
fact  is  brought  out  by  the  defendant  on  cross-examination  of  the 
state's  witness,  the  prosecution  may  on  re-direct  examination 
bring  out  all  the  testimony  which  is  material  thereto/^ 

But  where  a  witness  testifies  on  his  cross-examination  to  pre- 
vious difficulties  and  disputes  with  the  accused  from  which  it  may 
have  been  inferred  that  he  was  hostile  to  the  accused  and  preju- 
diced against  him,  the  state  cannot  show  on  the  re-direct  exami- 
nation any  fact  which  furnishes  a  ground  for  such  hostility.^- 

A  suggestive  mode  of  questioning  a  witness  on  the  re-direct 
examination,  though  sometimes  permitted,^^  and  always  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  is  not  to  be  commended.  Counsel  should 
not  be  allowed  to  extricate  an  untruthful  witness  from  the  dif- 
ficulties and  inconsistencies  into  which  he  has  plunged  by  repeat- 
ing to  him  his  evidence  on  the  direct  examination,  and  asking 
him  if  the  statements  made  on  the  cross-examination  are  con- 
sistent therewith.^*  If  the  court  permits  a  witness  to  answer 
irrelevant  questions  or  to  give  irrelevant  replies  on  the  cross- 
examination,  the  party  calling  him  has  the  right  to  question  him 
on  such  matters  on  the  re-direct  examination.^^     In  case  the  ad- 

ecuting  witness,  a  minor,  admitted  on  "  People  v.  Noblett,  184  X.  Y.  612, 

cross-examination     that      a     writing  77  N.  E.  1193,  aff'g  96  App.  Div.  293, 

signed  by  her  had  been  prepared  by  89  N.  Y.  S.  181,  18  N.  Y.  Cr.  476. 

the  district  attorney  and  signed  at  his  "  State  v.  Judd,   132  Iowa  296,   109 

bidding,  she  was  allowed,  on  the  re-  N.  W.  892. 

direct  examination,  to  state  that  the  "  Smith  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  277, 

statement  was   wholly  voluntary  and  17  S.  W.  471 ;    State  v.  Vickers,  209 

true,  and  that  its  language  was  sub-  Mo.    12,    106    S.    W.    999;    Smith    v. 

stantially  her  own.     People  v.  Mills,  State,    52   Tex.    Cr.   344,    106    S.    W. 

94   Mich.   630,   54   N.    W.   488.     See,  1161. 

also.  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  487.  "  Smith  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  277, 

'Simmons  v.  State,  145  Ala.  61,  40  17  S.  W.  471;  Stoner  v.  Devilbiss,  70 

So.   660;    Hudson  v.    State,    137   Ala.  Md.  144,  16  Atl.  440;  Moody  v.  Row- 

60,  34  So.  854.  ell,    17    Pick.    (Mass.)    490,    28    Am. 

'"People  V.   Majoine,    144  Cal.   303,  Dec.  317. 

77  Pac.  952.  "  People  v.  McXamara,  94  Cal.  509, 


§  224 


CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE. 


410 


verse  part}'  desires  to  re-examine  tlie  witness  he  may  then  do  so 
on  the  re-cross-examination,  but  must  restrict  himself  to  new 
matter  brought  out  on  the  re-direct  examination. 


§  224.  Recalling  witnesses. — Whether  a  witness,  after  he  has 
left  the  stand,  shall  be  allowed  to  be  recalled  by  the  party  in  whose 
behalf  he  testified,  or  for  further  cross-examination,"  is  wholly 
discretionary  with  the  court, ^'  and  this  discretion  was  held  not 
to  have  been  abused  where  a  witness  was  recalled  after  a  direct, 
cross,  re-direct  and  re-cross-examination,^**  and  even  after  both 
the  state  and  the  defense  had  rested.^"  Where  a  witness  is  un- 
able to  answer  positively  or  definitely,  while  on  the  stand,  the 
court  may  properly  refuse  to  permit  his  recall  for  additional  ex- 
amination,-"^ or  to  permit  a  witness,  who  has  already  testified  fully 
and  exhaustively,  to  be  recalled  solely  for  the  purpose  of  having 


29  Pac.  953;  State  v.  Cardoza,  11  S. 
Car.  195 ;  Schaser  v.  State,  36  Wis. 
429;  Parks  V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  100, 
79  S.  W.  301.  See  Underbill  on  Ev., 
§  341. 

"  People  V.  Koerner,  154  N.  Y.  355, 
48  N.  E.  730;  People  v.  Farton,  49 
Cal.  632. 

"  State  V.  Robinson,  32  Ore.  43,  48 
Pac.  357;  Faust  v.  United  States,  163 
U.  S.  452,  41  L.  ed.  224,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
1 1 12;  Pigg  V.  State,  145  Ind.  560,  43 
N.  E.  309;  Chapman  v.  James,  96 
Iowa  233,  64  X.  W.  795 ;  Robbins  v. 
Springfield  &c.  R.  Co.,  165  Mass.  30, 
42  N.  E.  334;  Lafferty  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.),  35  S.  W.  374;  Riley  V.  State,  88 
Ala.  193,  7  So.  149;  State  v.  Dilley, 
15  Ore.  70,  13  Pac.  648;  Humphrey  v. 
State,  78  Wis.  569,  47  N.  W.  836; 
Snodgrass  v.  Commonwealth,  89  Va. 
679,  17  S.  E.  238;  State  v.  Huff,  76 
Iowa  200,  40  N.  W.  720;  Hollings- 
worth  V.  State,  79  Ga.  605,  4  S.  E. 
560;  Commonweahh  v.  Kennedy,  170 
Mass.  18,  48  X.  E.  770;  Upton  v. 
State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  289,  88  S.  W.  212; 


Hammond  v.  State,  147  Ala.  79,  41 
So.  761;  Bellamy  v.  State  (Fla.  1908), 
47  So.  868;  State  v.  Thompson,  68 
S.  Car.  133,  46  S.  E.  941.  Underbill 
on  Ev.,  §  342,  citing  civil  cases.  The 
prosecutrix,  in  a  trial  for  rape,  may 
be  recalled  to  testify  to  non-consent 
after  both  sides  have  rested.  State 
V.  Case,  96  Iowa  264,  65  N.  W.  149. 
In  State  v.  Clyburn,  16  S.  Car.  375, 
it  was  held  that  the  judicial  discretion 
was  properly  exercised  when  a  wit- 
ness for  the  state  was  recalled  to 
prove  a  single  fact,  though  the  exam- 
ination of  the  witnesses  for  the  ac- 
cused was  thereby  interrupted.  State 
V.    Laycock,    141    Mo.   274,  42    S.   W. 

723- 

"  State  V.  Jacobs,  28  S.  Car.  29.  4 
S.  E.  799;  Brown  v.  State,  72  Md. 
468,  20  Atl.  186. 

'^  Cochran  v.  United  States,  14 
Okla.   108,  ^d  Pac.  672. 

="  Bonnet  v.  Gladfeldt  (Glattfeldt), 
24  111.  App.  533,  120  111.  166,  II  N.  E. 
250. 


41  I  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  g    225 

him  repeat  his  testimony  or  to  obtain  cumulative  evidence.^^  If 
there  is  a  dispute  as  to  what  testimoney  a  witness  has  given,  or 
if  the  jurors  did  not  understand  or  have  forgotten  what  he  said 
it  is  very  proper  to  ahow  him  to  restate  his  testimony,  even  after 
the  case  is  closed.^"  But  the  practice  is  open  to  the  serious  objec- 
tion that  it  may  lead  to  injustice  to  the  prisoner  by  placing  too 
much  emphasis  on  some  material  evidence  against  him.  If  a  wit- 
ness is  recalled  for  further  direct  examination,  or  for  further 
cross-examination,  the  other  side  has  the  right  of  further  cross- 
examination  or  of  further  re-direct  examination. 

After  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  has  left  the  witness  stand 
he  may  be  recalled  by  the  counsel  for  the  accused  at  any  time 
during  the  trial  to  lay  a  foundation  for  his  impeachment.^^  The 
prosecuting  attorney  has  the  same  right.  The  fact  that  a  party  re- 
calls a  witness  for  this  purpose  does  not  make  him  the  witness  of 
the  party  recalling  him."* 

The  rule  that  evidence  which  is  not  apparently  relevant,  or 
Avhich  is  apparently  irrelevant,  may  be  received  by  the  court, 
upon  the  promise  of  the  party  offering  it  that  he  will  show  the 
relevancy  and  connection  later  on,  is  applicable  to  criminal  trials. 
But  the  matter  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  who  may  re- 
quire that  the  relevancy  be  shown  at  once  by  introducing  some 
evidence  which  will  connect.  The  party  offering  evidence  ap- 
parently irrelevant  may  be  required  to  state  at  once  its  connection 
with  other  facts,  and  to  promise  to  connect,  and  if  he  does  not  do 
so,  the  evidence  should  be  stricken  out.^^ 

§  225.    Exclusion   and   separation  of  witnesses. — The   presiding 

judge  may,  when  it  shall  seem  necessary  for  the  due  administra- 
tion of  justice,  order  a  separation  of  the  witnesses,  and  the  ex- 

^  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazels,  26  the   purpose   of   laying   a    foundation 

Neb.  364,  42  N.  W.  93.  for      his      impeachment.        State      v. 

"Bennefield  v.    State,  62  Ark.  365,  Brown,   in   La.  696,  35   So.  818. 

35  S.  W.  790 ;  Hayes  v.  State,  36  Tex.  ^^  Johnson  v.   State,  55  Fla.  46,  46 

Cr.    146,   35    S.   W.   983;    Lafiferty   v.  So.  154;  Vann  v.  State.  140  Ala.  122, 

State  (Tex.  Cr.),  35  S.  W.  374;  State  zi  So.  158. 

V.  Johnson,  89  Iowa  i,  56  N.  W.  404;  "Hammond  v.   State,    147   Ala.   79, 

Dillard  v.  State,  58  Miss.  368;  Haddix  41   So.  761. 

V.  State,  76  Neb.  369,  107  N.  W.  781.  "=  Ross    v.    State,    169    Ind.    3S8,    8s 

A  witness  may  usually  be  recalled  for  N.  E.  781. 


225 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


412 


elusion  of  all  witnesses,  expert,-"  or  otherwise,  from  the  court- 
room while  any  witness  is  under  examination.-'  The  value  and 
importance  of  this  order  in  criminal  trials  to  prevent  collusion 
among  witnesses  are  self-evident,  and  can  hardly  be  overesti- 
mated. In  the  absence  of  statute  the  order  is  not  of  right.  But 
it  is  seldom  refused  if  it  appears  that  the  ascertainment  of  truth 
will  be  advanced.  The  matter,  however,  is  wholly  one  of  judicial 
discretion  and  neither  side  can  claim  it  as  matter  of  right. 
Hence  the  refusal  of  the  court  to  exclude  all  the  witnesses  for 
the  prosecution  except  the  witness  who  is  testifying  is  not  re- 
versible error  which  will  entitle  the  accused  to  a  new  trial  upon 
his  conviction. ^'^  Thus  the  court  does  not  err  in  refusing  to  ex- 
clude a  detective  who  caused  the  arrest  of  the  accused,  and  he 
may  remain  in  court  and  assist  the  district  attorney  in  framing 
questions  based  upon  what  he  has  found  out  in  searching  for 
the  guilty  party.^** 

If  a  witness  returns  after  leaving  the  court,  or  remains  through 
inadvertence  after  the  separation  of  witnesses  has  been  ordered, 
the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  refuse  to  permit  him  to  be  ex- 


°°  Vance  v.  State,  56  Ark.  402,  19 
S.  W.  1066;  Reg.  V.  Frances,  4  Cox 

C.  C.  57. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Thompson,  159 
Mass.  56,  33  N.  E.  iiii;  State  v. 
Whitworth,  126  Mo.  573,  29  S.  W. 
595 ;  State  v.  Fitzsimmons,  30  Mo. 
236;  State  V.  Davis,  48  Kan.  i,  28 
Pac.  1092;  Barnes  v.  State,  88  Ala. 
204,  7  So.  38,  16  Am.  St.  48;  Kelly  v. 
People,  17  Colo.  130,  29  Pac.  805 ; 
Nelson  v.  State,  2  Swan  (Tenn.)  237; 
Heath  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  464; 
Roberts  v.  Commonwealth,  94  Ky. 
499,  22  S.  W.  845,  15  Ky.  L.  341; 
People  V.  Sam  Lung,  70  Cal.  515,  11 
Pac.  673 ;  Haines  v.  Territory,  3  Wyo. 
167,  13  Pac.  8;  Talley  v.  State,  2  Ga. 
App.  395,  58  S.  E.  667;  Joseph  v. 
Commonwealth,  99  S.  W.  311,  30  Ky. 
L.  638;  Conley  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.), 


116  S.  W.  806;  State  V.  Pell  (Iowa), 
119  N.  W.  154. 

"*  See,  generally,  McGuff  v.  State, 
88  Ala.  147,  7  So.  35,  16  Am.  St.  25; 
Barnes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  204,  7  So. 
38,  16  Am.  St.  48;  Commonwealth  v. 
Follansbee,  155  ]\Iass.  274,  29  N.  E. 
471 ;  Zoldoske  v.  State,  82  Wis.  580, 
52  N.  W.  778;  State  v.  Davis,  48 
Kan.  I,  28  Pac.  1092;  People  v. 
Machen,  loi  Mich.  400,  59  N.  W.  664; 
Murphey  v.  State,  43  Neb.  34,  61  N. 
W.  491. 

'"  People  V.  Burns,  67  Mich.  537,  35 
N.  W.  154. 

As  to  exclusion  of  attorneys  who 
are  also  witnesses  see  Allen  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  703,  10  Ky. 
L.  582;  Powell  V.  State,  13  Tex.  App. 
244;  State  V.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  i7  Atl. 
483. 


413  EXAMIXATIOX    OF    WITNESSES.  §    225 

aminecl^^  and  its  action  will  not  be  reversible  error  unless  serious 
injustice  is  done  the  prisoner,  as,  for  example,  where  he  is  de- 
prived of  the  evidence  of  a  material  witness/"  But  this  rule  is 
not  universally  recognized.  It  is  manifestly  unfair  to  deprive  one 
not  at  fault,  of  testimony  on  which  he  relies,  and  which  may  prove 
him  innocent  of  a  heinous  and  often  capital  crime,  merely  be- 
cause his  witness,  through  carelessness,  obstinacy  or  caprice,  re- 
fuses or  neglects  to  obey  the  court.  So  when  the  defendant  is 
not  to  blame  the  witness  cannot  be  prevented  from  testifying.^^ 

If,  however,  the  accused  detains  one  of  his  witnesses  in  court 
or  by  any  sort  of  connivance  encourages  the  witness  to  remain 
in  court  after  an  order  has  been  made  to  exclude  the  witnesses 
for  the  accused  it  has  been  held  not  error  for  the  court  to  refuse 
to  permit  the  witness  to  testify.^* 

After  witnesses  not  under  examination  have  been  ordered  to 
withdraw,  the  court  may  permit  one  or  more  of  them  to  remain, 
as  circumstances  may  require.  An  exception  must  always  be 
made  in  the  case  of  the  accused,  if  he  is  a  witness,  because  of  his 
constitutional  right  to  be  present  and  to  confront  the  witnesses 
against  him."^     So  an  exception  is  always  made  in  the  case  of 

^^  State  V.  Fitzsimmons,  30  Mo.  236;  Cunningham  v.   State,  97  Ga.  214,  22 

State  V.  Brookshire,  2  Ala.  303;  Mc-  S.    E.   954;    Bow   v.    People,    160   111. 

Lean  v.   State,   16  Ala.  672;   Kelly  v.  438,  43  N.  E.  593;  State  v.  Jones,  47 

People,    17    Colo.    130,    29    Pac.    805;  La.   Ann.    1524,   18  So.  515;   Hellems 

Trujillo  V.  Territory,  6  N.  M.  589,  30  v.  State,  22  Ark.  207;  Taylor  v.  State, 

Pac.  870;   Hey  v.  Commonwealth,  32  130  Ind.  66,  29  N.   E.  415;    State  v. 

Gratt.  (Va.)  946,  34  Am.  799;  Taylor  Ward,  61  Vt.  153,  17  Atl.  483;  Grant 

V.  State,   131   Ga.  765,  63  S.  E.  296;  v.   State,  89   Ga.   393,    15   S.   E.  488; 

State   V.   High,    122   La.   521,   47   So.  Sartorious    v.    State,    24    Miss.    602; 

878;  State  V.  Pell  (Iowa),  119  N.  W.  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624;  State 

154;  Fouse  V.  State,  83  Neb.  258,  119  v.  King,  9  S.  Dak.  628,  70  N.  W.  1046; 

N.  W.  478.  Ashwood  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  550,  40 

"'Carlton  v.   Commonwealth    (Ky),  S.  W.  273.     The  disobedient  witness 
18  S.  W.  535,  13  Ky.  L.  946;  Cook  v.  may  be  punished  for  contempt.     Las- 
State,  30  Tex.  App.  607,  18  S.  W.  412 ;  siter  v.  State,  67  Ga.  739. 
Turner    v.    State    (Tex.),   32    S.    W.  ^* Jackson    v.    State,    14    Ind.    327; 
700.  State  V.  Gesell,  124  Mo.  531,  27  S.  W. 

""*  Parker   v.    State,  67  I\Id.  329,    10  hot. 

Atl.  219,  I  .Am.  St.  387;  State  v.  Lee  ^  Boatmeyer  v.   State,  31   Tex.   Cr. 

Doon,    7   Wash.   308,   34    Pac.    1103;  473,  20  S.  W.  1102. 


126 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


414 


counsel,  or  a  sheriff,^*'  or  other  officer  of  the  coiirt,^'  or  a  juror^* 
who  is  also  a  witness.^" 

The  fact  that  a  witness  comes  into  and  remains  in  court,  in 
ignorance  of  the  rule,  does  not  of  necessity  render  him  in  con- 
tempt or  make  his  testimony  incompetent.  This  was  so  held 
where  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  through  ignorance  disobeyed 
the  rule."" 

And  in  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  the  fact  that  witnesses, 
whether  for  the  state  or  for  the  accused,  have  been  put  under  the 
rule  and  excluded  from  the  court-room,  does  not  prevent  the  at- 
torney who  has  called  them  from  consulting  with  them."^ 

§226.  Refusal  to  testify.— If  a  witness  refuses  to  attend,*-  or, 
if  he  attend  and  refuse  to  be  sworn, '^^  or  to  answer  a  relevant 
question  without  a  satisfactory  excuse,**  or  acts  insolently  or  dis- 
respectfully towards  the  court  or  the  grand  jury,*^  he  is  guilty 
of  a  contempt. 

The  power  to  punish  a  contumacious  witness  for  refusing  to 
testify  is  limited  to  courts  of  record  and  to  legislative  bodies,  in 
the  absence  of  any  statute  conferring  it  on  other  officials  whose 


^*  Askew  V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  79,  59 
S.  E.  311;  Webb  v.  State,  100  Ala. 
47,  14  So.  865. 

"Kelly  V.  People,  17  Colo.  130,  29 
Pac.  80s;  State  v.  Hopkins,  50  Vt. 
316;  Green  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  645, 
98  S.  W.  1059 ;  People  v.  Nunley,  142 
Cal.  441,  76  Pac.  45 ;  Jackson  v.  State, 
55  Tex.  Cr.  79,  115  S.  W.  262;  Smith 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  80,  105  S.  W. 
501;  State  V.  Pell  (Iowa),  119  N.  W. 
154.  See  People  v.  McGarry,  136 
Mich.  316,  99  N.  W.  147,  II  Det.  Leg. 
N.  ID. 

^  State  V.  Vari,  35  S.  Car.  175,  14 
S.  E.  392,  and  see  Underbill  on  Ev., 
p.  468,  n.  4. 

^*The  court  will  not  prohibit  ex- 
cluded witnesses  from  reading  news- 
papers containing  accounts  of  the 
trial.  Commonwealth  v.  Hersey,  2 
Allen  (Mass.)   173. 


*"  State  V.  Watson,  t,^  La.  Ann.  148; 
Cook  V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  607,  18  S. 
W.  412. 

"Bryan  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
33  S.  W.  95,  17  Ky.  L.  965;  Allen  v. 
State,  61  Miss.  627;  Williams  v.  State, 
35  Tex.  355;  Jones  v.  State,  3  Tex. 
App.  150;  Brown  v.  State,  3  Tex. 
App.  294. 

^  Burr's  Trial,  354 ;  Langdon,  Ex 
parte,  25  Vt.  680;  Ellerbe,  In  re,  13 
Fed.  Rep.  530;  Judson,  Ex  parte,  3 
Blatchf.  C.  C.  89.  An  attachment  will 
not  issue  to  compel  an  expert  witness 
or  an  interpreter  to  attend.  Roelker, 
In  re,  Sprague  Dec.  276. 

"  Stice,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  51,  11  Pac. 

459- 

"United  States  v.  Coolidge,  2  Gall. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  364,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14858. 

"United  States  v.  Caton,  i  Cranch 
C.  C.  150. 


415 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


227 


duty  it  may  be  to  interrogate  witnesses/"  A  court  may  punish 
as  a  contempt  the  refusal  of  a  witness  to  testify  before  a  com- 
missioner appointed  by  it  to  take  depositions,*"  or  before  the 
grand  jury  over  which  it  exercises  control,**  and  it  may  do  so 
often  as  the  witness  refuses.*^  When  the  w^itness  has  the  statu- 
tory right  to  answer  pertinent  questions  only,  he  cannot  be  com- 
mitted for  contempt  if  he  refuses  to  answer  those  which  are  not 
pertinent/**  If  the  court  has  not  obtained  jurisdiction,  a  witness 
who  refuses  to  testify  is  not  in  contempt/^ 

§  227.  Interpreting  the  language  of  the  witness. — The  employ- 
ment of  an  interpreter  when  the  witness  is  unable  to  speak  or  to 
understand  the  English  language, ^^  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
examination  through  the  interpreter  shall  be  conducted, ^^  are 
discretionary  with  the  court  when  not  expressly  regulated  by 
statute.  But,  where  a  party  in  a  civil  trial  was  deprived  of  the 
testimony  of  a  material  witness  (and  a  fortiori  this  rule  would 
seem  applicable  where  one  is  accused  of  crime),  by  the  refusal 
of  the  court  to  accept  an  interpreter  who  was  offered,  a  new  trial 
was  granted.^* 


'"People  V.  Rice,  57  Hun  (X.  Y.) 
62,  10  N.  Y.  S.  270,  32  N.  Y.  St.  7; 
White  V.  Morgan  &  Co.,  119  Ind.  338, 
21  X.  E.  968;  Llewellyn's  Case,  13  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  126;  Woodworth,  Ex  parte, 
29  W.  L.  Bui.  315,  and  cases  in  Un- 
derbill on  Ev.,  p.  468. 

"Robb's  Petition,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
442.  "A  justice  of  the  peace,  though 
he  cannot  commit  a  witness  for  con- 
tempt, may  bind  a  party  refusing  to 
testify  to  answer  an  indictment  for 
obstructing  justice."  Albright  v. 
Lapp,  26  Pa.  St.  99. 

"  United  States  v.  Caton,  i  Cranch 
C.  C.  150;  Harris,  Ex  parte,  4  Utah 
5,  5  Pac.  129;  People  v.  Fancher,  2 
Hun  226;  People  v.  Kelly,  24  X.  Y. 
"4;  Stice,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  51,  11  Pac. 
45Q- 

"Stice,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  51,  11 
Pac.  459. 


^^  Zeehandelaar,  Ex  parte,  71  Cal. 
238,  12  Pac.  259. 

^^  People  V.  Warner,  51  Hun  53,  3 
X^.  Y.  S.  768.  A  publisher  of  a  news- 
paper who  refuses  to  testif\'  or  give 
the  real  name  of  the  author  of  a 
libelous  article  may  be  punished  for 
contempt,  though  he  himself  is  under 
indictment  for  the  libel.  Pledger  v. 
State,  77  Ga.  242,  3  S.  E.  320. 

^-  Horn  V.  State,  98  Ala.  23,  13  So. 
329;  State  V.  Severson,  78  Iowa  653, 
43  X.  W.  533 ;  Livar  v.  State,  26  Tex. 
App.  115,  9  S.  W.  552;  Thomason  v. 
Territory,  4  N.  Mex.  150,  13  Pac.  222. 

°'  Skaggs  V.  State,  108  Lid.  53,  8  N. 
E.  695.  See  People  v.  Salas,  2  Cal. 
App.  537;  84  Pac.  295,  where  under 
Code  §  1884  the  court  had  the  right 
to  appoint  a  resident  of  tlic  county 
as  an  interpreter. 

"Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shenk,  131 


S    221 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


416 


A  witness  may  act  as  interpreter.-'^^"  But  ever}^  non-official  in- 
terpreter should  be  sworn  to  interpret  truly.'"'"  The  accuracy  of 
the  interpretation  is  a  question  for  the  jury,'"'"  and  either  side  may 
impeach  its  accuracy  by  cross-examining  the  interpreter,  or  by 
producing-  another  claimed  to  be  more  accurate.^^ 

§  228.  Improper  reception  of  evidence  by  the  jurors. — For  the 
jury  in  a  criminal  trial  to  seek  or  to  receive  evidence  out  of  court 
is  in  the  highest  degree  improper.  Such  action  prejudicing  the 
accused  will,  if  the  verdict  might  have  been  influenced  thereby, 
be  ground  for  a  new  trial. 

Jurors  will  not  be  permitted  to  experiment, ^^  or  take  a  private 
and  unauthorized  view,  or  to  communicate  with  other  persons. 


111.  283,  23  N.  E.  436.     Cf.  People  v. 
Constantino,   153  N.  Y.  24,  47  N.  E. 

27- 

'"'^  One  of  several  witnesses  sum- 
moned before  the  grand  jury  may  act 
as  an  interpreter  for  the  others.  Peo- 
ple V.  Ramirez,  56  Cal.  533,  38  Am. 
73.  A  juror  may,  with  the  defendant's 
consent,  act  as  interpreter.  People  v. 
Thiede,  11  Utah  241,  39  Pac.  837; 
Thiede  v.  Utah  Territory,  159  U.  S. 
510,  40  L.  ed.  237,  16  Sup.  Ct.  62; 
Chicago  &c.  Co.  v.  Shenk,  131  111.  283, 
23  X.  E.  436. 

°"  People  V.  Dowdigan,  67  Mich.  95, 
38  N.  W.  920.  Cf.  United  States  v. 
Gibert,  2  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  19.  The  fact 
that  the  interpreter  is  assisted  by  one 
or  more  bystanders  who  are  unsworn, 
and  when  he  is  doubtful  uses  their 
knowledge  as  an  aid  to  his  own  judg- 
ment, rendering  his  own  version 
finally  to  the  court,  is  not  error. 
United  States  v.  Gibert,  2  Sumn.  (U. 
S.)  19. 

"  Schnier  v.  People,  23  111.  il. 

'^'Skaggs  V.  State,  108  Ind.  53,  8 
X.  E.  695.  The  fact  that  evidence  in 
a  criminal  trial  is  received  through  an 
interpreter  does  not  render  it  hearsay. 
State  V.  Hamilton,  42  La.  Ann.  1204, 


8  So.  304;  X^ioum  v.  Commonwealth, 
128  Ky.  685,  108  S.  W.  945,  23  Ky.  L. 
62.  Though  the  appointment  of  an 
interpreter  is  usually  discretionary  in 
the  absence  of  statute  one  is  almost 
always  appointed  if  the  necessity  is  at 
all  apparent.  Usually  it  is  the  ac- 
cused who  needs  the  interpreter  and 
if  he  has  any  difficulty  in  understand- 
ing English  an  interpreter  ought  to 
be  appointed  in  justice  to  him.  The 
fact  that  he  understands  or  speaks 
the  English  language  to  a  limited  ex- 
tent ought  not  to  deprive  him  of  the 
services  of  an  interpreter  if  necessary 
to  enable  him  to  make  his  defense. 

"^  Yates  V.  People,  38  111.  527 ;  Fore- 
hand v.  State,  51  Ark.  553,  11  S.  W. 
766;  People  V.  Conkling,  in  Cal.  616, 
44  Pac.  314;  State  v.  Sanders,  68 
Mo.  202,  30  Am.  782.  Where  the 
question  was,  could  the  prisoner's 
voice  have  been  heard  on  a  certain 
occasion,  the  experiment  of  stationing 
a  man  outside  the  jury-room,  who 
was  to  listen  and  report  if  he  could 
hear  the  voices  of  the  jurors  through 
a  closed  door,  was  held  ground  for  a 
new  trial.  Jim  v.  State,  4  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  289. 


417 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


228 


and  particularly  with  witnesses.""  But  communications  by  jurors 
with  outsiders  may  be  disregarded  if  it  clearly  appears  that  no 
injustice  has  resulted  to  the  accused.*'^ 

Neither  party  to  a  criminal  trial  has  the  right  to  submit  docu- 
mentary or  other  evidence  to  the  jury  except  during  the  trial  and 
in  the  presence  of  the  court.  The  reception  of  evidence  out  of 
court  may  cause  a  conviction  to  be  reversed.  And  with  much 
better  reason,  writings  which  are  no  part  of  the  evidence,  such  as 
newspapers,*^-  maps  or  diagrams,''^  scientific  books,*'*  or  legal  pub- 
lications,*''^  are  not  permitted  to  be  perused  by  the  jury.*'®  The 
jurors  may,  when  out  of  court,  consult  memoranda  or  notes  of 
the  judge's  charge,*'^  and  all  papers  which  are  in  evidence,*'^  in- 


cluding the  indictment.**® 


""Epps  V.  State,  19  Ga.  102;  State 
V.  Fruge,  28  La.  Ann.  657;  March  v. 
State,  44  Tex.  64;  Collier  v.  State, 
20  Ark.  2)^.  If  a  juror  has  knowledge 
of  the  facts  or  of  the  character  of  a 
witness,  he  should  be  called  as  a  wit- 
ness. Where  the  verdict  is  based  upon 
or  influenced  by  statements  of  facts 
known  to  the  juror  made  in  the  jury- 
room,  which  would  be  relevant  evi- 
dence if  he  were  a  witness,  a  new 
trial  will  be  granted.  Taylor  v.  State, 
52  Miss.  84;  Anschicks  v.  State,  6 
Tex.  App.  524 ;  McKissick  v.  State,  26 
Tex.  App.  673,  9  S.  W.  269;  Lucas  v. 
State,  27  Tex.  App.  2^2,  ir  S.  W.  443. 

"  People  v.  Boggs,  20  Cal.  432 ; 
Epps  V.  State,  19  Ga.  102. 

"*  State  V.  Robinson,  20  W.  Va.  713, 
43  Am.  799. 

•"State  V.  Hartmann,  46  Wis.  248, 
250,  50  N.  W.  193;  State  v.  Lantz,  23 
Kan.  728,  Z3  Am.  215. 

**  State  V.  Gillick,  10  Iowa  98. 

"'Phillips  V.  State  (Tex.,  1896),  34 
S-  W.  539;  State  v.  Wilson,  40  La. 
Ann.  751,  5  So.  52,  i  L.  R.  A.  795; 
State  v.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  33;  Bernhardt 
V.  State,  82  Wis.  22,,  51  N.  W.  1009; 
Harris  v.  State,  24  Neb.  803,  40  N. 
W.  317;  State  V.  Hopper,  71  Mo.  425; 
27 — Under  HILL  Crim.  Ev. 


Johnson  v.  State,  27  Fla.  245,  9  So. 
208;  State  V.  Gillick,  10  Iowa  98. 

^'^  See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  490,  cit- 
ing cases.  The  mere  presence  of  law 
books,  etc.,  in  the  jury-room  is  not 
enough,  if  the  jury  did  not  read  them. 
State  V.  Harris,  34  La.  Ann.  118; 
State  V.  Tanner,  38  La.  Ann.  307. 
This  must  be  shown.  It  will  not  be 
presumed.  Jones  v.  State,  89  Ind.  82. 
Cf.  Mulreed  v.  State,  107  Ind.  62,  7 
N.  E.  884. 

"  State  V.  Thompson,  83  Mo.  257, 
261 ;  Hurley  v.  State,  29  Ark.  17. 

"*  People  V.  Formosa,  61   Hun  272, 

16  N.  Y.  S.  753;  Masterson  v.  State, 
144  Ind.  240,  43  N.  E.  138;  United 
States  V.  Wilson,  69  Fed.  584;  State 
V.  Lowry,  42  W.  Va.  205,  24  S.  E. 
561 ;  State  v.  Raymond,  53  N.  J.  L. 
260,  21  Atl.  328;  Baker  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  17  S.  W.  625,  13  Ky. 
L.  571 ;  State  v.  Tompkins,  71  Mo. 
613;  People  V.  Cochran,  61  Cal.  548; 
Cargill  V.  Commonwealth,  93  Ky.  578, 
20  S.  W.  782,  14  Ky.  L.  517.  Deposi- 
tions, however,  may  be  excluded. 
State  V.  Carr,  20  W.  Va.  679;  State 
V.  Lowry,  42  W.  Va.  205,  24  S.  E. 
561;   Baker  v.  Commonwealth   (Ky.), 

17  S.  W.  625. 

•"•  Stout  v.  State,  90  Ind.  i. 


§  229  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  418 

The  impropriety  and  unfairness  of  permitting  jurors  to  take 
m  the  jury-room  articles  of  personal  property  which  have  been 
used  to  explain  the  evidence,  and  from  which  they  may  draw,  in 
the  absence  of  judge,  counsel  and  accused,  erroneous  and  unjust 
inferences  will  be  admitted.  Hence,  by  the  majority  of  the  cases 
it  is  held  that  for  the  jury  to  take  into  the  jury-room  a  weapon, 
alleged  to  have  been  employed  by  the  accused,  is  reversible  error.'" 
There  are  cases,  however,  which  hold  the  contrary,  and  if  the  ac- 
cused consent,  it  seems  that  articles,  as  clothing,  not  in  evidence, 
may  be  taken  by  the  jury  to  aid  them  in  their  deliberations.^^ 

§  229.    View  by  the  jurors — Discretionary  power  of  the  court. — 

The  court  is  sometimes  permitted  by  statute  to  direct  the  jury 
trying  a  criminal  to  be  taken  in  a  body,  in  charge  of  proper  of- 
ficers, to  the  place  where  the  crime  was  committed,  or  where  a 
material  fact  or  transaction  occurred,  or  they  may  be  taken  out 
of  court  to  view  some  bulky  article  of  personal  property,  as  a 
wagon,  which  cannot  be  brought  into  the  court-room.  The  exer- 
cise of  the  statutory  power  is  usually  altogether  discretionary,^' 
and  a  refusal  to  grant  a  view  is  not  error  unless  it  clearly  appear 
that  it  was  necessary  and  practicable,  and  that  the  denial  of  the 
request  substantially  injured  the  accused. 

A  view  cannot,  however,  be  ordered  by  the  court  in  the  ab- 
sence of  statute  without  the  consent  of  all  parties.'^     Sometimes 

""Forehand  v.  State,  51  Ark.  553,  311;  People  v.  Bonne}-,  19  Cal.  426; 
II  S.  W.  "/(£;  Yates  v.  People,  38  Benton  v.  State,  30  Ark.  328;  Chute 
111.  527;  Forehand  v.  State,  51  Ark.  v.  State,  19  Minn.  271.  See  also,  Un- 
553,  1 1  S.  W.  766 ;  People  v.  Thorn-  derhill  on  Ev.,  §  344 ;  State  v.  Hunter, 
ton,  74  Cal.  482,  16  Pac.  244;  English  18  Wash.  670,  52  Pac.  247. 
V.  State,  31  Fla.  340,  12  So.  689;  Mc-  "State  v.  Bertin,  24  La.  Ann.  46; 
Coy  V.  State,  78  Ga.  490,  3  S.  E.  768;  Bostock  v.  State,  61  Ga.  635;  Corn- 
compare  contra,  State  v.  Stebbins,  29  monwealth  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
Conn.  463,  79  Am.  Dec.  223;  Powell  496,  20  Am.  Dec.  491.  In  Smith  v. 
V.  State,  61  Miss.  319;  Jack  v.  Wash-  State,  42  Tex.  444,  it  was  held  that  a 
ington  Territory',  2  Wash.  Ter.  loi,  3  view  cannot,  in  the  absence  of  a 
Pac.  832.  statute,  be  ordered  on  the  request  of 

"  People  V.   Mahoney,  TJ  Cal.   529,  the   state,    even   if    the   accused   con- 

20  Pac.  TZ-  sents,  as  it  will  be  presumed  he  con- 

'"  Commonwealth     v.     Webster,     5  sented   because    he    did    not   wish    to 

Cush.  (^lass.)  295,  52  Am.  Dec.  7 1  in;  show    a    lack    of    confidence    in    the 

People    V.    Hawley,    in    Cal.    78,    43  jury's  powers  of  observation. 
Pac.  404;    State  v.   Adams,   20  Kan. 


419  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    23O 

the  statutory  power  may  be  exercised  sua  spontc.  Usually  the 
view  can  be  directed  only  on  request  or  with  the  consent  of  all 
parties.  Whether  in  any  case  a  request  or  consent  is  necessary 
depends  upon  the  express  terms  of  the  statutes,  which  should  be 
consulted.'* 

§  230.  Purpose  of  the  view  is  to  afford  evidence. — The  authorities 
are  divided  upon  the  question  whether  the  purpose  of  taking  the 
view  is  to  furnish  new  evidence  or  to  enable  the  jurors  to  com- 
prehend more  clearly  in  the  light  of  fuller  knowledge,  and  by  the 
aid  of  visible  objects,  the  evidence  received  in  court.  The  latter 
proposition  is  well  supported,'"  and  seems  more  consistent  with 
the  conservative  theories  on  which  the  rules  of  evidence  and  pro- 
cedure in  jury  trials  are  based.^*'  But  the  contrary  opinion  that 
the  purpose  of  the  view  is  to  supply  evidence  is  also  held  and  sup- 
ported by  the  majority  of  the  cases."^  Indeed,  where  the  evi- 
dence regarding  the  locus  in  quo  is  at  all  contradictory,  it  is  a 
mental  impossibility  for  the  jury  to  view  it  without  receiving 
some  knowledge  through  their  eyes  which,  so  far  as  it  modifies 
the  facts  proved,  or  reconciles  conflicting  evidence,  is  itself  evi- 
dence.'^^ 

§  231.  The  right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  during  the  taking 
of  the  view. — From  this  diversity  of  opinion  it  follows  that  the 
right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  at  the  view  is  not  settled.  If 
the  purpose  of  the  view  is  to  obtain  evidence  the  view  is  a  part 

'*  Conrad  v.  State,  144  Ind.  290,  43  them,  and  not  to  make  them  silent  wit- 

N.  E.  221.  nesses  in  the  case,  burdened  with  tes- 

'°  Shular  v.    State,    105   Ind.   289,   4  timony  unknown  to  both  parties,  and 

N.  E.  870,  55  Am.  211 ;  Sasse  v.  State,  in  respect  to  which  no  opportunity  for 

68  Wis.  530,  32  N.  W.  849;   State  v.  cross-examination    or    correction    of 

Adams,    20    Kan.    311;     O'Berry    v.  error,  if  any,  could  be  afforded  either 

State,  47  Fla.  75,  36  So.  440.  party.     See  cases  cited  in  note  i,  p. 

'"  In  Close  V.   Samm,  27  Iowa  503,  282,  and  civil  cases  Underbill  on  Ev., 

it  is  said:     The  purpose  is  to  enable  p.  491. 

the  jury,  by  the  view  of  the  premises        "State  v.   Bertin,  24  La.  Ann.  46; 

or   place,    to    better    understand    and  Smith  v.  State,  42  Tex.  444;  Benton 

comprehend  the  testimony  of  the  wit-  v.  State,  30  Ark.  328.     See  cases  cited 

nesses  respecting  the  same  and  there-  in  note. 

by  the  more  intelligently  to  apply  the        "  People   v.   Bush,   68   Cal.   623,    10 

testimony  to  the  issues  on  trial  before  Pac.  169. 


8  231 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


420 


of  the  trial  and  the  presence  of  the  accused  is  indispensable,  even 
where  the  statute  is  silent,  as  he  has  a  constitutional  right  to  con- 
front the  witnesses,  to  hear  the  evidence  and  to  observe  the  actions 
of  the  jury.'"  While  if  the  view  does  not  furnish  evidence  his  pres- 
ence, while  allowable,  is  not  indispensable,**"  for  it  is  then  held 
that  taking-  the  view  is  no  part  of  the  trial,  but  rather  a  part  of  the 
jury's  deliberation,  during  which  the  accused  has  no  right  to  be 
present.  The  accused  cannot  be  compelled  to  be  present,  at  least 
in  those  states  where  the  view^  is  not  regarded  as  furnishing  evi- 
dence. He  may  either  expressly,  or  by  laches  in  claiming  his 
right,  waive  the  right  to  be  present.**^ 

A  view  may  be  had  after  the  summing  up,^"  but  no  oral  evi- 
dence should  be  brought  before  the  jury,  nor  should  they  be 
separated  while  it  is  taken. ^^  The  duty  of  the  showers  of  the 
view,  who  are  usually  officers  sworn  for  the  purpose,  though  a 
watness,^*  or  a  juror  who  is  familiar  with  the  scene,  may  serve, **^ 
is  only  to  point  out  the  place.^*^  It  is  always  the  safer  and  better 
course  for  the  presiding  judge  to  be  present  at  the  view.*^  His 
absence  has,  in  one  instance  at  least,  been  held  reversible  error.^^ 


"  Benton  v.  State,  30  Ark.  328;  Peo- 
ple V.  Bush,  71  Cal.  602,  12  Pac.  781, 
68  Cal.  623,  634,  10  Pac.  169;  People 
V.  Palmer,  43  Hun  397,  109  N.  Y.  413, 
17  N.  E.  213;  Rutherford  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 78  Ky.  639;  State  v. 
Congdon,  14  R.  I.  267;  State  v.  San- 
ders, 68  Mo.  202,  30  Am.  782;  East- 
wood V.  People,  3  Park.  Cr.  Rep. 
25 ;  Sasse  v.  State,  68  Wis.  530,  32  N. 
W.  849;  Carroll  v.  State,  5  Neb.  31; 
Foster  v.  State,  70  Miss.  755,  12  So. 
822;  Conrad  v.  State,  144  Ind.  290,  43 
N.  E.  221.  Contra,  under  statute 
Shular  v.  State,  105  Ind.  289,  4  N.  E. 
870,  55  Am.  211.  A  person  accused 
of  crime  is  deprived  of  his  right  of 
appearing  in  person  and  of  being  con- 
fronted by  the  witnesses  if  the  jury 
view  the  locus  in  quo  without  his 
presence.  People  v.  Lowrey,  70  Cal. 
193,  II  Pac.  605. 

'"  Commonwealth  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick. 


(Mass.)  496,  20  Am.  Dec.  491;  Peo- 
ple V.  Bonney,  19  Cal.  426;  State  v. 
Ah  Lee,  8  Ore.  214;  State  v.  Lee 
Doon,  7  Wash.  308,  34  Pac.  1103; 
State  v.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311. 

*^  State  V.  Reed,  3  Idaho  754,  35 
Pac.  706;  State  v.  Moran,  15  Ore. 
262,  14  Pac.  419 ;  Sasse  v.  State,  68 
Wis.  530,  32  N.  W.  849. 

^■Patchin  v.  Brooklyn,  2  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  377- 

**  People  v.  Hull,  86  Mich.  449,  49 
N.  W.  288 ;  State  v.  Landry,  29  Mont. 
218,  74  Pac.  418. 

^  People  V.  Bush,  71  Cal.  602,  12 
Pac.  871. 

*^  State  V.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311. 

^°  State  V.  Lopez,  15  Nev.  407;  Hay- 
ward  V.  Knapp,  22  Minn.  5. 

"Benton  v.  State,  30  Ark.  328. 

^^  People  v.  Yut  Ling,  74  Cal.  569. 
16  Pac.  489.  A  view  may  be  granted 
though  the  place  does  not  lie  in  the 


421  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  §    232 

§  232.  Presence  of  the  accused  while  taking  testimony. — In  order 
that  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  a  felony  shall  stand,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  examination  of  witnesses  shall  take  place  only 
during  the  actual  presence  of  the  accused  in  the  court-room.** 
He  must  be  present  when  the  witness  is  sworn,^'*  and  an  error  in 
receiving  evidence  in  his  absence  is  not  cured  by  the  repetition 
of  the  questions  and  answers  on  his  return. 

Whether  the  prisoner  was  prejudiced  by  the  testimony  given 
in  his  absence  is  immaterial.  Though  the  court  has  excluded 
the  evidence  which  he  did  not  hear,  or  has  caused  it  to  be  re- 
peated in  his  presence,  still  he  has  been  deprived  of  his  right  to 
see  the  witness,  and  to  watch  and  to  observe  his  every  look,  ges- 
ture and  motion.  The  court  must  see  that  the  prisoner  is  present, 
and  must  allow  nothing  to  be  done  in  his  absence.  As  soon  as 
his  absence  is  noticed,  the  trial  should  be  suspended  or  ad- 
journed.®^ 

But  this  rule,  while  designed  to  secure  him  in  his  constitutional 
right  to  confront  the  witnesses,  should  not  be  invoked  to  delay 
the  trial.  He  may  not  indulge  in  disorderly  actions  or  noisy  and 
outrageous  behavior,  and  shelter  himself  behind  his  privilege. 
No  step  which  is  original  in  character  can  be  taken  in  the  pris- 
oner's absence.  But  after  the  evidence  is  in,  and  the  jury  has  been 
instructed  and  has  retired,  the  stenographer  may  read  the  evi- 
dence to  the  jury  from  his  notes  in  the  prisoner's  absence.  This 
is  merely  a  repetition  of  what  has  already  been  said  in  his  pres- 
ence.**' 

county   where    the    case    is    on    trial.  196,  5  So.  385 ;  State  v.  Greer,  22  W. 

People  V.  Bush,  71  Cal.  602,  12  Pac.  Va.    800.     Where   the   accused   is   by 

781.  mistake  taken    from   the   court   room 

*"  Jackson     v.     Commonweahh,     ig  while  the  competency  of  a  witness  is 

Gratt.   (Va.)  656;  State  v.  Moran,  46  under    discussion    an   error   is    made. 

Kan.    318,    26    Pac.    754;    Adams    v.  The  accused  has  a  right  to  hear  the 

State,  28  Fla.  511,   10  So.  106;   State  argument  on  the  admissibility  of  evi- 

V.  David,  14  S.  Car.  428.  dence  as  well  as  the  evidence  itself, 

■^^  Bearden    v.    State,    44    Ark.    331;  and  the  fact  that  the  court  directs  it 

Simpson  v.  State,  31  Ind.  90  (a  child  to  be  gone  over  cannot  place  him  in 

witness)  ;     People     v.     McNair,     21  the    position    of    having    heard    what 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  608.  was  said   in  his   absence.     Adams   v. 

"'Richards   v.   State,  g^   Tenn.   723,  State,  28  Fla.  511,  10  So.  106. 
20  S.  W.  533,  30  Am.  St.  907 ;  People        °"  State  v.   Haines,  36   S.   Car.   504, 

v.  Kohler,  5  Cal.  72;  Rolls  v.  State,  52  15  S.  E.  555. 
Miss.  391 ;  Garman  v.  State,  66  Miss. 


§  233 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


422 


The  record  must  show  that  the  prisoner  was  in  court  during 
the  trial,  though  it  need  not  show  his  presence  was  continuous 
and  uninterrupted.  If  the  record  shows  he  was  in  court  when 
the  trial  began,  his  continuous  presence  during  the  taking  of  testi- 
mony will  be  presumed  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  con- 
trary.''^ 

§  233.  Experiments  in  and  out  of  court. — A  non-expert  witness 
will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  to  the  results  of  experiments  made 
out  of  court."*  But,  if  the  conditions  and  circumstances  existing 
or  alleged  to  exist  in  the  case,  and  surrounding  the  subject-mat- 
ter, are  reproduced  for  the  experiment,  a  witness  who  is  an  ex- 
pert may  accompany  his  statement  of  opinion  with  a  statement  of 
the  result  of  an  experiment  out  of  court."° 

So,  in  a  murder  trial,  the  state  may  prove  the  result  observed 
after  shooting  a- bullet  through  material  identical  with  the  cloth- 
ing worn  by  the  deceased,  the  same  weapon  being  employed.'"' 


°^  Brown  v.  State,  29  Fla.  543,  10 
So.  736;  Sylvester  v.  State,  71  Ala. 
17;  Simpson  v.  State,  56  Miss.  297. 
One  accused  of  misdemeanor  may  in 
the  court's  discretion  be  tried  in  his 
absence.  Sharp  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  30  S.  W.  414,  16  Ky.  L.  840; 
State  V.  Lucker,  40  S.  Car.  549,  18 
S.  E.  797. 

°*  State  V.  Justus,  11  Ore.  178,  8  Pac. 
2,27,  SO  Am.  470;  Smith  v.  State,  46 
Tex.  Cr.  267,  81  S.  W.  936,  108  Am. 
St.  991. 

®^  Commonwealth  v.  Piper,  120 
Mass.  185;  Boyd  v.  State,  14  Lea 
(Tenn.)  161;  State  v.  Jones,  41  Kan. 
309,  21  Pac.  265 ;  Underbill  on  Ev., 
p.  296.  Where  the  question  is,  were 
the  fatal  wounds  found  upon  the  skull 
of  the  deceased  caused  by  a  blow 
from  a  poker  which  is  in  evidence, 
the  defendant  cannot  prove  the  re- 
sults of  an  experiment  with  a  differ- 
ent poker  on  the  skull  of  a  dead  body. 
The  different  motives  with  which  the 
actual  criminal  and  the  experimenting 


witness  must  have  handled  the  wea- 
pons must  be  considered.  Common- 
wealth v.  Twitchell,  i  Brewst.  (Pa.) 
551.  See  also  Lillie  v.  State,  72  Neb. 
228,  100  N.  W.  316;  State  v.  Nowells, 
13s  Iowa  53,  109  N.  W.  1016;  State 
V.  Bean,  yj  Vt.  384,  60  Atl.  807.  Com- 
prehensive notes  on  experiments  as 
evidence,  see  53  Am.  St.  375,  14  L.  R. 
A.  221 ;  discretion  of  court  in  admit- 
ting or  rejecting  evidence  of  experi- 
ments, 53  Am.  St.  384. 

""  Sullivan  v.  Commonwealth,  93 
Pa.  St.  284;  Commonwealth  v.  Sulli- 
van, 13  Phil.  410.  Cf.  Evans  v.  State, 
109  Ala.  II,  19  So.  535.  On  a  trial  for 
poisoning  a  horse  a  witness  was  per- 
mitted to  state  that,  after  the  horse 
died,  he  gave  some  of  the  contents  of 
its  stomach  to  a  hen,  which  died  at 
once.  State  v.  Isaacson,  8  S.  Dak.  69, 
65  N.  W.  430.  An  experiment,  other- 
wise admissible,  is  not  to  be  excluded 
because  the  defendant  was  not  pres- 
ent when  it  was  made.  Moore  v. 
State,  96  Tenn.  209,  33  S.  W.  1046. 


423 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


^?>2> 


An  expert  may  be  allowed  to  conduct  an  experiment  in  court  to 
illustrate  or  emphasize  his  testimony,  if  it  appears  independently 
that  the  exact  conditions  alleged  to  have  existed  are  reproduced 
before  the  jury.^^ 

If  the  conditions  under  which  the  experiment  is  made  out  of 
court  do  not  correspond  with  those  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
crime,  evidence  derived  from  the  experiment  must  be  rejected. 
So  where  the  point  at  issue  was  whether  the  witnesses  had  seen 
a  certain  occurrence  in  a  field,  the  evidence  of  a  witness  who 
several  months  later  went  to  the  field  and  looked  about  and  who 
testified  that  the  view  was  obstructed  by  trees  and  bushes  so  that 
he  could  not  see  the  field,  will  not  be  received. ®® 

And  articles  with  which  experiments  have  been  made  are  not 
admissible  in  evidence  unless  they  are  similar  in  character  to  the 
articles  proved  to  have  been  connected  with  the  commission  of 
the  crime. "'^  But  the  reproduction  in  the  experiments  of  the  con- 
ditions and  circumstances  existing,  or  alleged  to  have  existed  in 
the  case,  need  not  be  exact  in  all  particulars  if  the  material  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  are  reproduced.    So,  where  an  ex- 


"  State  V.  Smith,  49  Conn.  376 ;  Si- 
berry  V.  State,  133  Ind.  677,  2,2,  N.  E. 
681 ;  State  v.  Fletcher,  24  Ore.  295,  :^^ 
Pac.  575 ;  People  v.  Hope,  62  Cal. 
291 ;  Hisler  v.  State,  52  Fla.  30,  42 
So.  692;  People  V.  Solani,  6  Cal.  App. 
103,  91  Pac.  654;  State  v.  Ronk,  91 
Minn.  419,  98  N.  W.  334;  Spires  v. 
State,  50  Fla.  121,  39  So.  181.  In  case 
the  experiment  will  consume  some 
time  it  is  not  an  abuse  of  judicial  dis- 
cretion for  the  court  to  refuse  to  per- 
mit an  experiment  to  be  made  in  open 
court.  People  v.  Levine,  85  Cal.  39, 
22  Pac.  969,  24  Pac.  631.  The  matter 
is  largely  in  the  judicial  discretion. 
Polin  V.  State,  14  Neb.  540,  16  N.  W. 
898.  In  the  very  recent  case  of  the 
People  V.  Luetgert,  the  trial  of  which 
in  the  city  of  Chicago,  111.,  has  just 
terminated  in  a  disagreement  of  the 
jury,  the  relevancy  and  propriety  of 
evidence    of    experiments    conducted 


out  of  court  received  much  attention. 
The  prosecution  alleged  that  the  pris- 
oner, after  killing  his  wife,  immersed 
her  body  for  a  lengthy  period  in  a 
chemical  preparation  contained  in  a 
vat  located  in  a  factory  of  which  he 
was  the  proprietor,  the  effect  of  which 
was  to  dissolve  and  disintegrate  it  to 
such  an  extent  that  only  a  few  small 
pieces  of  bone  were  subsequently 
found  intact.  The  accused  was  per- 
mitted to  offer  in  evidence  the  results 
of  an  experiment  made  by  immersing 
the  body  of  a  woman  in  a  chemical 
preparation  admitted  to  be  the  same 
as  that  alleged  to  have  been  used  by 
the  accused. 

"^  Sherrill  v.  State,  138  Ala.  3,  35 
So.  129.  Note  on  experiments  before 
jury  during  view,  42  L.  R.  A.  384. 

"^  Hisler  v.  State,  52  Fla.  30,  42  So. 
692. 


§    233  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  424 

periment  was  made  by  firing  bullets  from  a  pistol  which  was 
found  at  the  scene  of  the  crime,  the  bullets  thus  fired  might  be 
offered  in  evidence  in  comparison  with  the  bullets  extracted  from 
the  body  of  the  person  whom  the  accused  was  alleged  to  have 
killed,  though  the  pistol  which  was  used  had  been  cleaned  after  its 
discovery  at  the  scene  of  the  crime/**" 

Evidence  procured  by  means  of  experiments  is  usually  offered 
in  homicide  upon  the  question  of  the  manner  in  which  the  fatal 
shot  was  fired  or  wound  inflicted  and  particularly  as  to  the  near- 
ness of  the  weapon  to  the  body  of  the  deceased.  A  witness, 
whether  an  expert  or  a  non-expert,  may  testify  that,  having  meas- 
ured the  powder  marks  surrounding  a  gunshot  wound  which 
cause  death  he  experimented  with  the  pistol  alleged  to  have  been 
used  by  the  deceased,  or  with  a  weapon  of  similar  caliber,  by  dis- 
charging it  at  an  object  substantially  similar  in  character  to  the 
skin  or  flesh  of  the  human  body.  He  may  then  testify  to  the  ex- 
tent and  character  of  the  bullet  hole  and  powder  marks  which  re- 
sulted from  his  experiment,  and  may  compare  them  with  the 
condition  of  the  body  of  the  deceased.  If  an  expert,  he  may  give 
his  opinion  in  connection  with  evidence  of  the  experiment  as  to 
how  near  the  weapon  was  to  the  deceased  when  it  was  dis- 
charged.^ 

One  who  was  present  at  the  time  and  place  of  the  crime  may 
be  able  to  describe  what  took  place,  without  being  able  to  give 
in  detail  everything  that  he  could  have  seen  there.  This  consti- 
tutes no  valid  objection  to  the  competency  of  his  evidence,  though 
it  may  be  considered  in  determining  his  credibility.  If  it  be- 
comes material  to  identify  certain  objects  at  the  scene  of  the 
crime,  a  witness  may  be  permitted  to  revisit  it  in  charge  of  an 
ofiicer  of  the  court  and,  thus  having  refreshed  his  memory,  by 
going  over  the  ground,  he  may  describe  the  objects  which  he  saw. 
Of  course,  this  is  proper  only  where  it  is  proved  that  the  condi- 
tion of  the  scene  of  the  crime  has  not  been  materially  changed 
since  the  crime.^ 

'■^  People  V.  Weber,  149  Cal.  325,  86     1063,  105  Am.  St.  864 ;  State  v.  Mel- 
Pac.  671.  vern,  32  Wash.  7,  ^2  Pac.  489. 

^  State  V.  Nagle,  25  R.  I.  105,  54  Atl.        =  State  v.  DeHart,  38  Mont.  211,  99 

Pac.  438. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


THE  IMPEACHMENT  OF   WITNESSES. 


!  234.  Impeachment  of  witnesses — 
General  rule. 

235.  The  impeachment  of  necessary 
witnesses  and  those  unex- 
pectedly  hostile. 

2.2,6.  Impeachment  of  adverse  wit- 
nesses by  showing  bad  repu- 
tation for  veracity — Belief 
under  oath. 

237.  Impeachment    by    showing    the 

general  bad  character  of  the 
witness  aside  from  truthful- 
ness. 

238.  Impeachment    of    the    adverse 

witness  by  showing  contra- 
dictory statements  —  Neces- 
sity for  foundation. 

239.  Impeachment    by   contradictory 

affidavits,  depositions  and 
other  writings. 

240.  Contradictory  writings  must  be 

shown  to  the  witness  who  is 
to  be  impeached. 


241.  Contradiction       of      irrelevant 
'    matters      not      permissible — 

Proof  of  confirmatory  state- 
ments. 

242.  Previous    silence    as    impeach- 

ment. 

243.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show 

the  general  reputation  for 
truthfulness  of  a  witness 
who  has  been  impeached. 

244.  Limitations    upon   the   right   to 

ask  questions  w'hich  disgrace 
the  witness. 

245.  Impeachment    by    showing    so- 

cial connections,  occupation 
and  manner  of  living. 

246.  When    and    how    previous    im- 

prisonment or  conviction  of 
crime  may  be  shown. 

247.  Incriminating  questions. 

248.  Interest    and   bias    of   the   Avit- 

ness  as  impeachment. 


§  234.  Impeachment  of  witnesses — General  rule. — A  party  in 
whose  behalf  a  witness  is  called  to  testify  will  not,  as  a  general 
rule  (to  which,  however,  there  are  some  exceptions),  be  per- 
mitted to  impeach  the  veracity  or  credibility  of  the  witness. 

The  law  presumes  that  he  is  acquainted  with  the  character  of 
his  own  witness,  and  knows  before  he  calls  him  whether  he  is  a 
truthful  man  or  the  reverse.  So,  too,  the  party  must  or  ought  to 
be  thoroughly  aware  whether  or  no  his  witness  has  any  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts  in  issue,  and  if  he  calls  him  to  prove  any  par- 
ticular fact  he  is  concluded  by  his  testimony  and  cannot  contra- 

425 


§    235  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  426 

diet  him  as  to  that  fact.  Hence,  applying  this  rule  to  criminal 
prosecutions,  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  the  state's  attorney,  in 
the  performance  of  his  duty  to  secure  the  punishment  of  crimi- 
nals, will  stoop  to  offer  untruthful  testimony  for  that  purpose. 
Nor  can  we  with  justice  suppose  that  the  accused,  whom  the  law 
presumes  innocent  until  his  guilt  is  proved  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  contemplates  or  intends  the  willful  introduction  of  per- 
jured testimony.  Hence,  the  mere  calling  of  a  witness  by  either 
side  is,  in  law,  an  implied  representation  that  the  witness  is 
worth}^  of  belief. 

The  rule,  as  thus  stated,  is  applicable  to  exclude  direct  impeach- 
ment alone.  That  is,  the  party  cannot  show  that  the  reputation 
of  his  own  witness  for  veracity  is  bad,  nor  prove  that  he  made 
contradictory  statements  out  of  court,  nor  contradict  him,  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  impeachment.  The  party  may  be  compelled 
by  the  exigencies  of  the  case  to  impeach  his  witness  incidentally 
and  indirectly.  He  may  have  to  do  this  or  lose  the  opportunity 
of  proving  relevant  facts  which  are  vitally  important  in  their 
bearing  upon  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused.  The  law 
does  not  forbid  the  proof  of  any  relevant  fact  which  may  have  a 
tendency  to  show  the  truth  merely  because  the  proof  of  that  fact 
indirecth',  though  positively,  contradicts,  and  thus,  of  necessity, 
discredits  and  impeaches  the  testimony  of  some  other  witness  to 
that  or  some  other  relevant  fact.^  Nor  is  it  material  that  the 
result  of  such  an  incidental  conflict  of  evidence  is  to  show  that 
one  or  the  other  of  the  witnesses  is  totally  unworthy  of  credit. 

§  235.  The  impeachment  of  necessary  witnesses  and  those  unex- 
pectedly hostile. — If  either  party  is,  by  law,  under  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  compelled  to  call  a  particular  person  to  prove 
any  fact,  the  party  calling  him  cannot  be  said  to  vouch  for  this 
witness  that  the  law  forces  upon  him.  Accordingly,  a  party  who 
is  compelled  to  prove  the  execution  of  a  writing  by  producing 
the  subscribing  witnesses  under  a  statute  requiring  this  proof  is 

^United      States     v.     Watkins,     3  Ga.  754,  13  S.  E.  87;  Reyes  v.  State, 

Cranch  C.  C  441,  28  Fed.  Cas.  16649;  48  Tex.  Cr.  346,  88  S.  W.  245.     For 

Chism  V.   State,  70  Miss.  742,  12  So.  a   discussion   of   the   double  meaning 

852;  State  V.  Cummins,  76  Iowa  133,  of   the  word   "impeach,"   see   Under- 

40    N.    \V.    124;    Dixon    v.    State,   86  hill  on  Evidence,  p.  500,  §  347. 


427  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    235 

not  concluded  by  the  answers  of  such  witnesses.  If  the  subscrib- 
ing witnesses  deny  their  signatures  or  their  presence  at  the  exe- 
cution, the  party  who  cahed  them  may  directly  contradict  them 
by  other  witnesses,  or  their  reputation  for  veracity  may  be  im- 
peached." Another  exception  to  the  rule  forbidding  a  party  to 
contradict  his  own  witness  occurs  where  the  witness  is  treacher- 
ous and  proves  unexpectedly  hostile  in  his  testimony  upon  the 
stand.  In  such  circumstances  it  would  be  most  unfair  to  the  ac- 
cused, if  the  witness  has  been  called  in  his  behalf,  to  permit  him 
to  be  convicted  merely  because  a  witness  on  whom  he  has  de- 
pended for  exculpation  has  betrayed  him  at  a  critical  moment  in 
his  defense.  The  witness  may  have  been,  or  may  be  when  he 
testifies,  in  the  secret  employment  or  under  the  control  of  a  prose- 
cuting attorney  who  may  have  permitted  professional  zeal  to 
overcome  his  sense  of  justice  and  right,  or  he  may  be  a  secret 
enemy  of  the  prisoner,  desirous  of  revenging  himself  in  this  un- 
derhand manner.  On  the  other  hand,  the  consciousness  existing 
in  the  mind  of  the  accused  that  he  is  guilty  may,  and  no  doubt 
frequently  does,  impel  him  to  practice  such  an  artifice  by  which 
the  case  against  him  will  unexpectedly  be  broken  down. 

A  man  who  deliberately  engages  in  such  an  enterprise,  with 
the  purpose  and  intention  of  giving  evidence  when  on  the  stand 
by  which  the  party  who  calls  him  will  be  routed  and  confounded, 
may  have  stated  the  facts  differently  out  of  court  for  the  express 
purpose  of  luring  the  party  into  calling  him.  If  he  then  gives  a 
widely  variant  version  of  relevant  facts,  to  the  surprise  of  the 
party  in  whose  favor  he  was  called,  his  extra-judicial  declara- 
tions may  be  proved,  but  solely  for  the  purpose  of  impeachment.^^ 

The  party  must  first  show  that  the  evidence,  as  given,  has  taken 
him  by  surprise  and  that  the  witness  is  hostile.  The  witness  may 
then  be  asked  if  he  has  made  contradictory  statements  out  of 
court,  the  times,  places  and  circumstances  of  the  statements  being 
described  to  him  in  detail.^     But  the  fact  that  a  witness,  when 

^Shorey    v.    Hussey,    32    Me.    579,  'Conway   v.    State,    118    Ind.    482, 

581;    Orser   v.    Orser,   24   N.   Y.    51;  488,  21   N.  E.  285;  Rhodes  v.   State, 

Foster  v.    Dickerson,  64  Vt.  233,  24  128  Ind.  189,  192,  27  N.  E.  866;  Wil- 

Atl.  253,  and  cases  cited  in  Underbill  Hams  v.   State,  25  Tex.   App.  76,  90, 

on  Evidence,  p.  502,  §  348.  7   S.   W.    661 ;    Schuster   v.    State,  80 

"a  Sylvester    v.    State,    46    Fla.    166,  Wis.  107,  117.  49  N.  W.  30;  State  v. 

35  So.   142.  Tall,   43   Minn.    273,   275,   45   N.    W. 


^  235 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


428 


on  the  stand,  seems  ignorant  of  some  or  all  the  facts  he  was  ex- 
pected to  know  will  not  permit  the  examining  party  to  prove  that 
he  made  the  desired  statements  out  of  court.*  In  order  that  one's 
own  witness  may  be  contradicted,  mere  silence  or  ignorance  on 
his  part  is  not  enough.  The  witness  must  testify  expressly,  and 
in  terms  to  facts  wdiich  are  in  direct  contradiction  to  his  prior 
extra-judicial  statements.'* 

The  rule  by  which  one's  own  witness,  who  unexpectedly  proves 
hostile,  may  be  impeached  by  proving  contradictory  statements 
made  out  of  court  has  been  confirmed  by  statute  in  some  states. 
The  rule  applies  to  criminal  as  well  as  to  civil  cases."  But  such 
statutes,  being  somewhat  in  derogation  of  common  law  principles, 
usually  receive  a  strict  construction.'^  All  the  circumstances  of 
time,  place  and  person  ought  to  be  detailed  to  the  witness.  It 
is  not  enough  merely  to  ask  him  if  he  made  contradictory  state- 
ments to  a  particular  person,^  without  stating  where  and  when 
thev  were  made. 


449;  People  V.  Sweeney,  55  Mich. 
586,  591,  22  N.  W.  50;  People  v. 
Jacobs,  49  Cal.  384;  State  v.  Sortor, 
52  Kan.  531,  34  Pac.  1036;  McAlpine 
V.  State,  117  Ala.  93,  23  So.  130; 
Barber  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  598,  60 
S.  E.  285.  For  example,  a  witness 
for  the  state,  proving  hostile,  may  be 
asked  if  he  did  not  make  contradic- 
tory statements  before  the  grand 
jury.  People  v.  O'Neill,  107  Mich. 
556,  65  N.  W.  540.  But  see  contra, 
the  divided  opinion  of  the  court  in 
Putnam  v.  United  States,  162  U.  S. 
687,  40  L.  ed.  1 1 18,  16  Sup.  Ct.  923. 

*  Adams  v.  State,  34  Fla.  185,  15 
So.  905;  Chism  v.  State,  70  Miss. 
742,  12  So.  852;  People  v.  Mitchell, 
94  Cal  550,  29  Pac.  1106. 

"  Gibson  V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  218, 
29  S.  W.  471.  Contra  Southworth  v. 
State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  532,  109  S.  W.  133. 
To  entitle  the  prosecution  to  impeach 
one  of  its  witnesses  by  contradictory 
statements  it  must  prove  that  having 
taken  due  steps  to  inquire  of  the  wit- 


ness what  he  would  testif}^  to  it  has 
been  deceived  and  surprised.  If  the 
state's  attorney  relies  solely  for  in- 
formation as  to  the  expected  testi- 
mony of  his  witness  upon  what  out- 
side parties  tell  him  the  witness  will 
say,  and  neglects  to  talk  to  his  wit- 
ness, he  cannot  plead  surprise.  Dunk 
v.  State,  84  Miss.  452,  36  So.  609. 

*  State  V.  Sederstrom,  99  Minn.  234, 
109  N.  W.  113. 

'  Williams  v.  State,  25  Tex.  App. 
76,  7  S.  W.  661 ;  Blackburn  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 12  Bush  (Ky.)  181,  184, 
185 ;  Underbill  on  Evidence,  p.  503, 
note  3. 

*  Commonwealth  v.  Thyng,  134 
Mass.  191 ;  People  v.  Bushton,  80 
Cal.  160,  22  Pac.  127,  549;  Underbill 
on  Evidence,  §  342.  A  statute  per- 
mitting a  "person"  introducing  a  wit- 
ness, where  he  proves  hostile,  to  im- 
peach him,  permits  the  state  to  do 
this  in  a  criminal  case.  Brown  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  1908),  114  S.  W. 
820.     The  prosecution  in  the  case  of 


429  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    236 

The  extent  to  which  the  impeachment  of  one's  own  witness 
may  be  carried  is  largely  a  matter  of  judicial  discretion.  It  must 
appear  that  the  witness  is  hostile  and  not  merely  reluctant  to  give 
testimony.'^  Unless  the  testimony  is  actually  prejudicial  to  the 
party  calling  the  witness,  he  cannot  be  impeached.^" 

And  in  all  cases  the  court  ought  to  limit  the  impeaching  testi- 
mony to  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  introduced.  Its  purpose  is 
not  so  much  to  break  down  the  credibility  of  all  the  testimony 
of  the  hostile  witness  as  to  supply  material  facts  which  the  hos- 
tile witness  was  expected  but  failed  to  prove.  The  credibility  of 
the  hostile  witness  is  still  for  the  jury.^^ 

§  236.  Impeachment  of  adverse  witness  by  showing  bad  repu- 
tation for  veracity — Belief  under  oath. — Independent  evidence 
tending  directly  to  show  that  a  witness  possesses  a  bad  reputation 
for  veracity  is  always  admissible  to  impeach  an  adverse  witness 
after  he  has  been  examined  in  chief  by  the  party  calling  him.^- 
The  same  rule  applies  where  a  showing  is  made  for  an  absent 
witness  and  received  as  evidence. ^^  The  impeaching  witness 
ought  to  be  called  from  among  those  persons  who  are  resident 
near  the  domicile  of  the  witness  to  be  impeached.  He  must  first 
be  asked  if  he  knows  the  general  reputation  of  the  witness,  and 
if  he  does  not  know  it  he  is  incompetent.  If  the  court  believes 
he  knows  the  reputation  of  the  witness  for  veracity  he  may  then 
state  what  that  reputation  is.^*  Evidence  of  reputation  for  truth- 
fulness or  the  reverse  is  not  admissible,  unless  it  relates  to  the 
reputation  of  the  witness  which  is  prevalent  in  the  locality  where 
he  resides. ^^     The  reputation  proved  must  be  recent.     The  fact 

an  unexpectedly  hostile  witness   may  So.    259.      Contra,    People    v.    Pem- 

show  that  he  had  testified  differently  broke,  6  Cal.  App.  588,  92  Pac.  668, 

at  the  inquest.     State  v.  Jennings,  48  where  evidence  taken  on  the  prelimi- 

Ore.  483,  87  Pac.  524.  nary    examination    was    read    at    the 

*  Southworth  v.   State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  trial. 

532,  109  S.  W.  133.  "  State    V.    Johnson,    41    La.    Ann. 

'"Xathan   v.    State,    130   Ga.  48,   61  574,  7  So.  670;   People  v.   Markham, 

S.  E.  994.  64  Cal.  157,  30  Pac.  620,  49  Am.  700; 

"Sapp  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1903),  77  Cole  v.   State,  59  Ark.   50,  26  S.   \V. 

S.  W.  456.  377;  Spies  V.  People,  122  111.  i,  12  N. 

^■Hoge  V.  People,  117  111.  35,  6  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am.  St.  32on. 

E.  796.  "  Brown  v.    United   States,    164   U. 

^Gregory  v.  State,  140  Ala.  16,  37  S.  221,  41  L.  ed.  410,   17  S.   Ct.  33; 


§  236 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


430 


that  a  witness  was  reputed  to  be  truthful  when  he  was  a  boy  by 
no  means  tends  to  show  that  he  is  credible,  when,  as  a  man.  he 
testifies  upon  the  witness  stand.  But  evidence  of  good  or  bad 
reputation  existing  two  or  three  years  prior  to  the  trial  is  admis- 
sible. It  cannot  reasonably  be  presumed  that  a  man  of  mature 
age  and  settled  habits  would  acquire  a  new  reputation  in  that 
comparatively  short  time." 

The  evidence  of  the  impeaching  witness  must  be  confined 
strictly  to  the  general  reputation  of  the  witness  for  veracity.  /.  c, 
to  what  he  has  heard  people  say  regarding  this  trait  of  character. 
He  will  not  be  allowed  to  prove  the  commission  of  specific  acts 
of  untruthfulness  or  other  bad  conduct. ^^ 

A  witness  who  is  called  to  prove  the  bad  reputation  of  another 
may,  after  he  has  testified  to  that  reputation,  be  asked  if  he 
would  believe  the  witness  under  oath.^"*     Though  the  reputation 


State  V.  Rugan,  5  Mo.  App.  592; 
State  V.  Beal,  68  Ind.  345,  346,  34 
Am.  263;  Mershon  v.  State,  51  Ind. 
14;  State  V.  Kirkpatrick,  63  Iowa 
554-  559,  19  N-  W.  660;  State  v. 
Johnson,  41  La.  Ann.  574,  577,  7  So. 
670 ;  Jackson  v.  State,  78  Ala.  471 ; 
Combs  V.  Commonwealth,  97  Ky.  24, 
29  S.  W.  734;  State  V.  Norman,  135 
Iowa  483,  113  N.  W.  340;  Alford  v. 
State,  47  Fla.  i,  36  So.  436. 

"  Davis  V.  Commonwealth,  95  Ky. 
19,  21,  23  S.  W.  585,  44  Am.  St.  201  ; 
Mynatt  v.  Hudson,  66  Tex.  66,  17  S. 
W.  396;  People  V.  Xunlej',  142  Cal. 
441,  76  Pac.  45. 

"  People  V.  O'Brien,  96  Cal.  171,  31 
Pac.  45;  People  v.  Rj^an,  55  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  214,  8  N.  Y.  S.  241;  State  v. 
Rogers,  108  Mo.  202,  18  S.  W.  976; 
State  V.  Barrett,  40  Minn.  65,  41  N. 
W.  459;  People  V.  Wolcott,  51  Mich. 
612,  17  N.  W.  78;  Randall  v.  State, 
132  Ind.  539,  542,  32  N.  E.  305;  Con- 
ley  V.  IMeeker,  85  N.  Y.  618;  State 
V.  Gesell,  124  Mo.  531,  27  S.  W. 
iioi;  McArthur  v.  State,  59  Ark. 
431,  27   S.  W.   628;    People  V.   Mon- 


real,  7  Cal.  App.  37,  93  Pac.  385; 
Seaborn  v.  Commonwealth,  25  Ky.  L. 
2203,  80  S.  W.  223;  State  V.  Arnold, 
146  N.  Car.  602,  60  S.  E.  504.  The 
witness  may  testify  that  the  man'3 
neighbors  said  nothing  as  to  his  gen- 
eral reputation  for  telling  the  truth. 
Their  silence  may  be  evidence  that 
his  reputation  was  imiformh-  good. 
Conrad  v.  State,  132  Ind.  254,  259, 
31  N.  E.  805. 

^^  Mayes  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  33, 
24  S.  W.  421 ;  Ware  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  597,  38  S.  W.  198 ;  State  v.  Chris- 
tian, 44  La.  Ann.  950,  952,  11  So. 
589;  State  V.  Boswell,  2  Dev.  ( N. 
Car.)  209,  211;  Hudspeth  v.  State, 
50  Ark.  534;  People  v.  Ryder,  151 
^[ich.  187,  114  N.  W.  i02t;  Doug- 
lass v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1906),  98  S. 
W.  840.  An  affirmative  answer  to 
the  question,  "Would  you  believe  the 
witness  under  oath?"  may  be  consid- 
ered as  sustaining  the  veracitj-  of  the 
witness.  Taylor  v.  State,  5  Ga.  App. 
237,  62  S.  E.  1048.  For  civil  cases  see 
Underbill  on  Evidence,  page  505. 
Contra,   Walton   v.    State,  88  Ind.  9. 


431 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


^Z7 


of  the  witness  is  shown  to  be  bad,  his  credibiHty  is  still  a  question 
for  the  jury,  who  may  believe  him  though  he  has  a  bad  reputa- 
tion for  telling  the  truth/"  The  fact  that  they  may  believe  him 
to  have  a  bad  reputation  does  not  justify  an  instruction  that  they 
must  disregard  all  his  evidence.-" 

Xo  man  can,  with  fairness,  be  required  without  warning  to  de- 
fend or  to  disprove  particular  actions  perhaps  long  since  forgot- 
ten by  him.-^  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  impeaching  witness 
should  be  personally  acquainted  with  the  witness  whose  credibil- 
ity he  attacks.--  He  may  be  cross-examined  as  to  the  sources 
from  which  he  has  derived  his  knowledge  of  the  reputation  which 
he  has  testified  to,  and  he,  in  his  turn,  may  have  his  reputation  in- 
vestigated.-' 

It  is  not  permissible  in  a  criminal  case  to  ask  a  witness  whether 
his  own  general  character  for  veracit}'-  is  good.-* 

§  237.  Impeachment  by  showing  the  general  bad  character  of 
the  witness  aside  from  truthfulness. — A  few  authorities  reject  all 
evidence  to  prove  the  good  or  bad  character  of  a  witness,  except 
so  far  as  it  is  confined  to  his  reputation  for  truthfulness,  or  the 
reverse.-^    If  the  witness  possesses  no  knowledge  of  that  particu- 


19;  State  V.  Miles,  15  Wash.  534,  46 
Pac.  1047;  Cline  v.  State,  51  Ark. 
140,  10  S.  W.  225.  But  the  witness 
will  not  generally  be  permitted  to 
state  that  he  would  not  believe  a  per- 
son under  oath,  unless  he  knows  that 
person's  reputation  for  veracity,  and 
is  able  to  testify  that  his  reputation  is 
bad.  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  i,  208, 
12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898.  See  also, 
Mitchell  V.  State,  94  Ala.  68,  10  So. 
518. 

"Taylor  v.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  '22)T, 
62  S.  E.  1048;  Peaden  v.  State,  46 
Fla.  124,  35  So.  204. 

""Pentecost  v.  State,  107  Ala.  8r, 
18  So.  146. 

''  See  Underbill  on  Evidence,  page 
.=506,  n.  2.  It  may  be  shown  that  the 
witness  was  intoxicated  when  he  ob- 
served the  events  which  he  describes 


on  the  stand.  But  if,  though  intoxi- 
cated, his  evidence  is  corroborated,  or 
if  his  recollection  appears  to  be  clear 
and  distinct  he  ought  to  be  believed. 
State  V.  Castello,  62  Iowa  404,  407,  17 
N.  W.  605. 

"  State  V.  Turner,  36  S.  Car.  534, 
IS  S.  E.  602. 

"State  V.  Perkins,  66  N.  Car.  126; 
Nelson  v.  State,  z-  Fla.  244,  13  So. 
361. 

■*  Glass  V.  State,  147  Ala.  50,  41  So. 

^  State  V.  Clawson,  30  Mo.  App. 
139;  State  V.  Coffey,  44  Mo.  App. 
455 ;  State  v.  Jackson,  44  La.  Ann. 
160,  162,  ID  So.  600;  Briggs  V.  Com- 
monwealth, 82  Va.  554;  People  v. 
Abbott,  97  Mich.  484,  56  N.  W.  862, 
37  Am.  St.  360 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Lawler,  12  Allen  (Mass.)   585;  State 


§  22,7 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


432 


lar  trait  of  character  he  is  incompetent.  But  the  majority  of  the 
cases  allow  greater  latitude.  In  most  cases  evidence  involving 
the  whole  moral  character  of  the  witness  will  be  received  upon 
the  reasonable  theory  that  a  man  who  is  addicted  to  vicious  habits, 
or  who  is  prone  to  commit  immoral  acts,  may  be  presumed  to 
have  lost  respect  for  truth,  and  to  be  ready  to  perjure  himself 
when  it  is  to  his  interest  to  do  so."** 

The  rule  that,  in  proving-  character,  the  witness  will  be  con- 
fined to  general  reputation  in  the  neighborhood,  applies  where 
a  witness  is  called  to  impeach  another  witness  by  proof  of  bad 
character.  The  evidence  of  bad  reputation  may  be  supplemented 
by  proof  of  a  report  that  the  witness  who  is  attacked  had  com- 


V.  Perkins,  66  N.  Car.  126;  Holmes 
V.  State,  88  Ala.  26,  7  So.  193,  16 
Am.  St.  17;  State  v.  Grove,  61  W. 
Va.  697,  57  S.  E.  296;  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2721.  Comprehensive  note 
on  evidence  and  instructions  as  to 
character  of  accused,  see  20  L.  R.  A. 
609.  Note  on  evidence  of  specific  in- 
stances to  prove  character,  14  L.  R. 
A.   (N.  S.)  708. 

^Wachstetter  v.  State,  99  Ind.  290, 
298,  50  Am.  94n;  Boyle  v.  State,  105 
Ind.  469,  475,  5  N.  E.  203,  55  Am. 
218;  McTyier  v.  State,  91  Ga.  254,  18 
S.  E.  140;  State  v.  Hart,  67  Iowa 
142,  25  N.  W.  99;  State  v.  Kirkpat- 
rick,  63  Iowa  554,  19  N.  W.  660; 
State  v.  McCiintic,  TZ  Iowa  663,  35 
N.  W.  696;  State  v.  Froelick,  70  Iowa 
213,  30  N.  W.  487;  Gilliam  v.  State, 
I  Head.   (Tenn.)  39;  State  v.  Miller, 

93  Mo.  263,  6  S.  W.  57;  State  v. 
Boswell,  2  Dev.  (N.  Car.)  209,  210; 
State  V.  Jackson,  44  La.  Ann.  160, 
162,    10    So.    600;    Mitchell    v.    State, 

94  Ala.  68,  ID  So.  518;  Common- 
wealth V.  Lee,  143  Mass.  100,  9  N.  E. 
it;  People  v.  Webster,  139  N.  Y.  "j^,, 
34  N.  E.  730;  People  v.  Harrison,  93 
Mich.  594,  597,  53  N.  W.  725;  Crump 
V.  Commonwealth,  14  Ky.  L.  450,  20 


S.  W.  390;  Hauk  V.  State,  148  Ind. 
238,  46  N.  E.  127,  47  N.  E.  465 ;  Hen- 
derson V.  State,  Z7  Tex.  Cr.  79,  38 
S.  W.  617,  39  S.  W.  116;  State  v. 
Blackburn,  136  Iowa  743,  114  N.  W. 
531 ;  Sweatt  v.  State,  156  Ala.  85,  47  So. 
194;  State  V.  Sassaman,  214  Mo.  695, 
114  S.  W.  590;  State  V.  Thompson, 
127  Iowa  440,  103  N.  W.  2>77-  The 
fact  that  a  female  witness  is  a  pros- 
titute may  also  be  shown.  People  v. 
Mills,  94  Mich.  630,  54  N.  W.  488; 
Paul  V.  Paul,  2,7  N.  J.  Eq.  23,  25. 
While  the  fact  that  a  witness  is  of 
very  bad  moral  character  may  call 
for  a  careful  scrutiny  and  considera- 
tion of  his  testimony,  the  jury  are 
not  bound  in  law,  for  that  reason, 
to  disregard  it  if  they  believe  it  is 
in  itself  credible;  or  if  having  a 
doubt  of  his  credibility  they  believe 
he  is  corroborated  by  the  circum- 
stances or  by  the  credible  testimony 
of  other  witnesses.  People  v.  Mills, 
94  Mich.  630,  54  N.  W.  488;  Duncan 
v.  State,  97  Ga.  180,  25  S.  E.  182; 
State  v.  Van  Vliet,  92  Iowa  476,  (:^ 
N.  W.  748;  Douglass  v.  State  (Tex. 
1896),  22,  S.  W.  228;  Schanzenbach 
V.  Brough,  58  111.  App.  526. 


433  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    238 

mitted  larceny,  but  no  evidence  as  to  the  details  of  the  larceny 
will  be  received.-' 

The  court  should  instruct  on  the  impeachment  of  witnesses  by 
proof  of  their  bad  reputation,  but  an  instruction  which  in  effect 
tells  the  jury  that  the  witnesses  for  the  defendant  are  disreputable 
or  lawless  and  criminal  persons  because  evidence  has  been  intro- 
duced attacking  their  reputation  is  error.  Whether  the  proof  of 
bad  reputation  or  of  lawless  and  criminal  practices  on  the  part  of 
the  witnesses  has  impeached  their  testimony  is  for  the  jury  alone 
to  determine. ■** 

§  238.  Impeachment  of  the  adverse  witness  by  showing  con- 
tradictory statements — Necessity  for  foundation. — The  witness 
whom  it  is  desired  to  impeach  may,  upon  his  cross-examination, 
be  asked  if  he  has  not  made  statements  out  of  court  relevant  to 
the  guilt  of  the  accused  which  are  inconsistent  with  or  contra- 
dictory of  his  testimony  given  on  direct  examination.  All  the 
circumstances  attendant  upon  the  extra-judicial  declarations  must 
be  embodied  in  the  question.  If  he  does  not  admit  that,  upon  the 
particular  occasion  designated,  he  made  the  statement,  it  may  be 
proved  that  he  did  in  fact  make  it.-'' 

■  The  same  course  may  be  followed  with  a  witness  upon  his  di- 
rect examination  in  case  he  proves  hostile  to  the  party  calling 
him.      But  in  either  case  it  is  always  absolutely  essential  in  fair- 

^  State   V.    Sebastian,   215    Mo.    58,  Cr.    164,    105    S.    W.    796;    State    v. 

114  S.  W.  522.  Burns,  148  Mo.  167,  49  S.  W.  1005,  71 

-'  People  V.  Christensen,  85  Cal.  568,  Am.  St.  588 ;  Wilson  v.  United  States, 

24  Pac.  888;   State  v.  Lucas,  24  Ore.  5  Ind.  Ter.  610,  82  S.  W.  924;  Sher- 

168,    33    Pac.    538;    Smith    v.    United  rod  v.  State,  90  Miss.  856,  44  So.  813; 

States,  161  U.  S.  85,  40  Law  Ed.  626,  Ridgell  v.  State,  156  Ala.  10,  47  So.  71 ; 

16  Sup.  Ct.  483.  Jones   v.    State,    141    Ala.    55,   37   So. 

^  State  V.   Lewis,  44  La.  Ann.  958,  390 ;  State  v.  Lockhart,  188  Mo.  427, 

II  So.  572;  Lanasa  v.  State,  109  Md.  87   S.   W.  457;   Brown  v.   State,   142 

602,  71  Atl.  1058;  People  V.  Row,  135  Ala.  287,  38  So.  268;  Burton  v.  State, 

Mich.    S05,  98  N.   W.    13,   TO  Detroit  115  Ala.   i,   22  So.  585;    Richards   v. 

Leg.    N.    841;    People    v.    Tice,    115  Commonwealth,  107  Va.  881,  59  S.  E. 

IMich.  219,  73  N.  W.  108,  69  Am.  St.  1104;  Smith  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  27, 

560 ;  Pitts  V.  State,  140  Ala.  70,  37  So.  105  S.  W.  182 ;  People  v.  Yee  Foo,  4 

loi ;    State  v.    Darling,  202  Mo.    150,  Cal.  App.  730,  89  Pac.  450;  People  v. 

100  S.  W.  631 ;  Scott  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Feinberg,  237  111.  348,  86  N.  E.  584. 
28 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


238 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


434 


ness  to  the  witness  to  lay  a  foundation  for  contradicting-  him  by- 
bringing  to  his  attention  in  the  question  put  to  him,  clearly  and 
distinctly,  all  the  circumstances  of  time,  place  and  person  under 
which  the  contradictory  statements  were  made.^°  By  having  his 
attention  called  directly  to  the  exact  circumstances  under  which 
it  is  alleged  the  contradictory  or  inconsistent  statement  was  ut- 
tered, the  witness  is  protected  from  an  unfair  surprise.  He  has 
the  right  to  explain  the  contradiction.     When   his  memory  is 


^"^  People  V.  Chin  Hane,  io8  Cal.  597, 

41  Pac.  697;  Hester  v.  State,  103  Ala. 
83,  IS  So.  857;  People  v.  Bosquet,  116 
Cal.  75,  47  Pac.  879;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hosier,  135  Pa.  St.  221,  19  Atl. 
943;  Hoge  V.  People,  117  111.  35,  6  N. 
E.  796;  Aneals  v.  People,  134  111.  401, 
25  N.  E.  1022;  Carpenter  v.  State,  62 
Ark.  286,  36  S.  W.  900;  King  v. 
State,  77  Ga.  734;  Bruce  v.  State,  31 
Tex.  Cr.  590,  21  S.  W.  681 ;  Mont- 
gomery V.  Knox,  23  Fla.  595,  3  So. 
211;  State  V.  Turner,  36  S.  Car.  534, 
IS  S.  E.  602 ;  State  v.  Goodbier,  48 
La.  Ann.  770,  19  So.  755 ;  State  v. 
Delaneuville,  48  La.  Ann.  502,  19  So. 
SSo;  State  v.  Jones,  44  La.  Ann.  960, 
962,  II  So.  596;  Jones  v.  State,  65 
Miss.  179,  3  So.  379;  State  v.  Mc- 
Laughlin, 44  Iowa  82;  Kent  v.  State, 

42  Ohio  St.  426;  State  v.  Glynn,  51 
Vt.  577;  State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i, 
12  Pac.  318;  State  v.  Hunsaker,  16 
Ore.  497,  19  Pac.  605 ;  Cotton  v.  State, 
87  Ala.  75,  6  So.  396;  State  v.  Free- 
man, 43  S.  Car.  105,  20  S.  E.  974; 
Crossland  v.  State,  77  Ark.  537,  92  S. 
W.  776;  State  V.  Anderson,  120  La. 
331,  45  So.  267;  Coker  v.  State,  144 
Ala.  28,  40  So.  516;  Alford  v.  State, 
47 'Fla.  I,  36  So.  436;  State  v.  Mc- 
Gowan,  36  Mont.  422,  93  Pac.  552; 
Waller  v.  People,  209  111.  284,  70  N. 
E.  681;  People  V.  Mallon,  116  App. 
Div.  425,  loi  N.  Y.  Supp.  814,  20  N. 
Y.    Cr.    427;    affirmed    in    189    N.    Y. 


520,  81  N.  E.  1171 ;  Burton  v.  State, 
IIS  Ala.  I,  22  So.  585;  Brown  v. 
State,  46  Fla.  159,  35  So.  82;  State 
V.  Meyers,  120  La.  127,  44  So.  1008; 
Lanasa  v.  State,  109  Md.  602,  71 
Atl.  1058;  Commonwealth  v.  Smith, 
163  Mass.  411,  40  N.  E.  189.  Cf. 
contra,  People  v.  Shaw,  in  Cal. 
171,  43  Pac.  593.  See,  also,  cases  in 
Underhill  on  Evidence,  p.  S08,  note  i. 
The  witness  may  be  contradicted  by 
his  testimony  given  on  a  prior  trial  of 
the  same  indictment  if  he  asserts  that 
his  present  testimony  is  the  same  as 
that  previously  given.  Hudson  v. 
State,  28  Tex.  App.  323,  13  S.  W. 
388;  Brown  v.  State,  76  Ga.  623;  or 
by  his  testimony  at  the  coroner's  in- 
quest. State  V.  Merriman,  34  S.  Car. 
576,  13  S.  E.  328;  Moran  v.  People, 
163  111.  372,  45  N.  E.  230;  State  v. 
Taylor,  136  Mo.  66,  37  S.  W.  907; 
Williford  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  414,  37 
S.  W.  761 ;  State  v.  O'Brien,  18  Mont. 
I,  43  Pac.  1091,  or  by  his  deposition 
taken  before  the  examining  magis- 
trate. People  V.  Butler,  55  Mich.  408, 
409,  21  N.  W.  385;  Falkner  v.  State, 
151  Ala.  77,  44  So.  409,  or  tlae  grand 
jur}^  Bressler  v.  People,  117  111.  422, 
8  N.  E.  62 ;  Dean  v.  Commonwealth, 
25  Ky.  L.  1876,  78  S.  W.  1 1 12,  where 
a  member  of  the  grand  jury  was  al- 
lowed to  testify  to  contradict  a  wit- 
ness. 


435  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    238 

aroused  and  refreshed  by  these  details  he  may  be  able  to  show 
that  he  was  honestly  mistaken  on  the  former  occasion,  or  that 
the  persons  then  present  misunderstood  or  misquoted  him.  The 
impeached  witness  ought  to  be  permitted,  in  giving  his  evidence, 
to  state  any  facts  which  will  explain  or  reconcile  the  seemingly 
inconsistent  utterances  or  show  their  relation  to  one  another  and 
the  meaning  and  purpose  of  each.^^ 

If  the  witness  declares  he  does  not  remember  making  the  con- 
tradictory statements,  he  may  be  contradicted  at  once,  without 
further  foundation  for  their  introduction.^^ 

If  the  witness  admits  that  he  made  the  contradictory  state- 
ments it  is  not  then  competent  to  prove  the  statements  by  wit- 
nesses to  whom  they  were  made  or  who  overheard  them,^^ 

Both  the  admissions  and  the  confessions  of  the  accused  are 
admissible  against  him  as  a  part  of  the  evidence  for  the  prosecu- 
tion and  as  direct  evidence  of  guilt,  and  not  merely  to  contradict 
him  when  he  testifies  as  a  witness.  Hence,  the  fact  that  he  tes- 
tifies as  a  witness  and  denies  that  he  confessed  or  affirms  his  in- 
nocence does  not  render  it  necessary  to  lay  a  foundation  before 
introducing  any  of  his  contradictory  statements,  which  are  in 
form  or  substance  confessions  and  admissions,  as  in  the  case  of 
other  witnesses  who  are  to  be  impeached  by  contradiction.^*  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  accused  is  a  witness,  his  confession  is  not 
admissible  as  a  contradictory  statement  to  impeach  him  if  it  would 
not  be  admissible  as  a  confession. ^^ 

But  if  the  accused,  being  a  witness,  expressly  denies  on  cross- 
examination  that  on  a  prior  occasion  he  had  made  an  incriminat- 
ing statement  not  already  proven  by  the  prosecution  he  may  be 

^Bressler  v.  People,  117  111.  422,  8  145  Ala.  51,  40  So.  947;  Campos  v. 

N.  E.  62;  Henson  v.  State,  120  Ala.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  289,  97  S.  W.  100. 

316,  25  So.  23;    Brown  v.    State,  46  ^^  Bice  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  133,  too 

Fla.  159,  35  So.  82.  S.  W.  949- 

^"  Payne  v.  State,  60  Ala.  80;  Wag-  ^*  Klug  v.  State,  ^y  Ga.  734;  Lewis 

ncr  V.  State,  116  Ind.  181,  184,  18  N.  v.    State,  91    Ga.    168,    16   S.   E.  986; 

E.  833 ;  Billings  v.  State,  52  Ark.  303,  State  v.   Forsythe,  99  Iowa   i,  68  N. 

12  S.  W.  574;  Levy  v.  State,  28  Tex.  W.   446.     In   State   v.   Callahan,    100 

App.  203,  12  S.  W.  596,   19  Am.   St.  Minn.  63,  no  N.  W.  342,  a  foundation 

826;    Fuller   V.    State,   30  Tex.    App.  was  required  to  be  laid. 

559,   17   S.  W.    1 108;    Smith  v.    State  ''State  v.  Barrett,  40  Minn.  65,  74, 

(Tex.),  20  S.  W.  554;  Jones  v.  State,  41  N.  W.  459.     See  Underhill  on  Evi- 
dence, p.  509,  note  4. 


239  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  436 


contradicted  by  the  testimony  of  one  who  heard  liim.  His  in- 
criminating statement  being  in  form  either  a  confession  or  an  ad- 
mission is  properly  a  part  of  the  case  for  the  prosecution.  He  has 
a  right  to  contradict  it,  of  which  he  cannot  be  deprived  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  offered  out  of  its  regular  order.  It  is  error  to  re- 
fuse to  permit  him  to  attempt  to  show  by  other  witnesses  that  he 
never  made  such  an  incriminating  statement.^" 

And  in  conclusion  we  may  say  that  the  jury  have  a  right  to 
determine  what  effect  upon  the  credibility  of  the  \vitness  they 
shall  give  to  the  statement."'"  The  mere  fact  of  contradiction  is 
not  in  law'  sufficient  to  justify  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  truth  of 
all  the  testimony  of  the  Avitness  in  the  minds  of  the  jury.'"'' 

§  239.  Impeachment  by  contradictory  affidavits,  depositions 
and  other  writings. — The  rules  governing  impeachment,  by  con- 
tradictory statements,  as  above  set  forth,  are  equally  applicable 
whether  the  inconsistent  declarations  are  oral  or  are  contained  in 
affidavits  and  depositions,^''  or  in  publications  by  the  witness  on 
the  subject  to  which  his  testimony  relates.*" 

Thus  the  accused,  when  testifying,  or  any  w^itness  called  in  his 
behalf,  may  be  contradicted  by  the  evidence  as  stated  by  him  in 
the  affidavits  wdiich  were  made  and  used  by  the  accused  upon  a 
motion  for  a  continuance  or  postponement.*^ 

Contradictory  statements  contained   in  affidavits,   depositions 

''State    V.    Constantine,    48    Wash.  "  Hartford  v.  State,  96  Ind.  461,  468, 

218,  93  Pac.  317.  49  Am.  185. 

''Jones  V.  State,  145  Ala.  51,  40  So.  "Commonwealth  v.    Starr,  4  Allen 

947.  (Mass.)    301,   302;    Pledger  v.    State, 

'^Snyder  v.   State,   145  Ala.  33,  40  77   Ga.   242,   3    S.    E.    320;    State   v. 

So.  978.  Hayes,     78     Mo.     307;     People     v. 

'^  Gilyard  v.  State,  98  Ala.  59,  13  So.  Sweeney,  55  Mich.  586,  590,  22  N.  W. 

391;  State  V.  O'Brien,  18  Mont,  i,  43  50;  Weaver  v.  State,  S3  Ark.  119,  102 

Pac.  1091 ;  United  States  V.  Taylor,  35  S.   W.   713.     In  Behler  v.    State,   112 

Fed.  484.    See  also,  Sullivan  v.  Jeffer-  Ind.  140,  13  N.  E.  272,  the  court  says : 

son,  etc.,  Co.  133  Mo.  i,  34  S.  W.  566,  "There  is  nothing  giving  to  the  state- 

32  L.  R.  A.  167;  Fein  v.  Covenant  &c.  ments  in  an  affidavit   for  a  continu- 

Assn.,  60  111.  App.  274;  State  v.  Cater,  ance  of  a  privilege;  nor  is  there  any- 

100  Iowa  501,  69  N.  W.  880;  People  thing  which  impresses  upon  them  any 

v.   Smith,   114  App.  Div.  513,   100  N.  compulsory    or    confidential    feature. 

Y.    Supp.  259;    State  v.  Jennings,  48  The  affidavit  is  a  paper  belonging  to 

Ore.  483,  87  Pac.  524.  the  files,  public  in  its   character  and 

freely  executed." 


437  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    239 

and  other  formal  judicial  documents  are  obviously  to  be  consid- 
ered from  a  different  point  of  view,  so  far  as  their  impeaching 
character  is  concerned,  than  oral  statements. 

In  the  case  of  contradictory  writings,  it  is  manifestly  unfair 
to  the  witness  to  confront  him  with  an  affidavit  or  other  paper 
couched  in  formal  and  technical  phraseology.  The  language  of 
the  document  is  usually  not  his.  In  a  criminal  trial  the  affidavit 
or  other  legal  instrument  is  usually  prepared  by  the  clerk  of  the 
court,  as.  for  example,  in  the  case  of  a  complaint  or  affidavit  on  a 
preliminary  examination,  and,  though  the  affidavit  or  deposition 
may  have  been  read  over  to  the  affiant  before  he  signed  it,  by  the 
person  whom  the  witness  trusted,  or  whose  duty  it  was  to  frame 
his  ideas  in  proper  words,  he  may  have  most  likely  wholly  mis- 
understood the  true  meaning  of  a  writing  couched  in  such  tech- 
nical, and  to  him  novel  and  unusual,  language.*^ 

These  considerations  ought  to  be  kept  in  view  when  the  af- 
fidavit or  deposition  of  the  complaining  witness,  taken  down  by 
the  clerk  of  the  court,  as  a  basis  for  issuing  a  warrant  for  the 
arrest  of  the  accused,  is  employed  to  contradict  the  witness  at  the 
examination  before  the  magistrate  or  at  the  trial.*^ 

"Johnston    v.    Todd,    5    Beav.    597,  The  most  common  mode  is  that  of 

600.  filing    a    written    complaint    with    the 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Snee,  145  Mass.  examining  magistrate  followed  by  a 
351,  14  X.  E.  157.  A  proceeding  preliminary  examination.  It  is  usually 
against  an  alleged  criminal  may  be  necessary  that  the  complaint  shall 
begun  by  four  methods.  The  party  be  sworn  to  before  the  examining 
aggrieved  may  give  information  to  magistrate,  but  not  necessarily  writ- 
the  public  prosecuting  officer,  who  ten  out  by  him.  The  clerk,  if  any,  of 
prepares  an  indictment  and  brings  the  the  justice  of  the  peace  or  other  ex- 
evidence  orally  before  the  grand  jury,  amining  magistrate  usually  prepares 
The  accuser  may  file  a  written  com-  the  complaint  and  affidavit.  If  there 
plaint  on  oath  before  a  magistrate  be  no  clerk  the  complaint  is  prepared 
who  issues  a  warrant,  followed  by  the  by  the  magistrate  himself.  Except 
preliminary  examination  and  the  pos-  perhaps  in  the  cities,  the  magistrate 
sible  holding  of  the  accused  for  the  is  rarely  an  attorney  and  even  in  the 
action  of  the  grand  jury.  The  grand  cities  the  clerk  is  usually  a  layman, 
jury  may  act  upon  the  knowledge  It  follows  that  complaints  are  often 
of  any  of  its  members  that  a  crime  carelessly  and  unskillfully  drawn, 
has  been  committed  and  make  a  pre-  omitting  material  facts  and  including 
^cntment  against  the  accused.  The  much  that  is  immaterial ;  and  by  rea- 
prosecuting  attorney  may  file  an  in-  son  of  lack  of  intelligence  or  for 
formation  with  the  grand  jury.  other   causes,   the    statements    of   the 


§  240  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  438 

§  240.  Contradictory  writings  must  be  shown  to  the  witness  who 
is  to  be  impeached. — The  writing  by  which  it  is  proposed  to  con- 
tradict the  witness  must  be  shown  him  on  his  examination  so  that 
he  may  read  it,  or  it  may  be  read  to  him.  He  must  be  asked  if  he 
wrote  it  or  signed  it,  and  if  he  admits  this  his  attention  must  then 
be  called  to  the  inconsistencies.^*  If  he  admits  that  he  wrote  or 
signed  it,  the  whole  ought  to  be  read  to  the  jury  as  the  best  evi- 
dence of  what  the  writing  contains.  If  he  denies  that  he  is  the 
author,  the  fact  that  he  wrote  it  may  be  proved  by  proper  evi- 
dence.*^ The  stenographer  who  took  down  the  testimony  of  a 
witness  at  a  former  trial  to  impeach  the  witness  may  read  from 
his  notes  if  he  will  swear  that  they  are  accurate,  the  witness  hav- 
ing first  been  asked  if  he  has  testified  on  the  former  trial.*" 

§  241.  Contradiction  of  irrelevant  matters  not  permissible — 
Proof  of  confirmatory  statements. — The  rules  above  discussed, 
regulating  the  introduction  of  inconsistent  declarations  for  the 
purpose  of  contradicting  a  witness,  permit  him  to  be  contra- 
dicted only  as  regards  matters  relevant  to  the  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  prisoner.  Where  the  witness  is  confronted  with  contra- 
dictory or  inconsistent  declarations  made  out  of  court  and  pertain- 
ing solely  to  irrelevant  matters,  and  denies  that  he  is  their  author, 

accuser  may  be  incorrectly  understood  578,  581,  7  So.  130;  Cole  v.  State,  59 

and    transcribed    by    the    clerk.      So,  Ark.    50,   26    S.    W.    ZTl',    Gunter    v. 

also,  in  haste  the  clerk  may  omit  to  State,  83  Ala.  96,  3  So.  600;  State  v. 

read  the  complaint   and  procure  the  Leeper,  70  Iowa  748,  751,  30  N.  W. 

signature  of  the  accuser  to  statements  501 ;    State  v.   Baker,   136  Mo.   74,  Zl 

of  which  he  had  no  knowledge.  These  S.  W.  Rep.  810.     The  testimony  of  a 

facts  should  be  taken  into  considera-  witness,    taken    before    a    magistrate, 

tion    on    a   criminal    trial    where    the  or  at  a  coroner's  inquest  reduced  to 

prosecuting  witness  is  confronted  with  writing  and  signed  by  the  witness,  is 

contradictory  statements  in  or  omis-  not  admissible  unless  it  is  first  shown 

sions   from  his  complaint  before  the  to  him  and  his  attention  called  to  the 

examining  magistrate.  inconsistencies.     Simmons  v.  State,  z^ 

"  Gemmill    v.    State,    16    Ind.    App.  Fla.  387,  13  So.  896;  State  v.  O'Brien, 

154,  43  N.  E.  909;  Floyd  v.  State,  82  18    Mont,    i,   43    Pac.    1091,    44    Pac. 

Ala.  16,  2  So.  683;  People  v.  Ching,  399. 

74  Cal.  389,   16  Pac.  201;   Cooper  v.        *"  For  numerous  civil  cases  illustrat- 

State,  90  Ala.  641,  8  So.  821 ;  State  v.  ing  this  rule  see  Underbill  on  Ev.,  pp. 

Crow,    107    Mo.   341,    17    S.    W.   745;  510-512. 

State  V.  Steeves,  29  Ore.  85,  43   Pac.         "  Casey  v.    State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  392, 

947;   State  V.   Callegari,  41   La.  Ann.  97  S.  W.  496. 


439 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES, 


241 


his  replies  are  conclusive.  He  cannot  be  contradicted  on  that  point 
by  the  party  seeking  to  impeach  him.'*'  The  cases  are  not  har- 
monious upon  the  question  whether,  after  it  has  been  shown  that  a 
witness  has  made  contradictory  statements  out  of  court,  it  is  per- 
missible to  prove  upon  his  re-direct  examination  that  he  has  made 
other  statements  which  are  consistent  with  and  confirmatory  of  his 
testimony.  The  majority  of  the  cases  maintain  the  negative.'** 
\\'hen,  however,  it  appears  that  the  witness  is  probably  biased  in 
favor  of  the  party  calling  him  because  of  his  relation  to  him,  or 
on  account  of  his  relation  to  the  crime  which  is  under  investiga- 
tion, it  may  be  shown  that,  before  such  relation  existed,  the  wit- 
ness made  statements  confirmatory  of  his  testimony  now  given  in 
open  court.** 

§  242.    Previous   silence    as   impeachment. — A   witness   may   be 
impeached,  not  only  by  his  contradictory  or  inconsistent  state- 


"  Crawford  v.  State,  112  Ala.  i,  21 
So.  214;  State  V.  Conerly,  48  La. 
Ann.  1561,  21  So.  192;  Wilson  v. 
State,  z-]  Tex.  Cr.  64,  38  S.  W.  610; 
Reynolds  v.  State,  147  Ind.  3,  46  N. 
E.  31 ;  State  v.  Brown,  100  Iowa  50, 
69  N.  W.  277;  Carter  v.  State,  36 
Neb.  481,  54  N.  W.  853;  Hill  v.  State, 
91  Tenn.  521,  19  S.  W.  674;  State  v. 
Morris,  109  N.  Car.  820,  2  Am.  St. 
415,  13  S.  E.  877;  Commonwealth  v. 
Jones,  155  Mass.  170,  171,29  N.  E.  467; 
Commonwealth  v.  Fitzpatrick,  140 
Mass.  455,  5  N.  E.  272 ;  Welch  v.  State, 
104  Ind.  347,  351,  3  N.  E.  850;  Fordv. 
State,  112  Ind.  2)7Z,  384,  14  N.  E. 
241 ;  Huber  v.  State,  126  Ind.  185, 
189,  25  N.  E.  904;  People  v.  Green- 
wall,  108  N.  Y.  296,  15  N.  E.  404; 
State  V.  Dunn  (Oreg.  1909),  99  Pac. 
278;  Henson  v.  State,  120  Ala.  316, 
25  So.  23 ;  State  v.  Teachey,  134  N. 
Car.  656,  46  S.  E.  733;  Dillard  v. 
United  States,  72  C.  C.  A.  451,  141 
Fed.  303 ;  Justice  v.  Commonwealth, 
20  Ky.  L.  386,  46  S.  W.  499;  Mc- 
Knight  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  252,  95 
S.  W.  1056;  People  V.  Turner,  i  Cal. 


App.  420,  82  Pac.  397.  A  witness  can- 
not be  impeached  by  showing  that  out 
of  court  he  had  expressed  suspicions 
of  the  prisoner,  or  an  opinion  of  his 
guilt,  which  he  denies  on  cross-exam- 
ination. Welch  V.  State,  104  Ind.  347, 
351,  3  N.  E.  850;  People  v.  Stack- 
house,  49  Mich.  "](>,  77,  13  N.  W.  364; 
Commonwealth  v.  Snow,  iii  Mass. 
411. 

**  Sentell  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  260, 
30  S.  W.  226;  Goode  V.  State,  32 
Tex.  Cr.  505,  24  S.  W.  102;  Williams 
V.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  637,  7  S.  W. 
32,3;  People  V.  Doyell,  48  Cal.  85; 
Connor  v.  People,  18  Colo.  272>,  Z3 
Pac.  159,  2>^  Am.  St.  295;  Fallin  v. 
State,  83  Ala.  5,  3  So.  525;  State  v. 
Flint,  60  Vt.  304,  14  Atl.  178;  Lowe  v. 
State,  97  Ga.  792,  25  S.  E.  676; 
Holmes  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  352, 
106  S.  W.  1 160;  Burks  V.  State,  78 
Ark.  271,  93  S.  W.  983;  State  v.  Mc- 
Daniel,  68  S.  Car.  304,  47  S.  E.  384, 
102  Am.  St.  661 ;  State  v.  Houghton, 
45  Oreg.  no,  75  Pac.  887;  Rice  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  648,  100  S.  W. 
771 ;   Lounder  v.   State,  46  Tex.   Cr. 


§    242  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  44O 

ments,  but  also  by  proof  that  on  a  former  occasion,  under  cir- 
cumstances ^vhere  it  was  his  duty  to  state  the  whole  truth,  he 
omitted  to  state  material  and  relevant  facts  which  he  now  states.*'"* 
Thus,  it  may  be  proved  that  a  witness  omitted  to  state  facts  at  the 
preliminary  examination  which  he  testifies  to  on  the  trial.'"'"  But, 
for  his  silence  to  be  admissible,  it  must  apj^ear  from  all  the  cir- 
cumstances that  it  was  his  duty  to  tell  the  whole  truth.  The  wit- 
ness must  be  permitted  to  explain  his  previous  ignorance  or  si- 
lence, and  to  show  that  his  present  forgetfulness  or  past  ignorance 
was  real  and  not  assumed. 

He  may  testify  that  the  occasion  of  his  silence  was  a  proceed- 
ing in  a  court  of  justice  during  which  he  was  not  questioned 
upon  the  matter  at  all.''^^  The  denial  by  the  witness  that  he 
omitted  any  fact  on  a  previous  examination  may  be  dispensed 
with.  If  he  says  he  does  not  remember,  the  party  seeking  to  im- 
peach may  prove  the  omission  to  testify.^" 

The  witness  may  himself  testify  that  he  actually  forgot  the 
facts  upon  the  earlier  occasion, ^^  or  suppressed  them  through 
fear,^*  and,  in  a  word,  to  any  fact  showing  that  his  silence  or  con- 
cealment was  in  good  faith  and  prompted  by  right  motives.'" 

§  243.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show  the  general  reputation  for 
truthfulness  of  a  witness  who   has   been   impeached. — The  party 

121,  79  S.  W.  552;   State  V.   Gilliam,  "  Babcock  v.   People,   13  Colo.  515, 

66  S.  Car.  419,  45  S.  E.  6;   State  v.  22  Pac.  817;  State  v.  Vickers,  47  La. 

Sharp,    183   Mo.  715,  82   S.   W.    134;  Am.    1574,    18    So.   639;    Territory   v. 

State  V.  Thomason,  i  Jones  (N.  Car.)  Clayton,  8  Mont,  i,  19  Pac.  293;  Hy- 

274;  Thompson  v.  State,  38  Ind.  39;  den   v.    State,   31    Tex.    Cr.   401,  404, 

State  V.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304,  14  Atl.  178.  20  S.  W.  764. 

But  see  contra.  Ball  v.  State,  31  Tex.  "^  Brown  v.  State,  79  Ala.  61,  63.    It 

Cr.  214, 20  S.  W.  363 ;  Hobbes  v.  State,  may   be   shown   that   his   prior   state- 

•133  Ind.  404,  32  N.  E.  1019,  18  L.  R.  ment  was  omitted  from  the  record  of 

A.   774;    State   V.    McKinney,    11 1    N.  the  former  proceeding.    United  States 

Car.  683,  16  S.  E.  235,  and  civil  cases  v.  Ford,  33  Fed.  861. 

fully  cited  in  Underbill  on  Ev.,  page  ^^  State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  Car.  534,  15 

512.  S.  E.  602. 

^"  Brown  v.   State,  79  Ala.  61,  62;  "People  v.  Chapleau,  121  N.  Y.  266, 

Commonwealth    v.     Harrington,     152  24  N.  E.  469. 

Mass.  488,  25  N.  E.  835.  "  Miller  v.  State,  97  Ga.  653,  25  S. 

°°  People  V.   Wirth,    108   Mich.   307,  E.  366. 
66  N.  W.  41 ;  Cook  v.  State,  124  Ga. 
653,  53  S.  E.  104. 


441  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  8    243 

whose  witness  has  been  directly  impeached  has  the  right  to  intro- 
duce evidence  to  overcome  any  presumption  that  may  have 
arisen  that  he  is  not  credible.  Not  only  may  he  introduce  cumu- 
lative evidence  to  corroborate  him,  but  he  may  attempt  to  prove 
that  his  general  reputation  for  truthfulness  is  good.  It  has  been 
held  that  a  party  should  not  be  permitted  to  prove  that  his  witness 
was  a  man  whose  reputation  for  veracity  was  good,  where  the 
impeachment  consisted  wholly  of  evidence  that  the  witness  had 
made  contradictory  statements  out  of  court.^®  But  the  majority 
of  the  cases  repudiate  this  distinction.  It  is  now  held  almost  uni- 
versally that  evidence  to  show  that  the  reputation  of  the  witness 
for  veracity  is  good  may  be  introduced  whenever  the  evidence  of 
the  witness  has  been  impeached  in  any  way,  whether  by  his  con- 
tradictory declarations  or  by  a  direct  attack  upon  his  character." 

But  evidence  that  a  witness  enjoys  a  reputation  for  truthfulness 
is  not  receivable  to  strengthen  his  testimony  merely  because  he 
has  been  contradicted  by  an  adverse  witness,^*  or  because  he  has 
been  shaken  or  confused  on  cross-examination.^^ 

But  it  has  been  held  in  Texas  that  a  witness  for  the  prosecu- 
tion, who  had  been  subjected  to  a  most  searching  cross-examina- 
tion having  a  strong  tendency  to  discredit  him  before  the  jury, 
might  have  his  credibility  sustained  by  the  introduction  on  the 
part  of  the  state  of  proof  that  his  reputation  for  truth  and  veracity 
were  good,  though  his  character  had  not  been  directly  attacked 
and  no  contradiction  had  been  shown.*'"  A  witness  M'ho  testifies 
that  the  accused  has  a  bad  reputation  for  truth  and  veracity  may 
be  contradicted  by  proving  that  on  prior  occasions  he  had  made 
an  inconsistent  statement.®^ 

^^  Brown  v.  IMooers,  6  Gray  (Mass.)  ham  v.  State,  153  Ala.  38,  45  So.  580; 

451-  State  v.  Christopher,  134  Mo.  App.  6, 

"Clem  V.  State,  33  Ind.  418;  Surles  114   S.   W.  549.    For  civil   cases  see 

V.    State,   89    Ga.    167,    15    S.    E.   38;  Underhill  on  Evidence,  §  352. 

Griffin    v.    State,   2(5  Tex.    App.    157,  ^^  Saussy  v.  South  Florida  R.  Co.,  22 

9  S.  W.  459,  8  Am.  St.  460;  Harris  Fla.  327;  Britt  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
v.  State,  30  Ind.  131 ;  State  v.  Jones,  215,  17  S.  W.  255. 

29  S.  Car.  201,  7  S.  E.  296;  ]\Iagee  v.  ^"Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  Vt.  601, 

People,   139  111.   138,  28  N.   E.    1077;  23  Atl.  697;  contra,  State  v.  Rice  (S. 

State  v.  Fruge,  44  La.  Ann.  165,  167,  Car.,  1897),  37  S.  E.  452. 

10  So.  621;  People  v.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  ""Harris  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  338, 
61 ;    Tipton    v.    State,    30    Tex.    App.  94  S.  W.  227. 

530,  17  S.  W.  1097;  Commonwealth  v.  '"  Norris  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  166, 
Ingraham,  7  Gray.   (Mass.)  46;  Gra-     106  S.  W.  136. 


§  244  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  442 

§  244.  Limitations  upon  the  right  to  ask  questions  which  dis- 
grace the  witness. — An  important  distinction  must  be  noted  as 
regards  the  competency  of  questions  the  answers  to  which  involve 
facts  which  tend  to  disgrace  the  witness.  The  mere  fact  that  a 
witness  on  his  direct  examination  must,  in  order  to  answer  a 
relevant  question  truthfully,  make  an  admission  which,  while  it 
may  not  tend  to  criminate  him,  may  disgrace  him  or  lower  him  in 
the  estimation  of  his  friends  and  acquaintances,  is  not  sul^cient  to 
exclude  the  answer.  Thus  a  woman  or  child  may  testify  in  rape 
that  she  had  sexual  intercourse  with  the  accused  over  an  objec- 
tion that  this  was  evidence  that  would  degrade  her.''-  It  would 
be  not  only  unjust  but  absurd,  particularly  in  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion, to  close  the  mouth  of  a  witness  for  that  reason  where  the 
liberty  and  perhaps  the  life  of  an  innocent  person  may  depend 
upon  his  answer.  His  answer  will  not  subject  him  to  any  crimi- 
nal or  civil  liability.  It  may,  on  the  other  hand,  be  absolutely 
essential  to  a  proper  administration  of  justice.  Hence  a  witness 
will  be  compelled  to  give  relevant  evidence,  however  greatly  it 
may  degrade,  disgrace  or  humiliate  him,  provided  his  reply  will 
tend  to  throw  light  upon  the  question  at  issue.'^^ 

Other  considerations  may  be  invoked  where  the  question  which 
tends  to  disgrace  the  witness  is  asked  while  he  is  under  cross- 
examination.  The  policy  of  the  law  does  not  permit,  or  at  least 
does  not  encourage,  cross-examination  upon  matters  wholly  ir- 
relevant merely  for  the  purpose  of  subsequent  contradiction. 
Hence,  if  the  witness,  while  being  cross-examined,  is  asked, 
"Have  you  ever  been  convicted  of  burglary?"  and  replies  that  he 
has  not,  the  interrogating  party  is  bound  by  his  answer. 

But  objections  to  evidence  because  of  its  irrelevancy  are  to  be 
taken  by  a  party,  not  by  the  witness.  It  is  impossible  to  formulate 
any  general  rule  by  which  can  be  determined  the  relevancy  of 
questions  upon  cross-examination.  The  matter  is  largely  in  the 
judicial  discretion.     It  may  with  safety  be  said  that  the  court 

"State  V.  George,  214  Mo.  262,  113  INIiller,  72  IMich.  265,  40  N.  W.  429,  16 

S.  W.  1 1 16.  Am.    St.   536;    Coleman   v.    State,   53 

'"People  V.   Mather,  4  Wend.    (N.  Tex.  Cr.  578,  in  S.  W.  ion;  Leach 

Y.)  229,  250,  254;  21  Am.  Dec.  I22n;  v.   Commonwealth,   33   Ky.    1016,   112 

Ex  parte,  Boscowitz,  84  Ala.   463.  4  S.  W.  595. 
So.  279,  5  Am.   St.  384;  Johnston  v. 


443  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    245 

ought  to  interfere  whenever  necessary  to  protect  the  witness  from 
needless  insult  and  contumely,  and  to  forbid  impertinent  ques- 
tions which  are  altogether  irrelevant,  and  have  been  asked  merely 
to  surprise,  annoy  and  confuse  the  witness,  and  to  cause  him  to 
lose  his  temper."* 

Subject  to  this  limitation  the  law  regards  as  relevant  all  facts 
which  tend  to  illustrate  the  credibility  of  the  witness  or  which 
may  enable  the  jury  to  determine  the  weight  of  his  testimony. 

§  245.  Impeachment  by  showing  social  connections,  occupation 
aiid  manner  of  living. — The  previous  conduct  of  the  witness,  his 
life  and  associations,  whether  irreproachable  or  the  reverse,  are 
all  relevant.  Every  person  possesses,  to  a  certain  extent,  the 
power  of  selecting  his  domicile  and  avocation.  So  the  choice  of 
his  business  and  social  connections,  the  circle  of  his  friends  and 
acquaintances,  and  his  general  mode  and  course  of  living  are 
largely  in  his  own  control.  If,  therefore,  he  voluntarily  associates 
with  those  who  are  engaged  in  disreputable  pursuits ;  or  if  he  is 
addicted  to  disgraceful  or  vicious  practices,  or  follows  an  occupa- 
tion which  is  loathsome  and  vile,  though  not  perhaps  criminal; 
no  rule  of  law  prevents  such  facts  from  being  shown  to  determine 
his  credibility,  by  questions  put  to  him  upon  his  cross-examina- 
tion. And  usually  he  may  be  questioned  as  to  specific  facts,  in 
his  past  career,  which  .may  tend  to  his  disgrace,  provided  they  are 
not  too  remote  in  point  of  time.*^^ 

But  it  is  generally  held  that  a  female  witness  cannot  be  asked 
if  she  is  a  professional  prostitute  or  a  dissolute  woman,  or  if  she 
keeps  a  disorderly  house.*^"    And,  as  a  rule,  compelling  a  witness 

"Commonwealth  v.  Shaw,  4  Cush.  v.  Miller,  100  Mo.  606,  13  S.  W.  832, 

(Mass.)  593;  Commonwealth  v.  Sack-  1051 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  117  Mo.  181,  22 

et,   22    Pick.    (Mass.)    394;    State  v.  S.  W.   1103;  People  v.  Casey,  72  N. 

Rogers,  31  Mont,  i ;  T]  Pac.  293.  Y.  393 ;  Reg.  v.  Burke,  8  Cox  C.  C.  44; 

"  Warren  V.  Commonwealth,  99  Ky.  People  v.   Giblin,   115   N.  Y.   196,  21 

370,  35  S.  W.  1028,  18  Ky.  Law  141;  N.  E.  1062,  4  L.  R.  A.  757;  State  v. 

Clayton  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  489,  21  Hilsabeck,  132  Mo.  348,  34  S.  W.  38; 

S.  W.  255;  Carroll  v.  State,  32  Tex.  State  v.  Moran,  216  Mo.  550,  115  S. 

Cr.  431,  24  S.  W.  100,  40  Am.  St.  786;  W.    1126;    Dyer   v.    State    (Tex.   Cr. 

Roberts    v.    Commonwealth,    14    Ky.  1903),  ']^  S.  W.  456. 
Law   219,   20    S.    W.    267;    Ryan    v.        ""  Holtz  v.  State,  76  Wis.  99,  44  N. 

People,  79  N.  Y.  593;  State  v.  Phil-  W.   1107,   ttto;   Stayton  v.   State,  32 

pot,  97  Iowa  365,  66  N.  W.  730;  State  Tex.  Cr.  ZZ,  22  S.  W.  38;  Retching- 


g  245  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE,  444 

to  answer  degrading  or  disgracing  questions  is  largely  a  matter 
of  judicial  discretion.*^" 

Thus,  for  example,  the  witness  may  be  compelled  to  answer 
the  question,  "How  long  since  you  lived  with  your  wife?''  The 
facts  that  a  man  had  abandoned  his  family,  has  no  permanent 
place  of  abode  and  has  become  a  tramp,  are  very  material  upon 
his  credibility.''*'  So  it  may  be  shown  by  cross-examining  a  wit- 
ness that  he  has  sought  to  bribe  another  witness,"^  or  otherwise 
to  fabricate  evidence,""  or  that  he  had  been  instructed  what  to 
say  upon  the  witness  stand, "^  or  had  offered  to  leave  the  state  if 
paid  for  doing  so." 

Now  that  an  ex-convict  or  a  person  convicted  of  a  felony  is 
competent  as  a  witness,  it  remains  to  inquire  to  what  extent  the 
conviction  may  be  shown  as  impeachment.  As  a  matter  of  ordi- 
nary observation  it  is  clear  to  most  persons  that  the  mere  fact 
that  a  witness  has  been  convicted  of  an  infamous  crime,  or,  in  fact, 
of  any  offense,  will  not  prevent  him  from  telling  the  truth  or 
from  being  believed  in  a  case  w'here  he  has  no  motive  to  deceive. 
It  is  not  usually  the  facts  of  a  man's  past  which  prompt  him  to 
give  false  testimony,  except  where  the  circumstances  of  the  past 
create  his  present  motives.  Thus,  it  might  be  that  a  conviction 
or  even  a  prosecution  brought  about  by  a  person  against  whom 
the  witness  is  testifying  would  create  prejudice  against  that  per- 
son, and  the  convict  witness  could  not  fairly  and  truthfully  testify 
against  him.  Ordinarily  this  is  not  the  case.  The  rule  that  a 
prior  conviction  may  be  shown  to  impeach  a  witness  which  is 

man  v.  State,  6  Wis.  417;  La  Beau  v.  64  ]\Iich.  702,  31  X.  W.  590;  Browder 
People,  34  N.  Y.  223,  230.  Contra,  v.  State,  102  Ala.  164,  14  So.  895. 
State  V.  Hack,  118  ]\Io.  92,  23  S.  W.  "' Yanke  v.  State,  51  Wis.  464,  468, 
1089;  Tla-Koo-Y-et-Lee  v.  United  8  X.  W.  276;  Roberts  v.  Common- 
States,  167  U.  S.  274,  42  Law  ed.  166,  wealth,  14  Ky.  L.  219,  20  S.  W.  267. 
17  S.  Ct.  85s;  State  V.  Romero,  117  °' State  v.  Hack,  118  Mo.  92,  23  S. 
La.  1003,  42  So.  482;  Swint  v.  State,  W.  1089. 

154  Ala.  46,  45  So.  901.    But  see.  State  '"England   v.    State,   89   Ala.   76,  8 

V.  Boyd,  178  Mo.  2;  76  S.  W.  979,  in  So.  146. 

which  case  the  witness  was  permitted  "  State  v.  Tall,  43  Minn.  273,  276,  45 

to  be  asked  about  her  child  being  born  N.  W.  449 ;  Boulden  v.  State,  102  Ala. 

out  of  wedlock.  78,  15  So.  341. 

"Commonwealth  v.  McDonald,  no  "Jenkins  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  201, 

Mass.  405;  State  v.  Hobgood,  46  La.  29  S.  W.  1078. 
Ann.  855,  15  So.  406;  People  v.  Carr, 


445  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  S    245 

imbedded  in  the  statutes  of  the  various  states  is  a  survival 
of  the  rule  that  a  prior  conviction  was  an  insurmountable  objec- 
tion to  the  competency  of  the  witness.  The  modern  rule  is  that 
the  conviction  of  an  infamous  crime,  i.  c,  a  crime  which  at  com- 
mon law  would  have  rendered  the  witness  incompetent  or  of  a 
crime  involving  great  moral  turpitude,  may  be  proved  to  impeach 
the  credibility  of  the  witness.'^ 

After  the  witness  has  admitted  or  it  is  proved  that  he  is  a  con- 
vict his  credibility  cannot  be  sustained  by  proving  that  he  was 
unjustly  convicted.'^  Nor  is  a  conviction  of  an  infamous  crime 
inadmissible  because  the  judgment  of  conviction  has  been  ap- 
pealed from  and  the  appeal  is  still  pending.'^^  But  a  conviction 
of  a  misdemeanor  cannot  be  shown/''  nor  should  the  court  permit 
a  question  to  the  witness  as  to  whether  he  has  ever  been  arrested 
or  indicted.'^  These  facts  are  immaterial,  for  even  innocent  per- 
sons are  arrested  and  are  subject  to  indictment. 

Under  the  statute,  which  permits  a  conviction  of  an  infamous 
crime  to  be  shown,  a  conviction  of  a  statutory  felony  which  was 
not  a  crime  at  common  law  has  been  received."'' 

If  it  appears  that  one  or  more  of  the  witnesses  is  a  convict,  the 
accused  is  entitled  to  an  instruction  on  the  effect  of  this  fact  on 
the  credibility  of  these  witnesses.  It  is  proper  to  instruct  the  jury 
that  they  are  not  to  disregard  the  evidence  of  a  convict  merely 

"Fuller   V.    State,    147   Ala.   35,   41  '^Viberg  v.   State,   138  Ala.    100,  35 

So.  774;  Wheeler  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  So.  53. 

325,  61  S.  E.  409;  Martin  v.  Common-  "Wells   v.   Commonwealth,  30  Ky. 

wealth,  25  Ky.  L.  1928,  78  S.  W.  1104;  L.    504,    99    S.    W.    218;    Wheeler    v. 

State  V.   Powell,   5   Penn.    (Del.)    24,  State,  4  Ga.  App.  325,  61  S.  E.  409. 

61  Atl.  966;  Rollings  V.  State  (Ala.),  "  Mullins  v.  Commonwealth,  25  Ky. 

49  So.  329;  Wells  V.  Commonwealth,  L.  2044,  79  S.  W.  258;  Ross  v.  State, 

30  Ky.  L.  504,  99  S.  W.  218;  State  v.  I39    Ala.    144,   36    So.    718;    State   v. 

Griggsby,    117   La.    1046,   42    So.  497.  Barrett,    117    La.    1086,    42    So.    513; 

The  proof  of  conviction  in  most  cases  (arrest)    Starling  v.    State,  89   Miss. 

is    merely    a    convenient    pretext    on  328,   42    So.   798;    Hays   v.    State,   47 

which  counsel  can  abuse  the  witness  Tex.  Cr.  149,  82  S.  W.  511. 

by  describing  him  as  "an  ex-convict,"  "Fuller  v.  State,  147  Ala.  35,  41  So. 

in  his  summing  up ;   Caples  v.    State  774.     See,  contra,  as  to  an  act  which, 

(Okla.  Cr.  App.,  1909),  104  Pac.  493.  under  a  statute,  may  under  some  cir- 

^*  Fuller   v.    State,    147   Ala.    35,   41  cumstances    be    a    misdemeanor    and 

So.  774.  under   others,    a    felony.      Gordon    v. 

State,  140  Ala.  29,  36  So.  1009. 


§    246  CRIAIINAL    EVIDENCE.  446 

because  he  is  a  convict,  but  that  they  must  weigh  it,  and  consider 
it  according  to  the  rules  of  evidence ;  and  that  in  so  considering  it, 
they  may  take  into  consideration  the  conviction  of  the  witness  as 
bearing  upon  his  credibiHty,  but  that  they  should  determine  the 
credibility  of  convict  witnesses  upon  the  same  consideration  as 
that  of  any  other  witnesses.'*'' 

§  246.  When  and  how  previous  imprisonment  or  conviction  of 
crime  may  be  shown. — To  question  the  witness  on  cross-examina- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  from  his  own  lips  if  he  has 
ever  been  convicted  of,  or  imprisoned  for,  crime,  is  not  usually 
permitted,  in  the  absence  of  statute.®^  The  fact  of  conviction  or 
of  incarceration  is  always  of  record.  Hence,  when  either  fact  is 
directly  in  issue,  it  must  be  proved  by  the  best  evidence  of  which  it 
is  susceptible.  A  transcript  of  the  prison  register,  or  of  the  rec- 
ord of  conviction,  ought  to  be  produced.*" 

A  witness  cannot  be  asked  if  he  has  been  convicted  of  a  crime 
in  a  particular  court  where  the  statutes  permit  him  to  be  exam- 
ined only  as  to  certain  infamous  crime.^^  The  question  is  gen- 
erally put  to  a  witness  in  the  following  form,  "Have  you  ever 
been  convicted  of  a  felony?"  or  "Have  you  ever  been  in  state's 
prison  ?"  or  some  other  similar  question  of  this  character.®*  It  is 
always  proper  to  permit  the  witness  who  is  asked  whether  he  was 
convicted  to  state,  in  connection  with  the  admission  that  he  was 

*°  People  V.  Putman,  129  Cal.  258,  61  436,  15  N.  E.  33;  Saxon  v.  State,  96 

Pac.  961;  People  v.  McLane,  60  Cal.  Ga.  739,  23  S.  E.  116;  Commonwealth 

412;   State  V.  Hubbard,  201   Mo.  639,  v.   Gorham,  99   Mass.   420;    Green   v. 

100  S.  W.  586.  State,  125  Ga.  742,  54  S.  E.  724;  Gor- 

*^  Fuller  V.    State,    147   Ala.   35,  41  don  v.  State,  140  Ala.  29,  36  So.  1009; 

So.  774.    Section  1796,  Code  1896.  O'Donnell  v.   People,  224  111.  218,  79 

*^Boyd  V.   State,  94  Tenn.   505,  29  N.  E.  639;  James  v.  United  States,  7 

S.  W.  901 ;   State  v.  Farmer,  84  Me.  Ind.  T.  250,   104  S.  W.  607 ;   People 

436,  24  Atl.  98s;   Driscoll  v.   People,  v.  Cascone,   185  N.  Y.  317,  78  N.  E. 

47    Mich.    413,   417,    II    N.    W.    221;  287;  McKevitt  v.  People,  208  111.  460, 

State  V.   Minor,    117   Mo.   302,  22  S.  70    N.     E.    693;     Commonwealth    v. 

W.   1085;   Chambless  v.   State    (Tex.,  Walsh,  196  Mass.  369,  82  N.  E.  19,  124 

1894),  24  S.  W.  899;  State  V.  Alexis,  Am.  St.  559. 

45  La.  Ann.  973,  13  So.  394;  Murphy  *^  Williams  v.  State,  144  Ala.  14,  40 

V.  State,  108  Ala.  10,  18  So.  557 ;  Com-  So.  405. 

monwealth  V.  Sullivan,  150  Mass.  315,  ***  Dodds  v.   State    (Miss.    1908),  45 

23  N.  E.  47 ;  Kirby  v.  People,  123  111.  So.  863. 


447 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


§    247 


convicted,  that  he  was  granted  a  new  trial  and  acquitted  or  was 
pardoned.®^  And  finally,  in  Texas  a  conviction  of  crime  is  not  ad- 
missible to  impeach  a  witness  unless  of  comparatively  recent 
date.**' 

But  sometimes  by  statute  it  is  permitted  to  ask  the  witness  if 
he  has  ever  been  convicted  of  crime.*^  In  case  the  conviction  or 
imprisonment  is  denied  by  the  witness,  it  must  be  proved  by  a 
copy  of  the  record.*^ 

§  247.  Incriminating  questions. — No  witness  can  be  required  or 
compelled  to  answer  a  question,  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  it 
seems  evident  that  to  answer  it  truthfully  would  tend  to  criminate 
him,  or  even  subject  him  to  the  danger  of  a  criminal  prosecution.*^ 

Whether  the  question  is  wholly  unanswered,  or  partly  answered 


^  Thompson  v.  United  States,  30 
App.  D.  C.  352;  O'Donnell  v.  People, 
no  111.  App.  250. 

^  Casey  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  392, 
97  S.  W.  496;  Busby  V.  State,  48  Tex. 
Cr.  83,  86  S.  W.  1032. 

"State  V.  O'Brien,  8r  Iowa  88,  93, 
46  N.  W.  752,  861 ;  People  v.  Hall,  48 
Mich.  482,  12  N.  W.  665,  42  Am.  477 ; 
People  V.  Rodrigo,  69  Cal.  601,  11  Pac. 
481 ;  State  v.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90,  12 
Pac.  406;  State  v.  Adamson,  43  Minn. 
196,  45  N.  W.  152;  Marion  v.  State, 
16  Neb.  349,  20  N.  W.  289;  State  v. 
Miller,  100  Mo.  606,  13  S.  W.  832, 
1051 ;  State  v.  McGuire,  15  R.  I.  23, 
22  Atl.  1 1 18;  State  V.  Merriman,  34 
S.  Car.  16,  12  S.  E.  619;  Common- 
wealth V.  Morgan,  107  Mass.  199,  205 ; 
Helm  V.  State,  67  Miss.  562,  7  So.  487 ; 
State  V.  Martin,  124  Mo.  514,  28  S. 
W.  12;  State  V.  Pratt,  121  Mo.  566, 
26  S.  W.  556;  People  V.  Tubbs,  147 
Mich.  I,  no  N.  W.  132;  State  v.  Bar- 
rington,  198  Mo.  23,  95  S.  W.  235; 
Koch  V.  State,  126  Wis.  470,  106  N. 
W.  531;  Fuller  v.  State,  147  Ala.  35, 
4:  So.  774. 

''*  State  V.   Saucr,  42  Minn.  258,  44 


N.  W.  115;  State  v.  McGuire,  15  R. 
I.  23,  22  Atl.  1 1 18;  People  V.  Carolan, 
71  Cal.  195,  12  Pac.  52;  State  v.  Wyse, 
33  S.  Car.  582,  12  S.  E.  556;  Titus  v. 
State,  117  Ala.  16,  23  So.  77;  Under- 
bill on  Ev.,  p.  517,  note  3,  §  354.  These 
statutes  are  construed  strictly.  Where 
the  statute  permits  proof  of  a  convic- 
tion of  any  crime,  a  conviction  of 
either  felony  or  misdemeanor  may  be 
shown.  Helm  v.  State,  67  Miss.  562, 
7  So.  487;  State  V.  Sauer,  42  Minn. 
258,  44  N.  W.  115;  Commonwealth 
V.  Ford,  146  Mass.  131,  15  N.  E.  153; 
State  V.  Brown,  100  Iowa  50,  69  N. 
W.  277. 

*°  Commonwealth  v.  Trider,  143 
Mass.  180,  9  N.  E.  Sio;  State  v.  Pan- 
coast  (N.  Dak.,  1896),  67  N.  W.  1052; 
Temple  v.  Commonwealth,  75  Va. 
892;  Stevens  v.  State,  50  Kan.  712,  32 
Pac.  350;  Minters  v.  People,  139  111. 
363,  29  N.  E.  45 ;  People  v.  Botkin 
(Cal.  App.  1908),  98  Pac.  861.  Under- 
bill on  Ev.,  p.  519,  note  11.  This  rule 
is  also  applicable  to  the  production  of 
l)0()ks  and  papers  which  will  incrim- 
inalc.  Lamson  v.  Boyden,  160  Hi.  O13, 
43  N.  E.  781,  aff'g,  57  111.  App.  232. 


§  247  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  44S 

and  the  witness  objects  to  going  any  further,  is  immaterial.  If 
the  answer,  though  not  embracing  a  full  confession  of  criminal 
liability,  merely  forms  "one  link  in  the  chain  of  testimony  which 
would  convict  him,"  the  witness  may  withhold  it."" 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  without  request,  to  instruct  the  wit- 
ness that  he  need  not  answer.  He  may  then  answer,  if  he  chooses 
to  do  so,  and  if.  having  been  judicially  informed  of  his  legal  pre- 
rogative of  silence,  he  answers  the  question  fully,  he  may  be  com- 
pelled to  divulge  every  detail  of  the  incriminating  transaction."^ 

The  witness  cannot  be  compelled  to  explain  in  detail  how  the 
answer  required  would  tend  to  incriminate  him  in  order  to  enjoy 
the  privilege  of  refusing  to  answer.  It  is  sufficient  if  he  swears 
that  he  believes  that  his  answer  will  have  that  effect.''-  Whether 
the  question  calls  for  an  answer  which  will  tend  to  incriminate  the 
Avitness  is  for  the  court  to  determine."^ 

The  witness  must  answer,  though  he  shall  sw^ear  that  he  be- 
lieves his  answer  will  incriminate  him,  if,  from  all  the  circum- 
stances, and  from  the  character  of  the  question  and  the  answer 
required,  it  shall  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  that  any 
possible  answer  he  may  make  will  not  have  that  effect.  If  there 
is  no  reasonable  ground  for  supposing  that  he  will  incriminate 
himself  he  ought  to  answer."*  When  the  danger  to  the  witness  is 
apparent  he  must  be  allowed  a  large  discretion  in  remaining 
silent."^     The  accused  who  voluntarily  becomes  a  witness  in  his 

*"  Where    evidence,   sought    from    a  ""People  v.    Mather,  4  Wend.    (X. 

witness  in  a  criminal  case,  has  a  ten-  Y.)   229,  252-254,  21  Am.  Dec.  I22n; 

dency  to  incriminate  him  or  to  estab-  Bellinger  v.  People,  8  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

lish   a  link   in   a   chain   of    evidence  595;  State  v.  Bond,  12  Idaho  424,  86 

which  may  lead  to  his  conviction,  or  Pac.  43. 

if  the  proposed  evidence  will  disclose  ^^  Ex    parte,    Irvine,    74    Fed.    954; 

the  names  of  persons  upon  whose  tes-  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.    (N.  Y.) 

timony  the  witness  might  be  convicted  229,  252-254,  21  Am.  Dec.  I22n ;  State 

of  a  criminal  offense,  or  will  expose  v.  Thaden,  43  Minn.  253,  45   N.   W. 

him    to    penalties    or    forfeitures,    he  447;   State  v.  Tall,  43  Minn.  273,  45 

cannot  be  compelled  to  answer.     Peo-  N.   W.   449;   Commonwealth   v.    Bell, 

pie  v.  Argo,  237  111.  173,  86  N.  E.  679.  145  Pa.  St.  374,  22  Atl.  641-644. 

"'Williams  v.  State,  98  Ala.  52,   13  "Forbes   v.   Willard,   37   How.    Pr. 

So.  333;  Commonwealth  v.  Pratt,  126  (N.  Y.)    193;  Lothrop  v.  Roberts,  16 

Mass.  462 ;   State  v.  Van  Winkle,  80  Colo.  250,  27  Pac.  698. 

Iowa  15,  45  N.  W.  388;  State  v.  "' Minter  v.  People,  39  111.  App.  438. 
Denny  (N.  D.  1908),  117  N.  W.  869. 


449 


IMPEACHMEXT    OF    WITNESSES. 


247 


own  behalf  waives  the  privilege  of  refusing  to  answer  incriminat- 
ing questions,  so  far  as  the  charge  against  him  is  concerned,  by 
answering  upon  his  direct  examination  questions  relating  to  the 
crime  with  which  he  is  charged,  and  in  which  he  denies  his  guilt. 
He  cannot,  subsequently,  on  his  cross-examination,  refuse  to  an- 
swer other  incriminating  questions.®*' 

The  right  to  refuse  to  answer  incriminating  questions  is  per- 
sonal to  the  witness.  To  preserve  his  right  he  must  himself  object. 
If  he  wishes  to  answer,  he  may  do  so  and  neither  the  prosecution 
nor  the  accused  has  a  right  to  object.®' 

And  a  witness  cannot  refuse  to  answer  incriminating  questions 
because  his  answer  will  incriminate  another  person  by  whom  he  is 
employed,  or  will  incriminate  a  corporation  of  which  he  is  an 
officer.®" 

It  is  error  not  to  instruct  the  jury  that  no  inference  that  the  wit- 
ness is  a  criminal  should  be  drawn  from  his  refusal  to  answer  an 
incriminating  question.®® 


'°  Shears  v.  State,  147  Ind.  51,  46 
N.  E.  331 ;  McClain  v.  Common- 
wealth, no  Fa.  St.  263,  I  Atl.  45; 
Sullivan  v.  People,  114  111.  24,  28  N. 
E.  381 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Mullen,  97 
Mass.  545 ;  Stover  v.  People,  56  N.  Y. 
315;  Rains  v.  State,  88  Ala.  91,  7  So. 
315;  Commonwealth  v.  Nichols,  114 
Mass.  285,  19  Am.  346n;  State  v. 
Ober,  52  N.  H.  459,  13  Am.  88 ;  People 
V.  Tice,  131  N.  Y.  651,  30  N.  E. 
494;  State  V.  Allen,  107  N.  Car.  805, 
II  S.  E.  1016;  Spies  V.  People,  122  111. 
I,  235,  12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898.  See, 
also,  ante,  §  61,  and  Underhill  on  Ev- 
idence, page  521,  note  4. 

"  State  V.  Wentworth,  65  Me.  234, 
20  Am.  688;  Bradford  v.  People,  22 
Colo.  157,  43  Pac.  1013;  State  v.  But- 
ler, 47  S.  Car.  25,  24  S.  E.  991 ;  State 
v.  Mungeon,  20  S.  Dak.  612,  108  N.  W. 
552;  People  v.  Gosch,  82  Mich.  22,  46 
X.  W.  loi ;  Commonwealth  v.  Shaw, 
4  Cush.  (Mass.)  594,  50  Am.  Dec. 
813;  Samuel  v.  People,  164  111.  379, 
29 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


45  N.  E.  728;  Brown  v.  State  (Tex. 
1893),  20  S.  W.  924;  Taylor  v.  State, 
83  Ga.  647,  ID  S.  E.  442;  Ham  v. 
State,  156  Ala.  645,  47  So.  126;  Taylor 
v.  United  States,  81  C.  C.  A.  197,  152 
Fed.  I ;  and  see  cases  cited  in  Under- 
hill on  Ev.,  p.  521. 

*^Hale  V.  Henkel,  201  U.  S.  43,  50 
L.  ed.  652,  26  Sup.  Ct.  370,  aff'g  order 
hi  re,  Hale,  139  Fed.  496;  McAlister 
V.  Henkel,  201  U.  S.  90,  50  L.  ed.  671, 
26  S.  Ct.  385. 

•°  State  V.  Bartlett,  55  Me.  200 ;  Dev- 
ries  V.  Phillips,  63  N.  Car.  53.  The 
refusal  must  not  be  considered  by  the 
jury  at  all.  It  is  gross  injustice  to  the 
prisoner,  and  constitutes  reversible 
error  for  the  court,  to  charge  that  a 
refusal  to  answer  an  incriminating 
question  may  lead  to  the  inference 
that  the  witness  is  endeavoring  to 
shield  the  accused  and  not  to  protect 
himself.  Beach  v.  United  States,  46 
Fed.  754. 


§  247  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  45O 

The  information  which  is  eHcited  from  a  witness  who,  after  he 
has  claimed  his  privilege,  is  forced  to  answer  an  incriminating 
question,  cannot  be  used  against  him  subsequently."** 

If  facts  are  shown  from  wdiich  the  court  is  convinced  that  the 
incriminating  evidence  called  for  by  the  question  cannot  be  used 
against  the  witness  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  the  witness  must  Idc 
compelled  to  answer. 

Such  is  the  case  when  the  prosecution  of  the  crime  has  been 
barred  by  the  lapse  of  time,^  or  where  a  statutory  enactment  for- 
bids the  use  of  such  testimony  in  a  criminal  prosecution  of  the 
witness.^ 

A  statutory  provision  of  this  nature  should  be  liberally  con- 
strued for  the  purpose  of  affording  the  witness  the  fullest  protec- 
tion where  he  answers  an  incriminating  question.^  A  statute 
which  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  prosecuted  or  be  subjected 
to  penalty  or  forfeiture  on  account  of  any  transaction  or  matter 
concerning  which  he  may  testify  in  a  proceeding  or  prosecution 
brought  under  certain  statutes  is  constitutional  and  deprives  a 
wdtness  of  his  right  to  claim  a  privilege  against  answering  in- 
criminating questions.  The  protection  of  the  federal  statute  af- 
fords the  witness  immunity  only  in  the  federal  courts  and  this  it 
has  been  held  is  sufficient.* 

In  other  words,  the  Supreme  Court  oi  the  United  States  has 
held  that  the  fact  that  the  statute  passed  by  congress  does  not 
guarantee  the  witness  against  a  prosecution  in  the  state  courts  is 

^'"United  States  v.   Smith,  47  Fed.  around  a  witness  bj'  the  fifth  amend- 

501.     Ex  parte  Buskett,  106  Mo.  602,  ment     to     the     federal     constitution, 

17  S.  W.  753;  Taylor  V.  United  States,  which  provides  that  no  person  shall 

152  Fed.  I,  81  C.  C.  A.  197.  be  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against 

^Ex  parte  Boscowitz,  84  Ala.  463,  himself,  was   intended   to   shield   the 

4  So.  279,  5  Am.   St.  384;  People  v.  witness  from  actual  prosecution,  and 

Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74;  Southern  Railway  not  merely  from  the  disgrace  and  in- 

News  Co.  V.  Russell,  91  Ga.  808,  18  S.  famy    resulting    from    incriminating 

E.  40.    Contra,  McFadden  v.  Reynolds  disclosures.    Brown  v.  Walker,  161  U. 

(Pa.,  1887),  II  Atl.  638.  S.  591,  40  Law  ed.  819,  16  S.  Ct.  644. 

-Ex  parte  Buskett,  106  Mo.  602,  17        ^People  v.  Argo,  237  111.  173,  86  X. 

S.  W.  753,  27  Am.  St.  378,  14  L.  R.  A.  E.  679. 

407n;  Willis  v.  State,  12  Ga.  444,  448;        *  Hale  v.  Henkel,  201  U.  S.  43,  50 

Commonwealth  v.   Webster,   5    Cush.  L.  ed.  652,  26  Sup.  Ct.  370;  Nelson  v. 

(Mass.)  295,  52  Am.  Dec.  7lin.    The  United  States,  201  U.  S.  92,  50  L.  ed. 

constitutional       protection       thrown  673,  26  Sup.  Ct.  358. 


451  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    247 

not  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  This  decision  was  made  during  a 
search  for  evidence  in  a  prosecution  under  the  federal  anti-trust 
law  and  the  same  cjuestion  has  also  arisen  in  Kansas  under  the 
state  anti-trust  law  and  a  similar  decision  was  arrived  at — that  is, 
the  protection  was  sufficient  although  it  did  not  protect  in  a  prose- 
cution under  the  federal  anti-trust  law.^  And  the  rule  that  a  wit- 
ness cannot  refuse  to  answer  incriminating  questions  where  the 
statute  gives  him  full  immunity,  is  illustrated  in  a  New  York  case, 
construing  a  statute  which  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  ex- 
cused from  testifying  as  to  gambling  on  the  ground  that  his  evi- 
dence may  tend  to  convict  him  of  a  crime,  but  that  no  such  evi- 
dence shall  be  received  against  him  upon  any  criminal  investiga- 
tion.*^ 

Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  no  witness  shall  be  prose- 
cuted on  account  of  any  testimony  he  may  give  in  any  proceed- 
ing, suit  or  prosecution,  it  has  been  held  that  the  examination  of 
witnesses  before  a  grand  jury  is  a  proceeding.'^  And  where  a 
state  constitution  provides  that  no  person  can  be  compelled  in  any 
"criminal  case,"  to  give  evidence  against  himself,  an  inquisition 
before  a  grand  jury  has  been  held  to  be  a  criminal  case.® 

A  statute  which  provides  that  no  testimony  given  by  a  bank- 
rupt under  certain  circumstances  shall  be  used  against  him  in  a 
criminal  proceeding  is  meant  to  protect  him  only  against  the  use 
of  his  admissions  against  himself;  and  it  does  not  permit  him  to 
close  his  mouth  when  he  is  called  as  a  witness  to  testify  against 
another  person  in  a  criminal  proceeding.  Its  operation  is  con- 
fined strictly  to  his  admissions  in  his  own  bankruptcy  proceed- 
ings. It  has  been  held  under  this  statute  that  a  bankrupt  cannot 
be  convicted  of  perjury  or  false  swearing  committed  in  his  own 
bankruptcy  proceedings  in  support  of  a  claim  filed  by  him  against 
his  estate.^ 

An  inquiry  by  a  justice  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  it  will  be 
necessary  for  him  to  hold  an  inquest  is  not  a  legal  examination 

"  State  V.  Jack,  69  Kan.  387,  76  Pac.  '  Hale  v.  Henkel,  201  U.   S.  43,  50 

911.  Law  ed.  652,  26  Sup.  Ct.  370. 

"  People  V.  Court  of  General   Ses-  *  People  v.  Argo,  237  111.  173,  86  N. 

sions  &c.,  96  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   201,  E.  679. 

^9    X.     Y.     Supp.     364;     People     v.  "United  States  v.  Simon,  146  Fed. 

O'Brien,  176  N.  Y.  253,  68  N.  E.  353,  89. 
afif'g,  80  N.  Y.  Supp.  816. 


§    248  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  452 

within  a  statute  which  provides  that,  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  no 
evidence  shall  be  given  against  the  accused  of  any  statement  made 
by  him  as  a  witness  on  a  legal  examination/^ 

§  248.  Interest  and  bias  of  the  witness  as  impeachment. — The 
bias  of  the  witness  and  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  prosecution 
are  not  collateral,  and  may  always  be  proved  to  enable  the  jury 
to  estimate  his  credibility.  They  may  be  proved  by  his  own  tes- 
timony upon  cross-examination  or  by  independent  evidence. ^^ 
Thus,  for  example,  the  prosecution  may  show  that  its  witness  has, 
on  his  direct  examination,  unexpectedly  proved  hostile,  and  may 
then  show  by  other  witnesses  that  the  biased  witness  was  at  one 
time  ready  and  willing  to  testify  against  the  prisoner.^^ 

On  the  other  hand  the  defendant  may  show  that  he  had  a  diffi- 
culty with  one  of  the  witnesses  for  the  state. ^^  He  may  show  that 
the  witnesses  for  the  prosecution  hated  him  and  from  his  evidence 
the  jury  may  infer  that  this  hatred  colored, the  testimony.^*  The 
bias  of  the  witness  may  be  shown,  either  by  independent  testi- 
mony or  by  questions  put  to  him  upon  his  examination.  He  may 
be  interrogated  as  to  his  sympathy  with  the  prisoner,^^  or  as  to  his 
hostility  towards  him.^®  Thus  one  accused  of  illegal  dealing  in 
liquors  may  show  that  one  of  the  prosecuting  witnesses  had  been 
convicted  of  an  illegal  sale  and  that  the  accused  was  a  witness 
against  him.^^ 

In  proving  bias  or  interest  by  questions  put  to  the  witness  re- 

"  State  V.  Legg,  59  W.  Va.  315,  53  '*  State  v.  Barber,   13  Idaho  65,  88 

S.  E.  545,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  115211.  Pac.  418. 

"  Sage  V.  State,  127  Ind.  15,  28,  26  "  State  v.  Turlington,  102  Mo.  642, 
N.  E.  667;  Bennett  v.  State,  28  Tex.  15  S.  W.  141;  Porch  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
App.  539,  13  S.  W.  1005;  Eldridge  v.  Cr.  7,  99  S.  W.  1122. 
State,  27  Fla.  162,  9  So.  448;  Davis  "A  witness  who  testifies  for  the 
V.  State,  51  Neb.  301,  70  N.  W.  984;  defendant  may  be  asked  if  he  did  not 
People  V.  Mallon,  116  App.  Div.  425,  leave  the  state  to  enable  the  accused 
loi  N.  Y.  S.  814;  Wheeler  v.  State,  79  to  procure  a  continuance.  Sage  v. 
Neb.  491,  113  N.  W.  253;  State  v.  State,  127  Ind.  15,  26  N.  E.  667;  Bur- 
Darling,  202  Mo.  150,  100  S.  W.  631.  nett  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  515,  112  S. 

'^  See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  340.  W.  74. 

"Jordan   v.    State,   79   Ala.   9,    12;  "Vann  v.   State,    140  Ala.    122,   37 

Lyle  v.   State,  21   Tex.  App.   153,   17  So.  158. 
S.  W.  425;  Scott  V.  State,  113  Ala.  64, 
21  So.  425. 


453 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    248 


garding  his  previous  statements  out  of  court  indicating  bias,  it  is 
necessary  to  state  details  of  time,  place  and  person  attendant  upon 
such  declarations/*  If  the  witness  denies  having  uttered  the 
statement  indicating  bias,  or  if  he  refuses  to  answer  or  answers 
evasively,  the  fact  of  bias  may  be  proved  by  other  witnesses.^* 
Under  modern  rules  the  possession  of  an  actual  pecuniary  interest 
in  the  outcome  of  an  action  is  not  a  valid  objection  to  the  compe- 
tency of  a  witness.  But  it  may  always  be  shown,  even  in  a  crimi- 
nal proceeding,  as  a  fact  from  which  the  jury  may  infer  that  the 
witness  is  biased.  So  a  detective  testifying  against  the  accused 
may  be  asked  if  he  had  received  any  money,  or  if  he  expected  to 
be  paid  for  acting  as  a  detective.^** 

So,  also,  an  attorney  testifying  against  the  accused  may  be 
asked  if  he  had  received  a  retainer  in  the  case  to  assist  in  its  pros- 
ecution and  as  to  what  capacity  he  was  retained.  If  he  denies 
these  facts,  they  may  be  shown  by  other  evidence.^^ 

It  may  always  be  shown  that  a  witness  testifying  for  the  ac- 
cused is  related  to  him,  either  by  blood  or  marriage.  And  the 
jury  may,  with  propriety,  be  warned  that  they  should  einploy 
great  caution  in  weighing  the  testimony  of  such  a  person,"^  un- 

"  Queen's  Case,  2  Br.  &  Bing.  284,  witness    has    frequently    testified    for 

311,  22  R.  R.  662;  Crumpton  v.  State,  the  state  in  similar  criminal  prosecu- 

52  Ark.  273,  12  S.  W.  563 ;   State  v.  tions   is    not    admissible    as    impeach- 

Brown,  28  Ore.  147,  41  Pac.  1042.     It  ment.     Mitchell  v.  State,  94  Ala.  68, 

is  otherwise  when  the  bias  is  to  be  10  So.  518;  Lea  v.  State,  64  Miss.  294, 

proved     by     independent     testimony  i  So.  244;  Union  v.  State  (Ga.  App., 

without     interrogating     the     witness.  1909),  66  S.  E.  24. 

People  V.  Brooks,  131  N.  Y.  321,  30  N.  "^  Miller  v.  Territory,  15  Okla.  422, 

E.  189.  85  Pac.  239,  reversed  in  149  Fed.  330, 

"  State  V.  McFarlain,  41   La.  Ann.  79  C.  C.  A.  268. 

686,  6  So.  728 ;  Eldridge  v.  State,  27  ""  Smith  v.   State,   143  Ind.  685,  42 

Fla.  162,  9  So.  448;  Bennett  v.  State,  N.  E.  913;  State  v.  Calkins,  ^2)  Iowa 

28   Tex.    App.    539,    13    S.    W.    1005;  128,  131,  34  N.  W.  '7^^',  United  States 

State  v.  Kelley,  45  S.  Car.  659,  668,  v.  Ford,  zz  Fed.  861 ;  State  v.  Hilsa- 

24  S.  E.  45 ;  State  v.  Darling,  202  Mo.  beck,  132  Mo.  348,  34  S.  W.  38 ;  State 

150,  100  S.  W.  631.  V.  Byers,  100  N.  Car.  512,  6  S.  E.  420; 

^  State  V.  Tosney,  26  Minn.  262,  263,  Simpson  v.  State,  78  Ga.  91 ;  State  v. 

264,  3  N.  W.  345;  Heldt  v.  State,  20  Farrell,  82  Iowa  553,  48  N.  W.  940. 

Xeb.  492,  30  N.  W.  626,  57  Am.  835n;  Contra,  People  v.   Shattuck,  109  Cal. 

Rivers  v.  State,  97  Ala.  ^2,  12  So.  434.  673,  42  Pac.  315.     In  Mj-ers  v.  State, 

Cj.  State  V.  Barber,  2  Kan.  App.  679,  97  Ga.  76,  25  S.  E.  252,  it  was  held 

43  Pac.  800.    But  the  mere  fact  that  a  that  the  bare  fact  of  a  reward  having 

been  offered  for  the  apprehension  of 


§    248  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  454 

less  the  inference  of  bias  is  overcome  by  evidence  which  shows  to 
their  satisfaction  that  the  witness  and  the  accused  are  on  bad 
terms. 

The  relations  of  the  witness  and  the  decedent  in  a  murder  trial 
are  always  relevant.  The  witness  may  be  compelled  to  disclose 
his  or  her  relations  with  the  decedent,  though  they  were  improper 
and  they  may  be  shown  by  other  witnesses.  If  the  witness  is 
questioned  and  denies  that  he  knew  the  decedent  at  all,  he  may  be 
contradicted  by  other  witnesses:  the  object  of  evidence  to  prove 
that  there  existed  improper  relations  between  decedent  and  the 
witness  not  being  to  blacken  his  or  her  character  but  to  show  bias 
and  prejudice  against  the  accused. 

Evidence  of  relations  which  are  entirely  proper,  for  example, 
that  the  witness  was  the  wife,  sister  or  daughter  of  the  decedent, 
is  always  competent.-^ 

On  the  other  hand  inasmuch  as  the  friendly  feeling  of  the  pros- 
ecuting witness  for  the  accused  cannot  be  considered  by  the  jury 
in  arriving  at  their  verdict  it  is  not  allowable  for  the  accused  to 
prove  that  the  prosecuting  witness  did  not  have  the  accused  ar- 
rested of  his  own  free  will  or  that  he  bore  the  accused  no  malice 
or  ill  will."* 

The  bias  of  a  witness  in  favor  of  the  accused  may  have  been 
created  by  means  of  threats  made  or  bribes  offered  by  him  or  by 
some  one  connected  with  him.  The  fact  that  a  witness  has  been 
thus  tampered  with  does  not  exclude  his  testimony.  But  the 
bribeiy  of  or  attempts  to  bribe  a  witness  either  to  testify  or  to  re- 
main silent  when  upon  the  stand  are  always  relevant, ^^  though  it 
is  for  the  jury  to  determine  what  effect,  if  any,  the  threats  or 
bribes  have  had  upon  the  credibility  of  the  wntness.^'' 

Under  the  rule  that  the  bias  or  interest  of  the  witness  may  be 
shown,  it  is  competent  to  prove,  either  by  his  cross-examination 
or  by  the  evidence  of  another  witness,  that  a  witness  for  the  state 

the  accused  may  be  given  in  evidence  ^  State  v.  Cook,  13  Idaho  45,  88  Pac. 

as  affecting  the  credibility  of  the  virit-  240. 

nesses  for  the  prosecution.  ""  A  witness  may  be  impeached  by 

^  Leach  v.   Commonwealth,  23  Ky.  showing    his    refusal    to    attend    the 

L.  1016,  112  S.  W.  595.  funeral  of  a  person  murdered  by  con- 

"*  State  V.  De  Hart,  38  Mont.  211,  spirators  under  circumstances  of  un- 

99  Pac.  438.  usual    brutality.     Holtz    v.    State,    76 

Wis.  99,  44  N.  W.  1 107,  inc. 


455 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  §    248 


knows  that  he  himself,  is  accused  of  the  crime  for  which  the  ac- 
cused is  being  tried.  This  often  appears  without  the  cjuestion  be- 
ing put  where  one  accompHce  testifies  against  another  and,  for 
that  reason  there  exists  the  well-known  rule  that  a  conviction 
cannot  be  had  upon  accomplice's  evidence,  alone. 

The  inference  may  be  very  strong  that  the  witness  Is  endeavor- 
ing to  fasten  the  crime  upon  the  accused  on  trial  in  order  to  ex- 
culpate himself,  and  if  this  does  not  appear  from  the  testimony 
of  the  witness,  counsel  for  the  accused  may  bring  it  out  to  effect 
his  credibility.-^ 

The  jury  have  no  right,  however,  to  determine  the  credibility 
of  the  witness  upon  his  bias  or  prejudice  alone.  The  bias  or  prej- 
udice of  the  witness  are  only  circumstances  to  be  considered  in 
connection  with  other  circumstances  as  his  intelligence,  his  man- 
ner of  testifying  and  his  conduct  on  the  witness-stand.  Though 
a  witness  may  be  friendly  to  the  accused,  closely  related  to  him,  or 
very  intimate  with  him,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  will  perjure 
himself  to  secure  his  acquittal,  for  the  conscience  of  the  witness, 
or  his  regard  for  the  binding  obligation  of  his  oath,  or  his  fear  of 
punishment  in  case  he  shall  swear  falsely,  may  overcome  his 
prejudice  in  favor  of  the  accused  and  prompt  him  to  tell  the  truth. 

Bias  or  prejudice  is  no  more  conclusive  of  the  lack  of  veracity 
on  the  part  of  the  witness  than  is  his  prior  bad  reputation  and 
hence  it  is  reversible  error  for  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  that 
they  may  disregard  the  testimony  of  a  witness  who  is  biased.  The 
proper  instruction  is  that  they  may,  in  determining  the  credibility 
of  witnesses,  consider  among  other  circumstances  of  proof  of 
bias  or  prejudice  or  interest  in  the  outcome  of  the  trial."'* 

Where  the  impeachment  of  a  witness  is  attempted,  the  accused 
is  entitled  to  a  charge  by  the  court.  If  direct  impeachment  has 
not  been  attempted  by  some  of  the  methods  indicated  In  this  chap- 
ter, the  court  may  charge  to  that  effect,  expressly  pointing  out  the 
methods  of  possible  impeachment.    A  general  charge  that  a  wit- 

"  State  V.  Rosa,  71  N.  J.  L.  316,  58  Mo.  391,  6r  S.  W.  187;  Van  Burcn  v. 

Atl.  loio.  State,  63   Neb.   453,   88   N.   W.   671; 

"'  People  V.  Amaya,  134  Cal.  531,  66  State  v.  Hoshor,  26  Wash.  643,  67  Pac. 

Pac.  794;  State  v.  Carey,  23  Ind.  App.  386;  State  v.  Dickey,  48  W.  Va.  325, 

378,  55  N.  E.  261 ;  State  v.  Adair,  160  37  S.  E.  695. 


248 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


456 


ness  has  not  been  impeached  invades  the  province  of  the  jury  and 
may  properly  be  refused."" 

The  court  may  instruct  the  jury  that  they  may  disregard  the 
evidence  of  a  witness  if  they  determine  that  he  has  been  success- 
fully impeached,  unless  upon  the  whole  evidence,  they  find  that  he 
has  been  corroborated  to  their  satisfaction.^"  The  jury,  however, 
are  not  at  liberty  to  arbitrarily  regard  or  disregard  any  evidence 
which  is  ojflfered  to  impeach  a  witness  and  should  be  so  instruct- 
ed.^^ They  must  consider  the  credibility  of  the  evidence  of  the 
witness  whose  impeachment  has  been  attempted  and  they  may  be- 
lieve it,  notwithstanding,  that  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  im- 
peach him.^^ 


""Rambo  v.  State,  134  Ala.  71,  32 
So.  650;  Prior  v.  State,  99  Ala.  196,  13 
So.  681 ;  State  v.  Breckenridge,  33 
La.  Ann.  310. 

^"Osborn  v.  State,  125  Ala.  106,  27 
So.  758;  Loerh  v.  People,  132  111.  504, 
24  N.  E.  68;  State  v.  Goforth,  136 
Mo.  Ill,  37  S.  W.  8or. 

^^  Hall  V.  State,  130  Ala.  45,  30  So. 
422;  Hufif  V.  State,  104  Ga.  521,  30 
S.  E.  808. 

^-  Plummer  v.  State,  1 1 1  Ga.  839,  36 
S.  E.  233;  State  v.  Johnagen,  53  Iowa 
250,  5  N.  W.  176;  People  v.  Lyons,  51 
Mich.  215,  16  N.  W.  380;  Owens  v. 
State,  80  Miss.  499,  32  So.  152;  Strong 


V.  State,  61  Neb.  35,  84  N.  W.  410. 
An  instruction  that,  if  the  jury  are 
satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  a  wit- 
ness has  been  impeached,  or  they  have 
a  reasonable  doubt  on  account  of 
such  evidence  as  to  his  credibility,  his 
testimony  should  be  disregarded  ex- 
cept as  for  as  it  has  been  corroborated 
by  credible  witnesses,  is  properly  re- 
fused, a^  it  directs,  instead  of  permits, 
the  jury  to  disregard  the  testimony, 
and  excludes  corroboration  by  cir- 
cumstances and  documents.  Niezor- 
awski  V.  State,  131  Wis.  166,  11 1  N. 
W.  250. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE    ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES. 

§  249.    The  subpoena — Witness  fees.         §  255.    Obstructing  the  attendance  of 

250.  Constitutional  right  of  the  ac-  witnesses. 

cused  to  compulsory  process  256.    Change  of  venue  for  the  con- 
to  procure  the  attendance  of  venience  of  witnesses, 
witnesses.                              -  257.    The     intentional     absence     of 

251.  Subpoena  duces  tecum.  witnesses — When    it    consti- 

252.  Validity    of    reasons    for    not  tutes  a  contempt  of  court. 

producing  writings.  258.    Privilege     of    witnesses     from 

253.  Service    of-  the    subpoena    and  civil  arrest  and  from  service 

time  allowed  to  witnesses.  of  civil  process. 

254.  Recognizance  to  secure  the  at-       259.    Attendance     of     witnesses     in 

tendance  of  witnesses  where  custody, 

the  hearing  is  postponed. 

§  249.  The  subpoena — Witness  fees. — The  power  of  the  court  to 
hear  testimony  and  to  determine  controversies  confers  by  imphca- 
tion  at  common  law  the  further  power  to  require  and  to  compel 
the  production  of  evidence  for  or  against  the  controverted  facts. 
The  judicial  power  to  summon  witnesses  is  commonly  exercised 
by  the  employment  of  a  subpoena,  which  has  been  defined  as  a 
"judicial  writ,  directed  to  the  witness,  commanding  him  to  ap- 
pear at  the  court,  to  testify  what  he  knows  in  the  cause  therein 
described,  pending  in  such  court,  under  a  certain  penalty  men- 
tioned in  the  writ."^  In  the  absence  of  statute  the  state  is  under 
no  obligations  to  pay  the  fees  or  expenses  of  its  witnesses  or  of 
the  witnesses  for  the  accused. 

It  is  conceived  to  be  the  duty  of  every  citizen  to  assist  gratu- 
itously so  far  as  lies  in  his  power  in  procuring  the  punishment  of 

^  Grecnl.  on  Ev.,  §  309.    The  attend-  cured  by  a  subpoena,  or  order  in  the 

ance  of  a  witness  before  a  commis-  nature  of  one.     State  v.   Bourne,  21 

sioncr,  who  has  been  appointed  to  take  Ore.  218,  27   Pac.    1048;   Donnelly  v. 

his   deposition   by  a  court  which   has  County,  7  Iowa  419. 
received   letters   rogatory,  may  be  se- 

457 


S  250 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


458 


wrong-doers."  Hence,  a  statute  providing;  that  a  witness  in  a 
criminal  case  is  not  entitled  to  fees  does  not  conflict  with  a  consti- 
tutional guarantee  that  no  man's  services  shall  be  demanded  or 
taken  by  the  state  without  projDer  compensation.^ 

?  250.  Constitutional  right  of  the  accused  to  compulsory  process 
to  procure  the  attendance  of  witnesses. — The  prisoner,  e\en  though 
on  trial  for  his  life,  possessed,  at  common  law,  no  absolute  right 
to  command  the  process  of  the  court  to  secure  the  attendance 
of  his  witnesses,  while  if  they  voluntarily  attended  he  was  not 
permitted  to  examine  them.*  By  the  provisions  of  the  federal 
constitution  and  those  of  the  several  states,  the  right  to  com- 
pulsory process  to  obtain  the  attendance  of  witnesses  is  secured 
to  the  accused,^  and  he  is  thus  placed  on  an  equality  with  the 
state."  If  he  is  unable  to  pay  the  expense  of  serving  a  subpoena, 
the  court  may  direct  a  court  officer  to  serve  it.'^  The  courts  con- 
struing these  constitutional  enactments  hold  that  they  merely 
confer  a  right  to  a  subpoena  or  if  this  is  not  obeyed  to  further 
compulsory  process  such  as  a  recognizance  or  bench  warrant.* 


'  Commissioners  v.  Ballinger,  20 
Kan.  590;  State  v.  Massey,  104  N. 
Car.  877,  ID  S.  E.  608.  In  North  Car- 
olina by  custom  tlie  prisoner  if  found 
guilty  was  taxed  with  the  fees  for  the 
state's  witnesses.  Afterwards  the  mat- 
ter was  regulated  by  statute.  For  the 
statutes  compelling  the  state  to  pay 
the  fees  of  its  witnesses,  see  Barrett 
V.  State,  24  Ala.  74;  Briggs  v.  Cole- 
man, 51  Ala.  561;  Herrick,  Ex  parte, 
78  Ky.  23;  Sargent  v.  Cavis,  36  Cal. 
552;  Hall  V.  County  Com'rs.,  82  Md. 
618,  34  Atl.  771,  51  Am.  St.  484,  32  L. 
R.  A.  449. 

^  Daly  V.  Multnomah  Co.,  14  Ore. 
20,  12  Pac.  11;  United  States  v.  Bur- 
ling, 4  Biss.  509,  25  Fed.  Cas.  15010; 
State  V.  Massey,  104  X.  Car.  877,  10 
S.  E.  608. 

*  State  V.  Hornsby,  8  Rob.  (La.) 
554,  41  Am.  Dec.  305;  United  States 


V.  Reid,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  361,  13  L. 
ed.  1023,  4  Bl.  Com.  355,  358,  359. 

°  West  V.  State,  i  Wis.  209 ;  United 
States  V.  Burr,  25  Fed.  Cas.  I4692d; 
United  States  v.  Kenneally,  26  Fed. 
Cas.  15522,  5  Biss.  122. 

*  State  V.  Massey,  104  X.  Car.  877, 
ID  S.  E.  608. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Lindsey,  2  Ches. 
Co.  (Pa.)  268;  Chamberlain,  Ex 
parte,  4  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  49.  See  Com- 
monwealth V.  Williams,  13  Mass.  501 ; 
State  V.  Archer,  54  N.  H.  465,  in 
which  the  rule  is  restricted  to  capital 
cases.  And  where  one  accused  of  a 
capital  crime  trusted  to  counsel  to 
summon  his  witnesses,  which  the  lat- 
ter neglected  to  do,  it  was  held  that 
the  trial  must  be  postponed  until  the 
witnesses  could  be  subpoenaed.  State 
V.  Lewis,  9  Mo.  App.  321. 

*  State  V.  Pope,  78  S.  Car.  264,  58 
S.  E.  815. 


459 


ATTEXDAXCE    OF    WITXESSES. 


250 


The  accused  is  not  entitled  to  an  allowance  for  his  expenses  in 
summoning  witnesses  or  procuring  depositions,®  unless  it  is  ex- 
pressly provided  by  statute  that  such  expenses  shall  be  paid  by 
the  county  if  he  is  acquitted/" 

It  is  always  for  the  trial  judge  to  determine  whether  the  ac- 
cused, when  he  applies  for  compulsory  process  for  the  procurement 
of  witnesses  at  the  expense  of  the  state,  has  properl}^  complied 
with  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  and  whether  the  accused  is 
making  the  application  in  good  faith. ^^  The  necessity  and  ma- 
teriality of  the  evidence  of  the  witness  for  whom  compulsory 
process  is  asked  must  be  made  to  appear,^" 

The  prisoner  must  be  granted  the  writ  whenever  he  applies 
for  it  during  the  trial,^^  though  he  should  do  so-  at  the  earliest 
reasonable  opportunity.^*  His  constitutional  right  must  be  exer- 
cised in  conformity  with  recognized  legal  rules.  It  does  not  apply 
to  procure  the  personal  attendance  of  a  witness  who  resides  out 
of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,^^  or  to  those  within  it  whose 
deposition  in  favor  of  the  prisoner  can  easily  be  procured  if  they 
are  unable  to  attend  in  person,^®  But  any  statute  which  prescribes 


°  State  V.  Hornsby,  8  Rob.  (La.) 
554,  41  Am.  Dec.  305. 

^^  State  V.  Massey,  104  N.  Car.  877, 
10  S.  E.  608;  State  v.  Willis,  79  Iowa 
326,  44  X.  W.  699;  Carpenter  v.  Peo- 
ple, 3  Gilm.  (111.)  147;  Bennett  v. 
Kroth,  ij  Kan.  235,  15  Pac.  221,  i 
Am.  St.  248;  Little  v.  Todd,  3  Rich. 
(S.  Car.)  91;  Howell  v.  Blackwell, 
7  Ga.  443 ;  Donnelly  v.  County,  7  Iowa 
419;  Commonwealth  v.  Williams,  13 
Mass.  501 ;  Chamberlain,  Ex  parte,  4 
Cow.  (X.  Y.)  49.  In  Chamberlain,  Ex 
parte,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  49,  a  distinction 
was  made  between  witnesses  for  the 
accused  in  a  case  of  felony  and  in  a 
case  of  misdemeanor,  the  court  hold- 
ing that  a  witness  in  the  former  case 
must  attend,  when  subpoenaed  by  the 
accused,  without  payment  of  fees, 
while  in  the  latter  he  need  not.  But 
this  distinction,  if  ever  generally  rec- 
ognized, has  long  since  been  abolished 


either  by  express  statute  or  well  rec- 
ognized practice. 

"Jenkins  v.  State,  31  Fla.  190,  12 
So.  680;  State  V.  Godard,  4  Idaho 
750,  44  Pac.  643. 

^^  State  V.  Godard,  4  Idaho  750,  44 
Pac.  643. 

^^  Edmondson  v.  State,  43  Tex.  230 ; 
Green  v.  State,  17  Fla.  669.  Cf.  State 
V.  Thornton,  49  La.  Ann.  1007,  22  So. 
315. 

"Jenkins  v.  State,  31  Fla.  190,  12 
So.  680. 

"  State  V.  Pagels,  92  Mo.  300,  4  S. 
W.  931;  State  V.  Butler,  67  Mo.  59; 
State  V.  Yetzer,  97  Iowa  423,  66  N. 
W.  737;  State  V.  Wilcox,  21  S.  Dak. 
532,  114  X.  W.  687. 

"  Willard  v.  Superior  Court,  82  Cal. 
456,  22  Pac.  1 120.  Cf.  State  v.  Berk- 
ley, 92  Mo.  41,  4  S.  W.  24.  In  such 
a  case  the  accused  has  an  absolute 
right  to  a  commission  to  take  testi- 


§    251  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  460 

that  a  criminal  trial  shall  not  be  postponed  if  either  party  consents 
that  the  facts  contained  in  affidavits  for  a  continuance  shall  be 
regarded  as  the  evidence  of  the  absent  witness,  is  unconstitutional, 
as  it  deprives  the  accused  of  his  constitutional  right  to  compulsory- 
process." 

The  court  will  grant  the  accused  an  attachment  for  a  witness 
only  when  his  evidence  is  material/*^  and  it  affirmatively  appears 
he  will  testify  in  favor  of  the  accused/®  and  when  it  also  appears 
that  he  has  been  summoned,  or  that  diligence  has  been  used  to 
secure  his  attendance,  that  he  is  in  the  state,  and  that  his  early 
presence  can  be  secured. "° 

A  statute  or  rule  of  court  limiting  the  number  of  subpoenas  for 
witnesses  to  which  one  accused  of  felony  is  entitled  is  unconstitu- 
tional."^ But  a  rule  which  authorizes  the  court  to  refuse  the  ac- 
cused compulsory  process  unless  he  shall  show  the  witnesses  are 
necessary  for  his  defense  and  that  their  testimony  is  material  is 
not  unconstitutional."^ 

§251.  Subpoena  duces  tecum. — Where  the  production  of  docu- 
mentary evidence  in  the  possession  of  the  witness  is  required,  a 
subpoena  duces  tecum  is  employed,  commanding  him  to  search 
for  and  bring  to  court  certain  books  or  papers  which  are  specifi- 
cally described,  with  all  documents  and  writing  which  may  be 
evidence  in  the  case.  The  papers  are  required  to  be  stated  with 
that  degree  of  certainty  which  is  practicable  under  the  circum- 

mony.      State    v.    Hornsby,    8    Rob.  ^°  State  v.  Pope,  78  S.  Car.  264,  58 

(La.)  554,  41  Am.  Dec.  305.     And  it  S.  E.  815. 

is  not  error  for  the  court  to  exercise  "°  State  v.  Johnson,  41  La.  Ann.  574, 

its  discretion  in  refusing  to  summon  7  So.  670.    If  the  venue  is  changed  on 

witnesses    for    the    defendant    at    the  the    motion    of    the    prosecution,    the 

public  expense,  where  it  appears  that  court  may  make  it  a   condition  that 

their  evidence  is  cumulative  or  imma-  the  traveling  expenses  of  the  defend- 

terial.     Goldsby  v.  United  States,  160  ant's  witnesses,  who  cannot  pay  their 

U.   S.  70,  40  L.  ed.  343,   16  Sup.   Ct.  own  expenses,  shall  be  provided  for. 

216;  State  v.  O'Brien,  18  Mont,  i,  43  People  v.  Baker,  3  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

Pac.     1091,    44    Fac.    399;    State    v.  42. 

Graves,  13  Wash.  485,  43  Pac.  376.  ^  State  v.   Gideon,    119  Mo.   94,  24 

"  State  v.  Berkley,  92  Mo.  41,  4  S.  S.  W.  748,  41  Am.  St.  634r-. 

W.  24;  Graham  v.  State,  50  Ark.  161,  "State  v.  O'Brien,   18  Mont,   i,  43 

6  S.  W.  721.  Pac.    109T,    44    Pac.    399;     State    v. 

"People  v.  Marseiler,  70  Cal.  98,  11  Graves,  13  Wash.  485,  43  Pac.  376. 
Pac.  503. 


461  ATTEXDAXCE    OF    WITNESSES.  §    252 

stances,-"  that  the  witness  may  know  what  is  wanted  of  him,  and 
the  court  may  ascertain  if  the  subpoena  has  been  properly  obeyed."* 
The  sole  object  of  this  writ  is  the  production  of  documentary  evi- 
dence, and  a  piece  of  metal  or  other  article,  or  a  weapon  with 
which  a  crime  has  been  committed,  cannot  be  brought  into  court 
by  a  subpoena  duces  teciiin.'^  Nor  can  the  writ  be  employed  to 
compel  the  production  of  writings  which  are  not  to  be  used  as 
evidence,  but  to  refresh  the  memory  of  a  witness."'' 

§  252.  Validity  of  reasons  for  not  producing  writings. — Disobedi- 
ence to  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  by  a  post-office  or  internal  revenue 
official  is  not  excused  by  the  fact  that  the  rules  of  his  department 
forbid  him  to  disclose  any  information  contained  in  its  records."^ 
A  witness  in  whose  possession  are  papers  which  it  is  sought  to 
produce  by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum,  is  not  excusable  for  refusing 
or  neglecting  to  obey  it,  because  the  papers  do  not  belong  to  him. 
But  the  custodian  of  public  records,  and  even  of  the  records  of  a 
private  corporation  will  be  excused  from  bringing  the  originals 
into  court  because  of  the  great  inconvenience  which  would  cer- 
tainly result,  and  because  the  writings  can  generally  be  proved  in 
a  satisfactory  manner  by  authenticated  copies."* 

The  mere  fact  that  the  witness  brings  the  documents  in  court, 
in  response  to  the  subpoena,  does  not  determine  their  admissi- 
bility as  evidence.^'' 

Nor  will  the  witness  be  compelled  to  produce  the  documents, 

^Starrer,  In  re,  63  Fed.  564;  Mur-  Steel    &c.    Co.   v.    North    Branch    &c. 

ray  v.  Louisiana,  163  U.  S.  lOi,  41  L.  Co.,  48  Fed.  191. 

ed.   87,    16    Sup.    Ct.   990 ;    Ex   parte,  ^  United   States  v.  Tilden,    10  Ben. 

Jaynes,  70  Cal.  638,  12  Pac.  117;  Ex  566,  28  Fed.  Cas.  16522.    While  a  sub- 

parte,  Brown,  72  Mo.  83,  27  Am.  426.  poena  duces   tecum  is  unreturned   or 

"'  It  is   the   duty  of  the   person   to  unserved,  no  second  subpoena  will  be 

whom  the  writ  is  directed  to  make  a  valid  for  the  same  purpose.    Elting  v. 

reasonable  search   for  the  documents  United  States,  27  Ct.  CI.  158. 

required  if  they  are  in  his  possession.  ^^  Rice  v.  Rice,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  559,  21 

United  States  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  566,  Atl.  286,  11  L.  R.  A.  59m.    Hirsch,  In 

570,  571,  24  Fed.   Cas.    14484;   Elting  r^  74  Fed.  928. 

v.    United    States,    27    Ct.    CI.    158;  =^  Corbett  v.  Gibson,  16  Blatchf.  334. 

United  States  v.  Hunter,  15  Fed.  712.  ^  Rex    v.     Dixon,    3     Burr.     1687; 

''^  In    re   Shepard,    18   Blatchf.   225;  Campl)cll  v.  Dalhousie,  L.  R.  i  II.  L. 

Shcphard,  In  re,  3  Fed.  12;  Johnson  Sc.  App.  462;  Mott  v.  Consumers'  Ice 

Co.,  52  How.  (N.  Y.)  Fr.  244. 


§  253  CRIMINAL  EVIDEKCE.  462 

though  he  have  them  \vi*^^h  him  in  court,  if  he  can  show  a  lawful 
or  reasonable  reason  for  withholding  them.^''  The  sufficiency  and 
validit}'  of  the  reason  for  not  producing  a  writing  are  for  the 
court."^  The  mere  assertion  of  the  witness  that  writings  are  not 
in  his  possession  does  not  excuse  their  non-production,  if  it  ap- 
pears they  were  recently  in  his  hands  and  he  fails  to  account 
for  their  disappearance.^" 

^  253.    Service  of  the  subpoena  and  time  allowed  to  witnesses. — 

The  subpccna  should,  in  justice  to  the  witness,  be  seasonably 
served.  He  should  be  given  a  reasonable  opportunity  so  to  ar- 
range his  business  that  it  will  not  suffer  during  his  absence.^^  It 
is  now  usually  enacted  by  statute  that  a  witness  shall  be  allowed 
one  day's  time  for  each  twenty  miles  he  is  compelled  to  travel 
from  his  residence  to  the  court  where  his  testimony  is  needed.  At 
least  one  day's  notice  is  necessary  in  every  case.  The  witness 
must  be  served  with  the  subpoena  in  person,  so  that  being  thus  in- 
formed of  its  contents,  he  may  be  chargeable  with  contempt  if  he 
disobey  it.  To  constitute  a  personal  service,  the  subpoena  should 
be  shown  to  the  witness,  and  a  copy  or  a  ticket  containing  a  con- 
cise summary  of  its  contents  should  be  delivered  to  him,  accom- 
panied by  his  fees  and  an  oral  statement  of  what  the  paper  is."'''* 
A  subpoena  is  only  valid  to  secure  the  attendance  of  a  witness  in 
the  particular  proceeding  in  which  it  issues.  It  is  inoperative  to 
secure  his  presence  at  a  later  term  to  which  the  trial  has  been  ad- 
journed.^^ 

g  254.  Recognizance  to  secure  the  attendance  of  witnesses  where 
the  hearing  is  postponed. — Where  the  accused  on  the  preliminary 
examination  has  been  committed  for  trial,  or  is  held  to  await  the 
action  of  the  grand  jury,  or  where  the  trial  is  continued,  it  is 
sometimes  the  practice  to  require  a  witness  to  give  his  recog- 
nizance or  personal  bond  in  order  that  his  future  attendance  at 

'"Lane  v.  Cole,   12  Barb.    (N.  Y.)  '"Fenlon   v.   Dempsey,   21   Abb.   N. 

680;  Central  Nat.  Bank  v.  Arthur,  2  Cas.  291. 

Sweeney  (N.  Y.)  194.  "' Hughbanks,  lu  re,  44  Kan.  105,  24 

^^  Bull  V.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  Pac.  75. 

9;   Lane  v.  Cole,   12  Barb.    (N.   Y.)  "  See  Undcrhill  on  Evidence  §  281a. 

680.  ''  Sapp  V.  King,  66  Tex.  570,  i  S.  W. 

466. 


463  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  §    254 

the  trial  may  be  secured.'^*'  It  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  to 
accept  sureties  for  the  attendance  of  the  witness,  and  if  they  are 
not  procurable,  or  if  the  witness  refuses  to  give  his  recognizance, 
the  court  may  order  that  he  shall  be  kept  in  custody  until  the 
trial. ^'  This  is  doubtless  a  correct  statement  of  the  practice  as  it 
obtained  at  common  law,  but  the  modern  tendency  is  to  regard 
such  a  mode  of  procedure  as  extremely  oppressive  and  unjust. 
It  is  certainly  unfair  to  an  innocent  person,  whose  only  offense 
is  his  accidental  presence  at  the  time  and  place  of  a  crime,  to  in- 
carcerate him  because  he  is  unable  to  give  sureties  for  his  appear- 
ance as  a  witness  on  the  trial. ^^  Hence  it  is  sometimes  provided 
by  statute  that  a  witness  who  is  unable  to  give  sureties  for  his 
appearance  may  be  released  from  custody  on  giving  his  deposi- 
tion.^" And  in  any  case  it  may  be  that  there  is  an  abuse  of  the 
judicial  discretion  if  a  witness  is  committed  to  jail  solely  because 
he  cannot  give  bail  for  his  appearance  unless  there  is  some  proof 
of  an  intention  on  his  part  not  to  appear  and  testify.*" 

§  255.  Obstructing  the  attendance  of  witnesses. — At  the  common 
law,*^  and  now  frequently  by  statute,  in  many  of  the  states,  any  at- 
tempf*^  to  retard  or  to  prevent  the  attendance  of  witnesses  called 
to  testify  in  either  civil  or  criminal  proceedings,*^  or  the  act  of 

'"  Bickley  v.  Commonwealth,  2  J.  J.  deposition   is   admissible    as    evidence 

Marsh.  (Ky.)  572;  State  v.  Grace,  18  against  the  accused  unless  he  had  a 

Minn.  398;   Means  v.   State,    10  Tex.  full  opportunity  to  confront  the  wit- 

App.  16,  38  Am.  640;  Shaw,  Ex  parte,  ness  and  to  cross-examine  him  at  the 

61  Cal.  58;  United  States  v.  Durling,  previous  hearing. 

4  Biss.  509,  25  Fed.  Cas.  15010.  "  State  v.  Grace,  18  Minn.  398. 

"  2  Hale  P.  C.  282 ;  Roscoe  Cr.  Ev.  "  Commonwealth    v.    Reynolds,     14 

p.  87;  Fawcet  v.  Linthecum,  7  Ohio  Gray  (Mass.)  87;  State  v.  Carpenter, 

Cir.  Ct.  141 ;  State  v.  Grace,  18  Minn.  20  Vt.  9,  74  Am.  Dec.  665. 

398;  Petrie,  In  re,  i   Kan.  App.   184,  ^- State  v.  Keyes,  8  Vt.  57,  30  Am. 

40  Pac.  118.  Dec.  450. 

"'  See  remarks  of  court  in  Hall  v.  "  4  Bl.  Com.  129 ;  State  v.  Keyes,  8 

Somerset  County,  82  Md.  618,  on  p.  Vt.  57,  30  Am.  Dec.  450  (even  when 

623,  34  Atl.  771,  51  Am.  St.  484,  32  L.  the  witness  has  not  been  served  with 

R.  A.  449.  a   subpoena)  ;    State   v.   Carpenter,   20 

""State    v.    Grace,    18    Minn.    398;  Vt.  9;  United  States  v.  Kee,  39  Fed. 

People  v.  Lee,  49  Cal.  37 ;  Bickley  v.  603 ;  State  v.  Ames,  64  Me.  386 ;  State 

Commonwealth,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  v.  Bailer,  26  W.  Va.  90,  53  Am.  66; 

572.     It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  the  (in    which    the    character    of    an    at- 


§    255  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  464 

a  party  in  advising  a  witness  not  to  answer  any  question  put  to 
him/*  is  a  misdemeanor. 

It  is  immaterial  that  the  attempt  was  unsuccessful,*^  or  that 
the  obstructor  refrained  from  the  employment  of  violence  or  force 
and  contined  himself  wholly  to  threats  or  scurrilous  language," 
got  the  witness  intoxicated,  so  that  he  was  unable  to  attend,*^  or 
employed  tlie  machinery  of  the  criminal  law  to  prevent  his  at- 
tendance l)y  preferring  an  unfounded  charge  against  him,  and, 
in  collusion  with  a  magistrate,  procured  his  imprisonment.'*'*  The 
Avitness  may  obtain  a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  the  party  who  has 
obstructed  him,*''  or  the  person  who  has  thus  illegally  and  ma- 
liciously hindered  the  attendance  of  the  witness  may  be  indicted 
by  the  grand  jury.''''° 

Intimidating  a  witness  from  testifying  against  one  accused  of 
felony,  though  a  misdemeanor,  does  not  make  the  offender  an 
accessory  to  the  felony. °^ 

The  rules  and  principles  laid  down  above  are  usually  invoked 
in  cases  where  private  persons  attempt  to  influence  witnesses  who 
were  called  to  testify  against  the  accused.  They  are,  of  course, 
equally  applicable  where  police  ofHcials  or  public  prosecuting  of- 
ficers practice  similar  methods  of  intimidation  upon  the  witness 
for  the  accused.  And  in  any  event  it  is  extremely  improper  to 
allow  a  public  prosecutor  to  endeavor  to  dissuade  witnesses  for 
the  accused  from  appearing  and  testifying,  even  though  he  may 

tempt   to    obstruct   a   witness    is    dis-  ^*  United     States     v.     Kindred,     4 

cussed)  ;  Rex  v.   Lawley,  2  Str.  904.  Hughes   (U.  S.)  493. 

The    fact    that    the   witness   was    ex-  ■"•  Magnay  v.  Burt,  5  Q.  B.  381. 

pected  to  testify,  even  though  he  has  ^°  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  record 

not  been  subpoenaed,  and  is  not  under  of  the  case  in  which  the  witness  was 

recognizance   to   appear,   is    sufficient,  to  testify,  State  v.  Carpenter,  20  Vt. 

State  V.  Horner,  i  Marv.   (Del.)   504,  9,   or  the   fact   that   the   evidence   of 

26  Atl.  "/Z^  41  Atl.  139.  the   witness   was   material,   Common- 

"Gandy  v.  State,  22,  Neb.  436,  36  N.  wealth  v.  Reynolds,  14  Gray.  (Mass.) 

W.   817;    Per  row   v.    State,  67   Miss.  87,  74  Am.  Dec.  665,  or  the  particular 

365,  7  So.  349.  method  used  to  intimidate  or  obstruct 

*^  Russell  on  Cr.,  p.   182;  Gandy  v.  him,  State  v.  Ames,  64  Me.  386,  shall 

State,   22,   Neb.   436,   36    N.    W.   817;  be  set  forth  in  the  indictment. 

State  V.  Carpenter,  20  Vt.  9.  ^^  Reg.  v.  Chappie,  9  C  &  P.  355.    A 

^^  Reg.  V.  Onslow,  12  Cox  C.  C.  358 ;  person  is  not  guilty  of  intimidating  or 

Charlton's  Case,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  316.  impeding  a  witness  who  beats  him  af- 

""  State  V.  Holt,  84  Me.  509,  24  Atl.  ter  he  has  testified.     United  States  v 

951-  Thomas,  47  Fed.  807;  United   States 

V.  Kee,  39  Fed.  603. 


465  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  §§    256,    257 

have  the  best  of  grounds  to  believe  that  they  are  unreHable  and 
that  they  will  perjure  themselves. 

§  256.  Change  of  venue  for  the  convenience  of  witnesses. — In 
civil  cases  in  order  to  avoid  the  expenditure  of  large  sums  of 
money  as  mileage,  or  for  the  taking  of  depositions,  it  is  very  fre- 
quently provided  by  statute  that,  where  the  convenience  of  the 
witnesses  requires  it,  the  venue  or  place  of  trial  of  the  action  may 
be  changed.  But  as  a  general  rule,  in  criminal  cases  no  change 
of  venue  can  be  procured  solely  for  the  convenience  of  witnesses.^^ 

§  257.  The  intentional  absence  of  witnesses — When  it  constitutes 
a  contempt  of  court. — Every  witness  who  has  been  properly  sum- 
moned to  attend  and  give  testimony  is  guilty  of  a  contempt  of 
court  if  he  intentionally  fails,  neglects  or  refuses  to  attend.^^  The 
court  may,  upon  the  application  of  the  party  by  whom  he  has 
been  summoned,  grant  an  ex  parte  and  immediate  order  for  his 
arrest  upon  facts  showing  that  his  contempt  is  intentional  and 
manifest.'"'  But  usually  an  attachment  will  issue  only  after  the 
granting  and  the  return  of  a  preliminary  order  to  show  cause.^^ 
The  subject  is  usually  regulated  by  statute.  Where  this  is  not 
the  case  the  power  to  grant  an  attachment  is  discretionary.^"  At 
common  law  a  witness  is  not  in  contempt  who  fails  to  attend  on 
his  subpoena  summoning  him  to  appear  before  the  grand  jury.  He 
must  be  summoned  to  appear  in  court  to  give  evidence  before  the 
grand  jury." 

It  is  never  essential  that  the  trial  should  have  been  begun,  or 
that  the  witness  should  have  been  called  in  open  court  before 
an  attachment  will  issue  to  compel  his  presence.  But  it  must  be 
satisfactorily  proved  that  he  is  wilfully  disobedient  in  absenting 

"People    V.    Harris,   4    Denio.    (N.  Andrews    v.    Andrews,   2    John.    Cas. 

Y.)  150.  (N.  Y.)    109;  People  v.  Vermilyea,  7 

'^Gunn,  In  re,  50  Kan.  155,  2>2  Pac.  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  108. 

470,  948,   19  L.  R.  A.  519;   People  v.  "'Wilson  v.  State,  57  Ind.  71;  Green 

Brown,  46  Hun    (N.  Y.)    320;  Com-  v.  State,  17  Fla.  669;  State  v.  Hopper, 

monwealth      v.      Carter,      11      Pick.  71  Mo.  425. 

(Mass.)   277;   Stephens  v.  People,  19  °"  State   v.    Hillstock,   45    La.    .Ann. 

N.  Y.  549;  Baldwin  v.  State,  126  Ind.  298,  12  So.  352. 

24,  25  X.  E.  820.  "  Baldwin  v.  State,  126  Ind.  24,  25 

"  State  V.  Trumbull,  4  \.  J.  L.  139:  X.  E.  820. 
30 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


§    258  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  •  466 

himself.^^  The  party  must  move  promptly  for  an  attachment  to 
bring  the  witness  before  the  court.  The  apphcation  must  be 
founded  upon  affidavits  showing  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a 
prompt,  seasonable  and  personal  service  of  the  subpoen?^''''  and 
the  payment  or  tender  of  all  proper  and  necessary  fees.  A  writ 
of  attachment  for  contempt  is  an  extraordinary  remedy  which,  in 
the  absence  of  a  statute,  is  wholly  in  the  discretion  of  the  court, 
and  it  should  issue  only  upon  evidence  that  is  reasonably  clear 
and  convincing,  that  its  issuance  is  needed  and  that  the  evidence 
of  the  witness  is  not  cumulative,  is  material,*"'  and  that  due  dili- 
gence has  been  employed,*'^  though  the  immateriality  of  his  evi- 
dence is  no  defense  for  a  witness  who  distinctly  refuses  to  obey  a 
subpoena.  So  also  it  must  appear  that  the  witnesses  would  be  phys- 
ically able  to  attend  if  the  attachment  were  to  issue.*'"  Every  .per- 
son whatever  his  office  or  dignity,  is  bound  to  appear  and  testify 
when  he  is  required  to  do  so  by  proper  judicial  process,  unless 
he  has  a  lawful  excuse.  It  has  been  held  that  the  official  engage- 
ments of  the  higher  officers  of  the  government  may  be  a  sufficient 
and  legal  excuse,  though  the  dignity  of  the  office  is  not."" 

A  witness  who  has  received  early  notice  to  attend  court  may  be 
in  contempt  if,  believing  he  has  sufficient  time,  he  postpones  com- 
pliance with  the  subpoena  until  the  case  is  on  trial. '^'* 

§  258.  Privilege  of  witnesses  from  civil  arrest  and  from  service  of 
civil  process. — A  witness  who  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the 

^^  Wilson  V.    State,  57  Ind.   71.     A  28  Pac.  961;  State  v.  Johnson,  41  La. 

member   of   congress    is    not    exempt  Ann.  574,  7  So.  670,  and  cases  cited  in 

from   subpoena   by   the   accused   in   a  Underbill  on  Ev.,  on  page  420. 

criminal   case.    The  constitution  con-  "  State  v.  Johnson,  41  La.  Ann.  574, 

fers    upon    every   man    charged   with  7  So.  670. 

crime  the  benefit  of  compulsory  pro-  "'  State   v.   McCarthy,  43   La.   .A.nn. 

cess  to  obtain  the  attendance  of  wit-  541,  9  So.  493. 

nesses.     United    States   v.    Cooper,  4  "'  Thompson  v.    German   Valley   R. 

Dall.  341,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14861.  R.   Co.,   22   N.   J.   Eq.    iii;    i    Burr's 

^°  State   V.   Allemand,   25    La.    Ann.  Trial  182.     It  is  doubtful,  however,  if 

525 ;    State  v.   Trumbull,  4   N.   J.    L.  the  executive  official  can  be  proceeded 

139.  against  for  contempt.    The  party  may 

*"  Garden  v.  Creswell,  2  M.  &  W.  have  a  remedy  in  damages.    Thomp- 

319;    State  V.   Trounce,  5   Wash.    St.  son    v.    German    Valley    R.    R.    Co., 

804,  32  Fac.  750;  People  v.  Van  Tas-  supra. 

sel,  64  Hun  (N.  Y.)  444,  19  N.  Y.  S.  "Jackson  v.  Seager,  2  D.  &  L.  13. 
643;   Wyatt  v.  People,   17  Colo.  252, 


467  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  §    258 

court  is  exempted  from  the  service  of  a  summons  or  other  civil 
process  under  the  same  conditions,  as  regards  time  and  place,  and 
for  the  same  reasons,  as  he  is  exempt  from  civil  arrest  while  volun- 
tarily within  the  jurisdictional  limits  of  the  court  for  the  purpose 
of  testifying.*'^  Not  only  are  witnesses  privileged  from  service  of 
civil  process  during  their  attendance,  but  they  are  also  protected 
from  arrest  in  civil  actions  during  the  time  they  are  proceeding 
to,  remaining  at,  or  returning  from  court,*'*'  or  any  place  where  a 
congressional  or  legislative  investigation  is  in  progress.^^  Non- 
resident witnesses,  in  order  to  encourage  their  voluntary  attend- 
ance, and  because  they  cannot  be  summoned  by  a  subpoena,  will 
be  privileged,  although  they  may  have  come  into  the  state  volun- 
tarily,^* but  the  rule  is  otherwise  in  the  case  of  a  witness  who 
resides  within  the  jurisdiction  and  who  attends  voluntarily  and 
without  a  subpoena.*'^ 

The  non-resident  witness  will  be  regarded  as  having  waived 
his  privilege  if  he  shall  voluntarily  submit  to  arrest  or  fail  to  assert 
his  exemption  and  claim  his  liberty  at  his  earliest  opportunity. 
He  cannot  then  claim  his  privilege  has  been  violated.'" 

The  trial  in  which  he  was  to  testify  will  be  continued  until  his 
discharge  from  arrest.'*  The  witness  is  privileged  not  only  during 
his  journey  to  and  from  the  place  where  the  court  is  in  session, 

•''Hollander  v.   Hall,   58  Hun    (N.  "'Rogers  v.  Bullock,  3  N.  J.  L.  109. 

Y.)   604,  II  N.  Y.   S.  521;  Christian  ™  Smith   v.   Jones,  76   Me.    138,   49 

V.  Williams,  35  Mo.  App.  297 ;  Larned  Am.  598 ;  Underhill  on  Evidence,  page 

V.   Griffin,   12  Fed.  590;   Compton  v.  421,   notes    5   and   6.     The   court   in 

Wilder,  40  Ohio   St.   130;   Massey  v.  which  the  witness  is  called  to  testify 

Colville,  45  N.  J.  L.  119,  46  Am.  754;  will,  in  the  case  of  his  illegal  arrest. 

Person  v.  Grier,  66  N.  Y.  124,  23  Am.  order  his   immediate   discharge   upon 

35.  the  proper  motion  supported  by  affida- 

"'  Ballinger   v.    Elliott,   72   N.    Car.  vits.    Moore  v.  Green,  'jz  N.  Car.  394, 

596;     May    V.    Shumway,    16    Gray.  21  Am.  470.     Though  in  the  case  of 

(Mass.)  86,  77  Am.  Dec.  40in;  Norris  inferior   courts   the   witness   may   be 

V.  Beach,  2  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   294;  and  under  necessity  of  employing  the  writ 

Underhill  on  Evidence,  page  421,  note  of  habeas  corpus.    Smith  v.  Jones,  76 

2.  Me.  138,  49  Am.  598. 

"  Thompson's  Case,  122  Mass.  428,  "  Hurst's  Cases,  4  Dall.  387,  i  L.  cd. 

23  Am.  370.  878;  Commonwealth  v.  Daniel,  4  Pa. 

''"Christian    v.    Williams,    35    Mo.  L.  J.  49;   United   States  v.   Edme,  9 

App.  297;  Person  v.  Grier,  66  N.  Y.  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)   147. 
124,  23  Am.  35 ;  Jones  v.  Knauss,  31 
N.  J.  Eq.  211. 


§§    258,    259  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  468 

but  also  during  his  detention  in  the  place  where  the  court  is  held, 
if  the  sole  reason  of  his  stay  is  his  purpose  to  testify.  The  law- 
allows  a  reasonahle  time  for  the  journey  to  and  from  the  place 
of  trial,  but  does  not  countenance  loitering,''-  though  a  slight 
deviation  to  partake  of  food,  to  see  one's  friends  or  to  oljtain 
papers  which  are  to  be  used  as  evidence  at  the  trial,  will  not  nullify 
the  privilege  from  arrest.  If  the  witness,  after  testifying,  before 
returning  home,  proceeds  to  transact  business  which  is  wdiolly 
unconnected  with  his  functions  as  a  witness,  his  privilege  ceases." 

§  259.  Attendance  of  witnesses  in  custody. — The  attendance  of  a 
witness  who  is  incarcerated  in  prison,""*  or  who  is  in  the  military 
or  naval  service,  may  be  procured  by  the  service  of  a  writ  of  ha- 
beas corpus  ad  testificandiim  on  the  prison-keeper  or  officer  in 
whose  immediate  charge  he  is.'^  The  application  for  the  writ 
should  specify  the  nature  of  the  suit  in  wdiich  his  attendance  is 
needed,  that  the  evidence  of  the  witness  is  material,  and  that  the 
witness  is  restrained  from  attending  court,  together  with  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  restraint  so  far  as  they  are  known  to  the  appli- 
cant. It  is  not  usually  necessary  in  a  criminal  case  that  money 
to  pay  the  expenses  of  a  witness  in  a  penitentiary  should  be 
tendered  him.'*^  As  the  general  rules  governing  the  granting  and 
the  service  and  return  of  this  w-rit  are  those  which  obtain  in  con- 
nection with  the  ordinary  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  no  elaboration 
of  them  is  necessary  in  the  connection. 

^"Chaffee  v.  Jones,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)     which  was  a  case  of  a  witness  in  jail 
260.  convicted  of  a  murder. 

^^  See  Underhill  on  Evidence,  page        '^People  v.    Sebring,    14  Misc.    (N. 
420,  and  notes.  Y.)  31,  35  N.  Y.  S.  237,  69  N.  Y.  St. 

'*  Harris,  Ex  parte,  72  N.  Car.  65,    612. 

'"Roberts  v.  State,  72  Ga.  673. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 


ABSENT    WITNESSES   AND    CONTINUANCES. 


260.  Grounds     for     admitting     the     §  267. 

testimony  of  missing  wit- 
nesses. 

261.  Deceased    or    insane   witnesses 

— How  death  of  witness  may 

be  proved.  268. 

262.  Witnesses   sick   or   out  of   the 

jurisdiction — Distinction  be- 
tween civil  and  criminal 
cases.  269. 

263.  Mode    of    proving   absence    of 

witness. 

264.  Absence    of    witness    procured 

by      connivance  —  Relevancy 

and  use  of  evidence  of  such       270. 

witness. 

265.  Cross-examining  and  confront-        271. 

ing  witnesses. 

266.  Mode  of  proving  the  evidence 

of     the     absent     witnesses — 
Substance      only      need      be       272. 
stated. 


Stenographer's  notes,  judge's 
minutes  and  bill  of  excep- 
tions when  used  to  prove  the 
evidence  of  the  absent  wit- 
ness. 

Continuance  when  granted  be- 
cause of  absence  of  witness 
— Discretionary  power  of  the 
court. 

Due  diligence  in  summoning 
witness  must  be  proved — 
The  competency  and  mate- 
riality of  his  testimony  must 
appear. 

What  facts  the  affidavit  for  the 
continuance  must  contain. 

Admissions  to  avoid  contin- 
uance— Constitutional  right 
of  the  accused  to  enjoy  the 
benefit  of  oral  testimony. 

Admission  of  facts  as  true  to 
avoid  continuance. 


§  260.  Grounds  for  admitting  the  testimony  of  missing  witnesses. 
— The  main  reasons  for  the  rejection  of  hearsay  evidence  are  the 
absence  of  a  judicial  oath  and  of  an  opportunity  for  the  cross- 
examination  of  the  person  who  is  the  informant  of  the  witness. 

Where  a  witness  who  has  given  testimony  in  any  judicial  pro- 
ceeding, civil  or  criminal,  cannot  be  produced  at  a  subsequent 
trial  of  the  same  matter  between  the  same  parties,  there  can  be  no 
objections  on  such  grounds  to  receiving  his  sworn  testimony  at 
the  former  trial,  if  the  absence  of  the  witness  is  not  caused  by  the 
party  desiring  to  use  his  evidence. 

The  latter  trial  should  be  for  the  same  ofifense,  and  the  accused 

469 


§    26l  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  47O 

person  should  be  the  same  as  in  the  former.  It  is  not  material 
that  the  later  trial  is  under  another  indictment,  if  the  offense 
charged  and  the  parties  are  identical.^ 

§  261.  Deceased  or  insane  witnesses — How  death  of  witness  may 
be  proved. — In  criminal,  as  in  civil  procedure,"  the  evidence  of  a 
witness  at  a  prior  trial  may  be  proved  as  evidence  in  a  subsequent 
trial  of  the  accused  for  the  same  offense  if  the  witness  is  dead,^ 
or  has  beome  incompetent  by  reason  of  mental  derangement.* 
His  testimony  is  admissible  either  for  or  against  the  party  in 
whose  favor  he  originally  testified. 

The  same  rule  is  applicable  to  evidence  received  at  the  prelim- 
inary examination,  wdiether  it  was  or  was  not  committed  to  writ- 
ing, where  a  witness  is  dead,  but  not  where  he  is  missing  merely.^ 
The  death  of  the  w-itness  must  be  shown  by  the  best  evidence 
which  is  obtainable,  preferably  a  certified  copy  of  the  record  of 
his  death  kept  by  the  proper  officer.  In  the  absence  of  such 
proof  of  death,  the  oral  testimony  of  a  person  wdio  could  swear, 
of  his  own  knowledge,  that  he  was  dead  would  doubtless  be  re- 
ceived, as,  for  example,  of  a  physician  who  had  attended  his  death- 
bed, or  of  one  who,  being  acquainted  with  the  witness,  had  at- 
tended his  funeral.  Evidence  that  it  is  generally  believed  or  re- 
ported that  an  absent  witness  is  dead  is  not  competent.*^ 

^Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U.  "State    v.    King,    86    N.    Car.    603; 

S.  145,  158-161,  25  L.  ed.  244;  Putnal  Marler  v.   State,  67  Ala.   55,  42  Am. 

V.  State  (Fla.),  47  So.  864.  95;  State  v.  Laque,  41  La.  Ann.  1070, 

=  See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  120.  6  So.  787;   State  v.  Wheat,   in   La. 

'State  V.   Taylor,    Phil.    (N.   Car.)  860,  35  So.  955- 

508,  513;  Hair  v.  State,  16  Neb.  601,  "Davis  v.    State,   17  Ala.  354,  357; 

605,  21  N.  W.  464;   State  v.  McNeil,  State  v.  Hooker,  17  Vt.  658;  Cox  v.  ■ 

33  La.  Ann.    1332;   O'Brian  v.   Com-  State    (Tex.   Crim.,    1896),  36   S.   W. 

monwealth,  6  Bush    (Ky.)    563,   571;  435;  United  States  v.  Macomb,  5  Mc- 

State  V.  Johnson,   12  Nev.   121,   123;  Lean  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  286;  State  v.  Mc- 

State  V.   Able,  65  Mo.  357;    Sullivan  O'Blenis,   24   Mo.   402,   69   Am.   Dec. 

V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  319,  32  Am.  580;  435;  State  v.  Byers,  16  Mont.  565,  41 

Nixon  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  325,   109  Pac.    708;    State   v.    Bollero,    112   La. 

S.  W.  931;   State  V.  Simmons    (Kan.  850,  36  So.  754;  Wilson  v.  State,  140 

1908),  98  Pac.  277;  Lrpscomb  v.  State,  Ala.  43,  Z7  So.  93. 

76  Miss.  223,  25  So.  158;  Weatherford  'State  v.  Wright,  70  Iowa  152,  153, 

V.    State,   78  Ark.   36,  93   S.   W.   61;  30  N.  W.  388;  McGrew  v.  State,  13 

Maloney  v.  State  (Ark.,  1904),  121  S.  Tex.  App.  340. 
W.  728. 


471 


ABSEXT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES.      §§    262,    263 


§  262.  Witnesses  sick  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction — Distinction  be- 
tween civil  and  criminal  cases. — It  was  formerly  doubted,  even  in 
civil  cases,  whether  the  testimony  of  a  hving  witness  who  was 
absent  merely  would  be  received  in  trial.  Though  the  authorities 
sustain  the  rule  by  which  in  civil  suits  the  testimony  of  an  absent 
witness  is  received  not  only  in  case  of  death,  but  where  he  is  in- 
competent by  insanity  or  illness,  or  mere  absence,  the  criminal 
courts  always  hesitate,  in  the  absence  of  a  permissive  or  manda- 
tory statute,  to  admit  such  evidence  unless  the  death  or  insanity 
of  the  witness  is  shown. 

The  mere  fact  that  the  witness  is  sick  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction, 
or  that  his  whereabouts  are  unknown  so  that  he  cannot  be  reached 
by  a  subpoena,  is  not  enough.'^  The  authorities  are  not  wholly 
harmonious,  though  usually  now,  by  statute,  such  evidence  is  ad- 
missible.* 

§  263.  Mode  of  proving  absence  of  witness. — The  absence  of  a 
witness  from  the  state  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence, 
as  by  letters  and  telegrams  alleged  to  have  been  written  by  him 
while  he  was  absent.''    The  dates  and  places  named  therein  are 


"Reg.  V.  Scaife,  5  Cox.  C.  C.  243, 
245,  246,  2  Den.  C.  C.  281,  17  Q.  B. 
238;  McLain  v.  Commonwealth,  99 
Pa.  St.  86,  97 ;  State  v.  Oliver,  43  La. 
Ann.  1003,  10  So.  201 ;  State  v. 
Staples,  47  X.  H.  113,  90  Am.  Dec. 
565 ;  Finn  v.  Commonwealth,  5  Rand. 
(Va.)  701;  People  v.  Newman,  5  Hill 
(X.  Y.)  295;  Brogy  v.  Common- 
wealth, 10  Gratt.  (Va.)  722;  Bergen 
V.  People,  17  111.  426,  65  Am.  Dec. 
672n;  United  States  v.  Angell,  11 
Fed.  34,  42;  Hall  v.  State,  6  Baxt. 
(Tenn.)  522,  525;  People  v.  Murphy, 
45  Cal.  137;  State  v.  King,  86  X.  Car. 
603,  605 ;  Collins  v.  Commonwealth, 
12  Bush  (Ky.)  271;  Bardin  v.  State, 
143  Ala.  74,  38  So.  833;  Kirkland  v. 
State,  141  Ala.  45,  zi  So.  352;  Taylor 
V.  State,  126  Ga.  557,  55  S.  E.  474. 

*  Shackelford  v.  State,  33  Ark.  539, 
542;  Dolan  V.  State,  40  Ark.  454,  461; 


Benson  v.  Shotwell,  103  Cal.  163,  yj 
Pac.  147;  Minneapolis  Mill  Co.  v. 
Minneapolis  &c.  R.  Co.,  51  Minn.  304, 
53  X.  W.  639;  Perrin  v.  Wells,  155 
Pa.  St.  299,  26  Atl.  543;  Matthews  v. 
State,  96  Ala.  62,  11  So.  203;  Pruitt 
V.  State,  92  Ala.  41,  43,  9  So.  406; 
State  V.  Xelson,  68  Kan.  566,  75  Pac. 
505 ;  Bell  V.  State,  156  Ala.  76,  47  So. 
242;  Morris  v.  State,  146  Ala.  66,  41 
So.  274;  State  V.  Wheat,  in  La.  860, 
35  So.  955;  Pate  V.  State  (Ala.  1909), 
48  So.  388;  Shirley  v.  State,  144  Ala. 
35,  40  So.  269;  Hobbs  v.  State,  53 
Tex.  Cr.  71,  112  S.  W.  308;  People 
V.  Gilhooley,  187  X.  Y.  55i,  80  X.  E. 
1 1 16;  Ozark  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 
106,  100  S.  W.  927;  State  V.  Timber- 
lake,  so  La.  Ann.  308,  23  So.  276. 

"  Conner  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  378, 
5  S.  W.  189;  Carman  v.  Kelly,  5  Hun 
(N.  Y.)   283;   People  v.   Barker,   144 


§    264  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  472 

always  relevant,  though  never  conclusive.  And  all  the  facts 
proved  should  be  such  as  will  justify  a  fair-minded  and  reasonable 
man  in  believing  that  the  witness  is  really  out  of  the  state. ^**  If 
the  residence  of  the  absentee  is  known  his  deposition  ought  to 
be  procured." 

If,  by  statute  or  otherwise,  the  testimony  of  an  absent  witness 
is  receivable  merely  because  his  whereabouts  cannot  be  ascer- 
tained, it  must  appear  that  diligent  search  for  him  was  made,  and 
that  neither  his  attendance  nor  his  deposition  can  be  procured.^" 
The  absence  of  a  w'itness  being  shown,  it  will  be  presumed  to  con- 
tinue to  the  date  of  the  trial. ^^ 

§  264.  Absence  of  witness  procured  by  connivance — Relevancy  and 
use  of  evidence  of  such  witness. — Where  a  living  witness  is  absent 
by  the  procurement  or  connivance  of  the  accused,  his  evidence  at 
a  former  trial  or  before  a  coroner's  jury,  is  not  admissible  for  the 
accused  though  it  may  be  against  him,^*  It  must  be  shown  that 
the  absence  was  procured, ^^  though  not  necessarily  by  corrupt 
means.    If  it  is  shown  that  the  witness  was  sought  diligently  and 

Cal.  705,  78  Pac.  266;  Somers  v.  State,  Tex.  App.  162,  14  S.  W.   1020;  State 

54  Tex.  Cr.  475,  113  S.  W.  533.  v.  King,  86  N.  Car.  603,  605;  People 

"Wheat  V.  State,  no  Ala.  68,  20  So.  v.  Nelson,  85  Cal.  421,  24  Pac.  1006; 

449;   Harwood  v.  State,  63  Ark.  130,  State  v.  Riley,  42  La.  Ann.  995,  8  So. 

37   S.    W.    304;    McCollum   V.    State,  469;  Dorman  v.  State,  48  Fla.  18,  37 

29   Tex.    App.    162,    14    S.    W.    1020,  So.  561 ;  State  v.  Riddle,  179  Mo.  287, 

1021;  People  V.  Barker,  144  Cal.  705,  78  S.  W.  606;   State  v.   Sejours,   113 

78   Pac.  266;    Kirkland  v.    State,    141  La.  676,  37  So.  599;  State  v.  McClel- 

Ala.  45,  37  So.  352;  Robinson  v.  State,  Ian,  79  Kan.   11,  98  Pac.  209;  People 

128  Ga.  254,  57  S.  E.  315.     The  ans-  v.  Lewandowski,  143  Cal.  574,  77  Fac. 

wers   to   inquiries   made   at  the   resi-  467. 

dence  of  the  missing  witness,  or  in  the        ^^  Rixford  v.  Miller,  49  Vt.  319,  325 ; 

neighborhood,    are    admissible.      Mc-  State  v.  Bollero,  112  La.  850,  36  So. 

Collum    V.    State,    supra;    People    v.  754. 
Rowland,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  449,  452.  "Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U. 

"Sullivan    v.    State,    6    Tex.    App.  S.  145,  155,  158,  25  L.  ed.  244;  State 

319,  32  Am.  580;  Brogy  v.  Common-  v.    King,    86    N.    Car.    603;    Reg.    v. 

wealth,  10  Gratt.   (Va.)  722.  Scaife,  5  Cox  C.  C.  243,  2  Den.  C.  C. 

^- State    V.    Stewart,    34    La.    Ann.  281,  17  Q.  B.  238,  242;  Lord  Morley's 

1037;   Summons  v.  State,  5  Ohio  St.  Case,  6  St.  Trials  770;  State  v.  Cole- 

325;    Dolan    V.    State,    40    Ark.    454;  man,  199  Mo.  112,  97  S.  W.  574- 
Collins    V.    Commonwealth,    12    Bush.        ^^  Williams  v.  State,  19  Ga.  402,  403 
(Ky.)    271 ;    McCollum   v.    State,   29 


473  ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES.  §    265 

the  circumstances  indicate  that  he  kept  out  of  the  way  purposely, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  prisoner  to  prove  good  faith. 

Where  the  evidence  of  an  absent  witness  is  admissible,  if  rele- 
vant, is  should  be  excluded  if  it  was  irrelevant  on  the  prior  trial, 
though  through  inadvertence  its  incompetency  was  not  recog- 
nized and  it  was  not  objected  to  at  the  earlier  trial. ^'^  And  the 
testimony  of  one  of  defendant's  witnesses,  at  a  former  trial,  who 
is  absent  from  the  second  trial,  may,  if  he  is  deceased,  be  used  by 
the  state  in  its  own  favor, ^'  or,  if  the  witness  testifies  at  the  later 
trial,  to  impeach  his  credibility.^^ 

§  265.  Cross-examining  and  confronting  witnesses. — Because  of 
the  universal  constitutional  right  of  the  accused  to  confront  the 
witnesses,  it  is  absolutely  necessary,  in  order  that  the  testimony  of 
a  deceased  or  absent  witness  may  be  admissible  at  a  subsequent 
trial  against  the  accused,  that  the  party  against  whom  it  is  offered 
should  have  had  an  opportunity  of  cross-examining  him  at  the 
earlier  trial. ^^  Consequently  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for 
homicide,  the  testimony  taken  at  the  coroner's  inquest,  held  to  in- 
vestigate the  death,  is  not  admissible  against  the  accused  where 
the  witness  cannot  be  produced. "° 

If  the  accused  has  once  enjoyed  his  right  to  confront  witnesses 
his  constitutional  right  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face 
to  face  is  not  violated  by  the  admission  of  the  testimony  of  such 

''Petrie  v.  Columbia  &c.  R.  Co.,  29  Putnal   v.    State    (Fla.),  47    So.  864; 

S.  Car.  303,  317,  7  S.  E.  515.  Pratt  v.   State,  53  Tex.   Cr.  281,   109 

"Hudson    V.    Roos,    76    Mich.    173,  S.   W.    138;    Commonwealth   v.    Len- 

180,  42  N.  W.  1099.  ousky,  206  Pa.  277,  55  Atl.  977. 

^*  Nuzum  V.  State,  88  Ind.  599.  -°  Cline  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  320,  36 

"  O'Brian  v.  Commonwealth,  6  S.  W.  1099,  37-  S.  W.  722,  61  Am.  St. 
Bush  (Ky.)  563;  State  v.  Johnson,  12  Sson ;  State  v.  Campbell,  i  Rich  (S. 
Nev.  121;  State  v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa  Car.)  124;  Whitehurst  v.  Common- 
88,  46  N.  W.  752 ;  Hair  v.  State,  wealth,  79  Va.  556 ;  State  v.  Cecil  Co., 
16  Neb.  601,  60s,  21  N.  W.  464;  54  Md.  426;  McLain  v.  Common- 
Brown  V.  Commonwealth,  73  Pa.  St.  wealth,  99  Pa.  St.  86,  97;  Dupree  v. 
321,  13  Am.  740;  Wray  v.  State,  154  State,  33  Ala.  380,  73  Am.  Dec.  422. 
-Ma.  36,  45  So.  697,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  In  State  v.  McNeil,  33  La.  Ann  1332, 
S- )  493n;  Butler  v.  State,  83  Ark.  the  accused  was  permitted  to  intro- 
272,  103  S.  W.  382;  Smith  V.  State,  48  duce  testimony  received  at  the  cor- 
Tox.  Cr.  65,  85  S.  W.  1 153;  State  v.  oner's  inquest. 
Ilcrlihy,    102    Me.    310,    66   Atl.    643; 


266 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


474 


a  witness,  who  is  absent,  at  a  subsequent  trial. -^  Hence,  if  the 
defendant  was  represented  by  counsel  at  the  preliminary  examina- 
tion and  has  had  an  opportunity  of  cross-examining  the  witnesses, 
he  has  enjoyed  his  right  to  meet  his  accusers  face  to  face,  and  no 
objection  exists  to  receiving  the  testimony  of  deceased  or  insane 
witnesses. -■  But  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine  is  not  shown 
by  evidence  that  the  prisoner's  counsel  at  the  trial  was  also  present 
at  the  preliminary  examination.^^  The  testimony  will  not  be  ex- 
cluded merely  because  the  former  trial  was  conducted  under  an 
unconstitutional  statute  if  the  witness  was  amenable  to  the  penalty 
for  perjury  if  he  testified  falsely.-* 

§  266.  Mode  of  proving  the  evidence  of  the  absent  witness — Sub- 
stance only  need  be  stated. — It  was  formerly  considered  essential 
that  the  person,  testifying  to  the  evidence  of  the  absentee,  should 
state  his  exact  language."^  This  rule  has  been  relaxed.  The  ex- 
act language  need  not  now  be  given  if  the  witness  can  state  ac- 
curately the  substance  of  what  was  said,"*^  and  his  claiming  to 
repeat  verhatim  what  w^as  said  might  be  a  suspicious  circum- 
stance."'    It  is  safe  to  assume,  however,  that  all  the  evidence  of 


^  Commonwealth  v.  Richards,  i8 
Pick.  (Alass.)  434,  438,  29  Am.  Dec. 
608;  State  V.  McO'Blenis,  24  Mo. 
402,  69  Am.  Dec.  435;  People  v.  Pen- 
hollow,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.)  103,  106; 
State  V.  Walton  (Ore.  1909),  99  Pac. 
431 ;  Arnwine  v.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr. 
213,  114  S.  W.  796,  802;  Putnal  V. 
State  (Fla.),  47  So.  864.  Depositions 
once  legally  taken  may  be  used  in  a 
subsequent  trial.  Johnson  v.  State, 
I  Tex.  App.  2,23- 

-Lucas  V.  State,  96  Ala.  51,  11  So. 
216;  Commonwealth  v.  Cleary,  148 
Pa.  St.  26,  23  Atl.  mo,  11 13;  Sulli- 
van V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  319,  32  Am. 
580;  Commonwealth  v.  Keck,  148  Pa. 
St.  639,  24  Atl.  161 ;  State  v.  Mc- 
O'Blenis, 24  Mo.  402,  69  Am.  Dec. 
435 ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa  268, 
19  N.  W.  202 ;  People  v.  Newman,  5 
Hill  (N.  Y.)  295. 


"Jackson  v.  Crilly,  16  Colo.  103. 
109,  26  Pac.  331. 

"  State  V.  Johnson,  12  Nev.  121,  124. 

"  I  Greenleaf  on  Ev.,  §  165 ;  Rex  v. 
Jolliffe,  4  T.  R.  285;  Montgomery  v. 
State,  II  Ohio  424;  United  States  v. 
Wood,  3  Wash.   C.   C.    (U.   S.)   440, 

28  Fed.  Cas.  16756;  Commonwealth  v. 
Richards,   18  Pick.    (Mass.)   434,  438, 

29  Am.  Dec.  608. 

="  State  V.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa  88,  46 
N.  W.  752;  People  v.  Murphy,  45 
Cal.  137;  State  v.  Hooker,  17  Vt.  658; 
Brown  v.  Commonwealth,  y^i  Pa-  St. 
321,  13  Am.  740;  State  v.  Able,  65 
Mo.  357,  369,  373;  Davis  v.  State,  17 
Ala.  354,  357;  Commonwealth  v.  God- 
dard,  14  Gray.  (Mass.)  402;  Jackson 
v.  State,  81  Wis.  127,  51  N.  W.  89. 

"' Cornell  v.  Green,  10  S.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
14;  Ruch  V.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S. 
693,  24  L.  ed.  iioi ;  Putnal  v.  State 
(Fla.),  47  So.  864. 


475  ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES.  §    26/ 

the  witness  bearing  upon  any  particular  point,  must  be  repeated 
in  language  as  nearly  identical  with  that  originally  used  as  pos- 
sible, so  that  the  effect  which  is  produced  may  correspond  with  the 
impression  made  upon  the  jury  by  the  testimony  of  the  witness 
at  the  former  trial.  Hence  the  evidence,  which  was  elicited  upon 
the  cross-examination  of  the  witness,  must  be  substantially  re- 
peated.'* A  witness  who  is  relating  the  substance  of  the  evidence 
of  an  absent  witness,  should  be  required  to  state  all  the  material 
facts  concerned  in  the  issue  in  the  later  trial,  so  that  his  testimony 
may  not  present  the  evidence  of  the  absent  witness  in  a  loose  and 
fragmentary  condition,  or  suggest  that  some  important  part  has 
been  forgotten.  If,  however,  the  memory  of  the  witness  is  weak 
as  to  incidental  or  immaterial  facts,  the  court  should  not  therefore 
exclude  the  testimony;  for,  if  it  appears  complete  and  substantially 
inclusive  of  what  was  said,  it  should  go  to  the  jurors.  Slight 
inaccuracies,  omissions  or  contradiction,  are  for  them  to  consider 
in  estimating  its  weight  and  credibility.  But  where,  from  the 
language  or  demeanor  of  the  witness,  it  is  obviously  apparent  that 
he  has  forgotten  the  substance  of,^^  or  has  intentionally  omitted  a 
material  part  of  what  was  said,^°  he  is  incompetent.  Because  of 
lack  of  facilities  in  early  times  for  taking  down  testimony  in  writ- 
ing with  rapidity  and  correctness  it  was  a  universal  custom,  and 
in  fact  a  rule  for  the  common  law,  to  receive  only  the  oral  nar- 
rative of  a  person  who  heard  the  testimony  on  the  former  trial  as 
the  best  and  perhaps  the  only  evidence  of  it. 

^  267.  Stenographer's  notes,  judge's  minutes  and  bill  of  exceptions 
when  used  to  prove  the  evidence  of  the  absent  witness. — The  employ- 
ment of  a  court  stenograjjher  whose  duty  it  is  to  take  the  oral 
evidence  is  now  nearly  universal.  He  is  a  sworn  officer,  and  his 
notes,  or  transcripts  thereof,  possess  an  official  character  which 
renders  them  of  great  value  in  case  of  the  subsequent  death  or 
absence  of  a  witness.    If  the  statute  provides  for  thus  preserving 

^'Wade  V.   State,  7  Baxt.    (Tenn.)  "» Puryear    v.    State,    63    Ga.    692; 

^,  81 ;   and,   see  civil  cases  cited  in  Bush  v.  Commonwealth,  80  Ky.  244, 

Undcrhill  on  Ev.,  p.  171,  note  4.    The  3  Cr.  L.  Mag.  505,  506,  507. 

objection  that  the  witness  fails  to  re-  ^"Tharp  v.  State,  15  Ala.  749;  Com- 

member     the     cross-examination      is  monwealth     v.     Richards,     18     Pick, 

waived  if  not  made  immediately.  State  (Mass.)   434,  438,  439,  29  Am.   Dec. 

V.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa  88,  46  N.  W.  752.  608. 


267 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


476 


evidence,  the  production  of  such  records  on  a  subsequent  trial 
may  be  required  as  the  best  proof. ^^  If  the  stenographer's  notes 
are  not  made  evidence  by  statute,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary 
implication,  they  are  not  admissible  as  such  while  he  is  alive  ;^- 
though,  perhaps,  after  his  death  they  might  be  received  as  the 
entries  of  a  third  person  made  in  the  course  of  his  employment.^^ 
If  the  reporter  is  called  as  a  witness  they  may  be  used  to  refresh 
liis  memory,  and  may  even  be  read  by  him  on  the  stand,  if  he  can 
swear  they  were  made  when  the  testimony  was  taken,  contain 
its  substance  and  are  accurate.^* 

A  stenographer's  notes  taken  out  of  the  jurisdiction.""  or  not 
made  by  or  under  the  direction  of  a  magistrate,  or  not  signed  by 
the  witnesses,  or  taken  from  the  lips  of  an  interpreter  where  a 
witness  testifies  in  a  foreign  tongue,^"  have  been  rejected.  But 
the  oral  testimony  of  the  stenographer  after  refreshing  his  mem- 
ory by  notes  is  always  admissible,  though  his  notes  may  not  be 
evidence,^^   even   though   their  correctness   be  not  conclusively 


"  Sage  V.  State,  127  Ind.  15,  26  X. 
E.  667;  Jackson  v.  State,  81  Wis.  127, 
51  X.  W.  89;  Burnett  v.  State,  87  Ga. 
622,  13  S.  E.  552;  Matthews  v.  State, 
96  Ala.  62,  II  So.  203;  Sullivan  v. 
State,  6  Tex.  App.  319,  32  Am.  580; 
People  V.  Garnett,  9  Cal.  App.  194, 
98  Pac.  247;  Morawitz  v.  State,  49 
Tex.  Cr.  366,  91  S.  W.  227;  State  v. 
Heffernan  (S.  Dak.),  118  X.  W.  1027; 
State  V.  Laird,  79  Kan.  681,  100  Pac. 
637 ;  Jones  v.  State,  128  Ga.  23,  57  S.  E. 
313;  Sanford  v.  State,  143  Ala.  78,  39 
So.  370;  United  States  v.  Greene,  146 
Fed.  796;  People  v.  Buckley,  143  Cal. 
375,  77  Pac.  169;  Fertig  v.  State,  lOO 
Wis.  301,  75  N.  W.  960.  Unless  the 
statute  in  terms  provides  that  the 
notes  are  evidence  when  certified  by 
the  reporter,  they  must  be  authenti- 
cated in  the  mode  prescribed  for  the 
authentication  of  judicial  records. 
Rounds  V.  State,  57  Wis.  45,  14  X. 
W.  865  ;  State  v.  Frederic,  69  Mq.  400. 
See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  146. 

^'  State    V.    Frederic,    69    Me.    400 ; 


People  V.  IMcConnell,  146  111.  532,  34 
N.  E.  945;  Rounds  v.  State,  57  Wis. 
45,  47,  52,  14  X.  W.  865;  Dowd  v. 
State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  563,  108  S.  W.  389- 
^'^  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §§  58,  146. 
"People  V.  Sligh,  48  Mich.  54,  58, 
II  X.  W.  782;  Jackson  v.  State,  81 
Wis.  127,  51  X.  W.  89;  Common- 
wealth V.  Goddard,  14  Gray.  (Mass.) 
402;  Hair  v.  State,  16  Xeb.  601,  606,  21 
X.  W.  464;  Horton  v.  State,  53  Ala. 
488;  State  V.  Kendig,  133  Iowa  164, 
no  X.  W.  463;  IMiller  v.  People,  216 
111.  309,  74  X.  E.  743;  Flohr  V.  Ter- 
ritory, 14  Okla.  477,  78  Pac.  565 
Austin  V.  Commonwealth,  124  Ky 
55,  98  S.  W.  295,  30  Ky.  L.  295 ;  Bur- 
ton V.  State,  115  Ala.  i,  22  So.  585 
State  V.  Fetterly,  33  Wash.  599,  74 
Pac.  810;  Hobbs  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr. 
71,  112  S.  W.  308;  Fuqua  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 118  Ky.  578,  81  S.  W 
923,  26  Ky.  L.  420. 

""  Herrick  v.  Swomley,  56  ?kld.  439 
'"People  v.  Ah  Yute,  56  Cal.  ii9- 
"State  V.  Freidrich,  4  Wash.  204, 


477  ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES.  §    268 

shown.  But  the  notes  must  be  shown  to  the  opposite  party,  and 
he  must  have  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine  to  test  their  accu- 
racy.^* It  is  never  permissible  on  the  later  trial  to  show  contra- 
dictory statements  to  impeach  the  testimony  of  an  absent  witness. 
The  law  requires  that  the  witness  himself  should  be  interrogated, 
giving  the  particulars  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  contradictory 
utterances.^'' 

The  judge's  notes  are  not  evidence  of  what  the  witness  said, 
and,  as  a  rule,  they  can  be  used  only  to  refresh  the  memory  of 
a  witness.'**'  Their  incompetency  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are 
not  a  part  of  the  record,  and  are  not  made  within  the  scope  of 
official  duty,  or  under  the  sanction  of  an  official  oath,  which  would 
guaranty  that  they  are  complete  or  correct.  For  the  same  reasons 
if  it  is  sought  to  show,  by  the  bill  of  exceptions  or  case  on  appeal, 
the  testimony  of  an  absent  witness,  a  foundation  must  first  be  laid 
by  proving  (and  for  this  purpose  the  certification  and  authentica- 
tion by  the  court  in  accordance  with  the  statute  is  usually  suffi- 
cient) that  the  bill  does  actually  contain  all  the  evidence  given 
by  the  witness.*^  It  is  a  preliminary  question  for  the  court,  upon 
which  it  is  error  to  refuse  or  neglect  to  rule,  whether  in  any  case 
it  is  proper  to  admit  the  testimony  of  the  witness  given  at  a  prior 
proceeding.*" 

?  268.  Continuance  when  granted  because  of  absence  of  witness — 
Discretionary  power  of  the  court. — The  rules  governing  continu- 

29  Pac.  1055,  30  Pac.  328,  31  Pac.  332;  5  Cox  C.  C.  197,  203;  State  v.  Her- 

People   V.    Chung   Ah    Chue,    57   Cal.  lihy,  102  Me.  310,  66  Atl.  643;  Butler 

'567;  State  V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.   i,  12  v.  State,  83  Ark.  272,  103  S.  W.  382. 

Pac.    318;    Shackelford    v.    State,    33  See,  also,  civil  cases  in  Underhill  on 

Ark.  539.    Cf.  Cravens  v.  State  (Tex.  Ev.,  p.   172. 

Cr.  1907),  103  S.  W.  921 ;  Kimberly  V.        ''^  Kean  v.  Commonw^calth,  10  Bush 

State,  4  Ga.  App.  852,  62  S.  E.  571.  (Ky.)   190,  19  Am.  63;  State  v.  Able, 

'^  People  V.  Lem  You,  97  Cal.  224,  65    Mo.    357;    Woollen   v.    Wire,    no 

32  Pac.  II.  Ind.  251,  II  N.  E.  236;  Case  v.  Blood, 

^^  Pruitt    v.    State,    92    Ala.    41,   43,  71  lov^a  632,  33  N.  W.   144;   Slinger- 

9    So.    406;    Matthevirs    v.    State,    96  land    v.    Slingerland,    46    Minn.    100, 

Ala.  62,  II   So.  203;  State  v.  Hunter,  103,  48  N.  W.  605;  Dwyer  v.  Rippc- 

70  S.  Car.  84,  60  S.  E.  241.  toe,  72  Tex.  520,  10  S.  W.  668.     And 

''State  v.  Dewitt,  2  Hill  (S.  Car.)  cases  cited  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  172. 
282,  27  Am.  Dec.  371 ;  Reg.  v.  Child,        "  People  v.  Willett,  92  N.  Y.  29. 


268 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


478 


ances  are  substantially  the  same  in  criminal  and  civil  cases,*''  but 
generally  in  the  former  an  application  for  a  continuance,  coming 
from  the  accused,  may  be  scanned  with  some  suspicion  because  of 
his  natural  desire  for  delay,** 

Neither  the  defendant  nor  the  prosecution  can  claim  to  have 

unlimited  continuances  granted.  A  continuance  is  not  always  a 
matter  of  right.  It  lies  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court 
to  grant  and  its  action  will  not  be  reviewed,  or  a  new  trial  granted 

to  the  defendant,  for  a  refusal  to  grant  a  continuance,  unless  there 
has  been  a  palpable  abuse  of  that  discretion  to  his  disadvantage.*'^ 

*^  People  V.  Vermikea,  7  Cow.   (N.  State,  139  Ala.  i,  2^  So.  1025;  Gers- 

Y.)    369,   384;    Howard   v.   Common-  tenkorn  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  621,  44 

wealth    (Ky),  80  S.  W.  817,  26  Ky.  S.  W.  503;  Clements  v.  State,  51  Fla. 

L.   148,  reversed  on  rehearing   (Ky),  6,  40  So.  432;   State  v.  Chitman,  117 

26  Ky.  L.  465,  81  S.  W.  689;  People  La.  950,  42  So.  437;  State  v.  Thomp- 

V.  Plyler,  121  Cal.  160,  53  Pac.  553;  son,  121   La.   1051,  46  So.  1013;  AIc- 

Ewert   V.    State,  48   Fla.   36,   Z7   So.  Farland  v.  State,  83  Ark.  98,  103  S. 

334.  W.    i6g;    Sisk    v.    State     (Tex.    Cr. 

"Ballard  v.  State,  31  Fla.  266,  282,  1897),  42  S.  W.  985;  Early  v.  State, 

12  So.  865;  Gardner  v.  United  States,  51  Tex.  Cr.  382,  103  S.  W.  868,   123 

5  Ind.  Ter.  150,  82  S.  W.  704.  Am.  St.  889;  Dallas  v.  State,  129  Ga. 

■^  State    V.    Johnson,    47    La.    Ann.  602,  59  S.  E.  279;  Lewis  v.  State,  129 

1225,   17   So.  789;    State  V.   Dettmer,  Ga.    731,    59    S.    E.    782;    People    v. 

124    Mo.   426,   432,   27    S.    W.    1117;  Grill,  151  Cal.  592,  91  Pac.  515;  Peo- 

People  V.    Considine,    105    Mich.    149,  pie  v.  Fong  Chung,  5  Cal.  App.  587, 

62,   X.   W.    196;    State   V.   Liicker,   40  91    Pac.    105,    People    v.    Boyd,    151 

S.  Car.  549,  550,  18  S.  E.  797)  Walker  Mich.  577,  ii5  N.  W.  687,  15  Detroit 

V.  State,  136  Ind.  663,  666,  36  N.  E.  Leg.    N.    36;    Gallaher    v.    State,    78 

356;  Walker  v.  State,  91  Ala.  y6,  79,  Ark.  299,  95  S.  W.  463;  Goddard  v. 

9   So.   87;    Ballard  v.   State,  31    Fla.  State,   78   Ark.   226,   95    S.    W.   4/6; 

266,  281,  12  So.  865;  Brown  v.  State,  State  v.  Johnson,   136  Iowa  601,   in 

85  Tenn.  439;  Hardesty  v.  Common-  X.   W.    827;    State   v.    Kenny,    yy    S. 

wealth,  88  Ky.  537,  11   S.  W.  589,  11  Car.  236,  57  S.  E.  859;  Shaw  v.  State 

Ky.  L.  43;  State  v.  Wyse,  Z3  S.  Car.  (Tex.    Cr.),    105    S.    W.    500;    Ryder 

582,  12  S.  E.  556;  Price  v.  People,  131  v.   State,   100  Ga.  528,  28  S.   E.  246, 

111.   223,    22,    X.    E.    639;    Jackson   v.  62  Am.    St.   334,  38   L.   R.   A.   72in; 

State,    54   Ark.    243,    15    S.    W.    607;  Turner  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.)  46  S.  W. 

Woolfolk  V.   State,  85   Ga.  69,   11   S.  830;   IMoss  v.   State,   152  Ala.  30,  44 

E.  814;  Thompson  v.  Commonwealth,  So.  598;  Isham  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.), 

88  Va.  45,   13   S.  E.   304;   Kefifer  v.  49  S.  W.  581;  State  v.  Burns,  148  Mo. 

State,  12  Wyo.  49,  y^  Pac.  556;  State  167,  49  S.  W.  1005,  71  Am.  St.  588; 

V.    Ripley,    32    Wash.    182,    y2    Pac.  State  v.  Cochran,  147  Mo.  504,  49  S. 

1036;    Commonwealth   v.    Delero,  218  W.  558;  Clinton  v.  State,  53  Fla.  98, 

Pa.  487,  67  Atl.  764;  Stevens  v.  State,  43  So.  312. 
138  Ala.   71,   35    So.    122;   Kroell   v. 


479  ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES.  §    269 

This  general  principle,  however,  must  be  taken  with  the  quali- 
fication that  the  discretion  of  the  court  must  be  exercised  in  a 
reasonable  and  not  in  an  arbitrary  or  capricious  manner.  The 
statutory  and  constitutional  rights  and  privileges  of  the  prisoner 
must  be  considered.  His  right  to  a  fair  and  impartial  jury  trial, 
to  procure  and  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses,  to  be  repre- 
sented by  counsel,  and  to  have  a  reasonably  full  opportunity  to 
consult  with  counsel  and  to  prepare  his  defense ;  must  be  respected, 
and  a  refusal  to  grant  a  continuance,  which  results  in  depriving 
him  of  any  of  these  rights,  constitutes  reversible  error.**'  Often 
the  matter  is  regulated  by  statute  under  which  a  continuance  is 
granted  as  a  matter  of  right.  All  defendants  jointly  tried  are, 
under  such  a  statute,  entitled  to  the  same  privilege  in  this  respect. 

§  269.  Due  diligence  in  summoning  witness  must  be  proved — The 
competency  and  materiality  of  his  testimony  must  appear. — In  order 
to  obtain  a  continuance  because  of  the  absence  of  a  witness,  cer- 
tain facts  must  appear  from  the  affidavits  presented  in  support 
of  the  motion. 

First,  it  must  be  shown  that  due  diligence  was  employed  to 
ascertain  his  whereabouts  and  secure  his  attendance.  The  de- 
fendant should  promptly,  upon  his  arrest,  ascertain  who  and 
where  his  witnesses  are,  and  should  procure  subpoenas  or,  if  neces- 

^Claxon  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  v.   State,  53  Tex.  Cr.   16,   108  S.  W. 

30  S.  W.  998,  17  Ky.  L.  284;   State  372;  State  v.  VonKutzleben,  136  Iowa 

V.   Xewsum,   129  Mo.   154,  31   S.  W.  89,   113  N.  W.  484;  Brown  v.  State, 

605;  Delk  V.  State,  100  Ga.  61,  27  S.  120  Ga.  145,  47  S.  E.  543;  Brooks  v. 

E.  152;  Johnson  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  458,  60  S.  E.  211, 

201,    107   S.   W.   52;    Magee   v.    State  213;   State  v.   Morgan,  27  Utah    103, 

(Miss.),    45     So.     360;     Johnson    v.  74  Pac.  526;  State  v.  Cummings,  189 

Commonwealth  (Ky),  107  S.  W.  768,  Mo.    626,    88    S.    W.    706;    State    v. 

32  Ky.  L.  1 1 17;  Swan  v.  State  (Tex.  Timberlake,  50  La.  Ann.  308,  23   So. 

Cr.),  76  S.   W.  464;   White  v.   State  276.     No  constitutional  objections  can 

(Miss.),  45  So.  611;  Moore  v.  Com-  exist  to  a  statute  permitting  a  party 

monwealth    (Ky.),  81    S.   W.   669,  26  to  avoid  a  continuance  by  admitting 

Ky.  L.  356;   Mays  v.  Commonwealth  an    absent   witness   will   testify,   in   a 

(Ky.),  76  S.  W.  162,  25  Ky.  L.  646;  civil  case,  as  alleged  in  the  affidavit. 

Long  V.   State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  461,  537,  But  the  action  of  the  legislature,  in 

46  S.  W.  821,  "j-i)  Am.  St.  954;  Foster  making  such  a  statute  apply  to  crim- 

V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  137,  105  S.  W.  inal   trials,   is   unconstitutional.     Gra- 

498;    State   V.   Hesterly,    182   Mo.    16,  ham  v.  State,  50  Ark.   161,  167,  6  S. 

81  S.  W.  624,  103  Am.  St.  634;  Wingo  W.  721. 


§  269 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


480 


saiy,  attachments,  for  them  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable.  He 
has  no  right  to  delay  until  a  very  few  days  before  the  trial,  and 
then  to  demand  a  postponement  because  his  witnesses  do  not 
attend.-*' 

The  competency  and  materiality  of  the  testimony  which  the 
absent  witness  is  expected  to  give  must  also  be  shown.    It  must 


*'  Chapman  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr., 
1895).  30  S.  W.  225;  State  V.  Lange, 
59  Mo.  418;  Pullen  v.  State,  ir  Tex. 
App.  89;  Pettit  V.  State,  135  Ind. 
393,  405,  406,  34  X.  E.  1 1 18;  State 
V.  Hagan,  22  Kan.  490;  Mackey  v. 
Commonwealth,  80  Ky.  345 ;  Wray 
V.  People,  78  111.  212;  Trask  v.  Peo- 
ple, 151  111.  523,  527,  38  N.  E.  248; 
State  V.  Smith,  8  Rich  (S.  Car.)  460; 
State  V.  Dixon,  47  La.  Ann.  i,  3,  16 
So.  589;  Blige  V.   State,  20  Fla.  742, 

51  Am.  628;  McDermott  v.  State,  89 
Ind.  187;  State  v.  Veillon  (La.,  1897), 
21  So.  856;  Robinson  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.,  1898),  48  S.  W.  176;  Carter  v. 
State  (Miss.  1898),  24  So.  307;  Hull 
V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  607,  100  S.  W. 
403;  Shelton  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
627,  100  S.  W.  955 ;  Ishani  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.,  1899),  49  S.  W.  594;  State 
V.  Kindred,  148  Mo.  270,  49  S.  W. 
845;  State  V.  Crane,  202  Mo.  54,  100 
S.  W.  422;  State  V.  Burns,  124  Iowa 
207,  99  N.  W.  721 ;  State  v.  Brown,  62 
W.  Va.  546,  59  S.  E.  508;  State  v. 
Rabens,  79  S.  Car.  542,  60  S.  E.  442, 
mo;    State   v.   Burns,    19   Wash.   52, 

52  Pac.  316;  State  v.  Mills,  79  S. 
Car.  187,  60  S.  E.  664;  Jackson  v. 
State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  215,  91  S.  W.  788; 
Early  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  382,  103 
S.  W.  868,  123  Am.  St.  889;  State  v. 
Morgan,  27  Utah  103,  74  Pac.  526; 
State  V.  Thompson,  141  Mo.  408,  42  S. 
W.  949;  McQueen  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky),  88  S.  W.  1047,  28  Ky.  L.  20; 


White  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1906),  98 
S.  W.  264;  Sizemore  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  108  S.  W.  254,  2>2  Ky. 
L.  1 1 54;  Hughes  V.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  80  S.  W.  197,  25  Ky.  L.  2153; 
Mullins  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  79 
S.  W.  258,  25  Ky.  L.  2044;  O'Rear  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  78  S.  W.  407, 
25  Ky.  L.  1537;  Garza  v.  State,  39 
Tex.  Cr.  358,  46  S.  W.  242,  y^i  Am. 
St.  927;  Weaver  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr. 
II,  105  S.  W.  189;  State  V.  Tucker,  72 
Kan.  481,  84  Pac.  126;  Melbourne  v. 
State,  51  Fla.  69,  40  So.  189;  Williams 
V.  State,  53  Fla.  89,  43  So.  428;  Harter 
V.  People,  204  111.  158,  68  N.  E.  447; 
High  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1906),  98  S. 
W.  849;  Tanner  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
1898),  44  S.  W.  489;  Harmanson  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  1897),  42  S.  W.  995; 
Davis  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1907),  102 
S.  W.  1 1 50;  Gerstenkorn  v.  State,  38 
Tex.  Cr.  621,  44  S.  W.  503;  Kroell  v. 
State,  139  Ala.  i,  36  So.  1025;  Bynum 
V.  State,  46  Fla.  142,  35  So.  65 ;  Welty 
V.  United  States,  14  Okla.  7,  76  Pac. 
121 ;  Watts  V.  State,  90  Miss.  757,  44 
So.  36;  People  V.  Browne,  118  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  793,  103  N.  Y.  S.  903,  21 
N.  Y.  Cr.  91,  aff'd  in  189  N.  Y.  528,  82 
N.  E.  1 130;  Stegar  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.), 
105  S.  W.  789 ;  People  v.  Melandrez,  4 
Cal.  App.  396,  88  Pac.  27^)  Kidd  v. 
State,  loi  Ga.  528,  28  S.  E.  990.  The 
burden  of  proof  to  show  diligence  is 
on  the  accused.  Walker  v.  State, 
13  Tex.  App.  618. 


48 1 


ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES. 


269 


reasonably  appear  that  the  testimony  of  such  a  witness  will,  if 
introduced,  influence  the  verdict.'** 

If  from  the  evidence  already  received  it  is  apparent  that  the  ab- 
sent witness  has  no  knowledge  of  the  matter  in  issue,'*®  or  if  the 
evidence  to  be  procured  is  merely  cumulative,^"  or  if  the  court 
has  sufficient  reason  for  believing  that  certain  facts  which  the 
absent  witness  is  expected  to  controvert  are  already  so  far  sus- 


**  Gilcrease  v.  State,  ss  Tex.  Cr. 
619,  28  S.  W.  531;  Cannon  v.  State, 
60  Ark.  564,  576,  31  S.  W.  150,  32 
S.  W.  128;  Land  v.  State,  34  Tex. 
Cr.  330,  30  S.  W.  788;  Crumpton  v. 
United  States,  138  U.  S.  361,  34  L. 
ed.  959,  II  Sup.  Ct.  355;  Dow  v. 
State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  278,  20  S.  W.  583; 
Knowles  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  383,  20 
S.  W.  829;  Polin  V.  State,  14  Neb. 
540,  16  N.  W.  898;  State  v.  Bennett, 
52  Iowa  724,  2  N.  W.  1103;  State  v. 
Falconer,  70  Iowa  416,  30  N.  "W.  655 ; 
People  V.  Anderson,  53  Mich.  60,  18 
X.  W.  561 ;  Moody  v.  People,  20  111. 
316;  Steele  v.  People,  45  111.  152; 
State  V.  Turlington,  102  Mo.  642,  15 
S.  W.  141 ;  Strauss  v.  State,  58  Miss. 
53;  People  V.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  369;  State  V.  Spillman,  43  La. 
.Ann.  loor,  10  So.  198;  Isham  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  1899),  49  S.  W.  581; 
State  V.  Cochran,  147  Mo.  504,  49  S. 
W.  558;  State  V.  Kindred,  148  Mo. 
270,  49  S.  W.  845 ;  Tanner  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.,  1898),  44  S.  W.  489;  Clem- 
ents V.  State,  51  Fla.  6,  40  So.  432; 
Williams  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  352, 
102  S.  'W.  1 147;  Morphew  v.  State, 
84  Ark.  487,  106  S.  W.  480;  Holley  v. 
State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  306,  92  S.  W.  422, 
122  Am.  St.  810;  Harris  v.  State,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  118,  105  S.  W.  801.  For 
example,  a  continuance  will  be  re- 
fused in  a  murder  trial  where  the  ab- 
sent witness  was  expected  merely  to 
prove  that  unknown  persons  had 
ilireatcned  the  deceased.  Boyett  v. 
31 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


State,  26  Tex.  App.  689,  9  S.  W.  275 ; 
Stapleton  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
3  S.  W.  793. 

^"Griffin  V.  State  (Tex.,  1892),  20 
S.  W.  552;  Jones  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
Cr.  177,  20  S.  W.  354;  Childs  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  1893),  22  S.  'W.  1039;  State 
V.  Crane,  202  Mo.  54,  100  S.  W.  422; 
House  V.  State,  139  Ala.  132,  36  So. 
732;  State  V.  Kemp,  120  La.  378,  45 
So.  283 ;  State  v.  Horn,  209  Mo.  452, 
108  S.  'W.  3 ;  State  v.  'Woodward,  182 
Mo.  391,  81  S.  W.  857,  103  Am.  St. 
646n;  State  v.  Pope,  78  S.  Car.  264, 
58  S.  E.  815;  Kennedy  v.  State,  loi 
Ga.  559,  28  S.  E.  979. 

^"Nelms  V.  State,  58  Miss.  362; 
Varnadoe  v.  State,  67  Ga.  768;  Robin- 
son V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1898),  48  S. 
■W.  176;  State  V.  Crane,  202  Mo.  54, 
100  S.  'W.  422;  Dudley  v.  State,  40 
Tex.  Cr.  31,  48  S.  W.  179;  "Vanata  v. 
State,  82  Ark.  203,  loi  S.  'W.  169; 
Richie  v.  State,  85  Ark.  413,  108  S. 
"W.  511;  State  V.  Horn,  209  Mo.  452, 
108  S.  'W.  3;  State  V.  Hasty,  121 
Iowa  507,  96  N.  'W.  1115;  Mullins  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  79  S.  W.  258, 
25  Ky.  L.  2044;  Williams  v.  State,  45 
Tex.  Cr.  218,  75  S.  W.  859;  Wash- 
ington V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  542,  103 
S.  W.  879;  Kelley  v.  United  States, 
7  Ind.  Ter.  241,  T04  S.  W.  604; 
Cravens  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1907),  103 
S.  W.  921 ;  Dean  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  78  S.  W.  1 1 12,  25  Ky.  L. 
1876. 


§    270  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  482 

tained  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  his  testimony 
bearing  thereon  would  beuntrue,^^  a  continuance  may  be  denied.'" 

§  270.  What  facts  the  affidavit  for  continuance  must  contain. — 
The  affidavit  for  the  continuance  must  show  the  names  of  the 
absent  witnesses  and  their  residences,  if  known/'^  and  the  specific 
facts  to  which  the  witnesses  will  testify,  their  connection  with  and 
relevancy  to  the  subject-matter.^*    Merely  to  allege  in  the  affida- 

"  Brown  v.  State,  ^2  Tex.  Cr.   119,  129  Ga.  602,   59  S.   E.  279;    Rush   v. 

22  S.  W.  596;  Rollins  V.  State  (Tex.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1903),  76  S.  W.  927; 

Cr.   1892),  20  S.  W.  358;   Borroun  v.  Wiggins  v.  State,   loi   Ga.  501,  29  S. 

State    (Miss.,    1897),  22   So.   62;   An-  E.   26;    Territory   v.    Dooley,   3   Ariz, 

drews  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  100  S.  W.  60,  78  Pac.   138;   State  v.  Cummings, 

922;  Cravens  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  103  189  Mo.  626,  88  S.  W.  706;  State  v. 

S.  W.  921 ;  Robinson  v.   State   (Tex.  Teachey,    138   N.    Car.   587,   50   S.   E. 

Cr.  1898),  48  S.  W.  176.  232;  Renfroe  v.  State,  84  Ark.  16,  104 

"Benson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  103  S.  S.  W.  542;  State  v.  Howard,  120  La. 

W.    911;    Blanks    v.    Commonwealth,  311,  45  So.  260;   State  v.  Leary,   in 

105    Ky.    41,   48    S.    W.    161,    20   Ky.  La.  301,  35  So.  559;  Vanata  v.  State, 

L.     1037;     State    V.     Timberlake,    50  82  Ark.  203,  loi  S.  W.  169.    That  the 

La.    An.    308,    2^    So.    276;     Harris  witness  has  knowledge  of  such  facts. 

V.    State,    52    Tex.    Cr.    118,    105    S.  Long    v.    People,    34    111.    App.    481; 

W.  801.     It  has  been  held  not  error  Benge   v.    Commonwealth,   92   Ky.    i, 

■to   refuse  the  accused  a  continuance  17  S.  W.  146,  13  Ky.  L.  308.    That  the 

asked  merely  to  enable  him  to  procure  affiant    believes    the    evidence    of    the 

witnesses    to    prove    his    good    char-  witness  to  be  true.     State  v.   Dusen- 

acter.     Steele  v.    People,  45   111.   152;  berry,    112   Mo.   277,   20    S.    W.   461; 

McNealy  v.  State,  17  Fla.  198.  North  v.  People,  139  111.  81,  28  N.  E. 

"State  V.  Underwood,  76  Mo.  630;  966.     That   he  also  believes  that   his 

Colton  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  50 ;  State  testimony   can   be    procured    in    time, 

v.  Horn,  209  Mo.  452,   108  S.  W.  3;  stating  the  grounds   for   such  belief. 

Xick  V.  State,  128  Ga.  573,  58  S.  E.  Shirwin  v.  People,  69  111.  55 ;  Austine 

48;  State  V.  Jones,  53  W.  Va.  613,  45  v.  People,  no  111.  248;  State  v.  Har- 

S.  E.  916;  State  v.  Morgan,  27  Utah  rison,  36  W.  Va.  729,  15  S.  E.  982,  18 

103,   74   Pac.   526 ;    State   v.    Kindred,  L.   R.   A.  224n ;    People   v.    McCrory, 

148  Mo.  270,  49  S.  W.  845.  41  Cal.  458;  Skates  v.  State,  64  Miss. 

"  Long  V.    People,    135   111.   435,   25  644,  i   So.  843,  60  Am.  7on ;   State  v. 

X.    E.   851,    10    L.    R.    A.   48;    State  Moultrie,  33  La.  Ann.  1146;  State  v. 

V.     Manceaux,     42     La.     Ann.     n64,  Burwell,    34    Kan.    312,    8    Pac.    470; 

8    So.    297;    Carthaus    v.    State,    78  Faulkner  v.  Territory,  6  N.  Mex.  464, 

Wis.     560,     47     N.     W.     629;     State  30  Pac.  905;  State  v.  Aired,  n5  Mo. 

V.     Benge,     61      Iowa     658,     17     N.  471,  22   S.    W.   363.   and   that   proper 

W.    100;    Holland    v.    State,   31    Tex.  diligence  has  been  employed  to  pro- 

Cr.  345,  20  S.  W.  750;  Dallas  v.  State,  cure    the   attendance   of   the   witness. 


483  ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES.  §    2/1 

vit  that  proper  diligence  has  been  employed  to  procure  the  attend- 
ance of  the  witness  is  not  enough.  Facts  constituting  diligence 
must  appear.  Thus  where  it  appears  that  the  witness  was  at  one 
time  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  it  must  appear  that  a  sub- 
pcena  was  seasonably  and  properly  issued  and  duly  served  on  him 
to  procure  his  attendance. ^^  But  under  some  circumstances  ac- 
tual service  of  a  subpoena  is  not  required,  if  it  be  shown  that  one 
was  issued  and  seasonably  delivered  to  the  proper  officer  for 
service,  and  that  he  has  made  a  return  thereon  that  the  witness 
cannot  be  found. ^^ 

If  a  witness  is  bound  over  to  appear,  the  accused  is  not  under 
the  necessity  of  serving  him  with  a  subpoena.  But  the  fact  that 
the  magistrate,  at  the  preliminary  examination,  admonished  a 
witness  to  attend  at  the  trial  does  not  excuse  the  defendant  from 
serving  him  with  process  and  then  demanding  a  continuance 
because  of  his  absence.^" 

§  271.  Admissions  to  avoid  continuance — Constitutional  right  of 
the  accused  to  enjoy  the  benefit  of  oral  testimony. — The  authorities 
are  divided  on  the  question  whether  the  state  can  defeat  the  de- 
fendant's motion  for  a  continuance  to  procure  the  testimonv  of 
an  absent  witness  by  a  mere  admission  that  he  will  testify  to  the 
facts  which  the  affidavit  states  the  defendant  expects  to  prove. 
Some  of  the  cases,  basing  their  reasoning  upon  the  existing  con- 
stitutional guaranty  that  the  prisoner  shall  have  the  personal 
presence  of  witnesses  in  his  own  behalf,  maintain  the  negative. 
Hence,  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  a  statute  providing  that 
the  defendant  shall  not  be  entitled  to  a  continuance  if  the  state 

Havcrstick  v.  State,  6  Tnd.  App.  595,  Dingman  v.  .State,  48  Wis.  485,  4  N. 

32  N.  E.  785;  Vogt  V.  Commonwealth,  W.  668;  State  v.  Burns,  54  Mo.  274; 

92  Ky.  68,   17  S.  W.  213,   13  Ky.   L.  Roussell  v.  Commonwealth,  28  Gratt. 

376.     That  the  witnesses  are  not  ab-  (Va.)  930. 

sent  through  the  procurement  or  con-  ''"Murray  v.  State,  i  Tex.  App.  417; 

sent   of    the    applicant,    and    that    the  Skipworth  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  135; 

application    is    not    made    for    delay.  Thomas  v.  State,  6r  Miss.  60;  People 

Crews  V.   People.   120  111.  317,   11   N.  v.  Lampson,  70  Cal.  204,  11  Fac.  593; 

K.  404;  State  V.  P)radley,  90  Mo.  160.  State  v.  Walker,  69  Mo.  274;  Walton 

Sec  Undcrhill  on   Ev.,  §§  355-358,  as  v.    Commonwealth.    32    Gratt.     (Va.) 

to  the   ff)rm   anrl   language   of   affida-  855. 

vits.  "State    v.     Ilayden,    45    Towa     11; 

"Henderson  v.  State,  22  Tex.  593;  People  v.  Brown,  46  Cal.  102. 


s  271 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


484 


shall  consent  that  the  afiidaxit  stating  the  evidence  which  he  is 
to  give  may  be  read  as  his  testimony  is  unconstitutional,  if  the 
defendant  has  used  due  diligence  in  endeavoring  to  procure  the 
attendance  of  the  witnesses,  and  the  affidavit  shows  facts  sufficient 
for  the  purpose. ^^ 

Others  maintain  a  contrary  view  and  sustain  as  constitutional 
similar  statutes,  conferring  upon  the  court  the  power  to  overrule 
an  application  for  a  continuance,  where  the  prosecution  does  not 
admit  that  the  missing  testimony  is  true.^'' 


'''State  V.  Berkley,  92  Mo.  41,  46- 
53,  4  S.  W.  24;  Adkins  v.  Common- 
wealth, 98  Ky.  539,  33  S.  W.  948,  17 
Ky.  L.  1091,  32  L.  R.  A.  108;  Graham 
V.  State,  50  Ark.  161,  167,  6  S.  W. 
721;  State  V.  Baker,  13  Lea  (Term.) 
326,  329;  Pace  V.  Commonwealth,  89 
Ky.  204,  207,  12  S.  W.  271,  II  Ky.  L. 
407.  Cf.  State  V.  Loe,  98  Mo.  609, 
613,  12  S.  W.  254;  Goodman  v.  State, 
Meigs  (Tenn.)  195;  Risner  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  117  S.  W.  318; 
Mise  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  80  S. 
W.  457,  25  Ky.  L.  2207;  Foster  v. 
.State,  79  Neb.  259,  112  N.  W.  656; 
Gaines  v.  State,  146  Ala.  16,  41  So. 
865 ;  People  v.  Fong  Chung,  5  Cal. 
App.  587,  91  Pac.  105.  The  constitu- 
tional right  of  the  accused  to  have 
process  to  compel  the  attendance  of 
witnesses  in  his  own  behalf  is  abso- 
lute, and  cannot  be  bartered  or  cut 
down  by  statutory  enactment.  The 
right  is  only  enjoyed  with  complete- 
ness if  the  personal  attendance  of  a 
witness  is  secured,  for  it  is  only  then 
that  the  accused  can  receive  the  full 
benefit  of  his  testimony.  The  de- 
meanor of  the  witness  on  the  stand 
while  giving  his  testimony  viva  voce 
is  an  important  factor  in  enabling  the 
jury  to  determine  his  credibility.  The 
defendant  has  a  right  to  claim  that 
the  influence  upon  the  jury  of  the  in- 
telligence and  candor  of  his  witness. 


his  respectable  and  refined  appear- 
ance, his  promptness  and  frankness 
in  answering  questions,  his  unhesitat- 
ing readiness  in  giving  all  details, 
his  calmness  and  self-restraint  under 
a  searching  and  perhaps  abusive 
cross-examination,  shall  not  be  lost 
to  him  by  a  statute  which  compels 
him  to  accept  a  piece  of  paper  in 
place  of  a  living  human  being.  Sec 
State  v.  Berkley,  92  Mo.  41,  46-53,  4 
S.  W.  24;  Pace  V.  Commonwealth,  89 
Ky.  204,  207-210,  12  S.  W.  271,  II  Ky. 
L.  407;  a  leading  case  and  the  dis- 
senting opinion  in  State  v.  Jennings, 
81  Mo.  185,  193,  195-208,  51  Am.  236. 
"The  value  of  oral  testimony,  over  all 
other,  is  too  well  understood  to  sup- 
pose, for  a  moment,  that  such  declar- 
ations would  have  the  same  weight 
on  the  minds  of  the  jury  as  the  tes- 
timony of  the  witness,  if  he  had  been 
examined  before  them  in  open  court." 
People  V.  Diaz,  6  Cal.  248.  Cf.  Good- 
man V.  State,  Meigs  (Tenn.)   195. 

°°  Keating  v.  People,  160  111.  480,  43 
N.  E.  724;  Adkins  v.  Commonwealth, 
98  Ky.  539,  22>  S.  W.  948,  17  Ky.  L. 
1091,  2^  L.  R.  A.  108;  People  v.  Ley- 
shon,  108  Cal.  440,  41  Pac.  480;  Fan- 
ton  v.  State,  50  Neb.  351,  69  N.  W. 
953,  2(>  L-  R-  A.  158;  Territory  v. 
Perkins,  2  Mont.  467,  470;  Terri- 
tory v.  Harding,  6  Mont.  323,  332. 
333,  12  Pac.  750;  Bach,  J.,  dissenting; 


48: 


ABSENT    WITNESSES    AND    CONTINUANCES. 


§    272 


If  the  absent  witness  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction,  so  that  com- 
pulsory process  will  not  reach  him,  a  continuance,  as  it  would  only 
bring  his  written  evidence,  may  be  denied  on  the  admission.'^'' 

§  272.    Admission  of  facts  as  true  to  avoid  continuance. — In  the 

absence  of  statute  it  is  the  rule,  according  to  the  decided  current  of 
authorit}^,  that  the  state  may  avoid  the  granting  of  a  continuance 
to  defendant  because  of  the  absence  of  a  material  witness  in 
his  behalf  by  admitting  the  truth  of  the  statement  of  the  evidence 
he  would  give  as  it  is  set  forth  in  the  affidavit.  The  statements 
go  to  the  jury  as  true,  and  it  is  their  positive  duty  so  to  regard 
them.  They  are  not  open  to  contradiction,  and  though  the  accused 
is  deprived  of  his  witness  he  receives  the  benefit  of  his  evidence 
free  from  impeachment.^^  And  a  statute  laying  down  such  a 
rule  has  been  held  constitutional.  But  the  state  must  admit  the 
truth  of  the  evidence  absolutely.  It  cannot  reserve  the  right  to 
impeach  its  credibility  in  any  way.®" 


Territory  v.  Guthrie,  2  Idaho  398; 
Hoyt  V.  People,  140  111.  588,  593, 
594,  30  N.  E.  315,  16  L.  R.  A.  239n; 
Hickam  v.  People,  137  111.  75,  79,  27 
N.  E.  88;  State  v.  Hartley,  48  Kan. 
421,  425,  29  Pac.  701,  citing  cases; 
State  V.  Shannehan,  22  Iowa  435,  437 ; 
State  V.  McComb,  18  Iowa  43,  47.  Cf. 
Pace  V.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky.  204, 
207,  12  S.  W.  271,  II  Ky.  L.  407; 
State  V.  Lund,  49  Kan.  580,  584,  31 
Pac.  146;  State  v.  Daniels,  49  La. 
Ann.  954;  22  So.  415;  State  v.  Hutto, 
66  S.  Car.  449,  45  S.  E.  13;  People  v. 
Mylin,  139  111.  App.  500,  aff'd  236  111. 
19,  86  N.  E.  156. 

""State  V.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311; 
Thompson  v.  State,  S  Kan.  159. 

"'Powers  V.  State,  80  Ind.  77,  11 
Ky.  L.  407;  Pace  v.  Commonwealth, 
8q  Ky.  204,  207,  208,  12  S.  W.  271 ; 
O'Brien  v.  Commonwealth,  89  Ky. 
354,  361,  12  S.  W.  471,  II  Ky.  L.  534; 
I'rowning  v.  State,  Z2  Miss.  47;  Van 
Meter  V.  People,  60  111.  168;  Miller 
V.   State,  9  Ind.  340;   People  v.  Vcr- 


milyea,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  369;  Wassels 
V.  State,  26  Ind.  30;  People  v.  Diaz, 
6  Cal.  248,  249;  Trulock  v.  State,  i 
Clarke  (Iowa)  515;  State  v.  Baker, 
13  Lea  (Tenn.)  326;  People  v. 
Brown,  54  Cal.  243;  People  v.  Wil- 
son, 3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  199,  202; 
Nichols  V.  Commonwealth,  11  Bush 
(Ky.)  575;  Terry  v.  State,  120  Ala. 
286,  25  So.  176;  State  v.  Williams,  76 
S.  Car.  135,  56  S.  E.  783;  State  v. 
High,  116  La.  79,  40  So.  538;  State 
V.  Wilcox,  21  S.  Dak.  532,  114  N.  W. 
687. 

"-People  V.  Diaz,  6  Cal.  248,  249; 
Wassels  v.  State,  26  Ind.  30;  Powers 
V.  State,  80  Ind.  77.  Cf.  Burchfield  v. 
State,  82  Ind.  580;  Territory  v.  Em- 
ilio  (N.  Mex.),  89  Pac.  239;  Miller 
V.  State  (Wis.),  119  N.  W.  850; 
Howerton  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
112  S.  W.  606,  33  Ky.  L.  1008;  Iluf- 
fakcr  V.  Commonwealth,  124  Ky.  115, 
98  S.  W.  331,  30  Ky.  L.  334;  Davis 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  332,  107  S.  W. 
855.     "An  unconditional  admission  of 


S    2  72 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


486 


the  truth  of  the  facts  souglit  to  l)c 
proved  by  the  absent  witnesses  would 
necessarily  have  a  different  effect. 
They  would  go  to  the  jury  as  admit- 
ted facts  in  the  case,  not  open  to 
controversy,  and  it  would  be  a  posi- 
tive duty  of  the  jury  so  to  consider 
them  in  determining  the  question  of 


the  defendant's  guilt.  Such  an  admis- 
sion, we  think,  would  give  the  accused 
all  the  benefit  that  he  could  derive 
from  the  testimony  of  the  witness  if 
present  at  the  trial."  Wassells  v. 
State,  26  Ind.  30;  Mayfield  v.  State, 
no  Ind.  591,  593,  II  N.  E.  618. 


CHAPTER    XXII. 

THE    PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AND    JURY. 

§  273.    The    power    and    right    of    the  §  276.  Charging  on  the  evidence. 

jury  to  determine  the  law —  277.  Assumption  of  facts  in  charge. 

Criminal  libel.  278.  Necessity  for  evidence  to  sus- 

274.  Character    and    analysis    of    a  tain  instructions. 

general  verdict.  279.    Directing  a  verdict. 

275.  Charging  the  jury  on  the  law        280.    Order    and    manner    of    intro- 

— Physical  power  of  the  jury  ducing  the  proof. 

to      disregard     the     judge's        280a.  The    credibility    of    detectives 

charge.         *  and  experts. 

§  273.  The  power  and  right  of  the  jury  to  determine  the  law — 
Criminal  libel. — The  main,  if  not  the  sole,  purpose,  of  the  intro- 
duction of  evidence  in  criminal  trials,  is  to  determine  disputed 
questions  of  fact.  If  the  facts  constituting  the  case  for  the  plain- 
tiff in  a  civil  action  are  admitted  by  a  demurrer,  or  if  the  matter 
in  defense  constitutes  no  defense  in  law,  or  if  the  jury  find  a 
special  verdict,  a  pure  question  of  law  arises  which  is  exclusively 
for  the  judge  to  determine.  This  is  universally  the  rule  in  all 
civil  proceedings.  The  jury  are  bound  to  take  the  law  from  the 
court's  instruction,  and  a  verdict  rendered  by  them  which  is 
palpably  against  the  law  will  be  set  aside.  Whether  a  jury  se- 
lected to  try  a  criminal  case  are  under  any  circumstances  judges 
of  the  law,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  judges  of  the  issue  of  fact, 
is  a  question  which  has  received  much  attention.  The  subject 
received  much  investigation  and  was  debated  with  vast  learning 
and  a  great  expenditure  of  eloquence  and  ability  in  England  at 
the  end  of  the  last  century,  in  the  numerous  prosecutions  for  crim- 
inal libel  which  were  brought  by  the  crown.  It  w^as  admitted 
by  all  parties  that  the  question.  Did  the  accused  publish  the  libel  ? 
and  its  meaning,  were  exclusively  questions  of  fact  for  the  deter- 
mination of  the  jury.  The  controversy  turned  upon  the  right  to 
determine  whether  the  tendency  of  the  publication  was  or  was  not 

487 


/6 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


488 


mischievous,  and  the  intent  of  the  accused  in  pubhshing"  it.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  was  held  that  the  court  had  the  exchisive  right  to 
decide  that  the  Hbel  was  or  was  not  calculated  to  produce  mischief, 
and  that  the  accused  intended  that  it  should  do  so.  On  the  other, 
it  was  maintained  that  the  question  of  mischievous  tendency  and 
criminal  intent  w-ere,  as  in  all  other  crimes,  mixed  questions  of 
law  and  fact  to  be  tried  by  the  jurors,  under  proper  instructions 
from  the  bench.  ^ 

So  far  as  the  question  of  the  right  of  jurors  to  determine  the 
laAv  in  prosecutions  for  criminal  libel  is  concerned,  it  may  be  con- 
sidered as  set  at  rest  by  the  various  constitutional  provisions  that 
in  such  cases  the  jurors  shall  have  the  right  to  determine  both 
the  law  and  the  facts.  If  the  constitution  provides  that  the  jury 
shall  be  judges  of  the  law,  "as  in  other  cases,"  or  may  determine 
Cjuestions  both  of  law  and  fact  "under  the  direction  of  the  court." 
it  is  very  clear  that  it  was  intended  merely  to  place  criminal  libel 
on  the  same  footing  as  other  crimes,  and  that  the  jury,  while  hav- 
ing the  right  to  determine  the  intention  of  the  accused,  as  well  as 
the  facts  of  publication,  must  receive  the  law  from  the  court.- 


^  See  Rex  v.  Woodfall,  5  Burr. 
2661 ;  Rex  V.  Dean  of  St.  Asaph,  3 
T.  R.  428;  State  v.  Croteau,  23  Vt. 
14,  54  Am.  Dec.  90;  Commonwealth 
V.  Anthes,  5  Gray  (Mass.)  185,  212, 
219.  For  other  cases  bearing  upon 
this  subject,  see  United  States  v.  Bat- 
tiste,  2  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  240,  243,  24 
Fed.  Cas.  14545;  United  States  v. 
Morris,  I  Curt.  (U.  S.)  23,  26  Fed. 
Cas.  15815 ;  Pennsylvania  v.  Bell, 
Add.  (Pa)  156,  I  Am.  Dec.  298; 
Pennsylvania  v.  M'Fail,  Add.  (Pa.) 
255;  Townsend  v.  State,  2  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  151;  Hamilton  v.  People,  29 
Mich.  173;  Commonwealth  v.  Knapp, 
ID  Pick.  (Mass.)  477,  20  Am.  Dec. 
534;  Pierce  v.  State,  13  N.  H.  536; 
People  V.  Croswell,  3  Johns.  Cas.  (X. 
Y.)  337,  394. 

Province  of  judge  and  jury,  see 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  2732,  68  L.  R.  A. 


79.     Proof  of  corpus  delicti  in  crim- 
inal cases,  68  L.  R.  A.  33. 

"  Coole}''s  Cons.  Limit.,  567.  By 
constitutional  enactment  in  some  of 
the  states,  the  right  to  determine  the 
law  as  well  as  the  facts  is  conferred 
upon  the  jury  in  a  criminal  case. 
Blaker  v.  State,  130  Ind.  203,  29  N. 
E.  1077;  Goldman  v.  State,  75  Md. 
621,  23  Atl.  1097;  State  V.  Arm- 
strong, 106  Mo.  395,  16  S.  W.  604,  27 
Am.  St.  361,  13  L.  R.  A.  4i9n.  In 
Pennsj-lvania  and  Tennessee  by  con- 
stitutional provisions  "in  all  indict- 
ments for  libel  the  jury  shall  have  the 
right  to  determine  the  law  and  the 
facts  under  the  directions  of  the  court 
as  in  other  cases."  There  has  been 
much  conflict  of  authority  as  to  the 
effect  of  these  provisions  but  it  is 
apparently  settled  that  the}-  do  not 
alter  the  general  rule  that  the  court 
must  determine  the  law  and  the  jury 


489  PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AXD    JURY.  §    2/4 

§  274.  Character  and  analysis  of  general  verdict. — By  the  plea  of 
not  guilty  both  the  law  and  the  facts  are  put  in  issue.  Two  issues 
thus  arise  and  both  must  be  tried.  An  acquittal  is  equivalent  to 
a  finding  that  either  the  existence  of  the  law  or  the  existence  of 
the  facts  has  not  been  established,  while  a  verdict  of  guilty  shows 
that  both  the  law  and  the  facts  have  been  found  to  be  against  the 
accused.  In  other  words,  a  general  verdict,  as  Chief  Justice  Shaw 
well  points  out.  is  an  answer  both  to  the  question,  "Is  there  a  law 
such  as  is  alleged  by  the  state?"  and  to  the  question,  "Has  the 
defendant  done  the  acts  charged  and  violated  that  law  ?"  Hence, 
it  is  very  evident  that  a  general  verdict  must  and  does  embody  and 
declare  the  result  of  an  inquiry  into  a  question  of  law  as  well  as 
of  fact.  But  no  way  of  analyzing  it  exists  to  ascertain,  as  it 
stands  upon  the  record,  whether  the  jury  determined  the  law  as 
well  as  the  weight  of  the  evidence.  Their  verdict  is  conclusive 
and  unquestionable,  because  the  law  conclusively  presumes  that 
they  acted  upon  correct  legal  rules.  But  the  fact  that  the  question 
of  fact  and  the  question  of  law  are  thus  intermingled  in  the  ver- 
dict, and  in  the  deliberations  of  the  jury  which  led  up  to  it,  should 
not  be  permitted  to  obscure  the  principle  that  both  are  independent 
and  distinct,  and  that  each  is  to  be  determined  by  different  and 
distinct  but  co-ordinate  tribunals.  If  we  recognize  the  line  of 
demarkation  between  them  and  the  exclusive  province  of  judge 
and  jury  we  must  also  admit  that  the  minds  of  the  jurors  must 
act  freely  and  fully  within  the  scope  of  their  authority  and  duty, 
and  the  mind  of  the  judge  must  operate  with  equal  freedom 
within  the  range  of  his  right  and  authority.  The  law  will  presume 
that  both  judge  and  jury  have  done  their  duty,  and,  this  being  so, 
a  general  verdict  is  the  proper  answer  to  the  double  or  mixed 
question  of  law  and  fact,  "Is  the  defendant  guilty  as  charged  in 
the  indictment  ?"  Such  are  the  proper  considerations  when  a  gen- 
eral verdict  is  rendered.  But  the  jury  may  find  a  special  verdict. 
They  can  determine  the  material  facts  in  detail  upon  the  evidence 
as  submitted  to  them,  and  as  the  same  are  proved  to  their  satisfac- 
tion, and  the  judge  can  then  decide  whether,  in  law,  the  facts  as 
proved  bring  the  accused  within  the  penal  statute  which  it  is  al- 

acccpt  it  as  laid  down  by  the  court.     L.  R.  A.  89;  Ford  v.  State,  loi  Tenn. 
Commonwealth  v.  McManus,  143  Pa.     454,  47  S.  W.  703. 
St.  64,  21    Atl.    1018,  22  Atl.  761,   14 


§    275  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  49O 

leged  he  has  broken,  and  he  can  then  pronounce  him  giiilty  or  the 
reverse.  On  the  other  hand,  the  court  can  inform  the  jury  what 
the  law  is  as  apphed  to  the  case,  if  certain  facts,  stated  hypotheti- 
cally,  are  proved  to  their  satisfaction,  leaving  the  proof  entirely  to 
them.  As  the  court  cannot  tell  what  facts  the  jury  will  find,  it  can 
only  of  necessity  give  its  direction  in  a  hypothetical  form.  In  so  far 
as  the  jury  apply  the  rules  of  law  thus  stated  to  them  by  the  court 
they  may,  with  correctness,  be  said  to  pass  upon  the  law  by  in- 
corporating it  in  their  verdict  and  placing  it  on  record  with  their 
determination  of  the  facts.  They  certainly  have  the  physical 
power  to  refuse  to  apply  the  rules  of  law  stated  to  them,  and  if 
their  refusal  results  in  an  acc|uittal  they  may,  to  that  extent,  deter- 
mine what  the  law  is,  or  to  decide  the  law,  as  stated,  is  not  appli- 
cable. But  in  the  majority  of  instances  in  which  a  general  verdict 
is. returned  it  is  more  correct  and  nearer  the  truth  to  say  that  the 
jurors  merely  affirm  and  declare  the  law  than  that  they  determine 
Avhat  it  shall  be.  It  is  for  the  court  to  point  out  what  facts  are,  ac- 
cording to  law\  necessary  in  the  particular  case  to  be  proved  and  to 
inform  the  jury  that  the  law  characterizes  certain  facts,  taken  to- 
gether, as  criminal  or  the  re^'crse.  It  is  for  the  jnry  then,  keep- 
ing these  rules  of  law  in  mind,  to  find  a  verdict  of  guilty  or  not 
guilty,  according  as  they  find  these  facts  proved  or  the  reverse. 

^  275.  Charging-  the  jury  on  the  law — Physical  power  of  the  jury 
to  disregard  the  judge's  charge. — The  judge  presiding  at  a  criminal 
trial  is  performing  one  of  his  most  delicate  and  important  duties 
when  he  charges  the  jury  and  endeavors  to  instruct  them  in  the 
rules  of  law^  which  should  regulate  their  deliberations.  The  im- 
pressiveness  and  dignity  of  the  judicial  ofiice,  the  venerable  and 
upright  character  of  its  occupant,  and  the  learning,  acumen  and 
experience  which  he  is  assumed  to  possess,  unite  to  impress  the 
jury.  They  are  unconsciously  influenced  to  accept  everything 
that  comes  from  his  lips  as  authoritative,  and  they  permit  his  opin- 
ions upon  the  issues  of  fact  involved,  so  far  as  he  may  announce 
them,  to  guide  them  in  their  deliberations.  The  frequency  with 
which  convictions  are  reversed  by  appellate  courts,  because  of  er- 
rors in  judicial  instructions,  clearly  demonstrates  the  truth  of 
this  statement,  and  illustrates  how  extremely  difficult  it  is  for  the 
human  mind  to  operate  impartially  in  the  presence  of  accusations 


491  PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AND    JURY,  §    2/5 

of  wicked  conduct,  even  when  trained  to  the  task  by  years  of  study 
and  experience. 

Under  the  quaHfications  and  limitations  above  pointed  out  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  instruct  the  jury  upon  all  questions  of 
law  involved,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  be  governed  thereby,^  The 
jury  are  sworn  to  determine  the  issue  according  to  the  law  and 
the  evidence,  and  the  language  of  the  court  is  the  only  proper 
evidence  of  what  the  law  is  that  is  in  their  possession.  In  the 
absence  of  any  express  constitutional  or  statutory  provision  mak- 
ing them  the  judges  of  the  law  in  criminal  cases,  they  are  bound 
by  their  oaths  to  accept  the  judge's  charge  as  proving  what  the 
law  is,  and  to  act  accordingly.  It  will  be  found,  as  a  rule,  that 
juries  obey  and  follow  the  judicial  instructions  implicitly.  It  is 
evident,  however,  that  they  have  the  physical  power,  though  not 
the  legal  right,  to  disregard  them.  But  the  exercise  of  the  power 
does  not  involve  the  possession  of  a  legal  right  to  disregard  the 
judicial  instructions  as  to  the  law,  and  the  distinction  between 
the  two  is  clear  and  vital.*  Hence,  if  the  jury  shall  disregard  the 
law,  so  far  as  it  is  stated  favorably  to  the  accused,  and  pronounce 
him  guilty,  the  verdict  may  be  set  aside  and  a  new  trial  ordered, 

'Duffy   V.    People,   26    N.    Y.    588;  Wright,  53  Me.  328,  330-344;   People 

People   V.    Worden,   113   Cal.   569,  45  v.    Pine,   2   Barb.    (N.   Y.)    566,   568; 

Pac.  844;  Sparf  v.  United  States,  156  State  v.  Jeandell,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  475; 

U.  S.  51,  39  L.  ed.  343,   15   Sup.  Ct.  Davenport  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Leigh 

273,  et  seq.   (a  leading  case  and  well  (Va.)  588;  Danforth  v.  State,  75  Ga. 

reasoned.    Decided  in  October,  1894)  ;  614,  58  Am.  480 ;  McGowan  v.   State, 

Commonwealth  v.  McManus,  143  Pa.  9  Yerg.   (Tenn.)   184,  193-19S;  Pleas- 

St.  64,  21   Atl.    1018,  22  Atl.   761,   14  ant  v.  State,  13  Ark.  360,  376;  Adams 

L.  R.  A.  89;   Commonwealth  v.   Ab-  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  412;   Parrish  v. 

bott,  13  Mete.   (Mass.)    120,  123,  124;  State,  14  Neb.  60,  15  N.  W.  357;  Peo- 

Hannum  v.  State,  90  Tenn.  647,  18  S.  pie  v.  Ivey,  49  Cal.  56;  State  v.  Han- 

W.  269;  United  States  v.  Battiste,  2  nibal,  2>7  La-  Ann.  619;  State  v.  Mil- 

Sumn.  240,  245,  24  Fed.  Cas.   14545;  Icr,  53  Iowa  84,  IS4,  209,  4  N.  W.  838, 

People  V.  Finnegan,  i   Park.  Cr.   147,  900,    1083;    State   v.    Main,   69   Conn. 

152;   Pierce  v.    State,   13   N.   H.   536;  123,  37  Atl.  80,  61  Am.  St.  30,  36  L. 

Hamilton    v.    People,    29    Mich.    173,  R.    A.   623.     Cautionary   instructions, 

192 ;   Montee  v.  Commonwealth,  3  J.  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2733. 
J.  Marsh.   (Ky.)    132,  149,  151;  State        'Parrish   v.    State,    14   Neb.   60,    15 

V.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  ^^2;  State  v.  Pierson,  N.  W.  357;  State  v.  Reed  (Ore.),  97 

12  .-Xla.   149,   153;   Hardy  v.   State,  7  Pac.  627;  Anderson  v.  State,  122  Ga. 

Mo.  607;  Commonwealth  v.  Anthes,  5  175,  50  S.  E.  51;  State  v.  Taylor,  57 

Gray  (Mass.)    185,  208,  218;  State  v.  W.  Va.  228,  50  S.  E.  247. 


§    2-]-^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  492 

for  the  same  reason  that  a  verdict  which  is  against  the  weight  of 
the  evidence  would  be  set  aside.  When,  however,  a  verdict  of 
acquittal  is  rendered  in  disregard  of  the  law  laid  down  by  the 
court,  the  decision  of  the  jury  is  final,  by  reason  of  the  existence 
of  the  common-law  rule  that  no  man  can  twice  be  put  in  jeopardy 
for  the  same  offense.  Hence,  to  this  extent  the  jury  may  be  saicl, 
not  indeed  to  settle  the  law,  but  to  determine  that  the  law  is  not 
applicable,  or  to  refuse  to  apply  it.  So  far  they  have  the  power 
(and  perhaps  the  legal  right)  to  disregard  the  instructions  of  the 
court.  ^ 

It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  not  every  proposition  which 
is  contained  in  a  text-writer  or  reported  case  is  the  law.®  It  is 
not  a  correct  method  of  instructing  the  jury  to  read  or  to  repeat 
to  them  the  process  of  reasoning  or  the  arguments  of  legal  authors, 
or  of  judges  relating  to  matters  of  fact  or  experience  which  do  not 
contain  express  propositions  of  law,  but  are  mere  enunciations  of 
opinions  upon  matters  of  fact  or  suggestions  drawn  from  every- 
day experience.  These  have  an  appropriate  place  in  the  argument 
of  counsel,  but  their  weight  and  cogency  in  determining  the  issue 
of  guilt  are  for  the  minds  of  the  jury  alone.'^ 

'  Commonwealth  v.  McManus,  143  court  says :  "The  teachings  of  ex- 
Pa.  St.  64,  21  Atl.  1018,  22  Atl.  761,  perience  on  questions  of  fact  are  not, 
14  L.  R.  A.  89;  Habersham  v.  State,  however,  doctrines  of  law,  which  may 
56  Ga.  61,  64-67;  Pierce  v.  State,  be  announced  as  such  from  the 
13  N.  H.  536;  United  States  v.  Wil-  bench,  nor  j'et  are  they  matters  of 
son,  I  Baldw.  78,  108,  28  Fed.  Cas.  proof  to  be  shown  as  other  facts  in 
16730;  United  States  v.  Taylor,  11  the  case.  They  may  well  enter  into 
Fed.  470,  472,  3  McCrary  500,  505;  the  arguments  of  attorneys,  one  side 
Duffy  V.  People,  26  N.  Y.  588;  Peo-  claiming  that  experience  teaches  one 
pie  V.  Pine,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  566,  568.  thing,  and  the  other  side  asserting 
"They  are  also,  'ex  necessitate,'  the  another  conclusion ;  but  the  jury,  not 
ultimate  judges,  in  one  respect,  of  the  the  judge,  is  the  arbiter  of  such  con- 
law.  If  they  acquit,  the  judge  cannot  tentions,  as  of  all  questions  of  fact, 
grant  a  new  trial,  how  much  soever  The  most  that  the  judge  may  do, 
they  have  misconceived  or  disregarded  under  our  practice,  which  leaves  ques- 
the  law."  Montee  v.  Commonwealth,  tions  of  fact  entirely  to  the  jury,  is 
3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  132,  149,  151 ;  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  jurors 
Commonwealth  v.  VanTuyl,  i  Mete,  to  such  propositions  and  leave  them, 
(Ky.)   I,  5,  71  Am.  Dec.  455.  in   the   light   of   their   experience,   to 

®  People  V.  Wayman,  128  N.  Y.  585,  say  what  credit  should  be  given  to  any 

27  X.  E.  T070.  testimony   on   account   of   its    alleged 

'In  Garfield  v.  State,  74  Ind.  60,  the  doubtful  character." 


493  PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AXD    JURY,  §    2/6 

§  276.  Charging  on  the  evidence.— The  judge  may,  and  indeed 
should,  charge  the  jury  on  the  evidence.  It  is  his  duty  to  marshal 
all  the  evidence  before  the  jury  in  such  a  way  and  with  such  com- 
ments as  will  enable  them  to  see  its  relevancy  and  pertinency.  He 
may  state  it,  and  a  careful,  logical  and  impartial  repetition,  or  an 
intelligent  analysis  of  it  will  invariably  facilitate  their  labors  in 
determining  its  credibility,  appreciating  its  character  and  weight, 
and  thus  ascertaining  the  truth.  These  are  for  their  consideration 
alone,  but  the  court  should  aid  them  so  that  they  may  come  to  an 
intelligent  and  satisfactory  conclusion,  which  shall  be  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law  and  consistent  with  the  proof.  This  must  be 
done  fairly  and  impartially,  with  a  due  regard  to  the  preservation 
of  the  defendant's  rights.  Nor  need- the  court  refrain  from  a  fair, 
just  and  accurate  summary  of  the  evidence  because  when  thus 
presented  it  may  be  unfavorable  to  the  accused.^  On  the  other 
hand  the  court  must  not  select  and  give  undue  prominence  to 
certain  parts  of  the  testimony  to  the  exclusion  of  others  of  equal 
importance,  but  which  do  not  seem  as  important  to  the  judicial 
mind.'' 

The  usual,  and  at  the  same  time  the  safest,  formula  is,  "if,  from 
the  evidence,  the  jury  believe,  etc.,  then  it  is  their  duty  to  convict." 
The  court  may  proceed  to  lay  down  certain  well  recognized  legal 
rules  which  should  be  their  gnide  in  weighing  the  evidence  and 
in  determining  its  weight,  for  the  power  of  the  jury  to  determine 
the  weight  and  credibility  of  the  evidence  is  not  arbitrary.  It 
must  be  exercised  in  subordination  to  the  logical  principles  which 
underlie  all  evidence,  and  which,  from  long  reiteration  and  experi- 
ence, have  acquired  the  effect  and  character  of  rules  of  law.  Thus 
the  jury  may  with  propriety  be  told  that  the  testimony  of  an  ac- 
complice, uncorroborated,  is  to  be  viewed  with  distrust ;  that  the 
admission  of  the  prisoner  is  to  be  carefully  scrutinized ;  that  a 
witness  shown  to  have  testified  falsely  in  any  material  particular 

*  State  V.  Rose,  47  Minn.  47,  49  N.  pie,  141  111.  195,  30  N.  E.  329;  People 

W.  404;    People  V.   Fanning,    131    N.  v.   Hawes,  98  Cal.  648,  ^3  Pac.  791; 

Y.  659,  30  N.  E.  569;  State  v.  Valen-  Bell  v.  State,  91  Ga.  15,  16  S.  E.  207; 

tina,  71  N.  J.  L.  552,  60  Atl.  177.  Grant  v.  State,  97  Ala.  35,  11  So.  915; 

"Goley  V.  State,  85  Ala.  333,  5  So.  Miller  v.   State,   107  Ala.  40,   19  So. 

167;  State  V.  Ward,  19  Nev.  297,  10  37;   Prine  v.   State,  73  Miss.  838,   19 

Pac.   133;  Morgan  v.   State,  48  Ohio  So.  711;  People  v.  Caldwell,  107  Mich. 

St.  371,  27  N.  E.  710;  Scott  V.  Peo-  374,  65  N.  W.  213. 


§  276 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


494 


should  be  disbelieved,  and  that  they  may  consider  the  interest  of 
the  accused  when  he  testifies  as  a  witness.  So  they  may  be  in- 
structed generally  upon  the  rules  of  law  which  determine  the  rele- 
vancy and  probative  force  of  presumptions  of  law  which  are  re- 
ceived in  lieu  of  proof,  and  of  evidence  such  as  dying  declarations 
and  confessions,  which  constitute  exceptions  to  general  rules, 
and  are  received  ex  necessitate  rei.  But  the  court  cannot  exceed 
these  limits  and  point  out  the  particular  and  common  details  which 
are  within  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  men  generally,  and 
are  to  be  regarded  in  determining  whether  any  evidence  is  or  is 
not  to  be  believed.  Thus,  for  example,  the  court  should  not  dis- 
credit a  witness  by  stating  that  he  has  been  impeached  on  liis 
cross-examination  because  of  his  ignorance  and  want  of  expe- 
rience.^" 

The  weight  to  be  given  to  the  evidence  and  the  credibility  of 
the  witnesses  in  every  case  where,  upon  the  whole  testimony,  an 
issue  of  fact  arises,  are  for  the  exclusive  consideration  and  deter- 
mination of  the  jury." 


^"Thomas  v.  State,  95  Ga.  484,  22 
S.  E.  Rep.  315.  Cf.,  also,  Hauk  v. 
State,  148  Ind.  238,  46  N.  E.  127,  47 
N.  E.  465. 

"State  V.  Jones,  44  La.  Ann.  1120, 
1 121,  ir  So.  827;  State  v.  Plum,  49 
Kan.  679,  31  Pac.  308;  Baysinger  v. 
People,  115  111.  419,  5  N.  E.  375;  State 
V.  Jones,  86  Mo.  623,  628;  State  v. 
Wisdom,  84  Mo.  177,  190;  Jones  v. 
State,  59  Ark.  417,  27  S.  W.  601 ; 
State  V.  Kibling,  63  Vt.  636,  22  Atl. 
613;  People  V.  Minnaugh,  131  N.  Y. 
563,  29  N.  E.  750;  People  v.  Cowgill, 
93  Cal.  596,  29  Pac.  228;  Dean  v. 
State,  130  Ind.  237,  29  N.  E.  911; 
Rawls  V.  State,  97  Ga.  186,  22  S.  E. 
529;  Ware  v.  State,  96  Ga.  349,  23 
S.  E.  410;  Williams  v.  State,  46  Neb. 
704,  65  N.  W.  783;  People  v.  Brow, 
90  Hun  (N.  Y.)  509,  35  N.  Y.  S. 
1009;  Bonner  v.  State,  107  Ala.  97.  18 
So.  226;  State  V.  Aughtry,  49  S.  Car. 
285,  26  S.  E.  619,  27  S.  E.  199;  State 
V.  Cannon,  49  S.  Car.  550,  2y  S.  E. 


526;  State  V.  Walker,  149  X.  Car. 
527,  63  S.  E.  76;  Peak  v.  State,  5  Ga. 
App.  56,  62  S.  E.  665;  State  v.  Fisliel 
(Iowa),  118  N.  W.  7^:^;  Konda  v. 
United  States,  C.  C.  A.  166  Fed.  91,  22 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  304n;  State  v.  Sassa- 
man,  214  Mo.  695,  114  S.  W.  590; 
State  V.  Pirkey  (S.  Dak.),  118  N.  W. 
1042;  Dennis  v.  State  (Ark),  114  S. 
W.  926;  Post  V.  United  States,  135 
Fed.  I,  67  C.  C.  A.  569,  70  L.  R.  A. 
989n  ;  Shires  v.  State  (Okla.  Cr.  App.), 
99  Pac.  1 100;  State  v.  Wilco.x,  132  N. 
Car.  1 120,  44  S.  E.  625;  State  v.  Hall, 
132  N.  Car.  1094,  44  S.  E.  553;  Lyles 
V.  United  States,  20  App.  Cas.  D.  C. 
559;  State  V.  Dunn  (Wis),  102  N.  W. 
935 ;  Carson  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
157,  86  S.  W.  ion;  State  v.  Collins, 
28  R.  I.  439,  67  Atl.  796;  State  v. 
Thrailkill,  71  S.  Car.  136,  50  S.  E. 
551;  State  V.  Shuff,  9  Idaho  115,  72 
Pac.  664;  State  v.  Littooy,  52  Wash. 
87,  100  Pac.  170. 


495 


PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AXD    JURY.  §§    277.    278 


§  277.  Assumption  of  facts  in  charge.— The  duty  and  the  right 
of  the  court  to  state  the  testimony  does  not,  by  implication, 
authorize  it  to  declare  what  is  proved  by  the  testimony,  or  what  is 
the  result  of  the  testimony.  These  are  questions  for  the  jury.'" 
The  credibility  of  any  evidence  which  has  been  offered  is  for  the 
jury  alone.  Hence,  the  court  should  not.  in  its  charge,  assume, 
as  proved,  any  allegation  unsupported  by  evidence,  or  on  which 
the  evidence  is  so  contradictory  that  reasonable  men  may  form 
opposite  opinions. ^^  Whether  a  fact,  upon  which  the  evidence  is 
conflicting,  is  proved,  is  for  the  jury  to  determine.  But  where  a 
fact  is  conceded  or  is  established  clearly  and  satisfactorily  by  the 
evidence  without  conflict  or  contradiction,  the  court  may  assume 
it  as  proved,  or  instruct  the  jury  that  there  is  evidence  tending  to 
prove  that  fact.^* 

§  278.  Necessity  for  evidence  to  sustain  instruction. — It  is  not 
proper  for  the  court  to  give  instructions  which,  though  they  em- 
body a  correct  statement  of  the  law  of  evidence,  are  merely  legal 


"People  V.  Flynn,  T2,  Cal.  511,  15 
Pac.  102;  People  v.  Casey,  65  Cal. 
260,  3  Pac.  874;  State  v.  Stewart, 
Del.  Gen.  Sess.,  dy  Atl.  786;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Thomas  (Ky.),  104  S. 
W.  326,  31  Ky.  L.  899;  Hall  v.  State, 
134  Ala.  90,  32  So.  750;  People  v. 
Matthai,  135  Cal.  442,  ^^  Pac.  694; 
Doyle  V.  State,  39  Fla.  155,  22  So. 
272,  63  Am.  St.  159;  Suddeth  v.  State, 
112  Ga.  407,  37  S.  E.  747;  Hellyer  v. 
People,  186  111.  550,  58  N.  E.  245; 
State  V.  Bige,  ri2  Iowa  433,  84  N.  W. 
518;  State  V.  Lewis,  56  Kan.  374,  43 
Pac.  265. 

^'Newton  v.  State  (Miss.),  12  So. 
560;  State  V.  Hope,  102  Mo.  410,  14 
S.  W.  98s ;  Horn  v.  State,  98  Ala.  23, 
13  So.  329;  Brown  v.  State,  72  Miss. 
997,  17  So.  278;  Commonwealth  v. 
McMahon,  145  Pa.  St.  413,  22  Atl. 
97'  ;  People  v.  Lang,  104  Cal.  363,  37 
Pac.  1031 ;  Scott  v.  People,  141  111. 
195.  30  N.  E.  329;  State  v.  Lewis,  56 
Kan.   374 ;    43    Pac.    265 ;    Fowler    v. 


State,  100  Ala.  96,  14  So.  860;  Butler 
V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  397 ;  58  S.  E.  685. 
"  Koerner  v.  State,  98  Ind.  7,  13 ; 
Spigner  v.  State,  103  Ala.  30,  15  So. 
892;  Hawkins  v.  State,  136  Ind.  630, 
36  N.  E.  419;  Morgan  v.  State,  48 
Ohio  St.  371,  27  N.  E.  710;  State  v. 
Meshek,  61  Iowa  316,  16  N.  W.  143; 
State  V.  Aughtry,  49  S.  Car.  285,  26 
S.  E.  619,  27  S.  E.  199;  Wiborg  v. 
United  States,  163  U.  S.  632,  41  L. 
ed.  289,  16  S.  Ct.  1 127,  1 197:  Jeffries 
V.  State,  61  Ark.  308,  32  S.  W.  1080; 
State  V.  Zinn,  6r  Mo.  App.  476;  HoUi- 
day  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  133,  Z2.  S.  W. 
538;  People  V.  Sternberg,  11 1  Cal.  3, 
43  Pac.  198;  State  v.  Kinney,  21  S. 
Dak.  390,  1 13  N.  W.  T7 ;  State  v.  Tay- 
lor, 57  W.  Va.  228,  50  S.  E.  247; 
People  V.  Phillips,  70  Cal.  61,  ir  Pac. 
493;  Hawkins  v.  State,  136  Ind.  630, 
Z()  N.  E.  419;  State  v.  McKnight.  rug 
Iowa  79,  93  N.  W.  (iZ\  Pisar  v.  State, 
56  Neb.  455,  ^(i  N.  W.  869;  State  v. 
Nickels,  65  S.  Car.  169,  43  S.  E.  521. 


§    279  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  496 

abstractions,  because  they  are  not  sustained  by  any  evidence  in 
the  case/^'  Thus,  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  charge 
upon  evidence,  which  was  excluded,^*'  and  a  fortiori,  on  evidence, 
which  has  not  been  offered,  and  which  is  absolutely  irrelevant," 
because  the  issue  upon  which  it  would  alone  be  relevant  does  not 
exist  in  the  case. 

§  279.  Directing  a  verdict. — In  a  civil  case  the  court  has  the 
legal  power  to  direct  a  verdict  for  plaintiff  when  his  cause  of 
action  is  admitted,  or  even  when  the  evidence  or  matter  of  defense, 
if  true,  constitutes  no  defense  in  law.^^  So  if  the  plaintiff  fails  to 
substantiate  his  allegations  by  evidence  showing  at  least  a  prima 
facie  case,  there  is  nothing  to  go  to  the  jnry,  and  the  court  may 
direct  a  nonsuit.  In  other  words,  where  the  case  turns  upon  an 
issue  of  law,  the  court  may,  in  a  civil  case,  direct  the  jury  to  find 
a  verdict  according  as  it  determines  the  law,  for  the  reason  that  it 
has  the  power  to  set  aside  a  verdict  which  is  against  the  law. 
But  the  court  cannot  in  a  criminal  trial  set  aside  a  verdict  of  ac- 
quittal. Hence,  to  permit  it  to  direct  a  verdict  of  guilty  would 
be  to  allow  it  to  do  indirectly  that  which  it  has  no  power  to  do 
directly. 

For  this  reason  the  jury  cannot  be  directed  to  render  a  verdict 
of  guilty,  no  matter  how  convincing  the  evidence  may  be,  even 
where  the  facts  are  admitted  or  settled  beyond  any  possibility  of 
dispute.  The  constitutional  right  of  the  accused  to  have  his  guilt 
or  innocence  determined  by  a  jury  of  his  peers  cannot  be  denied 
by  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  judicial  power. ^°     In  a  criminal 

^^  State  V.  Robinson,  35  S.  Car.  340,  29    Tex.    App.    159,    15    S.    W.    601 ; 

14  S.  E.  766;  Bostic  V.  State,  94  Ala.  Grafif  v.    People,    134  111.   380,   25    N. 

45,  10  So.  602;  Hill  V.  Commonwealth,  E.  563;  Doyle  v.  People,  147  111.  394. 

88  Va.  633,  14-  S.  E.  330,  29  Am.  St.  35  N.  E.  372 ;  Jackson  v.  State,  91  Ga. 

744;  Crane  v.    State,   in   Ala.  45,  20  271,  18  S.  E.  298,  44  Am.  St.  22. 

So.  590;   Morearty  v.   State,  46  Neb.  ^*  United    States   v.    Taylor,   3    IMc- 

652,  65   N.   W.   784 ;    Doyle  v.    State,  Crary  500,  505. 

39  Fla.    155,  22   So.  272,  63  Am.    St.  '"  State  v.  Wilson,  62  Kan.  621,  64 

159.  Pac.  22,,  52  L.  R.  A.  79;  United  States 

^*  Commonwealth  V.  Cosseboom,  155  v.   Taylor,    11    Fed.   470,  472,   3    Mc- 

Mass.  298 ;  29  N.  E.  463.  Crary  500 ;  United  States  v.  Battiste, 

"  Felker  v.    State,   54  Ark.   489,    16  2  Sumn.  240,  243,  24  Fed.  Cas.  I4S4S ; 

S.  W.  663 ;  Morgan  v.  State,  48  Ohio  Commonwealth  v.  Werntz,  161  Pa.  St. 

St.  371,  27  N.  E.  710;  Massey  v.  State,  591,  29  Atl.  272;  Tucker  v.  State,  57 


497 


PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AND    JURY. 


§    279 


trial  under  a  plea  of  not  guilty,  no  admission  of  a  cause  of  action 
by  the  state  can  be  implied.  This  plea  puts  in  issue  the  credibility 
of  the  state's  evidence,  even  if  it  is  otherwise  uncontradicted,  be- 
cause of  the  presumption  of  innocence  which  compels  a  determina- 
tion by  the  jury.  If  no  question  of  intent  is  involved  in  the  crim- 
inal transaction,  and  the  facts  are  overwhelmingly  proved  or  ad- 
mitted, so  that  the  only  question  is,  has  a  statute  been  violated? 
the  court  may  properly  point  out  that  the  law  as  applied  to  the 
facts  shows  the  defendant's  guilt,  and  instruct  the  jury  that  it  is 
their  duty  to  convict. ^° 

The  court  cannot,  during  the  progress  of  the  trial,  instruct  the 
clerk  to  enter  a  verdict  of  not  guilty  and  then  discharge  a  prisoner. 
If  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  prove  the  offense  charged,  and 
the  only  issue  is  one  of  law,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  direct  an 
acquittal,  and  erroneous  not  to  do  so.^^    And  it  has  been  held  that 


Ga.  503,  505;  State  v.  Picker,  2  Mo. 
App.  1074;  Sims  V.  State,  43  Ala.  33; 
Nonemaker  v.  State,  34  Ala.  211; 
People  V.  Collison,  85  Mich.  105,  48 
X.  W.  292;  State  V.  Winchester,  113 
N.  Car.  641,  18  S.  E.  657;  State  v. 
Riley,  113  N.  Car.  648,  18  S.  E.  168; 
State  V.  Picker,  2  Mo.  App.  1074; 
Townsend  v.  State,  137  Ala.  91,  34 
So.  382;  Territory  v.  West  (N. 
Mex.),  99  Fac.  343. 

-°  People  V.  Neumann,  85  Mich.  98, 
48  N.  W.  290;  People  v.  Elmer,  109 
Mich.  493,  67  N.  W.  550.  But  where 
intent  is  in  question,  an  instruction 
that  if  the  jury  believe  the  evidence  it 
is  their  duty  to  find  the  defendant 
guilty,  is  erroneous  as  withdrawing 
the  question  of  intent  from  them. 
Perkins  v.  State,  50  Ala.  154,  159.  "A 
charge  to  the  jury,  that  upon  the  facts 
testified  to,  assuming  them  to  be 
true,  it  would  be  their  duty  to  con- 
vict the  prisoner,  if  ever  proper, 
would  be  so  only  in  the  very  rare 
cases  in  wliich  the  force  of  the  facts 
proved  should  be  such,  as  to  make 
the  inference  of  criminal  intent,  an 
32 — Underhill  Ckim.  Ev. 


inference    of   law    and   not   of    fact." 
Duffy  V.  People,  26  N.  Y.  588. 

"^  State  V.  Trove,  i  Ind.  App.  553, 
27  N.  E.  878;  Commonwealth  v.  Low- 
rey,  158  Mass.  18,  32  N.  E.  940; 
Commonwealth  v.  Ruddle,  142  Pa.  St. 
144,  21  Atl.  814;  People  V.  Bennett, 
49  N.  Y.  137;  State  v.  Green,  117  N. 
Car.  695,  23  S.  E.  98;  State  v.  War- 
ner, 74  Mo.  83,  85 ;  People  v.  Besold, 
154  Cal.  363,  97  Pac.  871 ;  People  v. 
Minney,  155  Mich.  534,119  N.  W.  918; 
Murphy  v.  State,  124  Wis.  635,  102  N. 
W.  1087.  Cf.  People  V.  Daniels,  105  Cal. 
262,  38  Pac.  720,  where  the  court  has 
power  only  to  "advise"  an  acquittal. 
People  V.  Roberts,  114  Cal.  67,  45 
Pac.  1016.  "In  cases  of  weak  and 
unsatisfactory  evidence,  the  court  can 
always  impress  a  jury  with  the  benign 
principles  of  the  common  law  estab- 
lished for  the  protection  of  the  inno- 
cent, that  the  prosecution  are  bound 
to  establish  a  clear  case;  that  the 
prisoner  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of 
all  reasonable  doubts,  and  that  it  is 
better  that  many  guilty  prisoners 
should  escape  than  that  one  inrtocent 


§    28o  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  498 

even  when  the  evidence  is  insufficient  in  the  opinion  of  the  court 
to  support  a  conviction  on  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  it  becomes  its 
duty,  with  or  without"^  a  rec|uest,  to  direct  an  acquittal.  A  request 
to  have  the  jury  directed  to  acquit  must  state  specifically  the 
grounds  on  which  it  is  based. ^^ 

§  280.  Order  and  manner  of  introducin«f  the  proof. — Ordinarily 
in  all  judicial  proceedings  the  party  who  has  the  burden  of  proof 
must,  in  the  opening,  introduce  all  the  facts  in  evidence  which 
constitutes  his  case.  He  is  required  then  to  make  out  a  prima 
facie  case  only,  and  need  not  anticipate  his  adversary's  case  or 
attempt  to  meet  his  evidence  until  the  proof  of  the  latter  is  heard. 

In  the  case  of  homicide  and  other  serious  similar  criminal  of- 
fenses, it  is  within  the  judicial  discretion  to  require  the  state  to 
prove  the  corpus  delicti  at  least  prima  facie,  before  admitting  evi- 
dence to  connect  the  accused  therewith. ^''^ 

After  the  prosecution  has  exhausted  its  case  and  the  accused 
has  had  a  full  opportunity  to  introduce  all  the  evidence  upon 
which  he  relies  for  an  acquittal,  the  court  may  permit  the  intro- 
duction of  rebutting  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  state.  By  rebut- 
ting evidence  is  meant  not  merely  evidence  which  contradicts  the 
w^itnesses  upon  collateral  and  irrelevant  points,  or  which  is  cor- 
roborative and  confirmative  of  that  which  preceded  it,  but  evi- 
dence which  squarely  meets  and  controverts  some  affirmative 
fact  or  facts  which  the  adversary  has  attempted  to  prove. ^* 

person  should  be  punished;  and  there  introduce  its  proof  is  usually  a  matter 

may  be  cases  so  weak  upon  the  facts  of  judicial  discretion.    Davis  v.  State, 

as  to  justify  the  advice  of  the  court  51    Neb.    301,    70    N.    W.   984;    State 

that  it  is  unsafe  in  the  particular  case  v.  Pruett,  49  La.  Ann.  283,  21  So.  842; 

to    convict."      People   v.    Bennett,    49  Brooke   v.    People,   23    Colo.   375,   48 

N.  Y.  137.  Pac.  502;  State  v.  Remington,  50  Ore. 

-- Commonwrealth     v.      Merrill,      14  99,  91   Pac.  473;  State  v.  DeHart,  38 

Gray   (Mass.)   415,  418,  77  Am.  Dec.  Mont.  21 1,  99  Pac.  438;  People  v.  Car- 

336;  People  V.  Ledwon,  153  N.  Y.  10,  son    (Cal.),  99   Pac.  970;   Caswell  v. 

46   N.   E.    1046;   Taylor   v.   Territory  State,  5  Ga.  App.  483,  63  S.  E.  566; 

(Okla.  Cr.  App.),  99  Pac.  628.  Crawford  v.   United   States,  30  App. 

-'State  V.  Nulty,  2  Eastern  347.  Cas.  D.  C.  i;  Shires  v.  State   (Okla. 

^a  People  V.  Millard,  53  Mich.  63,  18  Cr.  App.),  99  Pac.  iioo. 

N.  W.  562;  People  v.  Hall,  48  Mich.  ="  State    v.    Parish,    22    Iowa    284; 

482,  12  N.  W.  66s,  42  Am.  477.     The  People    v.    Mayes,    113    Cal.    618,    45 

order  in  which  the  prosecution  shall  Pac.   860;    Thomas  v.    State,  47   Fla. 


499  PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AXD    JURY.  §    28oa 

§  280a.  The  credibility  of  detectives  and  experts. — The  evidence 
of  private  detectives  is  justly  regarded  with  some  suspicion  by  the 
courts,  but  there  is  no  rule  of  law  that  their  testimony  is  to  be 
weighed  by  any  other  method  than  that  employed  in  the  case  of 
other  witnesses. ^^  It  is  usually  a  custom,  as  matter  of  practice,  to 
caution  the  jury  to  be  very  careful  in  estimating  the  evidence  of 
private  detectives.  This  matter,  however,  is  largely  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court.  "^ 

It  has  been  held  improper  for  the  court  as  invading  the  prov- 
ince of  the  jury  to  instruct  that  the  testimony  of  private  detectives 
or  of  public  detectives  or  police  officers  should  be  received  with 
caution  or  with  distrust."' 

The  jury  may  take  into  consideration  the  fact  of  the  interest  of 
the  detective  or  policeman  in  securing  a  conviction.  The  jury  in 
determining  his  credibility  that  it  would  be  to  his  advantage  to  se- 
cure a  conviction  as  tending  to  give  him  credit  and  reputation, 
but  it  would  hardly  be  proper  for  the  court  to  instruct  that  the 
interest  which  the  detective  has  in  the  conviction  would  justify 
the  jury  in  regarding  his  testimony  with  suspicion.  His  motive 
is  relevant  and  may  be  considered.  It  is  immaterial,  as  matter  of 
law.  that  the  detective  acts  in  apparent  connection  with  the  ac- 
cused in  the  commission  of  the  crime  and  that  he  did  so  for  the 
purpose  of  procuring  the  arrest  of  the  accused.^*  And  the  fact 
that  a  private  detective  or  police  officer  procures  evidence 
that  a  crime  has  been  committed  by  committing  a  trespass  on  the 
premises  occupied  by  the  accused  and  by  watching  the  accused 
and  others  while  they  engaged  in  the  commission  of  the  crime, 
does  not  violate  the  constitutional  prohibition  against  compelling 
the  party  to  testify  against  himself."'^ 

99,  36  So.  161  ;  Smith  v.  State,  126  Ga.  24  N.  E.  861,  23  Am.  St.  652,  8  L.  R. 

803,  55  S.  E.   1024;   State  v.  Arnold,  A.  837;  State  v.  Hoxsie,  15  R.  I.  i, 

206  Mo.  589,  105  S.  W.  641.  22  Atl.  1059,  2  Am.  St.  838;  State  v. 

=  Myers  v.  State,  97  Ga.  •](>,  25  S.  Bennett,  40  S.  Car.  308,  18  S.  E.  886. 

E.  252;  Burns  v.  People,  45  111.  App.  But  the  contrary  has  also  been  held. 

70;  People  V.   Shoemaker,   131   Mich.  People  v.  Loris,  115  N.  Y.  S.  236. 

107,    90    N.    W.     1035;    Copeland    v.  ^Commonwealth     v.     Foran,      no 

State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  575,  38  S.  W.  210.  Mass.  179. 

'"Jaynes  v.  People,  44  Colo.  535,  99  ^  Cohn  v.  State  (Tcnn.),  109  S.  W. 

Pac.  325.  1 149. 

"Hroneck   v.    People,    134    111.    139, 


§    28oa  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE,  5OO 

There  is  no  presumption  in  law  against  the  testimony  of  an 
expert  witness  who  testifies  for  pay.  It  is  error  for  the  court  to 
charge  in  such  a  way  that  the  jury  will  be  prejudiced  against  ex- 
pert testimony.  For  example,  it  would  be  error  for  the  court  to 
tell  the  jury  that  experts  can  be  found  to  swear  on  both  sides  of 
any  question.^"  And  it  is  manifest  and  glaring  error  for  the  court 
to  state  to  the  jury  that  medical  experts,  employed  by  the  accused, 
are  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  they  testify  for  the  defense  entitled 
to  little  or  no  credit,  but  that  great  weight  should  be  given  to  the 
testimony  of  an  expert  appointed  by  the  court  or  produced  by  the 
state.^^  The  court  may  properly  charge  that  expert  opinions  are 
to  be  considered  with  all  the  evidence  and  that  the  jury  are  not 
bound  to  act  upon  them.®-  But  the  jury  may  determine  whether 
these  opinions  are  reasonable  on  a  consideration  of  all  the  facts 
in  the  case  and  that  they  should  subject  all  evidence,  both  expert 
and  non-expert,  to  a  careful  examination  by  the  same  test.'^  But 
it  is  proper  for  the  court  to  tell  the  jury  that  the  weight  of  expert 
testimony  depends  on  the  skill,  knowledge  and  appearance  of  the 
witness  and  his  acquaintance  with  the  subject  under  investiga- 
tion.®^ 

It  is  error  for  the  court  to  go  beyond  this  in  charging  the  jury 
on  the  weight  of  expert  testimony.  Thus,  it  is  error  where  an 
expert  witness  testifies  that  the  accused  was  sane  when  he  com- 
mitted the  crime  to  instruct  that  "great  respect  is  due  to  the  opin- 
ion of  those  skilled  in  such  matters  and  with  reference  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  human  mind.®^ 

=»  People  V.   Webster,   59   Hun   398,  S.   W.   312;    Epps   v.    State,    102   Ind. 

13  N.  Y.  S.  414;  State  v.  Rathbun,  74  539,  i  N.  E.  491. 

Conn.  524,  51  Atl.  540.  ''  State  v.  Hockett,  70  Iowa  442,  30 

''  Persons  v.  State,  90  Tenn.  291,  16  N.    W.    742,    distinguishing    State    v. 

S.  W.  726.  Townsend,   66    Iowa    741,   24    N.    W. 

'=  Wagner  v.  State,  116  Ind.  181,  18  535- 

N.  E.  833.  "  Smith  v.  State,  127  Ga.  56,  56  S. 

"Wilcox  V.  State,  94  Tenn.  106,  28  E.  116. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY. 


§281. 

Embezzlement — Essential    facts 
constituting  the  crime. 

§  296. 

282. 

Embezzlement — The     intention 

297. 

to   convert. 

298. 

283. 

Proving   other   acts   of   embez- 

zlement. 

299. 

284. 

Ev'idence   of    demand    and    re- 

fusal. 

300. 

285. 

The  existence  of  the  trust  rela- 

tion. 

301. 

286. 

The  ownership  of  the  property. 

287. 

Evidence  of  efforts  to  conceal 

or    dispose    of    property    or 

302. 

money. 

303- 

288. 

Circumstantial       evidence       to 
prove  the  venue. 

304- 

289. 

Value  of  the  property. 

305- 

290. 

Admissions   by   the   defendant. 

306. 

291. 

Documentary  evidence. 

291a 

.  Definition  of  larceny. 

307. 

292. 

Larceny — The   felonious  inten- 

308. 

tion. 

309- 

293- 

The  carrying  away. 

294. 

Ownership  —  Character       and 

proof  of. 

310. 

295- 

Competency  of  owner  of  stolen 
goods   as  witness — Proof  of 
his  non-consent. 

3II- 

Identifying  the  stolen  prop- 
erty. 

Brands  on  cattle. 

Evidence  of  venue  and  of  the 
value  of  money  or  property. 

Inference  from  possession  of 
the  property  stolen. 

Recent  and  exclusive  charac- 
ter of  possession. 

Burden  of  explaining  posses- 
sion— Character  of  explana- 
tory evidence. 

Explanatory  declarations. 

Evidence  of  footprints. 

Financial  standing  and  expend- 
itures of  the  defendant. 

Evidence  of  other  crimes. 

Stolen  goods  found  through 
inadmissible  confession. 

Malicious  mischief. 

Malicious  intent. 

Ownership  and  value  of  prop- 
erty— Evidence  that  the  ac- 
cused acted  in  good  faith. 

Maliciously    injuring    animals. 

Injuries  to  grain,  trees,  crops, 
etc. 


,^  281.  Embezzlement — Essential  facts  constituting  the  crime. — 
Four  distinct  propositions  of  fact  must  be  established  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  to  sustain  a  prosecution  for  embezzlement  by 
an  agent  of  a  private  person  or  a  corporation.  First,  that  the  ac- 
cused was  the  agent  of  the  person  or  corporation,  and  that  he, 
by  the  terms  of  his  employment,  was  charged  with  receiving  the 

501 


^-    282  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  5O2 

money  or  property  of  his  principal.  Second,  that  he  did,  in  fact, 
receive  such  money  or  property.  Third,  that  he  received  it  in 
the  course  of  his  employment.  Fourth,  that  he,  knowing  it  was 
not  his  own,  converted  it  to  his  own  use  or  to  the  use  of  some 
third  person  not  the  true  owner.^ 

A  statute  defining  embezzlement  which  provides  that  a  conver- 
sion to  the  use  of  the  accused,  or  to  that  of  any  "other  person"  is 
embezzlement  or  larceny,  means  some  other  person  or  some  third 
person  other  than  the  accused  and  not  some  person  other  than  the 
owner  of  the  property."  If  the  accused  being  a  servant  or  an 
agent  converts  goods  or  money  of  which  he  has  merely  the  cus- 
tody without  the  actual  possession,  the  offense  is  larceny,  not 
embezzlement.^ 

§  282.  Embezzlement — The  intention  to  convert. — The  crime  of 
embezzlement  was  unknown  at  common  law.  It  is  wholly  the 
creature  of  statutory  enactment.*  And  in  determining  whether 
acts  charged  constitute  embezzlement  the  terms  of  the  statute  are 
controlling.^  Under  most  of  the  statutes,  an  appropriation  of 
the  money  or  the  property  of  another,  entrusted  to  the  care  of  the 

^  Leonard  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  417.  W.    i ;    Commonwealth   v.    Stearns,   2 

Ex  parte,  Hedley,  31  Cal.  108;  Webb  Met.  (Mass.)  343. 

V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  310,  311;  State  ^People  v.    Perini,  94  Cal.   573,  29 

V.    Schingen,   20   Wis.   74;    People   v.  Pac.  1027;  Brown  v.  People,  20  Colo. 

Cobler,  108  Cal.  538,  41  Pac.  401 ;  De-  161,  36  Pac.  1040. 

Leon    V.    Territory,   9    Ariz.    161,    80  Evidence  of  embezzlement   in  gen- 

Pac.   348;    People  v.    Hemple,  4  Cal.  eral,  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2969.  Pre- 

App.     120,    87     Pac.     227 ;    Fields    v.  sumptions  in  prosecutions  for  embez- 

United    States,    27   App.    D.    C.    433 ;  zlement,  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2964. 

State  V.  Dudenhefer,  122  La.  288,  47  Burden  of  proof  in  prosecutions  for 

So.   614;    State   V.    Shuman,    loi    Me.  embezzlement,    see    Elliott    Evidence, 

158,  63  Atl.  665;   State  V.   Stevenson,  §  2965.    Weight  and  sufficiency  of  the 

91    Me.    107,    39    Atl.    471 ;    State    v.  evidence,  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2972. 

Newman,  74  N.   H.    10,  64  Atl.  761 ;  Questions  of  law  and  fact,  see  Elliott 

Moore  v.  State,  53  Neb.  831,  74  X.  W.  Evidence,   §  2966.     Defenses  in  pros- 

319 ;  Flohr  v.  Territory,  14  Okl.  477,  ecutions  for  embezzlement,  see  Elliott 

78   Pac.    565;    State  v.    Bogardus,   36  Evidence,  §  2971. 

Wash.    297,    78    Pac.    942;    Bailey    v.  *  Leonard  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  417; 

Commonwealth  (Ky.  1908),  113  S.  W.  State  v.  Pellerin,  118  La.  547,  43  So. 

140;  State  v.  Foster,  i   Penn.    (Del.)  159. 

289,  40  Atl.  939.  'State  V.   Pellerin,   118  La.  547.  43 

'Fleener  v.  State,  58  Ark.  98,  23  S.  So.  159. 


503 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY.  §    282 


accused,  to  his  own  use  or  to  the  use  of  any  other  person  with  a 
fraudulent  intent  is  embezzlement."  Generally  there  must  be 
some  act  on  the  part  of  the  accused  to  separate  the  property  or 
money  from  that  held  by  him  as  an  agent,  to  deprive  the  owner 
of  it.  or  to  convert  it  to  his  own  use,  and  he  must  assume  some 
personal  dominion  over  the  property.' 

It  consists  of  a  fraudulent  appropriation  to  one's  own  use  of  the 
goods  or  money  of  another,  which  were  entrusted,  with  the  own- 
er's consent,  to  one's  care  as  agent,  servant,  bailee,'^  trustee,  or  in 
some  other  fiduciary  capacity.  It  differs  from  larceny  in  that 
larceny  involves  an  unlawful  taking  without  the  owner's  consent, 
while  the  gist  of  embezzlement  is  the  conversion  or  breach  of 
trust.' 

Larceny  involves  a  trespass  upon  the  possession  of  another,  but 
the  accused  in  embezzlement  being  the  agent  or  trustee  of  the 
owner  has  the  possession  of  the  property  converted  and  therefore 
cannot  be  guilty  of  a  trespass  by  converting  the  property.^"  It 
has  been  held  that  one  who  obtains  possession  of  property  with 
the  intention  of  subsequently  stealing,  and  carries  out  this  inten- 
tion is  guilty  of  larceny.  The  prosecution  must  show  that  he  had 
the  intent  to  steal  at  the  time  he  acquired  possession  in  order  that 
the  crime  shall  be  larceny  ;^^  for,  if  the  intent  to  steal  is  conceived 

*  State  V.    Seeney,   5    Penn.    (Del.)  16    Ky.    L.    184;    Commonwealth    v. 

142,   59   Atl.   48;    State    V.    Foster,    i  Moore,  166  Mass.  513,  44  N.  E.  612; 

Penn.  (Del.)  289,  40  Atl.  939.  Wilson  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  App.  159, 

'Knight  V.    State,    152   Ala.    56,   44  82  S.  W.  651;  State  v.  Dunn,  138  N. 

So.  585.  Car.  (i'/2,  50  S.  E.  772.     The  history 

'  Any  exercise  of  dominion  or  con-  of  the  distinction  at  common  law  be- 

trol  by  a  bailee  over  property  incon-  tween  the  crimes  of  larceny  and  em- 

sistent  with  the  rights  of  the  owner  bczzlement  and  of  the  English  legis- 

or  with  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  lation   upon   the   subject   is   discussed 

bailment  is  evidence  of  a  conversion  at    considerable    length    in    Common- 

if  done  with  intent  to  defraud.    State  wealth  v.  Ryan,  155   Mass.  523,  527- 

V.  Sicnkiewiez,  4  Penn.   (Del.)  59,  55  529,  30  N.  E.  364,  31  Am.  St.  560,  15 

Atl.  346.  L.  R.  A.  317. 

"Ennis   v.    State,   3   Green    (Iowa)  ^"Knight   v.    State,    152   Ala.   56.   44 

67;    People  V.   Johnson,   91   Cal.    265,  So.  585. 

272.  273,  27  Pac.  663;  Commonwealth  "Johnson  v.  State,   119  Ga.  563,  46 

V.  CliflFord,  96  Ky.  4,  2^  S.  W.  811,  S.  E.  839- 


s  282 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


504 


after  the  taking  of  possession  the  crime  is  embezzlement/-  Evi- 
dence of  motive  is  inadmissible  in  embezzlement/'' 

The  intent  to  defraud  the  true  owner  of  his  property  and  to 
convert  it  to  one's  own  use,  or  to  the  use  of  some  third  person, 
must  always  be  proved/* 

The  intent  to  defraud  is  always  a  question  for  the  jury,^'^  and  a 
charge  upon  fraudulent  or  dishonest  intent  should  be  given.'" 

The  intent  to  convert  may  always  be  inferred  from  the  circum- 
stances/^ if  they  are  sufficient  to  prove  a  willful  and  unlawful 
conversion. ^"^ 

The  accused  is  entitled  to  a  charge  to  the  jury  that  the  pre- 
sumption of  law  was  that  the  defendant  would  not  steal  or  mis- 
appropriate the  money  if  it  got  into  his  hands. '^ 


^'  Levy  V.  State,  79  Ala.  259. 

"State  V.  Allen,  21  S.  Dak.  121,  no 
N.  W.  92. 

"  People  V.  Hurst,  62  Mich.  276, 
277,  28  N.  W.  838;  State  v.  Carkin, 
90  Me.  142,  37  Atl.  878;  People  v. 
Galland,  55  Mich.  628,  629,  22  N.  W. 
81 ;  Stallings  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App. 
220,  15  S.  W.  7t6;  State  v.  Reilly,  4 
Mo.  App.  392,  396-400 ;  State  v.  Lyon, 
45  N.  J.  L.  272,  27s;  State  v.  Adams, 
108  Mo.  208,  18  S.  W.  1000;  State  v. 
Kortgaard,  62  Minn.  7,  64  N.  W.  51 ; 
Mulford  V.  People,  139  111.  586,  28  N. 
E.  1096;  State  V.  Pratt,  98  Mo.  482, 
485,  II  S.  W.  977;  State  V.  Trolson,  21 
Nev.  419,  427,  32  Pac.  930;  State  v. 
Hopkins,  56  Vt.  250;  Robson  v.  State, 
83  Ga.  166,  9  S.  E.  610,  612;  Beaty  v. 
S<:ate,  82  Ind.  228,  232;  People  v. 
Page,  1x6  Cal.  386,  48  Pac.  326;  State 
V.  Seeney,  S  Penn.  (Del.)  142,  59  Atl. 
48;  O'Brien  v.  United  States,  27  App. 
D.  C.  263;  Eatman  v.  State,  48  Fla. 
2T,  7,7  So.  576;  Ehrhart  v.  Rork,  114 
111.  .\pp.  509;  State  V.  McDonald.  133 
N.  Car.  680,  45  S.  E.  582;  State  v. 
Summers,  141  N.  Car.  841,  53  S.  E. 
856;  Busby  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
289,    103   S.   W.  638;   State  V.   Mis- 


pagel,  207  Mo.  557,  106  S.  W.  513; 
State  V.  Newman,  74  N.  H.  10,  64 
Atl.  761.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§§  2967,  2716,  2717,  21  Am.  St.  314. 

"Walker  v.  State,  117  Ala.  42,  23 
So.  149. 

^^  State  v.  Dunn,  138  N.  Car.  672,  50 
S.  E.  772. 

"  State  V.  Kortgaard,  62  Minn.  7,  64 
N.  W.  51,  55;  People  v.  Wadsworth, 
63  Mich.  500,  30  N.  W.  99;  State  v. 
Seeney,  5  Penn.  (Del.)  142,  59  Atl.  48; 
State  v.  Lentz,  184  Mo.  223,  83  S.  W. 
970. 

"  State  v.  Brame,  61  Minn.  loi,  63 
N.  W.  250;  State  v.  Noland,  in  Mo. 
473,  485,  19  S.  W.  715,  722;  Common- 
wealth v.  Moore,  166  Mass.  513,  44 
N.  E.  612.  In  such  a  case  the  consent 
or  permission  of  the  owner  to  the 
taking  is  irrelevant.  United  States 
V.  Taintor,  11  Blatch.  C.  C.  374,  28 
Fed.  Cas.  16428,  i  Thomp.  Nat.  Bank 
Cas.  256;  Faust  v.  United  States,  163 
U.  S.  452,  41  L.  ed.  224,  16  S.  Ct.  1 1 12; 
Stephens  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
489,  93  S.  W.  545- 

'"People  V.  Fitzgerald,  156  N.  Y. 
253,  50  N.  E.  846,  reversing  20  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  139,  46  N.  Y.  Supp.  1020. 


0^0 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY, 


§    283 


The  accused  may  always  introduce  evidence  to  show  he  acted 
in  good  faith  and  that  he  had  no  intention  to  convert."'^  He  may 
testify  he  beheved  he  had  authority  to  use  the  money  as  his  own,"^ 
as,  for  example,  where  his  employer  owed  him  a  debt  and  he  re- 
tained money  to  offset  it.-^  He  may  show  that  the  money  he  is 
accused  of  embezzling  was  employed  to  pay  the  debt  of  the  princi- 
pal to  another  with  the  consent  of  the  owner.-^  If  the  jury  are 
convinced  that  the  accused  had  appropriated,  or  applied  the  prop- 
erty openly,  and  with  an  honest  belief  that  he  owned  it,  they 
should  usually,  under  the  statutes,  acquit,  though  the  accused  was 
mistaken  in  his  claim  of  title,^*  and  his  good  faith  had  nothing 
for  its  foundation. ^^ 

The  offense  is  complete  as  soon  as  the  property  or  money  is  in- 
tentionally converted.  The  subsequent  return  of  the  property  or 
the  repayment  of  the  money  to  the  owner  is  not  admissible  in 
evidence  and  does  not  excuse  or  extenuate  the  offense."^ 

§  283,  Proving  other  acts  of  embezzlement. — Other  similar  acts 
of  embezzlement  at  about  the  same  time  are  relevant  to  show  the 
criminal  intent."^ 


""Frink  v.  State  (Fla.  1908),  47  So. 
514- 

"'  Eatman  v.  State,  48  Fla.  21,  37 
So.  576. 

"Eatman  v.  State,  48  Fla.  21,  2>1 
So.  576. 

"Walker  v.  State,  117  Ala.  42,  23 
So.  149. 

"  People  V.  Lapique,  120  Cal.  25, 
52  Pac.  40. 

"Eatman  v.  State,  48  Fla.  21,  yj 
So.  576.  It  has  been  held  that  the  in- 
tent to  convett  may  be  inferred  from 
the  non-payment  of  money  to  the 
owner.  O'Brien  v.  United  States,  27 
App.  D.  C.  263;  Zuckerman  v.  People, 
213  111.  114,  72  N.  E.  741.  The  con- 
trary has  also  been  held.  State  v. 
McDonald,  133  N.  Car.  680,  45  S.  E. 
582. 

^' State  V.  Pellerin,  118  La.  547,  43 
So.  159;  State  V.  Lentz,  184  Mo.  223, 


^2,  S.  W.  970;  Busby  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  App.  289,  103  S.  W.  638;  State  v. 
Merkel,  189  Mo.  315,  87  S.  W.  1186; 
State  V.  Summers,  141  X.  C.  841,  53 
S.  E.  856 ;  Guenther  v.  State,  137  Wis. 
183,  118  X.  W.  640;  United  States 
V.  Gilbert,  25  Fed.  Cases  15205 ;  People 
V.  DeLay,  80  Cal.  52,  22  Pac.  90; 
Shinn  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Gratt. 
(Va.)  899;  State  v.  Leicham,  41  Wis. 
565;  People  V.  Britton,  118  X.  Y.  S. 
989. 

"  People  V.  Xeyce,  86  Cal.  393.  395, 
24  Pac.  109T  ;  People  v.  Bidleman,  104 
Cal.  608,  613,  38  Pac.  502;  People  v. 
Connelly  (Cal.),  38  Pac.  42;  People 
V.  Van  Ewan,  in  Cal.  144,  43  P'lc 
520;  State  V.  Kortgaard,  62  Minn.  7, 
64  N.  W.  51 ;  Bulloch  v.  State,  10  Ga. 
47,  54,  54  Am.  Dec.  369;  Common- 
wealth V.  Tuckcrman,  10  Gray 
(Mass.)  173,  200;  Cnmmnnweahh  v. 
Shcpard,    i    Allen    (Mass.)    575.   581; 


284 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


506 


So  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  failed  to  pay  over  money 
belonging  to  other  persons  aside  from  the  offense  in  question  and 
also  promises  by  the  accused  that  he  would  pay  money  entrusted 
to  him  though  such  evidence  tends  to  prove  a  distinct  offense."'^ 

§  284.  Evidence  of  demand  and  refusal. — Whether  proof  of  a  de- 
mand is  necessary  to  show  the  conversion  depends  wholly  upon 
the  language  of  the  statute.  Even  if  not  absolutely  essential  it 
may  be  relevant  and  proper  to  prove  a  demand,  and  that  compli- 
ance was  refused  to  show  the  intention  to  convert.^"  Proof  of  a 
demand  is  certainly  immaterial  where  the  demand  would  be  in- 
effectual, as  when  the  accused  admits  he  has  sold  the  goods.^"" 

Proof  of  a  demand  is  not  necessary  where  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  make  it  because  the  accused  disappeared  shortly  after  the 
embezzlement.^^    The  same  rule  applies  where  before  any  demand 


Commonwealth  v.  Eastman,  i  Cush. 
(Mass.)  189,  216,  48  Am.  Dec.  596; 
Brown  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  496; 
People  V.  Hawkins,  106  Mich.  479,  64 
N.  W.  736;  Jackson  v.  State,  76 
Ga.  551,  568;  Stanley  v.  State,  88 
Ala.  154,  157,  7  So.  273;  Lang  v.  State, 
97  Ala.  41,  46,  12  So.  183;  Ingram 
V.  State,  39  Ala.  247,  84  Am.  Dec.  782 ; 
People  V.  Gray,  66  Gal.  271,  5  Pac. 
240;  Reg.  V.  Richardson,  8  Cox  C. 
C.  448,  2  F.  &  F.  343.  But  the  court 
must,  on  request,  instruct  the  jury  that 
this  evidence  must  be  confined  to  this 
point.  State  v.  Holmes  (Mich., 
1896),  68  N.  W.  11;  Eatman  v.  State, 
48  Fla.  21,  2)7  So.  576;  United  States 
V.  Breese,  131  Fed.  915;  State  v. 
Dudenhefer,  122  La.  288,  47  So.  614; 
People  V.  Robertson,  6  Gal.  App.  514, 
92  Pac.  498;  Kossakowski  v.  People, 
177  111.  563,  53  N.  E.  lis;  People  v. 
Rowland  (Gal.  App.,  1909),  106  Pac. 
428. 

®  Schintz  V.  People,  178  111.  320,  52 
N.  E.  903. 

Evidence  of  other  crimes  in  prose- 
cution for  embezzlement,  see  62  L.  R. 
A.  226,  264,  105  Am.  St.  996,  looi. 

^  State  V.  Bryan,  40  Iowa  379 ;  Peo- 


ple V.  Royce.  106  Gal.  173,  39  Pac. 
524,  525 ;  Burnett  v.  State,  60  N.  J.  L. 
255,  y?  Atl.  622;  State  V.  Blackley,  138 
N.  Gar.  620,  50  S.  E.  310.  See  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  2970.  The  felonious  con- 
version of  the  property,  when  com- 
plete, constitutes  the  gist  of  the  crime, 
and  if  this  is  otherwise  proved  a  de- 
mand is  superfluous.  Wallis  v.  State, 
54  Ark.  611,  620,  16  S.  W.  821.  Cj. 
State  V.  Brooks,  85  Iowa  366,  371,  52 
N.  W.  240;  State  v.  Ross  (Ore.,  1909)' 
104  Pac.  596. 

™  United  States  v.  Adams,  2  Dak. 
305,  9  N.  W.  718;  State  v.  Foley,  81 
Iowa  36,  Z7,  46  N.  W.  746;  Dean 
V.  State,  147  Ind.  215,  46  N.  E.  528; 
State  V.  Fellerin,  118  La.  547,  43  So. 
159;  State  V.  Knowles,  185  Mo.  141,  83 
S.  W.  1083.  Evidence'  of  demand 
may  be  admissible  and  proper  to  show 
a  failure  to  pay  over  or  account  for 
money.  State  v.  Sarlls,  135  Ind.  195, 
199,  34  N.  E.  1 129;  State  v.  Adam- 
son,  114  Ind.  216,  219,  16  N.  E.  187; 
Hale  v.  Richards,  80  Iowa  164,  45  N. 
W.  734.  See,  also.  People  v.  Page,  116 
Gal.  386,  48  Pac.  326. 

^'  Kossakowski  v.  People,  177  111- 
563,  53  N-  E.  115. 


507 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY. 


§    285 


is  made  the  accused  tells  a  witness  that  the  money  is  all  gone  and 
he  supposes  he  is  to  be  arrested. '- 

§  285.  The  existence  of  the  trust  relation. — There  can  be  no  em- 
bezzlement where  the  relation  between  the  accused  and  the  owner 
of  the  property  is  that  of  debtor  and  creditor.^^  According-  to 
this,  there  can  be  no  embezzlement  as  between  partners.^*  The 
evidence  must  show  that  a  relation  of  trust  existed  between  the 
defendant  and  the  true  owner  of  the  money  or  property,  and  that 
the  thing  embezzled  came  into  the  defendant's  possession  by  vir- 
tue of  his  employment  as  an  agent  or  bailee.^^ 

An  agent  or  servant  dc  facto  without  an  express  or  formal  ap- 
pointment, may  be  guilty  of  embezzlement.  But  one  who  is  in  no 
position  of  trust  or  confidence  towards  the  owner  cannot  be  guilty 
of  embezzlement  though  he  may  commit  larceny. 

It  is  sufficient  to  prove  the  official  character  of  an  officer  of  a 
corporation  de  facto.  It  is  not  necessary  to  produce  a  written 
certificate  of  his  appointment,  or  to  show  that  he  was  sworn  or 
had  given  an  official  bond.^*' 


"  State  V.  Blackley,  138  X.  Car.  620, 
50  S.  E.  310.  No  demand  required 
though  it  could  have  been  made. 
State  V.  Tompkins,  32  La.  An.  620; 
Commonwealth  v.  Tuckerman,  10 
Gray  (Mass.)  173;  Wallis  v.  State, 
54  Ark.  611,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  821 ;  State 
V.  New,  22  Minn.  76;  State  v.  Porter, 
26  Mo.  201 ;  Hollingsworth  v.  State, 
III  Ind.  289,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  490.  These 
cases  were  under  particular  statutes. 
A  demand  was  required  to  be  proved 
in  People  v.  Tomlinson,  66  Cal.  344, 
5  Pac.  Rep.  509 ;  People  v.  Royce, 
106  Cal.  173,  39  Pac.  Rep.  524;  Wright 
v.  People,  61  111.  382;  State  v.  Ban- 
croft, 22  Kan.  170.  But  it  need  not 
be  in  any  particular  form  or  lan- 
guage. State  V.  Bancroft,  22  Kan. 
170. 

"  Mulford  v.  People.  139  III.  586,  28 
N.  E.  1096. 

"McCrary    v.    State,    51    Tex.    Cr. 


App.  496,  502,  103  S.  W.  924,  926,  123 
Am.  St.  903. 

^^  Bartow  v.  People,  78  N.  Y.  Z77, 
381 ;  Tipton  v.  State,  53  Fla.  69,  43 
So.  684;  McAleer  v.  State,  46  Neb. 
116,  64  N.  W.  358;  State  v.  Mahan, 
132  Mo.  112,  39  S.  W.  465;  State  v. 
Cooper,  102  Iowa  146,  71  N.  W.  187. 
Evidence  of  usage  and  custom  is  ad- 
missible to  show  that  the  money  came 
into  the  custody  of  defendant  by 
virtue  of  his  employment.  State  v. 
Silva,  130  Mo.  440,  32  S.  W.  1007. 

^  State  V.  Findley,  loi  Mo.  217,  14 
S.  W.  i8s,  186;  State  v.  Stone,  40 
Iowa  457,  2  S.  W.  286;  State  v.  Dier- 
berger,  90  Mo.  369,  371 ;  Common- 
wealth v.  Logue,  160  Mass.  551,  36 
N.  E.  475;  People  v.  Page,  116  Cal. 
386,  48  Pac.  326;  Tipton  v.  State,  53 
Fla.  69,  43  So.  684;  Walker  v.  State, 
117  Ala.  42,  23  So.  149;  Cooper  v. 
State,  lOi  Ga,  783,  29  S.  E.  22;  People 


§    286  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  :;o3 

An  entry  in  the  book  of  the  minutes  of  the  board  of  directors 
of  a  corporation,  showing  the  election  of  the  accused  as  president 
is  sufficient  proof  of  official  character  with  evidence  that  he  acted 
as  president.^^  Whether  or  not  a  public  official  who  is  accused 
of  embezzlement  of  public  funds  was  or  was  not  lawfully  ap- 
pointed is  immaterial. ^^ 

But  the  crime  is  not  proved  merely  by  showing-  the  agency  and 
the  conversion.  To  show  the  intent,  it  must  appear  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  that  the  agent  had  no  right  to  use  the  money  or 
goods  in  the  manner  he  did.  It  must  be  shown  to  be  a  conver- 
sion which  the  agent,  under  his  contract,  had  no  right  to  make.^* 
Ordinarily,  the  contract  of  employment,  when  in  writing,  ought 
to  be  produced.  But  it  seems  the  principal  may  testify  orally  to 
the  fact  of  agency,  and  he  is  then  open  to  cross-examination  as  to 
the  facts  upon  which  this  conclusion  is  based.*" 

§  286.  The  ownership  of  the  property. — The  ownership  of  the 
goods  must  be  proved  to  be  in  some  other  person  than  the  ac- 
cused. When  it  is  laid  in  a  corporation,  proof  of  a  corporation 
de  facto  is  enough.*'  The  charter  or  certificate  of  incorporation 
need  not  be  produced." 

V.  Cobler,  io8  Cal.  538,  41   Pac.  401 ;  taxes.     State  v.  Dudenhefer,  122  La. 

State  V.  Mims,  26  Minn.  183,  2  N.  W.  288,  47  So.  617. 

494;   Fortenberry  v.   State,   56  Miss.  ^  State  v.  Brooks,  85  Iowa  366,  2>72, 

286.  52  N.  W.  240.     But  compare,  contra, 

"  McKnight  v.   United   States,    122  People  v.  Bidleman,  104  Cal.  608,  613, 

Fed.  926,61  C  C.  A.  112.  38   Pac.   502;   Thalheim  v.   State,  38 

^*  People  V.  Sanders,  139  Mich.  442,  Fla.  169,  20  So.  938. 

102   N.    W.   959;    State   v.    Ring,   29  "  Fleener  v.  State,  58  Ark.  98,  102, 

Minn.  78,  11  N.  W.  233.  23  S.  W.  i;  Burke  v.  State,  34  Ohio 

^  State  V.  Wallick,  87  Iowa  369,  373,  St.  79 ;  Calkins  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St. 

54  N.  W.  246;  State  v.  Hill,  47  Neb.  366,  98  Am.  Dec.  121;  State  v.  Turner, 

456,  66  N.  W.  541;   People  v.   Page,  119  N.  Car.  841,  25  S.  E.  810;  Kos- 

116  Cal.  386,  48  Pac.  326;   Busby  v.  sakowski  v.  People,  177  111.  563,  53  N. 

State,  51   Tex.  Cr.  App.  289,   103   S.  E.  115. 

W.  638;   McCrary  v.   State,  51   Tex.  *"  An  immaterial  variance  in  proving 

Cr.  App.  502,  103  S.  W.  924,  123  Am.  the  name  of  the  owner  may  be  disre- 

St.  905.     A  tax  collector  withholding  garded.    Jackson  v.  State,  76  Ga.  551, 

settlement    raises    a    presumption    of  567;    Commonwealth   v.   Dedham,   16 

embezzlement.     It  may  not  be  neces-  Mass.   141,   147;   Eatman  v.  State,  48 

sary   to   prove  he   has   collected  any  Fla.  21,  37  So.  576.    Contra,  Washing- 
ton V.  State,  72  Ala.  272,  276. 


509  EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY.  §    287 

The  ownership  of  money  by  a  corporation  is  proved  by  evi- 
dence that  the  corporation  owned  certain  real  estate  and  that 
such  real  estate  had  been  sold.*^  The  conversion  of  the  funds 
of  the  local  lodge  of  an  unincorporated  benevolent  association  is 
embezzlement  under  a  statute  which  punishes  embezzlement  by 
officials  or  members  of  benevolent  organizations  and  a  local  lodge 
has  such  an  ownership  of  the  funds  collected  from  its  members 
to  be  forwarded  to  the  grand  lodge  as  will  justify  alleging  it  to 
be  the  owner.**  The  ownership  of  the  money  or  property  em- 
bezzled must  be  proved  substantially  as  laid  in  the  indictment. 
Proof  of  ownership  in  a  corporation  does  not  sustain  an  allega- 
tion of  ownership  by  a  partnership.*^  But  an  allegation  of  owner- 
ship by  an  express  company  is  supported  by  proof  that  the  money 
appropriated  belonged  to  parties  who  had  delivered  it  to  the  ex- 
press company  for  transportation.*^  So  proof  that  money  was 
paid  to  a  bank  through  checks  drawn  by  the  agent  of  the  state 
and  collected  by  the  bank  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  money  was 
the  property  of  the  state.*" 

§  287.  Evidence  of  efforts  to  conceal  or  dispose  of  property  or 
money. — It  is  always  relevant,  and,  indeed,  indispensable  to  prove 
some  kind  or  degree  of  concealment  by  the  accused,  either  of  the 
property  or  of  the  facts  regarding  its  disposal.*^  Fraudulent 
vouchers  and  false  statements,**^  and  false  entries  in  books  con- 
taining a  record  of  the  transaction  in  question  are  always  relevant. 
It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  false  entries  were  made  at  the  time 
of  the  embezzlement,  or  tnat  they  were  made  by  the  accused,  if 

**  Fields  V.  United   States,  27  App.  181;  State  v.  Tompkins,  32  La.  Ann. 

D.  C.  433.  620;   State  v.  Fain,  106  N.  Car.  760, 

"State  V.  Knowles,  185  Mo.  141,  83  764,  11  S.  E.  593;   Stallings  v.  State, 

S.  W.  1083.  29  Tex.  App.  220,  15  S.  W.  716,  717. 

"  State  V.  Morgan,  28  Oreg.  578,  42  But   facts  showing  a  conversion   arc 

Pac.  128.  enough.     It  need  not  be  shown  how 

*"  Riley  v.  State,  32  Tex.  763.  defendant     finally     disposed     of     the 

"Busby  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  App.  money.     State  v.  King,  81   Iowa  587, 

289,  103  S.  W.  638.  47   N.   W.    775;    State   v.    Pierce,   77 

^'Fleener  v.  State,  58  Ark.  98,  TO4,  Iowa  245,  42  N.  W.  181. 

23  S.  W.  I ;  Calkins  v.  State,  18  Ohio  "State  v.   Cowan,  74  Iowa   53,  55, 

St.  366,  98  -Am.   Dec.   I2in;    State  v.  36    N.    W.    886;    Commonwealth    v. 

Pierce,  77   Iowa  245,  249,  42   X.   W.  Moore,  166  Mass.  513,44  X.  E.  612. 


^§  288,  289         CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  5IO 

it  appears  that  they   were  made  at   his  instance  and  with  his 
knowledge.  °° 

§  288.  Circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  the  venue. — Circumstan- 
tial evidence  is  usually  all  that  can  be  obtained  to  prove  the  venue 
because  of  the  customary  secrecy  of  the  act  of  conversion.  If 
it  appears  that  the  accused  received  the  property  in  the  county 
alleged,  and  that,  when  it  was  last  seen  in  his  custody,  he  was 
in  that  county,  the  venue  is  proved. ^^  This  prima  facie  proof  of 
venue  may  be  rebutted  by  showing  that  the  money  was  taken  to 
another  county  and  fraudulently  converted  there.^' 

^  289.  Value  of  the  property. — The  value  of  the  property  in- 
volved need  not  be  shown  unless  to  ascertain  whether  the  crime 
is  a  felony  or  misdemeanor.^^  If  the  value  of  several  articles  is 
alleged  in  a  lump  sum,  the  value  of  each  may  be  shown  sep- 
arately.^* Proof  of  the  embezzlement  of  any  part  of  the  sum  al- 
leged is  sufificient.^^  But  proof  of  the  embezzlement  of  a  draft  or 
check  does  not  sustain  an  allegation  of  the  embezzlement  of 
money.^®  The  crime  of  embezzlement  is  peculiar  in  some  respects. 

It  is  usually  impossible  to  prove  it  with  much  preciseness  of 
detail,  particularly  in  the  case  of  superior  executive,  public  or 
private  officials,  who  have  no  one  to  watch  their  manner  of  doing 
business.  The  statute  against  embezzlement  would  be  a  dead 
letter  if  it  were  required  in  every  case  to  show  precisely  when  the 
accused  received  the  funds  or  to  prove  their  character,  w'hether 

^Jackson  v.  State,  76  Ga.  551,  568.  '^^  Gerard  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  690, 

Proof  of  demand,  and  neglect  to  re-  692. 

turn,  is  evidence  of  conversion ;   but  "  State  v.  Mook,  40  Ohio   St.   588, 

mere    neglect    to    return    or    to    pay  590.     Under  a  statute  permitting  the 

money  over  is  not  proof  of  a  fraud-  money  embezzled  to  be  described  as 

ulent  conversion.    Fitzgerald  v.  State,  gold,  silver  or  paper  in  the  indictment 

50  N.  J.  L.  475,  477,  14  Atl.  746,  747;  proof  of  the  amount  of  money  taken 

People   V.    Wyman,    102   Cal.    552,   36  is  enough  and  the  jury  may  presume 

Pac.  932,  934.  it  was  in  gold,  silver  or  paper  from 

"Wallis  V.  State,  54  Ark.  611,  620,  this  proof.     Storms  v.  State,  81  Ark. 

16   S.   W.   821 ;    Robson   v.    State,   83  25,  98  S.  W.  678. 

Ga.    166,  9   S.    E.   610,   611;    State   v.  "=  State   v.    Foster,    i    Penn.    (Del.) 

Small,  26  Kan.  209.  389,  40  Atl.  939. 

"  State  V.  New,  22  Minn.  76,  79.  ^  State   v.    ]\Iispagel,   207    Mo.   557, 

106  S  .W.  Rep.  513. 


511  EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY.  §    29O 

drafts,  bank-notes  or  coin.  Embezzlement  usually  consists  of  a 
continuous  series  of  acts  of  conversion,  done  at  various  times  but 
with  a  common  design,  and  resulting  in  the  principal  and  im- 
portant fact  of  a  shortage.  Proof  of  such  a  series  of  criminal 
acts  is  sufficient  to  sustain  a  verdict  that  the  aggregate  amount, 
as  alleged,  was  embezzled. ^'^ 

§  290.  Admissions  by  the  defendant. — A  confession  to  be  admis- 
sible must  relate  specifically  to  the  matter  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment. A  confession,  in  general  terms,  that  accused  had  been 
taking  money  "all  along,  ever  since  he  began  to  work  for  him, 
and  could  not  say  how  much  he  had  taken,"  should  be  rejected, 
as  it  does  not  refer  to  names,  dates,  amounts  or  any  other  specific 
details.^®  Admission  by  the  accused,  of  relevant  facts,  are  always 
competent,^"  though  they  may  tend  to  prove  him  guilty  of  another 
act  of  embezzlement.*"* 

A  draft  paid  to  the  defendant,^^  or  a  receipt  signed  by  him  in 
his  official  capacity,  is  admissible  against  him.^"  The  check  by 
which  the  accused  drew  the  money  he  embezzled  is  competent.''^ 
But  statements  of  accounts  and  letters  passing  between  the  prin- 
cipal and  the  agent  are  not  generally  received  as  independent 
evidence,  unless  they  can  be  construed  as  constituting  a  part  of 
the  res  gestiv.^* 

^  291.  Documentary  evidence. — The  admissibility  and  effect  of 
transcripts  of  public  records  are  frequently  under  consideration 

"Jackson  v.  State,  76  Ga.  551,  573;  52  X.  W.  246.     Though  not  payalile 

State  V.  Pratt,  98  Mo.  482,  489,  11  S.  to  him.    People  v.  McBride,  120  Mich. 

W.  977;  State  V.  Ring,  29  Minn.  78,  166,  78  N.  W.  1076. 

84,  II  N.  W.  233;   Bolln  V.  State,  51  "-People  v.  Van  Ewan,  in  Cal.  144, 

Xeb.  581,  71  N.  W.  444.  43  Pac.  520:  Denton  v.  State,  77  Md. 

^  Commonwealth    v.    Sawtelle,    141  527,  529,  26  Atl.  1022. 

Mass.  140,  144,  5  N.  E.  312.  *^  De  Leon  v.  Territory,  9  Ariz.  161, 

"  Butler  V.  State,  91  Ala.  87,  9  So.  80  Pac.  348. 

191 ;  State  V.  Mims,  26  Minn.   183,  2  "*  State  v.  Adams,  108  Mo.  208,   18 

X.  W.  494;  Smith  V.   State,  34  Tex.  S.  W.  1000;  Eatman  v.  State,  48  Fla. 

Cr.  265,  30  S.  W.  236,  237;   State  v.  21,    37    So.    576.     The    fact    that    the 

Davison  (N.  H.,  1906),  64  Atl.  761.  defendant  does  not  reply  to  a   letter 

""Bode  V.  State,  80  Xcb.  74,  113  X.  rcf|uesting    a    settlement    is    evidence 

W.  996.  with  the  letter.     State  v.  .'\dams,   108 

*'  State  V.  Brooks,  85  Iowa  366,  371,  Mo.  208,  213,  214,  18  S.  W.  1000. 


§    291  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  5 12 

in  the  trial  of  public  officials  for  embezzling  public  property  or 
funds.  The  oreneral  rule  is  that  public  records  are  admissible  as 
evidence  of  all  facts  which  are  contained  therein,  and  which  were 
required  by  statute  to  be  recorded  by  the  official  who  made  the 
entry.  So  the  failure  of  a  public  officer  to  pay  over  money  which 
he  has  collected  may  be  shown  by  a  transcript  of  an  official  regis- 
ter in  which  the  payment  should  have  been  entered.  "^^  Such  rec- 
ords are  not,  however,  conclusive  against  the  defendant.  He  may 
endeavor  to  explain  or  to  impeach  them  unless  he  had  already 
examined  them  and  appeared  satisfied  with  the  entries.  Under 
these  circumstances  he  may  be  regarded  as  estopped  by  them.*'" 
Entries  made  by  the  accused  himself  in  his  own  hand  in  books 
kept  by  him  are  received  against  him  as  admissions  to  show  the 
receipt  of  the  money  and  a  failure  to  pay  over.*'^  But  entries  in 
his  books  by  others  are  not  admissible  unless  there  is  preliminary 
proof  that  his  attention  was  called  to  them.**"^  An  expert  account- 
ant may  testify  orally  to  the  result  of  his  examination  of  volumi- 
nous books  and  accounts  containing  the  amount  of  money  received 
and  paid  by  the  accused  when  it  is  not  convenient  to  bring  the 
books  into,  court.*'^ 

•^'Shivers  v.  State,  53  Ga.  149,  152;  So.  183;  People  v.  Burnham,  106  N. 

State  V.  King,  81  Iowa  587,  47  N.  W.  Y.  Sup.  57.  120  App.  Div.  388. 

775.     See  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2968.  "' Hollingsworth   v.    State,   in    Ind. 

•^  People   V.    Flock,    100    Mich.    512,  289,  297,  12  N.  E.  490;  State  v.  Find- 

514,  59  N.  W.  237;  Bork  V.  People,  16  ley,  lor  Mo.  217,  14  S.  W.  185,  187; 

Hun    (N.   Y.)    476;   Hockenberger  v.  Busby  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  289,  103 

State,  49  Neb.  706,  68  N.  W.  1037.    A  S.  W.  638.    Where  the  defendant  was 

check  drawn  by  an  official  is  admis-  accused  of  embezzling  the  money  of  a 

sible  against  him  to  show  the  manner  bank   of   which   he  was  cashier,   and 

in  which  he  embezzled  public  funds,  the  point  at  issue  was  whether  he  had 

though  it  may  not  be  formally  correct,  conspired    with     others     to    get    the 

or  a  sufficient  voucher  as  between  the  money  of  the  bank  into  his  possession 

government  and  the  bank  upon  which  that  he  might  convert  it  to  his  own 

it   is    drawn.     State   v.    Noland,    in  use,  evidence  is  relevant  to  show  that 

Mo.  473,  19  S.  W.  715.  the  bank  became  insolvent,  its  finan- 

"  State   v.    Ring,   29   Minn.    78,   83,  cial  condition  at  that  date,  its  stock 

TT    N.    W.    233;    Commonwealth    v.  and  liabilities,  that  defendant  and  his 

Pratt,    137    Mass.    98,    105 ;    Hocken-  brother  were  insolvent  and  owed  the 

berger  v.  State,  49  Neb.  706,  68  N.  W.  bank  large  sums,  that  defendant  had 

1037.  drawn  large  sums  on  his  own  account, 

'''Lang  v.  State,  97  Ala.  41,  46,  12  and  that  a  person  whose  draft  had 


513  EMBEZZLEMEXT    AND    LARCENY.  §    291a 

As  against  the  claim  of  the  accused  that  he  accounted  for  the 
proceeds  of  a  check  which  he  is  accused  of  embezzHng,  it  is  per- 
mitted to  the  state  to  give  oral  testimony  showing  the  history  of 
the  check  from  the  time  it  was  made  out  and  mailed  to  the  ac- 
cused to  the  date  when  it  was  returned  by  the  bank  paying  it."" 
The  true  character  of  a  check  which  the  accused  is  charged  to 
have  used  fraudulently  may  always  be  shown  by  parol  evidence.'^^ 
Though  a  contract  of  hiring  be  in  writing,  parol  evidence  is  re- 
ceived to  show  how  the  money  to  become  due  thereunder  was  to 
be  used.^"  To  refresh  the  memory  of  the  prosecuting  witness  a 
memorandum  may  be  referred  to  if  it  was  properly  made  from 
information  within  the  recollection  of  the  wntness  at  the  time  it 
was  made.'^^ 

§  291a.  Definition  of  larceny. — Larceny  may  be  defined  as  the 
unlawful  or  wrongful  taking  and  carrying  away  of  the  personal 
property  of  another  with  the  intent  to  convert  it  to  the  use  of  the 
accused  or  to  the  use  of  some  third  person  without  the  owner's 
consent.'*  If  the  accused,  intending  to  steal  another's  goods,  per- 
suades the  owner  to  consent  to  give  him  the  goods  in  any  manner 
showing  an  intention  to  pass  title  to  him,  it  is  not  larceny.'^^  Lar- 
ceny and  robbery  are  distinct  in  that  in  the  case  of  robbery  the 
taking  is  by  physical  force  and  without  the  consent  of  the  owner. 
So  where  the  accused  was  discovered  to  have  his  hand  in  the 
pocket  of  the  prosecuting  witness,  and  a  struggle  ensued  between 
them  which  ends  in  the  taking  of  the  money  by  force,  a  robbery 
is  committed,  though  in  the  beginning  the  accused  intended  only 
to  commit  a  larceny.'^^   But  the  taking  of  a  purse  from  the  pocket 

been    discounted    for    the    defendant  "  People  v.  Alesser,   148  Mich.   168, 

was  also  insolvent.     Reeves  v.   State,  lii  N.  W.  854. 

Q5  Ala.  31,  II  So.  Rep.  158.    Evidence  "Eatman  v.  State,  48  Fla.  21,  2,7  So. 

to  show  that  the  bondsmen  of  the  ac-  576. 

cused  had  settled  and  paid  the  short-  "Walker  v.   State,   117  Ala.  42,  23 

age  is  irrelevant.    Fleener  v.  State,  58  So.  149. 

Ark.  98,  105,  23  S.  W.  i;  Morehouse  "State  v.  Wolf  (Del.),  66  Atl.  739. 

V.  State,  35  Xeb.  643,  646,  53  N.  W.  "Welch  v.  State,  126  Ga.  495,  55  S. 

571;  State  v.  Pratt,  98  Mo.  482.  492,  E.   183;   State  v.  Court    (Mo.,   1910), 

II   S.   W.  977;   State  V.  Lcicham,  41  125  S.  W.  451. 

Wis.  565.  '"  Carter   v.   State,  3   Ga.   App.   477, 

"People  v.  Peck,  139  Mich.  680,  103  60  S.  E.  Rep.  216. 
X.  W.  178,  12  Detroit  Leg.  N.  28. 

.13 — U.VDERHII.L    CrIM.    Ev. 


§    292 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


H 


of  the  prosecuting-  witness  secretly  and  without  his  knowledge  and 
without  force  and  violence  is  larceny  only.'^ 

^  292.  Larceny — The  felonious  intention. — The  felonious  and 
larcenous  intention  which  was  present  in  taking  the  goods  must 
be  shoW'U  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt."'' 

It  may,  of  course,  be  inferred  from  circumstances  indicating 
motive.  The  intent  is  for  the  jury,  and  if  it  can  fairly  be  inferred 
on  all  the  evidence  a  conviction  must  be  affirmed." 

To  rebut  the  inference  of  a  felonious  intent  the  accused  must 
be  permitted  to  testify  that  he  had,  .or  believed  he  had,  and 
claimed  in  good  faith  a  title  to  the  property  derived  from  its 
owner,^"  or  that  he  took  the  property  for  any  innocent  purpose,^^ 
or  in  an  open  manner,  to  satisfy  a  claim  against  the  owner,"*- 
or  because  he  believed  it  to  be  his  own.^^    The  intoxication  or 


"  Morris  v.  State,  125  Ga.  36,  53  S. 
E.  564.  For  further  definitions  of  the 
crime,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
cases  cited  in  §  292  and  §  293. 

"'  Long  V.  State,  1 1  Fla.  295,  297 ; 
Phelps  V.  People,  55  III.  334;  Britt  v. 
State,  2  Tex.  App.  215,  222,  17  S.  W. 
255 ;  Waidley  v.  State,  34  Neb.  25a, 
252,  51  N.  W.  830;  Micheaux  v.  State, 
30  Tex.  App.  660,  18  S.  W.  550;  Fence 
V.  State,  no  Ind.  95,  99,  10  N.  E. 
919;  State  V.  Fitzpatrick,  9  Houst. 
(Del.)  385,  32  Atl.  1072;  Green  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1896),  33  S.  W.  120; 
Truslow  V.  State,  95  Tenn.  189,  31  S. 
W.  987;  State  V.  Ravenscraft,  62  Mo. 
App.  109;  People  V.  Hendrickson,  18 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  404, 46  N.  Y.  S.  402 ; 
People  V.  Frankenberg,  236  111.  408,  86 
X.  E.  128;  State  v.  Allen,  34  Mont. 
403,  87  Pac.  177;  Todd  v.  Common- 
wealth, 29  Ky.  L.  473,  93  S.  W.  631 ; 
Flagg  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  602,  103 
S:W.  855;  Stoddard  v.  State,  132  Wis. 
520,  112  N.  W.  453;  McMahan  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  244,  96  S.  W.  17; 
Malone  v.  State,  169  Ind.  72,  81  N.  E. 
1099;   Ladeaux  v.   State,  74  Neb.   19, 


103  N.  W.  1048.  See  Elliott  Evidence. 
§§  3055,  3056.  Evidence  of  good 
character  of  defendant  in  prosecution 
for  larceny,  103  Am.  St.  901.  Com- 
prehensive note  on  proof  of  the  cor- 
pus delicti  in  criminal  cases,  68  L.  R. 
A.  33- 

'''Robinson  v.  State,  113  Ind.  510, 
512,  16  N.  E.  184;  Malone  v.  State, 
169  Ind.  72,  81  N.  E.  1099;  Jefferson 
V.  State  (Ark.),  115  S.  W.  1140.  See, 
also,  Talbert  v.  State,  121  Ala.  33,  25 
So.  690. 

'"'  State  V.  Williams,  95  Mo.  247,  250, 
8  S.  W.  217,  6  Am.  St.  46;  Common- 
wealth V.  Stebbins,  8  Gray  (Mass.) 
492,  495- 

'^Brooks  V.  State  (Tex.,  1894),  27 
S.  W.  141.  The  declaration  of  a  de- 
ceased owner  of  property  alleged  to 
have  been  stolen  that  he  gave  it  to 
the  accused  is  admissible.  People  v. 
Doyle,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.)  535,  538,  12 
N.  Y.  S.  836. 

'-People  V.  Husband,  36  Mich.  306, 
308:  State  V.  Bailey,  63  W.  Va.  668, 
60  S.  E.  785. 

"State   V.    Daley,   53   Vt.   442,  444, 


515  EMBEZZLEMEXT    AND    LARCENY.  §    292 

mental  weakness  of  the  accused  before  the  taking-  may  be  shown, 
not  in  extenuation,  but  as  a  circumstance  from  which  absence  of 
specific  intent  may  be  inferred.^'* 

The  state  may  always  show  circumstances  from  which  it  may 
be  reasonably  inferred  that  the  accused  made  a  claim  to  the  prop- 
erty in  bad  faith  or  that  he  had  no  confidences  in  the  claim  under 
which  he  took  it  away.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  accused,  though 
claiming  to  own  the  property  himself,  endeavored  to  put  it  be- 
A'ond  the  reach  of  the  true  owner,  either  by  concealment,  by  sell- 
ing it  or  by  destroying-  it.^^ 

Evidence  of  the  secret  taking-  of  the  goods,  or  of  their  open 
taking  with  the  owner's  knowledge  but  without  his  consent,  and 
with  the  intent  to  sell  them  or  to  prevent  the  owner  from  finding 
them  is  always  relevant.^*' 

Facts  or  declarations  prior  or  subsequent  to  the  taking  away 
may  be  proved  if  they  are  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc.  From  these  a 
larcenous  intent  may  properly  be  inferred.  The  false  representa- 
tions of  the  accused  employed  to  procure  money  subsequently 
stolen  are  relevant.*"  The  testimony  of  an  accomplice  who  aided 
the  accused  on  an  understanding  with  him  that  she  was  to  induce 
men  to  drink  intoxicating  liquors  in  order  that  the  accused,  a 
saloon  keeper,  might  steal  their  money  is  admissible.''^ 

Parol  evidence  of  a  conversation  between  the  prosecuting  wit- 
ness and  the  accused  has  been  received  where,  prior  to  the  taking 
of  the  property  they  met  and  traveled  some  distance  in  company 
to  the  place  where  the  money  was  taken. *^  So.  generally  anv 
statement  made  by  the  accused  to  the  owner  or  to  anv  other  per- 
son having  possession  of  the  property  by  which  he  obtains  its 
possession  that  as.  for  example,  where  he  states  that  he  will  keep 
it  until  the  owner  calls  for  it,  is  admissible  on  the  intent. '^^    All 

,■^8  Am.  694:  Hunter  v.   State   (Tex.,  '"  Long  v.  State,  ii  Fla.  295.  297. 

1897).  37  S.  W.  323;  State  v.  Ravens-  "Towns  v.   State,  167  Tnd.  315,  78 

craft,  62  Mo.   App.    109:   Johnson   v.  X.  E.  1012,  119  \m.  St.  50T. 

United    States    fOkla.    Cr.    App.),  99  **  State  v.  McCarthy,  36  Mont.  226, 

Pac.  T022.  92  Pac.  521. 

"Robinson  v.    State,    113   Tnd.    510,  '"Viberg  v.  State,   138  Ala.   100,  35 

513.  16  N.  E.  184:  ante.  §  166.  So.  53,  too  Am.  St.  22. 

"State  V.    Bailey,   63   W.   Va.   668,  ""State  v.  Levine,  79  Conn.  714,  66 

60  S.  E.  785.  Atl.  529,  ID  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  286. 


§  293 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


;i6 


these  facts  to  be  admissible  must  show  an  intention  to  commit 
larceny  and  not  some  other  crime."^ 

§  293.  The  carrying  away.— The  felonious  taking-  away  of  the 
stolen  property  out  of  the  possession  of  the  owner,  though  only 
for  an  instant,  without  the  owner's  consent,  being-  a  constituent 
element  of  the  crime,  must  usually  be  proved.^"  It  must  be  shown, 
too,  that  the  accused  actually  meant  to  deprive  the  owner  of  his 
property  permanently"^  and  not  merely  to  use  it  temporarily  in 
a  mischievous  or  wanton  manner,  intending  to  return  it.^* 

One  who  accepting  in  good  faith  the  custody  of  a  lost  article 
for  the  purpose  of  restoring  it  to  its  owner  subsequently  appro- 
priates it  to  his  own  use  is  guilty  of  larceny."^ 

It  is  always  proper  to  permit  the  state  to  prove  that  the  accused 
was  in  the  house  or  in  the  room  occupied  by  the  prosecuting  wit- 
ness If  the  property  stolen  was  there  too.  This  evidence  may  be 
very  strong  if  the  accused  was  near  the  stolen  property  while  the 
owner  was  absent  and  if  on  the  return  of  the  owner,  the  property 


"Pence  v.  State,  no  Ind.  95,  99,  10 
N.  E.  919;  People  v.  Burnham,  119 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  302,  104  N.  Y.  S. 

725- 

"'  Mizell  V.  State,  38  Fla.  20,  20  So. 
769;  Wright  V.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 
358,  365 ;  Sharp  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App. 
211,  213,  15  S.  W.  176,  177;  State  V. 
Wingo,  89  Ind.  204,  207 ;  Starck  v. 
State,  63  Ind.  285,  30  Am.  214;  Eads 
V.  State,  17  Wj-o.  490,  loi  Pac.  946; 
State  V.  Wolf  (Del.),  66  Atl.  739; 
Hicks  V.  State,  loi  Ga.  581,  28  S.  E. 
917;  People  V.  Burnham,  119  App. 
Div.  (N.  Y.)  302,  104  N.  Y.  S.  725. 
And  this  carrying  away  may  be  ac- 
complished by  any  removal  of  the 
property  from  its  original  situation 
as  would  work  a  complete  severance 
from  the  possession  of  the  owner. 
State  V.  Taylor,  136  Mo.  66,  37  S. 
W.  907;  Edmonds  v.  State.  70  Ala. 
8,  9,  45  Am.  67;  State  v.  Seagler,  i 
Rich.  (S.  Car.)  30,  42  Am.  Dec.  404; 
State  v.   Gilbert,  68  Vt.   188,  34  Atl. 


697;  State  v.  Rozeboom  (Iowa, 
1910),  124  N.  W.  783. 

°^  State  V.  McKee,  17  Utah  270,  53 
Pac.  733. 

^Colwell  v.  State  (Tex.,  1896),  34 
S.  W.  615;  Pence  v.  State,  no  Ind. 
95,  98,  10  X.  E.  919;  Robinson  v. 
State,  113  Ind.  510,  512,  16  N.  E.  184; 
State  v.  Hayes,  214  Mo.  230,  113  S. 
W.  1050;  State  V.  McGee,  212  Mo. 
95,  no  S.  W.  699;  Daniels  v.  State, 
148  Ala.  663,  41  So.  525 ;  People  v. 
Rogers,  22  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  147,  47 
X.  Y.  S.  893;  State  v.  Morse,  12 
Idaho  492,  86  Pac.  53. 

*^  State  V.  Levine,  79  Conn.  714,  66 
Atl.  529,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  286. 

The  property,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3052;  the  trespass,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3050;  the  taking,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3049 ;  the  carrying  away,  Elliott  Ev- 
idence, §  3051 ;  nonconsent  of  owner. 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3054;  testimony  of 
accomplice,  98  Am.  St.  173;  defenses, 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3059. 


517 


EMBEZZLEMENT   AND    LARCENY. 


293 


is  missing.^®  So  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  persons  who 
were  in  the  company  of  the  accused  and  who  aided  him  in  com- 
mitting the  larceny  were  acquainted  with  the  accused  prior 
thereto.^^ 

Evidence  that  he  was  present  when  the  taking  occurred  may 
be  sufficient,  if  his  presence  was  an  aid  to  an  accomplice  whO'  did 
the  carrying  away.''^  Proof  of  the  slightest  carrying  away  for  a 
very  short  time,^**  by  which  the  property  is  not  taken  out  of  the 
presence  of  the  owner/°°  and  also  when  immediately  thereafter 
it  is  restored  to  its  former  place/  is  enough  if  the  accused  is 
shown  to  have  obtained  full  custody  of,  and  entire  and  absolute 
control  over  the  property."  If  the  goods  were  lawfully  taken  by 
or  delivered  to  the  accused,  the  state  must  show  an  unlawful  con- 
version or  appropriation  by  the  accused,  as  in  embezzlement.^ 

§  294.  Ownership — Character  and  proof  of. — The  ownership  of 
the  property  must  be  proved  substantially  as  laid.'*    Slight  dis- 


^  Bradford  v.  State,  147  Ala.  95,  41 
So.  462. 

''State  V.  McGee,  188  Mo.  401,  87 
S.  W.  452. 

''  Edmonds  v.  State,  70  Ala.  8,  9,  45 
Am.  68;  Kent  v.  State,  64  Ark.  247, 
41  S.  W.  849. 

^Eckels  V.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  508, 
5i3~5i7;  Commonwealth  v.  Luckis,  99 
Mass.  431,  433,  96  Am.  Dec.  769;  Har- 
rison V.  People,  50  N.  Y.  518,  522,  10 
Am.  517;  State  v.  Gebey,  196  Mo. 
104,  93  S.  W.  402. 

"*  Madison  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App. 
435,  441- 

^Harrison  v.  People,  50  X.  Y.  518, 
520,  521,  10  Am.  517. 

"  Rex  V.  Thompson,  i  ]Mood.  C.  C. 
78. 

"  Shinn  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Gratt. 
(Va.)  899,  910;  Davis  v.  State,  100 
Ga.  69,  25  S.  E.  921 ;  ante,  §  282. 

*  Glover  v.  State,  40  So.  354,  146 
Ala.  690;  Bryan  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr. 
196.  91  S.  W.  580;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3053-   If  it  is  laid  in  one  person  and 


is  proved  to  be  in  another  a  conviction 
should  be  reversed.  McDowell  v. 
State,  68  Miss.  348,  8  So.  508;  Clark 
V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  437,  438,  16  S. 
W.  171 ;  Thurmond  v.  State,  37  Tex. 
Cr.  422,  35  S.  W.  965 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Trimmer,  i  Mass.  476;  State  v. 
McCoy,  14  N.  H.  364;  State  v.  Bur- 
gess, 74  N.  Car.  272.  If  the  owner  is 
alleged  to  be  unknown  to  the  grand 
jury,  he  must  be  proved  to  have  been 
so.  Sharp  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  211, 
15  S.  W.  176;  Logan  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  I,  34  S.  W.  925,  and  if  this  is 
done,  proof  of  ownership  in  a  person 
known  is  not  fatal.  People  v.  Flem- 
ing, 60  Hun  (N.  Y.)  576,  14  N.  Y. 
Supp.  200.  If  one  person  has  a  gen- 
eral and  another  a  special  ownership, 
the  ownership  may  be  alleged  and 
proved  in  either.  Trafton  v.  State,  5 
Tex.  App.  480,  484.  So  an  allegation 
of  ownership  by  A.  is  not  sustained 
by  proving  a  joint  ownership  in  A. 
and  B.  State  v.  Burgess,  74  N.  Car. 
272,  273. 


§§    294.    295  CRIMIXAL    EV^IDEXCE.  518 

crepancies  in  proving  the  name  of  the  owner  may  be  disregarded.' 
The  best  evidence  of  ownership  is  the  instrument  under  which  the 
title  is  claimed,  and  it  should  be  produced,"  though  under  most 
circumstances,  ownership  of  personal  property  may  be  proved  by 
parol.  Direct  proof  of  ownership  is  not  always  necessary.  Owner- 
ship may  be  inferred  from  circumstances.'  Possession  of  personal 
property  is  primary  evidence  of  ownership,'^  if  it  appears  that  the 
alleged  owner  exercised  exclusive  control,  possession  and  manage- 
ment over  it.^  An  absolute  ownership  need  not  be  proved.  Evi- 
dence that  the  alleged  owner  held  the  property  as  bailee  or  trustee 
will  suffice.^"  If  the  ownership  is  laid  in  a  corporation  proof  of 
its  dc  facto  existence  is  enough,"  nor  need  it  be  shown  that  the 
corporation  was  legally  doing  business  in  the  state. ^- 

^  295.  Competency  of  owner  of  stolen  goods  as  witness — Proof  of 
his  non-consent. — At  common  law  the  owner  was  not  incompetent 
because  of  his  interest  to  testify  at  the  trial,  even  wdien  he  was 
entitled  to  restitution  on  conviction,^^  or  to  a  fine,  the  value  of 
wliich  exceeded  that  of  the  goods  stolen.^*  The  non-consent  of 
tlie  owner  must  be  proved,  as  it  cannot  be  presumed  from  the 
taking.^^  His  testimony,  wdiere  he  had  the  exclusive  custody  and 
control  of  the  property,  and.  w'here  he  has  delegated  his  power 
of  management  to  another,  the  testimony  of  this  agent  with  his 
own  evidence  is  primary  evidence  to  prove  non-consent.^^ 

'Underwood  v.   State,  72  Ala.  220,  ville,   21    Ale.    14,   38  Am.    Dec.   248; 

222 ;  State  v.  Brin,  30  Minn.  522,  524,  United  States  v.  Jackson,  29  Fed.  503 

r6  N.   W.  406;    Perry  v.    People,   38  (mail     matter);      State     v.      Brown 

Colo.  23,  87  Pac.  796.  (Mont.),  99  Pac.  954. 

"Edwards  v.    State,   29   Tex.   App.  "Commonwealth   v.   Whitman,    121 

452,  16  S.  W.  98.  Mass.  361. 

"  George  v.  United   States,   i   Okla.  ^  State  v.  Hopkins,  56  Vt.  250. 

Cr.  407,  97  Pac.  1052,  100  Pac.  46.  ^^  State  v.  Casados,  i  N.  &  McC.  (S. 

^IMorris  v.  State,  84  Ala.  446,  4  So.  Car.)  91. 

912;  Ledbetter  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  "State  v.  Pray,  14  N.  H.  464,  466; 

195,  infra.  Commonwealth  v.    Moulton,  9   Mass. 

^  State   V.    Robinson,    35    La.    xA.nn.  29,  30. 

964.     The   alleged   owner   is   not   the  "  State  v.    Storts,   138  Mo.    127,  39 

best  witness  of  the  fact  of  possession  S.  W.  483;  Garcia  v.  State,  26  Tex. 

or  ownership.     Lowrance  v.   State,  4  209,  210,  82  Am.  Dec.  605;  Wilson  v. 

Yerg.  (Tenn.)  145,  146.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  481,  487. 

^"Ledbetter   v.    State.    35   Tex.    Cr.  '"State  v.  Moon.  41  Wis.  684,  686: 

195,  32  S.  W.  903;    State  V.   Somer-  Bubster  v.  State,  33  Neb.  663,  664,  50 


ii9 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY. 


§    296 


Other  evidence  is  not  admissible  until  the  absence  of  the  owner 
or  of  his  agent  has  been  satisfactorily  accounted  for.^^  If  this  is 
done,  non-consent  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence/^ 
provided  the  circumstances  proved  are  such  as  exclude  ever}^  rea- 
sonable presumption  that  the  owner  consented, ^^  as,  for  example, 
by  showing  that  he  was  searching  for  his  property  soon  after  the 
theft, -^  or  by  the  declarations  of  the  accused  to  the  effect  that  he 
had  parted  with  possession  and  that  the  owner  could  not  have  his 
property."^ 

Evidence  that  the  owner  furnished  an  opportunity  to  a  sus- 
pected person  to  commit  a  larceny,  for  the  purpose  of  detecting 
and  arresting  him.  is  inadmissible  to  show  he  consented  to  part 
with  his  property." 

§  296.  Identifying  the  stolen  property. — The  identity  of  the 
stolen  property  must  be  established  substantially  as  laid  in  the 
indictment.-^  Where  cattle  are  described  by  age,  color,  species  or 
brand,  these  details  become  material  and  a  variance  is  fatal.-* 


N.  W.  953;  Jackson  v.  State,  7  Tex. 
App.  363,  364;  Wilson  V.  State,  12 
Tex.  App.  481. 

"  State  V.  Osborne,  28  Iowa  9 ;  State 
V.  !Morey,  2  Wis.  494,  496. 

^Carroll  v.  People,  136  111.  456,  465, 
466,  27  N.  E.  18;  Rex  V.  Hazy,  2  C. 
&  P.  458;  State  V.  Skinner,  29  Ore. 
599,  46  Pac.  368;  Trafton  v.  State,  5 
Tex.  App.  480;  Files  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  206,  36  S.  W.  93 ;  State  v.  Porter, 
26  Mo.  201,  203,  2  Russ.  on  Crimes 
I'iT,  George  v.  United  States,  i  Okla. 
Cr.  307,  97  Pac.  1052 ;  Ray  v.  State,  4 
Ga.  App.  67,  60  S.  E.  816;  Van  Syoc 
V.  State,  69  Neb.  520,  96  N.  W.  266; 
Jordan  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  646,  T04 
S.  W.  900;  State  V.  Faulk  (S.  Dak., 
iOo8),  116  N.  W.  72. 

"Wilson  V.  States,  45  Tex.  ^6,  78, 
23  Am.  602 ;  Housh  v.  People,  24  Colo. 
262.  50  Pac.  1036. 

"Rains  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  588. 
'Cf.  State  V.  Porter,  26  Mo.  201,  207; 


George  v.  United  States,  i  Okla.  Cr. 
307,  97  Pac.  1052. 

=^  People  V.  Dean,  58  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
610,  12  N.  Y.  S.  749. 

^Varner  v.  State,  72  Ga.  745,  746. 
See  State  v.  Hull,  2>Z  Oreg.  56,  54  Pac. 
159,  ~2  Am.  St.  694n. 

^Hodnett  v.  State,  117  Ga.  705,  45 
S.  E.  61. 

"•*  State  V.  Jackson,  30  Me.  29,  30 ; 
Wiley  V.  State,  74  Ga.  840;  Hooker 
V.  State,  4  Ohio  348,  351 ;  Banks  v. 
State,  28  Tex.  644,  647 ;  Bush  v.  State, 
18  Ala.  415,  416;  Whart.  Cr.  Ev., 
§  124;  Robertson  v.  State,  97  Ga.  206, 
22  S.  E.  974;  Mizell  V.  State,  38  Fla. 
20,  20  So.  769;  State  V.  Dale,  141  Mo. 
284;  42  S.  W.  722,  64  Am.  St.  513. 
If  a  statutory  distinction  is  made  be- 
tween the  species  of  any  animal,  proof 
of  one  is  a  variance  if  another  is  al- 
leged. State  V.  Buckles,  26  Kan.  237, 
241.  Otherwise,  where  no  distinction 
is  made.     People  v.  Pico,  62  Cal.  50, 


296 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


520 


It  is  unnecessary  that  the  stolen  property,  even  though  bank 
notes,  should  be  produced  as  evidence  in  court,"'"^  though  this  may 
be  done-"  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  if  the  articles  are  first  iden- 
tified as  having  been  stolen."'  The  identity  of  money  received  in 
evidence  with  the  stolen  money  is  for  the  jury.-®  If  the  article 
is  not  produced  the  owner  may  testify  to  the  marks  thereon.-^ 

But  a  witness  cannot  be  permitted  to  prove  a  previous  descrip- 
tion, not  verified  by  oath,  which  he  received  from  a  person  who 
went  in  search  of  the  stolen  property,^*^  or  to  testify  that  such  a 
description  corresponds  with  his  recollection.  A  witness  to  the 
identity  of  the  property  need  not  be  positive  but  may  give  his 
opinion  based  in  personal  knowledge,^^  though  a  witness  will  not 
be  permitted  to  testify  that  on  the  previous  date  the  owner  identi- 
fied it.^"  An  indictment  for  stealing  chickens, ^^  a  cow,^*  a  horse,^^ 
or  a  hog,^"  is  sustained  by  proof  of  the  larceny  of  any  variety  or 
sex  of  the  animal."' 


52 ;  State  v.  Hill,  65  Mo.  84,  85 ;  Wiley 
V.  State,  3  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  362,  375; 
Turley  v.   State,  3    Humph.    (Tenn.) 

323,  324. 

^  Moore  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Leigh 
(Va.)  701,  706;  Spittorff  v.  State,  108 
Ind.  171,  172,  8  N.  E.  911;  State  v. 
Clark,  27  Utah  55,  74  Pac.  119. 

^  Ledbetter  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
195,  32  S.  W.  903 ;  Lue  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  15  S.  W.  664;  Bryant 
V.  State,  116  Ala.  445,  23  So.  40;  Hoo- 
ten  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  6,  108  S.  W. 
651. 

"  Buchanan  v.  State,  109  Ala.  7,  19 
So.  410. 

^Hooten  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  6, 
108  S.  W.  651. 

^  State  V.  Ballard,  104  Mo.  634,  637, 
16  S.  W.  525. 

^^  Whizenant  v.   State,  71   Ala.  383, 

385. 

''  Misseldine  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
335.  17  S.  W.  768;  State  v.  Lockwood, 
58  Vt.  378,  380,  3  Atl.  539;  State  v. 
Babb,  76  Mo.  501,  404;  State  v.  Mur- 


phy, 15  Wash.  98,  45  Pac.  729;  Minor 
V.  State,  55  Fla.  77,  46  So.  297.  But 
compare,  contra,  Elliston  v.  State,  50 
Tex.  Cr.  575,  99  S.  W.  999. 

"  Anderson  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App. 
49,  52.  Where  the  owner  identified 
goods  found  in  defendant's  possession 
from  their  quality  and  color  the  de- 
fendant should  be  allowed  to  show, 
by  a  witness  having  experience  in 
such  matters,  that  a  merchant  cannot 
identify  goods  from  color  and  quality 
alone.  Buchanan  v.  State,  109  Ala. 
7,  19  So.  410. 

^  State  V.  Bassett,  34  La.  Ann.  1108. 

^  Parker  v.  State,  39  Ala.  365. 

^' Davis  V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  210, 
211,  4  S.  W.  590. 

^  State  V.  Godet,  7  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 
210,  211. 

"  It  will  be  presumed  that  the  ani- 
mals alleged  to  have  been  stolen  were 
alive.  If  they  were  dead  it  should  be 
so  stated,  for  an  indictment  for  steal- 
ing an  animal  is  not  sustained  by 
proof  of  stealing  a  carcass.     Rex  v. 


521  EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY,  §    296 

]\Ioney  or  valuable  securities  stolen  must  be  properly  identified, 
and  the  proof  of  the  money  missing,  or  which  was  found  in  the 
possession  of  the  prisoner,  must  agree  substantially  with  that 
alleged  in  the  indictment.  A  witness  may  be  permitted  to  see  coins 
found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused  for  the  purpose  of  identify- 
ing them  as  stolen.^®  Where  it  is  alleged  that  bank  notes,"®  prom- 
issory notes,*"'  treasury  notes, *^  or  money,''"  were  stolen  the  proof 
must  correspond  with  the  allegation,  and  any  material  variance 
will  be  fatal.  But  strict  proof  of  the  identity  of  money  is  not  re- 
quired. The  identity  of  stolen  money  may  be  determined  from 
circumstantial  evidence.*^  So  where  several  bills  of  high  denomi- 
nation were  stolen,  evidence  was  received  to  show  that  the  accused 
had  bilb  of  that  sort  in  his  possession  after  the  larceny,  though 
before  he  had  been  destitute.** 

Evidence  of  the  genuineness  and  value  of  stolen  bank  bills, 
or  of  the  corporate  existence  of  the  bank,  is  proper,  though 
usually  the  jury  may  infer  these  facts,*^  as  from  an  admission 
by  the  accused  that  he  had  passed  them  for  value.**^  Parol  evi- 
dence may  be  given  to  prove  the  genuineness  of  stolen  bank  notes 
or  checks,  without  producing  them  or  accounting  for  their  non- 

Halloway,   i   C.  &  P.   127;   Common-  Mete.     (Mass.)     534,     537,     45     Am. 

wealth   V.    Beaman,   8   Gray    (Mass.)  Dec.      227;      Anglin      v.      State,      52 

497,  499-  Tex.     Cr.     475,     107     S.     W.     835 ; 

^Russell   V.    State    (Ala.),   38    So.  State  v.  Johnson,  36  Wash.  294,  78 

291.  Pac.  903,  where  the  prosecuting  wit- 

"'  Pomeroy  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Va.  ness  was  allowed  to  state  that  within 

Cas.  342.  a  half  hour  after  the  arrest  he  found 

*"  Stewart  v.  State,  62  Md.  412,  415.  a  $20  gold  piece  in  the  room  of  the 

"  State  V.   Collins,  72  N.   Car.    144,  accused  though  he  could  not  identify 

145 ;  Keating  v.  People,  160  111.  480,  43  that  particular  piece  of  money  as  his 

X.   E.  724;    State  v.   Clark,  27  Utah  own.     On  trial  for  the  larceny  of  a 

55,  74  Pac.  119.  roll   of   bills,   the   identification   of   a 

*^  Lancaster  v.    State,  9   Tex.   App.  roll     of    paper    with     a     single     bill 

393,  395 ;    Braxton  v.   State,  50  Tex.  wrapped   around   it   to   represent   the 

Cr.    632,   99    S.    W.    994;    Hooten   v.  roll    taken   is  not  error.     Keating  v. 

State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  6,  108  S.  W.  651.  People,  160  111.  480,  43  N.  E.  724. 

'■'McDonald  v.  State  (Fla.),  47  So.  "Clark  v.  State,  14  Ind.  26;  Collins 

485.  V.  People,  39  111.  233,  241. 

"People  V.  Wilkinson,  60  Hun  (N.  '"'Baldwin  v.  State,  i  Snccd  (Tcnn.) 

Y.)  582,  14  N.  Y.  S.  827;  Keating  v.  411,  416.     See,  also,  llildrcth  v.  Peo- 

People,    160   111.   480,   43   N.    E.   724;  pie,  32  111.  36,  38. 
Commonwealth    v.    Montgomery,    11 


§    297  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  522 

production.'*'  A  failure  to  prcxluce  the  bank  notes,  though  a  cir- 
cumstance which  the  jury  may  consider  as  favoring  the  prisoner's 
innocence,  does  not  render  parol  evidence  of  their  value  incompe- 
tent. If  they  are  produced,  it  is  not  necessary  to  call  the  officers 
of  the  bank  to  prove  them  genuine.''^ 

§  297.  Brands  on  cattle. — That  cattle  are  branded  with  the  brand 
of  the  prosecuting  witness  is  some  evidence  of  his  ownership.'" 
The  state  may  prove  that  an  unrecorded  brand  was  used  for  years 
by  the  party  claiming  ownership.'^^"  A  diagram  of  a  brand  has 
been  received,  together  with  the  hide  of  the  stolen  steer,  where 
they  were  properly  identified.''^  Testimony  that  the  prosecuting 
witness  made  mistakes  in  branding-  his  cattle  is  irrelevant.''- 
Brands  duly  recorded  according  to  law  must  usually  be  proved 
by  a  copy  of  the  record  to  identify  stolen  animals.  This  is  prima 
facie  proof  of  the  ownership  of  the  animal  bearing  that  brand. ^^ 

The  statutes  do  not  make  brands  and  marks  evidence  of  identity 
for  they  are  evidence  aside  from  statute.  The  effect  of  the  stat- 
utes is  to  render  a  certified  copy  of  the  record  admissible  in 
evidence.^'*  In  some  cases,  however,  the  statutes  provide  that  no 
brand  except  recorded  brands  shall  be  evidence  of  the  ownership 
of  cattle.^^ 

A  witness  who  has  seen  the  animal  alleged  to  have  been  stolen 
may  describe  any  marks  which  he  may  have  observed. ^*^  A  witness 

^'People  V.  Holbrook,  13  Johns.  (N.  "People  v.  Hutchings,  8  Cal.  App. 

Y.)   90,  93;   Milne's  Case,  2  East  C.  550,  97  Pac.  325. 

L.    602;    State   V.    Alayberry,   48    Me.  "Dickson  v.  Territory,  6  Ariz.   199, 

218,  238;    Commonwealth   v.    Messin-  56  Pac.  971. 

ger,    I    Binn.    (Pa.)    273,   275,   278,   2  ^* Thompson  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App. 

Am.  Dec.  441 ;  Williams  v.  State,  34  466,  476,  9  S.  W.  760 ;  Brooke  v.  Peo- 

Tex.  Cr.  523,  31  S.  W.  405,  406;  Mc-  pie,  23  Colo.  375,  48  Pac.  502;  Areola 

Ginnis  v.  State,  24  Ind.  500,  506,  507.  v.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  51,  48  S.  W.  195. 

*^  Moore  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Leigh  "  Territory   v.    Smith,    12   N.    Mex. 

(Va.)  701,  706.  229,  78  Pac.  42. 

**  State  V.  Wolfley,  75  Kan.  406,  89  "^  Lockwood  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  26 

Pac.    1046,    93    Pac.    337;    People    v.  S.  \V.  200;   Eisner  v.   State,  22  Tex. 

Romero    (Cal.  App.,   1910),   107  Pac.  App.  687,  688,  3  S.  W.  474;  Tittle  v. 

709.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  597,  599,  I7  S.  W. 

•'•°  Territory  V.  Aleredith  (N.  Mex.),  1118;    Sapp  v.   State    (Tex.   Cr.   App. 

91   Pac.  731.  1903),  77  S.  W.  456.    But  proof  of  the 

"  People  V.  Hutchings,  8  Cal.  App.  brand  to  show  ownership  is  not  indis- 

550,  97  Pac.  325.  pensable  unless  it  is  the  only  evidence. 

Wolf  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  332. 


523  EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY.  §    298 

may  always  be  permitted  to  state  that  it  is  difficult  to  identify 
cattle,  because  of  the  similarity  of  marks  on  them.^^ 

§  298.  Evidence  of  venue  and  of  the  value  of  money  or  property. — 
The  burden  of  proving  the  venue  as  laid,  and  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,"'^^  is  upon  the  state,  though,  if  the  state  shall  omit  to  prove 
the  venue  specifically,  the  jury  may  infer  it  from  all  the  evidence 
on  both  sides.^"  An  allegation  of  larceny  in  one  county  is  sup- 
ported by  evidence  of  a  taking  in  another,  and  a  transportation 
into  the  county  where  the  venue  is  laid.''"  The  property  taken 
must  be  proved  to  have  some  value,  ''^  though  the  value  alleged, 
not  being  usually  a  part  of  the  corpus  delicti,  need  not  be  proved 
unless  proof  of  value  is  necessary  to  fix  the  grade  of  the  offense."^ 

Direct  evidence  of  the  precise  value  of  the  property  stolen  is 
not  required.  The  value  of  the  stolen  property  is  always  largely 
a  matter  of  opinion.  The  opinion  of  a  witness  as  to  the  value, 
where  value  is  material,  is  not  of  necessity  conclusive  on  the  jury. 
They  may  disregard  the  opinion  of  the  witness  if  they  think  he 
has  not  testified  honestly  and  fairly.  The  jury  may  infer  that  the 
stolen  property  has  value  from  evidence  of  its  character  and  use,'''^ 

"Lue     V.      Commonwealth      (Ky.  wealth  (Ky.),  29  S.  W.  16,  16  Ky.  L. 

1889),   IS  S.  W.  664.     The  ears  and  530. 

dewlaps  of  a  cow  have  been  allowed  ^^  Scott   v.    State,   42   Ark.   y^,   yj ; 

to  be  exhibited,  to  identify  the  animal  State  v.  Shour,  196  Mo.  202,  95  S.  W. 

and  to  show  that  the  brand  had  been  405. 

mutilated.  State  v.  Crow,  107  Mo.  *'"  Commonwealth  v.  Dewitt,  10 
34i>  350,  17  S.  W.  745.  And  compare  Mass.  154,  155;  People  v.  Burke,  11 
Mizell  V.  State,  38  Fla.  20,  20  So.  769.  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  129,  4  Bl.  Com.  305. 
In  some  instances,  it  is  provided  by  Cf.  State  v.  Bartlett,  11  Vt.  650. 
the  statutes  that  in  a  prosecution  for  "  Powell  v.  State,  88  Ga.  32,  2Zj  I3 
stealing  a  horse  the  ownership  of  S.  E.  829;  Parker  v.  State,  iii  Aia. 
which  is  uncertain  or  unknown,  the  72,  20  So.  641 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 
propcrty  shall  be  held  to  be  owned  by  Kcnney,  9  Gray  (Mass.)  114;  Benja- 
the  state.  Contradictory  evidence  as  min  v.  State,  105  Ga.  830,  31  S.  E.  739. 
to  whether  the  horse  is  or  is  not  ""  Commonwealth  v.  Riggs,  14  Gray 
branded  leaves  the  ownership  uncer-  (Mass.)  376,  77  Am.  Dec.  2>23'>  Van- 
tain  within  the  statute.  State  v.  degrift  v.  State,  151  Ala.  105,  43  So. 
Eddy,  46  Wash.  494,  90  Pac.  641.  852;  Herd  v.  United  States,  13  Okla. 

"Harsdorf    v.    State    (Tex.    App.),  512,  75  Pac.  291. 

18  S.  W.  415;  Moyc  V.  State,  65  Ga.  "'Commonwealth    v.    McKcnncy,    9 

7.S4,  755;    Thockmorton   v.    Common-  Gray    (Mass.)    114,    116;    Whalon    v. 


§    298  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  524 

and  a  non-expert  \vitness  may  always  testify  to  the  value  of  the 
property."* 

The  courts  will  notice  judicially  the  meaning  of  words  used  to 
designate  the  circulating  medium,  its  value,  and  that  of  all  mon- 
eys, foreign  or  domestic,  whose  value  is  established  by  law."^ 

Evidence,  therefore,  that  the  property  consisted  of  bank  notes 
or  any  description  of  money  will  always  sustain  an  inference  that 
it  was  of  some  value.""  Securities,  as  stock  certificates,  whose 
real  value  is  not  proved,  will  be  presumed  to  have  a  nominal 
value."' 

Expert  evidence  will  be  received  to  prove  the  value  of  stocks, 
bonds  and  other  securities,  if  the  expert  has  bought  or  sold  the 
securities  in  question,  and  for  that  reason  is  competent."^  It  will 
be  presumed  that  gold  coin  alleged  to  have  been  stolen  was  of  its 
face  value."'*  Where  evidence  of  value  is  relevant  to  determine 
the  grade  of  the  ofifense.  the  accused  may  show  that  the  value  of 
the  property  was  such  that  he  should  not  be  convicted  of  grand 
larceny.  Usually  the  market  value  "^  at  the  time  and  place  of 
the  theft  is  the  only  proper  evidence.^^  Evidence  of  value  at  the 
time  of  the  trial  is  competent  unless  it  appears  that  the  value  at 
the  time  of  the  trial  differed  from  that  at  the  time  of  the  theft. '- 

Commonwealth,  90  Va.  544,  19  S.  E.  Donald  v.   State,  2  Ga.  App.  633,  58 

182;   State  V.  Faulk   (S.  Dak.  1908),  S.  E.  1067. 

116  N.  W.  72.  "•  People  v.  Griffin,  38  How.  Pr.  (N. 

•^  State  V.  Finch,  70  Iowa  316,  317,  Y.)    475,   480;    Whalen   v.    Common- 

30  N.  W.  578,  59  Am.  443;   Moss  v.  wealth,  90  Va.  544,  549,  19  S.  E.  182; 

State,  40  So.  340,   146  Ala.  686,  not  Rooney  v.  State,  51  Neb.  576,  71  N. 

reported  in  full;  Echols  v.  State,  41  W.  309. 

So.  298,  147  Ala.  700,  not  reported  in  '^  People  v.  Turpin,  233  111.  452,  84 

full;  State  v,  Montgomery,  17  S.  Dak.  N.  E.  679,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  276n. 

SCO,   97   N.    W.    716;    Vandegrift   v.  ''State  v.  Faulk  (S.  Dak.),  116  N. 

State,  43  So.  852,  151  Ala.  105;  Lewis  W.  72. 

V.  State  (Ala.,  1909),  51  So.  308.  '"State  v.   Brown,  55  Kan.  611,  40 

•^Underhill  on  Ev.,  §  237;  McDon-  Pac.  looi ;   Cannon  v.  State,   18  Tex. 

aid  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  633,  58  S.  E.  App.  172,  173;  Glover  v.  State,  40  So. 

1067.  354,  146  Ala.  690,  not  reported  in  full. 

**  Nelson  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  205,  "People  v.  Cole,  54  Mich.  238,  239, 

32  S.  W.  900;  ^IcDowell  V.  State,  74  19  N.  W.  968;  Glover  v.  State,  40  So. 

Miss.    37S,    20    So.    864;    Vincent    v.  354,  146  Ala.  690;  Keipp  v.  State,  51 

State,    3    Heisk.     (Tenn.)     120,    126;  Tex.  Cr.  417,  103  S.  W.  392. 

Bagley  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  163,  169;  '"  Cummings    v.     State     (Tex.     Cr. 

Duvall  v.  State,  63  Ala.  12,  15;  Ale-  1907),  106  S.  W.  363. 


525  EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCEXY.  §    299 

If  the  property  has  no  market  vakie  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  it  is 
competent  to  prove  the  purcliase  price. '^  The  owner's  opinion  of 
the  vahie  of  the  property  has  been  received.''* 

The  jury  may  fix  the  vahie  of  the  property  according  to  the 
highest  estimate  of  any  witness. '° 

§  299.  Inference  from  possession  of  the  property  stolen. — The 
rules  which  are  elsewhere  explained/''  in  connection  with  the 
question  of  a  presumption  of  guilt  arising  where  property  stolen 
from  a  house  in  which  a  burglary  has  been  committed  is  found  in 
the  possession  of  the  accused,  are  applicable  on  an  indictment  for 
larceny. 

According  to  the  most  approved  modern  view,  the  possession 
of  stolen  property,  however  recent  and  unexplained,  creates  no 
presmnption  of  law  that  the  possessor  committed  the  larceny,  and 
consequently  a  conviction  of  larceny  based  upon  an  instruction 
to  that  effect,  and  casting  the  burden  of  proving  the  innocent 
character  of  the  possession  upon  the  accused,  must  be  set  aside. 
The  fact  of  the  possession  of  stolen  goods  may  always  be  shown. 
From  proof  of  this  fact,  in  connection  with  other  evidence,  the 
jury  may  infer  as  a  matter  of  probability  and  reasoning,  but  not 
as  a  rule  of  law,  that  is,  they  may,  under  the  judicious  guidance 
of  the  court,  draw  the  inference  of  fact  that  the  possessor  is  guilty 
of  stealing  them." 

"State  V.  McDermet,  138  Iowa  86,  W.  119;  Orr  v.  State,  107  Ala.  35,  18 

115    X.    W.    884;    !^IcCoy    V.    State  So.  142;  Hix  v.  People,  157  111.  382, 

(Tex.    Cr.    App.,    1909),    120    S.    W.  41    N.    E.   862;    State  v.   Wilson,   95 

858.  Iowa  341,  64  N.  W.  266;   Dobson  v. 

"Commonwealth     v.      Stebbins,     8  State,   46   Neb.   250,   64   N.    W.   956; 

Gray    (Mass.)    492,    495;    People    v.  State   v.   Velarde,   59   Cal.   457,   563; 

Kehoe,  19  N.  Y.  S.  76^,  64  Hun.  (N.  Smith  v.  People,  103  111.  82,  85;  State 

Y.)  636,  without  opinion.  v.    Raymond,   46   Conn.   345;    Under- 

"Lane  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1894),  28  wood  v.  State,  72  Ala.  220,  222;  Boy- 

S.   W.  202,   203.     Circumstantial   evi-  kin   v.    State,  34  Ark.  443,  445,  446: 

dcnce  of  value  may  be  sufficient.    Col-  State  v.   Hoffman,  53  Kan.   700,  708, 

lins  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1909),  118  S.  709,  37  Pac.  138;  State  v.  Hodge,  50 

W.  1038.  N.  H.  510;  Ingalls  v.  State,  48  Wis. 

"Sec  post,  §  378.  647,  4  N.  W.  78s;  Conkwright  v.  Peo- 

"  People  V.  Wong  Chong  Suey,  lio  pic,  35   111.  204;   State  v.    Pennynian, 

Cal.    117,  42   Pac.  420;    People  v.   St.  68  Iowa  216,  217,  26  X.W.  82;  Harper 

Clair   (Cal.   1896),  44  Pac.  234;   Phil-  v.  State,  71    Miss.  202,  203;    State   v. 

lips  V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.,  1896),  34  S.  Jennett,  88  N.   Car.  665,  667;   Com- 


§  300 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


526 


§  300.  Recent  and  exclusive  character  of  possession. — The  posses- 
sion must  not  be  too  remote  in  time  from  the  theft,  or  it  wiU  not 
have  much  value  as  evidence.'''  The  lapse  of  time  between  the 
taking  and  the  date  of  the  possession  is  a  vevy  important  circum- 
stance. If  it  is  so  g-reat  tliat  no  connection  between  them  can 
reasonably  be  imagined,  e^■idence  of  possession  is  of  httle  weight, 
and,  in  an  extreme  case,  it  may  be  exchided  as  irrelevant. 

But  possession  of  the  property  so  soon  after  the  theft  that  the 
possessor  could  not  have  obtained  it  unless  he  had  just  stolen  it, 
may,  in  the  absence  of  a  credible  explanation,  sustain  a  convic- 
tion.'" As  the  intervening  time  lengthens  the  cogency  of  this 
evidence  diminishes.'"'     But  the  period  intervening  which  ought 


monwealth  v.  Montgomery,  11  Met. 
(Mass.)  534,  45  Am.  Dec.  227;  Blaker 
V.  State,  130  Ind.  203,  29  N.  E.  1077; 
Sahlinger  v.  People,  102  111.  241 ; 
Sliepperd  v.  State,  94  Ala.  102,  10  So. 
663 ;  Gravely  v.  Commonwealth,  86 
Va.  396,  400,  10  S.  E.  431 ;  Pace  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1894),  3i  S.  W.  173; 
Perry  v.  State  (Ala.,  1908),  46  So. 
470;  Perry  v.  People,  38  Colo.  23,  87 
Pac.  796;  McDonald  v.  State  (Fla. 
1908),  47  So.  485;  State  V.  Toohey, 
203  Mo.  674,  102  S.  W.  530;  State  v. 
Sprague,  149  Mo.  409,  50  S.  W.  901 ; 
State  V.  Drew,  179  Mo.  315,  78  S.  W. 
594;  loi  Am.  St.  474n ;  Territory  v. 
Livingston,  13  N.  Mex.  318,  84  Pac. 
1021 ;  State  v.  Lax,  71  N.  J.  L.  386,  59 
Atl.  18;  Randolph  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr., 
1899),  49  S.  W.  591 ;  Kennon  v.  State, 
46  Tex.  Cr.  359,  82  S.  W.  518;  Fool  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  596,  103  S.  W.  892; 
Bryant  v.  State,  1 16  Ala.  445,  23  So.  40 ; 
■  State  v.  Burns,  19  Wash.  52,  52  Pac. 
316;  State  v.  McClain,  130  Iowa  73, 
106  N.  W.  376.  Evidence  of  posses- 
sion of  stolen  goods  is  admissible.  loi 
Am.  St.  485.  Evidence  of  possession 
of  stolen  goods  does  not  warrant  con- 
viction if  the  jury  have  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  guilt.  loi  Am.  St.  503.  The 
possession  of  a  box   in   which    stolen 


goods  were  packed  may  be  equivalent, 
in  force  and  effect,  to  the  possession 
of  the  goods.  People  v.  Block,  15 
N.  Y.  S.  229,  60  Hun  (N.  Y.)  583, 
without  opinion;  State  v.  Record  (N. 
Car.,  1909),  65  S.  E.  loio. 

^*  Goldstein  v.  People,  82  N.  Y.  231  ; 
Davis  V.  State,  50  Miss.  86,  94,  95; 
Commonwealth  v.  Montgomery,  ir 
Met.  (Mass.)  534,  45  Am.  Dec.  227; 
Beck  V.  State,  44  Tex.  430,  432 ;  Sloan 
V.  People,  47  111.  y6,  2  Russ.  on  Crimes 
(9th  Am.  Ed.)   SS7 ;  Graves  v.  State, 

12  Wis.  591 ;  Williams  v.  State,  40 
Fla.  480,  25  So.  143,  74  Am.  St.  154; 
Bryant  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  851,  62  S. 
E.  S40;  Wiley  V.  State  (Ark.,  1909), 
124  S.  W.  249. 

^°  Blaker  v.  State,  130  Ind.  203,  205, 
29  N.  E.  1077,  1078;  Branson  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 92  Ky.  330,  17  S.  W.  1019, 

13  Ky.  L.  614 ;  Brown  v.  State,  59  Ga. 
456,  458;  Madden  v.  State,  148  Ind. 
183,  47  N.  E.  220;  State  v.  Eubank, 
32  Wash.  293,  74  Pac.  378;  Ingraham 
V.  State,  82  Xeb.  553,  118  N.  W.  320; 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3058;  Scott  v. 
State,  1 19  Ga.  425 ;  46  S.  E.  637 ;  State 
V.  Broxton,  118  La.  126,  42  So.  721; 
Miller  v.  People,  229  111.  376,  82  X. 
E.  391- 

'"State  V.  Jcnnett,  88  X.   Car.  665, 


527  EMBEZZLEMENT   AND    LARCENY.  §    3OO 

to  nullify  any  presumption  from  possession  cannot  be  fixed,  de- 
pending not  so  much  on  mere  lapse  of  time  as  on  other  circum- 
stances and  the  defendant's  declarations  explanatory  of  the  pos- 
session.^^ 

Though  the  element  of  time  is  important,  other  facts  are  to 
be  considered;  among  them  is  the  character  of  the  goods,  for  if 
they  are  light  and  portable,  such  as  coin,  bank  notes  or  jewelry, 
which  pass  easily  and  quickly  from  hand  to  hand,  possession  a 
few  days  after  the  theft  might  not,  as  matter  of  law,  be  recent.*- 
The  reverse  is  true  when  the  goods  are  bulky  and  cumbersome. 
But  generally  the  recency  of  possession  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
on  all  the  evidence. 

Not  only  must  the  possession  be  recent,  but  it  must  be  personal, 
exclusive,  and  with  a  distinct,  implied  or  express  assertion  of 
ownership.  If  these  essentials  are  not  proved,  a  conviction  based 
on  the  fact  of  possession  must  be  set  aside.^^  The  possession  of 
the  stolen  property  is  personal  and  exclusive  if  it  is  exclusive  as 
to  all  persons  not  particeps  criuiinis.  As  to  accomplices  the  pos- 
session of  one  is  the  possession  of  all.^*  A  mere  constructive  pos- 
session is  not  enough.  The  accused  will  not  be  presumed  to  have 
stolen  articles  which  he  does  not  know  he  possesses.  If  other 
persons  have  equal  right  and  facility  of  access  with  him  to  a 
room,  trunk  or  closet  w^here  stolen  goods  are  discovered,  posses- 
sion, not  being  exclusive  or  personal,  is  of  no  value  as  evidence.'*^ 

66;   Martin  v.   State,   104  Ala.  71,  16  N.  E.  1077;  People  v.  Wilson,  7  App. 

So.  82,  84;  People  V.  Deluce,  237  III.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   326,  40  N.  Y.  S.   107; 

541,  86  N.  E.  1080.      ■  State  v.  Lackland,  136  Mo.  26,  37  S. 

"State  V.  Miller,  45  Minn.  521,  522,  W.  812;  State  v.  Deyoe,  97  Iowa  744, 

48   N.   W.   401;    Davis   v.    State,    50  66  N.  W.  7Z2>;  Funderburg  v.   State 

Miss.  86,  94,  95;  State  v.  Jennett,  88  (Tex.  Cr.,  1896),  34  S.  W.  613;  Peo- 

N.  Car.  665,  667;  State  v.  Lange,  59  ple  v.  Wilson,  151  N.  Y.  403,  45  N.  E. 

Mo.  418,  422.  862;  Van  Straaten  v.  People,  26  Colo. 

"State  V.  Castor,  93  Islo.  242,  250,  184,    56    Pac.    905:    Bryant    v.    State, 

5  S.  W.  906;  Davis  V.  State,  50  Miss.  4  Ga.  App.  851,  62  S.  E.  540. 

86,  95 ;  Rex  v.  Partridge,  7  Car.  &  P.  "  People  v.  Horton,  7  Cal.  App.  34, 

551.  93   Pac.   382;   Wiley   v.   State    (Ark., 

"State  V.  Castor,  93  Mo.  242,  250,  1909),  124  S.  W.  249. 

.S  S.  W.  906;  Clark  v.  State,  30  Tex.  "3  Greenl.  on   Ev.,  §  :iT,;   State  v. 

.•\pp.   402,    17   S.   W.   942;    People   v.  Wilks,  58  Mo.  App.  159,  162.    "If  the 

Hurley,  60   Cal.   74,   75,   44   Am.   55;  article  be  small,  and  such  as  is  easily 

Hlaker  v.  State,   130  Ind.  203,  205,  29  and    quickly    transmissible    from    one 

person    to    anotlicr,    and    when    it    is 


§  o 


OI 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


528 


§  301.  Burden  of  explaining  possession — Character  of  explanatory 
evidence. — Though  hardly  accurate  to  say  that  the  burdeu  of  ex- 
l)laining  the  possession  of  stolen  property  is  upon  the  accused,*^" 
yet  he  must  offer  some  reasonable  and  probable  explanation.*' 
It  is  reversible  error  not  to  permit  him  to  do  so,  or  to  reject  anv 
relevant  evidence  tending-  to  produce  that  result.^^  If,  having 
the  power  and  opportunity  he  offers  no  explanation,""  or  one 
which  is  unsatisfactory  in  that  it  does  not  show  that  the  character 
of  his  possession  is  consistent  with  innocence,  a  conviction  will 
be  justified."*'  He  may  prove  that  he  bought  the  goods," ^  that  he 
offered  to  pay  the  owner  for  them,"-  or  that  he  became  possessed 
of  them,  believing  he  was  the  owner's  agent. "^  The  accused  may 
show  that  he  received  money  and  checks  from  the  prosecuting 
witness,  prior  to  the  alleged  larceny  of  a  check  which  is  found 

found   in   the   possession   of   the   ac-  State,  33  Tex.  480;    State  v.   Miller, 

cused,  it  is  openly  exposed  where  the  45    Minn.    521,   522,   48   N.    W.    401 ; 

owner  may  readily  find   it,  and  will  Tilly  v.  State,  21  Fla.  242,  249;  State 

probably   discover   it,    and   he   makes  v.  Jennings,  81  Mo.  185,  209,  51  Am. 

no  effort  to  conceal  it,  but  gives  an  236;   Waters   v.   People,   104  III.   544, 

account   of    his   possession,   which   is  548;  Commonwealth  v.  McGorty,  114 

probable  from  the  nature  of  the  ar-  Mass.  299;  Miller  v.  People,  229  111. 

tide,    these    circumstances    would    be  376,  82  N.   E.  391 ;   State  v.  McKin- 

sufficient  to  destroy  the  presumption  ney,  76  Kan.  419,  91  Pac.  1068;  State 

arising  from  mere  possession."   Jones  v.  Vinton  (Mo.,  1909),  119  S.  W.  370. 

V.  State,  30  Miss.  653,  655.  The    denial    by    the    accused    of    his 

*"  Baker  v.  State,  80  Wis.  416,  421,  identity  when  discovered  in  the  pos- 

50  N.   W.  518;   State  v.  Eubank,  33  session  of  the  property,  and  his  'ab- 

Wash.  293,  74  Pac.  378.     Cf.  Waters  surd  explanations  of  his  whereabouts 

V.   People,  104  111.  544,  548.     An  in-  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  testi- 

struction  which  requires  the  accused  mony  of  other  witnesses,  are  corrobo- 

to  satisfy  the  jury  of  the  good  faith  rative  of  possession  sufficient  to  war- 

of  his  claim  of  title  is  error.     John-  rant  submission  to  the  jury.     People 

son   v.   United    States    (Okla.   App.),  v.  Vidal,  121  Cal.  221,  53  Pac.  558. 
99  Pac.  1022.  *'  Though     he    has     forgotten     the 

"State  V.  Vinton   (Mo.,  1909),   119  name  of  the  vendor.     Merriwether  v. 

S.  W.  370.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  115  S.  W.  44;  Jones 

^'  Crossland  v.    State,   77  Ark.   537,  v.    People,    12   111.    259,   including   all 

92  S.  W.  776;  State  v.  Winter,  83  S.  pertinent   declarations  made  by  him- 

Car.  153,  65  S.  E.  209.  self  or  the  vendors.     People  v.  Dow- 

*°  Adams  v.  State,  52  Ala.  379,  381 ;  ling,  84  N.  Y.  478,  485. 
Tilly  V.  State,  21  Fla.  242,  249.  ""  Hall  v.  State,  34  Ga.  208.  210. 

*"  State  v.  Garvin,  48  S.  Car.  258,  26        "^  Lewis  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  105, 


S.  E.  570;  Franklin  v.  State,  37  Tex. 
Cr.  312,  39  S.  W.  680;  State  v.  Ho- 
gard,    12    Minn.    293;    Mondragon    v. 


T4   S.   W.    1008;   Chambers  v.   State, 
62  J\liss.  108. 


;29 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AXD    LARCENY. 


§    301 


in  his  possession  to  prove  the  lawfuhiess  of  his  possession 
of  the  check."*  These  aiid  other  explanatory  facts  may  be 
shown  even  where  the  defendant  has  failed  or  refused  to 
give  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  possession  of  the  prop- 
erty when  it  was  first  found  in  his  possession."^  If  the 
explanatory  evidence  creates  a  reasonable  doubt  in  the  minds  of 
the  jurors  that  he  stole  the  property,  he  should  be  acquitted.""  It 
is  not  absolutely  requisite  that  the  accused  should  prove  that  his 
possession  was  honest.  It  is  sufficient  to  acquit  him  if  he  gives 
a  natural,  reasonable  and  probable  explanation  of  how  he  acquired 
possession  which  the  prosecution  does  not  show  to  be  false."' 
Such  an  explanation  may  be  taken  as  true  if  the  state,  relying  for 
a  conviction  and  proof  of  the  corpus  delicti  upon  recent  possession 
alone,  does  not  prove  its  falsity  or  attempt  to  do  so."^  If  the 
explanation  is  absurd,  unreasonable  or  unsatisfactory  it  is  the 
right  of  the  jury,  and  often  their  dut}^  to  disregard  it  though  no 
evidence  in  rebuttal  on  that  point  is  offered.""  But  when  the 
explanation  offered  is  reasonable  and  probable  it  must  be  over- 
come, and  its  falsity  shown  by  positive  and  definite  evidence. 
Thus  if  the  accused  states  to  a  witness  that  he  purchased  the  proi> 


"Crossland  v.  State,  77  Ark.  537, 
92  S.  W.  77^. 

^Harris  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  411 ; 
Echols  V.  State,  41  So.  298,  147  Ala. 
700,  not  reported  in  full ;  People  v. 
Farrington,  140  Cal.  656,  74  Pac.  288. 

**  State  V.  Peterson,  67  Iowa  564, 
567,  25  X.  W.  780;  Grentzinger  v. 
State,  31  Xeb.  460,  462,  48  N.  W.  148; 
Clark  V.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  402,  17 
S.  W.  942;  Baker  v.  State,  80  Wis. 
416,  421,  50  X.  W.  518;  Blaker  v. 
State,  130  Ind.  203,  207,  29  N.  E. 
1077;  State  V.  Wilson,  95  Iowa  341, 
64  X.  W.  266;  State  V.  Cross,  95 
Iowa  629,  64  X.  W.  614;  Gilmore  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1895),  33  S.  W.  120; 
Crawford  v.  State,  113  Ala.  661,  21 
So.  64;  State  V.  Dillon,  48  La.  Ann. 
f.365,  20  So.  913;  State  V.  Lax,  71  X. 
J.  L.  3f^6,  59  Atl.  18;  Johnson  v. 
United  States  (Okla.),  99  Pac.  1022; 
34 — U.N'DKknii.L  Cki.m.  Ev. 


Xewton  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  48  S.  W. 
507;  Isham  V.  State  (Tex.),  49  S.  W. 
581;  McDonald  v.  State  (Fla.,  1908), 
47  So.  485;  Douglas  V.  State  (Ark., 
1909),  121  S.  W.  923. 

"'Hart  V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  563, 
3  S.  W.  741 ;  Garcia  v.  State,  26  Tex. 
209,  210;  State  V.  Moore,  loi  Mo.  316, 
14  S.  W.  182;  Jones  v.  State,  30  Miss. 
653,  655,  64  Am.  Dec.  175;  State  v. 
Castor,  93  Mo.  242,  250,  5  S.  W.  906; 
Yarbrough  v.  State,  115  Ala.  92,  22 
So.  534.  As  to  changing  brands  on 
cattle,  Williams  v.  State,  40  Fla.  480, 
25  So.  143,  74  Am.  St.  154. 

■*  People  V.  Hurley,  60  Cal.  74,  77, 
44  Am.  55 ;  Powell  v.  State,  i  t  Tcx. 
App.  401,  402;  Johnson  v.  State,  12 
Tcx.  App.  385,  391 ;  State  v.  Kimble, 
34  La.  Ann.  392.  395.  3  Grccnl.  on 
Evidence,  §  32;  Franklin  v.  State.  3 
Ga.  App.  342,  59  S.  E.  S35. 

"Tilly  V.  State,  21  Fla.  242,  249. 


§    2,02 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


530 


erty  of  a  third  person  the  latter  is  a  competent  witness  to  testify 
that  he  did  not  sell  the  accused  the  property.  ^^^  Direct  evidence 
is  not  always  essential.  Circumstantial  evidence  will  answer  if 
upon  all  the  evidence  the  prosecutor  shall  succeed  in  convincing 
the  jury  of  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. ^ 

§  302.  Explanatory  declarations. — Any  declaration  made  by  the 
accused  explaining  the  reason  or  character  of  his  possession,  if 
made  while  it  lasts,  is  admissible  as  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc  for 
or  against  him."  Under  the  older  authorities,  the  defendant's 
declarations  were  not  admissible  in  his  favor,  if  made  after  his 
possession  had  terminated.  This  rule  is  now  somewhat  relaxed, 
but  not  to  the  extent  of  permitting  proof  of  his  self-serving  dec- 
larations made  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances.  Where 
no  previous  opportunity  for  explanation  arose,  he  may  now  prove 
his  statements  made  when  arrested,  or  when  charged  with  theft, 
or  informed  he  is  suspected,  though  he  has  parted  with  posses- 


'°°  State  V.  Grubb,  201  Mo.  585.  99 
S.  W.  585. 

'Franklin  v.  State,  2>7  Tex.  Cr.  312, 
39  S.  W.  680;  State  V.  Schaffer,  70 
Iowa  371,  375,  30  N.  W.  639;  Brown 
V.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  150,  29  S.  W. 
yy2.  So  when  the  accused  produces  a 
bill  of  sale  to  account  for  his  posses- 
sion the  state  may  be  permitted  to 
show  its  invalidity  because  procured 
by  undue  influence  and  fraud  prac- 
ticed upon  the  owner.  Watson  v. 
State,  36  Miss.  593,  609,  610.  Where 
a  party  is  found  in  the  possession  of 
recently  stolen  goods,  and  gives  a 
reasonable  and  credible  account  of 
such  possession  or  an  account  raising 
a  reasonable  doubt,  the  state  must 
prove  that  such  account  is  untrue, 
otherwise  he  must  be  acquitted,  but 
the  account  may  be  reasonable  and 
highly  plausible,  yet,  if  the  jury  do 
not  believe,  they  have  a  right  to  con- 
vict  on  such  evidence  alone,  though 


the  state  does  not  put  in  any  evi- 
dence to  prove  the  falsity  of  such 
account.  McDonald  v.  State  (Fla.), 
47  So.  485. 

Effect  of  evidence  of  defendant's 
good  character  to  rebut  presumption 
from  possession  of  stolen  goods,  20 
L.  R.  A.  614;  sufificiency  of  evidence 
of  possession  of  stolen  goods,  loi 
Am.  St.  505,  S06. 

^Walker  v.  State,  28  Ga.  254,  256; 
Hubbard  v.  State,  107  Ala.  23,  18  So. 
225;  Smith  V.  State,  103  Ala.  40,  16 
So.  12,  14;  State  V.  Moore,  loi  Mo. 
316,  33  T,  14  S.  W.  182;  Mason  v. 
State  (Ind.,  1908),  85  N.  E.  776', 
Bryant  v.  State,  116  Ala.  445,  23  So. 
40;  Echols  V.  State,  41  So.  298,  147 
Ala.  700,  not  reported  in  full;  Whart. 
C.  E.,  §  761.  The  fact  of  possession, 
or  acts  evincing  ownership,  must  al- 
ways be  proved  prior  to  the  admis- 
sion of  the  declarations.  Cameron  v. 
State,  44  Tex.  652,  656. 


531  EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY.  §    3O3 

sion.     The  declaration  must  have  been  uttered  at  the  first  mo- 
ment he  was  expressly  or  by  implication  called  on  to  explain." 

Some  of  the  cases  admit  only  such  declarations  as  were  made 
at  the  instant  the  defendant  is  discovered  in  possession/  and 
obviously  declarations  made  after  the  accused  has  had  ample  time 
to  concoct  an  explanation  are  inadmissible."  Though  the  declara- 
tions of  the  accused  are  admissible  against  him,  the  statements 
of  a  third  person,  having  charge  of  the  stolen  property,  are  not 
admissible  when  they  were  not  made  in  the  presence  of  the  ac- 
cused.**  The  presumption  of  larceny  arising  from  possession, 
may  be  wholly  rebutted  by  proof  of  the  good  character  of  the 
accused.' 

§  303.  Evidence  of  footprints. — Evidence  of  the  identity  of  the 
accused  with  the  person  who  committed  the  theft,  derived  from 
a  comparison  of  foot-tracks,  is  admissible,  as  in  the  case  of  prose- 
cutions for  burglary,  homicide  and  arson. '^  On  a  prosecution  for 
larceny,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  had  purchased  boots 
and  shoes  of  the  same  size  as  those  worn  by  a  person  whose  foot- 
tracks  were  discovered  in  the  vicinity  of  a  house  from  which 
property  was  stolen.^  Evidence  that  wagon  or  foot-tracks  were 
observed  on  a  road  leading  from  a  place  whence  the  stolen  prop- 
erty was  taken  to  where  it  was  hidden,  near  the  house  of  the 
accused,  may,  if  unexplained  or  unrebutted,  and  particularly  if 
there  be  some  marked  peculiarity  in  their  form  or  character,  ^^•it]l 
proof  that  the  stolen  property  was  found  in  the  possession  of  the 
defendant,  support  a  conviction.^" 

'Ward  V.  State,  41  Tex.  611,  613;  ford  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.,  1903),  78  S. 

Taylor   v.    State,    15   Tex.    App.    356,  W.  692. 

360;  Carreker  v.  State,  92  Ga.  471,  17  ^People  v.   Hurley,  60  Cal.  74,   77. 

S.    E.    671;    State    v.    McClain,    130  44  Am.  55;  State  v.  Crooke,  129  Mo. 

Iowa  "jz,   106  N.   W.  Zl^\   Lohrey  v.  App.  490,  107  S.  W.  1104. 

State,  91  Miss.  853,  45  So.  145.  *  See  §  ZZT. 

'State  V.  Moore,  loi  Mo.  316,  331,  "State  v.  Reed,  89  Mo.   168,  170,   r 

14   S.   \V.    182;   Henderson   v.    State,  S.  W.  225. 

70  Ala.  23,  25,  45  Am.  72,  2  Bish.  Cr.  '"  Rryan  v.  State,  74  Ga.  393.  394 ; 

I'ro.,  §  746.  Holscy  v.  State,  89  Ga.  433,  434.  \$  S. 

■*  State  V.  Moore,  lor  Mo.  316,  330,  K.  $^9^. 
14    S.   W.    182;    Cooper   v.    State,   63  When  evidence  of  footprints  is  ad- 
Ala.  80,  81,  82.  missiblc.   94   Am.    St.   342,   343.      F.vi- 

°  State  V.   May,   20   Iowa  305;   Gil-  dence   that  accused   refused  to  make 


^§    304,    305  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  532 

Evidence  that  footprints  were  found  in  the  vicinity  of  the  lar- 
ceny may  be  received,  though  the  footprints  are  not  shown  to 
compare  with  the  footgear  of  the  accused,  and  though  they  may 
not  be  in  any  way  connected  with  him.^^ 

§  304.  Financial  standing  and  expenditures  of  the  defendant. — 
Evidence  that  the  defendant  had  ahvays  been  poor,  or  was  Hving 
extravagantly  and  beyond  his  means/-  or  that  he  was  generally 
reputed  to  be  in  good  circumstances,^^  or  as  to  the  wages  he  was 
receiving,^'*  either  before  or  after  the  larceny,  is  alike  inadmis- 
sible. But  evidence  that,  though  in  moderate  circumstances  be- 
fore the  larceny,  he  was  profuse  in  his  subsequent  expenditures,^^ 
or  that  he  spent  a  sum  of  money  about  the  date  of  the  larceny 
nearly  equivalent  to  what  the  stolen  property  may  have  sold  for, 
is  admissible.^''  The  reception  of  evidence  that  the  person  from 
whom  money  was  taken  a  day  or  two  before  had  a  large  sum  in 
his  possession  is  not  error.  ^'^ 

§  305.  Evidence  of  other  crimes. — Evidence  of  distinct  larcenies 
by  the  accused  is  not  generally  admissible,  though  to  this  rule 
many  important  exceptions  are  made.^''     It  may  be  proper  to 

footprints  not  admissible,  94  Am.  St.  crime    themselves    are    so    well    con- 

343.  cealed  from  view  by  the  perpetrator, 

"  Rucker  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  222,  as  to  furnish  no  immediate  evidence 

lOi  S.  W.  804.  against   him.    *    *    *    But  they  some- 

"  Snapp  v.   Commonwealth,  82  Ky.  times  betray  themselves  by  their  con- 

^73,   183,  184.  sequences,  as  by  a  sudden  and  mate- 

"  Commonwealth     v.      Stebbins,     8  rial  change  in  life  or  circumstances. 

Gray  (Mass.)  492,  495.  indicating,    beyond   question,    the    re- 

"Dorsey  v.   State,   no  Ala.  38,  20  cent    receipt    of    money    or   property 

So.  450.  from  some  quarter.    Where  a  person, 

^^  Perrin  v.  State,  81  Wis.  135,  140,  previously    known    to    be    poor,    is 

50  N.  W.  516;  Leonard  v.  State,  115  found,   shortly  after   a   robbery,  lar- 

Ala.  80,  22  So.  564.  ceny,    or    murder,    in    possession    of 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Grose,  99  Mass.  considerable    wealth,    it    is    always    a 

423,    424.      Cf.    Fulmer   v.    Common-  circumstance   of   suspicion."      Burrell 

wealth,    97    Pa.    St.    503;    Common-  Circ.   Ev.,  457;   Martin  v.  State,  104 

wealth     V.     Montgomery,     11     Met.  Ala.  71,  16  So.  82,  85. 
(Mass.)  534,  45  Am.  Dec.  227;  State        "Van  Syoc  v.   State,  69  Neb.  520, 

v.  Grebe,  17  Kan.  458,  461 ;  State  v.  96  N.  W.  266. 

Bruce,  106  N.  Car.  792,  795,  it  S.  E.        ''See  §§  84,  85:  Alexander  v.  State, 

475.     "In  most  cases,   the   fruits   of  21  Tex.  App.  406,   17  S.  W.   139.  57 


533 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AND    LARCENY, 


§    305 


prove  that  other  persons  had  their  property  stolen  and  that  it 
was  found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused,  to  show  his  felonious 
intention  and  guilty  knowledge/"  or  to  identify  him  as  the  per- 
son mentioned  in  the  indictment.-"  So  where  the  accused  was  on 
trial  for  larceny  of  a  horse  it  may  be  proved  that  a  saddle  was 
stolen  at  the  same  time.^^  For  w-here  property  is  found  in  the 
possession  of  the  accused  and  he  attempts  to  justify  his  posses- 
sion his  possession  of  other  property  stolen  at  the  same  time  is  a 
strong  circumstance  against  him.^^  The  accused  must  then  be 
allowed  to  explain  his  possession  of  the  other  stolen  property.'^ 
In  many  cases  where  the  crimes  are  separate  and  distinct,  in 
time,  place  or  character,  the  courts  refuse  to  admit  evidence  of 
similar  crimes,  even  to  show  a  criminal  intent.  This  is  particu- 
larly the  case,  if  the  evidence  connecting  the  accused  wnth  the 
similar  offense  is  very  slight,  remote  or  unconvincing.^*  The  de- 
fendant's admission  that  at  times  not  mentioned  in  the  indictment 
he  had  stolen  goods  from  a  building  in  which  were  found  goods 


Am.  617;  State  v.  Vinson,  63  N.  Car. 
335.  340;  Links  v.  State,  13  Lea 
(Tenn.)  701,  711,  712;  People  v. 
Tucker,  104  Cal.  440,  448,  38  Pac. 
195;  State  V.  Goetz,  34  Mo.  85;  Mc- 
Queen V.  State,  108  Ala.  54,  18 
So.  843;  Echols  V.  State,  41  So.  298, 
147  Ala.  700,  not  reported  in  full; 
People  V.  Cain,  7  Cal.  App.  163,  93 
Pac.  1037;  Buck  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr. 
319,  83  S.  W.  387;  Bryan  v.  State, 
49  Tex.  Cr.  200,  91  S.  W.  581 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Sekeson,  in  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
490,  97  N.  Y.  S.  917.  Proof  of  other 
crimes  in  prosecution  for  larceny,  see 
extensive  note,  62  L.  R.  A.  231,  281, 
315.  322,  105  Am.  St.  976,  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §§  2720,  3057. 

"Lynns  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  375, 
ni  S.  W.  729. 

*•  State  V.  Moore,  loi  Mo.  316,  327, 
14  S.  W.  182;  People  V.  Robles,  34 
Cal.  591,  593;  Commonwealth  v. 
Rig(?s,  T4  Gray  (Mass.)  376,  77  Am. 
I^cc.  333:  State  V.  White,  89  \.  Car. 
4C>2,  466;  Reed  v.  State,  54  Ark.  621, 


16  S.  W.  819;  Bonners  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.,  1896),  35  S.  W.  650;  People  v. 
Hughes,  91  Hun  (N.  Y.)  354,  36  N. 
Y.  S.  493;  Hurley  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  73,  35  S.  W.  371 ;  People  v.  Nagle, 
137  Mich.  88,  100  N.  W.  273;  Housh 
V.  People,  24  Colo.  262,  50  Pac.  1036; 
State  v.  Bates,  182  Mo.  70,  81  S.  W. 
408;  Watters  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr., 
1906),  94  S.  W.  1038;  Cohoe  V.  State 
(Neb.),  118  N.  W.  1088;  Brown  v. 
United  States,  142  Fed.  i,  73  C.  C.  A. 
187;  Territory  v.  Livingston,  13  N. 
Mex.  318,  84  Pac.  1021. 

'"Robinson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  48 
S.  W.  176. 

"  Penrice  v.  State  (Tex.),  105  S. 
W.  797- 

"  People  V.  Dowling,  84  N.  Y.  478, 
484;  State  v.  Lcvich,  128  Iowa  372,  104 
X.  W.  334- 

"'  Snapp  v.  Commonwealth,  S2  Ky. 
173.  177-183;  Boland  v.  People,  19 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  80;  Endaily  v.  State,  39 
Ark.  278,  280,  62  L.  R.  ;\.  23 in. 


§    306  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  534 

similar  to  those  referred  to  in  the  indictment,  is  admissible.  But 
such  an  admission  is  only  relevant  to  identify  the  prisoner  and 
not  as  a  confession  of  the  crime  charged."^ 

The  crimes  of  larceny  and  embezzlement  are  distinct  and  dis- 
similar offenses.  Evidence  tending  to  support  either  is  not  usually 
relevant  to  sustain  an  allegation  of  the  other.^"  But  if  by  statute 
the  crime  of  larceny  is  made  to  include  analogous  offenses,  as  ob- 
taining goods  by  false  pretenses  and  embezzlement,  evidence 
which  is  only  relevant  to  show  the  latter  offenses  may  be  received, 
though  a  conviction  of  larceny  under  such  circumstances  will  not 
be  affirmed,  unless  the  state  shall  prove  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  an  act  containing  all  the  elements  essential  to  obtain  a  con- 
viction of  the  crime  of  obtaining  goods  by  false  pretenses. ^^  Evi- 
dence is  admissible  to  show  the  contents  of  a  package  of  letters, 
under  an  indictment  of  a  postoffice  clerk  for  the  larceny  of  letters 
from  a  package  which  he  had  no  authority  to  disturb.-^ 

§  306.    Stolen  goods  found  through  inadmissible  confession. — The 

rule  that  those  portions  of  an  inadmissible  confession  which  are 
conclusively  corroborated  by  the  facts  discovered  are  admis- 
sible^*^ is  particularly  applicable  in  larceny  when  the  accused  has 
attempted  to  conceal  the  stolen  goods.  If  he  confesses  he  stole 
the  goods,  and  that  they  are  concealed  in  his  house  or  elsewhere, 
where  they  are  subsequently  found,  it  may  be  shown  that  the 
property  was  found  and  where  it  was  found.^'^  The  truthfulness 
of  that  part  of  the  confession  being  established,  all  that  the  ac- 
cused said  explanatory  of  the  hiding  or  discovery,  of  his  posses- 
sion, or  the  locality  of  the  hiding  place,  should  be  received.  But 
the  rule  excluding  involuntary  confessions  remains  intact,  and 
excludes  that  part  of  the  confession  stating  directly  that  he  stole 
the  goods  or  that  he  hid  them.^^ 

"  Griffin  V.    State,  86  Ga.  257,  260,  is  part  of  the  res  gestce,  62  L.  R.  A. 

12  S.  E.  409.  315- 

^Fulton  V.  State,  13  Ark.  r68.  "^United  States  v.  Falkenhainer,  21 

"Fay  V.  Commonwealth,  28  Gratt.  Fed.  624. 

fVa.)  912;  People  v.  Dumar,  106  N.  "See,  ante,  §  137. 

Y.  502,  511,  13  N.  E.  325.     Evidence  ^'' Warickshall's  Case,  t  Leach  C.  C 

of  other  to  prove  defendant's  connec-  298. 

tion  virith  the  acts  charged,  62  L.  R.  '*  Davis  v.   State,  8  Tex.  App.  510, 

A    281;   and   when   the   other   crime  515;    Strait    v.    State,   43   Tex.    486; 


535 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AXD    LARCENY.  §§    307,    308 


§  307.  Malicious  mischief. — This  offense  includes  all  acts  of  un- 
necessary and  malicious  injury  to  the  property  of  others  which 
impair  the  utility  or  diminish  the  value  of  such  property  to  a 
material  extent.^"  It  was  generally  indictable  at  common  law,^" 
and  proof  of  the  destruction  of  the  property  was  necessary;^* 
and  now  statutes  are  found  in  most  states  defining  the  crime, 
regulating  its  punishment  and  sometimes  expressly  enumerating 
wliat  acts  must  be  proved  to  constitute  it.^^ 

§  308.  Malicious  intent. — Usually  proof  of  the  injury  alone  is 
not  enough,  and  this  is  always  the  case  where  a  statute  requires 
that  it  shall  be  proved  to  have  been  wantonly  or  maliciously  in- 
flicted. Malice,  it  is  said,  must  be  alleged  and  proved.^**  But 
malice  need  not  be  express,  nor  need  it  be  proved  by  direct  evi- 
dence.^' It  may  be  inferred  to  exist  from  proof  that  the  injury 
was  done  to  the  property  to  secure  revenge  on  its  owner.^*     In 


Hudson  V.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
407 ;  White  v.  State,  3  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  338;  State  v.  Brick,  2  Harr. 
(Del.)  530;  State  v.  Garvey,  28  La. 
Ann.  925,  927,  26  Am.  123 ;  Laros  v. 
Commonwealth,  84  Pa.  St.  200 ;  Yates 
V.  State,  47  Ark.  172,  174;  Belote  v. 
State,  36  Miss.  96,  118,  72  Am.  Dec. 
163.  2  East  P.  C.  657,  658;  Reg.  v. 
Gould,  9  C.  &  P.  (38  Eng.  C.  L.) 
364 :  Johnson  v.  State,  1 19  Ga.  257,  45 
S.  E.  960. 

"  State  V.  Watts,  48  Ark.  56,  3  Am. 
St.  216;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3172. 

"People  V.  Smith,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
258,  260;  Res.  V.  Teischer,  i  Dall. 
(Pa.)  335;  Commonwealth  v.  Leach, 
I  Mass.  59;  State  v.  Batchelder,  5  N. 
H.  549.  552;  State  v.  Simpson,  2 
Hawks  (N.  Car.)  460,  461. 

"  State  V.  Martin,  141  N.  Car.  832, 
53  S.  E.  874. 

"State  V.  Tarlton  (S.  Dak),  118 
N.  W.  706;  Commonwealth  v.  Byard 
(Mass..  1Q08),  86  N.  E.  285,  constru- 
ing Rev.  Law,  c.  208,  §  100,  punish- 
ing the  willful  and  ma'icious  cutting 
of     trees.       In     California,     by     .^ct 


March  12,  1887  (St.  1886-87,  P-  112, 
c.  95),  maliciously  depositing  and  ex- 
ploding any  explosive  near  a  building 
with  intent  to  injure  same  or  to  in- 
jure a  human  being  is  a  felony.  In 
re  Mitchell,  i  Cal.  App.  396,  82  Pac. 
347.  See  Moody  v.  State,  127  Ga. 
821,  56  S.  E.  993,  as  to  mutilating  a 
trespass  notice  maliciously. 

*'  See  next  note ;  Knudson  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1909),  120  S.  W. 
878. 

"  The  malicious  intent  essential  to 
constitute  the  offense  of  malicious 
mischief  may  be  inferred  from  the 
nature  of  the  act  and  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case.  State  v.  Tarlton 
(S.  Dak.),  118  N.  W.  706. 

^Thompson  v.  State,  51  Miss.  353, 
356;  Commonwealth  v.  Walden,  3 
Cush.  (Mass.)  558,  561;  North  Caro- 
lina V.  Vanderford,  35  Fed.  282,  287; 
Johnson  v.  State,  61  Ala.  9,  11;  Har- 
ris V.  State,  73  Ga.  41,  43;  Goforth 
V.  State,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  37  .39: 
Losscn  V.  State,  62  Tnd.  437,  440; 
Hughes  V.  State,  103  Tnd.  344,  ,347. 
2  N.  E.  956;  Pippcn  V.  State,  77  Ala. 


?oS 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


536 


this  connection  the  declarations  of  the  accused  uttered  at  or  about 
•the  time  that  he  injured  or  destroyed  the  property  are  very  useful, 
and  are  relevant  as  a  part  of  the  res  gcstce  to  illustrate  his  state  of 
mind.  And  where  the  accused  stood  charged  with  maliciously 
destroying  the  property  of  a  church  the  state  was  permitted  to  put 
in  evidence  declarations  evincing  enmity  on  his  part  towards  the 
officers  and  .members  of  the  church  while  the  accused  was  engaged 
with  them  in  the  business  of  the  church.^^ 

A  malicious  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the  means  employed 
or  the  instrument  used,  or  from  the  wantonness  and  cruelty  by 
which  the  act  of  the  accused  was  accompanied.^*^  Portions  of  the 
.property  injured,  if  properly  identified  by  independent  evidence 
may  be  received  in  evidence.'*^  Whether  the  accused  acted  with 
a  malicious  intent  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine.''" 


1 


8r,  82;  Duncan  v.  State,  49  Miss. 
2)3'^,  339.'  Brady  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr., 
1894),  26  S.  W.  621;  Woodward  v. 
State,  S3  Tex.  Cr.  554,  28  S.  W.  204; 
State  V.  Flynn,  28  Iowa  26,  27 ;  State 
V.  Brigman,  94  N.  Car.  888,  889; 
Brown  v.  State,  26  Ohio  St.  176,  183. 
Contra,  Reg.  v.  Tivey,  i  Den.  C.  C. 
63 ;  Territory  v.  Crozier,  6  Dak.  8,  10, 
50  N.  W.  124.  Cf.  Johnson  v.  State, 
61  Ala.  9,  11;  Funderburk  v.  State, 
75  Miss.  20,  21  So.  658;  Edwards  v. 
State,  IIS  Ala.  52,  22  So.  564;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Shaffer,  32  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  375.  The  word  "malicious"  in  a 
statute  providing  for  the  punishment 
of  one  who  unlawfully  destroys  prop- 
erty must  receive  the  construction  usu- 
ally given  to  it  in  criminal  statutes.  It 
is  no  defense  that  the  accused  was  not 
prompted  to  his  act  by  actual  ill  will 
to  the  owner  of  the  property.  State 
v.  Boies,  68  Kan.  167,  74  Pac.  630. 

^People  v.  Ferguson,  119  Mich. 
373,  78  N.  W.  334- 

^°  State  v.  Enslow,  10  Iowa  115, 
1x7;  Commonwealth  v.  Walden,  3 
Cush.  (Mass.)  558,  561;  Hobson  v. 
State,  44  Ala.  380,  381 ;  State  v.  Mc- 


Dermott,  z^  Iowa  107 ;  Harris  v. 
State,  yz  Ga.  41,  44;  Shirley  v.  State 
(Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  42. 

^^  People  V.  Boren,  139  Cal.  210,  72 
Pac.  899. 

^  McClurg  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  624, 
58  S.  E.  1064.  "The  only  facts  estab- 
lished by  the  verdict  are,  that  the 
mare  was  injured  by  the  defendant 
by  the  discharge  of  a  gun  loaded  with 
powder  and  shot,  and  that  the  act 
was  done  willfully;  but  an  act  may 
be  unlawful,  and  may  be  done  will- 
fully, with  or  without  malice,  accord- 
ing to  the  evidence  of  the  motive, 
and  of  the  circumstances  attending 
the  transaction.  The  evidence,  there- 
fore, should  have  been  submitted  to 
the  jury,  with  instructions  that  they 
would  not  be  warranted  in  finding 
a  verdict  of  guilty,  unless  the  injury 
charged  in  the  indictment  was  done 
by  the  defendant,  not  only  willfully, 
but  also  maliciously;  that  if  the  in- 
jury was  done  intentionally  and  by 
design,  and  not  by  mistake,  accident, 
or  inadvertence,  that  would  fully  sup- 
port the  allegation  in  the  indictment 
that  it  was  done  willfully,  according 


CO/ 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AXD    LARCEXY. 


8  309 


§  309.  Ownership  and  value  of  property — Evidence  that  the  ac- 
cused acted  in  good  faith. — The  ownership  of  the  property,  whether 
it  be  real  or  personal,  may.  if  possession  is  shown,  be  proved  by 
parol,"  but  must  be  proved  substantially  as  laid,'**  though  not 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. ^^  The  accused  may  prove  by  oral 
or  written  evidence  that  he  in  fact  owned  the  property,**^  which  is 
a  valid  defense,*'  or  that  (believing  that  he  did)  he  had  taken 
legal  advice  and  acted  in  accordance  therewith,*^  All  facts  tend- 
ing to  show  that  he  was  acting  in  good  faith,  or  under  a  misap- 
prehension of  his  rights  when  he  injured  or  destroyed  the  prop- 
erty are  relevant.*''  Proof  of  a  total  destruction  is  not  necessary 
to  sustain  an  allegation  of  maliciously  destroying  or  injuring 


to  the  true  meaning  of  the  statute. 
But  the  jury  might  infer  malice  from 
the  fact  that  the  injury  was  done  by 
the  discharge  of  a  gun  loaded  with 
powder  and  shot,  unless  the  infer- 
ence were  rebutted  by  the  evidence, 
showing  that  the  gun  was  so  loaded 
that  it  was  not  likely  to  kill  or  do 
any  great  bodily  harm ;  and  the  jury 
should  have  been  so  instructed.  The 
jury  should  also  have  been  instructed 
that,  to  authorize  them  to  find  the 
defendant  guilt}',  they  must  be  satis- 
fied that  the  injury  was  done  either 
out  of  a  spirit  of  wanton  cruelty  or 
wicked  revenge."  By  the  court  in 
Commonwealth  v.  Walden,  3  Cush. 
aiass.)   558. 

"State  v.  Brant,  14  Iowa  180,  182; 
State  v.  Semotan,  85  Iowa  57,  59, 
51  N.  W.  1161;  Craighead  v.  State 
(Tex.),  117  S.  W.  128. 

"  Mayes  v.  State,  33  Tex.  340,  341 ; 
Smith  v.  State,  43  Tex.  433,  439; 
Hughes  V.  State,  103  Ind.  344,  347, 
2  X.  E.  956;  Perry  v.  State,  149  Ala. 
40,  43  So.  18;  Holder  v.  State,  127 
Ga.  51,  56  S.  E.  71. 

"State  V.  Scars,  Phill.  (N.  Car.) 
146,  149.  Proof  that  the  property 
was  in  the  possession  of  or  occupied 


by  the  alleged  owner  is  sufificient. 
People  v.  Coyne,  116  Cal.  295,  48  Pac. 
218;    State  V.   Semotan,  85   Iowa   57, 

59,  51  N.  W.  1 161,  even  though  he 
is  not  the  sole  owner.  People  v. 
Horr,  7  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  9,  12. 

^^  State  V.  Zinn,  26  Mo.  App.  17,  18. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Shaffer,  32  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  375. 

**  People  V.  Kane,  142  N.  Y.  366, 
369,  37  N.  E.  104;  People  v.  Stevens, 
109  N.  Y.  159,  163,  16  N.  E.  53. 

^""Lossen  v.  State,  62  Ind.  437,  442; 
Palmer  v.  State,  45  Ind.  388,  391 ; 
Barlow  v.  State,  120  Ind.  56,  58,  22 
N.  E.  88;  Goforth  v.  State,  8  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  37;  Reg.  v.  Langford,  i  C. 
&  M.  602 ;  Sattler  v.  People,  59  111. 
68,  70;  State  v.  Flynn,  28  Iowa  26, 
27;  Commonwealth  v.  Drass,  29  W. 
N.  C.  (Pa.)  463,  46s,  146  Pa.  St.  55. 

60,  23  Atl.  233 ;  Reg.  v.  Mathews,  14 
Cox  C.  L.  5,  7;  State  V.  Haney,  32 
Kan.  428,  430,  4  Pac.  831;  Adams  v. 
State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  35,  81  S.  W.  963. 
At  common  law  the  owner  of  the 
property  was  not  a  competent  witness 
because  of  interest.  Blackstonc  v. 
State,  IS  Ala.  415,  417;  Pike  v.  State. 
35  Ala.  419- 


§  3IO 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


538 


property. '"^^  Proof  of  value  is  necessary  and  relevant  only  where 
the  degree  of  the  crime  or  the  penalty  depends  on  the  value  of 
the  property  destroyed. ^'^ 

§  310.  Maliciously  injuring-  animals. — Killing-,  wounding,  maim- 
ing, injuring  or  disfiguring  the  animals  of  another  is  a  very  com- 
mon form  of  malicious  mischief,^-  and  is  indictable  at  common 
law.'^  The  killing,  maiming  or  injuring  must  always  be  proved 
to  be  willful.^*  An  allegation  of  injuring  an  animal  which  is  de- 
scribed under  its  generic  name  is  sustained  by  proof  of  an  injury 
to  any  species  of  the  animal.  Thus  proof  of  injuring  horses,  pigs, 
asses  or  .mares,  will  sustain  an  allegation  of  injury  to  cattle. ^^ 
And  an  allegation  of  injuring  any  species  of  animal  is  sustained 
by  proof  of  injury  to  any  one  of  that  species  irrespective  of  its 
age,  sex  or  condition.^" 

The  question  whether  an  indictment  for  maliciously  injuring 
personal  property,  or  for  killing  or  maiming  domestic  animals 
can  be  sustained  by  proof  of  maiming,  wounding  or  killing  a 
dog  has  been   variously  decided. ^^     Evidence  that  the  injured 


'"  State  V.  McBeth,  49  Kan.  584,  588, 
31  Pac.  145;  Brown  v.  State,  26  Ohio 
St.  176,  183;  State  V.  Cole,  90  Ind. 
1 12,  113;  State  V.  McKee,  109  Ind. 
497.  499.  10  N.  E.  405 ;  Hannel  v. 
State,  4  Ind.  App.  485,  486,  30  N.  E. 
1 1 18. 

"Holder  v.  State,  T27  Ga.  51,  56  S. 
E.  71 ;  State  v.  Heath,  41  Tex.  426, 
428;  State  V.  Garner,  8  Port.  (Ala.) 
447,  448 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Cox,  7 . 
Allen  (Mass.)  577,  578;  Walker  v. 
State,  89  Ala.  74,  75,  8  So.  144.  If 
the  defendant  claims  that  he  de- 
stroj^ed  the  property  with  the  owner's 
consent,  the  burden  is  on  him.  Ritter 
V.  State,  33  Tex.  608,  611;  McClurg 
V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  624,  58  S.  E. 
1064;  Commonwealth  v.  Shaffer,  32 
Pa.  Super.  375. 

"■  Davis  V.  Commonwealth,  30  Pa.  St. 
421,  424;  Atwood  V.  State,  106  S.  W. 
953.  84  Ark.  623,  not  reported  in  full. 

"  People  V.  Smith,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 


258,  259,  in  which  the  court  says : 
"The  direct  tendency  is  a  breach  of 
the  peace.  What  more  likely  to  pro- 
duce it  than  wantonly  killing,  out  of 
mere  malice,  a  useful  domestic  ani- 
mal ?" 

''*  Swinger  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 
397,  102  S.  W.  114. 

'=  Rex  V.  Moyle,  2  East  P.  C.  1076 ; 
Rex  V.  Mott,  I  Leach  C.  L.  85n ;  Rex 
V.  Chappie,  R.  &  R.  C.  C.  77 ;  State  v. 
Hambleton,  22  Mo.  452;  Rex  v.  Whit- 
ney, I  Moody  C.  C.  3;  Oviatt  v.  State, 
19  Ohio  St.  573;  Snap  v.  People,  19 
111.  80,  68  Am.  Dec.  582;  State  v. 
Grimes,  loi  Mo.  188,  190,  13  S.  W. 
956. 

■^Shubrick  v.  State,  2  S.  Car.  21, 
22 ;  Gholston  v.  State,  33  Tex.  342, 
343.  Contra,  where  the  statute  enu- 
merates various  species  of  animals 
all  belonging  to  one  genus. 

"Pro.  State  v.  Latham,  .13  Ired.  (N. 
Car.)    33;    State  v.    Sumner,   2   Ind. 


539 


EMBEZZLEMENT    AXD    LARCENY. 


311 


animal  was  running  at  large,  or  even  that  it  was  trespassing,  is 
irrelevant  if  it  appear  from  all  the  evidence  that  the  injury  was 
malicious.^® 

As  a  general  rule,  malice  towards  the  owner  of  the  animal 
must  be  proved. ^^ 

§  311.    Injuries  to  grain,  trees,  crops,  etc. — It  is  often  provided 
by  statute  that  it  shall  be  an  offense  willfully  and  maliciously  to 


377;  State  V.  M'Duffie,  34  N.  H.  523, 
69  Am.  Dec.  516;  Kinsman  v.  State, 
"/"J  Ind.  132,  13s;  State  v.  Doe,  79 
Ind.  9,  41  Am.  599;  State  v.  McKee, 
109  Ind.  497,  499,  90  N.  E.  405 ;  Sosat 
V.  State,  2  Ind.  App.  586,  589,  28  N. 
E.  1017;  Nehr  v.  State,  35  Neb.  638, 
642;  53  N.  W.  589,  17  L.  R.  A.  771. 
Contra,  Commonwealth  v.  Maclin,  3 
Leigh  (Va.)  809;  State  v.  Harriman, 
75  Me.  562,  46  Am.  423n;  Patton  v. 
State,  93  Ga.  iii,  112,  116,  19  S.  E. 
734,  24  L.  R.  A.  1Z2. 

"  Branch  v.  State,  41  Tex.  622 ; 
Wallace  v.  State,  30  Tex.  758;  Cryer 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  621,  zi  S.  W. 
753.  38  S.  W.  203;  Snap  V.  People, 
19  111.  80,  68  Am.  Dec.  582;  State  v. 
Fierce,  7  Ala.  728;  State  v.  Davis,  2 
Ired.  (N.  Car.)  153;  State  v.  Waters, 
6  Jones  (N.  Car.)  276,  277;  State  v. 
Brigman,  94  N.  Car.  888,  890 :  Bcnne- 
field  V.  State,  62  Ark.  365,  35  S.  W. 
7Q0.  Contra.  McMahan  v.  State,  29 
Tex.  App.  348,  349,  16  S.  W.  171,  where 
defendant  was  allowed  to  prove  that 
his  field  was  surrounded  by  a  good 
fence.  But  evidence  of  the  thievish 
and  unmanageable  character  of  the 
trespassing  animal  is  relevant,  not  to 
justify  maiming  or  wounding  it,  but 
to  show  that  defendant's  motive  was 
to  protect  his  crop  and  not  spite  to- 
ward the  owner.  Sosat  v.  State,  2 
Ind.  App.  586,  592,  28  N.  E.  1017; 
Wright  v.   State,  30  Ga.  325,  327,  76 


Am.  Dec.  656;  Farmer  v.  State,  21 
Tex.  App.  423,  2  S.  W.  767;  Benne- 
field  V.  State,  62  Ark.  365,  35  S.  W. 
790. 

^^  State  v.  Wilcox,  3  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
278,  279;  Hampton  v.  State,  10  Lea 
(Tenn.)  639,  641;  Hobson  v.  State, 
44  Ala.  380,  381 ;  State  v.  Latham,  13 
Ired.  (X.  Car.)  33,  35;  Hill  v.  State, 
43  Ala.  335;  Shirley  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  42;  Shepherd's  Case, 
2  Leach  C.  C.  609,  610.  Contra, 
Brown  v.  State,  26  Ohio  St.  176,  183; 
State  v.  Phipps,  95  Iowa  491,  64  N. 
W.  411.  Evidence  that  animals  found 
and  ate  poison  where  it  was  exposed 
with  an  intent  that  they  should  find 
and  eat  it  will  sustain  a  charge  of 
causing  them  to  eat  it.  Common- 
wealth v.  Falvey,  108  Mass.  304,  307- 
Where  one  was  indicted  for  mali- 
ciously poisoning  the  horses  of  an- 
other, the  prosecution  was  allowed 
to  prove  that  the  defendant  had 
bought  poison,  saying  it  was  to  kill 
rats,  that  he  had  never  used  it  for 
that  purpose,  but  that  he  had  every 
opportunity  to  administer  it  to  the 
horses,  and  a  motive  to  do  so.  Croy 
v.  State,  32  Ind.  384,  385.  An  allega- 
tion of  poisoning  animals  by  one 
means  is  sustained  by  proof  of  a 
means  substantially  similar.  Com- 
monwealth V.  McLaughlin,  105  Mass. 
460,  463. 


§311  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  54O 

burn,  cut  down,  destroy  or  injure  any  trees,  grain  or  growing- 
crops.'""''  When  a  statute  points  out  specifically  what  injurio^-is 
acts  are  punishable,  it  is  usually  required  that  the  acts  proved 
shall  substantially  conform  thereto."^^  If  a  man  cut  down  a  tree 
in  a  boundary  line,  with  intent  to  destroy  the  marks,  no  express 
malice  need  be  shown  under  a  statute  making  such  an  act  a 
crime.  If  the  immediate  consequence  of  cutting  down  the  tree 
is  to  destroy  certain  marks  upon  it,  the  presumption  will  arise 
that  he  intended  to  destroy  those  marks.  The  particular  intent 
must  be  left  to  the  jury.  If  the  act  of  destruction  is  criminal  only 
when  done  with  a  particular  intent,  the  presence  of  the  intent 
must  be  proved."^  Where  the  statute  makes  it  a  crime  to  cut 
or  injure  trees  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  the  intent  is  not 
material,  and  the  accused  cannot  show  his  motives  for  his  ac- 
tions.*'^ 

""  Daily  v.  State,  51   Ohio   St.  348,  Graeme,  130  Mo.  App.  138,  108  S.  W. 

Zy  N.  E.  710,  46  Am.  St.  578,  24  L.  R.  1131. 

A.  724;  People  V.  Horr,  7  Barb.  (N.  "State  v.  Allisbach,  69  Ind.  50,  54. 

Y.)    9,   12;   Parris  v.   People,  ^(i  111.  Cj.  State  v.  Jones,  33  Vt.  443,  447. 

274,  277.     To  authorize  a  conviction  "■  State  v.  Malloy,  34  N.  J.  L.  410, 

for    "willfully    and    maliciouslj'"    de-  417. 

stroying  any  tree  with  malicious  "  Mettler  v.  People,  36  111.  App.  324. 
intent    must    be    proved.       State    v. 


I 
\ 


CHAPTER    XXIV. 


HOMICIDE. 


§  312.  Facts  forming  the  corpus  delicti     §  ;i26. 
— Evidence      to      prove      the 
cause   and  manner  of   death.        ;i2j. 

313.  The    result   of    the    autopsy   as 

evidence.  328. 

314.  Variance  in  proof  of  means  or 

weapon  producing  death.  329. 

315.  Weapons  as  evidence. 

316.  Identity  of  the  deceased.  330. 

317.  The  identification  of  the  body 

of  the  deceased.  330^. 

318.  Expert  testimony  and  the  em- 

ployment  of   a   chemical   an-        331. 
alysis    in    cases    of    homicide 
by  poisoning. 

319.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show        ;i;i2. 

poisoning. 
319a.  Declarations  of  the  deceased.  33;^. 

320.  Presumption  and  proof  of  mal- 

ice. 334. 

321.  Connected  crimes. 

222.  Conduct  of  the  accused  subse-        335. 
quent  to  the  crime. 

323.  Facts  showing  possible  motive.       336. 

324.  Competency  of  evidence  show- 

ing the  habits,  character  and       ^s?- 
disposition    of    the    deceased.       338. 

325.  Nature   of   the   proof    required 

to  show  the  character  of  the       338^ 
deceased. 


Evidence  of  threats  by  the  de- 
ceased. 

Evidence  to  prove  the  peace- 
able character  of  the  accused. 

Threats  by  the  accused — Gen- 
eral nature  of  the  threats. 

Form,  character  and  mode  of 
proving  the  threats. 

Declarations  forming  a  part  of 

the  1-es  gestcE. 
Declarations  of  the  accused  af- 
ter the  crime. 

Declarations  of  third  persons 
and  cries  and  exclamations 
of  bystanders. 

Threats  against  deceased  by 
third  persons. 

Animosity  between  the  accused 
and  the  deceased. 

Expert  and  non-expert  evi- 
dence as  regards  blood  stains. 

Conspiracy  to  commit  homi- 
cide. 

Preparations  to  commit  homi- 
cide. 

Foot  prints. 

Self-defense — Burden  of  proof 
— Malice. 

.  The  alibi  of  the  alleged  victim. 


.§  312.  Facts  forming  the  corpus  delicti — Evidence  to  prove  the 
cause  and  manner  of  death. — In  homicide  tlie  necessary  constituents 
of  the  corpus  delicti,  tlie  death  of  a  human  beint;  and  the  criminal 
.'if^encv  producing  it  must  be  shown.     The  death  of  a  person  al- 

(541) 


S   6 


12 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


542 


leged  to  have  been  killed  must  he  establislied  by  direct  testimony 
or  circumstantial  evidence  of  the  most  cogent  and  irresistible 
force/  If  the  circumstances  point  to  the  death  of  the  person  al- 
leged to  have  been  killed  the  finding  of  fragments  of  a  human 
body,  or  of  tufts  of  hair  and  of  articles  known  or  proved  to  ha\e 
been  worn  by  the  deceased  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  death. - 
But  proof  that  the  person  alleged  to  have  been  killed  had  disap- 
peared, and  evidence  that  a  body  taken  from  the  river  had  on  it 
shoes  and  clothing  similar  to  those  worn  by  deceased  is  not  such 
proof  of  the  corpus  delicti  as  is  required  to  corroborate  a  confes- 
sion by  the  accused.^  Any  evidence  referring  to  either  of  these 
facts  and  tending  to  establish  or  to  disprove  them  is  relevant. 
The  physical  condition  of  the  deceased  prior  to,  or  at  the  instant 
of,  his  death,  or  when  his  body  is  found,*  may  be  shown, ^  and  the 
state  may  prove  his  declarations  made  to  a  physician  or  to  a  non- 
professional person  concerning  his  physical  health,"  or  respecting 
his  physical  peculiarities,  as,  for  example,  that  he  had  a  peculiar 


'  State  V.  Williams,  46  Ore.  287,  80 
Pac.  655.  See  State  v.  Nordall,  38 
Mont.  327,  99  Pac.  960;  Ausmus  v. 
People  (Colo.  1910),  107  Pac.  204. 

"  State  V.  Williams,  46  Ore.  287,  80 
Pac.  655. 

'Follis  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  186,  lOi 
S.  W.  242.  It  is  competent  to  prove 
the  color  of  the  hair  of  a  daughter  of 
the  deceased  and  that  hair  found 
on  the  person  of  the  accused  was  of 
the  same  color  where  deceased  and 
his  family  were  burned  in  their  home. 
State  V.  Nordall,  38  Mont.  327,  99 
Pac.  960.  The  bones  of  a  deceased 
person  who  was  killed  by  the  burning 
of  his  residence  are  competent  to 
prove  the  corpus  delicti.  Their  com- 
petency as  evidence  is  not  destroyed 
by  other  evidence  of  the  corpus  de- 
licti. Sprouse  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky. 
1909),  116  S.  W.  344. 

For  extensive  note  on  "Proof  of 
corpus  delicti  in  criminal  cases,"  see 
68  L.  R.  A.  33.  See  also,  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2708.    Evidence  in  general  in 


prosecution  for  homicide,  see  Elliott 
Evidence,  §§  3043,  3044,  3045;  confes- 
sions, §  3034.  Conviction  on  testi- 
mony of  accomplice,  see  98  Am.  St. 
Rep.  I58n.  Evidence  in  prosecution 
for  negligent  homicide,  6r  L.  R.  A. 
277n.  Weight  and  sufficiency  of  evi- 
dence in  prosecution  for  inciting  or 
abetting  a  suicide,  see  66  L.  R.  A. 
304n.  Proof  in  prosecution  for  homi- 
cide committed  in  resisting  arrest,  see 
66  L.  R.  A.  353n.  Proof  in  prosecu- 
tion for  homicide  resulting  from  per- 
sons acting  independently,  see  67  L. 
R.  A.  426n. 

*  Terry  v.  State,  118  Ala.  79,  23  So. 
776. 

^Williams  v.  State,  64  Md.  384,  389, 
I  Atl.  887;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan. 
I,  12  Pac.  318.  It  is  unnecessary  but 
harmless  to  the  accused  to  prove  that 
deceased  was  a  human  being.  Epps 
v.  State,  102  Ind.  539,  549,  i  N.  E.  491. 

"  State  V.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374,  385, 
14  S.  W.  969,  15  S.  W.  556;  State  v. 
Fournier,  68  Vt.  262,  35  Atl.  178. 


543 


HOMICIDE. 


8   31^ 


tooth  in  his  mouth."  It  may  be  shown  by  the  testimony  of  a  phy- 
sician that  a  wound  discovered  upon  a  dead  body  was  inflicted  be- 
fore or  after  death. ^^  Any  witness  famihar  by  experience  with 
the  appearance  or  treatment  of  wounds,"  particularly  a  physician 
or  surgeon,  may  give  an  opinion  as  to  the  manner  in  which  a  mor- 
tal wound  was  probably  inflicted/"  as  to  the  kind  of  weapon  used, 
as  to  the  distance  from  which  a  shot  was  fired, ^^  as  to  the  degree 
of  force  employed,^-  and  as  to  direction  of  a  blow,^"  and  that  in 


'  Edmonds    v.    State,    34    Ark.    720, 

HI- 

^  State  V.  Clark,  15  S.  Car.  403,  408; 
State  V.  Harris,  63  N.  Car.  i,  3. 

"  Lemons  v.  State,  97  Tenn.  560,  ■^~ 
S.  W.  552;  People  V.  Gibson,  infra; 
Rash  V.  State,  61  Ala.  89,  93 ;  Wise  v. 
State,  100  Ga.  68,  25  S.  E.  846.  That 
a  wound  was  mortal  is  an  inference 
for  the  jury  so  that  it  is  not  necessary 
for  a  physician  to  give  his  opinion 
that  the  wound  is  mortal.  Waller  v. 
People,  209  111.  284,  70  X.  E.  68r.  Evi- 
dence of  the  locality  and  description 
of  wounds  on  the  body  of  deceased 
is  always  relevant.  Basye  v.  State,  45 
Xeb.  261,  286,  63  N.  W.  811;  People 
v.  Gibson,  106  Cal.  458,  39  Pac.  864, 
870;  State  V.  Megorden,  49  Ore.  259, 
88  Pac.  306. 

"People  V.  Fish,  125  X.  Y.  136,  147, 
26  X.  E.  319;  State  v.  Ginger,  80  Iowa 
574,  577.  46  X.  W.  657;  State  v.  As- 
bell,  57  Kan.  398,  46  Pac.  770;  State 
V.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  19,  12  Pac.  318; 
Newton  v.  State,  21  Fla.  53,  102; 
Boyle  v.  State,  61  Wis.  440,  448,  21 
X.  W.  289;Carthaus  v.  State,  78  Wis. 
560,  564,  47  N.  W.  629;  People  v. 
Rector,  19  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  569,  577; 
State  V.  Seymour,  94  Iowa  699,  63  X. 
W.  661 ;  Doolittle  v.  State,  93  Ind. 
272,  275 ;  I  Grccnl.,  §  440 ;  Bowers  v. 
State,  122  Wis.  163,  99  X.  W.  447; 
People  V.  Hagenow,  236  111.  514,  86 
N.  E.  370;  demons  v.  State,  48  VVa. 


9,  yj  So.  647;  State  v.  Usher,  136 
Iowa  606,  III  X.  W.  811;  Ozark  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  106,  100  S.  W.  927. 

"State  V.  Voorhies,  115  La.  200,  38 
So.  964. 

^"  People  V.  Fish,  125  X.  Y.  136,  147, 
26  X'.  E.  319;  Owen  v.  State,  52  Tex. 
Cr.  65,  105  S.  W.  513.  Where  the 
medical  evidence  showed  that  the 
wounds  on  the  deceased  were  caused 
bj-  a  powerful  blow,  it  may  be  shown 
that  defendant  is  a  strong  and  pow- 
erful man.  Thiede  v.  Utah  Territory, 
159  LT.  S.  510,  40  L.  ed.  237,  16  Sup. 
Ct.  (>2. 

^*  Territory  v.  Egan,  3  Dak.  1 19,  127, 
13  X.  W.  568;  Commonwealth  v. 
Sturtivant,  117  Mass.  122,  123,  19  Am. 
40in:  Kennedy  v.  People,  39  X.  Y. 
245,  256;  Simon  v.  State,  108  Ala.  27, 
18  So.  731.  The  question  may  be, 
"What  was  the  cause  of  a  wound," 
describing  it,  as,  "What  would  be  tlic 
effect  of  a  blow  inflicted  by  a  weapon 
specified."  Williams  v.  State,  64  Md. 
384,  392,  I  Atl.  887.  The  court,  in 
Hopt  v.  Utah,  120  U.  S.  430,  438,  30 
L.  ed.  708,  7  Sup.  Ct.  614.  "Upon  tlie 
same  principle,  the  testimony  of  the 
physician  as  to  the  direction  from 
which  the  blow  was  delivered  was  ad- 
missible. *  *  *  It  Yvas  not  expert 
testimony  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term,  but  a  statement  of  a  conclusion 
of  fact,  such  as  men  who  use  tlicir 
senses    constaiulv    draw    from    wliat 


^^   312 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


544 


his  opinion  the  deceased  could  not  have  inflicted  the  wound  upon 
himself.^''  A  physician  who  has  examined  the  wounds  of  the  de- 
ceased may  testify  that  a  certain  weapon  was  a  deadly  weapon.*^' 
If  he  states  that  death  was  caused  by  a  certain  weapon  or  instru- 
ment, he  may  be  shown  an  instrument,  properly  identified,  as  hav- 
ing been  in  the  possession  of  the  accused,  and  may  be  asked  if  that 
would  ha\-e  caused  the  wound. ^°  A  non-expert  witness  may  tes- 
tify that  the  deceased  was  conscious  at  a  certain  time,"  and  he 
may  describe  the  wounds^'*  he  saw  on  the  body,^°  and  a  fortiori  a 
surgeon  may  give  an  opinion  as  to  the  probable  cause  of  death,"" 
and  may  state  when,  in  his  opinion,  death  occurred,"^  and  that  it 


they  see  and  hear  in  the  daily  con- 
cerns of  life."  State  \.  Megorden, 
49  Ore.  259,  88  Pac.  306. 

"  Miera  v.  Territory,  13  N.  Mex. 
192,  81  Pac.  586. 

^"  State  V.  Spaugh,  199  'Mo.  147,  97 
S.  W.  901. 

"  People  V.  Carpenter,  102  N.  Y. 
238,  248,  6  N.  E.  584;  Tune  v.  State, 
49  Tex.  Cr.  445 ;  94  S.  W.  231 ;  Hardin 
V.  State,  57  Tex.  Cr.  559,  103  S.  W. 
401.  Photographs  are  admissible  for 
the  purpose  of  identifying  the  de- 
ceased. State  V.  Windahl,  95  Iowa 
470,  64  N.  W.  420,  and  showing  the 
wounds  on  his  body.  Malachi  v. 
State,  89  Ala.  134,  139,  8  So.  104; 
People  V.  Fish,  125  X.  Y.  136,  147,  26 
X.  E.  319;  Wilson  V.  United  States, 
162  U.  S.  613,  40  L.  ed.  1090,  16  Sup. 
Ct.  895. 

'■  Walker  v.  State,  41  So.  878,  147 
Ala.  699   (not  reported  in  full). 

'^  Smith  V.  State,  43  Tex.  643,  647- 
649;  Everett  v.  State,  62  Ga.  65,  71; 
State  V.  Xieuhaus,  217  Mo.  332,  117 
S.  W.  73. 

"Batten  v.  State,  80  Ind.  394,  399; 
Hill  V.  State,  146  Ala.  51,  41  So.  621 ; 
Fowler  v.  State,  155  Ala.  21,  45  So. 
913;    Patton    V.    State,     (Tex.    Cr.), 


80  S.  W.  86;  Pitts  v.  State,  140  Ala. 
70,  37  So.  lOi.  As  for  example  that 
it  appeared  that  the  skull  of  deceased 
was  crushed  or  broken.  Terry  v. 
State,  120  Ala.  286,  25  So.  176. 
^  Boyle  V.   State,  61  Wis.  440,  448, 

21  N.  W.  289;  Commonwealth  v. 
Thompson,  159  Mass.  56,  33  X.  E. 
iiii;  State  v.  Chiles,  44  S.  Car.  338, 

22  S.  E.  339;  People  v.  Barker,  60 
Mich.  277,  292,  293,  27  X.  W.  539,  I 
Am.  St.  50in;  People  v.  Sessions,  58 
Mich.  594,  600,  26  X.  W.  291 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Snell,  189  Mass.  12,  75 
X.  E.  75,  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  loign; 
State  V.  Wilcox,  132  X.  Car.  1120,  44 
S.  E.  625;  Smith  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.), 
99  S.  W.  100;  Xordan  v.  State, 
143  Ala.  13,  39  So.  406;  Burkett  v. 
State,  154  Ala.  19,  45  So.  682;  Stovall 
V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  30,  108  S.  W. 
699;  Levering  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  117  S.  W.  253;  State  v.  Usher, 
136  Iowa  606,  III  X.  W.  811;  Sims 
v.  State,  139  Ala.  74,  36  So.  138,  loi 
Am.  St.  17;  State  v.  Megorden,  49 
Ore.  259,  88  Pac.  306;  Fay  v.  State, 
52  Tex.  Cr.  185,  107  S.  W.  55;  Jones 
V.  State,  155  Ala.  i,  46  So.  579. 

^  State  V.  Clark,  15  S.  Car.  403. 


545 


HOMICIDE. 


§    312 


was  not  suicidal.--    But  the  question  whether  a  wound  was  acci- 
dentally self-inflicted  is  for  the  jury.-^ 

The  physician  who  was  in  attendance  upon  the  victim  of  the 
homicide  during  his  mortal  illness  may  properly  repeat  on  the 
witness  stand  the  declarations  of  the  deceased  as  to  his  feelings 
and  sufferings,  the  locality  and  character  of  his  pain  and  as  to  his 
physical  condition  generally.  The  physician  may  then  testify  as 
to  his  opinion  of  the  extent  and  character  of  the  wounds,  his 
opinion  being  based  in  part  upon  what  the  deceased  told  him.-'*  A 
physician  who  is  called  to  give  an  opinion  as  to  the  cause  of  death 
may  state  that  from  his  experience  and  learning  as  a  practicing 
physician  he  is  competent  to  give  an  opinion  as  to  the  cause  of 
death.  On  such  a  statement  he  may  be  regarded  as  an  expert.-^ 
But  e.xpert  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  the  probable  posi- 
tion of  the  deceased  when  the  fatal  blow  was  struck,'^  or  whether 
he  would,  after  receiving  it,  have  sufficient  strength  to  inflict  a 
blow  with  an  effect  specified,-'  as  these  are  questions  which  the 
jury  can  determine  as  well  as  any  expert. 


~  Everett  v.  State,  62  Ga.  65. 

^  State  V.  Bradley,  34  S.  Car.  136, 
13  S.  E.  315;  Beene  v.  State,  79  Ark. 
460,  96  S.  W.  151;  Covington  v.  Peo- 
ple, 36  Colo.  183,  85  Pac.  832;  Brock 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  no  S.  W. 
878,  33  Ky.  L.  630 ;  People  v.  William- 
son, 6  Cal.  App.  336,  92  Pac.  313; 
State  V.  Trusty,  i  Penn.  (Del).  319, 
40  Atl.  766.  A  non-expert  witness 
may  testify  as  matter  of  common 
knowledge  that  a  pistol  must  be  held 
very  close  to  clothing,  when  fired,  to 
scorch  it.  Miller  v.  State,  no  Ala. 
674,  19  So.  zi\  State  v.  Cater,  100 
Iowa  501,  69  X.  VV.  880.  A  woman 
who  has  seen  burns  and  who  testifies 
that  she  and  her  children  have  been 
burned,  though  she  is  a  non-expert 
witness  may  state  that  wounds  were 
caused  by  burns.  State  v.  Xieuhaus, 
217  Mo.  2,2,2,  117  S.  W.  T2>.  A  radio- 
graph showing  the  vertebra  and  an 
object    located    near    it    has    been    ac- 

35 — L'.NDERHILL    CrIM.    Ev. 


cepted  as  competent.  There  must  be 
some  evidence  that  the  radiograph 
correctly  represents  the  condition  of 
the  body  though  it  is  not  absolutely 
necessary  that  either  a  physician  who 
was  present  or  the  operator  who  took 
the  radiograph  shall  say  that  the  ob- 
ject in  the  radiograph  is  a  bullet. 
State  V.  Matheson,  142  Iowa  414,  120 
X.  W.  1036. 

^  Gregory  v.  State,  148  Ala.  566,  42 
So.  829. 

^  State  V.  Wilcox,  132  X.  Car.  n20, 
44  S.  E.  625. 

-°  Brown  v.  State,  55  Ark.  593,  18 
S.  W.  1051  ;  Kennedy  v.  People.  39 
X.  Y.  245,  256,  257;  Watkins  v. 
State,  89  Ala.  82,  88,  8  So.  134;  Peo- 
ple v.  Hill.  n6  Cal.  562.  48  Pac.  7"- 
Contra,  State  v.  Sullivan.  43  S.  Car. 
205,  208.  21  S.  E.  4:  Miora  v.  Terri- 
tory, 13  X.  Mex.  102.  8t  Pac.  586. 

"People  V.  Rector,  19  Wend.  (X. 
V.)  5^)9.  577- 


313 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


546 


The  fact  that  the  deceased  died  suddenly  never  warrants  an  in- 
ference that  he  was  foully  dealt  with.  It  is  for  the  state  to  pro^•e 
that  his  death  was  the  result  of  a  criminal  act,  and,  unless  or  until 
this  is  proved,  it  is  presumed  that  death  resulted  from  natural 
causes."^  The  accused  may  show  the  deceased  was  of  a  melan- 
choly temperament  or  inclined  to  suicide, ''■'  and  may  show  any 
acts  or  declarations  on  the  part  of  the  deceased  showing  his  sui- 
cidal purpose,^"  while  the  state  may  prove  the  cheerful  disposition 
and  good  health, ^^  the  social  condition  and  favorable  prospects 
and  the  pleasant  personal  surroundings  of  the  deceased,  to  show 
the  absence  of  a  suicidal  intent.'*^  So  the  state  may  prove  that  the 
accused  had  threatened  to  kill  a  third  j^erson  at  a  particular  place 
and  in  a  particular  manner,  and  that  the  killing  of  the  deceased 
corresponded  in  time  and  manner  with  the  threat  to  contradict  the 
contention  by  the  accused  that  the  deceased  had  committed  sui- 
cide.^^ 


§  313.  The  result  of  the  autopsy  as  evidence. — The  testimony  of 
a  competent  surgeon  or  medical  practitioner,  who  conducted  the 
autopsy,  is  admissible,  though  some  minor  statutory  details  were 
not  observed,^*  and  though  the  accused  was  not  notified  to  be 
present,  or,  being  present,  was  without  counsel.  The  physician 
may  describe  what  tests  are  necessary  to  ascertain  the  cause  of 


"'State  V.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374, 
391,  14  S.  W.  969,  15  S.  W.  556;  Rob- 
erts V.  State,  123  Ga.  146,  51  S.  E. 
374;  State  V.  McDaniel,  68  S.  Car. 
304,  47  S.  E.  384,  102  Am.  St.  661. 
A  physician  may  testify  which  of  two 
wounds,  both  certainly  fatal,  caused 
death.  Eggler  v.  People,  56  N.  Y. 
642,  643. 

""Boyd  V.  State,  14  Lea  (Tenn.) 
i6r,  175-177;  Blackman  v.  State,  23 
Ohio  St.  146,  163;  Cf.  Hall  v.  State, 
132  Ind.  317,  325,  31  N.  E.  536.  Such 
evidence  is  of  peculiar  relevancy  in 
case  of  death  by  poisoning.  Hall  v. 
State,  132  Ind.  317,  325,  31  N.  E.  536. 
Threats  by  deceased  to  commit  sui- 
cide, unaccompanied  by  any  attempt 
to  carry  them  into  execution,  are  in- 


admissible, as  they  are  merely  hear- 
say. State  V.  Fitzgerald,  130  Mo. 
407,  32  S.  W.  1 1 13;  State  V.  Punshon, 
133  Mo.  44,  34  S.  W.  25;  State  v. 
Fournier,  68  Vt.  262,  35  Atl.  178. 

"^Nardan  v.  State,  143  Ala.  13,  39 
So.  406. 

"  State  V.  Marsh,  70  Vt.  288,  40  Atl. 
836;  Commonwealth  v.  Howard 
(Mass.  1910),  91  N.  E.  397. 

°"  State  V.  Lentz,  45  Minn.  177,  180, 
47  N.  W.  720. 

^''Commonwealth  v.  Snell,  189 
Mass.  12,  75  N.  E.  75,  3  L.  R.  A.  (X. 
S.)   lorgn. 

'*  People  V.  Weber,  149  Cal.  325,  86 
Pac.  671 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Taylor, 
132  Mass.  261,  263. 


547  HOMICIDE.  §    313 

death,  and,  after  relating  the  facts  revealed  by  the  autopsy,  may 
give  his  opinion,  based  thereon,  as  to  the  cause  and  mode  of 
death.-' ■'' 

In  order  that  evidence  of  the  result  of  an  autopsy  shall  be  re- 
ceived it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the  prosecution  to  account 
for  the  whereabouts  of  the  viscera  of  the  deceased  during  the 
whole  period  which  separates  their  removal  from  the  body  at  the 
morgue  or  elsewhere  by  an  undertaker  or  physician,  and  the  post 
inortcni  examination.  In  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary 
it  will  be  presumed  that  the  viscera  remained  in  proper  custody 
(luring  this  period.^" 

The  mere  fact  that  the  autopsy  was  made  some  time  after  the 
death  will  not  exclude  its  results  as  evidence  unless  the  delay  was 
great,  and  the  condition  of  the  body  at  the  autopsy  was  such  that 
it  was  impossible  to  determine  whether  its  condition  was  attribu- 
table to  antc-inortciH  or  post-niortern  causes.^"  One  of  several 
])hysicians  who  conducted  an  autopsy  may  prove  what  was  done 
by  the  others,  and  what  appeared  as  the  result  of  a  manual  inves- 
tigation by  another.''"  A  physician  who  has  performed  the  au- 
topsy and  has  made  an  expert  examination  of  the  stomach  of  de- 
ceased may  state  the  probable  length  of  time  intervening  between 
the  time  the  deceased  had  eaten  supper  until  his  death. ^"  An  ex- 
pert who  has  heard  the  autopsy  described  may  be  asked  if,  in  his 
opinion,  it  was  ])roperly  conducted,'*"  and  he  may  be  also  asked 
whether  it  is  possible  for  a  physician  to  determine,  on  the  facts 
which  were  observed,  the  exact  point  of  time  a  poison  which  was 
discox'ered  began  to  o])erate.'*^  A  physician  may,  though  a  person 
who  is  noi  familiar  with  anatomy  can  not.  give  an  opinion  of  a 
])erson's  sex,  based  u])on  his  examination  of  a  skeleton.^'" 

"State  V.  Merriman,  34  S.  Car.  16,  "■'People  v.  W'illson,  109  N.  Y.  345, 

12  S.   E.  619,  626;  procceding.s  at  in-  354,  16  X.  li.  540. 

qiicst,    sec    Elliott    Evidence,    §  3037 ;  •'"State  v.  Mortcnscn.  26  Utah   t,\j, 

admissibility  of   evidence   of   accused  73  Pac.  562. 

at  coroner's  inquest,  see  70  L.   R.  A.  *"  State  v.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374.  38/). 

33.    note;    adinissil)ility    of    coroner's  14  S.  W.  f)6g.  15  S.  W.  556. 

finding  to  show  cause  of  death,  see  68  *' Hartung    v.    People.   4    Park.    C'r. 

I-.  R.  .\.  28s,  note.  (  \.  Y.)  319.  325.  327. 

**  Slate  V.  Daly.  210  Mo.  C/)^,  kx)  S.  *•' Wilson  v.  State.  41  Tex.  320,  ,\J2- 

^V-  .s.r  32.';. 

■'Williams    v.     State,    64    .\ld.    384, 
391.  I  .Atl.  8X7. 


§  314 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE, 


548 


§  314.  Variance  in  proof  of  means  or  weapon  producing  death. — 
The  substance  of  homicide  being  the  felonious  kilhng,  proof  of  a 
kilHng,  in  any  manner  or  by  any  means,  that  correspond  substan- 
tially with  the  indictment,  is  sufficient.  All  the  details  of  the 
offense  need  not  be  proved  precisely  as  alleged.  Proof  of  a 
shooting  with  a  pistol  will  sustain  an  averment  of  shoot- 
ing with  a  gun  and  vice  versa,^^  and  proof  of  killing  with 
a  dagger  or  bowie-knife  will  sustain  an  averment  of  death  from 
stabbing  with  a  dirk,  sword,  or  similar  weapon.**  But  proof  of 
a  knife  will  not  sustain  an  allegation  of  killing  by  shooting,  and, 
as  a  rule,  where  the  killing  is  alleged  to  have  been  with  a  particu- 
lar weapon,  proof  of  a  totally  diverse  weapon  is  a  fatal  variance.*^ 
Proof  of  strangling  with  a  scarf  is  sufficient  where  strangling 
with  the  hands  was  alleged.**'  Allegations  of  the  place  or  nature 
of  wounds  are  generally  immaterial.*^ 

Evidence  that  a  weapon,  similar  to  that  with  which  the  deceased 
was  slain,  was  seen  near  the  defendant's  house  shortly  before  the 
homicide  and  subsequently  disappeared,*^  or  that  defendant  bor- 
rowed,*" purchased,  stole,^°  had  in  his  possession, ^^  or  practiced 


^^  Commonwealth  v.  Webster,  5 
Cush.  (Mass.)  295,  321,  322,  52  Am. 
Dec.  71  in;  Rodgers  v.  State,  50  Ala. 
102,  104;  State  V.  Lautenschlager,  22 
Minn.  514,  522;  Turner  v.  State,  97 
Ala.  57,  58,  12  So.  54 ;  State  v.  Smith, 
32  Me.  369,  ziZ,  54  Am.  Dec.  578. 

**  Hernandez  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
271,  22  S.  W.  972;  Jones  v.  State,  137 
Ala.  12,  34  So.  681. 

"Witt  V.  State,  6  Cold.  (Tenn.) 
5,  8;  Reg.  v.  Warman,  2  Car.  &  K. 
195,  I  Den.  C.  C.  183. 

*" Thomas  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
20  S.  W.  226,  14  Ky.  L.  288;  Rex  v. 
Waters,  7  Car.  &  P.  250,  i  Moody  C. 

c.  457. 

^^  Commonwealth  v.  Coy,  157  Mass. 
200,  214,  32  N.  E.  4;  State  v.  Waller, 
88  Mo.  402,  404;  Nelson  v.  State,  i 
Tex.  App.  41. 

*'  State  V.  Brabham,  108  N.  Car. 
793,  794,  13  S.  E.  217. 


*"  Finch  V.  State,  81  Ala.  41,  49,  i 
So.  565;  Webb  V.  State,  138  Ala.  53, 
34  So.  loii;  Glass  v.  State,  147  Ala. 
50,  41  So.  727;  People  V.  Del  Vermo, 
192  N.  Y.  470,  85  N.  E.  690;  Arn- 
wine  V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  213,  114  S. 
W.  796,  802;  People  V.  Haxer,  144 
Mich.  575,  108  N.  W.  90;  McKinney 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  591,  96  S.  W.  48. 
The  question  on  cross-examination  of 
the  accused  "What  did  you  have  the 
gim  for?"  is  competent  as  bearing  on 
motive.  Hill  v.  State,  156  Ala.  3, 
46  So.  864. 

^People  V.  Rogers,  71  Cal.  565,  567, 
568,  12  Pac.  679;  People  v.  M'Kay, 
122  Cal.  628,  55  Pac.  594. 

^^  Nicholas  v.  Commonwealth,  91 
Va.  741,  21  S.  E.  364;  Walsh  v.  Peo- 
ple, 88  N.  Y.  458,  466;  Collins  v. 
State,  138  Ala.  57,  34  So.  993;  Webb 
V.  State,  138  Ala.  53,  34  So.  TOii; 
Smith  V.   State,   165  Ind.   180,  74  N. 


549 


HOMICIDE. 


s  314 


iising-,^"  a  similar  weapon,  is  always  receivable  as  relevant  to  show 
preparation  to  commit  a  homicide. 

Evidence  of  the  finding  of  weapons,  known  to  belong  to  the  de- 
fendant, near  where  the  dead  body  was  found, ^^  or  the  testimony 
of  a  witness  who  is  familiar  with  firearms,  as  to  the  kind  of  gun 
by  which  a  wound  was  inflicted, ^^  or  that  a  jacketed  bullet  would 
probably  produce  infection  and  inflammation/**  that  a  gun  or 
pistol  belonging  to  the  defendant  had°^  or  had  not^"  been  recently 
used,  is  admissible. ^^ 

So  a  person  familiar  with  firearms  may  be  allowed  to  give  his 
opinion  that,  judging  from  the  report  he  heard,  the  weapon  used 
was  a  pistol.^* 


E.  983;  Rollings  V.  State  (Ala.  1909), 
49  So.  329;  Morgan  v.  Territory,  16 
Okla.  530,  85  Pac.  718;  Poe  v.  State, 
155  Ala.  31,  46  So.  521 ;  Richardson 
V.  State,  145  Ala.  46,  41  So.  82 ;  Smith 
V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  92  S.  W. 
610,  29  K^^  L.  231 ;  State  v.  Ruck,  194 
Mo.  416,  92  S.  W.  706;  Johnson  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  93  S.  W.  581, 
29  Ky.  L.  442;  Hardy  v.  Common- 
wealth (Va.  1910),  67  S.  E.  522; 
Graham  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  123 
S.  W.  691. 

"■  Boiling  V.  State,  54  Ark.  588,  596, 
16  S.  W.  658;  Burton  v.  State,  18  So. 
284,  107  .Ala.  108;  Allen  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.),  82  S.  W.  589,  26  Ky. 
L.  807. 

'^  State  V.  Craemer,  12  Wash.  217, 
40  Pac.  944;  State  v.  Jeffries,  210 
Mo.  302,  109  S.  W.  614;  Yancey  v. 
State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  366,  76  S.  W.  571 ; 
State  V.  Smalls,  73  S.  Car.  516,  53  S. 
E.  976.  Cf.  Thornton  v.  State,  113 
Ala.  43,  21  So.  356,  59  Am.  St.  97, 
where  a  memorandum  book  and  pen- 
cil found  at  the  locus  in  quo  and 
shown  to  have  belonged  to  the  de- 
fendant was  admitted  in  evidence 
against  him. 

'^  Franklin  v.  Commonwealth,  48  S. 
W.  986,  20  Ky.  L.  1 137. 


"a  Harper  v.  State,  129  Ga.  770,  59 
S.  E.  792. 

""*  Meyers  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  35, 
39,  48.  Non-expert  permitted  to  tes- 
tify in  Patton  v.  State,  156  Ala.  23, 
46  So.  862. 

°*  People  v.  Driscoll,  107  K.  Y.  414, 
420,  14  N.  E.  305.  Where  the  defend- 
ant, when  arrested,  had  in  his  posses- 
sion a  revolver  containing  four  empty 
shells,  it  is  proper  to  prove  the  cali- 
ber of  the  weapon,  that  a  witness 
heard  four  reports  of  fire  arms  in  the 
direction  of  the  house  where  the  kill- 
ing occurred,  that,  on  going  there, 
bullet  holes  were  found  in  the  ceiling 
of  the  room  and  the  description  of 
the  holes.  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  130 
Mo.  407,  32  S.  W.  1 1 13. 

"  If  it  is  proved  that  the  defendant 
carried  a  concealed  weapon  similar  to 
that  with  which  the  homicide  was 
committed,  he  cannot  show  that  it  is 
a  custom,  where  he  resides,  to  carry 
such  weapons,  though  he  may  prove 
his  habit  and  motive  in  going  armed. 
Creswell  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  i,  18. 
Nor  usually  should  the  accused  be 
permitted  to  state  why  he  carried  a 
concealed  weapon.  Gregory  v.  State, 
140  Ala.  t6,  37  So.  259. 

"Slate  V.  Graham,  116  La.  770.  41 
So.  90. 


fj    314  CRIMIXAI.    KVIOEXCE.  55O 

The  state  should  always  be  allowed  to  prove  that  there  was 
found,  either  upon  the  person  of  the  accused  or  in  his  house  at 
the  time  of  his  arrest,  if  not  too  remote,  a  weapon  similar  to  that 
with  which  the  homicide  was  committed.  Thus,  it  is  proper  for 
tlie  state  to  show  that  the  accused  told  a  witness  his  pistol  was  at 
his  house,  and  that  it  was  dug  up  where  he  had  buried  it  some  dis- 
tance from  his  house  ;  but  it  is  clear  that  evidence  of  the  finding  of 
a  pistol  under  such  circumstances  would  have  no  force  unless  it 
was  of  the  caliber  of  that  used.''"  Evidence  that  a  pistol  was 
found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused  corresponding  in  caliber 
Avith  the  bullet  taken  from  the  body  of  the  deceased  was  admitted 
where  the  accused  was  arrested  six  months  after  the  crime."" 
There  must  be  some  evidence,  however,  from  which  the  jury  may 
reasonably  infer  that  the  pistol  found  in  the  possession  of  the 
accused  was  that  used  in  the  commission  of  the  crime.**^  The  fact 
of  the  finding  of  a  pistol  cartridge,  loaded  or  not,  or  of  a  pistol 
near  the  scene  of  the  shooting  shortly  thereafter,  or,  if  the  shoot- 
ing was  done  with  a  gun,  the  presence  of  cartridges  used  is  always 
competent,  though  there  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  the  accused 
owned  these  articles.  Such  proof  is  usually  received  in  cases 
where  the  state  has  to  rely  on  circumstantial  evidence.®" 

Where  an  article  of  a  peculiar  and  exceptional  nature  is  found 
near  the  scene  of  the  crime,  a  witness  may  identify  it  with  an 
article  which  is  proved  to  have  been  owned  by  or  to  have  been  in 
the  possession  of  the  accused  before  the  crime."^  If  the  state 
shows  that  the  accused  was  in  the  possession  of  a  particular 
v.'eapon  after  returning  from  the  homicide,  and  it  is  impossible 
that  he  could  have  disposed  of,  or  concealed  it  except  in  a  particu- 
lar place,  evidence  that  this  place  has  been  searched  and  the 
weajion  not  found,  was  admitted."*  If  there  is  a  question  as  to 
the  caliber  of  the  bullet  by  which  the  wound  was  made  it  is  proper 
to  permit  a  physician  to  testify  that  on  his  examination  of  the 

°°Moss    V.    State,    152    Ala.    30,    44  *"  Nickles  v.  State,  48  Fla.  46,  37  So. 

So.  598.  312. 

"^  State  V.   Green,    115    La.    1041,   40  "^Richards    v.    Commonwealth,    107 

So.  451.  Va.  881,  59  S.  E.  1 104. 

"State  V.   Kehr,    133  Iowa  35,    no  '"Burton   v.    State,    115    Ala.    i,   22 

X.  W.  149.  So.  585. 


DO' 


HOMICIDE. 


wound  he  could  not  tell  the  caliber  of  the  cartridge. °^  A  phvsi- 
cian  may  always  testify  that  the  wound  which,  he  has  discox-ered 
could  not  have  been  made  with  the  gun  or  pistol  of  the  accused."'"' 

^  315.  Weapons  as  evidence. — The  state  may  introduce  in  evi- 
dence the  weapon  with  which  it  is  charged  the  homicide  was  com- 
mitted'*^ if  properly  identified  as  belonging  to  the  defendant."""  or 
bullets  taken  from  the  body  of  the  deceased/'"  or  cartridges  of  the 
caliber  of  a  rifle  apparently  carried  by  the  accused  in  his  flight 
after  the  crime  and  found  on  a  highway  some  distance  from  the 
scene  of  the  crime,'**  or  a  bullet  of  the  size  and  caliber  of  the 
pistol  owned  by  the  accused  found  near  the  scene  of 
the  crime,"  or  any  weapon  found  in  the  possession  of  the 
accused  or  his  criminal  associates,  which  is  similar  in  form  and 
character  to  that  which  was  employed.'-  A  weapon  found  on  the 
person  of  the  deceased  a  few  minutes  after  the  homicide  has  been 


■^  Humphrey  v.  State,  74  Ark.  554, 
S6  S.  W.  431." 

""Franklin  v.  Commonwealth,  105 
Ky.  237,  48  S.  W.  986,  20  Ky.  L. 
II37- 

'''  Siberry  v.  State,  133  Ind.  677,  685, 
33  X.  E.  681,  683;  Thomas  v.  State, 
67  Ga.  460,  465;  Crawford  v.  State, 
112  .Ala.  I,  21  So.  214;  McBrayer  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1896),  34  S.  W.  114; 
State  V.  Cushing,  14  Wash.  527,  45 
Pac.  145.  53  Am.  St.  883;  Burton  v. 
State,  107  Ala.  108,  18  So.  284;  State 
V.  Bean,  77  Vt.  384,  60  .Atl.  807;  Fay 
V.  State,  52  Te.x.  Cr.  185,  107  S.  W. 
55 ;  Fuller  v.  State,  147  .Ala.  35,  41 
So.  774;  Long  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
175,  88  S.  W.  203;  State  v.  Sherouk, 
6f  .\\\.  Sf)~,  78  Conn.  718,  not  reported 
in  full :  People  v.  Lagroppo,  90  App. 
Div.  (.\.  Y.)  219,  86  N.  Y.  S.  116; 
means  used  and  cause  of  death,  see 
I'lliott  Evidence,  §  3027:  articles  in 
eviflence,  §  3028.  Sec  §  48.  A 
liroken  gun  found  near  the  locality 
of  the  crime,  and  ajjparcntly  the 
instrument  of  death,  is  admissible, 
though  it  was  again  broken  after  its 


discovery.  Ezell  v.  State,  103  .\]a. 
8,  15  So.  818,  819. 

"^  State  V.  Tippet,  94  Iowa  646.  63 
N.  W.  445,  447;  Roberts  v.  State,  123 
Ga.  146,  51  S.  E.  374;  Tolliver  v. 
State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  329,  in  S.  W.  655. 

•^  People  V.  Weber,  149  Cal.  325,  86 
Pac.  671 ;  People  v.  Morales,  143  Cal. 
550,  77  Pac.  470. 

'"Harn  v.  State,  12  Wyo.  80.  73 
Pac.  705. 

"  Hickey  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  230, 
102  S.  W.  417. 

'"  Rodriquez  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
259,  22  S.  W.  978;  State  V.  Gallman, 
79  S.  Car.  229,  60  S.  E.  682.  A  wit- 
ness may  state  the  result  of  a  com- 
parison of  shot  taken  from  defend- 
ant's gun  with  other  shot  found  in 
the  body  of  deceased.  Granger  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr..  1895),  3i  S.  W.  671  ; 
Lemons  v.  State,  97  Tcnn.  560.  37  S. 
W.  552;  Dean  v.  Conunonwcalth,  32 
Gratt.  (Va.)  912,  922;  State  v.  Lem 
Woon  (Ore.  1910),  107  Pac.  974; 
People  V.  Mar  Gin  Suic  (Cal.  App. 
1909),  103  Pac.  951. 


§  3l6  CRIMIXAL  EVIDENCE.  552 


received  in  evidence.'^  It  is  improper  to  allow  experiments  with 
weapons  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,'*  nor  is  expert  evidence  ad- 
missible to  show  that  a  cartridge  is  marked  in  such  a  way  as  to 
indicate  it  had  been  fired  from  a  pistol  belonging  to  the  deceased."'' 
On  the  other  hand,  if  a  number  of  shells  are  found  on  the  ac- 
cused which  are  marked  with  a  peculiar  mark,  and  it  appears  that 
only  two  shots  were  fired,  two  empty  shells  bearing  the  mark, 
and  which  were  found  near  the  scene  of  the  crime,  should  be  re- 
ceived in  evidence." 

§  316.  Identity  of  the  deceased. — The  identity  of  the  deceased 
with  the  party  named  in  the  indictment  must  be  proved  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt.  And  where  the  body  of  the  deceased  has  been 
wholly  destroyed  so  that  an  ordinary  identification  is  impossible, 
as,  for  example,  where  it  has  been  destroyed  by  fire  in  the  burning 
of  a  house,  it  is  proper  to  permit  great  latitude  to  the  prosecution 
in  the  presentation  of  evidence  of  identity."  The  name  must  be 
proved  as  alleged.  Failure  to  prove  the  christian  name  of  the  de- 
ceased is  fatal, '^  though  this  variance  may  be  cured  if  the  occu- 
pation and  surname  are  proved  as  alleged."'^  And  when  the  name 
is  proved  as  idem  sonans,  with  respect  to  that  alleged,  slight  diver- 
gencies in  spelling  will  be  disregarded.*" 

§  317.  The  identification  of  the  body  of  the  deceased. — The  struc- 
ture and  condition  of  the  teeth  of  a  deceased  person,  by  reason 
of  the  imperishable  nature  of  the  materials  w^hich  compose  them, 
furnish  an  excellent  means  of  identification.    And  a  witness  who 

"Watson  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  85,  '"Shepherd   v.    People,    72   111.   480, 

105  S.  W.  509.  481 ;    State   v.   Lincoln,   17   Wis.    597, 

"*  United  States  v.   Ball,   163  U.   S.  599,  6or. 

662,  41  L.  ed.  300,  16  Sup.  Ct.  1 192;  '"Girous   v.    State,   29   Ind.   93,  94; 

Polin  V.  State,  14  Neb.  540,  545,  16  N.  State  v.  Witt,  34  Kan.  488,  494,  8  Pac. 

W.  898.  769;    State  V.   Lincoln,    17    Wis.   597, 

'°  People   V.    Mitchell,   94   Cal.    550,  599.     The  fact  that  the  deceased  was 

555,  29  Pac.  1 106.  a  white  man  may  be  proved  by  the 

'°  Fuller  V.   State,   147   Ala.   35,  41  confession  of  the  accused.     Isaacs  v. 

So.  774.  United  States,  159  U.  S.  487,  40  L.  ed. 

"  State  V.  Nordall,  38  Mont.  327,  99  229,  16  Sup.  Ct.  51. 
Pac.  960;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2715. 

■'  Penrod  v.  People,  89  111.  150,  151. 


553  HOMICIDE.  §    318 

was  acquainted  with  the  appearance  and  conformation  of  the 
teeth  of  the  person  in  question  may  describe  their  condition  of 
soundness  or  decay,  and  point  out  whatever  he  may  have  observed 
which  was  abnormal  or  pecuhar  in  them,  as,  for  example,  fillings, 
etc.  This  evidence  may  then  be  followed  up  by  the  testimony  of 
experts,  preferably  dentists  or  dental  surgeons,  who  have  made  an 
examination  of  the  teeth  after  death.  The  jury  may  then  deter- 
mine as  an  inference  from  the  points  of  similarity,  if  any,  the 
identity  of  the  remains  with  the  person  whose  death  is  under  con- 
sideration.^^ 

.3  318.  Expert  testimony  and  the  employment  of  a  chemical  an- 
alysis in  cases  of  homicide  by  poisoning. — A  conviction  of  homicide 
by  poisoning  will  stand  though  every  fact,  except,  perhaps,  the 
death  of  the  party,  which  must  be  proved  by  direct  evidence,  is 
sustained  by  circumstantial  evidence  alone.""  It  is  usually  indis- 
pensable to  prove  that  the  accused  was  in  possession  at  the  time 
of  the  crime  of  the  poison  alleged  to  have  been  administered  by 
him.**^  A  chemical  analysis,  an  autopsy  and  the  aid  of  expert 
testimony,  though  very  desirable,  are  never  indispensable.^* 

A  physician  cannot  testify  as  an  expert  on  symptoms  of  poison- 
ing who  has  never  treated  or  seen  a  case  of  poisoning  in  his  prac- 
tice, and  whose  knowledge  is  only  such  as  he  has  obtained  by 
reading  books  and  from  his  instruction  at  the  medical  school.''* 

A  properly  qualified  medical  witness  may  state  that,   in  his 

"The  subject  is   full}'  discussed   in  State,  82  ]\Iiss.  498,  34  So.  360,  as  to 

Rchfuss  on  Dental  Jurisprudence,  §9,  necessity  for  proof  of  the  corpus  dc- 

pp.    17-32.      See    also,    Udderzook   v.  licti. 

Commonwealth,  76  Pa.  St.  340;   Rex  "Johnson    v.    State,   29   Tex.    App. 

V.  Clewes,  4  Car.  &  P.  221;  Common-  150,  153,  15  S.  W.  647;  Polk  v.  State, 

wealth  V.  Webster,  5  Cush.    (Mass.)  36  Ark.  117,  126;   State  v.  Slagle,  83 

295,  52  Am.  Dec.  7iin;  and  ante,  §7.  N.   Car.   630,   631;    Nordan   v.    State, 

""Zoldoske    v.    State,   82    Wis.    580,  143  Ala.  13,  39  So.  406;   Levering  v. 

597,  52  X.  W.  778;  Commonwealth  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  117  S.  W.  253. 

Kennedy,  170  Mass.  18,  48  N.  E.  770.  '"  Soquct  v.  State,  y2  Wis.  659,  662- 

"  State    V.    Rlydenburg,    135    Iowa  665,  40  N.  W.  391.    Contra,  People  v. 

264,  112  N.  W.  634.     See  Stanley  v,  Thacker,  108  Mich.  652,  66  N.  W.  562. 


§  3^8 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


554 


opinion,  death  was  caused  by  a  certain  poison,"'  that  he  found 
a  certain  poison  in  the  stomach  of  the  deceased,""  or  may  describe 
symptoms  which  accompany  poisoning,"''  or  may  state  that  symp- 
toms described  in  a  hypothetical  question  indicate  the  presence 
of  arsenic  or  other  poison.*"* 

He  cannot,  perliaps,  state  the  result  of  a  chemical  analysis  un- 
less he  has  had  some  special  experience  in  chemical  research  and 
a  knowledge  of  the  science."^ 

The  com])etency  of  the  chemical  expert  is  always  a  judicial 
question,  though  his  knowledge  and  experience  may  be  brought 
out  to  enable  the  jury  to  give  proper  weight  to  his  evidence."" 
It  is  now  very  customary  in  criminal  trials  to  employ  trained 
analysts,  or  experienced  physicians  who  have  made  a  specialty 
of  the  study  of  organic  chemistry,  to  conduct  the  analysis  of  the 
contents  of  the  viscera  where  poisoning  is  suspected,®^  and  ob- 
"\-iously  the  opinions  of  such  persons  would  have  greater  weight 
with  the  jury  than  those  of  ordinary  physicians."* 

One  who  is  by  occupation  a  chemist  and  a  professor  of  chem- 
istry in  a  college  and  who  has  for  many  years  made  a  study  of 
poisons,  may  testify  as  to  the  effect  of  poison  on  the  human 
system  and  also  may  state  a  particular  poison  in  his  opinion 
caused  the  death  of  the  deceased,  though  he  is  neither  a  druggist 


See  also  Rice  v.  State,  .S4  Tex.  Cr. 
149,  112  S.  W.  2^9,  where  a  physician 
was  accepted  as  an  expert  on  strych- 
nine poisoning  who  had  no  practical 
knowledge  of  the  subject. 

"Mitchell  V.  State,  58  Ala.  417, 
419;  Davis  V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  236, 
114  S.  W.  366. 

''People  V.  Quimby,  134  Mich.  625, 
96  N.  W.  1061,  10  Det.  Leg.  X.  618. 

*•'  People  V.  Robmson,  2  Park  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  235,  243,  245;  Polk  V.  State, 
36  Ark.  117,  124;  State  v.  Terrell,  12 
Rich.   (S.  Car.)  321. 

""Stephens  v.  People,  4  Park.  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  396,  432-438;  State  v.  Rock- 
er, 138  Iowa  653,  irb  N.  W.  797. 

°'  Soquet  V.  State,  72  Wis.  659.  40 
N.  W.  391 ;  State  v.  Cook.  17  Kan. 
392,  395.    But  he  need  not  be  a  prac- 


tical analyst  or  chemist.  Zoldoske  v. 
State,  82  Wis.  580,  597,  52  N.  W.  778; 
State  V.  Hinkle,  6  Iowa  380,  386; 
Epps  V.  State,  102  Ind.  539,  548,  i  X. 
E.  491  ;  Hartung  v.  People,  4  Park. 
Cr.  (X.  Y.)  319. 

°^The  fact  that  the  opinion  of  an 
expert  chemist  given  on  the  witness 
stand  is  based  partly  on  his  reading 
is  immaterial.  State  v.  Baldwin,  36 
Kan.  I,  17,  12  Pac.  318:  People  v. 
Pekarz,  185  X.  Y.  470,  78  X.  E.  294. 

"^  People  V.  Buchanan,  145  X.  Y.  i, 
11-14,  39  N.  E.  846;  State  v.  Bow- 
man, 78  X.  Car.  509,  511,  514;  State 
V.  Cook,  17  Kan.  392,  394;  Joe  v. 
State,  6  Fla.  591,  601-606,  65  Am. 
Dec.  579n. 

=^  State  v.  Hinkle,  6  Iowa  380,  386. 
Cf.  Sanders  v.  State,  94  Ind.  147,  I49- 


0:5 : 


HOMICIDE. 


§    319 


nor  a  plwsician.^''  The  identity  of  the  subject  analyzed  with  that 
involved  in  the  case,  and  the  fact  that  it  has  not  been  improperly 
tampered  with,  must  be  shown, '■*''^  though  the  e\'idence  of  identity 
need  not  be  absolutely  convincing  before  it  should  be  permitted  to 
go  to  the  jury."*"'  A  hypothetical  question  containing  facts  proved 
or  claimed  to  be  proved  in  connection  with  the  poisoning  may  be 
asked,  and  it  is  not  material  that  the  question  does  not  contain 
all  the  facts  if  those  omitted  are  brought  out  on  the  cross-exam- 
ination."^ The  fact  that  the  expert  heard  that  there  was  poison 
in  the  house,  wdiich  fact,  being  \iewed  by  him  in  conjunction  with 
the  symptoms,  influenced  him  in  forming  an  opinion  that  the 
deceased  was  poisoned,  will  not  exclude  his  opinion."** 

§  319.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show  poisoning. — Malice  may  be 
reasonably  presumed  from  the  willful  administration  of  poison 
in  a  quantity  sufficient  to  cause  death  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances."" Evidence  that  a  member  of  a  family  with  whom  the 
defendant  had  lived  had  died  from  the  same  poison  which  he  is 
now  accused  of  having  administered  is"  relevant  to  aid  the  jury 
in  determining  the  probability  that  the  death  of  the  person  with 
whose  murder  he  is  charged  was  accidental.^"" 

The  evidence  which  tends  to  show  the  poisoning  or  death  of 
any  other  person  than  the  deceased  should  usually  be  confined  in 
its  bearing  to  the  motive  of  the  accused,  or  should  be  only  con- 
sidered by  the  jury  in  determining  whether  the  death  of  the  de- 
ceasefl  was  accidental  or  not.  The  accused  is  usually  in  such  cases 
entitled  to  have  the  court  charge  to  that  effect.^ 


•''■  .Scott  V.  State,  141  Ala.  i,  37  So. 
.157. 

"a  State  V.  Cook.  17  Kan.  392,  394. 
The  fact  that  the  jar.s  containing  the 
organs  of  the  deceased  were  not  her- 
metically sealed.  State  v.  Thompson, 
132  Mo.  301,  34  S.  W.  3r,  and  were 
not  kept  under  lock  and  key  does  not 
exclude  the  analysis.  State  v.  Cook, 
17  Kan.  392,  394. 

'•^People  V.  Williams,  3  Tark  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  84,  94-96. 

"Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind.  550, 
554-55^;  Epps  V.  Slate,  ro2  Ind,  539, 
554,  I  N.  E.  491  ;  Zf)Idoske  v.  State, 
82  Wis.  580,  597,  52  X.  W.  77H:  Con- 


way V.  State,  118  Ind.  482,  490,  21  N. 
E.  285. 

"'ATitchell  v.  State,  58  Ala.  417,  420. 

""People  V.  Sanchez,  24  Cal.  17; 
Commonwealth  v.  Danz,  211  Pa.  St. 
507,  60  .'\tl.  1070. 

""Zoldoske  V.  State.  82  Wis.  580, 
597.  52  N.  W.  778.  See  ante,  §  89. 
I'or  evidence  in  prosecution  for 
homicide  in  commission  or  attempt 
to  commit  ahortion,  see  63  L.  R.  :\. 
902,  note;  evidence  in  prosecution  for 
homicide  l)y  commission  of  unlawful 
;ict,  see  63  L.  K.  A.  353.  note 

*  Peo])l(;  V.  Zajicek.  233  111.  iy8,  84 
\.  IC.  249. 


§319  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  556 

The  possession  of  poison  by  the  accused  is  an  important  fact 
and  may  always  be  proved."  But  evidence  that  the  accused  mixed 
i:)oison  or  had  poison  in  his  possession  is  of  httle  weight  unless 
it  is  also  shown  that  he  had  an  opportunity  to  administer  it.^  The 
evidence  to  show  possession  need  not  be  direct,  nor  need  the  pos- 
session be  exclusive.  If  it  is  shown  that  poison  was  in  a  house 
where  the  accused  lived,  within  easy  reach,  and  that  he  had 
knowledge  of  the  fact,  a  conviction  will  be  sustained.* 

It  is  always  proper  for  the  state  to  show  that  the  accused,  or  a 
person  closely  resembling  him,  purchased  or  had  in  his  posses- 
sion the  poison^  which,  it  is  charged,  was  the  cause  of  the  death 
of  the  deceased."  Where  the  poison  was  mixed  in  food  eaten  by 
deceased  it  is  competent  to  prove  that  the  accused  purchased  the 
food.'  The  inability  of  the  witness  to  identify  positively  the  ac- 
cused as  the  person  who  purchased  the  poison  or  the  food  does  not 
render  his  testimony  incompetent.'*  The  witness,  in  fixing  the 
date  of  the  sale,  may,  if  necessary,  refresh  his  memory  by  read- 
ing from  a  shop  book  in  which  sales  of  poison  are  recorded,"  and 
may  also  testify  that  sales  of  a  certain  poison  were  not  common 
and  that  tliere  was  only  a  small  quantity  on  hand  at  the  time  as 
tending  to  show  facts  which  aided  him  in  remembering  the  sale.^'' 

The  inference  unfavorable  to  the  accused,  which  may  be  created 
by  proof  that  prior  to  the  death  of  the  deceased  he  had  purchased 
and  had  in  his  possession,  poison  similar  in  cliaracter  to  that 
found  in  the  stomach  of  the  accused  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence 
that  he  owned  a  farm  and  that  farmers  in  his  locality  generally 
kept  this  poison  for  poisoning  vermin.'^ 

"People  V.    Cuff,    122   Cal.    589,   55  '  State  v.  BIj'denburg,  135  Iowa  264, 

Pac.  407.  112    N.    W.    634;    Commonwealth    v. 

'  Madden  v.  State,  i  Kan.  340.  Kennedy,  170  Mass.  18,  48  N.  E.  770. 

*  Zoldoske    v.    State,    82    Wis.    580,  '  State  v.   Thompson,  141    Mo.  408, 

597,  52  N.  W.  778 ;  State  v.  Woodard,  42  S.  W.  949. 

132  Iowa  67s,   108  N.  W.  753.     The  *  State  v.  Thompson,   141   IMo.  408, 

court  may,  with  propriety,   enlighten  42  S.  W.  949;  Commonwealth  v.  Ken- 

the  jury  in  its  charge  by  defining  such  nedy,  170  Mass.  18,  48  N.  E.  770. 

words  as  "anaesthetic,"  "chloroform"  "  Commonwealth    v.    Kennedy,    170 

and  "poison."     State  v.   Baldwin,  36  Mass.  18,  48  N.  E.  770. 

Kan.  I,  22,  12  Pac.  318.  "Commonwealth    v.    Kennedy,    170 

'  State  V.  Woodard,   132  Iowa  675,  Mass.  18.  48  N.  E.  770. 

108    N.    W.    753;    State    v.    Rocker,  "People  v.   Cuff,    122  Cal.    589,  55 

138  Iowa  653,  116  N.  W.  797.  Pac.  407. 


:>D/ 


HOMICIDE.  §    319a 


^  319a.  The  declarations  of  the  deceased. — The  opinion  of  a  physi- 
cian that  the  accused  died  from  natural  causes  may  be  received 
where  it  is  based  on  his  examination  and  on  the  declarations  of 
the  deceased  as  to  her  condition  past  and  present  made  to  him  to 
enable  him  to  prescribe  for  her.^"  Hence,  it  follows  that  his 
declarations  and  statements  of  present  pain  and  suffering  should 
be  received  in  evidence.  His  statements  which  constitute  a  part 
of  the  res  gcstcc  are  always  received.  Thus  the  statements  of  the 
deceased  made  after  he  has  taken  medicine  given  him  by  the  ac- 
cused that  he  had  taken  it  and  describing  its  eft'ect,  should  be  re- 
ceived.^'' And  the  statements  of  the  deceased  made  while  he  was 
eating  the  food  in  which  it  is  alleged  the  poison  was  contained 
is  also  admissible.^* 

But  a  statement  by  the  deceased  descriptive  of  her  illness  made 
son]etime  after  the  date  on  which  the  illness  commenced  must  be 
rejected. ^^  The  dying  declarations  of  the  deceased  so  far  as  they 
are  statements  of  fact  and  not  of  mere  opinions  are  always  re- 
ceived.^"^  Under  the  claim  that  the  deceased  has  committed  suicide 
it  may  be  shown  that  he  was  at  times  despondent  and  ill,  pro- 
viding this  condition  is  not  too  remote.^'  So  also  it  may  be  shown 
under  the  plea  of  suicide  that  the  deceased  had  poison  in  his  pos- 
session and  his  declarations  showing  an  intention  on  his  part  to 
commit  suicide  have  been  received  providing  they  are  within  a 
reasonable  period  before  her  death. ^^  There  is,  how^ever,  some 
difference  of  opinion  in  the  cases  as  to  the  propriety  of  admitting 
the  declarations  of  an  intention  to  commit  suicide.  It  seems  that 
a  statement  that  he  intended  to  take  his  life  is  admissible  but 
statements  that  he  had  poison  in  his  possession  is  not  received  to 
show  such  possession  or  to  show  that  the  deceased  knew  the  ef- 
fects of  the  poison  administered.^®  In  other  words  declarations 
of  intent  to  commit  suicide  are  received  to  show  that  the  death 
of  the  deceased  was  not  caused  by  the  accused ;  but  statements 

"State    V.    Biydenburg,    135    Iowa  S.  W.  299;   Boyd  v.   State,  84  Miss. 

264,  112  X.  W.  634.  414,  36  So.  525. 

"  N'ordan  v.  State,  143  /Ma.   13,  39  "  State  v.   Kelly,   77  Conn.  266,  58 

So.  406.  Atl.  705. 

"State  V.  Thompson,  141  Mo.  408,  "State  v.   Kelly,  77  Conn.   266,   58 

42  S.  \V.  949.  Atl.  705;  Xordis'reii  v.  People.  2\\  111. 

"  Boyd  V.  State,  84  Miss.  414,  36  So.  425,  71  \.  E.  1042. 

^2^.  "State  V.   Kelly,  77   Conn.   266,   58 

"Rice  V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  149,  II2  Atl.  705;  State  v.  Marsh,  70  Vt.  288, 

40  Atl.  836. 


S    320  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  55S 

accompanying  tlicsc  declarations  of  inlenlion  will  he  rejected  as 
hearsay.-" 

i;  320.  Presumption  and  proof  of  malice. — The  character  of  homi- 
cide, whether  murder  or  manslaughter,  and  the  validity  and  co- 
gency of  a  defense  involving  justification  or  excuse  for  the  act 
of  killing,  which  itself  is  not  denied,  depends  wholly  upon  the 
presence  or  absence  of  a  malicious  intent.  To  constitute  the  kill- 
ing murder  in  the  first  degree  malice  existing  at  the  instant  of  the 
killing,  or,  at  least,  at  some  time  not  too  remote,  must  he  shown, 
or  circumstances  must  he  shown  from  whicli  it  may  he  presumed."' 

"Malice  aforethougiit,"  or  tliat  degree  of  malice  which  makes 
a  homicide  murder,  need  not  be  shown  l)y  direct  evidence.  Malice 
is  the  outcome  of  a  mental  condition,  and  direct  proof  of  a  mental 
condition  is  usually  impossible  from  the  customary  secrecy  of 
motive  leading  to  the  crime. 

If  an  unlawful  homicide  is  proved  to  have  been  committed  and 
is  shown  to  ha\^e  been  the  intentional  and  deliberate  act  of  the 
accused,  the  law  will  presume  malice  from  these  facts  alone  and 
the  intention  to  kill  until  he  shall  offer  e\'idence  to  show  mitigat- 
ing, excusing  or  justifying  circumstances.  The  legal  presumption 
of  malice  aforethought  arises  from  the  deliberate  use  of  a  deadly 
weapon  in  a  way  which  is  likely  to  produce,  and  which  does  pro- 
duce, death. -- 

'"  State  V.  Marsh,  70  Vt.  288,  40  Atl.  Other    presumptions,    §  3020 ;    pre- 

836.    For  dying  declarations,  see  Ch.  sumption    of    innocence,    Elliott    Evi- 

X;    also,    Elliott    Evidence,    §§  3031,  dence,  §  3013;  of  intent,  Elliott  Evi- 

3032,    3033;    86    Am.    St.    637,    note;  dence,  §3014:  as  to  degree  of  offense, 

56  L.   R.  A.  353,   note;  6t,   L.  R.   A.  Elliott    Evidence,    §  3015;     presump- 

916,  note.  tions  not  conclusive,  Elliott  Evidence, 

^^  State  V.  Johnson,  8  Iowa  525,  74  §  3015;   when  no  presumption  arises, 

Am.  Dec.  321 ;  State  v.  Decklotts,  19  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3018. 

Iowa  447;   State  v.  Peterson,   149  N.  "  McLeod  v.   State,   128  Ga.    17.  57 

Car.  533,  6^  S.  E.  87;  State  v.  Har-  S.    E.   83;    Ewing   v.    Commonwealth 

mon,  4  Penn  (Del.)  580,  60  Atl.  866;  (Ky.),  in  S.  W.  352.  ^2  Ky.  L.  749; 

Bonner  v.  State,  125  Ga.  237,  54  S.  E.  State  v.  Moore,  25  Iowa  128,  95  Am. 

143;  State  v.  Di  Gugliclmo  (Del),  55  Dec.    776n.      See    Commonwealth    v. 

Atl.  350;    State  V.   Kindred,   148  Mo.  York,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  93,  121,  43  Am. 

270,  49  S.   W.  845;   State  V.  Strong,  Dec.  2)7i'<   Pressley  v.  State,   132  Ga. 

85  Ark.  536,  109  S.  W.  536.     See  El-  64,  63  S.  E.  784;  State  v.  Prolow,  98 

liott  Evidence,  §§  3016,  3017;  4  L.  R.  Minn.   459,   108  X.   W.  873;    State  v. 

A.  (N.  S.)  934,  note.  liayden,  131  Iowa  r,  107  N.  W.  929; 


HOMICIDE. 


The  use  of  such  a  weapon  is  a  fact  which,  when  proved,  if  no 
otlier  evidence  is  offered  on  either  side  to  show  the  contrary,  raises 
a  presumption  of  law  that  a  dehherately  formed  design  existed 
in  the  mind  of  the  accused  to  kill  the  person  on  whom  that  weapon 
was  used.-''  Usually  modifying  facts  are  proved  in  connection 
with  the  killing.  These  facts  may  be  of  such  a  character  that  no 
necessity  may  exist  for  drawing  a  presumption  from  the  use  of  a 
deadly  weapon,  or  they  may  rebut  the  presumption.  It  is  then  for 
the  jury  to  say  on  all  the  facts,  whether  malice  or  the  deliberate 
intention  to  kill  was  present."* 


State  V.  Cole.  132  N.  Car.  1069,  44  S. 
E.  391 ;  State  v.  Powell,  5  Penn. 
(Del.)  24,  6r  Atl.  966;  State  v.  Har- 
mon, 4  Penn.  (Del.)  580,  60  Atl.  866; 
State  V.  Honey,  6  Penn.  (Del.)  148,  65 
.•\tl.  764;  State  V.  Rochester,  72  S. 
Car.  194,  51  S.  E.  685. 

-'  State  V.  Johns,  6  Penn.  (Del.)  T74, 
65  Atl.  763;  State  V.  Roberson,  150  X. 
Car.  837,  64  S.  E.  182;  Rosemond  v. 
State,  86  Ark.  160,  no  S.  W.  229; 
State  V.  Moore  (Del.  1909),  74  Atl. 
1 1 12.    See  cases  in  next  note. 

**  The  cases  which  may  be  consulted 
upon  the  presumption  or  proof  of 
malice  are  as  follows :  Compton  v. 
State,  no  Ala.  24,  20  So.  119;  State 
V.  Davis,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  407,  33  Atl. 
55;  State  V.  Peo,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  488, 
33  Atl.  257;  State  V.  Earnest,  56  Kan. 
3r,  42  Pac.  359;  State  v.  Jimmerson, 
118  X.  Car.  1 173,  24  S.  E.  494;  State 
V.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  308,  315,  12  .\m. 
20on;  State  v.  Knight,  43  Me.  11,  138; 
Simmons  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
18  S.  W.  534,  13  Ky.  L.  839 ;  State  v. 
Douglass,  28  W.  Va.  297,  302;  Jack- 
son V.  State,  81  Ala.  33,  35,  i  So.  33; 
Daccy  v.  People,  116  111.  555,  575,  ct 
scq.,  6  N.  EL  165;  Erwin  v.  State,  29 
Ohio  St.  186,  192,  23  Am.  733 ;  Lamar 
V.  State,  63  Miss.  265,  272,  274;  Mc- 
Adams  v.  State,  25  Ark.  405,  408; 
State  V.  Chavis,  80  N.  Car.  353,  358; 
State  V.  Ariel,  38  S.  Car.  221,  223,  16 


S.  E.  779 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Drum, 
58  Pa.  St.  9;  Young  v.  State,  95  Ala. 
4.  TO  So.  913;  Hill  V.  Commonwealth, 
2  Gratt.  (Va.)  594,  599,  603;  State 
V.  Willis,  63  X.  Car.  26,  29;  Murphy 
V.  People,  9  Colo.  435,  439,  13  Pac. 
528;  Hart  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  163, 
171,  17  S.  W.  421 ;  Boyle  v.  State,  105 
Ind.  469,  477,^5  N-  E.  203,  55  Am. 
218;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  218, 
225 ;  State  v.  Hockett,  70  Iowa  442, 
450,  30  X.  W.  742;  State  V.  Whitson, 
in  X.  Car.  695,  698,  16  S.  E.  332; 
Stokes  V.  People,  53  X.  Y.  164,  182, 
13  Am.  492;  State  v.  Howell,  9  Ired. 
(N.  Car.)  485,  487;  Hansford  v. 
State  (Miss.,  1891),  n  So.  106;  State 
V.  Evans,  65  Mo.  574,  580;  Common- 
wealth V.  York,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  93, 
103.  43  Am.  Dec.  373;  Davison  v. 
People,  90  111.  221,  229;  Cherry  v. 
State  (Miss.,  1897),  20  So.  837;  State 
v.  Zeibart,  40  Iowa  169;  State  v.  Sul- 
livan, 51  Iowa  142,  50  X.  W.  572; 
State  v.  Townsend,  66  Iowa  741,  24 
X.  W.  535 ;  Donnellan  v.  Common- 
wealth, 7  Bush  (Ky.)  676,  679;  State 
V.  Miller,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  564,  570. 
32  Atl.  137;  McDermott  v.  Stale,  89 
Ind.  187,  193;  Allen  v.  LJnito<i  States, 
164  U.  S.  4Q2.  4r  L.  cd.  528,  17  Suj). 
Ct.  154;  r.urkctt  V.  State,  154  Ala.  H), 
45  .So.  682;  Allen  v.  State,  14K  .\l.i. 
588,    42    So.    1006;    State    V.    Cei)hus 


CRI-MIXAL    EVIDEXCE. 


5(3c 


In  other  words,  a  relmtlablc  presumption  of  law  of  a  malicious 
intention  always  arises  as  soon  as  a  homicide  with  a  deadly 
weapon  is  proved.  This  may  become  conclusive  if  no  defense  is 
made.  But  it  may  be  rebutted  1)y  evidence  coming  from  the  state, 
i  f  this  does  not  happen,  the  accused  may  offer  evidence  to  show  he 
did  the  killing  in  self-defense,  or  while  insane.  The  presumption 
of  malice  thus  removed,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  find  whether  malice 
existed  on  all  the  facts,  and  not  merely  from  the  use  of  a  deadly 
weapon  alone.  If  malice  is  ascertained  to  have  existed  before  the 
killing,  as,  for  example,  from  evidence  of  threats,  its  continuance 
down  to  the  homicide  will  be  presumed  as  matter  of  law,  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary.""'^ 

§  321.  Connected  crimes. — Crimes  leading  up  to  or  connected 
with  the  homicide,  so  that  they  form  parts  of  one  transaction, 
may  be  proved  as  part  of  the  res  gcstcc  to  illustrate  the  conduct 
and  disposition  of  the  accused  about  the  time  of  the  homicide.-" 

(Del.),  67  Atl.  150;  State  v.  Tilgh-  take  life  or  infl'ct  grievous  bodily 
man  (Del.),  63  Atl.  772;  Burley  v.  harm.  The  law  implies  malice  where 
State,  130  Ga.  343,  60  S.  E.  1006;  Nel-     the  circumstances  of  the  homicide  in- 


son  V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  223.  60  S.  E. 
1072 ;  Tolhirt  v.  State,  124  Ga.  767,  53 
S.  E.  2>27;  State  v.  Hayden,  131  Iowa 
I,  107  N.  W.  929;  State  v.  DiGugliel- 
mo  (Del.),  55  Atl.  350;  Ewing  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  in  S.  W.  352, 
^T,  Ky.  L.  7.:|9;  Adams  v.  State,  125 
Ga.  II,  53  S.  E.  804;  Kennedy  v. 
State,  40  So.  658,  147  Ala.  687,  not  re- 
ported in  full;  State  v.  Whitbeck 
(Iowa,  1909)   123  N.  W.  982;  State  v. 


dicate  that  the  act  proceeded  from 
an  evil  disposition  or  a  heart  regard- 
less of  social  duty  and  bent  on  mis- 
chief. For  example,  if  death  results 
from  a  blow  with  the  hand,  inflicted 
on  a  person  of  mature  years  and 
great  physical  strength,  no  presump- 
tion of  malice  arises,  for  usually 
death  does  not  ensue  from  the  use  of 
such  means.  The  case  would  be 
quite    otherwise    if    death    should    be 


Blackburn    (Del.   O.   &   T.    1892),   75     caused    by    the    same    blow,    inflicted 


Atl.  536. 

"'Riggs  V.  State,  30  Miss.  635,  648; 
State  V.  Johnson,  i  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 
354,  363,  364,  35  Am.  Dec.  742;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Gibson,  211  Pa.  546,  60 
.\{\.  1086;  State  V.  Powell,  5  Penn. 
(Del.)  24,  61  Atl.  966;  State  v.  Har- 
mon, 4  Penn.  (Del.)  580,  60  Atl.  866. 


upon  a  new-born  infant,  or  feeble, 
old  person,  or  upon  one  whose  physi- 
cal frame  is  debilitated  from  disease 
or  hunger.  See  remarks  of  the  court 
in  Commonwealth  v.  Fox,  7  Gray 
(Mass.)  585,  588. 

-'  State  V.  Williamson,  106  Mo.  162, 
170,  17  S.  W.  172;  Cortez  v.  State,  47 


In  most  cases,  in  order  to  prove  mal-  Tex.  Cr.  10,  83  S.  W.  812;  Dudley  v. 

ice  as  the  term  is  understood  in  law.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  31,  48  S.  W.   179; 

it  is  necessary  to  prove  a  killing  with  62  L.  R.  .A..  193,  note ;  People  v.  Hill, 

a  weapon  or  instrument  calculated  to  198  X.  Y.  64,  91  N.  E.  272. 


;6i 


HOMICIDE. 


§  3^i 


It  may  be  shown  that  in  the  same  affray,-'  or  immediately  be- 
fore,■''  or  thereafter,  the  accused  killed,  or  attempted  to  kill,-'' 
another  person  than  the  one  for  whose  homicide  he  is  on  trial."*' 
Again,  if  the  evidence  shows  that  two  or  more  persons  were  killed 
at  or  about  the  same  time  and  place,  and  by  the  same  weapon, 
so  that  the  several  crimes  form  one  transaction,  evidence  of  the 
condition  of  any  one  of  the  bodies,  showing  the  cause  or  means 
of  death,  as  ascertained  by  an  autopsy,  or  otherwise,  is  admissible 
against  one  on  trial  for  the  homicide  of  any  one  of  the  deceased 
l)ersons.^^  So  it  may  be  shown  that  after  the  killing  of  the  de- 
ceased the  accused  immediately  shot  the  brother  of  the  deceased.^'- 
But  evidence  of  similar  crimes  committed  by  the  accused,  not  con- 
nected with  that  for  which  he  is  tried,  is  not  generally  admissible, 
as  such  evidence  casts  no  light  upon  his  guilt  and  may  prejudice 
the  jury  against  him.^^ 

Thus,  to  illustrate,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  after  the 
homicide,  took  money  from  the  pocket  of  the  deceased  as  this  is 
a  part  of  the  main  transaction.^*  Again,  where  the  accused  is  on 
trial  for  the  homicide  of  a  policeman  it  may  be  shown  that  the 


"'  People  V.  Pallister,  138  X.  Y.  601, 
605,  33  N.  E.  741 ;  Hickam  v.  People, 
137  III.  75,  27  X.  E.  88,  89;  State  v. 
Testerman,  68  Mo.  408,  415 ;  State  v. 
Vaughan,  200  Mo.  i,  98  S.  W.  2. 

^  State  V.  Fontenot,  48  La.  .A.nn. 
305,  19  So.  hi;  State  v.  La  Rose 
COre.  1909),  104  Pac.  299. 

^Killins  V.  State,  28  Fla.  313,  334, 
9  So.  711;  People  v.  Craig,  in  Cal. 
460,  44  Pac.  186;  State  v.  Gainor,  84 
Iowa  209,  50  X.  W.  947;  Benson  v. 
State,  119  Infl.  488,  491,  21  N.  E. 
1 109;  Wilkcrson  v.  State,  31  Te.x.  Cr. 
86,  90,  19  S.  W.  903. 

*"  Evidence  may  also  be  given  that 

tlie  accused  committed  a  burglary  for 

tlic  purpose  of  obtaining  a  weapon  to 

■  "mmit  the  homicide.    People  v.  Rog- 

rs.  71  Cal.  565,  568,  12  Pac.  679. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Sturtivant,  117 
.Mass.    122.    13-'.    19  Am.   40in:   Slate 

36 — L'.NDKRIIILL    CkI.M.    Ev. 


V.  Haj-es,  14  Utah  118,  46  Pac.  752; 
People  v.  Foley,  64  Mich.  148,  157, 
158,  31  X-  W.  94;  State  v.  William- 
son. 106  Mo.  162,  170,  17  S.  W.  172; 
State  V.  Perry,  136  Mo.  126,  37  S.  W. 
804;  Heath  v.  Commonwealth,  i  Rob. 
(Va.)  735,  743;  Crews  v.  State,  34 
Tex.  Cr.  533,  31  S.  W.  373;  Brown 
V.  Commonwealth,  76  Pa.  St.  319, 
337 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Robinson,  146 
Mass.  571,  578,  16  X.  E.  452;  Green 
v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  33  S.  W. 
100,  17  Ky.  L.  943 ;  Morris  v.  State, 
30  Tex.  App.  95.  16  S.  W.  757 :  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  2720.  Reason  for  admit- 
ting, 105  Am.  St.  979,  note ;  63  L.  R. 
A.  398,  note. 

°*  Hammond  v.  State,  147  /Ma.  79. 
41  So.  761. 

"See  8§  84,  85,  88.  ct  srq. 

"  Moran  v.  Territory,  14  Okla.  544, 
78  Pac.  III. 


§    322  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  562 

accused  or  a  member  of  his  parly  had.  immediately  before  the 
homicide,  attempted  to  rob  a  person  on  the  street.  All  the  facts 
and  circumstances  of  the  attempt  at  robbery,  as  for  example,  the 
conduct  and  outcries  of  the  intended  victim,  and  the  flight  of  the 
accused  and  his  companions,  may  be  received  to  show  the  cause 
of  the  homicide. ■'■'  Where  the  accused  is  charged  with  having 
killed  a  member  of  a  particular  class  of  persons  and  it  appears 
that  he  had  threatened  all  members  of  that  class,  it  may  be 
shown  that  a  short  time  before  the  homicide  he  had  attempted  to 
kill  other  members  of  the  same  class.^"  Proof  of  crimes  whicli 
differ  in  their  character  from  that  of  homicide  has  been  recei\-ed  ; 
thus,  it  has  been  permitted  llie  state  to  put  in  evidence  a  forged 
writing,  apparently  signed  by  the  deceased,  but  four.d  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  accused."'"'  So,  also,  where  the  motive  of  the  accused 
was  apparently  to  obtain  insurance  money  on  a  policy  on  the  life 
of  the  deceased,  a  note  for  premiums  and  other  instruments  pur- 
porting to  give  tlie  benefit  of  the  policy  to  tlie  accused,  were  re- 
ceived, though  their  reception  in  evidence  tended  to  prove  the  ac- 
cused was  guilty  of  the  crime  of  forgery.^^ 

§  322.  Conduct  of  the  accused  subsequent  to  the  crime. — The  per- 
petration of  a  homicide  is  well  calculated  to  create  a  perturba- 
tion in  the  mind  of  any  one  implicated  in  it,  that  will  manifest 
itself  by  the  agitation  subsequently  noticeable  in  his  conduct.  If 
the  charge  that  the  accused  did  the  killing  is  disputed,  or  if  it  is 
supported  by  circumstantial  evidence  only,  such  evidence  is  pe- 
culiarly appropriate.  It  is  proper  to  show  the  conduct  of  the  ac- 
cused on  the  night  of  the  killing  if  any  way  unusual.^"  It  is 
proper,  therefore,  to  show  that  the  accused  acted  unnaturally  and 
confusedly,*"  was  excited  and  nervous  in  manner,  spoke  hurriedly 
and  in  a  low  tone,  looked  pale  and  appeared  greatly  distressed 
shortly  after  the  crime,  or  when  accused  of  it.*^ 

^People  V.  Woods.  147  Cal.  265.  81  776;  Streety  v.  State   (Ala.   1909),  51 

Pac.  652.  So.  415. 

^°  State   V.    Davis,   6    Idaho    159,    53  '"  Xoftsinger  v.   State,  7  Tex.  App. 

Pac.  678.  30T,  323. 

^'  State  V.   Sassaman,  214  Mo.  695,  "  Lillie  v.  State,  72  Neb.  228,  100  X. 

114  S.  W.  590.  W.    316;    Bnrton    v.    State,    107   Ala. 

^  State  V.  Coleman.  17  S.  Dak.  594,  108,  18  So.  284;  Campbell  v.  State,  23 

98  N.  W.  175.  Ala.    44,   69,   70;    Williams   v.    State 

^  Terry  v.  State,  118  .Ma.  79,  23  So. 


;63  HOMICIDE.  §    3 


■0 


If  from  his  relation  to  the  deceased  it  would  be  natural  to  ex- 
pect that  the  accused  would  manifest  grief  or  distress  upon  hear- 
ing of  the  death  of  the  deceased  it  is  competent  to  show  that  he 
did  not  do  so.  Where  being  a  relati\-e  of  the  deceased  the  accused 
would  naturally  attend  his  funeral,  it  may  be  shown  that  he  did 
not  do  so.*- 

The  conduct  of  the  accused  after  he  hears  that  he  is  suspected 
is  also  relevant.  Any  act  proving,  or  tending  to  prove,  an  effort 
or  a  desire  on  his  part  to  obliterate  the  evidence  of  a  crime,  as 
bv  washing  his  hands  or  clothing  to  remove  blood  stains,  or  by 
liiding  or  destroying  weapons,  concealing  property  proved  to  have 
belonged  to  the  deceased,^''  or  his  flight  or  attempts  to  escape,''* 
or  his  nervousness  or  silence  when  first  charged  with  the  crime, 
is  always  relevant,  for  from  these  facts,  if  unexplained,  the  jury 
may  justly  apprehend  his  mental  condition  and  may  infer  that 
they  indicate  a  consciousness  of  guilt  on  his  part.*^ 

;^  323.  Facts  showing  possible  motive. — Alotive  upon  a  trial  for 
murder  need  not  be  shown.  The  absence  of  motive  does  not  alone 
require  that  the  accused  shall  be  acquitted  though  it  may  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  the  presence  of  intention.*"  Any  evidence 
that  tends  to  show  that  the  defendant  had  a  motive  for  killing 
the  deceased  is  always  relevant  as  rendering  more  i)robable  the 
inference  that  he  did  kill  him.*^  Thus  it  may  be  shown  that  the 
deceased  was  possessed  of  a  large  sum  of  money  or  of  personal 

(.^rk.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  816,  818;  Mc-  Benjamin   v.    State,    41    So.    739,    148 

Cann  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.   (Miss.)  Ala.  671,  not  reported  in   full;   Roll- 

471.  497;    State  V.   Brabham,    108    N.  ings    v.    State    (.Xla.,    1909),    49    So. 

Car.  793,  794,   13  S.  E.  217;  State  v.  329;  People  v.  Quimby,  134  Mich.  625, 

Nash,    7    Iowa    347,    382:     State    v.  96  N.  W.  io6r,  10  Det.  Leg.  N.  618. 

Baldwin,  36  Kan.  i,  r2  Pac.  318.    The  "^  Thomas  v.  State,  139  .\la.  80,  36 

conduct    and    appearance    of    defend-  So.  734. 

ant's   wife   after   the   crime   is   irrele-  *' Sec,    also,    chapter    Consciousness 

vant,  if  she  had  no  connection  with  it.  of  Guilt. 

People  V.  Wood,  126  N.  Y.  249,  271,  "State  v.   Ihrailkill,  73  S.  Car.  314, 

272,  27  N.  E.  362.  S^    S.    E.   482;    Morris   v.    State,    146 

"State  V.   Myers,   198   Mo.   225,  94  Ala.  66,  41  So.  274. 

S.  W.  242.  *' Bonner  v.   State,    107  Ala.  97.    18 

"Morris  v.  State,  30  Te.x.  App.  95,  So.  226;   State  v.  West,   r20  La.   747, 

117.   16  S.   W.   7S7;   liraiiam   v.   State,  45   So.   594;    Maloy  v.    State,   52   Fla. 

14.^  Ala.  28,  38  So.  919.  loi,  41  So.  791  ;  Stale  v.  Wilco.x,  132 

"Batten  v.  Slate,  8fj  Ind.  394,  401;  .\'.  Car.   1120,  44  S.  E.  625;  Stale  v. 


§  z^z 


CRIMIXAF-    EVIDENCE. 


5^4 


property.'*'''  that  the  defendant  knew  this'^  and  spoke  ahout  heing 
the  heir  of  the  deceased,^"  or  might  have  known  this^^  and  that 
personal  property  owned  by  the  deceased  was  found  in  the  defend- 
ant's possession,''-  leading  to  an  inference  that  his  covetoiisness 
or  necessity  was  tempted. ^^  Whether  the  possession  of  money  by 
the  deceased  is  so  remote  as  to  render  it  incompetent  depends  on 
circumstances.  If  he  was  an  active  business  man,  or  kept  a  bank 
account,  it  would  be  of  little  value  to  prove  that  the  accused  knew 
he  received  money  several  months  before  his  death  unless  other 
evidence  showed  its  retention  in  his  actual  possession.  But  in  the 
case  of  a  person  of  solitary  and  miserly  habits,  who  lived  poorly 
and  kept  money  in  his  house,  a  contrary  inference  may  be  drawn 
by  the  jury,^*  from  the  fact  that  he  had  received  money  some 


Dull,  67  Kan.  793,  74  Pac.  235 ;  Bur- 
ton V.  Commonwealth,  108  Va.  §92, 
62  S.  E.  376;  State  v.  Thrailkill,  72, 
S.  Car.  314,  53  S.  E.  482;  State  v. 
Gregory,  178  Mo.  48,  76  S.  W.  970; 
State  V.  Stratford,  149  N.  Car.  483,  62 
S.  E.  882;  State  v.  Bobbitt,  215  Mo.  10, 
IT4  S.  W.  511;  Streety  v.  State  (Ala., 
1909),  51  So.  415;  People  V.  Argentos 
(Cal.,  1909),  106  Pac.  65;  State  v. 
Whitbeck  (Iowa,  1909),  123  N.  W. 
982;  State  V.  Vanella  (Mont,  1909), 
106  Pac.  364;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§§  2719,  3026;  evidence  of  motive  or 
malice,  66  L.  R.  A.  384,  note ;  burden 
of  proving  malice,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3021. 

■•^Kennedy  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  245, 
254;  Shumway  v.  State,  82  Neb.  152, 
T17  X.  W.  407;  Johnson  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  423,  88  S.  W.  223;  People  v. 
Bonier,  189  N.  Y.  108,  81  N.  E.  949; 
Dean  v.  State,  85  Miss.  40,  :37  So.  501 ; 
Fouse  v.  State  (Neb.,  1909),  119  N. 
W.  478. 

'"People  V.  Wolf,  95  Mich.  625,  55 
N.  W.  357;  Byers  v.  State,  105  Ala. 
31,  16  So.  716;  State  v.  Donnelly,  130 
Mo.  642^,  32  S.  W.  1124;  Ettinger  v. 
Commonwealth,  98  Pa.  St.  338,  349. 
Under  such  circumstance  a  declara- 
tion by  the  deceased  that  he  had  no 


monc}^  is  incompetent.  Lancaster  v. 
State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  16,  35  S.  W.  165 ; 
Kennedy  v.  People,  39  X.  Y.  245,  253. 

°°  Johnson  v.  State,  128  Ga.  71,  57  S. 
E.  84,  130  Ga.  22,  60  S.  E.  158. 

"  Marable  v.  State,  89  Ga.  425,  426, 
427,  15  S.  E.  453.  See  Carwile  v. 
State,  148  Ala.  576,  39  So.  220. 

''"Morris  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  95, 
117,  16  S.  W.  757;  People  V.  Smith, 
106  Cal.  72,  39  Pac.  40;  Garza  v. 
State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  358,  46  S.  W.  242, 
72  Am.  St.  927.  It  may  be  shown 
that  accused  before  the  killing  had 
no  money,  that  immediately  there- 
after he  had  a  $10  bill  and  a  $5  bill : 
that  about  the  time  of  the  killing  the 
deceased  had  a  $10  bill  and  a  $5  bill, 
and  that  no  money  was  found  on 
the  remains  after  the  murder.  Com- 
monwealth V.  O'Xcil,  169  Mass.  .394, 
48  N.  E.  134. 

°'  Deceased  being  a  Mexican,  it  may 
be  shown  that  defendant  attended 
meetings  the  object  of  which  was  to 
get  rid  of  Mexicans  in  that  commu- 
nity. Chalk  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  116, 
2,2  S.  W.  534- 

"  Kennedy  v.  People,  39  X.  Y.  245, 
255;  Commonwealth  v.  Williams,  171 
Mass.  461,  50  X.  E.  1035. 


565  HOMICIDE.  §    T)22, 

time  prior  to  the  homicide  and  that  the  accused  l-cnew  it.  It 
may  also  be  shown  that  the  accused  was  the  heir  at  law  of  the  de- 
ceased or  a  devisee  under  his  will,  that  the  deceased  was  a  man  of 
some  wealth  and  that  the  accused  was  aware  of  these  circum- 
stances. So,  too,  as  proving  motive,  it  is  competent  to  show  that 
the  accused  was  a  beneficiary  named  in  an  insurance  policy  on  the 
life  of  the  accused."'^  In  connection  with  such  evidence  it  may  be 
rllowed  for  the  prosecution  to  prove  the  value  of  the  estate  be- 
longing to  the  ancestor  or  the  amount  of  the  insurance  to  em- 
phasize the  motive  which  may  have  prompted  the  accused.^'' 

The  statement  of  the  accused  that  he  attempted  to  borrow 
money  of  the  deceased  and  that  instead  of  loaning  it  to  him  he 
made  a  present  of  it,  is  admissible  where  it  seems  that  the  motive 
of  the  homicide  was  to  obtain  money  belonging  to  the  deceased. ^'^ 
And  usually  e\'idence  which  tends  to  show  that  the  homicide  was 
committed  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  possession  of  papers 
which  were  in  the  possession  of  the  accused  is  admissible.^* 

Many  motives  equally  strong  may  be  shown.  The  incitement  of 
jealousy."'"  or  envy,  or  the  desire  to  be  revenged  for  real  or  fancied 
injuries,  is  often  a  potent  motive  for  homicide.  The  means  and 
mode  of  showing  that  the  defendant  was  prompted  by  revenge 
are  elsewhere  treated,""  and  here  it  need  only  be  said  that  it  is 

"Commonwealth  v.  Clcmmer,  190  Andrews,  73  S.  Car.  257,  53  S.  E.  423; 
Pa.  St.  202,  42  .'\tl..  675 :  Jahnke  v.  State  v.  Beckner,  194  Mo.  281,  91  S. 
State,  68  Xcb.  154.  94  X.  W.  158.  104  \V.  892,  3  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  53Sn.  It 
X.  W.  154,  holding  that  the  accused  is  relevant  to  show  that  the  def end- 
may  prove  the  policy  was  of  small  ant  and  the  deceased  were  both  suit- 
value,  ers  for  the  hand  of  the  same  woman, 

""People  V.  Weber,  149  Cal.  325,  86  that    the    former    had    been    rejected 

Pac.  671.      See  Van  Wyk  v.    People  and  the  latter  accepted,  and  that  re- 

45     Colo,     r,    99     Pac.     1009,    as    to  ports  of  the  engagement  and  contem- 

falsehoods    by    the    wife    of    the    ac-  plated  marriage  had  come  to  defend- 

cused  where  the  deceased  applied  for  ant.      Hunter    v.    State,    43    Ga.    483, 

the  policy  of  insurance.  489,    522,    523;    McCue    v.    Common- 

"  Bess   v.  Commonwealth,    116  Ky.  wealth,  78  Pa.   St.    185,  189,  21   Am. 

'.-'7,  77  S.  W.  349,  25  Ky.  L.  1091.  7n.      See,    also.    Brown    v.    Common- 

'•  State  v.   Mortensen,  26  Utah  312,  wealth    TKy.).    17   S.   W.  2Jo,   13   Ky. 

73  Pac.  562.  633.  L.  372;  Commonwealth  v.  McManns, 

"  McCorf|uodaIe  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  143    Pa.    St.   64,   83,   21    .Atl.    1018,   22 

1906),  98  S.  W.  879:  Mathley  v.  Com-  Atl.   761.    14   L.   R.   A.  89:    People  v. 

monwcalth.  120  Ky.  389.  86  S.  VV.  988,  Brosfe   (Mich..   1910),   125  N.  W.  87. 
27    Ky.    I,.    785;    Moore   v.    State,   52        ^  See  §§  .327-333. 
Tc.\.  Cr.  336,  107  S.  W.  540;  State  v. 


CRI.MIXAL    EVIDEXCE. 


566 


relevant  to  show  that  the  chmghter  of  the  deceased  had.  by  his 
chrection,  caused  the  arrest  of  the  accused  for  bastardy/'^  or  that 
the  deceased  had  procured  the  incHctment  of  the  accused,"-  or  was 
a  witness  against  him  or  a  friend,  or  relation  of  his  in  some  ju- 
dicial proceeding  then  pending  or  soon  to  be  begun.""  And  testi- 
mony of  litigation  pending  between  the  accused  and  the  deceased 
is  not  to  be  excluded  merely  because  it  is  not  proved  that  ill  feel- 
ing actually  existed  in  connection  with  it."''*''  The  papers  in  a  prior 
litigation,  ci\'il  or  criminal,  instigated  by  the  deceased  against  the 
accused  or  in  which  he  was  a  witness,  such  as  for  example,  the  in- 
dictment, bail  bond  and  sentence,  are  admissible  against  the  ac- 
cused to  show  motive.*^*  The  fact  of  an  improper  intimacy,"'^  or 
illicit  or  incestuous  connection,"*^  may  always  be  proved  to  show  a 
motive,  when  the  defendant  is  charged  with  the  homicide  of  a 
person  whose  existence  was  an  obstacle  to  the  complete  gratifica- 


^  Franklin  v.  Commonwealth.  92 
Ky.  612,  18  S.  W.  532,  533.  534.  13 
K}'.  L.  814;  State  v.  Martin,  47  Ore. 
282,  83  Pac.  849.  Letters  written  by 
the  accused  showing  the  relations  be- 
tween him  and  deceased  who  had  in- 
stituted bastardy  proceedings  against 
accused  prior  to  her  marriage  are 
competent.  Nordan  v.  State,  143  .A.la. 
13,  39  So.  406. 

"■  Gillum  V.  State,  62  Miss.  547,  552 ; 
Martin  v.  Commonwealth,  93  Ky.  189, 
193,  19  S.  W.  580,  14  Ky.  L.  95;  Ball 
V.  Commonwealth,  125  Ky.  601,  loi 
S.  W.  956,  31  Ky.  L.  188;  Zipperian 
V.  People,  331  Colo.  134,  79  Pac.  1018; 
State  V.  Goodson,  116  La.  388,  40  So. 
771. 

•"  Murphy  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  590, 
594 ;  Turner  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  103, 
25  S.  W.  635;  Marler  v.  State,  68 
-Ala.  580,  583;  Easterwood  v.  State, 
34  Tex.  Cr.  400,  31  S.  W.  294;  John- 
son V.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  150,  153. 
15  S.  W.  647;  State  V.  Fontenot,  48 
La.  Ann.  305,  19  So.  iii;  Hayes  v. 
State,  126  Ga.  95,  54  S.  E.  809 ;  Terry 
V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  264.  76  S.  W. 
928;    State  V.   Walker,    145   N.    Car. 


567,  59  S.  E.  878;  Porch  V.  State,  50 
Tex.  Cr.  335,  99  S.  W.  102;  Hardy  v. 
Commonwealth  (Va.,  1910),  67  S.  E. 
522. 

•"aMaloy  V.  State,  52  Fla.  toi.  41 
So.  791. 

**  Hayes  v.  State,  126  Ga.  95,  54  S. 
E.  809. 

"  Webb  V.  State,  73  Miss.  456,  19 
So.  238;  Hall  V.  State,  40  Ala.  698: 
People  V.  Montgomery,  176  N.  Y. 
2T9,  68  X.  E.  258;  State  v.  Strat- 
ford, 149  N.  Car.  483,  62  S.  E.  882; 
Lawson  v.  State,  171  Ind.  431,  84  V. 
E.  974;  Mencfee  v.  State,  50  Tex. 
Cr.  249,  97  S.  W.  486;  Sasser  v. 
State,  129  Ga.  541,  59  S.  E.  255;  State 
V.  Marsh,  70  Vt.  288,  40  Atl.  836: 
Sullivan  v.  State,  100  Wis.  283,  75  N. 
W.  956;  State  V.  Myers,  198  Mo.  225, 
94  S.  W.  242 ;  Commonwealth  v.  How- 
ard (Mass.,  1910),  91  N.  E.  397. 

•"Stout  V.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  71,  128,  129;  Davis  V.  State,  .S4 
Tex.  Cr.  236,  114  S.  W.  366:  Reyes 
V.  State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  422,  117  S.  W.  152 ; 
People  V.  Botkin,  9  Cal.  App.  244,  98 
Pac.  861. 


567 


HOMICIDE. 


0-J 


lion  of  his  wrongful  desires.'''  Il  may  be  shown  to  illustrate  the 
motive  of  the  accused  that  an  improper  intimacy  existed  between 
the  accused  and  the  wife  of  the  deceased,'"'^  or  between  the  de- 
ceased and  the  wife  of  the  accused.  Evider-ce  of  improper  rela- 
tions between  the  accused  and  the  sister  of  the  deceased  has  been 
received.*^"  But  evidence  of  an  adulterous  intercourse  between  the 
accused  and  the  divorced  wife  of  the  deceased  has  been  rejected.'*^ 
And,  again,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  defendant  was  a  suitor  of 
the  sister  of  the  deceased,  that  the  only  opposition  to  his  suit  was 
from  the  deceased,  and  that  this  fact,  with  the  intention  of  the 
V  onian  to  defer  to  her  brother's  wishes,  was  known  to  the  ac- 
cused.'* The  pendency  of  a  suit  brought  by  the  deceased  against 
the  accused  for  a  divorce,''  or  previous  ill-treatment  and  lack  of 
affection''^  towards  the  wife.'*  or  unlawful  relations  with  another 
woman, '^^  may  be  shown  where  the  homicide  of  a  wife  is  con- 
cerned, as  supplying  a  moti\e.  On  the  other  hand  the  recent  in- 
fidelitv  of  a  wife  mav  be  shown  on  the  trial  of  her  husband  for 


"'  State  V.  Duestrow,  137  Mo.  44,  38 
S.  W.  554,  39  S.  W.  266;  Common- 
wealth V.  Ferrigan,  44  Pa.  St.  386, 
387;  Marler  v.  State,  67  Ala.  55,  56, 
42  Am.  95 ;  Pierson  v.  People,  79  .\'. 
Y.  424,  435,  436,  35  Am.  524;  State 
V.  Green,  35  Conn.  203,  206 ;  Traverse 
V.  State,  61  Wis.  144,  20  X.  W.  724; 
Stout  V.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.) 
71,  128;  Fraser  v.  State,  55  Ga.  325, 
327;  People  V.  Parmclee,  112  Mich. 
291,  70  N.  W.  577;  State  v.  Chase,  68 
Vt.  405,  35  Atl.  336;  People  v.  Bero- 
bute,  196  N.  Y.  293,  89  X.  E.  837. 

""State  V.  Page,  212  Mo.  224,  no 
S.  W.  1057;  Young  V.  State,  54  Tc.\. 
Cr.  417,  113  S.  W.  276. 

"Morrison  v.  Commonwealth 
<  Ky.),  74  S.  W.  277,  24  Ky.  L.  2493; 
Copcland  v.  State  (Fla.  1909),  50  So. 
621. 

'"People  V.  Wright,  144  Cal.  lOi, 
77  Pac.  877- 

"State  V.  L«-nfz,  45  .Minn.  177,  iHo, 
47  N'.  VV.  720. 

"  Binns  v.  State,  57  In<l.  46,  32,  26 
\in.  4K. 


"The  witness  cannot  testify  to  the 
liad  conduct  of  accused  where  the 
basis  of  his  evidence  is  only  hearsay. 
State  V.  McNamara,  212  Mo.  150,  no 
S.  W.  1067;  Commonwealth  v.  How- 
ard (Mass.  1910),  91  X.  E.  397. 

"*  Siberry  v.  State,  133  Ind.  677,  33 
X.  E.  681,  683;  Burley  v.  State,  130 
Ga.  343,  60  S.  E.  1006;  Nordan  v. 
State,  143  -Ala.  13,  39  So.  406;  dem- 
ons V.  State,  93  Miss.  244,  45  So. 
834;  Green  v.  State,  125  Ga.  742,  54 
S.  E.  724  (various  acts  of  ill  treat- 
ment need  not  be  proved  by  same 
witness")  :  Roberts  v.  State,  123  Ga. 
146,  51  S.  E.  374;  Owen  v.  State,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  65,  105  S.  W.  513;  State  v. 
BIydcn1)urg,  135  Iowa  264,  112  X.  W. 
634;  Fowler  v.  State,  155  .Ala.  21,  45 
.So.  913.  See  State  v.  Cummings,  189 
Mo.  626,  88  S.  W.  706. 

"Johnson  v.  State,  94  .Ala.  35,  40, 
10  So.  6C)7;  Wilkerson  v.  State,  31 
Tex.  Cr.  86,  90,  19  S.  W.  903;  Slate 
V.  Legg.  59  W.  Va.  315.  53  S.  F..  545, 
3  L.  R.  A.  (S.  S.)  115211;  .Sasscr  v. 
State,  129  Ga.  S4'.  59  S-  I*--  ^5.S. 


ji;  3^4 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


568 


her  murder,  if  it  ajipcars  that  he  knew  of  it,  but  not  otherwise. 
And  evidence  that  the  wife  of  the  accused  shortly  prior  to  the 
homicide  confessed  to  her  husl^and  that  she  had  been  guiUy  of 
adultery  with  decedent  is  relevant  to  show  the  motix'e  of  the  ac- 
cused wliich  prompted  him  to  commit  the  alleged  criminal  act.'" 

§  324.  Competency  of  evidence  showing  the  habits,  character  and 
disposition  of  the  deceased. —  ICvidence  of  the  quiet,  peaceable  dis- 
position, or  sober  and  industrious  habits  of  the  deceased,  or  of 
his  general  reputation  as  a  good  man  or  worthy  citizen  cannot 
be  proved  in  advance.  These  are  relevant  to  rebut  the  presumption 
which  may  result  from  an  attack  on  his  character  by  the  accused." 
The  rule  is  also  well  settled  that  the  reputation  of  the  deceased 
for  turbulence,  recklessness  or  violence  is  inadmissible,  unless  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  at  least  raise  a  doubt  whether  the  pris- 
oner acted  in  self-defense.  A  murderer  is  not  excusable  merely 
because  the  person  murdered  was  a  bad  man.'^^ 

'"  Shipp  V.  Commonwealth,  124  Ky.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  54,  79  S.  W.  565 ; 

643,  99  S.  W.  945,  30  Ky.  L.  904,  ID  State  v.  Lejeune,  116  La.  193,  40  So. 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  33Sn.  632;  Pettis  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  66, 

"  Roten  V.   State,  31   Fla.  514,  523,  81  S.  W.  312;  State  v.  Peterson,  149 

12  So.    910;    Lemons    v.    State,    97  N.  Car.  533,  63  S.  E.  87. 

Tenn.    560,    37    S.    W.    552 ;    Ben    v.  "  Wise  v.  State,  2  Kan.  419,  85  Am. 

State,  S7  Ala.  103;  Chase  v.  State,  46  Dec.  595;   People  v.   Lamb,  2  Keyes 

Miss.   683,   707;    Pound   v.    State,  43  (N.    Y.)    360,    365,    372;    People    v. 

Ga.  88,  128;  Bowman  v.  State  (Tex.,  Murray,  10  Cal.  309,  310;   People  v. 

1893),  21   S.  W.  48;   State  V.  Potter,  Edwards,  41  Cal.  640:  State  v.  Thaw- 

13  Kan.  414,  424;  People  v.  Powell,  ley,  4  flarr.  (Del.)  562;  State  v.  Rid- 
87  Cal.  348,  363,  25  Pac.  481,  II  L.  die,  20  Kan.  711,  715;  State  v.  Jack- 
R.  A.  75 ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich,  son,  12  La.  Ann.  679 ;  Pritchett  v. 
9,  97  Am.  Dec.  i62n;  Parker  v.  Com-  State,  22  Ala.  39,  58  Am.  Dec.  250; 
monwealth,  96  Ky.  212,  28  S.  W.  500,  Commonwealth  v.  Hilliard,  2  Gray 
16  Ky.  L.  449;  State  v.  Nash,  45  La.  (i\Iass.)  294;  Commonwealth  v.  Fer- 


Ann.  974,  13  So.  265;  Weaver  v. 
State,  83  Ark.  119,  102  S.  W.  713; 
Tribble  v.  State,  145  Ala.  23,  40  So. 
938;   Bloomer  v.   State,  75  Ark.  297, 


rigan,  44  Pa.  St.  386,  388;  State  v. 
Field,  14  Me.  244,  248,  249,  31  Am. 
Dec.  52;  Wesley  v.  State,  37  Miss. 
327,  349,  75   Am.   Dec.  62;    State  v. 


87    S.    W.   438;    Woods   V.    State,   90     Jackson,  17  Mo.  544,  548,  59  Am.  Dec. 


Miss.  245,  43  So.  433;  Council  v. 
State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  142,  75  S.  W.  512; 
Keith  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  63,  94  S. 
W.  1044;  Jones  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr. 
206.  106  S.  W.  126;  Kirby  v.  State, 
151    Ala.    66,   44    So.   38;    Moore    v. 


281;  Dock's  Case,  21  Gratt.  (Va.) 
909,  911,  State  V.  Tilly,  3  Ired.  (N. 
Car.)  424,  435:  State  v.  Barfield,  8 
Ired.  (X.  Car.)  344,  349:  Franklin  v. 
State,  29  Ala.  14,  17,  19:  Miers  v. 
State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  161,  29  S.  W.  1074, 


569                                                            HOMICIDE.  "                               §    324 

But  when  the  evidence  tends  to  show,  in  the  slightest  degree, 
lliat  the  kilhng  was  in  self-defense,  or  shows  a  hostile  demonstra- 
tion hy  the  deceased  against  the  accused  at  the  time  of  the  killing, 
or  even  leaxes  it  in  doubt  who  was  the  aggressor,  it  is  always 
relevant  to  show  that  the  deceased  was  a  quarrelsome,  desperate 

and  revengeful  man.'''  provided  it  also  appears  that  his  reputation 

5.^  Am.  St.  705;  Jenkins  v.  State,  80  State  v.  Zellers,  2  Halst.  (X.  Y.) 
Md.  "/Z,  30  Atl.  566;  State  v.  Stew-  220,  230;  State  v.  Dumphe3%  4  r^Iinn. 
art,  47  La.  Ann.  410,  16  So.  945;  Ro-  438;  Sindram  v.  People,  88  N.  Y. 
ten  V.  State,  31  Fla.  514,  523,  12  So.  ig6;  State  v.  Lull,  48  Vt.  581; 
910:  Gardner  v.  State,  90  Ga.  310,  17  Pfomer  v.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
S.  E.  86,  35  Am.  St.  202;  Evers  v.  Y.)  558,  570-581,  citing  cases;  Tif- 
State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  318,  20  S.  W.  744,  fany  v.  Commonwealth.  121  Pa.  St. 
yj  Am.  St.  811,  18  L.  R.  A.  421;  165,  15  Atl.  462.  6  Am.  St.  775;  Rapp 
Commonwealth  v.  Stracsser,  153  Pa.  v.  Commonwealth,  14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
St.  451,  456,  26  Atl.  17;  Davidson  v.  614;  State  v.  Home,  9  Kan.  119; 
State,  135  Ind.  254,  261,  34  X.  E.  972.  Smith  v.  United  States,  161  U.  S.  85, 
See  also,  Ffomer  v.  People,  4  Park.  40  L.  ed.  626,  16  Sup.  Ct.  483 ;  State 
Cr.  ex.  Y.)  558,  570-5/1,  where  all  v.  Dill,  48  S.  Car.  249,  26  S.  E.  567; 
the  important  cases  are  discussed  and  State  v.  Thompson,  49  Ore.  46,  88 
harmonized.  Patterson  v.  State  Pac.  583,  124  Am.  St.  ioi5n;  Com- 
156  -Ala.  62,  47  So.  52;  Earles  v.  monweallh  v.  Tircinski.  189  Mass. 
State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  140,  to6  S.  W.  138;  257,  75  X.  E.  261,  2  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
State  V.  Churchill,  52  Wash.  210,  100  i02n ;  Moseley  v.  State,  89  Miss.  802, 
Pac.  309.  Evidence  of  bad  character  41  So.  384;  People  v.  Rodawald,  177 
of  deceased,  2  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  102,  X.  Y.  408,  70  X.  E.  i;  State  v. 
note;  3  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.")  351,  note.  Feeley,  194  Vlo.  300,  92  S.  W.  663, 
Specific  instances  to  prove  character,  112  Am.  St.  511,  3  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
14  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  689,  note.  35in;  Humber  v.  Commonwealth 
'"Perry  v.  State,  94  .-Ma.  25,  30.  10  (Ky.),  102  S.  W.  1179,  31  Ky.  L.  606; 
So.  650;  People  v.  Anderson,  39  Cal.  Kiplcy  v.  People,  215  111.  358,  74  X. 
703,  704;  Roten  v.  State,  31  Fla.  514,  E.  379;  Teague  v.  State,  120  Ala.  309, 
l^2S,  \2  So.  910;  People  V.  Harris,  95  25  So.  309;  State  v.  Zorn,  202  Mo.  12, 
Mich.  87,  91,  54  X.  W.  648;  State  v.  100  S.  W.  591;  Morrison  v.  Common- 
Matthews,  78  X.  Car.  523,  530;  Brow-  wealth  (Ky.),  74  S.  W.  277,  24  Ky. 
ncll  v.  People,  38  Mich,  "js^;  State  L.  2493;  State  v.  Banner,  149  X.  Car. 
v.  Kcnyon,  18  R.  I.  217.  26  Atl.  199;  519,  (i^  S.  E.  84;  State  v.  Dunlap, 
I-'ranklin  v.  State,  29  .Xla.  14,  17,  19;  149  X.  Car.  550,  63  S.  E.  164;  State 
I-'iclfls  v.  State,  47  Ala.  603,  11  .Am.  v.  Fisher,  149  X.  Car.  557,  63  S.  E. 
771;  State  V.  Collins,  32  Iowa  36;  State  153;  State  v.  Sliafcr,  22  Mnnt.  17.  55 
V.  Pcffers,  80  Iowa  580,  583,  46  X.  Pac.  526;  Lawson  v.  State,  155  .Ma. 
\V.  662;  State  V.  Downs,  91  Mo.  19,  44,  46  So.  259.  I-'vidoiice  of  habits 
-•4.  3  .S.  W.  2ig;  State  v.  Claude,  35  and  disposition,  i-lllintt  Evidence, 
La.  .-\nn.  71,  74.  75;  May  v.  People,  §  3040;  evidence  of  |)liysicnl  coiidi- 
8   Colo.    210,    227,  228,6,     Pac.  816;  lion,  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3025. 


^^  325 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


0/* 


as  such  was  known  to  the  defenchmt/"  The  evidence  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  deceased  must  not  be  too  remote  or  it  may  be  excluded 
as  irrelevant.  It  is  his  character  for  peace  and  quietude  at  the 
date  of  the  homicide  which  is  relevant."^ 

^  325.  Nature  of  the  proof  required  to  show  character  of  deceased. 
— The  majorit}-  of  the  cases  reject  evidence  to  prove  the  actual 
moral  character  or  disposition  of  the  deceased,  /.  c,  his  inclina- 
tion to  do  right,  but  admit  his  reputation  in  evidence,  that  is,  the 
general  knowledge  or  opinion  of  his  character  and  disposition 
which  i)re\"ails  among  his  neighbors  and  acciuaintances.*"'    The 


■■*  People  V.  Powell,  ^~  Cal.  348,  36.3, 

25  Fac.  481,  II  L.  R.  A.  75;  People 
V.  Lamb,  2  Keyes  (N.  Y.)  360,  364; 
State  V.   Kcnnade,    121    Mo.  405,  415, 

26  S.  W.  347 ;  State  v.  Nash,  45  La. 
Ann.  974,  13  So.  265;  State  v.  Rol- 
lins, 113  N.  Car.  722,  18  S.  E.  394; 
Commonwealth  v.  Stracsser,  153  Pa. 
St.  451,  26  Atl.  17;  McGowan  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  117  S.  W.  387; 
Arnwine  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  477,  99 
S.  W.  97;  State  V.  Roderick,  yy  Ohio 
St.  301,  82  X.  E.  1082;  State  v.  Ronk, 
91  Minn.  419,  98  N.  W.  334.  "The 
general  principle,  then,  is  this :  not 
that  it  is  lawful  coolly  to  attack 
and  kill  a  person  of  ferocious  and 
blood-thirsty  character,  *  *  *  but 
that,  whenever  it  is  shown  that  a 
person  honestly  and  non-negligently 
believed  himself  attacked,  it  is  ad- 
missible for  him  to  put  in  evi- 
dence whatever  could  show  the  bona 
fides  of  his  belief.  He  may  prove 
that  the  person  assailing  him  had 
with  him  burglar's  instruments,  or 
was  armed  with  deadly  weapons,  or 
had  been  lurking  in  the  neighbor- 
hood on  other  plans  of  violence" 
*  *  *  and  may  reason,  "this  man 
now  attacking  me  is  a  notorious  ruf- 
fian, he  has  no  peaceable  business 
with  me;  his  character  and  relations 


forl^d  any  other  conclusion  than  tliat 
his  present  attack  is  felonious." 
Wharton  Cr.  Ev.,  §  69. 

"As  a  general  principle  such  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible.  When  admis- 
sible, it  must  be  in  a  case  where  the 
defendant  had  reason  to  be  in  fear 
of  his  life,  or  had  reasonable  ground 
to  apprehend  great  bodily  harm. 
*  *  *  .A.gain,  it  is  fundamental  to 
the  admission  of  this  class  of  testi- 
mony in  a  proper  case,  that  knowl- 
edge of  the  character  of  the  de- 
ceased must  be  brought  home  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  defendant  himself. 
It  might  be  presumed  that  a  man 
would  know  the  character  of  his 
wife  in  this  respect.  Yet,  I  think 
this  would  not  dispense  with  the  rule, 
that  it  should  affirmatively  appear 
that  the  defendant  had  such  knowl- 
edge." People  v.  Lamb,  2  Keyes  (X. 
Y.)  360,  364. 

"State  v.  Pettit,  119  Mo.  410,  41S, 
24  S.  W.  1014;  Brooks  v.  State,  85 
Ark.  376,  108  S.  W.  205. 

^  People  v.  .'\nderson,  39  Cal.  703, 
705 ;  State  v.  Turpin,  yy  N.  Car.  473, 
478,  24  Am.  455;  Moriarity  v.  State, 
62  Miss.  654,  661 ;  State  v.  Riddle,  20 
Kan.  711,  714;  Thomas  v.  People,  6y 
X\  Y.  2x8,  222;  Abbott  v.  People,  86 
X.  Y.  460,  470;  State  v.  Ford,  37  La. 


^71 


HOMICIDE. 


§    3^5 


reputation  of  the  deceased  for  vindictivenesr.  or  quarrelsomeness 
cannot  be  shown  by  proxing  specific  acts  of  violence^to  third  per- 
sons."^ or  acts  of  violence  unless  so  connected  with  the  fatal  ren- 
contre as  to  produce  a  reasonable  apprehension  of  grievous  bodily 
harm/*  as,  for  example,  that  he  was  an  escaped  convict,  or  that 
];e  had  threatened  to  shoot  or  kill  a  third  person. ^^  The  prosecu- 
tion may  show  that  deceased  was  unarmed  wdien  killed,  but  not 
that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  going  unarmed  and  had  refused  to 
arm  himself.*"  Nor  can  the  prosecution  put  in  evidence  that  the 
deceased  was  not  in  the  habit  of  tising  vulgar  and  profane  Ian- 


Ann.  443,  460;  State  v.  Kenyon,  18 
R.  I.  217,  26  Atl.  199;  State  v.  Smith, 
12  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  430,  441;  Payne 
V.  Commonweahh,  i  Met.  (Ky.)  370, 
397;  State  V.  Keefe,  54  Kan.  197,  203, 
204,  38  Pac.  302;  Dukes  v.  State,  11 
Ind.  557,  565,  71  Am.  Dec.  370; 
Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194,  222- 
224,  63  Am.  Dec.  269;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hoskins  (Ky.),  35  S.  W.  284.  18 
Ky.  L.  59;  Stalcup  v.  State,  146  Ind. 
270,  45  N.  E.  334;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  30.38;  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  708, 
note.  Contra,  State  v.  Brown,  63 
Mo.  439,  443 ;  Marts  v.  State,  26  Ohio 
St.  162,  168,  admitting  evidence  of 
disposition.  Weaver  v.  State,  83 
Ark.  119,  102  S.  W.  713;  Brownlee  v. 
State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  408,  87  S.  W. 
1 1 53 ;  Kennedy  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  102  S.  W.  863,  31  Ky.  L.  546. 
"People  V.  Powell,  87  Cal.  348,  361, 
25  Pac.  481,  II  L.  R.  A.  75;  .State  v. 
Dean,  72  S.  Car.  74,  51  S.  E.  524; 
-McCoy  V.  State,  91  Miss.  257,  44  So. 
H14;  People  V.  Gaimari,  176  X.  Y.  84, 
68  X.  E.  112;  People  v.  Rodawald, 
r77  N.  Y.  408,  70  X.  E.  i;  Warrick 
V.  State,  125  Ga.  133,  53  S.  E.  1027; 
Smith  V.  State,  142  Ala.  14,  39  So. 
^J()■,  State  V.  Roderick,  77  Ohio  St. 
wi.  82  N.  E.  1082,  14  L.  R.  A.  (X. 
.S.)  704n;  Ilardj^ravcs  v.  State 
88  Ark.  2<jr,  114  S.  W.  216;  Sturgeon 


v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  102  S.  W. 
812,  31  Ky.  L.  536. 

^*Ferrel  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
23  S.  W.  344,  15  Ky.  L.  321;  Eggler 
V.  People,  56  N.  Y.  642,  643;  People 
V.  Druse,  103  N.  Y.  655,  656,  8  N.  E. 
733;  Campbell  v.  State,  38  Ark.  498; 
Garrett  v.  State,  97  Ala.  18,  25,  14 
So.  327;  Dupree  v.  State,  33  Ala. 
380,  387,  73  Am.  Dec.  422;  Xichols 
V.  People,  23  Hun  (X.  Y.)  165,  167; 
Croom  V.  State,  90  Ga.  430,  434,  17 
S.  E.  1003;  State  v.  Jones,  134  Mo. 
254,  35  S.  W.  607;  State  v.  Peffers, 
80  Iowa  580,  583,  46  X.  W.  662 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Smith,  9  Cal.  App.  644,  99  Pac. 
I  hi;  Dean  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
78  S.  W.  1 1 12,  25  Ky.  L.  1876;  Cole 
V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  89,  loi  S.  W. 
218;  St.  Clair  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr. 
479,  92  S.  W.  1095;  State  v.  Foster, 
136  Iowa  527,  114  X.  W.  36;  Cole  v. 
State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  439,  88  S.  W.  341 : 
United  States  v.  Dcnsmore,  12  X. 
Mex.  99,  75  Pac.  31 ;  Darter  v.  State, 
39  Tex.  Cr.  40,  44  S.  W.  850;  State 
v.  Andrews,  73  S.  Car.  257,  53  S.  E. 
423 ;  Sneed  v.  Territory,  16  Okla. 
641,  86  Pac.  70. 

"Jenkins  v.  State,  80  Md.  72,  30 
Atl.  566;  Ryan  v.  State  (Tex.,  1896). 
35  S.  W.  288. 

"  People  V.  Powell,  87  Cal.  348,  363. 
25  Pac.  481,  II   L.  R.  A.  75;  Jackson 


§    3-6  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  57 J 

guage  or  that  lie  was  a  good  church  member/'''''  In  a  case  where 
the  accused , alleges  that  the  killing  was  in  self-defense  he  may 
prove  that  the  deceased  was  in  the  habit  of  carrying  a  pistol  or 
other  concealed  weapon.  But  as  a  preliminary  to  such  evidence  the 
accused  must  show  some  justification  and  must  also  show  that  he 
had  knowledge  of  the  habit  of  the  deceased  in  carrying  weapons/^ 
In  some  states  the  threats  of  the  deceased  or  his  dangerous,  vio- 
lent or  vindictive  character  are  only  admissible  when  it  is  proved 
that,  at  the  time  of  the  homicide,  he  assaulted  the  accused,  in- 
dulged in  hostile  demonstrations  against  him  or  did  some  act 
indicating  a  purpose  to  do  him  serious  bodily  harm.""'  Mere  evi- 
dence of  an  overt  act,  not  amounting  to  proof,  is  not  enough. 
Whether  an  overt  act  has  been  proved  is  a  preliminary  question 
bearing  on  the  competency  of  evidence,  and  is  for  the  judge. 
His  determination  is  conclusive.'*"  But  it  has  been  held  that  the 
court  cannot  exclude  evidence  of  bad  character  and  threats  un- 
less it  is  satisfied,  not  only  that  no  overt  act  has  been  proved,  but 
that  there  is  no  evidence  from  which  an  overt  act  can  be  inferred. 
If  the  evidence  of  an  overt  act  is  confiicting,  it  should  go  to  the 
jury  with  evidence  of  the  bad  reputation  and  threats.''*'  The  overt 
act  must  have  been  against  the  accused  and  not  a  third  person.''* 

§  326.    Evidence  of  threats  by  the  deceased. — Evidence  of  threats 
by  the  deceased,  whether  made  to  the  accused  or  to  others,  and 

V.  State,  41  So.  178,  147  Ala.  699,  not  333;   Hill  v.    State    (^liss.,   1895),    16 

reported  in  full ;  Moore  v.  State,  86  So.  901 ;  Travers  v.  United  States,  6 

Miss.  160,  38  So.  504.  App.  D.  C.  450;   Smith  v.   State,  142 

**a  Bowles    V.    Commonwealth,    103  Ala.   14,  39   So.  329 :  Roch  v.   State, 

Va.  816,  48  S.  E.  527.  52  Te.x.  Cr.  48,  105  S.  \V.  202;  Green 

"'Gibbs   V.    State,    156   Ala.    70,   47  v.  State,  143  Ala.  2,  39  So.  362. 

So.  65 ;   State  v.  Exum,   138  X.  Car.  ^  State  v.   Ford,  37   La,   Ann.   443, 

599,  50  S.  E.  283;  Sims  v.  State,  139  460. 

Ala.  74,  36  So.  138,  loi  Am.  St.  17;  "' State  v.   Abbott,   8   \V.   Va.   741. 

Jackson  v.  State,  41  So.  178,  147  Ala.  759;    Hawthorne    v.    State,   61    Miss. 

699,  not   reported  in  full;   Common-  749,    753;    Smith    v.    State,    75    Miss, 

wealth   V.    Booker    (Ky.),   76   S.    W.  542,  23   So.   260;    McHugh   v.   Terri- 

S3S,  25  Ky.  L.  1025;  Warrick  v.  State,  tory,  17  Okla.  i,  86  Pac.  433. 

125  Ga.  133,  53  S.  E.   1027;  Rodgers  "' ^loriarity  v.   State,  62  Miss.  654, 

V.  State,  144  Ala.  32,  40  So.  572.  661 ;    White    v.    Commonwealth,    125 

*^  State  V.  King,  47  La.  Ann.  28,  16  Ky.  699,  102  S.  W.  298,  1199,  31  Ky. 

So.  566;  West  V.  State,  18  Tex.  .App.  L.  271,  720. 
640,  652;  Eiland  v.  State,  52  Ala.  322, 


D/0 


HOMICIDE. 


§  3^6 


communicated  to  him,  is  always  admissible  to  show  the  defend- 
ant's motive.  If  the  evidence  tends  to  show  that  the  killing  was 
in  self-defense,  threats  may  be  proved  to  show  that  the  accused 
believed  he  was  in  imminent  danger  of  death  or  wounding  by  the 
deceased.^"  The  accused  may  prove  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy 
to  kill  or  assault  him  in  which  deceased  participated.  If  the  homi- 
cide occurred  in  an  affray  growing  out  of  the  conspiracy,  he  may 
prove  the  acts  and  threats  of  any  or  all  the  conspirators  as  the 
acts  and  declarations  of  the  deceased,  for  tlie  same  purposes  that 
threats  actually  made  by  the  deceased  may  be  shown. *'^  The  gen- 
eral rule  permits  the  communicated  threats  of  the  deceased  to  be 
pro\-ed,  though  no  evidence  of  any  overt  act  is  offered. °*  But 
threats  are  inadmissible  if  it  indubitably  appears  that  the  accused 
was  the  aggressor,  or  that  he  had  no  reasonable  grounds  for  ap- 
prehending an  attack  when  he  killed  the  deceased.''^   Usually  there 


■^  Pate  V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  462, 
113  S.  W.  759;  State  V.  Rideau,  116 
La.  245,  40  So.  691 ;  State  v.  Barks- 
dale,  122  La.  788,  48  So.  264;  State 
V.  Coleman,  119  La.  669,  44  So.  338; 
Dunn  V.  State,  143  Ala.  67,  39  So. 
147;  Bluett  V.  State,  151  Ala.  41,  44 
So.  84 ;  Sue  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  122, 
:o5  S.  W.  804;  State  v.  Doris,  51 
Ore.  136,  94  Pac.  44,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  66on ;  State  v.  Jackinan,  29  Nev. 
403,  91  Pac.  143;  Fleming  v.  State, 
150  Ala.  19,  43  So.  219;  State  v. 
Ilanlon,  38  Mont.  557,  100  Pac.  1035; 
Martin  v.  State,  144  Ala.  8,  40  So. 
275;  State  V.  Scaduto,  74  X.  J.  L. 
289,  65  Atl.  908;  Xeathery  v.  People, 
227  111.  no,  81  X.  E.  16;  State  v. 
Turpin,  77  X.  Car.  473,  480;  State  v. 
Abbott,  8  W.  Va.  741,  759;  State  v. 
Gainor,  84  Iowa  209,  214,  50  X.  \V. 
947;  State  V.  Dodson,  4  Ore.  64,  68, 
69:  KinK  V.  State,  55  Ark.  604,  607, 
19  S.  W.  no;  Lewis  v.  Common- 
wealth, 78  Va.  732,  735;  Eiland  v. 
State,  52  .Ma.  322,  333;  State  v.  Rol)- 
ertson,  30  La.  .Xnn.  340,  341;  Haw- 
thorne  V.    State,   61    Miss.   749,   75-'; 


Dickson  v.  State,  39  Ohio  St.  73,  78; 
Wood  V.  State,  92  Ind.  269,  273-275 ; 
Pitman  v.  State,  22  Ark.  354,  357; 
Wallace  v.  United  States,  162  U.  S. 
466,  40  L.  ed.  1039,  16  Sup.  Ct.  859; 
State  V.  Sullivan,  43  S.  Car.  205,  21 
S.  E.  4;  Grayson  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  35  S.  W.  1035,  18  Ky.  L.  205; 
Lester  v.  State,  37  Fla.  382,  20  So. 
232;  Henson  v.  State,  112  Ala.  41,  21 
So.  79;  Underbill  on  Ev.,  pp.  27 
and  69. 

"^Williams  v.  People,  54  111.  422, 
423,  426;  People  V.  Lee  Chuck.  74 
Cal.  30,  35,  36,  15  Pac.  322;  State  v. 
Hennessy,  29  Nev.  320,  90  Pac.  221 ; 
State  V.  Lindsay,  122  La.  375,  47  So. 
687:  Dranc  v.  State,  92  Miss.  180, 
45  So.  149. 

"State  V.  Abbott,  8  W.  Va.  741. 
759;  State  V.  Powell,  5  Penn.  (Del.) 
24,  61  Atl.  966;  Hammond  v.  State, 
147  Ala.  79.  41  So.  761. 

»°  Steele  v.  State.  3.3  Fla.  348.  14 
So.  841:  State  V.  Spell,  38  La.  Ann. 
20,  22;  Moriarity  v.  State,  62  Miss. 
654,  661  :  I'.al!  v.  State,  20  Tex.  .'\pp. 
107,    125,    14    S.    W.    1012;    Payne    v. 


^  3^6 


CRIMINAL    KVIDKXCE. 


574 


must  be  some  overt  act  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the  deceased  suf- 
licient  to  raise  the  issue  of  self-defense."'"''  I^he  admissibility  of 
threats  usually  depends  on  the  fact  that  they  were  communicated 
to  the  accused  before  the  homicide.""  But  uncommunicatod 
threats  may  be  recei\'ed  to  corroborate  those  communicated.''' 
and  to  show  the  mental  condition  of  the  deceased  toward  the  ac- 
cused where  there  is  doul)t  who  was  the  aggressor.  Sometimes 
the  former  may  be  regarded  as  of  the  res  gcsfcc,  explaining  some 
act  already  in  evidence,  as,  for  example,  to  show  the  mental  state 
of  the  deceased  when  the  question  is.  did  he  intend  to  harm  the 
accused,  and  was  he  the  attacking  party  in  the  affray  during  which 
he  was  killed?  Uncommunicated  threats  are  then  relevant  to 
show  he  provoked  the  affray,  or  to  explain  the  intention  with 
wliich  he  participated  in  it,  or  to  illustrate  the  character  of  the 
attack.""*   Evidence  from  the  accused  showing  the  communication 


State,  60  Ala.  80,  87;  State  v.  Guy, 
69  Mo.  430,  435 ;  Hill  V.  State  ( Miss., 
1894),  16  So.  901;  People  V.  Lynch, 
lor  Cal.  229,  231,  35  Pac.  860;  State 
V.  Reed,  137  Mo.  125,  38  S.  W.  574; 
State  V.  Nocton,  121  Mo.  537,  552,  26 
S.  W.  551 ;  State  v.  Vaughan,  22 
Xev.  285,  39  Pac.  733;  State  v.  King, 
47  La.  Ann.  28,  16  So.  566;  State  v. 
Fontenot,  48  La.  Ann.  305,  19  So. 
Ill  :  State  v.  Barber,  13  Idaho  65,  88 
Pac.  418;  State  v.  Peace,  121  La.  107, 
47  So.  28;  Brooks  v.  State,  85  Ark. 
376,  108  S.  W.  20s;  Smith  V.  State, 
142  Ala.  14,  39  So.  329;  State  v. 
Birks,  199  Mo.  263,  97  S.  W.  578; 
Kirby  v.  State,  151  Ala.  66,  44  So.  38; 
Dunn  V.  State,  143  Ala.  67,  39  So. 
147;  Oates  V.  State,  156  Ala.  99,  47 
So.  74;  State  V.  Bouvy,  124  La.  1054, 
50  So.  849;  Reed  v.  State  (Okla.  Cr. 
App.  T909),  103  Pac.  1042. 

"a  State  V.  Hanlon,  38  Mont.  557, 
100  Pac.  1035. 

""  Henson  v.  State.  120  Ala.  316.  25 
So.  23;  State  V.  Quinn  (Wash.  1909). 
105  Pac.  818. 

"'Wilson  V.  State,  140  Ala.  43,  37 
So.  93;  State  V.  Kelleher.  201  Mo. 
614,     100    S.    W.    470;    Tetterton    v. 


Commonwealth  (Ky.),  89  S.  W.  8, 
28  Ky.  L.  146;  Neathery  v.  People, 
227  111.  no,  81  N.  E.  16;  State  v. 
Edwards,  203  Mo.  528,  102  S.  W.  520; 
State  V.  Byrd,  121  N.  Car.  684,  28  S. 
K-  353;  State  V.  Thomas,  in  La.  804, 
35  So.  914;  State  V.  Nix,  in  La.  812, 
35  So.  917;  Commonwealth  v. 
Thomas  (Ky.),  104  S.  W.  326.  31 
Ky.  L.  899;  State  v.  Blee,  133  Iowa 
725,  ui  X.  W.  19;  State  v.  Davis, 
123  La.  133,  48  So.  771. 

"*  State  V.  Downs,  91  Mo.  19,  25,  3 
S.  W.  219;  People  V.  Travis,  56  Cal. 
251,  253,  254;  Stokes  V.  People,  53 
\.  Y.  164.  165.  13  Am.  492;  Mayfield 
V.  State,  no  Ind.  591,  594,  n  N.  E. 
618;  Leverich  v.  State,  105  Ind.  277, 
280,  4  X.  E.  852;  Martin  v.  State.  5 
Ind.  App.  453,  456,  32  N.  E.  594: 
State  v.  Turpin,  77  N.  Car.  473,  480, 
24  Am.  455 ;  Hart  v.  Commonwealth, 
8s  Ky.  77,  80,  2  S.  W.  673.  8  Ky.  L. 
714,  7  Am.  St.  576;  State  v.  Labuzan, 
37  La.  Ann.  489;  Little  v.  State,  6 
Baxt.  (Tenn.)  491,  493:  Dickson  v. 
vStatc.  39  Ohio  St.  73,  76;  State  v. 
Faile.  43  S.  Car.  52,  20  S.  E.  798; 
Garner  v.   State,  28  Fla.    113,  9   So. 


V  J 


HOMICIDE. 


§  3-2/ 


to  him  of  a  threat  does  not  permit  him  to  testify  that  he  then  said 
lie  had  never  injured  the  deceased  and  intended  to  avoid  trouhk> 
with  him."''  A  witness,  called  to  prove  threats,  may  state  his  repl_\' 
tliereto  as  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc.'^""  Bnt  he  cannot  he  allowed  to 
express  an  opinion  that  the  threats  ha\'e  heen  carried  into  execu- 
tion. That  question  is  for  the  determination  of  the  jury.^  Evi- 
dence to  prove  threats  must  tend  directly  to  show  an  intention  to 
injure  the  accused  by  violence.  A  statement  by  the  deceased  that 
he  is  prejudiced  against  the  accused  is  not  a  threat.-  In  conclu- 
sion it  may  be  said  tliat  declarations  of  peaceful  intent  by  the  de- 
ceased communicated  to  the  accused  are  competent  to  rebut 
evidence  of  prex'ious  threats  by  the  deceased.'' 

;j  327.  Evidence  to  prove  the  peaceable  character  of  the  accused. — 
The  rules  regulating  evidence  of  character  in  criminal  cases  are 
applicable.*  The  state  cannot  attack  the  character  of  the  defend- 
ant in  the  first  instance,''"'  though  it  may  do  so  after  he  has  sought 
to  prove  his  good  character.  An  accused  person  may  always  offer 
evidence  of  his  reputation,  as  a  quiet,  peaceable  and  inoffensive 
man  wherever  the  fact  that  he  committed  the  homicide,  or.  if  he 
admits  that  he  did  commit  it,  the  criminal  intent,  is  in  doubt  iqx^n 
the  whole  evidence.''    The  state  must  not  l)e  permitted  to  intro- 


•*^.35,  29  .'Km.  St.  232;  Brown  v.  State, 
55  Ark.  593,  603.  18  S.  W.  1051; 
State  V.  Helm,  92  Iowa  540,  61  N.  W. 
246;  State  V.  Gushing,  74  Wash.  527, 
45  Pac.  14s,  53  Am.  St.  883;  Wig- 
gins V.  Utah,  93  U.  S.  465,  2;i  L.  ed. 
941 ;  Campbell  v.  People,  16  111.  17, 
()i  Am.  Dec.  49n ;  Princ  v.  State,  73 
.Miss.  838,  19  So.  711;  Newton  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  102  S.  W. 
264,  31  Ky.  L.  327;  Hargis  v.  Com- 
mrmwealth  (Ky.,  1909),  123  S.  W. 
239. 

".Angus  V.   State,  29  Tex.  .Ai)]).  52, 

■  S.  W.  44.3. 
"People  V.   PalnKT,   105  Mich.  56S, 
63  \.  VV.  656. 

'  State   V.    Coella,    3    Wash.    St.   99, 
28  Pac.  28. 

'  State  V.  VVvse.  .33  S.  Car.  582,  594, 
S.  E.  556. 


■'Taylor  v.  State,  121  Ga.  348,  49  S. 
E.  303- 

*  Supra,  cliap.  VI 1. 

°  State  V.  Lodge,  9  lloust.  (Del.) 
342,  33  Atl.  312;  People  V.  Smith 
(Cal.  App.),  99  Pac.  11 11;  Sims  v. 
State,  38  Tex.  Cr.  637,  44  S.  W.  =,22 : 
State  V.  Richardson,  194  Mo.  3^6,  92 
S.  W.  649;  State  V.  Frederickson.  8r 
Kan.  854,  106  Pac.  1061.  The  state 
may  introduce  evidence  of  the  liad 
reputation  of  the  accused  in  rebuttal 
where  he  attempts  to  justify  tlie 
Iiomicide  nn  tlic  groinid  that  the  de- 
ceased was  attempting  to  ruin  his 
daughter  and  he  was  protecting  her. 
Gossett  V.  State,   123  Ga.  431,  51   S.  !■".. 

.W4- 

"Warren  v.  State,  3r  Tex.  Cr.  573, 
57(i.  21  S.  W.  r.yo;  Walker  v.  Stale. 
102  Ind.  502,  50(j,   I    .\'.    !•'.  85();  Slate 


^^  3^8 


CRI.MIXAL    EVIDENCE, 


576 


(luce  e\'i(lence  of  the  l)a(l  (lis])osition  of  the  accused  as  chs- 
tinguished  from  his  reputation,'  nor  may  it  show  that  he  pos- 
sessed a  nerA'Ous  temperaiuent,  was  excita])le  and  eccentric,"  or 
Hkely  to  resent  in  a  \'iolcnl  manner  an  indecent  and  insulting  mes- 
sage, or  that  he  has  heen  guihy  of  particuhu^  acts  of  bad  conduct. 
;\.ll  such  evidence  is  equally  irrelevant  to  show  guilt. 

^  328.    Threats  by  the  accused — General  nature  of  these  threats. — 

Evidence  of  threats  made  by  the  accused,  or  by  a  co-defendant  in 
the  presence  of  the  accused,  or,  if  in  his  absence,  subsequent  to  the 
date  when  a  conspiracy  existed,''  prior  to  the  killing,  is  always 
relevant  to  show  malice,  or,  when  made  long  before,  to  show 
deliberation  and  premeditation.^"    It  is  immaterial  that  the  threats 


V.  Cross,  68  Iowa  180,  195,  26  X.  W. 
62;  Hall  V.  State,  132  Ind.  317,  323, 
31  N.  E.  536;  McCarty  v.  People,  51 
111.  231,  232,  99  Am.  Dec.  542;  Mc- 
Daniel  v.  State,  8  Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.) 
401,  405,  47  Am.  Dec.  93;  People  v. 
Van  Gaasbeck,  118  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
511,  103  N.  Y.  S.  249,  aff'd,  189  N.  Y. 
408,  82  X.  E.  718;  State  v.  Dicker- 
son,  77  Ohio  St.  34,  82  X.  E.  969,  122 
Am.  St.  479.  U  L-  R-  A.  (X.  S.) 
341 ;  Maston  v.  State,  83  Miss.  647,  36 
So.  70;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3039.  Evi- 
dence of  good  reputation  of  defend- 
ant, 103  Am.  St.  897,  note. 

'  Thomas  v.  People,  67  X.  Y.  218, 
223;  Barnctt  v.  State  (Ala.,  1909),  51 
So.  299. 

*  Commonweallli  v.  Clcary,  148  Pa. 
St.  26,  23  Atl.  1 1 10. 

"Ford  V.  State,  112  Ind.  373,  382,  14 
N.  E.  24T ;  Rush  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  76 
S.  W.  927;  People  V.  Barthleman,  120 
Cal.  7,  52  Pac.  112;  State  v.  Wright, 
T41  Mo.  333,  42  S.  W.  934;  Poole  v. 
State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  348,  76  S.  W.  565- 
Previous  circumstances,  threats,  prep- 
aration and  previous  attempts,  Elliott 
Evidence,  §§  3035,  3036.  Evidence  of 
being  accused  of  threats  by  person 
injured  or  killed,  17  L.  R.  A.  654, 
note.     Evidence  of  threats  in  prose- 


cution  for  homicide,  89  Am.   St.  691, 
note. 

"State  v.  Birdwell,  36  La.  Ann. 
850;  Carr  v.  State,  23  Xeb.  749,  37 
N.  W.  630;  Mathis  v.  State,  34  Tex. 
Cr.  39,  28  S.  W.  817;  State  v.  Rash, 
T2  Ired.  (X.  Car.)  382,  384,  55  Am. 
Dec.  420;  State  v.  Green,  i  Houst. 
Cr.  (Del.)  217;  Griffin  v.  State,  90 
Ala.  596,  599,  8  So.  670;  State  v. 
Partlow,  90  Mo.  608,  609,  4  S.  \V.  14, 
59  Am.  31;  State  v.  McCahill,  72 
Iowa  III,  117,  30  X.  W.  553,  33  X. 
W.  599;  Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind. 
550,  552;  La  Beau  v.  People,  34  X.  Y. 
223,  229;  Westbrook  v.  People,  126  111. 
81,  91,  18  X^  E.  304;  Schoolcraft  v. 
People,  IT7  111.  271,  7  X.  E.  649; 
Riggs  v.  State,  30  Miss.  635 ;  Xichols 
v.  Commonwealth,  11  Bush  (Ky.) 
575,  580 ;  State  v.  Hoyt,  46  Conn.  330, 
336;  State  V.  Larkins,  5  Idaho  200, 
47  Pac.  945 ;  Brooks  v.  Common- 
wealth, 100  Ky.  194,  37  S.  W.  1043. 
18  Ky.  L.  702;  Wilson  v.  State,  no 
Ala.  I,  20  So.  415,  55  Am.  St.  17; 
Drake  v.  State,  no  Ala.  9,  20  So. 
450;  Allen  v.  State,  ni  Ala.  80,  20 
So.  490;  Phillips  V.  State,  62  Ark. 
1 19,  34  S.  W.  539 :  People  V.  Evans 
(Cal.,   1895),  41   Pac.  444;   Tuttle  v. 


577 


HOMICIDE. 


328 


were  not  directed  against  the  deceased  individually/^  as  where 
they  were  made  against  a  railroad  company  by  which  the  de- 
ceased was  employed/-  or  against  "anyone  who  hits  A,"^^  against 
a  family  by  name/*  or  a  class  of  men/^  as  policemen/*'  or  non- 
union men,  to  which  class  the  deceased  belong/"  or  against  any 

Commonwealth   (Kj-.),  ss  S.  W.  823,  '^Benedict    v.    State,    14    Wis.    423, 

17  K}-.  L.  1 139;  State  v.  Pain,  48  La.  426;    Harrison  v.   State,   79  Ala.  29; 

Ann.    311,    19    So.    138;    Linehan    v.  State  v.  Harlan,  130  Mo.  381,  407,  32 

State,    113  Ala.   70,  21    So.  497;   Mc-  S.  W.  997;  State  v.  Hymer,  15  Nev. 

Daniel  v.  State,  100  Ga.  67,  27  S.  E.  49;   State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518,  36 

158;   Underbill   on  Ev.,   §§  5,  9,   52;  Am.  89n;  Friday  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.), 

Morris  v.   State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  515,  98  79  S.  W.  815;  Starr  v.  State,  160  Ind. 

S.  W.  873 ;   State  v.  Feeley,  194  Mo.  661,  67  N.  E.  527 ;  McMahon  v.  State, 

300,  92  S.  W.  663,  112  Am.  St.  511,  3  46  Tex.  Cr.  540,  81  S.  W.  296;  State 

L.    R.    A.     (X.    S.)    35in;    State    v.  v.  Exum,   138  X.  Car.  599,  50  S.   E. 

King,  203   Mo.   560,    102  S.   W.   515;  283;    Bateson   v.    State,    46   Tex.    Cr. 

Golatt  V.   State,  130  Ga.  18,  60  S.  E.  34,   80   S.   W.   88;   Holland   v.   State 

107;  State  V.  Rideau,  116  La.  245,  40  55  Tex.  Cr.  27,  115   S.  W.  48;  Wil- 

So.    691 ;    Washington    v.    State,    46  Hams  v.  State,  147  Ala.  10,  41  So.  992 ; 

Tex.  Cr.   184,  79  S.  W.  811;   People  Hixon   v.    State,    130   Ga.   479,   61    S. 

V.   Gaimari,   176  X.   Y.   84,  68  X^.   E.  E.  14;  Hardy  v.  Commonwealth  (Va., 

112;  State  V.  Fielding,  135  Iowa  255,  1910),  67  S.  E.  522. 

112   X".    W.    539;    Owen   v.    State,   52  "  Xewton  v.  State,  92  Ala.  S3,  36,  9 

Tex.   Cr.  65,   105   S.  W.  513;   Tipton  So.  404. 

V.    State,    140   Ala.   39,    37    So.    231;  "Jordan  v.  State,  79  Ala.  9,  12. 

Wheeler  v.   Commonwealth,    120  Ky.  "People  v.  Craig,   iii   Cal.  460,  44 

697,  87  S.  W.  1 106,  27  Ky.  L.   1090;  Pac.  186;  State  v.  Belton,  24  S.  Car. 

-Miller  v.   State,  40  So.  342,  146  Ala.  185,   187,   190,  58  Am.  245 ;   Hobbs  v. 

686,    not    reported   in    full;    Glenn   v.  State,   86   Ark.   360,   in    S.   W.   264; 

State,  157  Ala.  12,  47  So.  1034;  Bluett  Morris  v.   State,   146  Ala.  66,  41   So. 

V.    State,    151    Ala.    41,    44    So.    84;  274;  George  v.  State,  145  Ala.  41,  40 

Powers  V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  92  So.  961,   117  Am.    St.    17;   People   v. 

S.   W.  975,  29  Ky.  L.  277;   State  v.  Owen,  154  Mich.  571,  118  N.  W.  590, 

Allen,  III  La.  154,  35  So.  495;  State  15  Det.  Leg.  N.  881,  21  L.  R.  A.   (X. 

V.   Stratford,   149  X.   Car.  483,  62  S.  S.)  520. 

E.  882;  State  V.  Thompson,  127  Iowa  "State   v.    Davis,  6   Idaho    159,   53 

440,  103  X.  W.  377;  Graham  v.  State,  Pac.    678;    Commonwealth    v.    Lam- 

125   Ga.  48,   53    S.    E.   816;   Johns   v.  tampa,  226  Pa.  23,  74  Atl.  736. 

State,  46  Fla.    153,  35  So.  71;  Jarvis  "  Di.xon  v.   State,  13  Fla.  636,  645: 

V.    State,    138   Ala.    17,   34   So.    1025;  Whittaker   v.   Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

State  V.   Demming,  79  Kan.  526,   100  17  S.  W.  358,  13  Ky.  L.  504;  State  v. 

Pac.  285;   Blocker  v.   State,  55  Tex.  Grant,  79  Mo.  113,  49  Am.  218. 

Cr.  30,  114  S.  W.  814;   State  v.  Mc-  "State   v.    Bailey,    190  Mo.  257.  88 

Kcllar  (S.  Car.,  1910),  67  S.   E.  314;  S.    W.    733.      Sec    State   v.    Cochran. 

Singleton    v.    State    (Tex.    Cr.    .App.  147  Mo.  504,  49  S.  W.  558,  wIktc  ac- 

i<)0(j),  124  S.  W.  92.  cuscd   said    he   would    like    to   kill   a 
37 — Underiiill  Crim.  Ev. 


§    3^9  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  5/8 

man  whose  attentions  shonld  be  recei\'e(l  by  the  woman  witli 
whom  he  was  intimate/"*  and  one  member  only  of  the  class  or 
family  is  slain  by  the  accused.  Under  certain  circumstances  the 
\ ague  and  uncertain  threats  of  the  accused  may  be  shown  to  pro\e 
the  condition  of  his  mind  at  the  tijne  of  the  crime.  This  rule 
is  applied  to  his  declarations  that  he  is  going  to  kill  somebody 
without  mentioning  any  names  or  that  he  is  going  to  make  trouble 
or  that  he  is  going  to  shoot  someone  or  similar  indefinite  threats 
which  indicate  that  he  is  in  an  ugly  frame  of  mind  and  disposed 
to  commit  some  crime  though  not  the  particular  crime  for  which 
he  is  on  trial.'"  When,  however,  it  clearly  appears  that  the  ac- 
cused and  the  deceased  were  acquainted,  and  had  always  been 
friends  down  to  the  homicide,  general  threats  by  the  accused  are 
incompetent.^"  So,  too,  a  specific  threat  directed  against  one  per- 
son by  name  is  not  relevant  on  a  trial  for  the  homicide  of  an- 
other,-' unless,  perhai)s,  when  the  threat  has  been  executed  and 
the  motive  for  the  killing  of  both  persons  was  the  same."" 

§  329.  Form,  character  and  mode  of  proving  threats. — The  rele- 
vancy of  threats  depends  largely  upon  the  light  they  shed  upon 
previous  malice  or  premeditation.  Hence  their  remoteness  in  time 
is  no  objection  to  their  reception,"^  though  it  may,  and  indeed 

Grand   Army  man   and   the   deceased  105,  11   S.  E.  814;  State  v.  McCahill, 

was  not  a  Grand  Army  man.  72  Iowa  in,  S3  ^-  W.  599;  State  v. 

'*  Brown  v.  State,  105  Ind.  385,  392;  Compagnet,  48  La.  Ann.   1470,  21  So. 

Garrett  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  255,  106  46;  Bradley  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.),  in 

S.    W.    389;    Cardwell    v.    Common-  S.  W.  733;  Stafford  v.  State,  50  Fla. 

wealth    (Ky.),  46  S.  W.  705,  20   Ky.  134,  39  So.  106;  Sprouse  v.  Common- 

L.  496.  wealth   (Ky.,  1909),  n6  S.  W.  344. 

"State  V.   Brown,    188  Mo.  451,  87         ='Jefferds   v.    People,    5    Park.    Cr. 

S.   W.   519;    Helvenston   v.    State,   53  (N.   Y.)    522    (two   years);    Redd  v. 

Tex.  Cr.  636,  ni  S.  W.  959;   Burton  State,  68  Ala.  492;   Everett  v.  State, 

V.  State,  IIS  Ala.  i,  22  So.  585.  62   Ga.  65;   State  v.   Campbell,  35  S. 

""State  V.  Crabtrec,  in  Mo.  136,  20  Car.  28,  32,   14  S.   E.   292;   Goodwin 

S.  W.  7;  State  V.  McGreevey  (Idaho,  v.    State,   96   Ind.    550,    552;   Graham 

1909),  105  Pac.  1047.  V.   State,   125   Ga.  48,   53   S.   E.  816; 

-^Carr  v.  State,  23  Neb.  749,  761,  37  State   v.    Schuyler,    75    N.   J.   L.   487, 

X.   W.   630;   Abernethy   v.   Common-  68  Atl.  56;  People  v.  Johnson,  185  N. 

wealth,   loi    Pa.   St.  322,  330;   People  Y.  219,  77  N.  E.  1164;  State  v.  Dem- 

V.    Bezy,    67    Cal.    223,    7    Pac.    643;  ming,    79    Kan.    526,    100    Pac.    285; 

Clarke  v.  State,  78  Ala.  474,  56  Am.  Rush   v.    State    (Tex.   Cr.,    1907),  76 

45.  S.  W.   927;   Ward  v.   Commonwealth 

"^'Woolfolk  V.  State,  85  Ga.  69,  104,  (Ky.),  91    S.  W.   700,  29  Ky.   L.  62; 


579  HOMICIDE.  §    T^2C) 

must,  be  considered  In  determining  their  weight  as  evidence  of 
existing  intent.'-*  For  it  is  manifest  that  a  threat  made  long  prior 
to  the  commission  of  a  homicide  may  indicate  that  it  was  the 
cuhnination  and  outcome  of  long-continued  rancor  rather  than 
the  result  of  a  sudden  and  momentary  outburst  of  passion,-^  while 
the  fact  that  a  threat  is  unrepeated  and  unexecuted  for  many 
Aears  may  indicate  that  the  feelings  of  hatred  or  revenge  have 
died  out.-"  The  language  used  need  not  be  specific  as  regards  the 
means  by  which, -^  or  as  to  the  time,  place  or  manner  in  which, 
\  iolence  is  to  be  inflicted.  It  is  for  the  court  to  say  whether  the 
utterance  of  the  defendant  imports  a  threat,  and  the  cases  go  very 
far  in  admitting  as  a  threat  any  declaration  which  indicates,  how- 
ever vaguely  and  indefinitely,  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  ac- 
cused to  inflict  violence  upon  the  deceased."^  Nor  is  it  material 
that  the  killing  was  accomplished  by  the  use  of  means  which 
differ  widely  from  those  mentioned  in  the  threat.-'"  It  is  not  nec- 
essary that  the  witness  should  be  able  to  relate  the  whole  con- 
versation of  which  the  threat  formed  a  part,^°  or  that  the  threat 
should  have  been  uttered  in  his  presence,  or  to  him,  or  that  he 
should  have  recognized  the  defendant's  voice,  if  the  evidence 
shows  that  the  accused  and  the  deceased  were  so  situated,  as 
respects  the  witness,  that  he  must  have  heard  all  that  was  said,''' 
as  when  he  o\-erhears  threats  made  by  tlie  deceased,  who,  while 
into.xicated   and   alone,   was  talking  to  himself.''"    It  is   always 

State  V.   Rodriguez,  115  La.   1004,  40  "' Schoolcraft  v.  People,  117  111.  271, 

So.  438;  State  V.  Porter,  213  Mo.  43,  7  X.  E.  649. 

Ill  S.  W.  529,  127  Am.  St.  589;  State  "'Drake  v.  State,  no  Ala.  9,  20  So. 

V.    Benjamin    (R.    L,    1908),    71    Atl.  450.     In  this  case  the  defendant  said 

65.     Evidence  of  threats  in  prosecu-  to    the    deceased,    "I    will    see    you 

tion    for    homicide,    89    .Am.    St.    6g\,  later." 

note;   .State  v.  Quinn    (Wash.,  1909),  ™  La  Beau  v.  People,  34  X.  Y.  223, 

105  Pac.  818.  229. 

■'State  V.   Hoyt,  46  Conn.  330,   ^,^7  '"State  v.  Oliver,  43  La.  Ann.  1003, 

f thirteen  years);  Erizzell  v.  State,  30  10  So.  201;  People  v.  Dice,   120  Cal. 

Tex.  .\pp.  42,  16  S.  \V.  75r;  Sprouse  189,  52  Pac.  477;  Woodward  v.  State, 

V.  Commonwealth   (Ky.,  1909),  116  S.  50  Tex.  Cr.  294,  97  S.  W.  499;  State 

W.  344.  V.  Benjamin   (R.  T.,  1908),  71  .Atl.  65. 

"JcfiFerds    v.    People,    5    Park.    Cr.  '"Short    v.    Commonwealth     (Ky.), 

(X.  Y.)   522,  541.  .=561.  4  S.  W.  810.  Si  I,  9  Ky.  L.  255:  State 

^  State  V.  Hoyt,  46  Conn.  330,  337;  v.  fiilliam.  66  .S.  Car.  419,  45  S.  E..  6. 

■•  oplc  V.  Johnson,   185  .\.  Y.  219,  7y  "''Smith    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

v..  1 164.  4  S.  W.  798,  799,  9  Ky.  L.  215. 


§    330  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  5S0 

competent  to  receive  any  cxidcncc  e.\i)lanatorv  of  tlic  tin-cats 
and  which  shows  their  trne  character  and  which  may  add  weight 
to  or  detract  from  t-heir  force  as  evidence  that  the  deceased  was 
moved  by  hatred  of  the  accnsed."'^  But  in  conclusion,  though  the 
remoteness  in  point  of  time  will  not  exclude  the  threat,  it  may  be 
said  that  if  a  long  period  intervenes  Ijetween  the  threat  and  the  act 
threatened,  and  there  have  been  opportunities  for  carrying  out 
the  threat  and  the  accused  has  made  no  attempt  to  do  so,  the  value 
of  the  threat  as  indicating  that  the  accused  hated  the  deceased 
is  greatly  weakened;  and  if  between  the  threat  and  the  act  an 
existing  state  of  ill  will  is  changed  to  one  of  good  will,  then  the 
value  of  the  threat  as  evidence  amounts  to  nothing.^^ 

§  330.  Declarations  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestae. — The  rule 
of  the  res  gcstcc  is  applicable  to  the  acts  and  declarations  of  the 
accused  and  other  persons  which  are  attendant  upon  the  homi- 
cide.^"' All  the  occurrences  and  conversation  of  the  period  in 
which  the  killing  took  place,  from  the  instant  the  accused  appeared 
until  the  homicide,  may  be  taken  as  constituting  the  res  gestce.'^'' 
Hence  statements  by  the  deceased  made  before  or  immediately 
after  the  killing,^'^  but  connected  with  and  explanatory  of  an  act 
which  led  up  to  or  jirepared  for  it,  are  relevant  to  show  his  mental 
state  and  motives, ^"^  to  show  where  he  was  going  about  the  time 
of  the  homicide, ■""*  or  to  identify  the  defendants.*"     His  declara- 

^  Price  V.    State    (Okla.,   1908),   98  State  v.   Talbert,  41    S.   Car.   526,   19 

Pac.  447.  S.  E.  852;  Commonwealth  v.  Werntz, 

**  Crumley  v.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  231,  161    Pa.    St.    591,   29   Atl.   272;    Von 

62  S.  E.  1005.  Pollnitz  V.  State,  92  Ga.  16,  18  S.  E. 

''See  §§  94-103,  ante:  Robinson  v.  301,  44  Am.  St.  72;  Boyle  v.  State, 
State,  118  Ga.  198,  44  S.  E.  985;  State  97  Incl.  322;  Appleton  v.  State,  61 
V.  Heidelberg,  120  La.  300,  45  So.  Ark.  590,  33  S.  W.  1066;  Harris  v. 
256.  Res  gcsta — attendant  circum-  State,  96  Ala.  24,  29,  11  So.  255;  Ed- 
stances  in  prosecution  for  homicide,  monds  v.  State,  34  Ark.  720,  734-736; 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3029.  Gibson  v.  State  (Miss.,  1894),  16  So. 

'*  Glass  V.  State,  147  Ala.  50,  41  So.  298;  State  v.  Harris,  63  N.  Car.  i,  6; 

727.  Harris   v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.),   74 

"Starks  v.  State,  137  Ala.  9,  34  So.  S.  W.   1044,  25  Ky.  L.  297;   State  v. 

687.  Lattin,  19  Wash.  57,  52  Pac.  314. 

^  State  V.   Moelchen,  53  Iowa  310,         ''  State  v.  Vincent,  24  Iowa  570,  95 

5  N.  W.  186;  State  v.  Rollins.  113  N.  Am.    Dec.    753;    State   v.    Mortensen, 

Car.    722,    18    S.    E.    394:    People    v.  26  Utah  312,  73  Pac.  562. 
Hawes,    98    Cal.    648,    33    Pac.    791;        "Cox  v.   State,  8  Tex.  App.   254; 


'.Si 


HOMICIDE, 


330 


tion  that  he  preferred  to  use  a  knife  in  assaulting  persons  as  it 
was  more  rehable  than  a  pistol/^  or  that  he  wished  to  procure  the 
arrest  of  the  defendant  for  threatening  him,*-  is  relevant  to  show 
the  motive  and  inclination  of  the  deceased  to  commit  crime. 

But  declarations  prior  to  the  crime  forming  no  part  of  the  res 
gcstcc  of  a  relevant  act  and  not  communicated  to  the  accused,  or 
if  known  to  him  not  acquiesced  in,"  or  statements  and  accusations 
by  deceased  which  are  narrative  in  their  form  and  character  and 
inadmissible  as  dying  declarations,  are  generally  rejected.** 

The  declarations  of  the  accused  prior  to  the  crime  cannot  be 
put  in  evidence  in  his  favor  unless  they  are  so  closely  connected 
with  the  crime  or  with  some  relevant  and  connected  transaction 
as  to  form  a  part  of  it.  Usually  the  accused  will  not  be  permitted 
to  introduce  his  statements  of  intention ;  thus  he  cannot  prove  that 
before  the  homicide  he  stated  that  he  wished  to  get  out  of  the 
neighborhood  fearing  he  might  have  trouble  with  him.*^  He  can- 
not prove  his  utterances  at  the  time  he  bought  the  weapon  with 
which  the  homicide  was  committed  to  show  the  innocence  of  the 
motives  which  prompted  the  purchase.*"    But  the  declarations  of 


Warrick  v.  State,  125  Ga.  133,  53  S. 
E.  1027;  Gibbs  V.  State,  156  Ala.  70, 
47  So.  65 ;  Grant  v.  United  States, 
28  App.  D.  C.  169.  How  near  the 
main  transaction  must  be  to  the  dec- 
laration made  in  order  to  be  part  of 
the  res  gcstcc,  19  L.  R.  A.  y^Jy  note. 

"  Boyle  V.  State,  97  Ind.  322,  325. 

*^  State  V.  Moelchen,  53  Iowa  310,  5 
X.  W.  186. 

*'  People  V.  Gress,  107  Gal.  461,  40 
Pac.  752;  State  v.  Punshon,  124  Mo. 
448,  27  S.  W.  iiii;  Commonwealth 
V.  Gray  (Ky.),  30  S.  W.  1015,  17  Ky. 
L.  354;  Macklin  v.  Commonwealth, 
93  Ky.  294,  19  S.  W.  931,  14  Ky.  L. 
180;  Weyrich  v.  People,  89  111.  90, 
96-98;  McBride  v.  Commonwealth, 
95  Va.  818,  30  S.  E.  454;  Bowles  v. 
Commonwealth,  103  Va.  816,  48  S.  E. 
527;  State  V.  Shafcr,  22  Mont.  17, 
55  Pac.  526;  Ausmus  v.  People  (Colo., 
1910).  ro7  Pac.  204. 

"State  V.  Noeninger,  108  Mo.   166, 


18  S.  W.  990;  State  V.  Duestrow,  137 
Mo.  44,  38  S.  W.  554,  39  S.  W.  266; 
Stevenson  v.  State,  69  Ga.  68;  Hall 
V.  State,  132  Ind.  317,  322,  31  N.  E. 
536 ;  State  v.  Carlton,  48  Vt.  636,  641 ; 
Reg.  V.  Bedingfield,  14  Cox  C.  C. 
341 ;  Lambright  v.  State,  34  Fla.  564, 
16  So.  =582;  Livingston  v.  Common- 
wealth, 14  Gratt.  (Va.)  592;  State 
V.  Frazier,  i  Houst.  Cr.  (Del.)  176; 
Wilson  V.  People,  94  111.  299.  Decla- 
rations as  to  slayer  not  made  in  ex- 
tremis must  be  a  part  of  the  res 
gestce.  Mayes  v.  State,  64  Miss.  329, 
333,  I  So.  733,  60  Am.  58;  Jones  v. 
State,  71  Ind.  66.  Declarations  must 
be  spontaneous.  Lockhart  v.  State, 
53  Tc.x.  Cr.  589,  III  S.  W.  1024. 

^' Red  V.  State,  39  Tc.x.  Cr.  414,  4C1 
S.  W.  408. 

'"State  V.  Holcomb,  86  Mo.  371, 
37^',  Johnson  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App. 
206,  2  S.  W.  609.     Contra,  Kollcr  v. 


§    ;^^0a  CRIMIXAL    KVIDEXCE.  582 

the  nccnscd  uttered  l)et()re  the  eriiiie  iii(lieatin_L;  that  he  entertained 
enmity  towards  the  deceased  or  towards  a  class  of  persons  to 
which  he  belonged/'  or  that  he  was  contemplating  the  commis- 
sion of  a  homicide.'"'  or  other  crime  upon  him,'"  or  some  person 
whose  name  is  not  mentioned,'"  are  always  admissible  as  of  the 
res  gcstcc  tending  to  increase  the  probability  that  he  is  the  slayer."' 
Declarations  of  the  accused  uttered  before  the  crime  may  be 
competent  in  his  favor  or  against  him  when  they  are  spontaneous 
and  also  when  they  explain  or  illustrate  the  circuiustances  of  the 
crime.  They  are  received  to  show  his  state  of  mind  towards  the 
deceased  and  to  show  the  motives  and  intentions  of  the  accused. 
Thus  it  may  be  shown  that  before  the  commission  of  the  homi- 
cide the  accused  inquired  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  deceased, " 
and  that  on  seeing  the  deceased  the  accused  said  to  him,  "Now  I 
have  found  you,""'^  or  uttered  some  other  language  showing  anger 
towards  or  hatred  of  the  deceased."*  The  statements  of  the  ac- 
cused may  also  be  received  in  his  favor.  Where  the  accused, 
being  a  police  ofificer,  w^as  charged  with  homicide  it  was  held  that 
he  might  prove  that  on  the  occasion  of  the  crime  he  was  about 
placing  the  deceased  under  arrest  and  that  he  ordered  him  to 
throw  up  his  hands  saying  that  he  was  a  policeman." 

§  330a.    Declarations  of  the  accused  after  the  crime. — The  declara- 
tions and  statements  of  the  accused  uttered  immediately  after 

State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  496,  38  S.  W.  44;  26  S.  W.  201;   Palmer  v.  People,  138 

Arnwine  v.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  213,  114  111.  356,  28  N.  E.  130,  32  Am.  St.  146. 

S.  W.  796,  802.  Declarations   of  accused,  just  before 

"^  People  V.  Hayes,  9  Cal.  App.  301,  the   killing,   that    he    felt   like   killing 

99  Pac.  386.  some  one,  are  admissible.     Muscoe  v. 

"State   V.    Ellis,    lOi    N.    Car.    765,  Commonwealth,  87  Va.  460,  12  S.  E. 

768,  7  S.  E.  704,  9  Am.  St.  49;  State  790. 

V.  Vallery,  47   La.  Ann.    182,    16   So.  "'  Xewcomb  v.   State,  37  Miss.  383, 

745,  49  Am.  St.  363;  State  v.  Home,  399. 

9  Kan.  119;  State  V.  Windahl,  95  Towa  ^'Morris  v.    State,    146   Ala.  66,  41 

470,  64  N.  W.  420;  Denson  v.  State  So.  274. 

(Tex.  Cr.,  1896),  35  S.  W.  150;  State  ■'•■' Hamblin  v.  State,  41  Tex.  Cr.  I35- 

V.   Lance,   149  N.   Car.  551.  63   S.  E.  50  S.  W.  1019,  51  S.  W.  iiii. 

I9'8;   Self  v.   State,  39  Tex.   Cr.  455,  '^Harris   v.   Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

47  S.  W.  26.  74  S.  W.  1044,  25  Ky.  L.  297. 

"  Mimms  v.  State,  16  Ohio  St.  221,  ''  People  v.  Lee,  i  Cal.  App.  169,  .Sr 

3.  Pac.  969. 

■"  Butler  V.  State,  33  Tex.   Cr.  232, 


o-j 


^8^  HOMICIDE.  §    331 

the  homicide  and  connected  with  it  are  often  received  as  a  part  of 
the  res  gcstcc.^^'  They  may  be  received  in  favor  of  the  accused. 
Thus,  he  may  prove  that  after  the  homicide  he  said  he  had  shot 
the  deceased  and  that  he  wanted  somebody  to  go  to  him  as  quick 
as  possible,  that  he  would  be  glad  if  a  doctor  could  be  procured, 
and  that  he  was  going  for  a  doctor  himself.'''  And  the  accused 
may  also  prove  that  he  stated  to  a  physician  who  was  dressing 
his  wound  how  he  received  that  wound  and  that  it  was  inflicted 
on  him  by  the  deceased."^  The  accused  may  show  that,  within 
a  minute  or  two  after  the  shooting,  he  stated  to  a  third  person 
that  he  had  shot  the  deceased  in  self-defense.''^  The  declarations 
of  the  accused  when  he  was  arrested  are  admissible;''*'  though 
where  he  surrendered  himself  to  an  officer  some  time  after  the 
commission  of  the  homicide  he  cannot  prove  what  he  said  at  the 
time.''^  The  statements  of  the  accused  made  immediately  after 
the  crime  are  usually  received  if  they  are  admissions  or  confes- 
sions.*'" 

§  331.  Declarations  of  third  parties  and  cries  and  exclamations  of 
bystanders. — Declarations  or  exclamations  uttered  by  third  per- 
sons, not  associated  with  the  accused,  after  the  commission  of  the 
homicide,  not  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc,  and  not  acquiesced 
in  by  the  defendant,  are  not  admissible  against  him,*'^  except  so 
far  as  such  declarations  may  be  introduced  for  the  sole  purpose  of 

^'Taggart    v.    Commonwealth,    104  ""''Allen  v.  State,  11 1  Ala.  80,  20  So. 

Ky.  301,  46  S.  W.  674,  20  Ky.  L.  493.  490;    State   v.    Ramsey,   48   La.   Ann. 

■"  Cole  V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  225,  75  1407,    20    So.    904.      See    Sanders    v. 

S.  W.   527.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  18  S.  W.  528. 

■^Wakcficlcl    V.    State,   50   Tex.    Cr.  13   Ky.   L.  820;    Brooks   v.    State,  96 

124,  94  S.  W.  1046.  Ga.  353,  23  S.  E.  413;  State  v.  Snecd, 

"^  State  V.   Rutlcdge,   135  Iowa  581,  88  Mo.  138,  140-142;   People  v.  Wal- 

113  X.  W.  461.  lace,  89  Cal.  158,  26  Pac.  650;  People 

■"''  Darter  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  40,  44  v.    Shattuck,    109    Cal.    673,    42    Pac. 

S.  W.  850.  315;  Marks  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  274, 

■"People  V.    Dice,    120  Cal.    189,   52  92    S.   W.   414;   Trinkle   v.    State,    52 

Pac.  477.  Tex.  Cr.  42,   105  S.  W.  201  ;  Gorman 

"Graham   v.   State,   125   Ga.  48,  53  v.   State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  24,    105   S.   \V. 

S.   E.  816;  Collins  V.   State,  137  Ala.  200;  State  v.  Gallman,  79  S.  Car.  229. 

50,    34    So.    403;    Stacy    V.    Common-  60    S.    E.    682;    Alford    v.    State,    52 

wealth    CKy.),  97   S.   W.  39,   29  Ky.  Tex.   Cr.  621,    108   S.   W.  364;    Hun- 

L.  1242.  drick  v.  State,   125  Ga.  753,  54  S.   V.. 


§  33^ 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


584 


impeaching  a  witness  by  showing  contradictory  statements. "^^  The 
exclamations  or  declarations  of  bystanders  uttered  during  or  im- 
mediately after  the  commission  of  the  crime  are  often  received 
as  a  part  of  the  res  gcsicc.''''  In  order  that  the  exclamations  of 
bystanders  may  be  recei\-ed,  it  must  be  shown  that  they  were  in 
some  way  connected  with  the  main  fact.  So  where  it  was  alleged 
that  defendant  had  shot  deceased  with  a  pistol  on  a  car  platform, 
and  had  thrown  the  body  from  the  train  while  it  was  in  motion, 
passengers  on  the  train  were  not  permitted  to  testify  to  exclama- 
tions made  by  persons  standing  on  the  platform  where  the  homi- 
cide had  been  committed."*' 

§  332.  Threats  against  deceased  by  third  persons. — The  general 
rule  is  that  threats  by  a  third  person  against  the  deceased  are 
inadmissible  to  absolve  the  accused.""  The  latter  may  introduce 
direct  evidence  to  show  that  some  one  else  committed  the  crime. 
If  the  connection  of  the  third  party  with  the  crime  is  shown 
pruna  facie,^^  his  threats  may  be  received  in  corroboration  or  to 
show  a  motive  to  kill  the  deceased. ""  If  the  accused  admits  the 
killing,  threats  of  a  third  person  should  be  rejected.     If  this  fact 


683;  State  V.  Xewman,  y^  N.  J.  L. 
202,  62  Atl.  1008;  Coker  v.  State, 
144  Ala.  28,  40  So.  576.  Attendant 
circumstances  —  declarations,  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  3030. 

^Mixon  V.  State,  55  Miss.  525; 
Kendall  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  19 
S.  W.  173,  14  Ky.  L.  15;  Jones  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  46  S.  W.  217, 
20  Ky.  L.  355;  State  v.  Blee,  133 
Iowa  725,  III  N.  W.  19. 

"^  Johnson  v.  State,  88  Ga.  203,  14 
S.  E.  208.  See  cases,  §  loi.  Excla- 
mations of  bystanders  "there  he 
comes  with  a  gun,"  referring  to  the 
accused,  have  been  received.  State  v. 
Biggerstaff,  17  Mont.  510,  43  Pac. 
709;  Shumate  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Cr. 
266,  42  S.  W.  600. 

*°  Bradshaw  v.  Commonwealth,  10 
Bush  (Ky.)  576.  See  also,  Felder 
V.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  477,  486,  5  S. 
W.  145,  59  Am.  777n. 

*^  Henry  v.   State    (Tex.,   1895),  30 


S.  W.  802;  Wilkins  v.  State,  35  Tex. 
Cr.  525,  34  S.  W.  627;  State  v.  Beau- 
det,  53  Conn.  536,  4  Atl.  237,  55  Am. 
155;  Morris  v.  Territory,  i  Okla.  Cr. 
617,  99  Pac.  760,  loi  Pac.  in;  Hall 
v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  93  S.  W. 
904,  29  Ky.  L.  485. 

''^  There  should  be  some  proof  of 
an  overt  act  on  the  part  of  the  third 
party  directed  against  the  deceased 
or  of  some  fact  or  circumstance  of 
his  conduct  which  would  tend  to  con- 
nect the  third  person  with  the  crime. 
Harn  v.  State,  12  Wyo.  80,  7^  Pac. 
705. 

"'State  V.  Davis,  77  X.  Car.  483; 
State  V.  Hajmes,  71  N.  Car.  79; 
Crookham  v.  State,  5  W.  Va.  510; 
Boothe  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  202; 
Morris  v.  Territory,  i  Okla.  Cr.  617, 
99  Pac.  760,  loi  Pac.  in;  State  v. 
Cremeans,  62  W.  Va.  134,  57  S.  E. 
405. 


585 


HOMICIDE. 


8    o  ">  '> 


is  in  doubt,  and  particularly  if  the  e\-idence  is  wholly  circumstan- 
tial, the  threats  of  a  third  person,  not  shown  to  have  been  con- 
nected with  the  crime,  may  be  received.'"  The  names  of  the  per- 
sons and  the  circumstances  attending  the  threats  must  be  stated."^ 
The  defendant  may  pro^•e  threats  against  the  deceased  made  by  a 
witness  who.  testifying  as  an  accomplice,  alleges  he  was  instigated 
by  defendant  to  commit  the  crime  to  show  that  the  witness  was 
actuated  by  personal  motives  involving  malicious  intent.^' 

§  333.  Animosity  between  the  accused  and  the  deceased. — Where 
the  existence  of  present  malice  or  premeditation  is  in  issue,  evi- 
dence of  previous  quarrels  or  difficulties  between  the  accused  and 
the  deceased  is  always  received'^  if  the  parties  have  not  become 
completely  and  permanently  reconciled."'*   Thus,  evidence  that  the 


'"Murphy  v.  State,  s6  Tex.  Cr.  24, 
35  S.  W.  174;  Commonwealth  v.  Ab- 
bott, 130  IMass.  472,  476;  State  v. 
Hawley,  63  Conn.  47,  27  Atl.  417; 
Alexander  v.  United  States,  138  U. 
S.  353,  34  L.  ed.  954,  11  Sup.  Ct.  350; 
Pollard  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.  1910), 
125  S.  W.  390. 

"State  V.  Johnson,  31  La.  Ann. 
368;  Pace  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
37  S.  W.  948,  18  Ky.  L.  690.  It  is 
improper  to  admit  evidence  that  some 
third  person  had  a  motive  to  kill  de- 
ceased and  was  near  the  scene  of  the 
crime  where  such  third  person  is  in  no 
wise  connected  with  the  crime  by 
other  evidence.  Walker  v.  State,  139 
.•\la.  56,  35  So.  loii. 

'•  Marler  v.  State,  67  Ala.  55,  66, 
42  .Am.  95;  Sanford  v.  State,  143  Ala. 
78,  39  So.  370. 

"  Nicholas  v.  Commonwealth,  91 
Va.  741,  21  S.  E.  364,  366;  State  v. 
Pennington,  124  Mo.  388,  27  S.  VV. 
1 106;  State  V.  Rash,  12  Ired.  (N. 
Car.)  382,  55  Am.  Dec.  420;  State  v. 
Pike,  65  Me.  II r;  State  v.  Pctsch,  43 
S.  Car.  132,  20  S.  K.  993;  State  v. 
Craftnn,  89  Iowa  109,  56  N.  W.  257; 
Mcf'ridc  v.  People,  5  Colo.  App.  91, 
37    Pnc.   953 ;    People   v.    M'Kay,    122 


Cal.  628,  55  Pac.  594;  State  v.  Cole- 
man, III  La.  303,  35  So.  560;  State 
V.  Brooks,  79  S.  Car.  144,  60  S.  E. 
518,  128  Am.  St.  836,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  483;  Pratt  V.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr. 
281,  109  S.  W.  138;  Waters  v.  State, 
54  Tex.  Cr.  322,  114  S.  W.  628;  State 
V.  Churchill,  52  Wash.  210,  100  Pac. 
309;  State  v.  Clark,  119  La.  733,  44 
So.  449;  State  v.  Baudoin,  115  La. 
837,  40  So.  239;  State  V.  Exum,  138 
N.  Car.  599,  50  S.  E.  283;  Shirley  v. 
State,  144  Ala.  35,  40  So.  269 ;  People 
v.  Williamson,  6  Cal.  App.  336,  92 
Pac.  313;  Sylvester  v.  State,  46  Fla. 
166,  35  So.  142;  Gallegos  v.  State, 
48  Tex.  Cr.  58,  85  S.  W.  11 50;  San- 
derson v.  State,  169  Ind.  301,  82  N. 
E.  525 ;  People  v.  Dinser,  49  Misc. 
(X.  Y.)  82,  98  N.  Y.  S.  314;  Spencer 
v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  107  S.  W. 
342,  32  Ky.  L.  880.  The  rule  of  the 
text  is  applical)lc  to  a  prosecution  for 
assault  with  intent  to  murder.  Ellis 
V.  State,  120  Ala.  333,  25  So.  i;  Bar- 
nett  V.  State  (Ala.,  1909),  51  So.  299; 
State  V.  Butler  (Iowa,  1910),  125  N. 
W.  106. 

'^Tidwell  V.  Slate,  70  Ala.  33,  46; 
Early  v.   State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  382,   103 


^  ?>33 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


586 


accused  had  frequently  (|uarreled  with.  Ijrulally  beaten  and  threat- 
ened to  kill  his  wife,  with  whose  murder  he  is  charged,  or  had 
made  remarks  reflecting  on  her  character,'''  is  competent  to  enable 
the  jury  to  determine  whether  malice  was  present.  The  fact  that 
these  marital  bickerings  cover  a  period  of  years  and  continue 
down  to  the  death,  strengthens  this  evidence.'"  This  evidence  is 
recei\cd  for  the  same  reason  that  previous  threats  by  any  person 
are  admissible."  It  tends  to  show  the  existence  of  animosity 
between  the  parties,  xmd  its  relevancy  results  from  the  fact  that 
the  existence  of  prior  ill-feeling  not  onh-  renders  the  commission 
of  the  crime  more  probable,  but  tends  to  show'  the  malice  or  ])re- 
meditation  of  the  accused."®  It  is  immaterial  how  remote  in  time 
the  hostile  acts  were,  as  far  as  the  competency  of  the  evidence  is 
concerned,"''  nor  can  the  details  of  the  previous  difficulty  be 
proved  to  show  which  party  was  in  the  wrong.*"* 

Evidence  of  prior  ill-feeling  between  the  defendant  and  the 
deceased  is  admissible  in  favor  of  the  former  as  well  as  against 
him.  This  is  the  case  where  a  plea  of  provocation  or  self-defense 
is  made  and  the  evidence  is  contradictory  as  to  whom  was  the 
aggressor."*'    The  i)rosecution  may  prove  that  when  a  third  person 


S.  W.  868,  123  Am.  St.  889.  Evi- 
dence of  friendly  conduct  and  decla- 
rations on  the  part  of  the  parties  is 
always  competent  in  rebuttal  of  a 
former  difficulty  and  threats  and  ill 
will  of  the  deceased.  Watson  v. 
State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  85,  105  S.  W.  509. 

'^  People  V.  Buchanan,  145  N.  Y.  i, 
39  N.  E.  846. 

'"3  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  145;  Koerner  v. 
State,  98  Ind.  7,  25;  State  v.  O'Neil, 
51  Kan.  651,  665,  33  Pac.  287,  24  L. 
R-  A.  555;  McCann  v.  People,  3 
Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  272;  Sayres  v. 
Commonwealth,  88  Pa.  St.  291 ;  State 
V.  Bradley,  67  Vt.  465,  32  Atl.  238; 
Phillips  V.  State,  62  Ark.  119,  34  S. 
^V.  539;  Thiede  v.  Utah  Territorj-, 
159  U.  S.  510,  40  L.  ed.  237,  16  Sup. 
Ct.  62. 

"  A  non-expert  witness  may  be  per- 
mitted   to   give    an   opinion    that    the 


deceased  and  the  defendant  were  on 
good  terms.  State  v.  Stackhousc,  24 
Kan.  445,  453. 

■nVhite  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  652, 
18  S.  W.  462;  Finch  v.  State,  81  Ala. 
41,  50,  I  So.  565. 

"  Sayres  v.  Commonwealth,  88  Pa. 
St.  291 ;  Koerner  v.  State,  98  Ind.  7. 
But  compare  Poe  v.  State,  155  Ala. 
31,  46  So.  521. 

^  People  v.  Thomson,  92  Cal.  506, 
512,  28  Pac.  589;  Gordon  v.  State, 
140  Ala.  29,  36  So.  1009;  Logan  v. 
State,  149  Ala.  11,  43  So.  10;  Patter- 
son v.  State,  156  Ala.  62,  47  So.  52; 
Stallworth  v.  State,  146  .Ala.  8,  41  So. 
184;  Thompson  v.  State,  84  Miss.  758, 
36  So.  389;  State  V.  Birks,  199  Mo. 
263,  97  S.  W.  578:  Jay  V.  State.  52 
Tex.  Cr.  567,  109  S.  W.  131;  Bluett 
V.  State,  151  Ala.  41,  44  So.  84. 

*'Coxwell  V.  State,  66  Ga.  309,  3^3', 


587  HOMICIDE.  §    334 

attempted  to  make  peace  between  the  deceased  and  tlie  accused 
that  the  latter  refused  to  settle  the  trouble  amicabh'  and  said  he 
would  not  accept  an  apology  from  the  deceased/- 

^  334.  Expert  and  non-expert  evidence  as  regards  blood  stains. — 
All  persons  are  more  or  less  familiar  with  the  a])pearance  of  stains 
caused  by  blood.  It  has,  therefore,  been  repeatedly  held  from 
time  immemorial  that  ordinary  witnesses  may  testify  that  certain 
stains  on  clothing  or  other  articles  "look  like"  or  resemble  blood 
stains.  A  non-expert  may  state  that  he  saw  stains  and  describe 
their  color, "^  or  that  garments  "looked  like  the  blood  had  been 
M-ashed  off."*"*  No  peculiar  skill  or  experience  is  required  to  be 
possessed  by  a  w^itness  who  saw  the  stains  in  court  or  elsewhere 
to  render  his  evidence  admissible,  nor  need  a  chemical  analysis, 
or  test,  or  a  microscopical  examination  have  been  made.^^ 

The  testimony  of  a  witness  that  he  recognized  blood  stains  on 
an  article  which  he  has  seen  is  not  secondary  evidence,  compared 
with  the  opinion  of  a  chemist,  based  solely  on  an  analysis.""' 
though  the  oi)inion  of  the  expert  witness  may  be  received  with 
more  confidence  in  the  minds  of  the  jury.  Though  any  witness 
may  testify  that  a  stain  looks  like  a  blood  stain,  only  a  skilled 
physician  or  microscopist  should  be  permitted  to  give  an  opinion, 
after  analysis,  on  the  question,  was  the  stain  in  question  caused 

Wcllar  V.  People,  30  Mich.  16;  Gun-  '^Walker  v.   State,   153   .Ma.  31,  45 

ter  V.   State,  in   Ala.  23,  20  So.  632,  So.  640. 

56  Am.  St.  17;  People  v.  Hecker.  log  '"People  v.  Gonzalez,  35  X.  Y.  49, 

Cal.  451,  42   Pac.   307,  30   L.    R.   A.  61 ;   State  v.   Bradley,  67  Vt.  465,  32 

403;    Stewart  v.    State,   78  .Ala.   436;  .\tl.  238;  State  v.  Welch,  36  W.  Va. 

State  V.   Cooper,  32   La.   Ann.    1084;  6go,   15  S.   E.  419;   Thomas  v.   State, 

McMccn   V.   Commonwealth,    114   Pa.  67  Ga.  460,  464;  McLain  v.  Common- 

St.  300,  9  .Atl.  878;  Marnoch  v.  State,  wealth,  99  Pa.  St.  86,  100;  Greenfield 

7  Tex.  App.  269,  272  (to  explain  why  v.    People,   85    X.    Y.   75,   83,   39   Am. 

defendant    went    armed    to    the    place  636:    Dillard   v.    State,  58   Miss.   368; 

where    he    met    deceased)  ;    State    v.  People  v.  Deacons,  109  X.  Y.  374,  382, 

Seymour,  94  Iowa  699,  63  X.  W.  661;  16   X.   E.  676;    People  v.   Smith,    106 

.•\ustin   V.   Commonwealth    fKy.),   40  Cal.  TJ^,  39  Pac.  40. 

S.  W.  905,  19  Ky.  L.  474.  "  People  v.  Gonzalez,  35  X.   Y.  49 

"Pettis  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  66,  81  6r.     A    piece   of  board   cut    from   tin 

S.  W.  3r2.  floor  of  a  room  in  which  a  homicido 

"  Gantling  v.  State,  40  Fla.  237,  23  was  conmiittcd  is  admissible  to  show- 
So.  857.  the    stains.      State    v.    M.irlin,    47    S 

Car.  67,  25  S.  E.  \\z. 


^  334 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCI 


588 


1)}"  the  blood  of  a  Ininian  l)cinj;  or  Ijy  that  of  otlicr  animals?" 
Evidence  that  there  was  a  great  effusion  of  blood  may  be  admis- 
sible to  show  the  nature  of  the  wound. '^'^  A  fatal  blow  with  a 
heavy  blunt  instrument  produces  little  effusion  of  blood,  while 
a  cut  or  a  stab  with  a  sword  or  knife  will  cause  an  outpouring 
that  may  spatter  with  blood  every  person  and  object  in  the  vicin- 
ity. Evidence  that  the  clothing  of  the  accused  was  spattered 
with  blood  is  relevant,  and  may  justify  a  strong  inference  that  he 
is  guilty.  On  the  other  hand,  the  absence  of  such  stains  is  not 
relevant,  and  usually  would  have  no  force  as  indicating  inno- 
cence. The  accused  may  have  removed  the  incriminating  marks 
or,  even  in  the  case  of  homicide  by  cutting,  may  have  inflicted  the 
wound  in  such  a  way  that  no  blood  was  spattered  on  him. 

The  direction  and  form  of  blood  stains  on  doors,  walls  or  fur- 
niture is  relevant  to  show  the  position  of  the  deceased  when  he 
was  killed.  So  the  position  of  such  stains  on  the  clothing  of  de- 
ceased may  be  relevant  to  show  whether  he  was  standing  or  re- 
clininir  when  the  fatal  blow  was  received.**" 


"  People  V.  Bell,  49  Cal.  485 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Dorsey,  103  Mass.  412, 
420;  Gaines  v.  Commonwealth,  50  Pa. 
St.  319;  State  V.  Knight,  43  Me.  11; 
Lindsay  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143; 
State  V.  Miller,9  Houst.  (Del.)  564,32 
Atl.  137;  State  V.  Alton,  105  Minn.  410, 
117  N.  W.  617.  In  State  v.  Knight,  43 
Me.  II,  pp.  19-25,  will  be  found  fully 
reported  the  language  of  an  expert 
chemist  who  had  made  a  chemical 
and  microscopical  examination  of 
blood  stains,  detailing  in  full  the 
methods  of  examination,  the  facts 
observed  and  the  results  achieved. 
Sime  microscopists  affirm  that  it  is 
easy  to  recognize  human  blood  by 
the  size  and  shape  of  the  corpuscles. 
The  more  recent  and,  perhaps,  better 
opinion  is,  that  "while  a  skillful  ex- 
pert can,  with  certainty,  distinguish 
between  human  blood  corpuscles  and 
those  of  the  blood  of  a  cow,  pig  or 
other  domestic  animals  with  which  it 


would  be  likely  to  be  confounded, 
still,  in  a  murder  trial,  where  human 
life  is  at  stake,  the  expert  is  hardly 
warranted  to  swear  that  the  blood 
stain  is  any  more  than  that  of  an 
animal."  See  Reese  Med.  Jurispru- 
dence, p.  132  (2d  ed.),  1889;  Beale's 
Microscope  in  Medicine,  4th  ed.,  p. 
266,  10  Cent.  Law  Jour.  (Feb.,  1880) 
183,  and  the  remarks  of  the  court  in 
pointing  out  with  what  caution  such 
expert  evidence  should  be  received. 
State  v.  Miller,  9  Houst.  (Del.)  564, 
32  Atl.  137. 

^  O'Mara  v.  Commonwealth,  75  Pa. 
St.  424. 

^  Richardson  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 
486,  492;  Wilson  v.  United  States,  162 
U.  S.  613,  40  L.  ed.  1090,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
895 ;  Jackson  v.  Commonwealth,  100 
Ky.  239,  38  S.  \V.  422.  109T,  18  Ky.  L. 
795,  66  Am.  St.  22>(>'^  Hinshaw  v. 
State,  147  Ind.  334,  47  N.  E.  157. 


589 


HOMICIDE. 


§  335.  Conspiracy  to  commit  homicide. — If  the  homicide  is  the 
result  of  a  conspiracy  the  acts  or  declarations  of  anv  one  of  the 
conspirators  are  binding  upon  his  criminal  associates  if  made 
during  the  existence  of  the  conspiracy  and  in  furtherance  of  its 
object.^'' 

§  336.  Preparation  to  commit  homicide. — Evidence  of  prepara- 
tion to  commit  a  homicide,  or  of  attempts  to  prepare  for  its  com- 
mission, is  always  relevant.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  accused 
was  armed  shortly  before  the  commission  of  the  crime. ^^  It  is 
always  relevant  to  show  that  the  defendant  at  or  immediately 
before  the  date  of  the  crime  had  in  his  possession  the  means  for 
its  commission.  It  may  be  shown  that  a  few  days  before  the 
crime  he  bought  shells  for  use  in  his  gun  where  similar  shells 
were  found  near  the  scene  of  the  crime.''-  It  may  also  be  proved 
that  a  third  person  purchased  cartridges  a  short  time  before  the 
crime  if  there  is  evidence  of  a  conspiracy  between  the  purchaser 
and  the  accused.'*^  And  such  evidence  is  competent,  it  seems, 
even  where  the  purchaser  was  present  at  the  commission  of  the 


'"  See  §§  492,  493;  State  v.  McCahill, 
72  Iowa  III.  This  rule  is  well  illus- 
trated in  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  i, 
12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am.  St. 
320n,  commonly  called  the  "Anar- 
chists' Case."  Here  it  appeared  from 
the  evidence  that  an  illegal  association 
had  been  formed,  having  for  its  ob- 
ject the  overturning  of  government 
and  the  abolition  of  law.  It  was 
proved  that  certain  newspapers  and  a 
book  entitled  the  "Science  of  Revo- 
lutionary Warfare,"  advocating  these 
views  and  pointing  out  how  they 
might  be  advanced  and  the  purposes 
of  the  society  accomplished  by  the 
use  of  dynamite  bombs  and  other 
violent  means,  were  read  and  circu- 
lated by  members  of  the  association 
and  approved  by  its  officials.  It  was 
also  shown  that  the  speakers  of  the 
association  had,  at  its  meetings,  used 
language  inciting  their  hearers  to  as- 


sault policemen  and  to  commit  riot 
and  murder.  Upon  murder  resulting 
from  the  conspiracy,  these  written  and 
spoken  declarations  were  held  binding 
upon  all  members  of  the  association. 
Evidence  in  prosecution  for  homi- 
cide in  carrying  out  unlawful  conspi- 
racy, 68  L.  R.  A.  215,  note. 

*'Way  V.  State  (Ala.,  1908),  46  So. 
273;  Ferguson  v.  State,  141  Ala.  20, 
27  So.  448;  People  v.  Sutherland,  154 
N.  Y.  345,  48  X.  E.  518.  The  accused 
cannot  offer  evidence  to  show  his 
"uncommunicated  intention"  in  thus 
arming  himself.  Dean  v.  State,  105 
Ala.  21,  17  So.  28,  29.  Cf.  Gilcreasc 
V.   State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  619,  28  S.  W. 

531. 

*"  Anderson  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr. 
341,  no  S.  W.  54;  Garner  v.  State, 
6  Ga.  App.  788,  65  S.  E.  842. 

•'  Pulpus  V.  State,  84  Miss.  49,  36 
So.  190. 


§    2)3^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  59O 

crime  without  actual  proof  of  couspiracy.""*  It  would  seem  that 
evidence  of  the  purchase  or  possession  of  the  means  of  commit- 
ting the  homicide  would  only  be  relevant  where  the  homicide 
was  in  fact  committed  by  the  use  of  such  means,  but  it  has  been 
permitted  to  be  proved  that  the  accused  purchased  i)istol  car- 
tridges where  the  crime  was  not  committed  with  a  pistol.''^  If 
the  body  of  the  decedent  shows  incised  wounds  it  is  proper  to 
permit  the  state  to  show  that  the  accused  was  the  owner  of  a 
knife,  and  had  it  a  short  time  before  the  crime,  though  it  is  not 
identified  as  the  weapon  with  which  the  crime  was  committed."" 
And  in  one  case  evidence  to  show  that  the  accused  had  access  to 
a  weapon  with  which  the  crime  might  have  been  committed  was 
received.""  So  it  may  be  proved  that  the  accused  w^as  familiar 
with  the  use  of  firearms."-  But  proof  that  the  accused  had  in  his 
possession,  or  attempted  to  procure  a  weapon,  is  not  conclusive 
and  in  fact  does  not  necessarily  create  any  presumi)tion  that  he 
intended  to  use  it  for  criminal  purposes.  He  may  always  show 
that  the  deceased  had  threatened  him  and  other  circumstances 
wdiich  would  justify  a  plea  of  self-defense.""  The  presence  of 
the  accused  in  the  locality  of  the  crime,  immediately  prior  to  its 
commission,  may  be  shown.  But  this  fact  possesses  little  value 
as  evidence,  unless  coupled  with  a  suspicious  circumstance,  as  his 
being  disguised,  or  armed,  or  his  uttering  threats  against  the  de- 
ceased.^"" 

§  337.  Footprints. — A  comparison  of  footjM'ints  proved  to  have 
been  made  by  the  ])risoner  with  other  tracks  or  footprints  found 
near  the  scene  of  the  homicide  is  relevant,  if  a  doubt  arises  on  the 
evidence  which  was  the  slayer.^     But  the  o])inion  of  a  witness 

**  State  V.  ThrailkiU,  71  S.  Car.  136,  "^  Rodriquez  v.   State.   32  Tex.  Cr. 

50  S.  E.  551.  259.  22  S.  W.  978:  State  v.  Craemer, 

"■''Hocker  v.  Commonwealth    (Ky.),  12  Wash.  217,  40  Pac.  944- 

III  S.  W.  676,  33  Ky.  L.  944.  '  Bouldin  v.  State,  8  Tex.  .\pp.  .3.32; 

"*  Jones  V.  State,  137  Ala.  12,  34  So.  Campbell  v.  State,  23  Ala.  44:  People 

681.  V.    McCurdy,   68   Cal.    576:    Stokes  v. 

"•  Lillie  V.  State,  72  Xcb.  228,  100  X.  State,   5  Baxt.    (Tenn.)    619.   30  Am. 

W.  316.  72;   Dunn  v.   People,   158  HI.   .s86,  42 

'M.illie   V.    State,  72   Xeb.  228,    100  X.  E.  47;    Dillin   v.    People.  8  Mich. 

X.  W.  316.  357;  Murphy  v.  People.  63  X.  Y.  590. 

■^  State  V.  Hough,  138  X.  Car.  663,  395,  596;  State  v.  Sanders.  73  S.  Car. 

50  S.  E.  709.  409,  56  S.  E.  35 ;  Krens  v.   State,  75 


)9i 


HOMICIDE. 


that  footprints  near  the  scene  of  the  crime  were  those  of  the 
accused  not  based  on  a  comparison  is  not  admissible."  But  the 
accused,  by  virtue  of  his  constitutional  immunity  against  being" 
compelled  to  testify  against  himself,  cannot  be  compelled  to  make 
an  impression  of  his  shoe  or  foot  in  some  soft  substance  so  that 
the  footprints  thus  produced  may  be  compared  with  others  which 
have  been  disco\-ered  in  the  vicinity  of  the  place  of  the  homicide."' 
If  the  accused  \'oluntarily  places  his  foot  in  a  footprint  near 
the  scene  of  the  homicide  or  permits  his  shoe  to  be  placed  in  the 
track  by  a  third  person,  the  latter  may  testify  to  the  result  of 
the  comparison  and,  where  such  testimony  was  given  at  the  cor- 
oner's inquest  in  the  presence  of  the  defendant  it  may  subse- 
quently be  proved  at  the  trial.* 

5  338.  Self-defense — Burden  of  proof — Malice. — In  a  murder  trial 
if  the  homicide  is  denied,  the  burden  of  proving  the  crime  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  in  all  its  constituent  elements,  /.  e.,  the  corpus 
delicti  and  the  malicious  intention  is  upon  the  state  throughout.' 
If  the  killing  is  proved  or  admitted  by  the  accused,  malice  may  be 
inferred  from  the  circumstances  already  proved,  and  it  is  then 
incumbent  upon  the  defendant  to  prove  circumstances  that  will 


Xeb.  294,  106  X.  \V.  27,  and  §  ^7^^ 
burglary. 

■  Du  Bosc  V.  State,  148  .Ma.  560,  42 
So.  862.  Evidence  of  footprints  of 
accused,  94  .•\m.  St.  342,  note ;  evi- 
dence of  measurements  of  footprints, 
53  .'\m.  St.  383,  note. 

"Stokes  V.  State,  5  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
619,  30  Am.  72,  and  see  §  372,  where 
this  subject  is  fully  discussed. 

■*  State  V.  Sanders,  75  S.  Car.  409, 
56  S.  E.  35. 

'"  People  V.  Coughlin,  65  Mich.  704, 
2,2  X.  W.  905,  9  West.  129;  State  v. 
Porter,  34  Iowa  131  ;  State  v.  WinRo, 
66  Mo.  181,  27  Am.  329;  State  v.  Don- 
ahoe,  78  Iowa  486,  43  X.  W.  297; 
People  V.  Riordan,  7  X.  Y.  Cr.  7; 
State  V.  Allen,  48  La.  .Ann.  1387,  20 
So.  iot2;  King  v.  State,  74  Miss.  576, 
2\    So.   23s;    State    V.    Williams,    122 


Iowa  115,  97  X.  W.  992;  State  v. 
Tcachcy,  138  X.  Car.  587,  50  S.  E. 
232;  Commonwealth  v.  Dcitrick,  221 
Pa.  7,  70  Atl.  275.  The  burden  is  on 
the  accused  to  show  inability  to  re- 
treat with  safety  and  all  the  elements 
of  self-defense.  McBryde  v.  State, 
156  Ala.  44,  47  So.  302;  State  v. 
Thrailkill,  71  S.  Car.  136,  50  S.  E. 
551.  In  the  case  of  State  v.  Quick,  150 
N.  Car.  820,  64  S.  E.  168,  it  was  said 
that  an  intentional  killing  with  a 
deadly. weapon  creates  a  presumption 
of  malice  and  the  crime  is  nuirder 
unless  tlie  facts  subsequently  proved 
either  justify  the  killing  or  reduce  it 
to  manslaughter  and  that  the  burden 
is  on  (he  accused  to  show  these  facts 
though  proof  of  such  facts  may  arise 
out  of  tile  evidence  against  him. 


§     7,^8  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  592 

excuse,  mitigate  or  justify  tlic  killing,  unless  (and  this  exception 
is  extremely  important),  the  proof  offered  by  the  state  tends  to 
show  the  defendant  was  exctised  or  justified."  If  circumstances 
are  shown  by  the  state  from  wliich.  when  uncontradicted  or 
proved,  a  presumption  of  malice  is  drawn  by  the  law  as  for  ex- 
ample the  intentional  use  of  a  deadly  weapon,  or  an  inference  may 
be  drawn  b}'  the  jurors,  it  is  considered  that  the  state  has  satis- 
fied the  rule  casting  the  burden  upon  it,  and  that  the  accused,  if 
he  wishes  to  exculpate  himself  by  a  plea  of  self-defense,  must 
]Mo\e  the  facts  on  which  his  plea  is  based, ^  perhaps  by  a  prepon- 
derance of  the  evidence.** 

The  rule  as  here  stated  is  perhaps  equivalent  in  meaning  to 
an  instruction  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  defendant 
where  he  relies  upon  any  distinct  affirmative  fact  to  exonerate 
him.  Such  an  instruction  has  been  supported  by  numerous  cases 
where  the  fact  relied  on  to  obtain  an  acquittal  was  the  insanity 
of  the  accused,  or  an  assertion  that  the  defendant  killed  the  de- 
ceased under  a  reasonable  apprehension  that  his  own  life  was  in 
danger."  But  the  qualification  may  always  be  safely  added  that 
the  defendant  need  not  himself  offer  positive  and  affirmative 
evidence  to  sustain  this  burden.  He  should  receive  the  benefit 
of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  whether  offered  by  him  or  by  the 
state.     If  any  fact  proved  against  him  by  the  prosecution  satis- 

"  State   V.    Cephus    (Del.),   67   Atl.  State  v.  Dillard,  59  W.  Va.  197,  53  S. 

150;   State  V.   Peterson,   149  N.   Car.  E.  117;  State  v.  Skinner  (Nev.,  1909), 

533.  63  S.  E.  87;  State  v.  Walker,  145  104  Pac.  223. 

N.  Car.  567,  59  S.  E.  878;  People  v.  *  State   v.   Jones,   20   W.   Va.   764; 

Tarm  Poi,  86  Cal.  2^5,  -?.i   Pac.  998;  Henson  v.  State,  112  Ala.  41,  21  So. 

Gibson  v.  State,  89  Ala.  121,  8  So.  98,  79;  State  v.  Ballon,  20  R.  I.  607,  40 

18  Am.    St.   96;    State  v.   Yates,    132  Atl.  861;    State  v.   Moss,  77   S.   Car. 

Iowa  475,  109  X.  W.  1005;  Lawson  v.  391,   57    S.    E.    1098;    Commonwealth 

State,    171    Ind.   431,   84   N.    E.    974.  v.  Palmer,  222  Pa.  299,  71   Atl.   100. 

Compare  Nail  v.  State,  125  Ga.  234,  128  Am.  St.  809,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

54  S.  E.  145.  483n;     Hoffman     v.     Commonwealth 

^Sawyer  v.  People,  91   N.  Y.  667;  (Ky.,  1909),  121  S.  W.  690;  State  v. 

State  V.    Skidmore,  87  X.   Car.   509;  Strother  (S.  Car.),  66  S.  E.  877. 

State  V.  Kibler,  79  S.  Car.  170,  60  S.  "  Burden  of  proof  as  to  insanity  or 

E.  438;  Lewis  V.  State,  120  Ala.  339,  self-defense,  Elliott  Evidence,  §§  3022, 

25  So.  43;  State  V.  Byrd,  121  N.  Car.  3023,   3041,  3041a;    self-defense,   bur- 

684,  28  S.  E.  353;  Robinson  v.  State,  den  of  proof  of  freedom  from  fault, 

155  Ala.  67,  45  So.  916;  Coolman  v.  45  L.  R.  A.  687,  note. 
State,    163   Ind.   503,   72   X.   E.   568; 


593  HOMICIDE.  §    338a 

fies  the  jury  that  the  kilHng  was  excusable  or  justifiable,  the  jury 
should  acquit  him/*'  Any  instruction,  whatever  its  language, 
which  in  effect  imposes  an  obligation  upon  the  defendant  of  prov- 
ing affirmatively  that  no  crime  was  committed,  constitutes  re- 
versible error,  as  it  clearly  deprives  him  of  the  benefit  of  the 
reasonable  doubt  which  may  arise  on  all  the  evidence." 

§  338a.  The  alibi  of  the  alleged  victim. — Not  only  must  the  state 
l^rove  the  death  of  sonic  human  being,  l)ut  it  must  also  prove  that 
the  identical  human  being  named  in  the  indictment  as  having 
been  killed  is  dead  as  the  result  of  some  act  of  the  accused.  The 
fact  that  such  a  person  is  actually  dead  may,  in  the  large  majority 
of  cases,  be  readily  proved  by  the  direct  evidence  of  those  who 
were  his  friends  and  acquaintances  in  life,  and  who  have  seen 
his  corpse.  In  some  exceptional  cases  such  proof  is  impossible. 
The  state  in  proving  the  corpus  delicti  and  the  identity  of  the 
deceased  will  then  have  to  rely  upon  circumstantial  evidence 
alone.  Such  proof  is  all  that  is  available  and  necessary  wherever 
the  killing  was  procured  or  was  accompanied  by  methods  which 
resulted  in  a  more  or  less  complete  destruction,  by  fire  or  other- 
wise, of  the  body  of  the  alleged  deceased;^-  so  that  all  that  re- 
mains for  purposes  of  identification  is  a  handful  of  bones  or  a 
charred  or  decapitated  corpse. 

Where  this  happens  the  accused,  while  denying,  and,  perhaps, 
attempting  to  disprove  the  identity  of  the  remains,  also  fre- 
quently alleges,  directly  or  by  inference,  that  the  alleged  victim 
of  the  homicide  is  alive. 

That  a  man  has  disappeared  suddenly  from  his  accustomed 
h.aunts  without  having  prepared  for,  or  informed  his  associates 
of,  his  intended  departure  is  by  no  means  proof  that  he  is  dead. 
But  evidence  of  a  sudden  and  unexplained  disappearance  is  al- 
ways admissible  and  may  be  considered  by  the  jury.    If,  however, 

'"State  V.   Castle,   133  X.  Car.  769,  So.  497;  State  v.  Hatch,  57  Kan.  420, 

^t  S.  E.  I.  46  Pac.  708,  57  Am.  St.  337;  State  v. 

"  Clirisman  v.  State,  54  .\rk.  283,  15  Crca,  10  Idaho  88.  76  Pac.  1013;  State 

S.  VV.  889,  26  .'\m    St.  44;   People  v.  v.  Presslcr,  16  Wyo.  214,  92  Pac.  806; 

Downs,  \23  X.  Y.  558,  25  X.  E.  988;  State  v.  Dillard,  59  W.  Va.  197,  53  S. 

Tweedy  v.  State,  5  Iowa  433;  Gravely  E.  117. 
V.  State,  38  N'fh-  871,  874.  57  X.  W.        "See  ante.  §  7- 
75';  I-inchan  v.  State,  113  .Ma.  70,  21 
38 — U.M)ERiiii,i.  Ckim.  Ev. 


35^^ 


CRIMINAL    KVIDKXCE. 


594 


the  state  offers  such  evidence  in  connection  with  proof  of  tlu 
finding  of  the  alleged  remains  of  the  deceased  in  such  a  condition 
as  to  render  their  identity  in  the  least  doubtful,  it  is  comi)etent 
for  the  accused  to  prove  that  the  alleged  deceased  was  not  killed. 
The  production  of  the  person  in  court,  provided  he  is  proj)- 
erly  identified,  would,  of  course,  be  conclusive.  This,  however, 
is  seldom  attempted.  Witnesses  are  usually  introduced  who  tes- 
tify that  they  are  acquainted  with  the  deceased,  and  that  thev 
have  seen  him  alive  at  a  date  subsequent  to  the  alleged  killing. 
\\'hile  there  is  nothing  per  sc  suspicious  in  such  testimony,  ex- 
])erience  teaches  us  that  such  e\'idence  can  be  readily  fabricated 
without  much  danger  of  detection  or  punishment.  But  if,  by 
such  testimony,  the  accused  shall  succeed  in  raising  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  the  death  of  the  deceased  he  ought  to  be  acquitted.^'' 


"Ausmus  V.  People  (Colo.,  1910), 
107  Pac.  204.  Two  curious  and  im- 
portant cases  recently  pending  in  the 
courts  of  New  York  and  Illinois  illus- 
trate the  principles  set  forth  in  the 
text.  In  the  case  of  the  People  v. 
Luetgert  (tried  in  the  citj^  of  Chicago) 
the  accused  was  charged  with  killing 
his  wife  and  with  subsequently  at- 
tempting to  destroy  her  body  by 
immersing  it  in  powerful  chem- 
icals in  a  vat  in  a  factory  of 
which  he  was  proprietor.  The 
only  proof  of  the  corpus  delicti 
offered  b}'  the  state  was  a  few  bones, 
or  portions  of  bones,  and  evidence 
that  the  woman  had  unexpectedly  and 
unaccountably  disappeared.  The  ac- 
cused, to  account  for  his  wife's  disap- 
pearance, endeavored  to  show  that  he 
and  she  had  disagreed  and  that  she 
had  deserted  him  for  the  purpose  of 
procuring  a  divorce.  He  also  pro- 
duced   witnesses     who     swore,     with 


great  positiveness,  that  they  had  seen 
a  woman,  whom  they  then  identified 
as  the  missing  wife,  alive  since  the 
commission  of  the  crime  charged.  In 
the  New  York  case  a  woman,  named ' 
Xack,  was  jointly  indicted  with  her 
paramour,  one  Thorn,  for  the  murder 
of  Goldensuppe,  her  discarded  lover. 
The  woman,  it  was  alleged,  lured  the 
deceased  to  a  vacant  house  in  a  lonely 
and  quiet  suburb  of  New  York  city, 
where  he  was  shot  by  Thorn  and  his 
body  cut  into  three  pieces.  The  sev- 
ered portions  of  the  trunk  were  care- 
fully wrapped  in  oil  cloth  and  cast 
into  the  river,  where  they  were  sub- 
sequentb'  found  and  positively  identi- 
fied by  the  associates  of  the  deceased. 
The  head  has  never  been  found.  In 
this  case  the  defense  was  that  Golden- 
suppe was  still  alive. 

Proof  of  alibi  under  a  charge  of 
conspiracy  to  kill,  68  L.  R.  A.  222, 
note. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON. 


§339-  Abduction — Proving  the  taking        351. 
away  or  enticement — Corrob- 
oration of  the  prosecutrix. 

340.  Abduction   of   a   minor — Proof       352. 

of    the    non-consent    of    the 
mother  or  other  guardian.  353. 

341.  Chastity    of    the    female — Pre- 

sumption of  chastity. 

342.  Evidence   to    show    the    age   of        354. 

prosecutrix. 

343.  Abduction   for  purposes  of 

prostitution  or  concubinage.         355. 

344.  Abortion   at   common   law    and        356. 

by  statute  distinguished. 

345.  Intention    to   produce   an   abor- 

tion— Evidence     of     other        356a 
crimes. 

346.  Victim    of   abortion    is    not    an        357. 

accomplice  —  Corroboration, 

when  required.  35S. 

347.  Necessity    for    the    operation — 

Burden  of  proof.  359. 

348.  Declarations    of    present    pain        360. 

and  suffering  and  dying  dec-        361. 
larations  of  the  victim.  362. 

349.  Evidence  of  the  woman's  phys-        363. 

ical    condition    and    illness — 
Direct  and  circumstantial  evi-        364. 
dence. 

350.  Expert    testimony  of   physician        365. 

— Evidence    afforded    by    the 
pnxt-ujortciu. 


Exception  to  rule  regulating 
privileged  communications  to 
physicians. 

.•\ssault  and  battery  —  Defini- 
tion. 

Evidence  to  show  present  abil- 
ity of  assailant  to  put  his  at- 
tempt in  action. 

Intention  to  do  bodily  harm — 
Circumstances  which  are  rel- 
evant. 

Evidence  of  other  assaults. 

Assault  with  deadly  weapons — 
Evidence  to  show  character 
of  weapon  used. 

Declarations  constituting  a  part 
of  the  res  cjcstcc. 

Evidence  of  threats  and  pre- 
vious hostility. 

Robbery — Intention  present  and 
force  employed. 

The  crime  of  mayhem. 

Sodomy. 

Criminal  libel  defined. 

The  publication  of  the  libel. 

The  meaning  of  the  language 
used. 

Malicious  intention  in  publish- 
ing. 

Evidence  of  the  truth  as  a  de- 
fense. 


.;■  339.  Abduction — Proving  the  taking  away  or  enticement — Cor- 
roboration of  the  prosecutrix. —  In  niminal  law,  the  act  of  takiiiu; 
away  a  woman  against  her  will,  01,  if  she  is  a  minor,  against  the 

(595) 


339 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE, 


596 


will  of  her  parents  or  some  oilier  person  having  lawful  control 
over  her,  is  an  abduction.  Whether  abduction  is  a  crime  in  the 
absence  of  statute  is  doubtful.  But  this  is  now  an  unimportant 
question,  as  the  subject  is  almost  universally  regulated  by  statute. 
The  taking  away  or  enticement  must  be  proved.^  It  need  not  be 
proved  that  the  taking  was  by  force  or  fraud.  It  is  enough  thai 
persuasion  or  enticement  was  employed."  But  evidence  that 
force  or  fraud  was  employed  in  taking  the  female  is  always  rele- 
vant. A  direct  proposal  or  express  enticement  need  not  be 
proved.  Either  may  be  inferred  by  the  jury  from  circumstances, 
such  as  the  association  of  the  prosecutrix  and  the  prisoner,  and 
from  the  fact  that  a  meeting  was  arranged  for  them  by  some 
third  person.^  Proof  of  a  taking  away  for  any  period  or  dis- 
tance, however  short,  is  enough.* 

Sometimes,  as  in  seduction,'^  it  is  enacted  that  a  conviction 
cannot  be  had  upon  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  the  female. 
If  corroborated  evidence  is  required,  it  need  not  be  direct  or 


^  Slocum  V.  People,  90  111.  274,  279. 
Evidence  that  the  accused  merely 
harbored  a  female,  though  for  im- 
moral purposes,  but  in  ignorance  of 
whom  she  was  or  whence  she  came, 
will  not  sustain  a  conviction  of  ab- 
duction. People  V.  Plath,  100  N.  Y. 
590,  594-597,  3  N-  E.  790,  53  Am.  236. 

Proof  in  prosecution  for  kidnap- 
ping, Elliott  Evidence,  §  2736;  com- 
mon law  rule  changed,  §  ^T^y.  Proof 
of  intent  in  abduction,  §2738;  in  kid- 
napping, §  2744.  Proof  of  taking 
away  or  detention,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§§  2742,  2743.  2747.  Proof  of  phys- 
ical force  not  required,  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2741. 

■  People  V.  ^rarshall,  59  Cal.  386, 
388;  People  V.  Demousset,  71  Cal.  611, 
613,  12  Pac.  788;  State  v.  Johnson, 
115  Mo.  480,  22  S.  W.  463;  State  v. 
Stone,  106  Mo.  i,  16  S.  W.  890;  State 
V.  Keith,  47  Minn.  559,  561,  50  X.  W. 
691 ;  State  v.  Jamison,  38  Minn.  21, 
23,  35  N.  W.  712;  Wallace  v.   State, 


147  Ind.  621,  47  N.  E.  13;  Beyer  v. 
People,  86  N.  Y.  369;  People  v.  See- 
ley,  2>7  Hun  (N.  Y.)  190.  Amatory 
letters,  written  by  the  defendant, 
though  without  date,  unsigned  by  him, 
and  not  proved  to  have  been  in  the 
possession  of  the  girl  abducted,  may 
be  proved  against  him  as  his  admis- 
sions. State  V.  Overstreet,  43  Kan. 
299,  23  Pac.  572. 

^People' v.  Carrier,  46  Mich.  442, 
447,  9  N.  W.  487 ;  People  v.  Wah  Lee 
Mon,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.)  626,  13  N.  Y. 
S.  767;  Huff  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
37  S.  W.  1046,  18  Ky.  L.  752. 

*  Slocum  V.  People,  90  111.  274,  276 ; 
State  V.  Stone,  106  Mo.  i,  16  S.  W. 
890;  Reg.  V.  Baillie,  8  Cox  C.  C.  238. 
Any  representation,  or  suggestion 
made  to  influence  the  female,  will,  if 
it  induces  her  to  go  away,  bring  the 
case  within  the  statute,  though  no  di- 
rect solicitation  be  used.  People  v. 
Carrier,  46  :Mich.  442,  9  N.  W.  487. 

"  See  §  §  389,  390. 


597 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON. 


§    340 


positive,  or  sufficient  alone  to  convict.''  Circumstantial  evidence 
will  suffice.  But  the  corroboration  should  extend  to  every  ma- 
terial fact  essential  to  constitute  the  crime  (among  which  the 
taking  away  is  most  important),  and  the  criminal  intent  and 
identity  of  the  abductor." 

^  340.  Abduction  of  a  minor — Proof  of  the  non-consent  of  the 
mother  or  other  guardian.— If  the  female  abducted  is  a  minor,  the 
burden  is  on  the  state  to  prove  the  non-consent  of  the  parent  or 
guardian.*^  The  latter  may  testify  that  the  taking  was  without 
his  or  her  consent,"  and  perhaps  on  this  point  he  is  an  indispensa- 
ble witness.^"  It  is  no  defense  to  prove  that  the  taking  was  with- 
out force,  and  with  the  consent  of  the  minor."  As  tending  to 
show  the  lack  of  the  consent  of  the  parents  it  may  be  shown  that 
neither  of  them  knew  where  the  child  was  and  that  the  mother 
sent  the  father  out  to  look  for  her.^- 


§  341.    Chastity  of  the  female — Presumption  of  chastity. — Where 

the  statute  provides  a  punishment   for  the  abduction  of  any  or 
every  female,  evidence  of  her  chastity,  or  the  reverse,  is  irrele- 


•  State  V.  Keith,  47  Minn.  559,  562, 
50  X.  W.  691 ;  Minn.  Penal  Code, 
§  241 ;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2757. 

^  People  V.  Plath,  100  X.  Y.  590,  593, 
594,  3  N-  E.  790,  53  Am.  236 ;  i  Cent. 
772;  State  V.  Keith,  47  Minn.  559, 
562,  so  X.  W.  691 ;  People  v.  Brandt, 
14  X.  Y.  St.  419,  whether  the  taking 
or  enticement  is  corroborated  is  for 
the  jury.  People  v.  Brown,  71  Hun 
fX.  Y.)  601,  24  X.  Y.  S.  nil.  See, 
also,  cases  cited  in  §§  389,  390,  post. 
In  the  absence  of  statute,  corrobora- 
tion is  unnecessary.  State  v.  Stone, 
106  Mo.  T.  16  S.  W.  890. 

•  But  State  v.  Burnett,  142  X.  Car. 
577.  .S.T  S.  E.  72,  places  the  burden  of 
proving  the  parents'  consent  on  the 
accused.  See,  also,  State  v.  Chisen- 
hall.  106  X.  Car.  676,  11  S.  E.  518. 

•  ScruRRs  V.  State,  90  Tcnn.  81,  15 
S.  W.   1074;  State  V.  Stone,  106  Mo. 


I,  7,  16  S.  \V.  890;  State  V.  Baldwin, 
214  Mo.  290,  113  S.  W.  1 123. 

'"  It  would  seem  by  analogy  that  the 
evidence  of  the  person  whose  consent 
was  not  given  is  primary  evidence  of 
non-consent,  as  in  larceny,  where  the 
owner  of  the  goods  must,  if  possible, 
be  called  to  prove  non-consent. 

Taking  against  will  of  person  ab- 
ducted, Elliott  Evidence,  §  2751. 

"  State  V.  Stone,  106  Mo.  i,  7,  16 
S.  W.  890;  State  V.  Bobbst,  131  Mo. 
328,  32  S.  W.  1 149.  Proof  of  age  and 
consent  in  prosecution  for  kidnap- 
ping, Ellif)tt  Evidence,  §  2739;  ab- 
duction from  house  without  consent 
r)f  parent  or  guardian,  Elliott  Evi- 
tlencc,  8  2748;  taking  from  residence 
or  custody,  §  2749;  taking  from  par- 
ent without  consent.  §  2750. 

"  State   v.   Chisi-nhall,    106    X.   Car 
676,  II  S.  E.  518. 


§    341  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  598 

vant.'^  It  is  otherwise  if  the  statute  refers  to  the  taking  away 
of  a  female  of  chaste  repute  or  character/^  and  then  a  single  act 
of  illicit  intercourse  witii  another  man  than  accused  may  be 
proved/'' 

Upon  the  question  whether  the  previous  chastity  of  the  prose- 
cutrix will  be  presumed,  or  whether  the  state  will  have  to  prove 
it.  as  an  essential  element  of  its  case,  the  authorities  are  divided. 
Some  of  the  cases,  basing  their  reasoning  upon  the  almost  uni- 
versal prevalence  of  female  chastity  admitted  to  exist  in  modern 
civilized  society,  maintain  that  it  is  a  presumption  of  law  that  she 
is  chaste,^''  and  cast  the  burden  of  proving  her  lack  of  chastity 
on  the  accused. 

It  has  also  been  held  that  no  presumption  exists  either  way, 
but  tliat,  in  view  of  the  presumed  innocence  of  the  accused,  the 
state  must,  in  the  first  instance,  introduce  some  evidence  of  chas- 
tity.^' It  is  competent  on  the  one  hand  to  show^  that  the  girl  ab- 
ducted was  reputed  to  be  a  prostitute^**  and  that  she  had  lived  in 
a  disreputable  house  and  associated  generally  with  disreputable 
persons,  or,  to  show  her  chastity,  that  she  had  before  the  abduction 
attended  Sunday  school  and  church  and  had  been  welcomed  in 
good  society.^^  The  evidence  of  the  unchastity  of  the  prosecutrix 
must  be  confined  to  her  conduct,  or  reputation,  prior  to  the  ab- 
duction by  which  she  has  been  corrupted.""  But  evidence  that 
after  the  taking  away  she  had  sexual  intercourse  with  the  accused 

^'People  V.  Demousset,  71  Cal.  611,  38    X.    E.    652;    Slocum    v.     People, 

612,  614,  12  Pac.  788;  State  v.  John-  90  111.  274;   Elliott  Evidence,  §  2755. 

son,  115  Mo.  480,  492,  22  S.  W.  463;  Previous    chaste    character,    Elliott 

State  V.  Gibson,  iii  Mo.  92,  19  S.  W.  Evidence,  §§  2753,  2754;  character  of 

980;    Scruggs  V.   State,  90  Tenn.   81,  victim  of  crime,  14  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.) 

15  S.  W.   1074;  State  V.  Bobbst,  131  725,  note. 

Mo.  328,  32  S.  W.  1 149,  1 1 50.  "Kerr    v.    United    States,    7    Ind. 

"Brown  v.  State,  72  Md.  468,  476,  Terr.  486,   104  S.  W.  809;  Common- 

20  Atl.   186;   People  V.  Roderigas,  49  wealth  v.   Whittaker,    131    Mass.  224, 

Cal.  9.     Proof  of  previous  unchastity  225.     See,  also,  §§  392,  393. 

as  a  defense,  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2756.  "  Brown   v.    State,   72    Md.   468,  20 

"  Lyons  v.  State,  52  Ind.  426,  427.  -Xtl.  186. 

*•  Andre  v.    State,   5    Iowa    389,   68  '"  Bradshaw  v.   People,   153  111.   156, 

Am.  Dec.  7o8n ;  State  v.  Higdon.  t,2  38  X.  E.  652. 

Iowa  262;  People  v.  Brewer,  27  Mich.  '"Scruggs  v.  State,  90  Tenn.  81.  85. 

134;  Bradshaw  v.  People,  153  111.  156,  15  S.  W.  1074;  Slocum  v.  People,  90 


599  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    342 

is  receivable  to  show  his  intent.-'  Evidence  that  the  mother,  or 
other  female  relatives  of  the  prosecutrix,  had  been  addicted  to 
lewdness,""  or  that  the  accused  had,  when  a  child,  lived  with  a 
prostitute,"^  is  inadmissible  as  being  too  remote. 

§  342.  Evidence  to  show  age  of  prosecutrix. — The  age  of  a  prose- 
cuting witness  alleged  to  be  under  the  age  of  consent  may  be 
pro\'ed  by  her  own  testimony,"*  though  her  parents  are  present 
and  testify  to  her  age."^  A  parent  may  testify  to  a  child's  age 
if  he  knows  the  age  independently  of  the  record  though  he  had 
written  the  date  in  the  family  Bible."'*  Her  evidence  is  primary 
and  original,  though  her  knowledge  is  based  solely  on  what  her 
parents  have  told  her,""  and  though  the  fact  is  also  recorded.  A 
non-expert  witness  may  testify  to  the  age  of  a  person  seen  out 
of  court.  He  should  be  asked  to  describe  the  person's  dress  and 
appearance,  and  he  may  then  state  his  opinion  as  to  his  or  her 
age."'"*  He  may  then  be  asked,  as  a  test,  to  give  his  opinion  of  the 
age  of  a  bystander,  the  latter  being  called  to  state  his  own  age  in 
rebuttal."'*  In  some  states  in  criminal  trials,  family  reputation 
as  to  age  has  been  held  inadmissible  as  being  hearsay.^''    Whether 

111.    274,   281;    People   V.    Carrier,    46  Mass.  433.  49  N.  E.  632;  Elliott  Evi- 

Mich.  442,  9  N.  W.  487.  dence,  §  2752. 

■'Henderson  v.  People,  124  111.  607,  ""State  v.    Miller,   71    Kan.   200.   80 

614,  ly  N.  E.  68,  7  Am.  St.  391 ;  State  Pac.  51. 

V.  Johnson,  115  Mo.  480,  495,  22  S.  W.  -°  Bynum   v.    State,  46  Fla.    142,   35 

463;    People  V.    Brown,  71    Hun    (N.  So.  65. 

Y.)  601,  24  N.  Y.  S.  nil.  "Cherry  v.    State,   68  Ala.  29,  31; 

~  Scruggs  V.  State,  90  Tenn.  81.  86,  State  v.  Trusty,   122  Iowa  82,  97   N. 

15  S.  W.  1074.  W.  989;  Underhill  on  Ev.,  p.  74. 

"  Brown  v.  State,  72  Md.  468,  480,  ^  Commonwealth    v.    O'Brien,     134 

20  Atl.  186.  Mass.  198,  200;  Carr  v.  State,  24  Tex. 

■^  Bain   v.   State,  61   Ala.  75 ;   Com-  App.  562,  7  S.  W.  328,  S  Am.  St.  905 ; 

monwcalth    v.    Stevenson,    142    Mass.  State  v.  Douglass,  48  Mo.  App.  39,  41  ; 

466,  468,  8  N.  E.  341 ;  Mason  v.  State,  Marshall  v.  State,  49  Ala.  21  ;  Under- 

29  Tex.  App.  24,  14  S.  W.  71;  Curry  hill  on  Ev.,  p.  269;  State  v.  Romero, 

V.    State,  50  Tex.   Cr.    158,  94  S.  W.  117  La.  1003,  42  So.  482;  Simpson  v. 

1058;    People    V.    Bernor,    115    Mich.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  320,  yy  S.  W.  819. 

692.   74    N.    W.    184;    Loose   V.   State,  ^Louisville   &c.    R.    Co.   v.    I'alvey, 

120  Wis.  115,  97  N.  W.  526:  Rcnfroe  104  Ind.  409,  3  N.  E.  389,  4  N.  E.  908. 

V.   State,  84  Ark.    16,  104  S.  VV.  542;  '"'Rex  v.  Wedge,  5  Car.  &  P.  298: 

State  V.  Scroggs,  123  Iowa  649,  96  \'.  Clark  v.  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  92  S. 

W.  ']2},;  Commonwealth  v.  Hollis,  170  W.  573,  29  Ky.  L.  154;  People  v.  Col- 

balli,  141  Mich.  189,  104  N.  W.  633. 


§    343  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  6oO 

the  age  of  a  witness  can  be  (Ictcnnincd  by  tbe  jury  solely  from 
his  personal  ai)pearance  has  been  variously  decided.  Some  cases 
hold  that  his  personal  appearance,  aside  from  direct  oral  or  writ- 
ter  proof,  is  competent  to  go  to  the  jury,^^  while  others  support 
the  contrary  proposition.^-  But  evidence  is  not  admissible  to 
show  that  the  defendant  was  ignorant  of  the  age  of  the  female, 
or  that  he  believed  or  had  good  reason  to  believe  that  she  was 
over  the  age  of  consent.^^  A  family  Bible  in  which  the  girl's  par- 
ents entered  the  birth  of  the  child  within  a  year  after  the  birth 
and  which  has  ever  since  been  in  his  possession  is  competent.^* 
This  is  also  true  of  a  piece  of  paper  kept  as  a  record  of  births  in 
a  family  when  the  entries  were  made  by  strangers  at  the  request 
of  the  parents  who  were  unable  to  write  and  the  person  who 
made  the  entry  could  not  be  found. ^^  For  a  Bible  or  other  family 
record  is  not  the  best  proof  of  birth  or  age  where  the  person  who 
made  the  record  is  alive,  competent  to  testify  and  can  be  reached 
by  a  subpoena.^" 

§  343.  Abduction  for  purposes  of  prostitution  or  concubinage. — 
When  a  statute  provides  that  the  taking  must  have  been  for  pur- 
poses of  prostitution,  the  evidence  must  show  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  that  the  accused  intended  to  cause  the  female  to  enter 
upon  a  life  of   indiscriminate  sexual   intercourse.^'      It   is   not 

''Commonwealth    v.    Emmons,    98        ''State  v.  Xeasby,  188  ]\Io.  467,  87 

Mass.  6;  People  v.  Special   Sessions,  S.  W.  468. 
ID  Hun  (\.  Y.)  224.  ""Loose  v.   State,  120  Wis.   115,  97 

"-  Stephenson  v.  State,  28  Ind.  272 ;  N.  W.  526. 
State  V.  Arnold,   13  Ired.    (N.  Car.)         '^  Osborn  v.  State,  52  Tnd.  526.    The 

184;  Bird  V.  State,  104  Ind.  384,  3  N.  intention  to   have   sexual   intercourse 

E.  827.     See  "Inspection,"  Underbill  maj-  be  inferred  from  the  making  of 

on  Ev.,  pp.  492-495.  a  proposition  for  it,  or  from  an  at- 

'^  People  V.  Dolan,  96  Cal.  315,  31  tempt  to  procure  it  by  force.    Huff  v. 

Pac.  107;   State  v.  Johnson,   115  Mo.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  37  S.  W.  1046, 

480,  494,  22  S.  W.  463;  Riley  v.  State  18  Ky.  L.  752.     It  is  not  material  to 

(Miss.,    1896),    18    So.    117;    but    cf.  prove  or  allege  the  actual  accomplish- 

contra,  Mason  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  ment  of  the  purpose  of  the  accused 

24,  14  S.  W.  71,  and  State  v.  Houx,  in  this  respect.     State  v.  Bobbst,  131 

T09  Mo.  654,  19  S.  W.  35,  32  Am.  St.  Mo.  328,  2>2  S.  W.  1149,  1151;  State 

686;  Lawrence  v.  Commonwealth,  30  v.  Knost,  207  jNlo.  18.  105  S.  W.  616; 

Gratt.    (Va.)    845;    State  v.   Xewton,  Elliott  Evidence,  §§  2745,  2746;  State 

44  Iowa  45.  V.  Fleetwood  (Mo.,  1909),  122  S.  W. 

"*  Simpson  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  320,  696. 
77  S.  \V.  819. 


60I  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    343 

enough  to  show  that  he,^*^  or  some  third  person,  intended  to  have 
intercourse  with  her  occasionally.^'^  Direct  evidence  that  the  ac- 
cused intended  to  devote  his  victim  to  purposes  of  prostitution 
is  not  required.  This  intent  may  be  inferred  from  evidence  that 
tlie  woman  was  taken  from  her  home  by  a  prostitute  and  her 
companion  directly  to  a  house  of  prostitution,'"^  and  from  evi- 
dence that,  prior  to  the  abduction,  illicit  relations  had  existed 
between  the  parties.'*^ 

Some  statutes  provide  for  the  punishment  of  abduction  for 
purposes  of  concubinage  as  well  as  prostitution.  Concubinage 
may  be  defined  as  the -informal  and  illicit  cohabitation  of  a  man 
and  woman  as  husband  and  wife  without  being  such.  Proof  of  a 
single  act  of  sexual  intercourse  is  enough  when  the  other  material 
elements  of  the  crime  are  proved.^-  Xo  length  of  time  or  long 
continuance  of  illicit  intercourse  is  necessary.  The  concubinage 
exists  as  soon  as  the  single  woman  consents  to  unlawfully  co- 
habit with  a  man  generally,  as  though  the  marriage  relation 
existed  between  them,  without  any  limit  as  to  the  duration  of 
such  intercourse  and  actually  commences  such  cohabitation.*^ 
Under  an  indictment  for  abducting  a  chaste  woman  for  the 
purpose  of  prostitution  specifying  only  one  house  of  prostitution 
to  which  she  was  taken**  it  may  be  proved  that  she  was  taken  to 

^  State  V.  Gibson,  iii  Mo.  92,  19  S.  '"People  v.    Marshall,    59  Cal.  386, 

\V.  980,  982;  Commonwealth  v.  Cook,  388;  State  v.  McCrum,  38  Minn.  154, 

12  Met.    (Mass.)   93;  State  v.  Brow,  155,  36  X.  W.  102. 

64  X.  H.  577,  15  .\tl.  216;  Osborn  v.  ^"People  v.   Carrier,  46   Mich.   442, 

State.  52  Ind.  526,  528;  State  v.  Stoy-  447,   9    X.    W.   487,   or   subsequently, 

ell,  54  Me.  24,  27,  89  Am.  Dec.  716;  State  v.  Johnson,  115  Mo.  480,  495,  22 

State   V.   Ruhl,  8   Iowa   447 ;   United  S.  W.  463 ;  People  v.  Claudius,  8  Cal. 

States    V.    Zes    Cloya,    35    Fed.    493 ;  App.  597,  97  Pac.  687. 

State  V.  Jamison,  38  Minn.  21,  23,  35  "State   v.   Gibson,    in    Mo.   92,    19 

X.  \V.  712;  Haygood  v.  State,  98  .-Ma.  S.  W.  980,  982;  State  v.  Gibson,  108 

61,  13  So.  325;  Henderson  v.  People,  Mo.  575,  18  S.  W.  T109,  mo;  State  v. 

124  111.  607,  612,  17  X.  E.  68,  7  Am.  Ovcrstreet,  43  Kan.  299,  23  Pac.  572; 

St.  39r  ;  State  v.  Wilkinson,  121  Mo.  People  v.  Sprig^s,  119  .\pp.  Div.  (X. 

;.^5.  486.  26  S.  W.  366.    The  principal  Y.)  236,  T04  X.  Y.  S.  539. 

■  Icment  is   the  taking  away  and   the  *' Henderson  v.  People,  124  III.  607, 

purpose  of  the  taking  and  subsequent  17  N-  E-  68,  7  Am.  St.  391. 

'"habitation  or  sexual  intercourse  is  "3  Inst.  50,  i  Hale  P.  C.  433. 

•!'>t    essential    to   be   proved,   but    arc  "State  v.   Savant,   115   La.   226,   38 

iicrcly  evidence  of   intent.     Stale  v.  So.  974. 
1  uckcr,  72  Kan.  481,  84  Pac.  126. 


§  344  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  602 

Other  houses  as  showing  the  purpose  of  the  accused  in  the  ab- 
duction. 

§  344.  Abortion  at  common  law  and  by  statute  distinguished. —  It 
was  not  a  crime  at  common  law  to  operate  upon  a  pregnant 
woman  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  an  abortion  unless  she  were 
actually  quick  with  child. ^^•''  But  if  this  were  the  case  an  abortion 
was  a  misdemeanor  at  common  law.^"  So,  anciently,  if  a  woman 
quick  with  child  killed  it  herself,  or  was  beaten  so  that  she  was 
delivered  of  a  dead  child,  it  Avas  not  murder.^"  The  same  prin- 
ciple applied  when  the  acts  with  an  intention  to  produce  an  abor- 
tion were  by  another.  Even  when  the  mother  died  as  a  result 
of  an  attempt  to  procure  an  abortion,  the  killing  was  not  regarded 
as  murder,  for  the  death  was  collateral,  and  aside  from  the 
principal  design  and  the  procurement  of  the  abortion  was  not  a 
felony.*'  These  rules  are  now  generally  changed  by  statute.  It 
is  now  equally  criminal  to  produce  abortion  before  and  after 
quickening,  and  if  the  statute,  as  is  usually  the  case,  makes  an 
abortion  a  felony,  then  the  death  of  the  woman  as  a  result  of  the 
subordinate  crime  is  murder.** 

ij  345.  Intention  to  produce  an  abortion — Evidence  of  other  crimes. 

— An  abortionary  intent  must  be  proved.*"     Evidence  of  an  as- 

"a  Commonwealth  v.  Farker,  9  Met.  monwealtli  v.  Surles,  165  Mass.  59,  42 

(Mass.)   263,  43  Am.  Dec.  396;  Peo-  N.  E.  502. 

pie  V.  McDowell,  63  Mich.  229,  30  N.  "  But  see  State  v.  Dickinson,  41  Wis. 

W.  68;  State  v.  Cooper,  22  N.  J.  L.  299. 

52,    51    Am.    Dec.    248,    and    compare  "  Slattery    v.    People,    76    Til.    217. 

contra,   State  v.   Fitzgerald,  49  Iowa  220.     Proof    of    motive,    Elliott    Evi- 

260,  31  Am.  I48n;  Smith  v.  State,  33  dence,    §  2762;    advising  or   adminis- 

Me.  48,  54  Am.  Dec.  607;   Common-  tering,    sufficiency    of    proof,    §  2763: 

wealth  V.  Wood,  11  Gray  (Mass.)  85.  effect    on    woman,    consent,    §  2764: 

^'^  State  V.    Slagle,  82   N.   Car.  653;  proof     of     nature     of     means    used, 

Commonwealth  v.  Dcmain,  6  Pa.  L.  J.  §  2765;   proof  of  pregnancy,  §  2766; 

29,3  Clark  (Pa.)  487.  proof  of   opportunities  and   facilities, 

*"  Smith  V.  State,  33  Me.  48,  53-60,  §  2767;  proof  of  similar  acts,  §  2768: 

54  Am.  Dec.  607.     See  this  case  for  a  corroborative  proof,  §  2769;  testimn- 

thorough    discussion   of   the  meaning  ny   of    accomplice,   98   Am.    St.    179: 

of   miscarriage.      See,    also,    State    v.  evidence  of  other  crimes,  62  L.  R.  A. 

Cooper,  22   N.   J.    L.   52-58,    51    Am.  229,  note. 

Dec.  248;  Mitchell  V.  Commonwealth,  "Elliott    Evidence.    §§2760,    2761; 

78   Ky.    204-210,   39   Am.   227;    Com-  62  L.  R.  A.  229,  note. 


6o3 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSOX. 


346 


sank  or  beating  alone  is  not  enongh,  thongli  a  miscarriage  actu- 
ally should  ensue  as  a  result  thereof/"  If  an  intention  to  produce 
an  abortion  is  shown,  it  is  immaterial  that  the  means  employed 
did  not  and  could  not  have  produced  the  result  intended,^ ^  and 
even  though  it  conclusively  appear  that  the  abortion  resulted 
from  other  means.'""  Evidence  that  the  accused  prior,"  or  sub- 
sequently, to  the  act  alleged,  had  attempted  to  procure  an  abor- 
tion on  the  same  woman.''*  using  the  same  or  different  means, 
or  that  on  other  occasions  he  had  operated  on  other  women, ^^ 
or  held  himself  out  as  being  able  and  willing  to  commit  an  abor- 
tion,"^ is  always  admissible  to  show  his  purpose  and  intention  in 
connection  with  tlie  act  charged.^' 

^  346.  Victim  of  abortion  is  not  an  accomplice — Corroboration 
when  required. — The  woman  on  whom  an  abortion  is  performed 
is  not  an  accomplice,"'"'  as  she  cannot  be  indicted  for  the  same 
offense  as  the  accused.  But  the  fact  that,  from  a  moral  point  of 
view,  she  is  implicated  in  the  crime  may  be  considered  by  the 
jury  as  bearing  on  her  credibility.^®  A  person  is  not  an  accomplice 


'""  State  V.  Fitzgerald,  49  Iowa  260, 
262,  31  Am.  14811. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Corkin,  136 
Mass.  429,  430;  People  v.  Seaman, 
T07  Mich.  348,  65  N.  W.  203,  61  Am. 
St.  326;  State  V.  Gedicke,  43  N.  J.  L. 
86;  State  v.  HoUenbeck,  36  Iowa  112; 
State  V.  Fitzgerald,  49  Iowa  260,  31 
-Am.  148. 

"State  V.  Morrow,  40  S.  Car.  221, 
18  S.  E.  8S3- 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  14  Graj' 
CMass.)  419,  432. 

"Scott  V.  People,  141  III.  195,  30  N. 
E.  329;  Commonwealth  v.  Corkin,  136 
Mass.  429. 

"  Lamb  v.  State,  66  Md.  285,  287,  7 
.•\tl.  399,  67  Md.  524,  10  Atl.  208,  298; 
Scott  V.  People,  141  111.  195,  213,  30 
N'.  E.  329;  State  v.  CroflFord,  121 
Iowa  395,  96  N.  W.  889;  People  v. 
Hagenow,  236  111.  514,  86  N.  E.  370. 
See,  also,  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §89,  10. 


^  Clark  V.  People,  224  111.  554,  79 
X.  E.  941. 

"  State  V.  Smith,  99  Iowa  26,  68  X. 
W.  428,  61  Am.  St.  219;  Common- 
wealth V.  Wood,  II  Gray  (Mass.) 
85,  93 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Boynton, 
1x6  Mass.  343,  345;  Commonwealth 
V.  Follansbee,  155  Mass.  274,  277,  29 
X.  E.  471 ;  Dunn  v.  People,  29  X.  Y. 
523,  527,  86  Am.  Dec.  3i9n;  State  v. 
Vedder,  98  X.  Y.  630,  632;  People  v. 
Hodge,  141  Mich.  312,  104  X.  W.  599; 
Clark  V.  People,  224  111.  554,  79  X.  E. 
941. 

^*Rcx  V.  Hargravc,  5  Car.  &  P.  170; 
Thompson  v.  United  States,  30  .■^pp. 
D.  C.  352 ;  State  v.  Carey,  76  Conn. 
342,  56  Atl.  632;  Smartt  v.  State,  112 
Tenn.  539.  80  S.  VV.  586. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Wood,  11  Gray 
(Mass.)  85;  Watson  v.  State,  9  Tex. 
App.  237,  245;  State  V.  Carey,  76 
Conn.  342,  56  Atl.  632. 


§  347  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  604 

who  procures  an  aiicTSthetic  which  is  administered  to  the  victim, 
if  it  is  not  shown  that  he  knew  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
used.""  Nor  is  a  woman  an  accomplice,  who,  being  an  intimate 
friend  and  confidant  of  the  deceased,  knew  of  her  pregnancy  and 
her  desire  for  rehef,  and  accompanied  her  to  the  defendant's 
house,  when  she  did  not  aid  or  advise  the  defendant,  and  was 
not  present  when  the  crime  was  committed. ''^  Because  of  the 
confidential  and  secret  character  of  the  relations  existing  between 
physicians  and  their  female  patients,  and,  also,  on  account  of  the 
great  danger  to  which  physicians  would  be  exposed  if  an  accusa- 
tion of  the  crime  of  abortion  committed  on  a  patient  could  be 
sustained  by  the  uncorroborated  statement  of  the  latter,  it  has 
been  enacted  by  statute  that  a  physician  shall  not  be  arrested, 
indicted'or  convicted  of  abortion  on  the  testimony  of  the  woman 
alone.  Her  testimony  must  be  corroborated  in  respect  to  some 
material  facts  which  constitute  a  necessary  element  in  the  crime, 
as,  for  example,  the  use  of  an  instrument  and  the  intent."-  Very 
frequently  several  defendants  are  jointly  indicted  for  the  abor- 
tion. In  such  a  case  the  criminal  lial)ility  is  several  as  well  as 
joint,  and  one  defendant  may  be  convicted  and  the  other  ac- 
quitted. Hence,  criminatory  evidence  may  be  received  against 
either,  though  the  state  shall  fail  to  connect  the  other  with  it."^ 

§  347.  Necessity  for  the  operation — Burden  of  proof. — Whether 
the  abortion  was  necessary  to  save  life  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
to  determine,  principally  upon  the  facts  involved  in  the  victim's 
illness.  The  opinion  evidence  of  physicians  to  its  necessity, 
though  desirable,  is  not  indispensable."*  The  burden  of  estab- 
lishing that  the  abortion  was  actually  necessary,"^  or  that  the 

*°  Commonwealth  v.  Follansbee,  155  *"  Hatchard   v.    State,   79   Wis.   357, 

Mass.  274,  29  N.  E.  471.  361,  48  X.  W.  380. 

"  People  V.   McGonegal,  42   X.   Y.  "^  People   v.   McGonegal,   42   X.   Y. 

St.  307,  314.  17  N.  Y.  S.  147,  62  Hun  St.    307,   313,    17    N.    Y.    S.    147.   62 

(X.    Y.)    622,   aff'd   without   opinion,  Hun    (X.   Y.)    622,  without   opinion; 

136  N.  Y.  62,  76,  32  X^.  E.  616.  Contra,  Bradford  v.  People,  20  Hun  (X.  Y.) 

People   V.    Spier,   120  App.    Div.    (X.  309;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2771,  but  cf. 

Y.)  786,  105  X.  Y.  S.  741.  contra,  State  v.  Clements.  15  Ore.  237, 

"•  People   V.   Josselyn,    39   Cal.    393,  246-249,  14  Pac.  410.  citing  i  Greenl., 

398.  §  7S,  and  State  v.  Wells  (Utah,  1909). 

"Baker  v.  People,  105  111.  452,  456.  100  Pac.  681,  is  also  contra. 


6o; 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSOX. 


348 


accused  was  advisecr'"''"  it  was  necessary,  is  on  him  as  facts  pecul- 
iarly within  his  own  knowledge."'"  He  need  not  establish  its 
necessity  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. ''^ 

§  348.  Declarations  of  present  pahi  and  suffering  and  dying  dec- 
larations by  the  victim. — The  declarations  of  the  \ictim  are  not 
generally  admissible  unless  they  are  so  far  contemporaneous 
with  and  explanatory  of  an  act  or  transaction  already  in  evidence 
that  they  may  be  received  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc,^^  or  unless 
they  consist  of  exclamations  or  ejaculations  of  present  suffering 
uttered  during  the  lying-in. '°  If  the  woman  not  only  consents 
to  the  operation,  but  actually  seeks  and  adopts  means  in  further- 
ance of  it,  her  declarations  may  be  admitted  against  the  accused 
as  the  declarations  of  a  fellow-conspirator  made  to  promote  the 
common  design.'^     They  should  be  admitted  in  his  favor  where 


•^^  Hatchard  v.  State,  79  Wis.  357, 
48  X.  \V.  380. 

*"  That  the  accused  thought  the  op- 
eration was  necessary  is  irrelevant. 
Hatchard  v.  State,  supra. 

°*  State  V.  Stevenson,  68  Vt.  529,  35 
Atl.  470;  State  V.  McCoy,  15  Utah 
136,  49  Pac.  420;  State  v.  Lee,  69 
Conn.  186,  27  Atl.  75.  As  to  the  ne- 
cessity of  the  operation  see,  also. 
State  V.  Watson,  30  Kan.  281,  i  Pac. 
770 ;  State  v.  Glass,  5  Ore.  y^. 

""  Scott  V.  People,  141  111.  195,  214, 
30  X.  E.  329;  State  v.  Gedicke,  43  X. 
J.  L.  86,  89;  Commonwealth  v.  Leach, 
156  Mass.  99,  loi,  30  X.  E.  163; 
Clarke  v.  People,  224  III.  554,  79  X.  E. 
941,  holding  that  statements  of  the 
victim  of  a  murder  resulting  from  an 
abortion  to  a  physician  in  a  prior  ill- 
ness as  to  how  such  prior  illness  was 
the  result  of  an  al)ortion  arc  hearsay. 

'"  People  v.  .\ikin,  66  Midi.  460,  475, 
33  X.  W.  821,  II  Am.  St.  512;  Rhodes 
V.  State,  128  Ind.  189,  191,  27  X.  E. 
866,  25  \m.  St.  429.  "These  declara- 
tions were  made  by  her  to  the  physi- 
cian at  the  time  he  was  called  upon 


as  an  expert  to  determine  the  state  of 
her  health,  and  were  statements  of 
her  bodily  feelings,  and  the  symp- 
toms of  her  supposed  pregnancy. 
This  evidence  was  admissible  *  *  * 
from  the  necessity  of  learning  from 
the  patient  herself  facts  within  her 
own  knowledge,  which  the  physician 
should  know  to  form  an  intelligent 
and  accurate  opinion  of  her  present 
health  and  situation.  The  usual  symp- 
toms of  pregnancy  in  its  early  stage 
must  be  obtained  from  the  patient 
herself,  such  as  the  obstruction  of 
the  usual  course  of  nature,  morning 
sickness,  head-ache,  nervousness  and 
other  indications  hidden  from  the 
observation  of  others."  State  v. 
Gedicke,  43  X.  J.  L.  86,  89 ;  People  v. 
Aikin,  66  Mich.  460,  475,  33  X.  W. 
821,  II  Am.  St.  512:  Hays  v.  State,  ^o 
Md.  633,  651 ;  Weightnovel  v.  State, 
46  Pla.  I,  35  So.  856.  (Declaration  l)y 
deceased  that  she  was  going  to  stay  at 
defendant's  house  for  an  operation.) 
"  Solander  v.  People,  2  Colo.  48, 
62-64. 


§  349 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDEXCE. 


606 


he  alleges  that  when  he  fust  met  her  as  a  physician  she  was  suffer- 
ing from  a  miscarriage  and  that  he  operated  on  her  in  good  faith 
in  company  with  another  physician.'-  The  fact  that  the  victim  is 
dead  does  not  admit  her  declarations.  They  will  not  be  received 
as  dying  declarations,  though  possessing  all  the  characteristics 
which  would  admit  them  in  a  trial  for  homicide. ''' 

^  349.  Evidence  of  the  woman's  physical  condition  and  illness — 
Direct  and  circumstantial  evidence. — The  evidence  will  be  permitted 
to  take  a  wide  range.  Facts  elicited  by  a  post  mortem  are  always 
admissible  to  prove  the  corpus  delicti.  But  evidence  of  the  vic- 
tim's pregnancy,  her  medical  treatment,'*  the  appearance  of  her 
bed  and  clothing,""  and  her  physical  condition,'®  her  health  and 
spirits,''  and  her  relations,  including  acts  of  sexual  intercourse''* 
with  the  defendant  or  with  one  accused  of  being  an  accessory.'''' 


•"State  V.  Fuller  (Ore.,  1908),  96 
Pac.  456. 

'^  Underbill  on  Ev.,  p.  141.  See 
also,  §  106;  Maine  v.  People,  9  Hun 
(X.  Y.)  13;  State  v.  Harper,  35  Ohio 
St.  78,  35  Am.  596;  Railing  v.  Com- 
monwealth, no  Pa.  St.  100,  I  Atl. 
314.  In  Massachusetts,  by  St.  1889, 
c.  100,  dying  declarations  are  admis- 
sible. Commonwealth  v.  Homer,  153 
Mass.  343,  344,  26  N.  E.  872.  And 
other  declarations  are  received  to 
show  that  the  former  were  made  un- 
der a  sense  of  impending  death. 
Commonwealth  v.  Cooper,  5  Allen 
(^lass.)  495,  497,  81  Am.  Dec.  762; 
Commonwealth  v.  Trefethen,  157 
Mass.  180,  184-188,  31  X.  E.  961,  24 
L.  R.  A.  235 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Thompson,  159  Mass.  56,  59,  Zi  ^^ 
E.  nil.  In  Maryland  a  statement  by 
the  woman  accusing  the  accused  of 
having  committed  the  abortion  was 
received  as  a  dying  declaration. 
Hawkins  v.  State,  98  Md.  355.  57  Atl. 
2~.  The  rule  is  that  dying  declara- 
tions  are   not   admissible   unless    the 


death  of  the  woman  is  by  statute  an 
indispensable  element  of  the  crime 
charged  against  the  accused.  State 
V.  Fuller,  52  Ore.  42,  96  Pac.  456. 
See  also,  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2770; 
86  Am.  St.  666,  note;  6z  L.  R.  A. 
916,  note. 

'*  People  V.  Aikin,  66  Mich.  460,  474, 
2,3  X.  W.  821,  II  Am.  St.  512.  It  is 
proper  to  permit  the  state  to  prove 
the  previous  condition  of  the  woman, 
that  she  had  never  been  pregnant  be- 
fore and  had  never  been  operated  on. 
Thomas  v.  State,  156  Ala.  166,  47  So. 

257. 

'*  People  v.  Olmstead,  30  Mich.  431. 

""Commonwealth  v.  Follansbee,  155 
Mass.  274,  29  X.  E.  471. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Wood,  11  Gray 
(Mass.)  8s,  91 ;  Hays  v.  State,  40  Md. 
63Z;  State  V.  Fletcher  (X.  J.  L.),  72 
Atl.  3Z- 

"Scott  V.  People,  141  III.  195.  211, 
30  X.  E.  329. 

"'  State  V.  Carey,  76  Conn.  342,  56 
Atl.  632,  to  show  motive  for  employ- 
ment of  principal. 


60/ 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON. 


349 


subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  alleged  abortion,  is  ahvavs  admis- 
sible."' 

It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  defendant  knew  the  woman  was 
pregnant.  If  the  intent  to  produce  a  miscarriage  is  present,  it  is 
enough  that  the  defendant  may  only  have  had  a  mere  suspicion 
that  pregnancy  existed. ""^  But  evidence  that  the  defendant  had 
or  had  not  a  knowledge  of  the  woman's  pregnancy  is  relevant  to 
support  or  to  rebut  a  presumption  of  an  abortionary  intention.''' 
Evidence  that  the  defendant  advertised  he  would  procure  abor- 
tions,*^ that  several  months  prior  to  the  alleged  offense  he  had 
articles  in  his  possession  which  he  knew  were  calculated  to  pro- 
duce an  abortion, ''■'  that  he  supplied  the  woman  with  the  means 
of  producing  an  abortion  and  gave  her  minute  directions  how 
those  means  were  to  be  employed,"^  is  admissible.  Direct  evi- 
dence that  the  defendant  committed  the  crime  is  not  demanded. 
He  may  be  convicted  on  circumstantial  evidence  alone,**'"'  if  it  is 
sufficient  to  convince  the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
woman  was  pregnant,'"'  and  that  drugs  or  instruments  were  used 
on  her  by  the  defendant  with  a  criminal  intent.^**  But  a  convic- 
tion of  having  in  one's  possession  instruments  Intended  to  cause 


™  Commonwealth  v.  Follansbee,  155 
Ivlass.  274,  277,  29  N.  E.  471.  In 
People  V.  Aikin,  66  Mich.  460,  33  X. 
\V.  821,  II  Am.  St.  512,  it  is  said,  "a 
history  of  her  illness  from  the  very 
beginning  to  the  end,  in  detail,  was 
most  proper,  and  perfectly  legitimate 
to  prove  the  corpus  delicti,  and  what 
the  respondent  did  and  said  in  con- 
nection with  such  illness  while  in  the 
house  attending  upon  the  sick  girl 
was  properly  a  part  and  parcel  of 
such  history." 

"  Powe  V.  State,  48  X.  J.  L.  34,  36, 
2  .Atl.  662. 

"'Scott  V.  People,  141  111.  195,  211, 
30  X.  E.  329;  State  v.  McLeod,  136 
.Mo.  109.  37  S.  W.  828;  People  v. 
I  lagcnow,  236  111.  514,  86  X.  E.  370. 

"Weed  v.  People.  3  Thomp.  &  C. 
(S.  Y.)  50:  Pc-Dpk-  V.  Sessions,  58 
-Mich.   594,  26  X.  VV.  291  ;    reopic  v. 


Hagenow,  236  111.  514,  86  X.  E.  370. 
As  to  proof  of  venue.  State  v.  Hogan, 
123  Mo.  App.  319,  100  S.  W.  528. 

"*  Commonwealth  v.  Blair,  126 
Mass.  40,  42 ;  People  v.  Vedder,  98  X. 
Y.  630;  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  121 
Mass.  69. 

"^  Jones  V.  State,  70  Md.  326,  327,  17 
Atl.  89,  14  Am.  St.  362. 

'"See  §5. 

"  State  V.  Stewart,  52  Iowa  284, 
286,  3  X.  W.  99;  State  V.  Rogers,  135 
Mo.  App.  695,  116  S.  W.  469. 

''''Commonwealth  v.  Leach,  136 
Mass.  99,  102,  30  X.  E.  163;  Clarke 
V.  People,  16  Colo.  511,  27  Pac.  724: 
State  V.  Stewart,  52  Iowa  284,  3  X. 
W.  99;  Commonwealth  v.  .Adams,  127 
Mass.  15,  19;  Dougherty  v.  People,  i 
Colo.  5r4;  Earil  v.  People,  99  111. 
123. 


sj    350  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE,  608 

an  al)Oi'lion  cannot  be  sustained  l)y  proof  of  the  possession  of  an 
instrument  which.  th()UL;ii  often  used  for  that  purpose,  was  made 
and  designed  for  a  dittercnt  one/"' 

§  350.  Expert  testimony  of  physicians — Evidence  afforded  by  the 
post-mortem. — A  ])h}-sician,  if  properly  quahfied,  may,  it  seems, 
testify  to  the  result  of  his  examination  of  the  person  of  the 
woman, '"^  testify  to  the  time  required  to  produce  an  abortion,'" 
that  in  his  opinion  an  abortion  had  been  procured.''-  and  that 
death  had  resulted  therefrom,"^  that  traces  of  an  abortion  would 
remain  if  one  had  been  committed  or  attempted,"'*  as  to  the  kind 
of  instrument  and  the  mode  of  using  it  which  w^ould  produce  the 
condition  in  which  the  woman  was  found, "^  and  that  certain 
drugs,''^^  or  instruments,'^*'  which  the  jury  may  be  permitted  to  in- 
spect, were  popularly  supposed  "''  to  be  calculated  to  produce  an 
abortion.  While  a  physician  who  made  a  post  inortcui  examina- 
tion is  undoubtedly  a  competent  witness  to  any  of  the  above 
matters,"*  his  is  not  the  best  nor  only  proper  evidence  and  any 
competent  medical  man  may  testify.  The  expert  may  testify 
that  it  is  impossible  for  any  woman  unaided  to  have  produced  an 
abortion  upon  herself  by  the  use  of  a  certain  instrument.    Then 

*"  State   V.    Forsythc,    78   Iowa   595,  wealth  v.  Thompson,  159  Mass.  56,  z;^ 

597,   43    N.    W.    548.      Evidence   that  N.  E.  iiii;  State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H. 

articles  adapted  to  procure  an  abor-  484;    Stevens  v.   People,  215   111.   593, 

tion  were  found  in  the  abode  of  the  74  X.  E.  786. 

defendant    is    admissible.      Common-        "^  Commonwealth  v.  Thompson,  159 

wealthy.  Tibbetts,  157  Mass.  519,  521,  Mass.  56,  59,  22>  ^-  E.   iiii;  People 

2,2  N.  E.  910.     It  is  not  necessary  to  v.    Hagenow,  236   111.   514,  86   N.    E. 

prove  that  the  defendant  used  all  the  370. 

instruments  alleged  in  the  indictment.         "*  P>athrick    v.    Detroit    &c.    Co.,    50 

It    is    enough    to    prove    that    one   of  Mich.  629,  16  N.  W.  172,  45  Am.  6^. 
them  was  used.     Scott  v.  People,  141         °^  Commonwealth    v.     Sinclair,    IQS 

111.    T95,   210,   30   X.   E.   329;   Rex   v.  Mass.  100,  80  X.  E.  799. 
Phillips,  3  Camp,  "/t,;  Rex  v.  Coe,  6         °°a  Williams  v.   State    (Tex.,   1892), 

Car.   &    P.   403;    Moore  v.    State,   2>7  IQ  S.  W.  897;  Carter  v.  State,  2  Ind. 

Tex.  Cr.  552,  40  S.  W.  287.  617. 

""Thomas  v.  State,  156  Ala.  166,  47        ""Commonwealth     v.     Brown,     121 

So.  257.  Mass.  69,  81. 

"People  v.  McGonegal,   136  X.   Y.         "'Carter  v.   State,  2   Ind.  617,  618, 

62,  75,  Z2  X.  E.  616.  624,  62^. 

"^Hauk  V.    State,    148   Ind.  238,   46         '"People  v.  Sessions,  58  Mich.  594, 

X.   E.   127,  47  N.  E.  465 ;  Common-  26  X.  W.  291. 


6og  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    351 

under  the  rule  that  where  an  opinion  has  been  given  that,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  a  certain  thing  is  impossible,  a  woman  mav 
testify  that  she  has  used  such  an  article  upon  herself  for  a  legiti- 
mate purpose."'*  To  explain  and  emphasize  his  evidence  the 
physician  who  made  the  post  iiiortcni  may  exhibit  parts  of  the 
body  preserved  in  spirits  to  the  jury.^°° 

§  351.  Exception  to  rule  regulating-  privileged  communications  to 
physician. — The  question  may  arise  are  communications  made  to 
a  physician  by  the  \-ictim  of  an  abortion  privileged  so  that  the 
physician  may  decline  to  disclose  them?  It  is  well  settled  that 
the  statutory  privilege  cannot  be  invoked  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
shielding  a  criminal.  And  though  the  accused,  being  a  physician, 
may  refuse  to  testify  at  all,  yet,  if  he  go  on  the  stand,  he  cannot 
claim  the  professional  privilege.  A  distinction  is  made  by  the 
cases  as  regards  the  testimony  of  a  physician  who  has  treated 
the  woman  after  the  commission  of  the  alleged  crime.  If  she  is 
living  the  law  forbids  the  physician  to  disclose  any  fact  that  he 
may  have  learned  while  attending  her  professionally,  for  the 
reason  that  his  statement  inevitably  tends  to  convict  her  of  a 
crime  and  to  discredit  and  disgrace  her.^  If,  however,  the 
woman  is  dead  this  evidence  cannot  incriminate  her,  though  it 
may  disgrace  her  memory,  and  on  this  account  the  physician  may 
speak.-  And,  generally,  a  physician  who  was  consulted  as  to  the 
best  mode  of  procuring  an  abortion  may  state  what  was  said  by 
him  and  the  person  who  consulted  him  and  what  was  done  by  him 
if  anything.^ 

**  Commonwealth     v.      Leach,      156  '""  Commonwealth     v.     Brown,     14 

Mass.    99,     102-107,    30    X.    E.     163,  Gray  (Mass.)  419,  431. 

Knowlton,  J.,  dissenting.     The  expert  ^  People  v.  Murphy,  loi  N.  Y.  126, 

should    be    interrogated    upon    hypo-  129,  4  X.  E.  326,  54  Am.  661.    In  this 

thetical     questions     containing     facts  case    the    public    prosecutor    sent    a 

proved  or  which  may  be  assumed  to  physician  to  make  an  examination  of 

be   proved.      He   cannot   be   asked   if  the  woman,  to  which  she  voluntarily 

he  has  read  or  heard  the  testimony,  submitted. 

and  to  give  his  opinion  thereon.    Pco-  '  Pierson  v.  People,  79  X.  Y.  424,  35 

pie  V.  Aikin,  66  Mich.  460,  476,  33  N.  Am.  524. 

W.  821,  II  Am.  St.  512.  '  Babcock    v.    People,    15    Hun    (N. 

Y.)  347,  354-     Sec,  ante.  §  174- 
39 — Underhill  Grim.  Ev. 


35^ 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE, 


6lO 


i:^  352.  Assault  and  battery — Definition. — An  assault  has  been  de- 
fined as  "any  attempt  or  offer,  with  force  or  \iolence,  to  do  a 
corporal  hurt  to  another,  whether  wantonly  or  with  a  malicious 
intention,  with  such  circumstances  as  denote  an  intention  to  do  it 
at  the  time,  coupled  with  a  present  ability  to  carry  that  intention 
into  execution."^  An  assault  is  involved  in  the  procurement  of 
an  abortion,  a  rape,  a  robbery  and  all  crimes  against  tiie  i)erson. 
But  usually  the  word  assault  is  employed  in  connection  with  the 
word  battery.  The  battery  is  merely  the  successful  termination 
of  the  assault.  The  assault  is  the  beginning  of  a  crime  the  motive 
of  which  is  the  infliction  of  some  corporal  hurt  upon  another 
without  that  person's  consent,  as  for  example  an  assault  with  in- 
tent to  commit  rape.  As  soon  as  the  person  assaulted  is  touched, 
no  matter  how  trifling  the  hurt  of  touch  may  be.  the  battery  has 
been  committed.'' 

^  353.  Evidence  to  show  present  ability  of  assailant  to  put  his  at- 
tempt in  action. —  l-Aidence  that  the  accused  did  not.  at  the  instant 
of  the  assault,  possess  the  ability  to  carry  out  his  attempt  to  in- 
jure, is  always  relevant  to  excuse  him.     If  he  can  show  that  he 


*  Roscoe  Cr.  Ev.,  p.  304 ;  Tarvcr  v. 
State,  43  Ala.  354,  356;  State  v.  Di- 
Guglielmo,  4  Penn.  (Del.)  336.  55 
Atl.  350;  Wilson  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.), 
74  S.  W.  315;  State  V.  Harrigan,  4 
Penn.  (Del.)  129,  55  Atl.  5;  State  v. 
Mitchell,  139  Iowa  455,  116  X.  W. 
808  (holding  a  threat  of  injury  to  be 
an  assault).  In  United  States  v. 
Hand,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 
435,  437.  ^  Fed.  Cas.  15297, 
the  court  says:  "It  is  as  if  one 
person  strike  at  another  with  his 
hands,  or  with  a  stick,  and  misses  him  ; 
for,  if  the  other  be  stricken,  it  is  a 
battery,  which  is  an  offense  of  a 
higher  grade.  Or  if  he  shake  his  fist 
at  another,  or  present  a  gun  or  other 
weapon,  within  such  distance  as  that 
a  hurt  might  be  given ;  or  drawing  a 
sword,  and  brandishing  it  in  a  menac- 
ing manner."  People  v.  Carlson 
(Mich..  1910).  125  X.  W.  361.  17  Det. 
Leg.    N.    120;    Co.\    V.    State     (Fla., 


^909),  50  So.  875;  Dickinson  v.  State 
(Okla.  Cr.  App.  1909),  104  Pac.  923. 
''Alston  V.  State,  109  Ala.  51,  20 
So.  81 ;  Lawson  v.  State,  30  Ala.  14, 
15;  Hill  V.  State,  yj  Tex.  Cr.  279,  z% 
S.  W.  987,  39  S.  W.  666,  66  Am.  St. 
803;  State  V.  Harrigan,  4  Penn. 
(Del.)  129,  55  Atl.  5:  Combs  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.),  it6  S.  W.  595. 
Attempt  or  offer  to  strike.  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  2824;  assault  by  strik- 
ing at  variance,  §  2825 :  assault 
and  menace,  §  2827;  drawing  firearm, 
§  2829;  pointing  firearms,  §  2830; 
drawing  unloaded  gun,  §§  283 r,  2832, 
2833 ;  drawing  gun — burden  of  proof, 
§  2834;  time  of  striking  not  neces 
sary,  §  2737 ;  assault  and  battery  on 
child  by  parent,  §§  2843.  2845:  as- 
sault and  battery  on  pupil  by  teacher, 
§  2834;  self-defense.  §§  2846.  2847, 
2849,  2855:  defense  of  family,  §2850: 
defense  of  possession,  §  2851  :  defense 
of  property,  §  2852;  degree  of  force, 


6ii 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSOX, 


was  not  able  to  do  the  violent  or  injurious  act  which  he  was 
threatening,  there  is  no  assault."  Accordingly,  evidence  is  rele- 
vant to  show  that  the  accused  was  at  such  a  distance  that  an 
immediate  contact  was  impossible,  as  when  he  threatened  one 
with  an  ax,  at  a  distance  of  twenty-five  feet,'  or  pointed  a  gun  at 
a  person  who  was  not  in  carrying  distance,^  or  pointed  an  un- 
loaded gun  or  pistol  at  a  person."  Some  cases,  however,  hold  that 
the  physical  ability  of  the  accused  to  carry  out  his  threats  or 
menacing  motions  is  irrelevant.^"  In  such  cases  it  will  generally 
appear  that  the  menacing  gesture  w^as  W'Cll  calculated  to  affect, 
and  did  in  fact  affect,  the  mind  and  purpose  of  the  person  threat- 
ened ;  and  that  he  w-as  led  to  act  against  his  wall,  because  he  be- 
lieved his  assailant  had  the  power  to  execute  his  threats.  In 
other  words,  if  the  menacing  conduct,  though  not  amounting  to 
a  battery,  actually  puts  a  person  in  fear  of  bodily  harm,  it  is  not 
relevant  to  pro\-e  that  the  accused  did  not  possess  the  ability  to 
carrv  his  threats  into  execution. ^^ 


S§  2853,  2854;  retaking  property,  jus- 
tification, §§  2856,  2857. 

'  Klein  v.  State,  9  Ind.  App.  365, 
368:  People  V.  Yslas,  27  ,Cal.  630, 
635 ;  Thomas  v.  State,  99  Ga.  38,  26 
S.  E.  748;  Smith  v.  State,  39  Miss. 
52T :  Mullen  v.  State,  45  Ala.  43,  45, 
6  Am.  St.  691 ;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§§  2822,  2823.  2S26.  Proof  of  mere 
threats  uttered  by  the  defendant, 
without  an  attempt  at  actual  violence 
:ind  the  ability  to  inflict  an  injurj-, 
will  not  sustain  a  conviction  of  as- 
^Huh.  Smith  V.  State,  39  Miss.  521, 
529;  Williams  v.  State,  99  Ga.  203,  25 
S.  E.  681;  State  v.  Davis,  i  Ired.  (X. 
Car.)  125,  35  .Am.  Dec.  735;  State  v. 
Napper,  6  N'ev.  113;  People  v.  Lillcy, 
43  Mich.  521.  5  \.  W.  982;  People 
v.  Jacobs.  29  Cal.  579;  State  v.  Mar- 
tin. 30  Wis.  2r6,  225,  M  .Xm.  567; 
RcR.  V.  James,  i  Car.  &  K.  (47  Eng. 
C.  L.)  530.  r  Cox  C  C.  78:  Chap- 
man V.  State,  78  .\la.  463.  465,  56  .Xm. 
42:  State  V.  Church,  63  N'.  Car.  15, 
16:  Robinson  v.  State,  3?  Tex.  170, 
3  GrecnI.  on  Ev.  6t.     "These  aiitlinri- 


ties  clearly  show  that  to  constitute 
an  assault  there  must  be  an  inten- 
tional attempt  to  do  injury  to  the 
person  of  another  by  violence,  and 
that  such  attempt  must  be  coupled 
with  a  present  ability  to  do  the  in- 
jury attempted."  State  v.  Godfrey, 
17  Ore.  300,  305,  20  Pac.  625,  ir  Am. 
St.  830. 

^Thomas  v.  State,  sufm:  State  v. 
Blackwell,  9  Ala.  79. 

*  People  V.  McKenzie,  6  App.  Div. 
(K.  Y.)  199,  39  N.  Y.  S.  951;  State 
V.  Yancey,  74  N.  Car.  244;  Tarver  v. 
State,  43  .Ala.  354.  What  is  carrying 
distance  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to 
determine.  Clark  v.  State,  84  Ga.  577, 
579.  10  S.  E.  1094. 

"Chapman  v.  State,  78  .Ala.  463, 
465,  56  Am.  42. 

'"Brooke  v.  State,  155  Ala.  78,  46 
So.  491. 

"State  V.  Marsteller.  84  \'.  Car. 
726,  728;  Crunibky  v.  State.  61  G;i. 
382,  584;  Unite<l  Stales  v.  Ortega.  4 
Wash.  C.  C.  rU.  S.)  531,  27  Fc<l. 
Cas.   1 597 1  ;   Slate  v.  Taylor.  20  K.in. 


§  354  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  6l2 

^  354.  Intention  to  do  bodily  harm — Circumstances  which  are  rele- 
vant.— A  present  intention  to  do  some  bodily  hn.rni  to  the  person 
assaulted  by  means  of  the  force  employed  must  be  proved  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt. ^-  The  gist  of  assault  with  intention  to 
do  great  bodily  injury  is  the  intention.  The  same  rule  holds  with 
relation  to  the  crime  of  assault  with  intent  to  murder.  Hence 
not  only  must  the  assault  be  proved  but  the  particular  intent  must 
also  be  proved.^''  Thus,  as  a  general  rule,  the  force  or  violence 
which  was  employed  must  be  proved  to  have  been  intentional,  or 
to  have  been  conceived  in  such  a  spirit  of  wantonness  as  to  sup- 
ply a  malicious  intention.  The  accused  may  always  testify  to 
his  own  intention.^^  Where  he  alleges  the  assault  was  committed 
in  self-defense  he  should  be  permitted  to  testify  that  he  carried, 
or  that  he  drew  a  revolver  in  self-defense,  though  he  should  not 
be  permitted  to  testify  that  he  carried  or  attempted  to  use  a  re- 
volver for  any  other  purpose.^'^  The  intention  to  do  great  bodily 
harm,  to  murder  or  to  commit  any  other  crime  by  means  of  an 
assault  may  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances.  Circumstantial 
evidence  is  usually  the  only  available  evidence  of  intention  aside 
from  the  declarations  of  the  accused.  The  intention  may  be 
inferred  from  the  force  or  direction,  or  from  the  natural  or  con- 
templated result  of  the  violence  employed,^"  from  the  weapon  or 
implement  used  by  the  accused,''  from  his  threats  or  prior  con- 

643,  64s;  Thomas  v.  State,  99  Ga.  38,  35      Atl.      1030;      Elliott     Evidence, 

26  S.  E.  748;   People  v.   Morehouse,  §§  2818,  2828,  2838. 

53  Hun  (N.  Y.)  638,  6  N.  Y.  S.  763;  "State  v.  Mills,  6  Penn.  (Del.)  497, 

State  V.  Lightsey,  43  S.  Car.   114,  20  69    Atl.    841;    State    v.    Mitchell,    139 

S.  E.  975.  Iowa  455,  116  N.  W.  808. 

"State    V.    Morgan,    3    Ired.     (N.  "Berry  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  423, 

Car.)    186,  38  Am.  Dec.   714;   Craw-  424,  17  S.  W.  1080. 

ford  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  454,  i  S.  "Ryan  v.  Territory    (Ariz.,   1909), 

W.    446;    Smith    V.    State,    39    Miss.  100  Pac.  770. 

521;   Johnson  v.    State,  35  Ala.  363;  "People  v.  Conley,   106  Mich.  424, 

State  V.  Church,  63  X.  Car.  15:  State  64  N.   W.  325;    People  v.   Miller.  91 

V.  King,  86  X.   Car.  603;   Cowley  v.  Mich.  639,  643,  52  N.  W.  65;  Hill  v. 

State,  ID  Lea  (Tenn.)  282;  People  v.  State,  zy  Tex.  Cr.  279,  38  S.  W.  987. 

Yslas,  27  Cal.  630;  Commonwealth  v.  39  S.  W.  666,  66  Am.  St.  803. 

Adams,   114  Mass.  323,  324,    19  Am.  "  State   v.    Dickerson,   98    N.    Car. 

362;  State  V.  Davis,  i  Ired.  (X.  Car.)  708,  3   S.   E.   687;    People  v.   Smith, 

125,  35  Am.  Dec.  735;  Keefe  v.  State,  106  Mich.  431,  64  N.  W.  200;   Dean 

19  Ark.   190 ;  State  v.   Sears,  86  Mo.  v.  State,  89  Ala.  46,  8  So.  38 ;  State  v. 

169,  174;  State  V.  Carver,  89  Me.  74,  Broadbent,  19  Mont.  467,  48  Pac.  775- 


6l3  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    354 

duct  towards  the  person  assaulted  and  generally  from  the  extent 
and  effect  of  the  injury  inflicted/''  or  from  any  deliberate  action 
which  is  naturally  attempted  and  usually  results  in  danger  to  the 
life  of  another/^  Hence  it  follows  that  the  language  of  the  ac- 
cused at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  assault  and  his  acts 
and  conduct  are  relevant  to  prove  his  intent."**  The  evidence  of 
the  condition  of  the  person  injured,  showing  the  character  of 
his  wounds  and  the  manner  in  which  they  were  treated  by  a 
physician  and  evidence  to  show  how  long  he  was  confined  in  a 
hospital  is  always  relevant  on  a  prosecution  for  assault  with  in- 
tent to  murder  to  show  the  grievous  nature  of  the  injuries  in- 
flicted from  which  injur}'  the  court  may  infer  that  the  accused 
intended  to  kill  the  person  assaulted.-^  Where  an  assault  is 
claimed  to  have  been  committed  by  one  having  lawful  authority 
to  punish  by  that  method  there  is  a  presumption  that  it  was  done 
in  the  exercising  of  such  authority  and  the  burden  of  proof  is 
on  the  prosecution  to  show  otherwise.-^^  Thus  where  a  question 
arose  as  to  whether  a  teacher  who  had  punished  a  scholar  was 
guilty  of  an  assault,  it  was  held  that  his  intention  was  to  be 
measured,  not  alone  by  the  character  of  the  punishment  inflicted, 
but  that  all  the  circumstances  attendant  should  be  considered  by 
the  jury  and  that  all  such  circumstances  were  relevant. " 

A  specific  intent  to  cause  the  very  injury,  and  that  only  which 
ensued,  need  not  be  proved.  If  bodily  harm  was  intended,  proof 
of  any  injury  will  sul^ce."^ 

Intent  may  be  inferred  from  circum-  ^  Wright  v.  State,  148  .-Ma.  596,  42 

stances,  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2841.  So.  745. 

"  State   V.    Remington,   50  Ore.   99,  ^^  Elliott    Evidence,    §    2844.      As- 

91  Pac.  473.  sault  and  battery  by  parent  on  child, 

"Conn  V.  People,  116  111.  458,  464,  Elliott   Evidence,   §§  2843,  2845. 

6  X.  E.  463;  Cowley  v.  State,  10  Lea  ^  Greer  v.  State   (Tex.,   1907),  106 

(Tcnn.)   282,  284;   Commonwealth  v.  S.    W.    339.      See    also,    Elliott    Evi- 

Randall,  4  Gray  (Mass.)  36;  State  v.  dence,   §   2840.     Intent   is  not  always 

-Meek,   41    La.    Ann.   83,   5   So.   639;  necessary,   Elliott   Evidence,   §§   2820, 

People   v.    Miller,  91    Mich.  639,  644,  2839.     Assault  with   intent   to   ravish 

52   .\.   W.  65;    Ullman   v.    State,   124  character  of  victim,  14  L.  R.  A.   (X. 

Wis.   602,    103    X.    W.    6;    Combs   v.  S.)  724,  note. 

State,  55  Tex.  Cr.  332,  116  S.  W.  595-  ="  People  v.  Marsoikr    (Cril..   1886), 

"State  V.  Mills,  6  Penn.  (Del.)  497,  11  Pac.  503;  Cowley  v.  Stale,  10  Lea 

69  .'Xtl.  841.  (Tcnn.)  282,  284;  Tarver  v.  State,  43 


§  355 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


614 


§  355.  Evidence  of  other  assaults. — Tt  is  not  permissible  to  prove 
assaults  by  the  defendant  upon  other  persons  or  upon  the  same 
person  at  other  times  and  places,  unless  there  is  some  connection 
between  them.  But  where  the  specific  intent  present  in  making 
the  assault  is  in  question,  evidence  of  other  assaults  is  relevant. 
Thus  where  an  assault  with  intent  to  kill  is  alleged,  the  previous 
relations  of  the  parties,  whctlicr  friendly  or  otherwise,  are  rele- 
vant,-* and  it  may  then  be  shown  that,  at  some  prior  time  and 
other  place,  the  defendant  assaulted  the  same  person.-^ 

§  356.  Assault  with  deadly  weapons — Evidence  to  show  character 
of  weapon  used. — The  expression  "deadly  weai)on,"  synonymous 
with  dangerous  weapon,  occurs  very  often  in  statutes  defining 
the  character  of  assaults,  and  in  the  common  law  of  homicide. 
Some  weapons  are  so  clearly  deadly  wlien  used  under  particular 
circumstances  that  the  court  may  declare  them  so  as  a  matter  of 
law.  So  it  has  been  held  that  a  club,-"  a  large  stone,-'  a  chisel,-'* 
a  loaded  gun  or  pistol,-"  or  one  unloaded  and  used  as  a  club,^"  a 
knife,  when  used  in  striking  distance,^^  is  a  deadly  weapon  per 


Ala.  354;  Reg.  v.  Fretwcll,  9  Cox  C. 
C.  471,  ID  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  428,  12  Wkly. 
Rep.  751 ;  People  v.  Miller,  91  Mich. 
639,  52  N.  W.  6s;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§§  2819,  2821.  Thus,  pointing  a  pistol 
alone  may,  if  nothing  else  is  proved, 
justify  an  inference  of  an  intent  to 
harm.  But  this  inference  may  be  re- 
butted by  a  declaration  by  the  ac- 
cused that  he  does  not  intend  to 
shoot,  leaving  it  a  question  for  the 
jury  to  find  the  intent  on  all  the 
facts.  The  circumstances  may  shovir 
that  his  statement  was  untrue  and 
employed  to  put  the  person  off  his 
guard.  Richels  v.  State,  i  Sneed 
(Tenn.)  606,  608. 

-*  State  V.  Forsythe,  89  Mo.  667,  i 
S.  W.  834;  State  V.  Sanders,  106  Mo. 
188,  17  S.  W.  223;  State  V.  Mont- 
gomery, 65  Iowa  483,  22  N.  W.  639; 
Nelson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  A  pp.),  20 
S.  W.  766.     Evidence  of  other  crimes 


in  prosecution  for  assault,  see  62  L. 
R.  A.  193,  extensive  note. 

"Pontius  V.  People,  82  N.  Y.  339; 
State  V.  Kline,  54  Iowa  183,  6  N.  W. 
184;  State  V.  Patrick,  107  Mo.  147,  17 
S.  W.  666;  State  v.  Place,  5  Wash. 
773,  32  Pac.  736;  Owen  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.  1910),  125  S.  W.  405. 

=»  State  V.  Phillips,  104  N.  Car.  786, 
10  S.  E.  463. 

"Regan  V.  State,  46  Wis.  256,  50 
N.  W.  287. 

'^  Commonwealth  v.  Branham,  8 
Bush   (Ky.)   387. 

="  State  V.  Painter,  67  Mo.  84 ;  Wil- 
son V.  State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  156,  38  S. 
W.  1013;  Heningburg  v.  State,  153 
Ala.  13,  45  So.  246. 

^"Riggs  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
33  S.  W.  4I3>  17  Ky.  L.  1015;  Allen 
v.  People,  82  111.  610. 

"'  Walters  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  :>,9S. 
35  S.  W.  652 ;  Ferguson  v.  State,  6 
Tex.  App.   504;   Brown  v.   State,   142 


6l5  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §§    356-357 

sc,  and  proof  of  an  assault  with  any  of  these  will  sustain  a  con- 
viction of  an  assault  with  a  deadly  weapon. 

If  the  evidence  as  to  the  character  of  the  weapon  or  the  mode 
in  which  it  was  used  is  at  all  conflicting,  the  determination  of  the 
question  whether  a  weapon  is  deadly  is  exclusively  for  the  jurors, 
to  decide  upon  all  the  facts. ^^'-  The  size,  shape,  character  and 
weight  of  the  weapon  or  implement  used,  its  manner  of  use,  the 
strength  and  physical  condition  of  the  defendant  and  of  the  per- 
son attacked,  are  all  relevant. ^^ 

^  356a.    Declarations  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gestae. — The 

declarations  and  acts  of  all  participating  in  the  assault,  if  con- 
'stituting  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc  are  admitted  against  any  one  of 
the  defendants.^*  In  a  case  where  there  is  a  positive  contradiction 
as  to  which  party  is  the  aggressor,  but  the  accused  admits  that 
he  struck  the  prosecuting  witness,  the  statements  of  third  parties 
which  shov/  or  tend  to  show  that  a  conspiracy  had  been  formed 
to  mob  the  accused,  are  admissible  though  the  accused  had  not 
knowledge  of  it.^"  The  exclamations  of  the  person  assaulted 
strictly  contemporaneous  with  the  assault  are  relevant.  But  those 
which  are  uttered  thereafter  are  usually  rejected  upon  the  ground 
that  they  are  not  res  gestcc.^^ 

§  357.    Evidence  of  threats  and   previous  hostility. — The   prior 

Ala.  2S7,  3S  So.  268:  State  v.  Spaugh,  ing  cane,   a  switch  of  the  size   of   a 

199  Mo.  147,  97  S.  W.  901.  woman's  finger,  if  strong  and  tough, 

•'"  Smallwood      v.       CommonwcaUh  may  be  made  a  deadly  weapon  if  the 

(Ky.),  33  S.  W.  822,  17  Ky.  L.  1134;  aggressor   shall   use   such    instrument 

People  V.  Leyba,  74  Cal.  407,  16  Pac.  with   great    or    furious    violence,   am! 

200.  especially,  if  the  party  assailed  should 

"  State  V.  Godfrey,  17  Ore.  300,  307,  have   comparatively    less   power   than 

20   Pac.  625,    ir   Am.    St.   830:    Skid-  the    assailant,     or    be    helpless     and 

more  v.   State,  43  Tex.  93;    State  v.  feeble."    State  v.  Huntley.  91  X.  Car. 

McDonald,    67     Mo.     13;     Kouns    v.  617. 

State.  3  Tex.  App.  13;  Berry  v.  Com-  '*  P.louni  v.  State,  49  .Ma.  381  ;  Col- 

monwcalth.  10  Bush  (Ky.)  15.   "Some  quitt  v.  State,  34  Tex.  550. 

weapons   arc   per  se   deadly;    others,  "Tompkins  v.  State.  17  Ga.  356. 

owing  to  the  manner  in   which  they  "  People  v.   Hicks,  98  Mich.  86.  56 

arc  used,  become  deadly.     A  gun,  a  N.  W.  1102:  State  v.  Nocninger.   108 

pistol,    or    a    dirk  knife,    is    of    itself  Mo.  166.  18  S.  W.  990;  Veal  v.  State, 

deadly;   a   small    pr)ckct    knife,   walk-  8  Tex.  App.  474. 


§  357  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  6l6 

threats  of  the  accused  are  always  relevant  to  illustrate  his  menial 
attitude  towards  the  prosecuting  witness  at  the  time  of  the  as- 
sault,^" unless  suhsequent  to  the  making  of  the  threats  the 
parties  have  become  friends."''  If  the  accused  claims  that  he 
acted  in  self-defense,  he  may  prove  the  prior  general  hostility 
of  the  injured  party  to  him.  including  threats  made  to  others 
and  communicated  to  him,"''"  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  person 
had  assaulted  others,  and  had  a  reputation  for  quarrelsomeness.'"* 
The  reputation  of  the  prosecuting  witness  for  peaceableness  is 
then  relevant." 

The  burden  of  proving  justification  for  an  assault  is  upon  the 
accused.''"  and  inasmuch  as  mere  words,  however  abusive  or 
vexatious,  will  never  justify  an  assault  or  battery,  the  accused  will 
not  be  permited  to  prove  bad  language  on  the  part  of  the  person 
assaulted.'*"^ 

But  where  the  assault  is  alleged  to  have  grown  out  of  writings 
or  letters  written  bv  the  prosecuting  witness  to  the  accused  and 
containing  abusive  language,  the  wa'itings  are  admissible  to  show 
the  condition  of  affairs  existing  between  the  parties  though  they 
may  not  supply  justification.** 

If  the  accused  is  shown  to  have  been  acquainted  with  the  person 
assaulted,  and  to  have  known  his  disposition  either  by  reputation 
or  actual  acquaintance,  it  is  proper  to  permit  him  to  prove  that 
the  prosecuting  witness  was  reputed  to  have  a  quarrelsome  dis- 
position.'*^ 

^  State  V.  Henn,  39  Minn.  476,  40  "  Bowlus  v.  State,  130  Ind.  227,  230, 

N.  'W.  572,  and  ante,  §  326.  28  X.  E.  1115. 

^People  V.  Deitz,  86  Mich.  419,  49  *^  Badger  v.   State,  5  Ga.  App.  477, 

X.  W.  296;   Sharp  v.  People,  29  111.  63  S.  E.  532. 

464.  ''^  State  V.  Harrigan,  4  Penn.  (Del.) 

""  Bolton  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1897),  129,  55  Atl.  5;  Sutton  v.  State,  2  Ga. 

39   S.   W.  672;   Rauck  V.   State,   no  App.  659.  58  S.  E.  1108:  State  v.  Kim- 

Ind.    384,    II    N.    E.    450;    Martin   v.  brell  (X.  C.  1909),  66  S.  E.  208. 

State,  5  Ind.  App.  453,  456;  Read  v.  "  De   Silva  v.   State,  91   Miss.   776, 

State,  2   Ind.  438.     But  not  uncom-  45  So.  611;  Brooke  v.  State,  155  Ala. 

municated  threats.     Guy  v.  State,  37  78,     46     So.     491,     under     Cr.     Code 

Ind.  App.  6gi,  77  N.  E.  855.  1896,  §  4345.  admitting  proof  of  op- 

"  People   V.    Frindel,    58   Hun    (N.  probrious  words. 

Y.)   482,  12  X.  Y.  S.  498.     See  ante,  ''' People  v.  Kirk,  151  Mich.  253,  114 

§  324.  N.  W.  1023,  14  Detroit  Leg.  N.  927- 


61/  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    358 

§  358.  Robbery — Intention  present  and  force  employed. — Rob- 
bery is  tbe  felonious  and  forcible  taking  of  goods  or  money  from 
die  person  of  another  by  \-iolence  or  by  putting  him  in  fear  and 
against  his  will."  To  constitute  the  crime  of  robbery  there  must 
be  violence  or  intimidation  of  such  a  character  as  that  the  injured 
party  is  put  in  fear  of  such  a  nature  as  in  reason  and  common 
experience  is  likely  to  induce  a  person  to  part  with  his  property 
against  his  will  and  for  the  time  being  suspend  the  power  of  exer- 
cising his  will.'*'  Stated  in  a  few  words  the  taking  of  property 
must  be  accomplished  by  force  or  by  fear,  and  the  force  or  the 
fear  must  precede  the  taking.'*''  Thus  snatching  a  watch  from  the 
person  of  the  owner  or  snatching  money  from  his  hand  consti- 
tutes robbery  though  the  force  used  is  very  slight.'*'* 

The  elements  in  the  crime  of  robbery  which  have  been  just 
described  distinguish  it  from  larceny,  for  if  money  or  goods  are 
obtained  by  trick  or  contrivance,  rather  than  by  force  or  fear,  the 
crime  is  larceny  and  not  robbery. ^*^ 

If  there  be  force  employed  to  secure  the  possession  of  the 
property  its  degree  is  immaterial  if  it  was  sufficient  to  compel  the 
owner  to  part  with  his  property.^^  Usually  if  the  jury  have  a 
leasonable  doubt  as  to  the  exercise  of  force  or  violence,  they 
may  convict  of  larceny  where  that  crime  is  alleged  in  the  indict- 
ment.^" It  is  no  variance  to  prove  that  the  crime  was  accomplished 

"State    V.    McAllister,    65    W.    Va.  °'' Routt  v.  State,  61  .Ark.  594,  34  S. 

97,     63     S.     E.     758;     McGinnis     v.  W.  262;    People  v.   Church,   116  Cal. 

State,     r6    Wyo.     72,    91     Pac.    936:  300,  48   Pac.    125;   Johnson  v.   State, 

Brown  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.,  1909),  35  Tex.  Cr.  140,  32  S.  W.  537;  Pick- 

117  S.  W.  281.     It  was  an  infamous  erel  v.   Commonwealth    (Ky.),  30  S. 

crime   at    the    common    law.      United  W.   617,    17    Ky.    L.    120;    Huber    v. 

States  V.  Evans,  28  App.  D.  C.  264.  State,  57  Ind.  341,  26  .Xni.  57;   Doyle 

"Steward    v.    People,   224    111.   434,  v.    State,   jj   Ga.    513;    McCloskey   v. 

79  X.  E.  636.  People,    5    Park.    Cr.    (N.    Y.)    299; 

"Jones  V.  Commonwealth,  115  Ky.  People  v.  AIcGinty,  24  Hun   (N.  Y.) 

592,  74  S.  W.  263,  24  Ky.  L.  2481,  103  62;  Dawson  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 

.Am.  St.  340.  74  S.  W.  701,  25  Ky.   L.  5;   State  v. 

"Perry    v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.),  Duffy,  124  Iowa  705,  100  N.  W.  796. 

85  S.  W.  732,  27  Ky.  L.  512;   Stock-  "State  v.  Parsons,  44  Wash.  299,  87 

ton   V.   Commonwealth,    125   Ky.   268,  Pac.  349,  120  .Am.  St.  1003. 

loi  S.  W.  298,  30  Ky.  L.  1302;  Rrown  "State  v.  Taylor,  140  Iowa  470,  118 

V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.,  1909),  117  S.  X.  \V.  747. 
W.  281. 


CRIMIXAL    F.\-IDEXCE. 


6l8 


by  both  force  and  fear  where  it  is  alleged  that  the  taking  of  the 
property  was  accomplished  by  force  only.'-*'' 

"Putting  in  fear"  is  equivalent  to  the  use  of  force.  Facts  suf- 
ficient to  imply  the  greatest  degree  of  terror  or  fright  need  not 
be  proved.  It  is  usually  enough  that  the  facts  jiroved  show  such  an 
emi)lovment  of  force  alone  or  willi  threatening  language  or 
gestures  as  will  result  in  the  person  robbed  surrendering  his 
]M-opertv  without  or  against  his  consent. "''•'  The  party  who  was 
robbed  may  testify  that  he  was  in  fear  of  violence  at  the  hands 
of  the  accused,  and  may  state  his  oral  threats  and  \-iolent  ges- 
tures.'"* as,  for  example,  that  the  accused  pointed  a  pistol  at  him 
and  ordered  him  to  throw  up  his  hands.''"'  The  fact  that  force  was 
employed  may  usually  be  proved  by  the  testimony  of  the  person 
robbed.""'  He  may  testify  that  he  did  not  consent"''  and  may  show 
tlie  nature  and  extent  of  the  violence  inflicted.'"*  In  case  he  is 
contradicted  on  this  point,  evidence  of  all  circumstances,  such  as 
the  strength  and  physical  condition  of  the  parties  and  the  place 
^v•here  the  crime  was  committed  may  be  received.'" 

It  mav  also  be  j^jresumed  by  the  jury,  upon  whom  is  the  ex- 
clusive determination  of  the  question,  that  the  person  robbed  was 


"a  State  V.  Sanders,  14  X.  Dak.  203, 
103  N.  W.  419. 

"United  States  v.  Jones,  3  Wash. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  209,  216,  26  Fed.  Cas. 
15494;  Ashworth  v.  State,  31  Te.x. 
Cr.  419,  20  S.  W.  982 ;  Tones  v.  State, 


'■■'Dill  V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  113; 
Long  V.  State,  12  Ga.  293. 

^'^  State  V.  Sanders,  14  N.  Dak.  203, 
103  X.  W.  419. 

''"Tones  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  363, 
88  S.  W.  217,  122  Am.  St.  759,  i  L.  R. 


48  Tex.   Cr.  363,  88  S.   W.   217,    122  A.  (N.  S.)   I024n. 

Am.    St.    759,    I    L.    R.    A.    ex.    S.)  "  Davis  v.  State,  159  Ala.  104,  48  So. 

I024n;   State  v.  Sanders,   14  X.   Dak.  694. 

203,  103  X.  W.  419;  State  V.  Vaughan,  ''^  Brown  v.   State,  120  Ala.  342,  25 

•  99  Mo.  108.  97  S.  W.  879;  Fannin  v.  So.  182. 

State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  41.  100  S.  W.  916,  '"People  v.  McElroy,   14  X.   Y.   S. 

123  .Am.  St.  874,  10  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  203,    60   Hun    (X.    Y.)    577,    without 

744n;  Grant  v.  State,  125  Ga.  259,  54  opinion.      The   physical    condition   of 

S.  E.  191.    As  to  proof  of  identity  of  the   person   robbed,   after   the   crime, 

accused,  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3133;  may  be  proved  by  the   testimony  of 

evidence  of   value,    §   3135;    evidence  a  physician  who  had  examined  him. 

of  good  character  of  defendant,   103  Commonwealth    v.    Flynn,    165    Mass. 

.Am.   St.  901,  note;  testimony  of  ac-  153.  42  X^  E.  562.     His  declarations 

complice,  98  Am.   St.   172,  note;  cir-  and      exclamation,      "I      have      been 

cumstantial     evidence.     Elliott     Evi-  robbed,"  may  be  received  as  res  gcstcr 

dence,  §§  3138,  3139;  defenses,  §  3140.  if  contemporaneous.   Walling  v.  State, 

55  Tex.  Cr.  254,  116  S.  W.  813. 


6l9  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    358 

put  in  fear  from  acts  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the  accused."" 
Actual  fear  of  life  or  bodily  injury  on  the  part  of  the  victim  need 
not  be  strictly  and  precisely  proved  as  the  law  will  presume  the 
existence  of  fear  where  there  appears  to  be  just  ground  for  it."^ 
The  aninuis  fiirandi  must  be  proved.  It  must  be  shown  that  the 
accused  took  the  property  without  the  consent  of  the  owner,  in- 
tending to  deprive  him  of  it  and  to  convert  it  to  another  use."- 
This  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the  same  description  of  facts 
and  circumstances  which  would  justify  a  similar  inference  in  a 
charge  of  larceny.^"  Thus,  the  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the 
circumstances  attendant  upon  the  taking  of  the  property ;  neces- 
sarily the  taking  implies  that  the  person  robbed  must  have  been 
in  possession  of  the  thing  taken  which  must  usually  be  of  some 
value."' 

The  accused  may  always  show  any  facts  tending  to  prove 
that  he  took  the  property  in  good  faith ;  he  may  show  that  he 
was  an  ofificer  of  the  law,  that  he  had  arrested  the  prosecuting 
witness,  and  that  he  had  searched  him  and  had  taken  his  personal 
property  from  him  in  order  that  it  might  be  safely  kept  during  his 
imprisonment.  If,  however,  in  doing  this  he  uses  force  which  is 
sufficient  to  overcome  his  resistance,  and  does  this  with  the  intent 

""  State  V.  Lawler,  130  Mo.  366,  32  Mo.  569,  74  S.  W.  846 ;  State  v.  Mc- 

S.    W.    979,    51    Am.    St.    575;    Mc-  Coy,   63   W.   Va.   69,    59    S.    E.    758: 

Xamara    v.    People,   24   Colo.   61,   48  State  v.  Carroll,   14  Mo.  392,   113   S. 

Pac.    541;    State    v.    Lamb,    141    Mo.  W.  1051,21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  31m. 

298,  42   S.   W.   827;   Tones   v.   State,  "'State  v.  Woodward,  131  Mo.  369, 

48  Tex.   Cr.   2i6^,  88  S.   W.  217,   122  33   S.  \V.   14;  Crawford  v.   State,  90 

Am.    St.    759,    i    L.   R.    A.    (N.    S.)  Ga.  701,  17  S.  E.  628,  35  Am.  St.  242: 

102411.  Jordan   v.    Commonwealth,   25    Gratt. 

°' .McN'amara  V.  People,  24  Colo.  61,  (Va.)     943;    People    v.    Hughes,    ir 

48  Pac.  541;  State  v.  Lawler,  130  Mo.  Utah  100,  39  Pac.  492;  Long  v.  State, 

366,   32   S.   W.   979;    State   V.   Lamb,  12  Ga.  293;  State  v.  Deal,  64  N.  Car. 

[41   Mo.  298,  42  S.  W.  827;  Jones  v.  270;  Tones  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  363, 

State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  363,  88  S.  W.  217,  88  S.  W.  217,  T22  Am.  St.  759.  i  I-  R- 

122  Am.  St.  759.  I  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  A.    (N.   S.)    I024n ;   Triplett  v.   Coin- 

I024n  ;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3131.  monwealth,  122  Ky.  35,  91  S.  W.  28t, 

"=  Sledge  V.   State,  99  Ga.  684,  26  S.  28     Ky.     L.     974;     Elliott     I'Aideiice. 

E.  756;   State  V.  Smith,  174   Mo.  586,  §  3132.     Sec,  also,  §§  292,  293. 

74   S.   W.  624;    Triplett   v.   Common-  "'Tones   v.    State,  48  Tex.   Cr.   363, 

wealth,   122  Ky.  35,  91   S.  W.  281.  28  HK  S.   \V.  _'r7,   uj  Am.  St.  759.   i    L. 

Ky.    L.   974;    Jones    v.    State    (Miss.,  R.  A.  (N.  S.)    102411. 
'909),  48  So.  407;  .State  V.  Spray,  174 


^    358  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE,  62O 

of  taking"  liis  property  or  money  from  him,  the  riglit  of  search  is 
not  a  defense,  hnt  the  jury  must  determine  the  intent  of  the  officer 
in  taking  the  jiroperty  upon  all  the  circumstances.'"'' 

Where  the  accused  alleges  that  at  the  time  of  committing  the 
crime  or  robbery,  he  was  incapable  of  entertaining  any  intent, 
because  of  his  intoxication,  the  question  of  intent  is  for  the  jury 
on  all  the  circumstances.'"'  It  may  be  proved  thai  the  thief  was  dis- 
guised. So,  too,  in  robbery  as  in  larceny,  the  possession  of  the 
stolen  property  by  the  accused,  if  recent  and  unexplained,  may 
justify  an  inference  that  he  was  implicated  in  it."'  But  the  ac- 
cused must  always  be  allowed  to  explain  his  possession  of  the 
property,  and  on  the  whole,  the  possession  of  the  property,  wdiile 
a  circumstance  to  be  considered  in  any  case,  is  by  no  means  con- 
clusive of  the  guilt  of  the  accused,*'^ 

And  it  has  also  been  held  that  it  was  proper  to  permit  the 
state  to  show  that  articles  taken  from  the  person  robbed  were 
found  in  the  possession  of  a  woman  with  whom  the  accused  had 
been  very  intimate  where  the  possession  was  recent.*^'*  The  own- 
ership of  the  money  may  be  inferred  as  being  in  the  person  robbed 
from  the  fact  that  it  was  taken  from  his  possession.""  Evidence 
that  the  defendant  owns  property  is  inadmissible.'^  So  it  has 
been  held  that  evidence  to  show  that  the  accused  for  a  long  time 
prior  to  the  date  of  the  crime,  had  a  large  sum  of  money  in  his 

"  State  V.  ^McAllister,  65  \V.  Va.  97,  felonious  intention.     Brown  v.  State, 

63    S.    E.    758;    Wynn    v.    Common-  28  Ark.    126;    State   v.    Hollyway,  41 

wealth  (Ky.,  1909),  122  S.  W.  516.  Iowa  200,  20  Am.  586;  Carr  v.  State, 

""Latimer  v.  State,  55  Neb.  609,  ^d  55  Tex.  Cr.  352,  116  S.  W.  591. 

N.  W.  207,  70  Am.  St.  403.  '^People  v.  Hallam,  6  Cal.  App.  331, 

'"  State  V.  Harris,  97  Iowa  407,  66  92  Pac.  190. 

N.  W.  728;  State  v.  Wyatt,  124  Mo.  ""Clay  v.  State,  122  Ga.  136,  50  S. 

537,  27  S.  W.  1096;  Bradley  v.  State,  E.  56. 

103    Ala.    29,    IS    So.    640;    State    v.  "Bow  v.  People,  160  111.  438,  43  N. 

Balch,    136   Mo.   103,   yj  S.   W.   808;  E.  593;   People  v.   Oldham,   iii   Cal. 

People  V.  Mackinder,  80  Hun  (X.  Y.)  648,  44  Pac.  312;  Riggs  v.  State,  104 

40,  29  X.  Y.  S.  842;  State  v.  Moore,  Ind.  261,  3  X.  E.  886;  People  v.  Mc- 

106  Mo.  480,  17  S.  W.  658;  Tabor  v.  Donald    (Cal.,    1896),   45    Pac.    1005; 

State,    52   Tex.    Cr.    387,   107    S.    W.  State  v.  Adams,  58  Kan.  365.  49  Pac. 

1116;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3136.     Evi-  81;   State  v.   Howard,  30  Mont.  518, 

dence  tending  to  show  that  the  tak-  77  Pac.  50;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3^30- 

ing  was  under  claim  of   title   is   ad-  "^  Reynolds  v.   State,  147  Ind.  3,  46 

missible  to  show  that  there  was  not  X'.  E.  31. 


621  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    359 

house  is  inadmissible.'-  But  on  the  other  hand  it  may  be  proved 
that  the  accused  on  the  day  before  the  robbery  was  without 
mone}%  and  wore  shabby  clothing  and,  that  on  the  day  after  the 
robbery  he  appeared  in  a  new  suit  of  clothes  and  exhibited  or 
boasted  of  having  large  sums  of  money  in  his  possession.'^  The 
person  robbed  may  always  testify  that  he  had  the  money  or  other 
property  which  is  alleged  to  have  been  stolen  in  his  possession. 
These  facts  may  be  proved  by  other  persons.  Indeed,  it  may 
be  shown  that  shortly  before  the  robbery  he  was  seen  to  have 
been  spending  money  and  that  he  exhibited  money,  had  it  in  his 
possession,  and  particularly  that  he  exhibited  or  spoke  of  having 
money  in  the  presence  of  the  accused.'*  Evidence  of  other  rob- 
beries or  of  attempts  to  commit  other  robberies  at  or  about  the 
same  time  as  the  one  for  which  the  accused  is  being  tried  and 
with  which  the  accused  is  connected  may  be  shown  to  identify 
the  accused  or  to  show  his  intention. '^^  Anything  the  person 
robbed  may  have  said  during  the  assault  which  preceded  or  ac- 
companied the  robbery,  if  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcu,  is  admis- 
sible."^ 

§  359.  The  crime  of  mayhem. — The  facts  which  must  be  proved 
to  sustain  an  allegation  of  mayhem  at  common  law  are :  First, 
the  injury ;  second,  malice,''  and  third,  an  intent  to  maim  and 
disfigure.''^  Thus  a  conviction  of  an  attempt  to  commit  mayhem 
cannot  be  sustained  by  proof  of  the  throwing  of  red  pepper  into 

"Craig  V.  State,  171  Ind.  317,  86  N.  "See  Green  v.   State,   151  Ala.   14, 

E.  397.  44  So.  194,  125  Am.  St.  17,  as  to  dis- 

"  People  V.    Sullivan,   144  Cal.  471,  tinction  between  "malice"  and  "malice 

77  Pac.  1000.  aforctliought." 

"Boyd  V.  State,  153  Ala.  41,  45  So.  "United  States  v.  Gunthcr,  5  Dak. 

591.  234,   241,    38   N.    W.    79;    Bowers    v. 

"State  V.   Howard,   30   Mont.   518,  State,  24  Tex.  App.  542,  549,  7  S.  W. 

77  Pac.  50 ;  Wyatt  v.  State,  55  Tex.  247,  5  Am.   St.  901 ;   Davis  v.   State, 

Cr.    73,    114    S.    W.    812;    Tabor    v.  22  Tex.   App.   45,   51,  2   S.   W.  630: 

State,    52   Tex.    Cr.    387,    107    S.    W.  State  v.  Johnson,  58  Ohio  St.  417,  51 

1116,  62  L.  R.  A.  193,  extensive  note;  N.  K.  40,  65  Am.  St.  ;69n ;  Carpenter 

Elliott  Evidence,  §  3137.  v.  People,  3r  Colo.  284,  72  Pac.  1072, 

"  State  v.  Ripley,  32  Wash.   182.  72  holding  that,  under  Laws  1895,  p.  156, 

Pac.    1036;    State    v.    I'inn,    199    Mo.  c.  69,  a  specific  intent  to  maim  is  not 

507.   98    S.    W.   9;    Elliott    Evidence,  necessary  to  be  proved. 
§  3r.34- 


§     :i60  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  622 

the  eve  of  another  where  il  appears  that  tlie  substance  thrown 
would  not  destroy  the  eye  unless  allowed  to  remain  an  extra- 
ordhiary  time.'''  Malice.''"  and  the  specific  intent  to  injure,  dis- 
fisfure  or  maim  ma\-  alwaws  he  inferred  from  the  circumstances 
under  the  rule  that  a  man  may  be  inferred  to  have  intended  the 
natural,  probable  and  reasonal)le  consequences  of  his  acts/^  Pre- 
meditation existing  prior  to  the  conflict  in  which  the  injury 
v/as  inflicted  is  not  necessary/- 

The  circumstances  attending  the  injur\-  may  ])c  shown  to  rebut 
tlie  intent  h\  proxing  the  defendant  indicted  the  injury  under 
jiressure  of  necessity  or  while  lawfully  defending  himself,  or 
that  it  was  purely  accidental. "*''  .V  previous  assault  ui)on  the  de- 
fendant is  admissible  in  justification.  It  must  be  made  to  appear 
that  the  striking  was  in  self-defense  and  that  the  force  employed 
was  in  proportion  to  the  attack.  Son  assault  is  a  good  plea  in 
mayhem,  Init  it  must  ai)pear  that  the  resistance  w^as  in  proportion 
to  the  nature  of  the  injury  offered.**^ 

^  360.  Sodomy. — This  crime  may  be  defined  as  the  carnal  co])u- 
lation  of  one  human  being  with  another  in  a  manner  "against 
nature,"  or,  to  be  more  definite,  in  any  manner  than  that  provided 
by  nature.  Bestiality  is  the  carnal  copulation  of  a  man  or  woman 
with  a  beast. *'■''  Writers  upon  criminal  law  ]ia\e  frequently,  and 
with  reason,  called  attention  to  the  ease  with  which  one  may  be 
accused  of  this  crime  and  the  extreme  dif^culty  of  proving  its 

■"  Dahlberg  v.    People,   225   111.  485,  "'State  v.   Hair,  2,7  ^tinn.  351,  354, 

80  N.  E.  310.  34 -N-    W.    893.      Compare    Green    v. 

*"  State   V.    Bloedow,   45    Wis.   279;  State,    151    Ala.    14,   44    So.    194,    125 

State  V.  Evans,   i    Hayw.    (X.   Car.)  Am.  St.  17. 

281.  "'Hayden  V.  State,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

*•  State  V.  Hair,  27  Minn.  351,  354,  5461  547;  Green  v.  State,  151  .Ala.  14, 

34    N.    W.    893;    State    v.    Jones,    70  44  So.    T94,   125  Am.   St.   17.     A   pre- 

lowa   505,   30   N.    W.   750;    Davis    v.  vious    threat   or   attempt   by    tiic    dc- 

State,  22  Tex.  App.  45,  51,  2  S.  W.  fendant    to    assault    the    prosecuting 

630;    State    V.    Abram,    10    .Ma.    928,  witness    before    the    final    assault    is 

93T  ;    State    v.    Girkin,    i    Ired.     (\.  relevant.      People    v.    Demasters,    109 

Car.)   121,  122;  Ridenour  v.  State,  38  Cal.  607,  42  Pac.  236. 

Ohio  St.  272,  274.  "  See    Rish.    Cr.    Law.    1029.    4   Bl. 

"State  V.  Simmons,  3  Ala.  497,  498;  Com.  415;  Commonwealth  v.  Thomas, 

State  V.  Crawford,  2  Dev.  (N.  Car.)  i  Va.  Cas.  307. 
4^5.  427- 


623  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    36 1 

commission.  If  the  crime  is  consummated,  both  parties  consenting 
thereto,  each  is  an  accomphce  of  the  other  and  neither  can  be  con- 
victed upon  the  uncorroborated  testimoii}'  of  the  other.**''  And, 
as  the  crime  is  usually  committed  when  no  third  person  is  present, 
corroboration  is  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible  to  obtain,  except 
so  far  as  it  may  be  found  in  circumstances  which  would  naturally 
accompany  the  commission  of  such  an  offense.'*^  When,  however, 
the  crime  is  attempted  or  committed  without  or  against  the  con- 
sent of  the  pathic  party  he  is  not  an  accomplice,  and  a  conviction 
may  be  had  upon  his  testimony  alone.  Whether  he  consented  is  a 
question  for  the  jury*"^  in  all  cases  where  the  evidence  is  at  all 
doubtful.  Evidence  to  show  that  he  did  or  did  not  consent  is 
always  relevant,****  particularly  in  the  case  of  a  charge  of  an  as- 
sault with  intent  to  commit  sodomy.****^  But  a  minor  under  twelve 
years  of  age  cannot  consent  so  that  his  submission  without  resist- 
ance does  not  constitute  a  defense.**" 

§  361.  Criminal  libel  defined. — This  may  be  defined  as  a  publica- 
tion in  print  or  writing  without  justification  or  lawful  excuse, 
which  is  calculated  to  injure  the  reputation  of  another,  by  expos- 
ing him  to  hatred,  ridicule  or  contempt.**^  The  state  must  prove 
the  following  facts:  First,  the  publication  by  the  defendant:  sec- 
ond, that  the  matter  published  is  libelous:  third,  the  intent,  and. 
fourth,  when  the  truth  is  admissible  in  defense,  the  falsity  of  the 
assertions  made.**' 

*'  Medis  V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  194,  Pac.     1027.       See    Commonwealth    v. 

IT   S.  W.  112,  IT  Am.  St.  192.  .Snow,  tri  Mass.  411. 

"  See    Williams    v.    Commonwealth  '"  State  v.  Smith,  137  Mo.  25,  38  S. 

(Va.,   1895),  22  S.  E.  859;   Territory  W.  717. 

V.    MahafFey,    3    Mont.    T12;    Hodges  '"a  People  v.    Ilickey,    T09  Cal.   275, 

V.    State,  94   Ga.    593,    19   S.    E.   758;  41  Pac.  1027. 

People  V.  Boyle,  116  Cal.  658,  48  Pac.  ""  Mascolo  v.  Montcsanto,  61  Conn. 

800.     The  declarations  of  the  person  50,  23  .Xtl.  714,  29  Am.  St.  170. 

.issaulted    are    not    admissible    unless  "^  People  v.  Croswell,  3  Johns.  Cas. 

said   in  the  presence  of  the  accused,  CN.  Y.)  ;^^7;  Raker  v.  State,  50  \ch. 

.IS  direct  evidence,  though  perhaps  ad-  202,  69  N.  W.  749;  People  v.  Ritchie, 

missihlc  as   corroboration.     I'ostcr  v.  12  Utah  180,  42  Pac.  209;   Elliott   Evi- 

Statc,  r  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  467,  i  Ohio  Cir.  dencc,  §  31^)9. 

Dec.  261;  State  v.  Gruso,  28  La.  .Ann.  ""Odgcrs  on  T.ihel  and  Slander  580. 

052.  Criminal    libel    is   "ni;dicions   defama- 

"  Pef)ple  V.   Hickcy,  109  Cal.  275,  41  tioiis,    expressed    in    printing   or   writ- 


§  3(^2 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE, 


624 


j<  362.  The  publication  of  the  iibel. — The  ])ul)licati(in  of  the  lihcl 
in  language  substantially  as  laid  in  the  incHctnient  must  be 
pro\e(l.''''  A  slight  \ariruice  between  the  publication  as  proxed  l)v 
a  copy  and  llie  incHctnient  may  be  disregarded.  If  the  libel  is  in 
writing  the  production  of  the  writing,  with  sufficient  proof  that 
it  is  in  the  handwriting  of  the  accused,  is  enougii.'"'*  If  tlie  hbel 
Avas  printed  eitlier  in  a  Ijook  or  newspaper,  the  production  of  a 
copy  with  proof  that  it  was  purchased  witliin  the  territorial  juris- 
diction of  the  court,  will  raise  a  presumption  of  publication. °'''' 
Proof  that  the  accused  is  the  editor  or  publisher  of  the  news- 
paper in  which  the  alleged  libelous  article  was  pul)lished  is  suf- 
ficient to  connect  him  with  the  publication.  He  cannot  prove  that 
lie  never  saw  the  libel  in  fact.  Xor  can  it  be  shown  in  his  favor 
that  he  had  no  actual  knowledge  of  the  publication. ^"^  To  sustain 
the  allegation  of  publishing  in  a  charge  of  criminal  libel  it  is  not 
necessary  to  prove  that  the  matter  complained  of  was  acttiallv 
seen  by  another  person.  If  it  is  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that  the  accused  knowingly  displayed  the  libelous  matter,  or 
parted  witli  it  under  circumstances  which  exposed  it  to  be  seen 
or  understood  by  another  than  himself,  the  proof  suffices."'    It 


ing.  or  by  signs  or  pictures,  tending 
either  to  blacken  the  memory  of  one 
who  is  dead,  or  the  reputation  of  one 
who  is  living,  and  thereby  to  expose 
him  to  public  hatred,  contempt  and 
ridicule."  State  v.  ShafFner,  2  Pcnn. 
(Del.)  171,  44  Atl.  620. 

"^A  slight  variance  between  the 
publication  as  proved  by  a  copy  and 
the  indictment  may  be  disregarded. 
Collins  V.  People,  115  111.  App.  280; 
Hartford  v.  State,  96  Ind.  461,  49 
Am.  185;  McArthur  v.  State,  41  Tex. 
Cr.  635,  57  S.  W.  847;  Gipson  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1903),  77  S.  W.  216. 

"  Rex  v.  Beare,  i  Ld.  Rd.  414. 

"'  Commonwealth  v.  Morgan,  107 
Mass.  199,  202.  And  evidence  to 
show  the  number  of  papers  contain- 
ing the  libel  which  were  printed  or 
sold,  or  to  prove  its  general  circula- 
tion, is  always  competent.  Boyle  v. 
State,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  163,  but  never 


indispensable.  Baker  v.  State.  97  Ga. 
452,  25  S.  E.  341. 

'^  Commonwealth  v.  Morgan,  107 
Mass.  199,  202.  Papers  signed  by  the 
accused  as  president  of  the  paper 
publishing  the  libel  are  admissible  tn 
show  his  connection  with  the  paper. 
Boyle  V.  State,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  163,  3 
Ohio  Cir.  Dec.  397.  Hostile  feeling 
between  the  accused  and  the  prose- 
cuting witness  may  be  shown.  Peo- 
ple V.  Ritchie,  12  Utah  180,  42  Pac. 
209.  See  also.  United  States  v.  Cran- 
dell,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  683.  25 
Fed.  Cas.  14885,  as  to  proof  of  find- 
ing other  copies  of  same  libel  in  pos- 
session of  the  accused. 

''Giles  V.  State,  6  Ga.  276;  New 
York  Penal  Code,  245.  See  also, 
Haase  v.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  34.  20 
Atl.  751;  State  V.  Barnes,  32  Me. 
530. 


625  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    362 

is  not  usually  necessary  that  the  state  should  prove  every  part 
of  the  libelous  article,  though  it  is  necessary  for  it  to  prove  enough 
of  the  article  to  convince  the  jury  that  it  is  libelous.  Therefore, 
all  portions  of  the  article,  or  of  the  newspaper  or  pamphlet  which 
contain  or  relate  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  libel,  ought  to  be 
introduced  in  evidence  by  the  state;  and,  while  its  failure  to  do 
this  may  not  justify  an  acquittal,  yet  it  is  a  dangerous  practice 
for  the  prosecution  to  omit  to  prove  any  portion  relating  to  the 
libel.  On  the  other  hand,  any  other  part  of  the  publication  which 
is  upon  an  entirely  different  topic,  and  which  in  no  way  qualifies 
or  explains  that  portion  which  is  alleged  to  be  libelous  may  be 
omitted  and,  indeed,  evidence  of  this  character  is  properly  ex- 
cluded.^* While  a  criminal  libel  may  be  sustained  by  proving 
the  substance  of  the  printed  or  written  language,  slander,  where 
it  is  criminal,  is  not  proved  unless  the  exact  language  which  is 
alleged  to  have  been  used  or  enough  of  it  to  constitute  the  charge 
is  pro\-ed,  for  it  is  not  enough  that  the  words  which  are  proved 
vo  have  been  uttered  are  equivalent  in  their  meaning  to  the  words 
charged.'*^  Several  persons  may  be  libeled  in  an  article  of  which 
there  is  but  a  single  publication.  The  libelous  charge  against 
them  may  be  identical,  or  there  may  be  separate  libels  against 
them  separately ;  though  each  person  thus  libeled  may  have  a 
separate  civil  action  against  the  offender,  the  state  may  treat  the 
publication  as  a  single  crime  where  all  the  libels  are  contained  in 
one  article  and  may  indict  tlie  person  responsible,  though  two  or 
more  persons  have  been  lil)eled,  and  the  indictment  will  1)e  good. 
Where  a  statute  permits  the  truth  to  be  pleaded  in  justification 
of  the  libel,  the  accused  may  plead  and  prove  the  truth  as  to  one 
of  the  persons  whom  he  is  charged  to  have  libeled,  and  not  as 
to  the  other,  at  least  where  tlie  statements  are  capable  of  being 
separated.  But  the  wliole  publication  may  be  admitted  in  evidence 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  intention  of  the  accused.^""  And 
finally,  though  it  is  customary  to  allege  in  the  indictment  that 
the  libel  was  published  on  a  particular  day,  proof  of  this  fact  is 

"'State  V.  Williams,  74  Kan.  180,  85  ""State  v.  Fenn,  112  Mo.  App.  531. 

Pac.   9.38;   Collins   V.   People.   115  111.  86  S.  W.  1098. 

App.  280;  Jones  V.  State.  38  Tex.  Cr,  ^™  Tracy  v.  Commonwealtli,  Sj  Ky. 

364.  43  S.  W.  78,  70  Am.  St.  75m.  578,  9  S.  W.  822,  10  Ky.  L.  611. 
40— Unueriull  Cki.m.  Ev. 


§  36: 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


626 


not  always  necessary  if  it  be  proved  that  the  publication  took 
place  at  anv  time  within  the  statute  of  limitations.^ 

§  363.  The  meaning  of  language  used. — Parol  evidence  is  always 
admissible  to  explain  the  meaning  of  the  language  used,  where  it 
is  ambiguous,  and  to  identify  the  persons,  objects  and  incidents 
referred  to.  Thus,  where  the  libelous  article  does  not  refer  to  the 
])rosecuting  witness  noininati)n,  a  witness  may  testify  that  from 
his  knowledge  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances,  he  understood 
that  he  was  the  i:)erson  alluded  to."  So  the  meaning  of  words 
which  are  slangy,  technical  or  ambiguous,  may  be  explained  by 
parol  evidence.^ 

§  364.  Malicious  intention  in  publishing. — ]\Ialice  on  the  part  of 
the  accused  must  be  proved.*  But  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that 
it  must  be  shown  that  the  accused  was  actuated  by  ill-will  or 
vindictive  feeling  towards  the  person  who  is  the  object  of  the  libel- 
ous allegations.  ^lalice  in  the  legal,  not  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
term,  is  meant,  and  this  may  be  inferred  from  the  publishing  of 
a  charge  which  is  actionable  per  sc.^    So  malice  may  be  inferred 


*  Commonwealth  v.  Varnej^  10 
Cush.  (Mass.)  402. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  ^Morgan,  T07 
Mass.  199;  State  v.  Mason,  26  Ore. 
273,  38  Pac.  130,  46  Am.  St.  629,  26 
L.  R.  A.  779n ;  Enquirer  Co.  v.  John- 
ston, 72  Fed.  443,  18  C.  C.  A.  628; 
Commonwealth  v.  Buckingham, 
Thach.  Cr.  Cas.  CMass.)  29;  People 
V.  Ritchie,  12  Utah  180,  42  Pac.  209; 
Whitehead  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  89, 
45  S.  W.  10.  But  see  contra,  People 
V.  McDowell,  71  Cal.  194,  11  Pac. 
868;  Dickson  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  i, 
28  S.  W.  815,  30  S.  W.  807,  53  Am. 
St.  694n. 

^  Dickson  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  i, 
28  S.  W.  815,  30  S.  W.  807,  53  Am. 
St.  694n ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  20  Mo. 
App.  408;  State  V.  Bonine,  85  Mo. 
.App.  462;  Haley  v.  State,  6^^  .Ala.  89. 
The  libelous  language,  as  set  forth  in 


the  indictment,  must  be  proved 
strictly  as  alleged.  Frisby  v.  State, 
26  Tex.  App.  180,  9  S.  W.  463 ;  Berry 
V.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  483,  11  S.  W. 
521 ;  State  v.  Armstrong,  106  Mo. 
395,  16  S.  W.  604,  27  Am.  St.  361 : 
Neely  v.  State,  2^  Tex.  Cr.  370,  23 
S.  W.  798;  Stichtd  V.  State,  25  Tex. 
App.  420,  8  S.  W.  477,  8  Am.  St.  444. 
So  of  slanderous  words.  Barnett  v. 
State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  280,  22  S.  W.  340. 

*  Cornelius  v.  State,  145  Ala.  65,  40 
So.  670;  State  V.  ShafFner,  2  Penn. 
(Del.)  171,  44  Atl.  620:  England  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.),  49  S.  W.  379; 
State  V.  Lomack,  130  Iowa  79,  106 
X.  W.  386. 

'"  State  V.  Brady,  44  Kan.  435,  24 
Pac.  948,  2T  Am.  St.  296,  9  L-  R-  A. 
606;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Daily  States  Pub. 
Co.,  48  La.  Ann.  11 16,  20  So.  173. 


62^ 


CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON. 


§    3^U 


from  the  falsity  of  the  accusations  and  the  absence  of  reasonable 
grounds  for  it.** 

The  existence  of  malice  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  Evidence  of 
all  facts  and  circumstances  is  admissible  which  may  throw  any 
light  upon  the  intention  of  the  defendant,  and  which  will  show 
that  he  acted  honestly,  or  the  reverse,  that  he  was  prompted  by 
a  desire  to  stir  up  strife  or  to  promote  the  public  welfare  by  his 
publication."^  Evidence  of  other  libelous  publications  by  the  ac- 
cused, directed  against  the  same  person  or  against  others,  uncon- 
nected with  the  one  complained  of,  is  admissible  to  prove  the  in- 
tention,"^  if  the  date  of  publication  is  near  enough  to  afford  an 
inference  that  similar  motives  prompted  the  accused  in  both 
cases. ^  The  accused  should  always  be  permitted  to  testify  to  his 
own  intention,^"  and  may  also  prove  all  the  circumstances  under 
•which  publication  was  made,  the  facts  on  which  it  was  based,  and 
the  source  of  the  information  which  is  contained  in  the  state- 
ment.^^ 


*  State  V.  Lomack,  130  Iowa  79,  106 
X.  W.  386;  Haley  v.  State,  63  Ala. 
89 ;  Pledger  v.  State,  "]•]  Ga.  242,  3  S. 
E.  320;  State  V.  Clyne,  53  Kan.  8,  35 
Pac.  789;  State  v.  Brady,  44  Kan. 
^35,  24  Pac.  948,  21  Am.  St.  296,  9  L. 
R.  A.  606;  Commonwealth  v.  Bland- 
ing,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  304,  15  Am. 
Dec.  2r4n ;  State  v.  Patterson,  2  N. 
J.  L.  J.  218. 

'  Smith  V.  Commonwealth,  98  Ky. 
437.  ZZ  S.  W.  419,  17  Ky.  L.  10 10. 
Proof  of  good  character  of  defend- 
ant, 103  Am.  St.  900,  note. 

*  Commonwealth  v.  Harmon,  2 
Gray  CMass.)  289;  Manning  v.  State, 
},■]  Te.x.  Cr.  180,  39  S.  W.  118;  State 
V.  Conable,  8r  Iowa  60,  46  N.  W.  759; 
Grant  v.  State,  141  Ala.  96,  -y]  So. 
420;  State  V.  Heacock,  106  Iowa  191, 
76  X.  W.  654;  Manning  v.  State,  zi 
Tex.  Cr.  180,  39  S.  W.  118;  Riley  v. 
State,  132  Ala.  13,  31  So.  ^2>^\  State 
V.  Riggs,  39  Conn.  498;  Eldridge  v. 
State,  2'7  Fla.  162,  9  So.  448;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Damon,  136  Mass.  441; 
State  V.  Mills,   116  X.  Car.    1051,  21 


S.  E.  563;  Butler  v.  State  (Ala., 
1909),  SO  So.  400;  Cox  V.  State  (Ala., 
1909),  50  So.  398. 

"  Eldridge  v.  State,  27  Fla.  162,  9 
So.  448.     See  §  88,  et  seq. 

"People  V.  Stark,  59  Hun  (X.  Y.) 
5T,  T2  X.  Y.  S.  688;  State  v.  Clyne, 
53  Kan.  8,  35  Pac.  789.  But  only 
where  the  language  is  ambiguous." 
State  V.  Heacock,  106  Iowa  191,  76 
X.  W.  654- 

"  Duke  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  14 ; 
People  V.  Glassman,  12  Utah  238,  42 
Pac.  956;  Commonwealth  v.  Snclling, 
15  Pick.  (Mass.)  2)Z7>  ZZf^'-  Common- 
wealth V.  Bonner,  9  Met.  (Mass.) 
410;  Benton  v.  State,  59  X.  J.  L.  551, 
36  Atl.  1041 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Swal- 
low, 8  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  539.  But  it 
seems  that  he  cannot  prove  that  he 
repeated  what  another  had  told  him 
to  corroborate  him  where  the  l.iiter 
was  accused  of  falsehood  and  threat- 
ened with  personal  violence.  Sliaw 
V.  State,  28  Tex.  ;\pp.  236,  12  S.  \V. 
741. 


364 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


628 


The  question  of  the  intention  of  the  accused  in  pul)hsliino-  tlie 
libel  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  to  be  determined  by 
the  jury  under  the  instruction  of  the  court/" 


"Benton  v.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  551, 
36  Atl.  1041 ;  State  v.  Norton,  89  Me. 
290,  36  Atl.  394;  Baker  v.  State,  97 
Ga.  452,  25  S.  E.  341 ;  People  v.  See- 
ley,  139  Cal.  118,  72  Pac.  834;  State 
V.  Ford,  82  Minn.  452,  85  N.  W.  217; 
Drake  v.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  23,  20 
Atl.  747.  Evidence  of  other  crimes 
to  show  intent,  62  L.  R.  A.  230,  note. 
In  Rex  V.  Woodfall,  5  Burr.  2661, 
Lord  Mansfield  thus  expresses  him- 
self upon  the  question  of  intent: 
"Where  an  act,  in  itself  indifferent, 
if  done  with  a  particular  intent  be- 
comes criminal,  there  the  intent  must 
be  proved  and  found ;  but  where  the 
act  is  in  itself  unlawful,  as  in  this 
case,  the  proof  of  justification  or  ex- 
cuse lies  on  the  defendant ;  and  in 
failure  thereof  the  law  implies  a 
criminal  intent."  This  is  certainly 
good  law  where  a  man  publishes  mat- 
ter criminal  per  se  and  offers  no  evi- 
dence in  explanation  or  exculpation. 
But  usually  the  evidence  as  to  the 
intent  of  the  accused  is  conflicting, 
and  the  jury  must  consider  other 
facts  than  publication  only.  The 
court  adds :  "There  may  be  cases 
where  the  fact  proved  as  a  publica- 
tion may  be  justified  or  excused  as 
lawful  or  innocent.  For,  no  fact 
which  is  not  criminal,  in  case  the 
paper  be  a  libel,  can  amount  to  a 
publication  of  which  a  defendant 
ought  to  be  found  guilty."  In  the 
case  of  the  King  v.  The  Dean  of  St. 
Asaph,  reported  3  T.  R.  428,  the  right 
of  the  jury  to  determine  the  intent  of 
the  defendant  in  publishing  a  libel  re- 
ceived a  thorough  discussion.  Down 
to   that   time    the   uninterrupted   cur- 


rent of  the  decisions  undoubtedly 
confined  the  jury  to  determining  the 
fact  of  publication  and  the  meaning 
of  the  words  only.  The  question  of 
intent,  whether  the  publication  was  or 
was  not  libelous,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  criminality  of  the  act  of  publish- 
ing, was  for  the  court  to  determine 
upon  the  record  after  the  jury  had 
found  that  the  accused  had  published 
it,  and  the  meaning  of  the  language. 
So  far  as  the  jury  were  forbidden  to 
consider  the  intention  of  the  accused, 
the  crime  of  libel  constituted,  it  was 
admitted,  an  exception  to  the  rule  by 
which  the  jury  determined  the  guilty 
intent  of  the  accused  in  all  cases. 
The  natural  consequence  of  this  was, 
that  juries,  finding  that  the  accused 
was  prevented  from  offering  any  evi- 
dence to  explain  the  motives  of  his 
actions,  and  that  they  were  shut  out 
from  considering  them,  and  that  all 
that  remained  for  them  to  do  was  to 
find  the  fact  of  publication,  which 
was  usually  admitted,  very  often  im- 
properly acquitted  those  who  were  in 
fact  guilty  in  order  merely  to  show 
their  independence  of  judicial  domi- 
nation. After  the  decision  of  the 
case  above  mentioned,  the  Statute  32, 
Geo.  Ill,  c.  60,  was  passed,  which 
provided  as  follows :  "That  on  every 
such  trial,  the  jury  sworn  to  try  the 
issue  may  give  a  general  verdict  of 
guilty  or  not  guilty  upon  the  whole 
matter  put  in  issue  upon  such  indict- 
ment or  information;  and  shall  not 
be  required  or  directed,  by  the  court 
or  judge  before  whom  such  indict- 
ment or  information  shall  be  tried,  to 
find    the     defendant    or    defendants 


629  CRIMES    AGAIXST    THE    PERSOX.  §    365 

§  365.  Evidence  of  the  truth  as  a  defense. — At  common  law  the 
defendant  in  a  criminal  prosecution  was  not  permitted  to  prove 
the  truth  of  the  statement  complained  of.  Hence  arose  Lord 
Mansfield's  celebrated  dictum,  "the  greater  the  truth,  the  greater 
the  libel;"  the  supposition  being  that  the  greater  the  appearance 
of  truth  in  a  criminal  libel,  the  more  likely  would  it  tend  to  stir 
up  the  victim  to  revenge  himself  and  lead  to  a  breach  of  the 
peace,  with  possible  homicide  or  bloodshed.  But  now  by  statute 
in  England,^^  and  under  various  constitutional  and  statutory  pro- 
visions in  the  states,  the  defendant  is  permitted  to  prove  the  truth 
of  his  assertions,  and  that  they  were  published  for  the  public  bene- 
fit.^* 

The  accused  is  permitted  to  prove  the  truth  of  the  statements 
for  which  he  is  to  be  held  responsible.^^  But  usually  the  truth 
alone  is  not  a  sufficient  excuse  if  the  libel  was  published  in  bad 
faith  and  with  an  intent  to  injure.^**  Where  the  truth  is  a  suf- 
ficient justification,  the  accused  is  not  compelled  to  prove  it 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. ^^  It  is  enough  if  upon  all  the  evidence 
the  jury  believe  his  statements  are  true.  And  where  the  evidence 
for  the  defendant  creates  a  prima  facie  presumption  in  the  minds 
of  jurors  that  his  statements  are  true,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the 
prosecution  to  convince  them  of  their  falsity  beyond  all  reasonable 
doubt.^*    It  is  only  necessary  to  prove  the  truth  of  that  part  of 

guilty,    merely    on    the   proof    of    the  "  Barthelemy  v.  People,  2  Hill  (N. 

publication  by  such  defendant  or  de-  Y.)   248;   State  v.  Bush,   122  Ind.  42, 

fendants  of  the  paper  charged  to  be  23  N.  E.  677;  State  v.  Lehre,  2  Brev. 

a  libel."  (S.  Car.)  446,  4  Am.  Dec.  596;  State 

"  Lord  Campbell's  Act,  6  and  7  Vic.  v.  Lyon,  89  N.  Car.  568. 

C1843),  c.  96.  "Manning   v.    State,   37    Tex.    Cr. 

"Odger's   Libel   and    Slander,   388-  180,  39  S.  W.  118. 

390;  Reg.  V.  O'Brien,  4  Cr.  L.  ]\Iag.  "State  v.  Bush,  122  Ind.  42,  23  N. 

424.  E.  677;   AIcArthur  v.   State,  59  Ark. 

"People  V.  Seeley,  139  Cal.  118,  72  431,  27  S.  W.  628;  State  v.  Wait,  44 

Pac.  834;  State  v.  Keenan,  in  Iowa  Kan.    310,    24    Pac.    354;    Common- 

286,  82  X.  W.  792;  State  V.  Conable,  wealth  v.  Rudy,  5  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  270; 

81   Iowa  60,  46  X.  W.  759;  State  v.  Smith  v.  Commonwealth,  98  Ky.  437, 

Wait,  44  Kan.  310,  24  Pac.  354;  Com-  33  S.  W.  419,  17  Ky.  L.  loio;   State 

monwealth    v.    Snelling,    Thach.    Cr.  v.  Grinstead,  10  Kan.  App.  90,  61  Pac. 

Cas.    (Mass.)   318;   Boyle  v.   State,  6  980;   Manning  v.   State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 

Ohio  Cir.  Ct.   163,  3  Ohio  Cir.   Dec.  180,  39  S.  W.  118. 

.397;    Johnson   v.    State,   31    Tex.    Cr.  • 
569,  21  S.  W.  541. 


§    3^5  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  63O 

the  publication  which  is  alleged  to  be  libelous."  Evidence  to 
prove  the  truth  of  the  charges  made  by  the  accused  must  come 
from  witnesses  who  have  a  competent  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
acquired  by  their  own  observation.  Hearsay  is  not  admissible. 
Hence  it  is  not  allowable  to  prove  that  the  matters  referred  to  in 
the  alleged  libel  were  rumored  about  the  neighborhood,  and  were 
accepted  as  the  truth  by  persons  who  knew  the  party  libeled.-" 

Where  the  statute  permits  the  truth  of  the  charges  which  are 
alleged  to  have  been  libelous  to  be  proved  in  justification,  any 
evidence  which  tends  to  prove  their  truth  is  relevant.  The  test 
of  relevancy  is  whether  the  facts  would  be  relevant  if  the  truth 
or  falsity  of  the  charges  were  directly  in  issue  in  some  legal  pro- 
ceeding either  criminal  or  civil.  For  example,  if  the  libel  consists 
in  charging  the  prosecuting  witness  with  a  crime,  the  relevancy 
of  the  evidence  to  prove  the  truth  of  the  charge  on  the  part  of 
the  accused  would  be  determined  by  the  answer  to  the  question, 
would  such  evidence  be  relevant  in  a  criminal  prosecution 
brought  against  the  prosecuting  witness  based  upon  the  crime 
charged?  Thus,  proof  of  the  commission  of  one  crime  is  not 
relevant  to  prove  in  justification  the  truth  of  an  allegation  charg- 

"  State   V.    Wait,    44    Kan.    310,    24  the  party  libeled  to  prove  the  truth  of 

Pac.  354.  the  charge.     People  v.  Stokes,  24  X. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Place,  153  Pa.  Y.  S.  -ji-/,  30  Abb.  X.  Cas.  200;  State 
St.  314,  26  Atl.  620;  People  v.  Jack-  v.  Bush,  122  Ind.  42,  23  N.  E.  (i-jT\ 
man,  96  Mich.  269,  55  X.  W.  809;  Commonwealth  v.  Snelling,  15  Pick. 
State  V.  Hinson,  103  X.  Car.  374,  9  (Mass.)  zyj;  State  v.  Lyons,  89  X. 
S.  E.  552;  State  v.  Butman,  15  La.  Car.  568;  McArthur  v.  State,  41  Tex. 
Ann.  166;  State  v.  Ford,  82  Minn.  Cr.  635,  57  S.  W.  847.  Contra,  by 
452.  85  X.  W.  217;  State  V.  White,  7  statute  in  Texas.  Manning  v.  State, 
Ired.  (X.  Car.)  180.  Contra,  Hum-  37  Tex.  Cr.  180,  39  S.  W.  it8.  In 
bard  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  200,  17  Texas,  Penal  Code,  Art.  646;  Mis- 
S.  W.  126.  In  Commonwealth  v.  souri.  Rev.  St.,  §  3858;  North  Caro- 
Snelling,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)  337,  342,  lina,  X.  Car.  Code,  §  11 13,  and  some 
the  court,  by  Shaw,  C.  J.,  said :  "But  other  states  slander,  consisting  of 
how  is  this  defense  to  be  made?  By  words,  imputing  unchastity  to  a 
proof  of  the  truth  of  the  matter,  woman,  is  good  ground  for  an  in- 
charged  as  libelous,  not  his  belief  of  dictment.  The  mode  of  proof,  ex- 
the  truth,  not  his  information,  nor  cept  so  far  as  the  words  uttered  are 
the  strength  of  the  authority  upon  oral  and  not  written,  is  the  same  as  in 
which  such  belief  was  taken  up."  criminal  libel.  Burnham  v.  State,  37 
The  accused  will  not  be  permitted  to  Fla.  327,  20  So.  548. 
prove   the   general   bad   character   of 


631  CRIMES    AGAINST    THE    PERSON.  §    365 

ing  the  witness  with  a  distinct  offense  involving  different  acts  on 
his  part.-^  After  the  accused  has  oft'ered  evidence  to  prove  that 
his  charge  was  true,  the  state  must  be  permitted  to  meet  this  with 
proof  tending  to  show  that  the  charge  was  false.  Where  the 
libelous  charge  was  that  the  prosecutor  was  dishonest,  and  the 
accused  was  permitted  to  show  that  he  did  not  pay  his  debts  and 
that  lie  had  to  be  sued ;  he  was  permitted  to  show  his  family  and 
his  means  and  other  circumstances  as  explaining  his  inability  to 
pay  his  debts  and  he  may  also  testify  how  many  times  and  for 
what  reasons  he  was  sued."" 

^  State  V.  Lomack,  130  Iowa  79,  106         "State  v.  Keenan,  iii  Iowa  286,  82 
X.  W.  386.  N.  W.  792. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


OFFENSES  AGAINST   HUMAN   HABITATIONS. 


366.  Arson — At  common  law  and  by 

statute — Evidence  to  show 
locality  of  building. 

367.  Proof    of    actual    burning    re- 

quired— Non-accidental  char- 
acter of  fire — Proof  of  prem- 
ises burned. 

368.  Threats     and     declarations    by 

the  accused — Remoteness. 

369.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show 

the  intent — Proof  of  other 
similar  crimes. 

370.  Evidence     of     preparation     to 

show  that  the  accused  was 
near  the  burned  premises. 

371.  Burglary   defined — Entrance   at 

night  time — Preparations  to 
commit. 
2,72.  Evidence  to  prove  forcible 
breaking  in  and  entering — 
The  condition  of  the  prem- 
ises. 


yjZ-  Proof  of  constructive  breaking 
— Xon-consent  of  owner — 
Evidence  of  ownership  and 
value  of  property. 

374.  Correspondence    of    foot-prints 

with    the    foot-wear    of    the 
accused. 
374a.  Evidence  obtained  by  trailing 
with  bloodhounds. 

375.  Burglarious  tools  in  the  posses- 

sion of  the  accused. 
yid-  Other  burglarious  acts. 
2)77.  The  felonious  intention  present 

in  entering. 

378.  Presumption   from   the   posses- 

sion of  stolen  property. 

379.  Articles  stolen  from  the  prem- 

ises as  evidence. 


^  366.  Arson — At  common  law  and  by  statute — ^Evidence  to  show 
locality  of  building. — The  malicious  or  willful  burning  of  the 
house  or  out-house  of  another,  or  the  burning  of  any  building,  so 
situated  as  to  endanger  a  dwelling-house,  is  arson  at  common 
law.^  This  crime  is  sometimes  graded  by  statute  according  to 
the  degree  in  which  it  involves  danger  to  human  life.  The  malic- 
ious and  intentional  burning  of  one's  own  house,  or  of  buildings 
which  are  not  the  subject  of  arson  at  common  law,"  is  sometimes 


M    Bl.    Com.    220;    Kopcyznski    v.     S.  E.  53,  55  Am.  St.  806,  32  L.  R.  A. 
State,  137  Wis.  358,  118  X.  W.  863.         647n. 
-  State  V.  Sarvis,  45  S.  Car.  668,  24 

(632) 


633  OFFENSES    AGAINST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS.  §    366 

made  arson  by  statute.^  The  character  of  the  dwelHng  or  other 
building  must  be  proved  substantially  as  laid  in  the  indictment.* 
A  charge  of  burning  a  building  is  sustained  though  the  proof 
shows  that  the  building  was  not  completed.^  So  it  has  been  held 
that  a  charge  of  burning  a  ''house"  is  sustained  by  showing  the 
burning  of  a  gin  set  up  on  posts  with  the  lower  part  thereof  used 
for  the  engine  and  the  upper  part  enclosed  with  walls.*'  Whether 
a  structure  is  or  is  not  a  building  within  the  statute  is  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury."  The  title  or  occupancy  of  the  building  need 
not  be  proved  with  the  fulness  which  is  necessary  in  actions  in- 
volving the  title  or  the  right  to  possession.*  Description  and 
proof  by  street  and  number,  or  by  its  proximity  to  well-known 
landmarks,  is  sufficient  to  sustain  the  venue.  The  ownership  of 
the  building  need  not  be  strictly  proved,  unless  it  is  an  essential 
element  of  the  crime,  as  when  one  is  indicted  for  setting  fire  to 
his  own  house.^  Any  evidence  tending  to  prove  ownership  in  a 
civil  action  is  competent.  It  has  been  held  that  ownership  must 
be  proved  by  the  production  of  the  deed,  though  apparently  this 
is  not  the  general  rule.^*'  In  another  case  a  receipt  for  rent  was 
received  signed  by  the  accused  while  in  jail."  Under  a  statute 
making  it  arson  for  one  to  burn  his  own  property,  proof  that  he 

^Burger  v.   State,  34  Xeb.   397,  51  'Van    Immons    v.    State,    29    Ohio 

N.    W.     1027;    State    v.    Grimes,    50  Cir.  Ct.  681. 

Minn.   123,  52  N.  W.  275 ;  People  v.  ^  IMorgan  v.  State,  120  Ga.  499,  48 

Fairchild,  48  Mich.  31,  11  X.  W.  ^^y,  S.  E.  238. 

State  V.  Harvey,  131   Mo.  339,  32  S.  "  People  v.   Handley,   100  Gal.   370, 

W.    mo;    Commonwealth   v.    Uhrig,  34    Pac.    853;    People   v.    Laverty,   9 

167  Mass.  420,  45  X.  E.  1047.  Cal.  App.  756,   100  Pac.  899;   Heard 

*  State  V.  Jeter,  47  S.  Car.  2,  24  S.  v.  State,  116  Tenn.  713,  94  S.  W.  605. 

E.  889.     See  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2816.  Whe<i  ownership  is  relevant,  it  may 

Presumptions   in  prosecution   for  ar-  be   proved   by   a   certified  copy  of   a 

son,    see    Elliott    Evidence,    §    2807.  recorded  deed,  with  oral  evidence  that 

Evidence  of  certain  facts  concerning  the  accused  had  made  an  oral  lease, 

the  property  burned,  see  Elliott  Evi-  or  had   signed  as  owner.     Common- 

dencc,    §    2814.      Evidence    of    good  wealth  v.  Preece,  140  Mass.  276,  278, 

character  of  defendant  in  prosecution  5  N.  E.  494. 

for  arson,  see  103  Am.  St.  902.  "  Goldsmith   v.   State,  46  Tc.x.   Cr. 

''Van    Immons    v.    State,    29   Ohio  556,81  S.  W.  710. 

Cir.  Ct.  681.  "  State  v.  Watson,  47  Ore.  543,  85 

'■'  Cadflcll  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  380,  Pac.  33C. 
97  S.  W.  705. 


§     'ifj'J  CRIMINAL  •EVIDENCE.  634 

had  some  estate  therein  is  sufficient,  tliough  it  be  not  proved  that 
lie  owned  all  of  it.'-' 

§  367.  Proof  of  actual  burning'  required — Non-accidental  char- 
acter of  fire — Proof  of  premises  burned. — In  order  to  prove  the 
corpus  delicti  of  arson,  it  is  not  sufficient  merely  to  show  a  burn- 
ing, which  may  have  been  the  result  of  an  accident.  It  must  be 
proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  burning  was  not  acci- 
dental, but  was  willfully  and  maliciousl)-  caused  by  some  person 
who  was  morally  resjionsible  for  his  actions.'^  I^'or  in  arson  the 
corpus  delicti  consists  hrst  in  the  burning  of  the  premises  de- 
scribed in  the  complaint  and  second  in  the  fact  that  the  burning 
was  the  result  of  the  agency  of  the  accused.^'*  If  nothing  appears 
in  the  evidence  but  the  fact  that  a  house  was  consumed  by  fire, 
it  will  be  presumed  that  the  fire  was  the  result  of  accident,  and  it 
is  for  the  state  to  overcome  this  presumption  and  to  prove  that 
the  fire  was  willfully  caused  by  the  accused.^''  At  common  law 
the  actual  burning  of  the  whole  or  of  some  part  of  the  house 
must  be  proved,  though  proof  of  the  actual  burning  of  the  small- 
est part  is  sufficient.  It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  wood  blazed, 
but  proof  that  the  wood  or  other  inflammable  material  was 
charred,  i.  c,  reduced  to  charcoal,  and  its  identity  destroyed,  is 
always  required.  A  mere  discoloration  or  scorching  black  by 
smoke  or  heat  is  not  enough.^" 

"Jones  V.  State,  70  Ohio  St.  36,  70  v.  State,  6  Ga.  App.  776,  65  S.  E.  816. 

X.  E.  952.  "West  V.  State,  6  Ga.  App.  105,  64 

"Winslow    V.    State,    76    .Ma.    42;  S.   E.   130;   Spears  v.   State,  92  Miss. 

Jesse   V.    State,    28    Miss.    100,    109;  613,  46  So.  166. 

Thomas  v.  State,  41  Tex.  27;  Com-  '^Williams  v.  State,  125  Ga.  741,  54 
monwealth  v.  Phillips  (Ky.),  14  S.  S.  E.  661;  Ragland  v.  State,  2  Ga. 
W.  378,  12  Ky.  L.  410;  Jenkins  v.  App.  492,  58  S.  E.  689;  West  v.  State. 
State,  53  Ga.  2i'>  Brown  v.  Common-  6  Ga.  App.  105,  64  S.  E.  130.  Ad- 
wealth,  87  Va.  215,  12  S.  E.  472;  Wil-  missions  and  Confessions,  see  Elliott 
liams  V.  State,  125  Ga.  741,  54  S.  E.  Evidence,  §  2816. 
661 :  State  v.  Pienick,  46  Wash.  523,  '"  State  v.  Hall,  93  N.  Car.  571 : 
90  Pac.  645,  II  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  987;  Woolsey  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  346. 
Ragland  v.  State,  2  Ga.  .-Xpp.  492,  58  17  S.  W.  546.  The  opinion  of  a  wit- 
S.  E.  689.  Proof  of  corpus  delicti,  ness  to  the  effect  that  he  thought  a 
see  68  L.  R.  A.  41,  note ;  16  L.  R.  \.  house  had  been  set  on  fire  is  not  ad- 
(N.  S.)  285,  note.  Burden  of  proof,  missible.  State  v.  Nolan,  48  Kan. 
see   Elliott  Evidence,   §  2808;   Burley 


635  OFFEX.-ES    AGAIXST    II  UMAX    HABITATIOXS.  §    368 

§  368.  Threats  and  declarations  by  the  accused — Remoteness. — 
Any  statements,  utterances  or  declarations  which  are  connected 
with  the  res  gcstar  of  the  burning  are  receivable.  Under  this  head 
may  be  grouped  tlu-eats  made  prior  to  the  fire,  and,  where  it  is 
his  own  property  which  is  destroyed,  the  statement  of  the  accused 
as  to  the  probable  cause  of  the  fire,  the  value  of  the  property 
whicli  was  burned  and  of  the  amount  of  tlie  insurance  thereon. 
So,  too.  any  declarations  made  by  him  or  in  his  presence  and 
adopted  by  him.  contemporaneous  with  and  explanatory  of  the 
main  transaction  are  admissible.^' 

In  a  prosecution  for  arson  in  setting  fire  to  the  dw-elling  or 
otlier  building  owned  by  another  person,  a  declaration  made  by 
the  accused  that,  as  he  liad  l)een  put  out  of  the  dwelling  no  one 
else  would  ever  prosper  in  that  place,^^  or  threats  of  bodih^  harm 
made  by  liim  and  directed  against  the  owner,  are  always  admis- 
sible to  show  malice  and  ill-well.  It  is  not  material  that  the  threats 
were  vague  and  general  in  their  character,  and  that  they  did  not 
point  directly  to  the  property  which  was  burned,  if  they  indicated 
hostility  to  its  owner.^''  So  it  may  be  proved  that  the  accused  had 
said  to  the  person  wliose  place  of  business  was  burned  that,  if 
were  not  for  him.  he  would  not  care  if  the  town  were  in  ashes.-" 

Threats  will  not  be  rejected  because  directed  against  members 

723.  20  Pac.  568,  30  Pac.  486.  An  "People  v.  Eaton,  59  Mich.  559. 
allegation  of  burning  a  dwelling-  561,  26  X.  W.  702;  State  v.  Ledford, 
house  is  not  sustained  by  proof  of  133  N.  Car.  714,  45  S.  E.  944.  Ex- 
burning  a  house  not  a  dwelling,  press  threats  to  burn  the  house  of 
Commonwealth  v.  Hayden,  150  Mass.  another,  with  the  whole  conversation 
332,  .333,  23  X.  E.  51 ;  Commonwealth  which  led  up  to  them,  are  particularly 
V.  Wellington,  7  .Allen  (Mass.)  299,  relevant.  State  v.  Lytle,  117  N.  Car. 
or  a  dwelling  which  is  vacant.  Peo-  799,  23  S.  E.  476;  Prater  v.  State, 
pic  V.  Handley,  93  Mich.  46,  48,  52  107  .Ala.  26,  18  So.  238.  See  also, 
X.  W.  1032.  Cf.  State  v.  Carter,  49  Elliott  Evidence,  §  281 1. 
S.  Car.  265,  27  S.  E.  T06.  Questions  "Davis  v.  State,  152  .Ala.  S2,  44  So. 
of  law  and  fact,  soc  Elliott  I-^vidence,  545;  Ford  v.  State,  112  Ind.  373,  383, 
§  2809.  14  N.  E.  241 ;  State  v.  Crawford,  99 
"Commonwealth  v.  Wesley,  166  Mo.  74,  77-79,  12  S.  W.  354;  State  v. 
Mass.  248,  44  N.  E.  228;  People  v.  Barrett,  151  X.  Car.  665,  65  S.  E.  894. 
Eaton,  50  Mich.  559,  26  X.  W.  702:  '"Morgan  v.  State,  120  Ga.  499,  48 
State  v.  Ward,  6r  Vt.  153.  17  .Atl.  S.  E.  238. 
483;  State  v.  Lockwood  (Del.,  1909), 
74  .Atl.  2. 


>^    369  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  63 

of  the  owner's  family  generally  who  did  not  reside  in  the  building 
which  was  burned  or  because  they  show  a  general  intention  to  be 
revenged,  though  not  by  any  particular  means."^  It  may  be  shown 
that  the  accused  had  threatened  the  owner  of  a  house  adjacent  to 
that  which  was  burned,-"-  or  a  person  wdio,  though  not  the  owner, 
had  goods  stored  in  the  building.*^  The  length  of  time  which  has 
elapsed  between  the  utterance  of  the  threat  and  the  destruction  of 
the  building,  though,  perhaps,  affecting  the  weight  of  the  threat 
as  evidence,  is  no  objection  to  its  admission.-^ 

i^  369.  Relevancy  of  evidence  to  show  the  intent — Proof  of  other 
similar  crimes — The  intent  to  set  fire  must  be  shown,  whether  the 
crime  alleged  is  the  arson  of  one's  own  house  or  of  some  other 
person's.  Direct  proof  of  an  intent  to  commit  the  crime  is  never 
required.  The  criminal  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the  circum- 
stances attendant  on  the  burning,"  or  from  the  hostility  of  the 
accused  to  the  owner.-"  If  the  accused  is  charged  with  the  arson 
of  his  own  house  it  may  always  be  shown  to  supply  a  motive  that 
he  was  financially  embarrassed  at  the  time,'"  and  that  he  had 
overvalued  and  unduly  insured  his  property."** 

But  it  cannot  be  proved  against  the  accused,  who  is  charged 
with  having  committed  arson  for  the  purpose  of  securing  insur- 
ance money  that  he  had  had  fires  in  buildings  other  than  the  one 
mentioned  in  the  indictment."'**    And  generally  where  the  accused 

-^Johnson  v.   State,  89  Ga.   107,  14  ""Commonwealth   v.    Goldstein,    114 

S.    E.   889;    Clinton    v.    State    (Fla.,  Mass.  272;   State  v.  England,  78  N. 

1909),  50  So.  580.  Car.  552;  State  v.  Lytle,  117  N.  Car. 

"Bond   V.   Commonwealth,   83  Va.  799,  23  S.  E.  476;  Luke  v.   State,  49 

581,  3  S.  E.  149.  Ala.  30,  20  Am.  269. 

''State  V.  Emery,  59  Vt.  84,  7  Atl.  ="  See  ante,  §  368. 

129.  "State  V.  Hull,  83  Iowa  112,  48  N. 

■*  Commonwealth     v.     Quinn,     150  W.  917.     See  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2810. 

Mass.  401,  23   N.   E.  54;   Clinton  v.  "^  Stitz  v.  State,  104  Ind.  359,  4  N. 

State,    56    Fla.    57,    47    So.    389.      A  E.  145 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Hudson,  97 

threat,    directed    against    a    building  Mass.  565;   People  v.   Sevine    (Cal.), 

specified,  is  not  excluded  as  evidence,  22  Pac.  969;   State  v.  Cohn,  9  Nev. 

by  a  subsequent  change  in  the  owner-  179;    People   v.   Kelly,    ti    App.    Div. 

ship  of  the  building.     State  v.  Fenla-  (X.  Y.)   495.  42  X.  Y.  S.  756;   State 

son,  78  Me.  495,  7  Atl.  38s ;  Common-  v.    Brand    (X.    J.    L.),   72    Atl.    131; 

wealth   V.    Crowe,   165   Mass.    139,  42  Hooker  v.  State,  98  Md.  145,  56  Atl. 

X.  E.  563.  390. 


62^"]  OFFENSES    AGAIXST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS.  §    369 

is  charged  with  arson  for  the  purpose  of  securing  insurance 
money  evidence  showing  or  tending  to  show  that  he  was  inter- 
ested in  preserving  the  building  that  has  been  burned  is  compe- 
tent.^*' 

The  amount  of  the  loss,^^  the  value  of  the  whole  property,^- 
and  the  fact  that  the  defendant  consented  to  a  settlement  of  the 
loss  at  one-half  of  the  adjusted  amount  of  the  same,^''  are  always 
relevant  in  evidence.  The  written  proof  of  loss  sworn  to  by  one 
who  is  indicted  for  arson  of  his  own  buildings,  where  it  describes 
them  and  their  contents,  is  admissible  against  him,^*  though  he 
should  be  permitted  to  show  that  other  property  of  his  was  de- 
stroyed by  the  fire  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the  writing.^"'  But 
evidence  of  a  demand  upon  the  accused,  to  allow  an  examination 
of  the  personal  property  destroyed ;  and  his  refusal  should  be  re- 
jected as  not  tending  to  show  his  guilt. ^^  If  the  accused  refuses 
to  produce  his  insurance  policy,  its  contents,  execution  and  deliv- 
er}- may  be  proved  by  parol  evidence.^'  Except,  perhaps,  to  show 
that  burning  was  intentional,  evidence  of  the  burning  of  other 
property  belonging  to  the  accused  is  not  received.  Thus,  when 
it  is  charged  that  the  accused  has  set  his  own  liouse  on  fire,  it  may 
be  shown  that  at  some  previous  time  the  same  or  other  buildings 
belonging  to  him  had  burned,  or  that  he  had  endeavored  to  induce 
some  one  to  set  fire  to  his  buildings.^^   Evidence  that  the  accused 

"  Dunlap  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  504,  Cal.    403,    24    Pac.    1091 ;    Meister    v. 

98  S.  W.  845.  People,  31  Alich.  99;  People  v.  Four- 

^  People  V.  Sevine   (Cal.),  22  Pac.  nier  (Cal.,  1897),  47  Pac.  1014;  Peo- 

969.  pie  V.  Jones,  123  Cal.  65,  55  Pac.  698; 

"State  V.  Ward,  61  Vt.  153.  17  .-Vtl.  Smith  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  80,  105  S. 

483;   State  V.   Harvey,  130  Iowa  394,  W.   501;    Knights   v.    State,   58    Neb. 

106  X.  VV.  938.  225,  78  N.  W.  508,  76  Am.   St.  78n. 

"State  V.  Brand    (X.  J.  L.,   1909),  Evidence  of  other  fires  was  held  to 

72  A.  131.  have    been    improperly    admitted    in 

"People  v.  Mix,  149  Mich.  260,  112  People  v.  Fitzgerald,   156  N.  Y.  253, 

X.  W.  907.  50  X.  E.  846,  reversing  20  App.  Div. 

"People  V.  Mix,  149  Mich.  260,  112  (X.    Y.)     139,    46    X.    Y.     S.     1020. 

X.  W.  907.  Evidence  of  other  offenses  in  prose- 

'^  People  v.    Brown,    no   .App.   Div.  cution    for    arson,    see    62    L.    R.    A. 

(X.  Y.)  490,  96  X.  Y.  S.  957.  193,  note;  105  .'\m.  St.  996.  note;  El- 

"  Knights  V.  State,  58  Xcb.  225,  78  liott    Evidence,   §  2813.     Evidence  of 

X.  W.  508,  76  Am.  St.  78n.  previous    attempts,    sec    Elliott    Evi- 

** Commonwealth   v.    Bradford,    126  dencc,  §  2812. 
Mass.    42;    People   v.    Lattimorc,   86 


§    2,yO  CRIMINAI-    KVIDEXCE.  63!^ 

forbade  the  removal  of  i)roi)erty  from  tlic  house  of  which  he  was 
the  owner  while  it  was  burning  is  admissible  to  prove  that  he 
started  the  fire.^"  If  the  accused  is  charged  with  setting  fire  to  the 
house  of  another,  evidence  to  show  his  familiarity  with  the  prem- 
ises/" and  that  goods  which  w^ere  in  the  house  when  it  was  burned 
were  subsequently  found  in  a  trunk  in  his  possession,  is  always 
admissible.""  So  it  may  be  shown  that  a  few  days  before  the  fire 
one  w'ho  is  charged  with  burning  a  building  owned  by  himself 
disposed  of  personal  property,  taken  from  the  building  in  such  a 
way  as  to  exempt  them  from  all  possibility  of  being  destroyed  by 
the  fire.*- 

The  opinions  of  fire  insurance  experts,  based  on  an  examina- 
tion of  the  debris,  are  admissible  as  to  the  quantity  of  goods 
\vhich  have  been  burned, ^^  and  perhaps  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
fire.^*  The  location  and  occupation  of  buildings  near  that  which 
was  burned  may  be  showm  by  maps,  photographs  or  otherwise,  to 
enable  the  jury  to  understand  the  evidence  more  clearly.*^'  A 
photograph  of  the  burned  premises,  if  it  is  properly  verified  as 
correct,  is  not  inadmissible  merely  because  it  shows  other  prem- 
ises which  Avere  owned  by  the  accused  and  which  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  a  previous  fire  if  the  court  instructs  the  jury  that  no 
inference  was  to  be  drawn  from  it  that  the  accused  w^as  guilty  of 
setting  fire  to  the  other  building.*® 

§  370.  Evidence  of  preparation  to  show  that  the  accused  was  near 
the  burned  premises. — Evidence  tending  to  show^  that  the  defend- 
ant made  preparations  to  commit  the  crime  is  always  admissible. 
So  it  may  be  pro\'ed  wdiere  and  how  he  procured  gunpowder  with 

^  Bluman  v.  State,  2>2  Tex.  Cr.  43,        ^''  People  v.  Cassidy,  133  N.  Y.  612, 

21  S.  W.  1027,  26  S.  W.  75.  30  N.  E.  1003.    If  it  appears  that  the 

*°  People  V.  Murphy,  135  X.  Y.  450,  defendant   had   removed  goods    from 

32  N.  E.  138.  the  burned  building  prior  to  the  fire 

"  State  V.  Vatter,  71  Towa  557.  he  must  be  permitted  to  explain  the 

*"  State  V.  !Mann,  39  Wash.   144,  81  removal.     People   v.   Fournicr    (Cal., 

Pac.  561.  1897),  47  Pac.  1014. 

*'  Birmingham  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pul-        *"  Commonwealth    \^    Fielding,     184 

ver,  126  111.  329,  18  X.  E.  804,  9  Am.  Mass.  484.  69  N.  E.  216.    Use  of  pho- 

St.  598.  tographs  in  criminal  cases,  see  75  Am. 

"Cook  V.  Johnston,  58   Mich.  437,  St.  477,  note;  114  Am.  St.  427,  note. 
25  X.  W.  388,  55  Am.  703. 


639  OFFEXSES    AGAINST    HUMAX    IIAP.ITATIOXS.  §    3/0 

which  the  fire  was  started/'  even  where  this  involves  proving  an- 
other crime:  and  that  he  was  seen  in  the  hnilding  after  business 
hours  or  observed  skulking  near  by.''^ 

The  testimony  of  a  prosecuting  witness,  that  he  took  extraor- 
dinary precautions  against  fire  because  of  other  fires,  is  relevant 
to  show  the  incendiary  origin  of  the  fire  in  question ;  but  evidence 
that  other  buildings  in  the  vicinity  were  burned  about  the  same 
time  as  the  building  in  question  is  always  irrelevant,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  evidence  connecting  the  defendant  therewith.*-^  It  is  al- 
ways relevant.  ])articularly  in  the  case  of  the  crime  of  arson, 
which  is  usually  committed  at  night  and  with  the  greatest  secrecy, 
to  show  that  the  accused  was  seen  in  the  vicinity  of  the  burned 
building  about  the  time  of  the  fire,  whether  before  or  after  it  oc- 
curred/'' 

Evidence  to  show  that  the  accused  was  in  the  crowd  which  sur- 
rounded the  building  at  the  time  of  the  fire  is  competent,  and, 
where  the  fire  took  place  in  the  night  time,  it  is  also  competent  to 
show  that  the  condition  of  the  dress  or  person  of  the  accused 
when  he  was  seen,  was  such  tliat  it  might  readily  be  inferred  that 
he  had  not  slept  in  the  building  that  night.""  His  ])resence  near 
tlie  scene  of  the  fire  may  also  be  shown  by  evidence  of  footprints 
which  on  comparison  with  shoes  worn  by  him  appeared  to  be  of 
the  same  size.  The  weight  of  such  evidence  is  always  for  the 
jury.'^^ 

It  may  always  be  shown,  where  the  footprints  and  the  shoes  of 
the  defendant  do  not  correspond,  that  he  changed  his  shoes  after 
he  was  arrested  and  while  in  jail.''- 

*' State  V.  Roberts,   15  Ore.   187,  13  ted    to    show    the    accused    had    used 

Pac.  896.  such  a  sleigh  on  the  night  of  the  fire; 

"State  V.  Crawford,  99  Mo.  74,  12  and  that,  on  the  same  night,  he  had 

S.  W.  354.  hired    a    horse,    which,    wlien    driven 

*'=>  State  V.   McMahon,   17   .\'cv.  365,  without    guiflance,    within    four    days 

^74.  376,  30  Pac.  1000.  thereafter  voluntarily  chose  the  route 

"''Commonwealth     v.    Ciauviii,     143  lakiii    hy    the    person    who    fired    the 

-Mass.  134,  8  N.  K.  89-;.  house.     Heidelbaugh  v.  State,  79  Meb. 

"In  State  v.  Ward,  6r   Vt.   153,  17  ^(jo,  'M  \.  W.  145. 
\tl.    483,    after    evidence    tending    to         ''"State    v.    Harvey,    130    Iowa    394, 

<  onncct  the  accuscrl  with  the  fire  had  106  N.  W.  938. 

been  introduced,  and  it  alsf)  apjxared        '''  Davis  v.  State,  132  .Ala.  8_',  .(4  So. 

that     the     incendiary    had     driven    a  545. 
Itigh  over  a  certain  route,  which  left         "Moore   v.   Statf,  51    Te.x.   Cr.   46H, 

joculiar  tracks,  the  state  was  permit-  103  S.  W.  188. 


§    T^yi  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  64O 

Where  an  incendiarv  fire  was  jiroxed  to  have  been  kindled  wiili 
kerosene,  it  may  be  shown  that,  about  the  same  date,  the  accused 
had  kerosene  stains  upon  his  clothing',"'''  or  that  two  or  three  davs 
after  the  lire  a  witness  smelled  the  earth  luidcr  the  building  and 
that  it  smelled  of  kerosene,'*  and  that  the  accused  was  seen  leav- 
ing the  building  burned  with  an  oil  can  in  his  hands. '^^ 

It  may  be  shown  that  the  accused,  when  arrested,  soon  after  the 
fire,  had  poisoned  meat  in  his  possession,  prepared  in  a  peculiar 
manner,  where  a  dog  belonging  to  the  owner  of  the  burned  prop- 
erty was  poisoned  on  the  night  of  the  fire  and  a  post-fiwrtciii  ex- 
amination show  poisoned  meat  in  the  animal's  stomach  similarly 
prepared.'"'  If  the  accused  is  charged  with  the  arson  of  his  own 
building  it  may  be  relevant  to  show  that  he  accused  another  of 
this  crime,  but  such  evidence  is  not  admissible  where  the  building 
is  owned  by  a  person  other  than  the  accused. ^^ 

^371.  Burglary  defined — Entrance  at  night-time — Preparations 
to  commit. — Burglary  is  the  breaking  in  and  entering  the  house  of 
another  in  the  night-time  with  the  intent  to  commit  a  felony  (usu- 
ally larceny,  but  often  rape  or  murder),  and  whether  the  felony 
is  actually  committed  or  not.^^  The  elements  to  be  proved  at  com- 
mon law  are:  First,  a  felonious  breaking  and  entering;  second, 
that  it  was  a  dwelling-house;  third,  that  it  occurred  in  the  night- 
time ;  fourth,  an  intention  to  commit  some  felony  in  the  house. 
The  intent  to  commit  a  felony  is  always  for  the  jury  to  determine. 
In  doing  so  they  may  consider  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  as 
disclosed  by  the  evidence.^®  For  it  is  a  well-settled  proposition 
that  burglary  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence.*^" 

At  common  law  it  must  always  be  shown  beyond  all  reasonable 

"'State  V.  Kingsbury,  58  Me.  238.  '^^2  Russ.  on  Crimes  (gth  Am.  Ed.), 

"State  V.  Watson,  47  Ore.  543,  85  p.  i ;  State  v.  Beeman,  51  Wash.  557, 

Pac.  336.  99  Pac.   756;   People  v.    Finer    (Cal. 

'^People  V.  Burridge,  99  Mich.  343,  App.   1909),  105  Pac.  780. 

58  X.  W.  319.     Cf.  Thomas  v.  State,  "^^  State  v.  Teeter,  69  Iowa  717,  27 

107   Ala.    13,    18    So.    229;    Gawn    v.  N.  W.  485;   People  v.   Soto,  53  Cal. 

State,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Dec.  19.  415. 

'^  Halleck  v.  State,  65  Wis.  147,  26  "''  Dupree  v.  State,  148  Ala.  620,  42 

\.  W.  572.  So.  1004:  State  v.  Perry,  124  La.  931, 

"  State  V.  McLain,  43  Wash.  267,  86  50  So.  799. 
Pac.  390. 


641  OFFENSES    AGAIXST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS.  §    37I 

doubt  that  the  breaking  in  and  entering  occurred  in  the  night- 
time,"^ i.  e.,  the  period  intervening  between  the  total  disappear- 
ance of  daylight  in  the  evening  and  its  reappearance  at  the  earli- 
est dawn  of  the  next  day,  during  which  a  person's  features  are  not 
discernible.  Evidence  that  features  were  discernible  by  artificial 
light,  or  by  moon  light,  is  not  admissible.'^-  Proof  of  a  breaking 
in  one  night  and  an  entrance  the  following  night  will  sustain  a 
conviction."^  If  the  evidence  leaves  the  exact  time  in  doubt,  and 
it  cannot  be  positively  ascertained  whether  the  breaking  in  was 
in  the  night-time  or  not,  the  prisoner  should  have  the  benefit  of 
the  dotibt." 

Evidence  to  show  the  condition  of  the  house,  when  the  owner 
or  any  other  witness  arrived  there  on  the  morning  after  the  bur- 
glary is  competent.""  It  may  be  inferred  that  the  crime  was  com- 
mitted during  the  night  from  proof  that  at  half-past  five  in  the 
morning,  when  the  occupant  awoke,  he  found  that  the  house  had 
been  broken  open  while  he  slept  and  articles  were  missing."^ 

Evidence  that  the  accused  had  prepared  to  commit  a  burglary ; 
that  lie  had  endeavored  to  induce  the  custodian  of  the  premises 
which  were  broken  into  to  absent  himself,  or  had  procured  bur- 
glar's tools,  is  competent."'^  It  may  be  proved  that  tools  were 
found  in  the  building  entered  which  had  been  taken  by  breaking 
and  entering  anotlier  building  near  by  on  the  same  night. ^'^  Evi- 
dence that  he  had  been  seen  lurking  about  the  premises,""  or  had 
made  inquiries  as  to  property  which  was  in  the  house,'"  or  as  to 

•Asliford  V.  State,  36  Xeb.  2,^.  40,  Bancroft,    10  X.   H.   105,    107.  2  East 

53  X.  W.  1036;  State  V.  Seymour,  36  P.  C.  509,  i  Hale  P.  C.  550. 

Me.    225,    227;    State    v.    Leaden,    35  "'Rex  v.  Smith,  Russ.  &  Ry.  417. 

Conn.  515;  Guynes  v.   State,  25  Tex.  "Waters  v.  State,  53  Ga.  567. 

.•\pp.    584,  8    S.    W.   667:    Waters   v.  '"  Herndon    v.    State,    50    Tex.    Cr. 

State,  53  Ga.  567 ;  People  v.  Taggart,  552,  99  S.  W.  558. 

43  Cal.  81,  87;  Allen  v.  State,  40  Ala.  "People  v.  Lowric,  4  Cal.  .App.  137, 

334.    91    Am.    Dec.    477n ;    Common-  S:7  Pac.  253. 

wealth  V.  Glover,  iii  Mass.  395,  402;  *"»  People   v.   Calvert,   22   X.    V.    S. 

Kcclcr  V.   State,  7^  Xeb.  441,   103  X.  220,  67  Hun  (X.  Y. )  without  opinidii. 

W.  64.  ""State  V.  Arthur.   135   Iowa  4X.   io<) 

'•State    V.    .Morris.    47    Conn.    179;  X.  W.  T083. 

State  V.   McKnight,    rir   N.  Car.  690,  ""State  v.  Turner,  106  Mo.  272,   17 

692,  16  S.  E.  319;  Commonwealth  v.  S.  W.  304:  People  v.  Ranicr.  127  App. 

'Kaas,  3  Brewst.    TPa.)   422:   State  v.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  47.  111    \    V.  S.  112. 

'"Gilmore  v.    .State,  (/j   Ala.    154.    13 
So.  536. 
41— Underhiu.  Crim.  Ev. 


§  3/2 


CRIMIXAI.    FAIDHXCE. 


642 


the  character,  financial  circumstances  and  haljils  of  its  inmates,  is 
always  admissible."' 

So  it  may  also  be  shown  where  the  accused  resided,  with  what 
people  he  associated.'-  and  that  property  taken  from  the  [)remises 
was  found  in  his  possession  after  the  crime. "^ 

Evidence  that  the  accused  was  found  in  the  premises  which 
were  broken  into  is  always  competent,  provided  his  presence  there 
is  not  too  remote  from  the  time  of  the  breaking  in,  but  the  accused 
should  be  permitted  to  show  his  reasons  for  being  there  ;  and.  if  he 
went  there  to  obtain  property  belonging  to  him,  he  may  be  per- 
mitted to  prove  that  he  obtained  the  property,  and  also  show  what 
he  did  with  it.'* 

§  372.  Evidence  to  prove  forcible  breaking  in  and  entering — 
Condition  of  the  premises. — The  gist  of  the  crime  is  the  forcible  and 
malicious  breaking  in.  Hence  the  condition  of  the  premises  be- 
fore and  after  the  offense  may  always  be  shown.  It  may  be 
shown  that  foot-prints  were  observed  on  a  road  leading  to  or  in 
the  grounds  around  the  house.'''  that  shoes  of  the  size  worn  b}- 
the  accused,'"  or  articles  of  wearing  a])]mrel  belonging  to  him, 
were  found  near  by,  and  that,  from  appearances,  and  in  the  opin- 
ion of  witnesses  (  but  based  on  their  own  observation  only  ),  force 
had  been  used  to  effect  an  entrance,"'  that  being  a  (|uestion  upon 
which  any  man  of  common  understanding  is  qualified  to  express 
an  opinion.^'* 


■"  State  V.  Ward,  103  X.  Car.  419, 
423,  8  S.  E.  814.  Proof  that  the  value 
of  the  property  in  the  house  was 
small  does  not  admit  evidence  that 
the  accused  is  a  man  of  large  means 
and  in  good  circumstances.  Coates 
V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  257,  261,  20  S. 
W.  585. 

"  Osborn  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  46, 
94  S.  W.  900. 

"^  Delmont  v.  State,  15  Wyo.  271,  88 
Pac.  623. 

''  Mason  v.  State,  153  Ala.  46,  45 
So.  472. 

"'See  §§  303.  337<  374-  Proof  of 
the  corpus  delicti,  see  68  L.  R.  A.  41, 
note.  Evidence  that  the  crime  was 
committed    in   the   night    time,   see   2 


Am.  St.  396,  note;  declarations  of  ac- 
cused, 2  Am.  St.  396.  Evidence  of 
breaking  and  entering,  see  Elliott  Ev- 
idence,  §  2912. 

■"England  v.  State,  89  Ala.  76,  78. 
8  So.  146;  Field  v.  State,  126  Ga.  571, 
55  S.  E.  502. 

"Fort  v.  State,  52  Ark.  r8o,  ri  S. 
W.  959,  20  -Am.  St.  163;  People  v. 
Block,  15  X.  Y.  S.  229.  60  Hun  (  X. 
Y.)  583,  without  opinion.  The  ques- 
tion. "How  did  the  accused  get  in?" 
is  not  leading.  Vallereal  v.  State 
(Tex.,  1892).  20  S.  W.  537:  State  v. 
Moore,  117  Mo.  395,  40  r.  22  S.  U'. 
1086. 

"  As  to  opinion  evidence  in  burg- 
lary, see  2  Am.  St.  397,  note. 


643 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS. 


§    373 


A  view  of  the  premises  by  the  jurors  in  a  trial  for  burglary  will 
undoubtedly  aid  them  materially  in  determining  the  means  em- 
ployed in  breaking  in,  and  whether  or  not  an  entrance  was  gained 
by  force.  As  the  rules  and  principles  which  regulate  and  govern 
the  taking  of  a  view  are  elsewhere  fully  elucidated  no  extended 
discussion  of  them  is  necessary  in  this  place.'®  - 

It  has  been  held  competent  to  prove  that  burglars'  instruments 
and  implements  and  tools  which  might  be  used  for  breaking  into 
the  premises  were  found  in  or  near  the  premises  after  the  alleged 
crime,  even  though  it  may  not  appear  that  they  were  owned  by  the 
accused.^''  The  condition  of  the  premises  or  of  a  safe  or  other 
article  of  furniture  contained  in  them  is  relevant."^ 


^  373.  Proof  of  constructive  breaking — Non-consent  of  owner — 
Ownership  and  value  of  property. — The  Ijreaking  must  be  proved. 
Proof  of  drawing  a  bolt."*-  lifting  a  latch, *^  or  a  window  sash,"* 
pushing  open  a  closed  door,^^  or  a  window  or  transom  which  was 
fastened,*''  or  breaking  in  an  inner  door,*^  or  opening  it  with  a 


•'  See  §§  229-232. 

*' Russell  V.  State  (Ala.,  1905),  38 
So.  291. 

"Russell  V.  State  CAla.,  1905),  38 
So.  291. 

'-  Kent  V.  State,  84  Ga.  438,  11  S.  E. 
355.  20  .Am.  St.  376. 

"State  V.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa  93,  95, 
46  X.  VV.  86  r ;  State  v.  Groning,  23 
Kan.  18,  21,  5  Pac.  446:  Carter  v. 
State,  68  .Ma.  96,  97:  .McCourt  v. 
People.  64  N'.  Y.  583 ;  Gonzales  v. 
State  CTe.x.  Cr.  App.,  1899)  50  S.  W. 
lorS. 

"Frank  v.  State,  39  Miss.  705,  715. 

"*  People  V.  N'olan,  22  Mich.  229, 
235:  .State  V.  Rcid,  20  Iowa  413,  421, 
422;  Mason  v.  People,  26  X.  Y.  200; 
State  V.  Conncrs,  95  Iowa  485,  64  X. 
W.  295 ;  Price  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.).  ir2  S.  W.  855;  People  v. 
rjartland.  30  App.  Div.  (X.  Y. )  534, 
52  X.  Y.  S.  352.  The  opening  of  a 
window  or  of  a  door  whicli  is  closed 


with  no  greater  force  than  is  gener- 
ally necessary  for  that  purpose  is  a 
breaking  into  the  house.  Scott  v. 
State,  122  Ga.  138,  50  S.  E.  49. 

**  Sims  V.  State,  136  Ind.  358,  360, 
36  X.  E.  278;  State  v.  Moore,  117 
Mo.  395,  22  S.  W.  1086;  Holland  v. 
State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  623.  85  S.  W.  798. 
The  raising  of  a  window  which  has 
been  left  partly  open  is  a  breaking 
into  the  house.  People  v.  White,  153 
Mich.  617,  117  X.  W.  161,  15  Del. 
Leg.  X.  554.  17  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
Ii02n.  Any  person  may  testify  to  the 
size  of  a  pane  of  glass  that  was 
broken  in  a  window,  Welch  v.  State, 
156  .Ala.  112,  46  So.  856;  or  on  the 
question  whether  a  lock  was  broken 
from  the  inside  or  the  outside  of  the 
df)or,  Dupree  v.  State,  148  .\!a.  620, 
42  So.   1004. 

"  Daniels  v.  State,  78  Ga.  98,  6  Am. 
St.  238n. 


§  :w3 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


644 


key.""'  will  sustain  an  allegation  of  breaking  in.  But  evidence  that 
an  entrance  was  made  (e\'en  in  the  night-time )'''■'  through  an  open 
door.""  or  transom,''"  or  through  any  opening  already  existing, 
and  not  forcibly  made,  will  not  sustain  an  allegation  of  breaking. 
Proof  of  the  actual  use  of  force  in  breaking  in  and  entering  is  not 
always  necessary.  A  verdict  will  stand,  though  it  be  not  shown 
affirmatively  that  the  premises  were  locked  during  the  period  in 
which  the  breaking  in  must  have  occurred,  and  the  only  proof  is 
that  property  was  missed  from  a  building,  such  as  a  stable,  in 
which  horses  were  confined,  which  would  have  escaped  had  not 
the  door  been  locked."-  If  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to  show 
that  the  entering  was  in  the  night-time  the  accused  is  entitled  to  an 
instruction  that  he  should  be  acquitted  if  the  jury  believe  that  he 
entered  in  the  day-time."^ 

Where  a  building  was  left  apparently  unoccupied,  no  presump- 
tion obtains  that  a  person  found  in  it,  attempting  to  commit  a 
felony,  had  not  broken,  but  had  secreted  himself  therein."^  The 
entrance  must  have  been  without  the  owner's  consent  to  consti- 
tute a  burglary. "^^  Xon-consent  need  not  be  proved  by  direct  evi- 
dence, but  mav  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances.''''     If  the  ac- 


''  I  Hale  P.  C.  553 ;  State  v.  Scrip- 
ture, 42  X.  H.  485 ;  Lowder  v.  State, 
63  Ala.  143,  146. 

*°  Williams  v.  State  (Tex.  App., 
1890),  13  S.  W.  609. 

""Costello  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.), 
21  S.  W.  360;  Newman  v.  State,  55 
Tex.  Cr.  273,  116  S.  W.  577;  Lock- 
hart  V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  480,  60  S. 
E.  215;  Carroll  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
155,  86  S.  W.  1012;  Pinson  v.  State 
(Ark.,  1909),  121  S.  W.  751.  If  the 
door  of  a  storehouse  is  open  when  the 
accused  enters  and  he  picks  up  the 
property  for  the  purpose  of  returning 
it  to  the  owner  and  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  stealing  it  he  is  not  guilty  of 
burglary.  Fields  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr. 
App..  1903),  74  S.  W.  309. 

"McGrath  v.  State,  25  Xcb.  780, 
41  X.  W.  780. 

""■  State  V.  Warford,  106  Afo.  55.  60, 
61,   16   S.   W.   886,  27   Am.    St.   322; 


Hays  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  in,  100  S. 
W.926. 

*'  Henderson  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
620,  99  S.  W.  TOO  I. 

°'a  United  States  v.  Lantry,  30  Fed. 
232. 

"Van  Walker  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr. 

359,  26  S.  W.  507 ;  State  v.  Hayes,  105 
Mo.  76,  84,  16  S.  W.  514,  24  Am.  St. 

360.  A  detective  employed  to  dis- 
cover persons  suspected  of  burglary, 
ingratiated  himself  into  the  confi- 
dence of  the  defendants,  loaned  them 
money  and  finally  suggested  that  they 
should  engage  in  burglary.  He  then 
arranged  with  the  owner  of  the  build- 
ing that  marked  money  should  be 
placed  in  a  safe,  and  having  made  the 
defendants  drunk,  he  took  them  to 
the  building,  opened  the  safe  and 
taking  out  the  money  handed  it  to 
thorn,  and  it  was  divided  among  the 


645  OFFENSES    AGAIXST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS.  §    374 

ciised  was  rightfully  on  the  premises,  having  entered  by  the  per- 
mission or  command  of  the  owner,  or  of  some  person  who  had  the 
right  to  permit, ^^  or  command  him,  and  stole  while  there,  his  of- 
fense is  larceny  only.^" 

Hence,  any  evidence  is  relevant  which  tends  to  prove  or  dis- 
prove the  fact  that  the  entrance  was  made  with  the  owner's  con- 
sent. The  ownership  of  the  property  stolen, '^^  its  value, ®^  the 
number  of  articles  taken."''  the  ownership  of  the  building  broken 
into,^""  or  the  date  of  the  burglary,^  is  not  an  essential  element  of 
the  crime.  These  facts,  therefore,  need  not  be  proved  precisely 
as  alleged.  The  ownership  of  the  building  broken  into  may  be 
projjerly  inferred  from  proof  that  the  party  alleged  to  be  the 
owner  was  in  possession,^  but  the  allegation  of  possession  must  be 
sustained  by  evidence  of  actual  occupancy  and  not  merely  by  a 
constructive  possession.^  An  allegation  of  possession  by  a  corpo- 
ration does  not  require  proof  of  the  incorporation  unless  this  fact 
is  expressly  denied  by  a  special  plea.^ 

§  374.  Correspondence  of  foot-prints  with  foot-wear  of  accused. — 
The  presence  of  recently  made  and  unaccounted  for  footprints  of 

party.    As  the  entrance  was  with  the  '""  State  v.  Lee,  95  Iowa  427,  64  N. 

owner's  consent,  it  was  held  that   a  W.  284;  State  v.  Porter,  97  Iowa  450, 

conviction   of  burglary  could  not  be  66  N.  W.  745;   State  v.  Horned,   178 

sustained.      Love   v.    People,    160   111.  Mo.  59,  76  S.  W.  953;  Boyd  v.  State, 

501,  43  X.  E.  710,  32  L.  R.  A.  139.  4  Ga.  App.  273,  6r  S.  E.  134;  Scoville 

''People  v.  McCord,  76  Mich.  200,  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1904),  81   S. 

42  X.  W.  1 106.  W.  117. 

**  Colbert  v.  State,  91  Ga.  705,  17  S.  Evidence  as  to  time  of  oflFense,  see 

E.  840.     Contra,  People  v.  Barry,  94  Elliott  Evidence,   §  2914.     Testimony 

Cal.  481,  483,  29  Pac.  1026.  of  accomplice,  98  Am.  St.  172. 

"  State  v.  Tyrrell,  98  Mo.  354.  II  S.  ^  State   v.    Dawkins,  32   S.   Car.   17, 

W.  734;  Brown  v.  State,  72  Miss.  990,  10   S.    E.   772;    State  v.    Daniels,    122 

18    So.   431 ;    People  v.    Edwards,    59  La.  261,  47  So.  599. 

Cal.    359;    State    v.    Hutchinson,    iii  ^  State  v.  McGuire,  193  Mo.  215,91 

Mo.  257,  263,  20  S.  \V.  34;  Calloway  S.  W.  939;   Hall  v.   State   (Ga.  -App., 

V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  App.  72,  94  S.  1909),  66  S.  E.  390. 

\V.  902.    Sec  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2913.  '  Daggett  v.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  5,  44 

"  Farley  v.   State,   127  Ind.  419,  26  S.  W.  148.  842. 

X.  E.  898;  Mason  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  'Burrow  v.  State,  147  Ala.  114,  41 

-App.,    1906),  98  S.  W.  854;    Boyd  v.  So.    987;    State   v.    SowcU    (S.    Car., 

State,  4  Ga.  App.  273,  61  S.  E.  134.  1910),  67  S.  E.  316. 

"Johnson     v.     Commonwealth,     87 
^y-  '^.  7  S.  \\^  927,  10  Ky.  L.  100. 


N     37-'r 


CRI.MIXAI.    I'AIDI^XCE. 


646 


man/'  or  beast/'  or  of  wajjion  tracks/  in  the  curtilage  of  a  lionsc 
which  has  been  entered,  or  on  a  road  Icachng  to  it.  may  always 
be  considered  in  determining  whether  a  burglary  has  been  com- 
mitted. As  the  accused  must  not  be  compelled  to  furnish  evi- 
dence incriminating  himself,  or  to  testify  against  himself,  he  can 
not  be  comi)elled  to  submit  to  a  comjiarison  of  footprints  in  open 
court/  Nor  can  the  accused  be  compelled  to  place  his  foot  in 
a  shoe-track  found  in  the  vicinity  of  the  crime."  His  refusal  to  do 
so  can  neither  be  proved  against  him  nor  commented  on  by  coun- 
sel,^" while,  generally,  if  he  is  forcibly  compelled  to  do  so,  a  wit- 
ness, who  was  present  at  the  comparison,  cannot  testify  to  the 
results. ^^  But  it  may  always  be  proved  that  the  accused  volun- 
tarily went  to  the  locus  in  quo  and  placed  his  foot  in  footprints 
found  there  and  that  his  foot  fitted  the  foot])rints  perfectly. '- 

A  distinction,  however,  was  made  where  the  officer  having 
charge  of  the  prisoner  took  off  his  shoes  without  his  consent,  or 
took  shoes  found  in  the  house  of  the  accused  and  compared  them 
with  the  tracks.  The  officer  was  allowed  to  testify  to  the  results, 
the  court  basing  its  ruling  on  the  admitted  right  of  police  officials 


■"■  England  v.  State,  89  Ala.  76,  8  So. 
146;  Moss  V.  State,  152  Ala.  30, 44  So. 
598;  State  V.  Daniels,  134  X.  Car.  641, 
46  S.  E.  743 ;  State  v.  Freeman,  146 
N.  Car.  615,  60  S.  E.  986;  Leonard 
V.  State,  150  Ala.  89,  43  So.  214; 
State  V.  Arthur,  135  Iowa  48,  109  N. 
W.  1083;  Doss  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
48,  95  S.  W.  1040 ;  State  v.  Fuller, 
34  Mont.  12.  85  Pac.  369,  8  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  762n;  Davis  v.  State,  152 
Ala.  82,  44  So.  545  (arson).  Contra, 
Kinnan  v.  State  (Neb.,  1910),  125  N. 

\y.  594- 

"Miller  v.  State,  91  Ga.  186,  16  S. 
E.  98s;  Doss  V.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
48,  95  S.  W.  T040,  where  it  was 
proved  accused  had  been  riding  a 
horse  near  the  scene  of  the  crime. 
'  Bryan  v.  State,  74  Ga.  393,  394- 
Mn  Stokes  v.  State,  5  Baxt. 
(^Tenn.)  619,  621,  30  Am.  72,  the  con- 
viction was  reversed  because  the 
state  was  permitted   to  bring  a   pan 


of  mud  in  court  and  to  request  de- 
fendant to  place  his  foot  in  it.  The 
court  said :  "In  the  presence  of  the 
jury  the  prisoner  is  asked  to  make 
evidence  against  himself.  The  court 
should  not  have  permitted  the  pan 
of  mud  to  have  been  brought  before 
the  jury,  and  the  defendant  asked  to 
put  his  foot  in  it.  We  are  satisfied 
the  jury  was  improperly  influenced 
thereby.  And  it  is  no  sufficient  an- 
swer that  the  judge  afterwards  told 
the  jury  that  the  refusal  to  put  his 
foot  in  the  mud  was  not  to  be  taken 
as  evidence  against  him."  Cf.  Walker 
V.    State,   7   Tex.   App.   245,   32   Am. 

595- 

°  See  Dunwoody  v.  State,  1 18  Ga. 
308,  45  S.  E.  412. 

"  See,  ante,  §§  303,  337,  372. 

"  Day  V.  State,  63  Ga.  667. 

"State  V.  Graham.  116  La.  779,  41 
So.  90. 


cr, 


OFFEXSES    AGAINST    II  UMAX    HABITATIONS. 


>^  374 


to  search  the  clothing"  of  prisoners  and  to  testify  to  what  thev 
find.^" 

The  reception  of  such  evidence  does  not  depri\'e  the  accused 
of  his  constitutional  right  to  refuse  to  testify  against  himself  in 
any  criminal  proceeding.'* 

The  accused  may  waive  his  rights  and  submit  to  a  voluntary 
comparison/^  by  putting  his  foot  in  tracks  found  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  crime.'''  His  offer  to  place  his  foot  or  shoe  in  the 
footprints  may  be  proved  in  his  favor/^  but  if  he  does  so  he  can- 
not object  to  evidence  that  it  seemed  to  fit.^"*  A  witness  who  has 
measured  the  tracks  of  man  or  beast  and  compared  his  measure- 
ments with  the  footwear  of  the  accused,  worn  about  the  time  of 
the  crime,  or  of  a  horse  owned  by  him,  may  testify  to  the  results 
and  may  state  that  in  his  opinion  a  correspondence  exists  in  size 
and  shape.'"' 

A  witness  cannot  testifv  that  he  thouirht  when  he  first  saw  the 


"  State  V.  Graham.  74  X.  Car.  646, 
649,  21  Am.  493 ;  Myers  v.  State,  97 
Ga.  76,  25  S.  E.  252;  Krens  v.  State, 
■/^  Xeb.  294,  106  X.  \V.  27;  Har- 
grove V.  State,  147  Ala.  97,  41  So. 
972,  119  Am.  St.  60;  Guerrero  v.  State, 
46  Tex.  Cr.  445,  80  S.  W.  ioot  ;  State 
V.  Williams,  120  La.  175,  45  So.  94. 
The  court  declined  to  decide  whether 
tile  policeman  could  compel  a  pris- 
oner to  place  his  foot  in  the  track. 

'*  State  V.  Fuller.  34  Mont.  12,  85 
Pac.  369.  8  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  76211. 

'"People  V.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228,  15 
X.  \\.  95;  State  V.  Sexton,  147  Mo. 
89.  48  S.  W.  452. 

"'  Burks  V.  State,  92  Ga.  461,  17  S. 
K.  619. 

''  Rouldin  v.  State,  8  Tex.  .Xpp. 
^?>2.  335.  Contra,  Potter  v.  State,  92 
.\la.  27,  40,  9  So.  402.  Compare  Har- 
Krovc  V.  State,  147  Ala.  97,  41  So. 
<)72,  1 19  Am.  St.  60,  where  shoes 
that  the  accused  admitted  he  wore 
about  the  time  of  the  burRlary  were 
taken    from  his   house  and  compared 


witli  tracks  near  the  scene  of  the 
crime. 

'*  Potter  V.  State,  92  Ala.  :^7,  40,  9 
So.  402. 

"  State  V.  Jeffries,  210  Mo.  302,  109 
S.  W.  614:  People  V.  Wolcott,  51 
Mich.  612,  615,  17  X.  W.  78;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Pope,  103  Mass.  440; 
Harris  v.  State,  84  Ga.  269,  10  S.  E. 
742;  State  V.  Reitz,  83  X.  Car.  634, 
636;  Cooper  V.  State,  88  Ala.  107,  no, 
7  So.  47;  Miller  v.  State,  91  Ga.  186, 
16  S.  E.  985 ;  Porch  v.  State,  50  Tex. 
Cr.  335,  99  S.  W.  102;  Thompson  v. 
State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  397,  77  S.  W. 
449;  Johnson  v.  State,  55  Fla.  46,  46 
So.  154;  Alford  V.  State,  47  Fla.  i, 
36  So.  436;  Parker  v.  State,  46  Tex. 
Cr.  461,  80  S.  W.  1008,  108  Am.  St. 
1021  ;  Smith  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  405, 
77  S.  W.  453;  Weaver  v.  State.  46 
Tex.  Cr.  607,  81  .S.  W.  39:  State  v. 
Arthur,  135  Iowa  48.  109  X.  W.  1083; 
State  V.  Lanfiford.  74  S.  Car.  460.  55 
S.  E.  120;  Moore  v.  State.  51  Tox. 
Cr.  46S.  103  S.  W.  188:  State  v.  \(.r- 
man,   135  Iowa  483,   it3  X.  W.  340. 


§    374^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  64S 

tracks,  and  still  believes,  they  were  made  by  the  defendant,  or  that 
thev  were  like  those  of  the  defendant.  This  is  only  an  expression 
of  an  opinion  upon  a  question  properly  to  l)e  determined  by  the 
jury.""  But  a  witness  may  testify  that  the  ground  in  a  highway 
near  the  scene  of  the  crime  and  the  residence  of  the  accused  was 
so  hard  that  no  track  could  be  made."^  The  accused  may  intro- 
duce any  evidence  tending  to  show  that  it  is  physically  impossible 
that  he  made  the  tracks,"  or  that  he  had  never  worn  or  possessed 
a  shoe  that  would  fit  them. 

§  374a.    Evidence  obtained  by  trailing  with  bloodhounds. — The 

well-known  instinct  possessed  by  certain  breeds  of  dogs,  com- 
monly known  as  bloodhounds,  which  enables  them  to  track  per- 
sons or  objects  wholly  by  their  sense  of  smell,  has  caused  them 
to  be  employed  in  tracking  persons  accused  of  crime  and  fugitives 
from  justice  from  the  earliest  times.  The  exceptional  keenness 
of  scent,  sagacity  and  capacity  for  training  of  these  animals,  their 
perseverence  and  intelligence  in  following  the  fugitive  are  well 
known.  .Vnd,  however  we  may  doubt  the  humanity  of  employing 
animals  whose  nature  is,  or  may  upon  occasion  be,  so  ferocious 
to  detect  and  apprehend  criminals,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
results  often  obtained  can  be  usually  relied  upon.  Thus  it  has 
been  held  that  testimony  that  bloodhounds  of  pure  blood,  and  ex- 
perienced in  tracking  human  beings,  were  put  upon  the  trail  at  the 
scene  of  a  crime  such  as  arson,  homicide,  rape  or  burglary,  and 
followed  the  trail  to  the  home  or  other  abiding  place  of  the  ac- 
cused is  admissible.'^  The  evidence  of  a  witness  to  these  facts,  if, 

="  State  V.  Green,  40  S.  Car.  328,  18  "State  v.  Alelick,  65  Iowa  614,  615, 

S.  E.  933,  42  Am.  St.  872;  Collins  v.  22  N.  W.  895. 

Commonwealth   (Ky.),  25  S.  W.  743,  '^  Spears  v.  State,  92  Miss.  613,  46 

745,  15  Ky.  L.  691;  State  v.  Senn,  32  So.  166;  State  v.  Hunter,  143  N.  Car. 

S.  Car.  392,400,  II  S.  E.  292;  Heidel-  607,  56  S.  E.   547,   118  Am.   St.  830; 

baugh  V.   State,  79  Neb.  499,   113  X.  Davis   v.    State,   46   Fla.    137,    35    So. 

W.   14s;  Terry  v.  State,  118  Ala.  79,  76;  Parker  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  461, 

23   So.  776.     The  witness  must  state  80    S.    W.    1008,    108    Am.    St.    1021 ; 

the     facts     showing     identity.       The  Hargrove   v.    State,    147    .Ma.    97,    41 

same    rule    applies    to    horse    tracks.  So.    972,    119    Am.    St.    60;    State    v. 

State  V.  Wideman,  68  S.  Car.  119,  46  Freeman,   146   X.  Car.  615,  60  S.   E. 

S.  E.  769.  986;    State  v.    Peebles,    178   Mo.   475. 

"State  V.   Sanders,  75  S.  Car.  409,  77  S.  W.  518:  Simpson  v.  State,  in 

56  S.  E.  35.  Ala.  6,  20  So.  572;  State  v.  Spivey  (X. 


649  CFFEXSES    AGAINST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS.  §    374a 

at  the  same  time,  he  was  acquainted  with  the  dogs  and  knew  them 
to  be  trained  and  experienced,  though  not  substantive  proof  of 
guilt  which  will  alone  and  uncorroborated  sustain  a  conviction,  is 
admissible  as  corroboration  of  other  evidence  as  to  the  identity  of 
the  accused."*  In  order  that  such  evidence  may  be  received  there 
must  be  preliminary  proof,  usually  coming  from  a  witness  who 
accompanied  the  bloodhounds,  that  they  are  animals  of  pure 
blood,  previously  trained  to  trail  human  beings,  that  they  have 
been  tested  by  trailing  other  men  and  found  reliable,  and  that 
they  were  laid  on  the  track  at  such  a  time  and  under  such  circum- 
stances as  tended  to  show  the  track  or  trail  was  actually  where  the 
accused  had  been.-^  In  a  case  of  arson  the  testimony  showed  the 
dog  was  put  on  the  trail  on  the  afternoon  after  the  fire.'**  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  evidence  of  the  prior  training  of  the  dogs  is  un- 
convincing, so  that  the  court  is  not  convinced  that  they  are  acute 
of  sense  or  trained  in  the  tracking  of  human  beings  this  evidence 
must  be  rejected.  It  ought  to  be  rejected  where  the  preliminary 
proof  shows  that  no  care  was  taken  to  prevent  the  hounds  from 
following  the  tracks  of  other  persons  who  since  the  time  of  the 
crime  had  frequented  the  scene  of  it.  And  where,  with  these  cir- 
cumstances, it  also  appears  that  no  opportunity  was  given  to  the 
hounds  to  obtain  the  scent  of  any  article  of  wearing  apparel  be- 
longing to  the  supposed  criminal,  and  the  dogs  were  on  the  trail 
accompanied  by  a  large  and  noisy  crowd,  whose  cries  urging  them 
on  confused  them,  and  also  that  it  was  from  time  to  time  neces- 
sary to  urge  them  on,  it  would  be  reversible  error  to  admit  proof 
of  the  fact  that  they  finally  trailed  the  defendant  to  his  place  of 
residence."  The  accused  should  always  be  permitted,  through 
counsel,  to  cross-examine  the  witness  who  testifies  to  the  training 
and  experience  of  the  dogs  to  bring  out  any  circumstances  to  show 
that  they  were  unreliable  and  unskilled.  He  may  cross-e.xamine 
as  to  the  circumstances  of  the  trailing  to  show  that  its  result  are 

Car.,  1909),  65  S.  E.  995.    Evidence  of  L.    R.    A.     (N.     S.)     341;     State    v. 

trailing  by  bloodhounds,  see  42  L.  R.  Hunter,    143    X.    Car.   607,    56    S.    E. 

.\.  432,  note.  547,  118  .'Km.  St.  830. 

•*  State  V.  Hunter,  143  X.  Car.  607,  -"Davis    v.    State,    46    Fla.    137,    35 

56  S.  E.  547,  118  .Xm.  St.  830.  .So.  76. 

^  State   V.    Dickcrson,   "]•]   Ohio    St.  "  Sprouse   v.   Commonwealth    (  Ky.. 

34,  82  X.  E.  969,  122  .'\m.  St.  479,  13  1909),  116  S.  W.  344. 


>j    375  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  65O 

not  lo  be  depended  upon  because  of  the  fact  that  the  dogs  were 
not  acquainted  with  the  scent  or  were  confused  by  the  crowds,  or 
to  show  any  otlier  relevant  fact.""" 

vi  375.  Burglarious  tools  in  possession  of  the  accused. — It  mav 
usually  be  sIk^wu  that  burglars'  tools  were  found  on  the  person 
of  the  accused,"''  in  his  dwelling,  in  a  trunk  shown  to  be 
his.  or  in  his  constructive  possession  and  control  at  or  about  the 
lime  of  his  arrest,  particularly  where  it  is  shown  that  such  tools 
were  used  in  the  perpetration  of  tlie  crime.'"'  But  evidence  that 
after  the  commission  of  the  crime  the  room  occupied  by  the  ac- 
cused was  searched  and  no  burglars'  tools  or  implements,  files  or 
keys  is  not  admissible  to  prove  innocence.'*'  All  the  details  of  the 
linding,  including  the  declarations  of  the  accused,  may  be  proved, 
and  it  is  immaterial  that  the  tools  found  were  not  adapted  to  the 
burglarious  act  alleged."'-  It  may  also  be  shown  that  burglars' 
tools  similar  to  others  found  in  the  defendant's  possession  were 
discovered  in  the  premises  which  had  been  burglariously  en- 
tered."^ The  purjDose  and  object  of  the  possession  of  articles  or 
tools  which,  though  usually  employed  for  lawful  purposes,  may 
be  used  by  burglars,  are  always  for  the  jury."*  It  may  be  shown 
that  chloroform  was  found  in  tlie  possession  of  the  accused,  or 
in  his  house  after  the  crime  where  chloroform  was  used  in  the 
commission  of  the  crime,  and  the  occupant  of  the  house  may  tes- 
tify that  he  smelled  chloroform  when  he  was  aroused,  though  he 
is  not  an  expert.^"' 

§  376.    Other  burglarious  acts. — Evidence  that  the  defendant  had 

"*  Richardson  v.  State,  145  Ala.  46,  '''  People    v.    Lowrie,    4    Cal.    App. 

41  So.  82.  137,  87  Pac.  253. 

^'' McCoy  V.    State,   48  Tex.   Cr.   30,  ^- Bish.  Cr.   Proc,  §   151;   Common- 

85  S.  W.  1072  (skeleton  keys)  ;  State  wealth    v.    Tivnon,    8    Gray    (Mass.) 

V.    Clark    (S.    Car.,    1910),   67    S.    E.  375,  69  Am.  Dec.  248;  Knickerl)ockcr 

300.  V.    People,   43    N.    Y.    177;    Frank    v. 

"*"  People   V.    Winters,   29   Cal.   658;  State,  39  Miss.  705. 

People  V.   Hope,  62  Cal.  291;   People  ^^  People  v.  Hope,  62  Cal.  291,  295. 

V.  Wilson,  7  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  326,  =*  Reg.    v.    Oldham,    2    Den.    C.    C. 

40  N.  Y.  S.  107;  2  Am.  St.  397,  note.  472. 

See    also,    EllioU    Evidence,    §  2916;  ''Miller  v.  State   (Tex.  Cr.),  50  S. 

Russell  V.  State   (Ala.,  1905),  38  So.  W.  704. 
291. 


651 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS. 


§  Z77 


committed,  or  had  attempted,^'^  or  had  planned  to  commit,^"  sim- 
ilar offenses  on  the  same  or  on  other  premises,"  is  admissible, 
when  the  circumstances  of  time  and  place  attendant  upon  both 
crimes  are  connected  and  form  a  part  of  one  criminal  system  or 
transaction.^*  Evidence  of  a  separate  and  distinct  burglary  is  not 
admissible^^  unless  introduced  solely  to  prove  the  defendant's 
whereabouts'*"  on  the  night  of  the  crime  in  issue. 

§  377.  The  felonious  intention  present  in  entering. — The  entrance 
must  have  been  made  with  a  felonious  and  unlawful  intention. 
The  intention  of  the  accused  to  commit  some  felony  in  the  prem- 
ises broken  in  must  be  shown. ''^  specifically,  as  alleged  in  the  in- 
dictment.*" The  fact  that  a  felony  was  actually  committed  by  the 
accused  in  the  house  is  strong  prima  facie  evidence  that  he  entered 


"■a  Cook  V.  State.  80  Ark.  495,  97  S. 

^\^  683. 

■""  Dawson  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  535, 
25  S.  W.  21,  40  Am.  St.  791. 

"Marshall  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893), 
22  S.  W.  878.  A  police  officer  may 
testify  that  certain  tools  and  other 
articles  found  in  the  house  of  the 
accused  were  such  as  burglars  ordi- 
narily use,  and  may  testify  how  they 
were  used.  And  mendicant  cards 
found  in  the  house  at  the  same  time 
are  relevant  to  show  the  occupation 
f>{  the  accused.  Commonwealth  v. 
Johnson,  199  Mass.  55,  85  X.  E.   188. 

"'  Frazier  v.  State,  135  Ind.  38,  40, 
34  X.  E.  817 ;  State  v.  Robinson,  35 
S.  Car.  340,  14  S.  E.  766;  State  v. 
Weldon,  39  S.  Car.  318,  17  S.  E.  688, 
24  L.  R.  A.  I26n;  People  v.  Mead, 
50  Mich.  228,  IS  N.  W.  95;  Eley  v. 
State  (Tex.,  i8go),  13  S.  W.  998; 
(iiite,  §  88,  et  seq. 

"'People  V.  McXutt,  64  Cal.  ir6,  28 
Pnc.  64;  People  v.  Grcenwall,  108  N. 
\.  2r/i,  301  (murder),  15  X.  E.  404, 
2  .Am.  St.  415;  People  v.  White.  3  X. 
Y.  Cr.  366.  Proof  of  other  crimes, 
see  62  L.  R.  A.  193,  note.  See  also, 
l-'lliott  Evidence,  §  2917. 


*"  People  V.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228,  15 
X'.  W.  95 ;  State  v.  Fitzsimon,  18 
R.  I.  236,  27  Atl.  446,  448,  49  Am. 
St.  766.  The  loss  of  articles  other 
than  those  mentioned  in  the  indict- 
ment may  be  shown.  Walker  v. 
State,  S  Ga.  App.  430,  63  S.  E.  534. 

*^Ashford  v.  State,  2,(>  Neb.  38,  40, 
53  N^.  W.  1036;  State  v.  Meche,  42 
La.  Ann.  273,  7  So.  573 ;  Harris  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  564,  103  S.  W. 
390;  Jones  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  336, 
87  S.  W.  1157;  Johnson  v.  State,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  201,  107  S.  W.  52;  Moore 
V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  364,  107  S.  W. 
355.  Evidence  of  the  intent,  see  El- 
liott Evidence,  §  2915;  2  Am.  St.  396, 
note. 

*-  Miller  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  445, 
446,  13  S.  W.  646;  State  V.  Taylor, 
136  Mo.  66,  2y  S.  W.  907;  Moore  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1896),  ^7  S.  W.  747- 
The  intent  is  a  question  for  the  jury. 
Woodward  v.  State,  54  Ga.  106,  107; 
Franco  v.  State,  42  Tex.  276,  281  ; 
Clifton  V.  State,  26  I'-la.  523,  525,  7 
So.  863;  Commonwealth  v.  Williams, 
2  Cush.  (Mass.)  582;  People  v.  Hope. 
62  Cal.  291,  296;  State  v.  Wrifjilit 
(  IXl.,    1907),  66   .\\\.   364;    Trcvcnio 


Z77 


CRIMIXAT-    EVIDENCE. 


65-2 


ii  with  a  felonious  inteiilion.  If  the  entrance  and  tlie  commission 
of  a  felony  on  the  premises  are  shown,  the  jury  will  he  juslilied  in 
inferring  a  criminal  intention  in  entering. ■*•'  The  jjurglarious  in- 
tention may  be  inferred  from  many  other  circumstances  in  evi- 
dence. So,  if  it  is  proved  that  the  accused  induced, "*•*  or  attempted 
to  induce, ■'^  the  custodian  of  the  premises  to  absent  himself,  or  en- 
tered the  building  after  dark,"'  and  was  found  there  with  bur- 
glars' tools,  or  with  implements  by  which  it  is  apparent  from  the 
evidence  that  the  breaking  into  was  effected, ^''^  or  keys  which  will 
open  the  doors  of  the  building,  in  his  possession,*'  or  was  discov- 
ered engaged  in  ransacking  a  trunk,***  or  in  putting  aside  articles 
of  value,*'''  and,  when  discovered,  made  a  hasty  and  immediate 
flight""  through  an  open  window,^^  or  attempted  to  conceal  him- 
self,''"" or  was  found  running  along  a  neighboring  road  soon  after 
a  burglary  had  been  attempted,^''  a  criminal  intent  may  be  in- 
ferred. Hence  these  circumstances  and  others  of  a  similar  charac- 
ter are  relevant,  wdth  other  evidence,  to  show  a  burglarious  in- 
tent. The  accused  must  be  allowed  to  account  for  his  presence  in 
the  house,  and  his  explanation  may  be  considered  by  the  jury  in 
the  light  afforded  by  the  other  evidence.^* 


V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1897),  42  S.  W. 
594.  A  specific  intent  to  commit  lar- 
cenj-  may  be  inferred  from  proof  of 
a  breaking  in,  and  of  the  presence  of 
valuables  in  the  house.  Steadman  v. 
State,  81  Ga.  Ti(y,  8  S.  E.  420. 

"Stokes  V.  State,  84  Ga.  258,  263, 
10  S.  E.  740;  State  v.  Wilkes,  82  S. 
Car.  163,  63  S.  E.  688;  Vance  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  115  S.  W.  774; 
Jenkins  v.  State  (Fla.,  1909),  50  So. 
582. 

"  Wright  V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va. 
183,  187;  Nightengale  v.  State,  50 
Tex.  Cr.  3,  95  S.  W.  531 ;  Gunter  v. 
State,  79  Ark.  432,  96  S.  W.  181,  116 
Am.  St.  85;  State  v.  Raphael,  123 
Iowa  452,  99  X.  W.  151,  loi  Am. 
St.  334;  People  V.  Lang,  142  Cal.  482, 
76  Pac.  232;  Kennedy  v.  State,  71 
Xeb.  765,  99  N.  W.  645. 


*^  People   V.    Calvert,    22    X.    Y.    S. 
220,  d-j  Hun  649,  without  opinion. 


*"  State  V.  Fox,  80  Iowa  312,  45  X. 
W.  874,  20  Am.  St.  425. 

^''a  Taylor  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  190, 
107  S.  W.  58. 

*•  People  V.  }^Iorton,  4  Utah  407, 
408,  II  Pac.  512;  State  v.  Christmas, 
loi  X.  Car.  749,  756,  8  S.  E.  361. 

■"  State  V.  Anderson,  5  Wash.  St. 
350,  31  Pac.  969. 

*^  Clifton  V.  State,  26  Fla.  523,  525, 
7  So.  863. 

"Hill  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  15 
S.  W.  870,  12  Ky.  L.  914. 

"Alexander  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr. 
359,  362,  20  S.  W.  756. 

"'  People  V.  Hagan,  14  N.  Y.  S.  2^^, 
60  Hun  (X.  Y.)  577,  without  opin- 
ion. 

■^^  Steadman  v.  State,  81  Ga.  736,  8 
S.  E.  420. 

'*  People  V.  Griffin,  77  Mich.  585, 
587,  43  X.  W.  1061  ;  State  v.  Perry, 
124  La.  931,  50  So.  799. 


653 


CFFEXSES    AGAIXST    IIUMAX    HABITATIONS. 


3/8 


§  378.  Presumption  from  possession  of  stolen  property. — It  has 
been  lield  that  a  person  in  whose  possession  money  or  goods  were 
found,  recently  taken  from  premises  which  had  been  broken  in, 
would  be  presumed  from  possession  alone  as  matter  of  law,  at 
least  in  the  absence  of  a  valid  explanation,  guilty  not  only  of  lar- 
ceny, but  of  the  burglary  as  well.^^  The  large  majority  of  the 
cases,  however,  while  admitting  that  recent  possession  alone  may 
in  some  circumstances  create  a  presumption  of  larceny,  repudiate 
this  doctrine  as  regards  burglary.  The  true  rule  doubtless  is  that 
the  mere  possession  of  stolen  property  creates  no  presumption  of 
law  that  the  person  in  whose  possession  it  was  found  committed 
the  burglary  in  wdiich  they  were  taken.  The  possession  is  a  cir- 
cumstance to  go  to  the  jury,  and  its  weight  is  for  them.  The 
corpus  delicti  of  the  burglary,  that  is,  the  breaking  in  and  en- 
tering, must  be  proved  by  independent  evidence  and  can  not  be 
presumed  from  evidence  of  mere  possession.'"^  If  it  appears  that 
a  burglary  was  in  fact  committed,  the  possession  by  the  accused  is 
a  circumstance  from  which,  in  connection  with  all  the  evidence, 
the  jury  may  presume  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  he  committed  it." 


"  Commonwealth  v.  Millard,  i 
Mass.  6;  State  v.  Toohey,  203  Mo. 
674,  102  S.  W.  530;  Scott  V.  State, 
122  Ga.  138,  50  S.  E.  49.  Where 
property  had  been  stolen  by  means 
of  a  burglary,  and  recently  there- 
after the  property  is  found  in  the 
possession  of  another,  the  latter  is 
presumed  to  be  the  thief  and  to  have 
used  all  means  necessary  to  have  se- 
cured access  to  and  possession  of 
such  property,  and,  if  he  fails  to  ac- 
cf)unt  for  his  possession  in  a  man- 
ner consistent  with  his  innocence,  or 
to  overcome  the  presumption  by  di- 
rect or  circumstantial  evidence,  a  ver- 
dict of  guilty  of  larceny  and  bur- 
glary is  authori/.ed.  State  v.  James, 
[94  Mo.  268,  92  S.  W.  679.  See  El- 
liott Evidence,  §  2918:  12  L.  R.  A. 
CS.  .S.)  200,  note.  Burden  of  proof 
and  prcsumi)tion  in  prosecution  for 
liuris'lary,    sec    2    Am.    St.    397,    note ; 


TCI  Am.  St.  482,  note;  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  29x0. 

■^Lester  v.  State,  106  Ga.  371,  32 
S.  E.  335,  and  see  cases  in  next  note. 

°'  King  v.  State,  99  Ga.  686,  26  S. 
E.  480;  State  V.  Conway,  56  Kan. 
682,  44  Pac.  627;  Metz  v.  State,  46 
Neb.  547,  65  N.  W.  190;  State  v. 
Ham,  98  Iowa  60,  66  N.  W.  1038; 
Porterfield  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Va. 
801,  22  S.  E.  352;  State  v.  Blue,  136 
Mo.  41,  37  S.  W.  796;  State  v.  Wil- 
son, 137  Mo.  592,  39  S.  W.  80;  State 
V.  Jennings,  79  Iowa  513,  44  N.  W. 
799;  State  V.  Reid,  20  Iowa  413,  420, 
421;  State  V.  Owsley,  111  Mo.  450, 
20  S.  W.  194;  Xeuhrandt  v.  State, 
53  Wis.  89.  90,  <)  X.  W.  824;  People 
v.  Carroll,  54  Mich.  334,  20  N.  W. 
66;  Dawson  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
.S.35.  23  S.  W.  21  :  Goldsmith  v.  State, 
32  Tex.  Cr.  112.  2J  S.  W.  405: 
Tiircadgill   v.   State,  3J  Tex.   Cr.  45 1, 


378 


CRI M I  X  A  L    i:\-  i  1  )E  X  CE. 


<'>54 


The  relevancy  of  the  possession  of  articles  taken  from  the 
jireniises  is  to  a  certain  extent  due  to  the  fact  that  the  possession 
sliows  that  the  accused  has  been  in  the  i)reniises.  The  possession 
may.  and  in  most  cases  does,  show  a  criminal  intent,  i.  c,  the  in- 
lent  to  steal,  where  proof  of  this  intent  is  necessary.  But  even 
where  proof  of  an  intent  to  steal  is  not  allci^ed  evidence  of  recent 
possession  after  the  breaking'  in  is  competent  to  identify  the  per- 
son wlio  did  it.''''  The  possession  by  one  of  several  jointly  indicted 
for  burglary  is  the  possession  of  all.  and  may  be  proved  against 
any  or  all,"'''  and  possession  by  all  those  jointly  charged  may  be 
proved  on  the  trial  of  any  one  of  them.""  But  in  burglary,  as  in 
the  kindred  offense  of  larceny,  the  possession  of  the  defendant 
must  be  personal  and  exclusive  and  unexplained,  and  must  in- 
volve a  conscious  assertion  of  ownership  by  him.  He  should  al- 
ways be  permitted  to  explain  how  he  obtained  the  property,  and  if 


24  S.  W.  511;  People  v.  Ah  Sing,  59 
Cal.  400;  People  v.  Titherington,  59 
Cal.  598;  People  v.  Cline,  74  Cal.  575, 
16  Pac.  391 ;  State  v.  Frahm,  7^  Iowa 
.355,  35  N.  W.  451;  State  v.  Rivers, 
68  Iowa  6ri,  27  N.  W.  781;  People 
v.  Wood,  99  Mich.  620,  58  N.  W.  638; 
Stuart  V.  People,  42  Mich.  255.  3  N. 
W.  863;  State  V.  Moore,  117  Mo.  395, 
22  S.  W.  T086;  Brooks  v.  State,  96 
Ga.  353,  23  S.  E.  413 ;  State  v.  Rights, 
82  N.  Car.  6/5,  678;  Methard  v. 
State,  19  Ohio  St.  363;  Davis  v. 
State,  76  Ga.  16;  State  v.  Raymond, 
46  Conn.  345;  Magee  v.  People,  139 
111.  138,  28  N.  E.  1077;  Gravely  v. 
Commonwealth,  86  Va.  396,  401,  403, 
10  S.  E.  431 ;  Wright  v.  Common- 
wealth, 82  Va.  183,  188;  Ryan  v. 
State,  83  Wis.  486,  53  N.  W.  836; 
Davis  V.  People,  i  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 
447,  452;  Sahlinger  v.  People,  102  111. 
241;  Hays  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  iii, 
TOO  S.  W.  926;  State  v.  Dale,  141 
Mo.  284,  42  S.  W.  722,  64  An  St. 
513;  Lynne  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  386, 
III  S.  W.  151;  Johnson  v.  State,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  201,  107  S.  W.  52;  Davis  v. 
State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  166,  74  S.  W.  919; 


Quong  Yu  v.  Territory  (Ariz.,  1909), 
100  Pac.  462;  State  v.  Vicrck  (S. 
Dak.,  1909),  120  N.  W.  1098;  People 
V.  King,  4  Cal.  App.  213.  87  Pac. 
400;  Davidson  v.  State,  104  Ga.  761, 
30  S.  E.  946;  Richardson  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.,  1897),  42  S.  W.  996;  Col- 
lier v.  State,  55  Fla.  7,  45  So.  752; 
State  V.  Hiillen,  133  N.  Car.  656,  45 
S.  E.  513;  State  v.  Peach,  70  Vt.  283, 
40  Atl.  732;  State  V.  Toohey,  203  Mo. 
674,  102  S.  W.  530;  State  V.  Beeman, 
51  Wash.  557,  99  Pac.  756;  Cuthbert 
V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  600,  60  S.  E. 
2,22;  Collier  v.  State,  55  Fla.  7,  45 
So.  752;  State  V.  Brady,  121  Iowa 
561,  97  N.  W.  62;  Thompson  v.  State 
(Fla..  1909),  30  So.  507;  People  v. 
Everett,  242  111.  628,  90  N.  E.  226; 
State   V.   Short    (Del.,    1909),   75   .Atl. 

787. 

"^  Walker  v.  State,  5  Ga.  .App.  430, 
63  S.  E.  534. 

^^  State  v.  Toohey.  203  Mo.  674.  102 
S.  W.  530;  Herndon  v.  State.  50  Tex. 
Cr.  552,  99  S.  W.  558 ;  State  v.  Leon- 
ard, 135  Iowa  371,  ir2  N.  W.  784- 

""  People  V.  Wilson,  133  Mich.  517, 
95  X.  W.  536,  10  Det.  Leg.  N.  287. 


6s 


50 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    HUMAN    HABITATIONS. 


^  379 


his  explanation   is   reasonable   and   probable,    he  should   be   ac- 
quitted.''' 

ij  379.  Articles  stolen  from  the  premises  as  evidence. — The  non- 
production  in  evidence  of  articles  alleged  to  have  been  stolen,  is 
not  ground  for  a  new  trial  when  the  accused  does  not  expressly 
demand  their  production  and  their  identity  is  not  disputed.'"'-  But 
articles  found  in  defendant's  possession  and  taken  from  him  by 
force,  which  are  alleged  to  have  been  taken  by  the  burglar,  may 
if  identified  by  the  owner,''^  or  by  some  other  witness,  and,  it 
seems,  where  the  evidence  of  identity  is  contradictory,"*  be  in- 
spected by  the  jury.**^  •  A  witness  may  testify  that  merchandise 
purchased  by  him  from  the  accused  was  of  the  same  character  as 
a  sample  shown  him  in  court  on  making  an  examination  and  com- 
parison."**  The  jury  may  compare  articles  of  wearing  apparel 
worn  by  the  defendant  when  arrested  with  clothing  belonging  to 


*"  See  cases  in  note  57,  also,  Gather 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1904),  8r  S.  W. 
717;  Lovelace  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr. 
261,  76  S.  W.  756;  Hays  v.  State,  30 
Tex.  App.  472,  17  S.  W.  1063 ;  Mor- 
gan V.  State,  25  Tex.  App.  513,  8  S. 
W.  487;  Field  V.  State,  24  Tex.  App. 
422,  6  S.  W.  200;  Jackson  v.  State, 
28  Tex.  App.  143,  12  S.  W.  701  ; 
State  V.  Owsley,  11 1  Mo.  450,  20  S. 
W.  194;  Payne  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
184,  17  S.  W.  463;  autc,  §  378,  et  scq. 
Possession  of  stolen  goods,  though 
unexplained  and  exclusive,  has  no 
weight  as  evidence  if  not  recent  or 
proved  after  the  offense.  Whether 
possession  is  recent  depends  on  the 
circumstances  of  each  case  and  is 
usually  for  the  jury,  though,  in  ex- 
ceptional cases,  the  evidence  may  so 
preponderate  that  the  court  may  de- 
cide. White  V.  State,  72  .Ma.  195. 
Where  a  party  charged  with  l)reak- 
ing  and  entering  a  building  with  in- 
tent  to   steal    is    found    in   possession 


of  goods  recent!}'  stolen  gives  a  rea- 
sonable and  credible  account  of  how 
he  came  into  such  possession,  or  an 
account  which  will  raise  a  reasonable 
doubt,  the  state  must  prove  that  such 
account  is  untrue ;  otherwise  he 
should  be  acquitted;  but,  if  the  ac- 
count, though  reasonable,  is  not 
credible,  the  jury  have  a  right  to 
convict,  though  the  state  puts  in  no 
proof  directly  to  prove  the  falsity  of 
the  account  given.  Collier  v.  State, 
55  Fla.  7,  45  So.  752. 

"■Johnson  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
15  S.  W.  671.  12  Ky.  L.  S7i- 

"'Walker  v.  State,  97  Ala.  85,  12 
So.  83;  Barnett  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr. 
538,  99  S.  W.  556. 

"*  Jackson  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 
370,  13  S.  W.  451,  19  Am.  St.  839; 
State  V.  Groiiing,  t,;^  Kan.  18,  21,  5 
Pac.  446. 

'"*  See  ante,  §  47. 

'"Stevens  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  190^)). 
95  S.  W.  505. 


§  379  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  656 

an  inmate  of  the  building  which  was  entered,  where  a  striking 
similarity  in  style  and  numbers  renders  them  relevant."" 

A  failure  to  prove  any  particular  walue  for  the  goods  may  be 
cured  by  their  production  in  court  and  tlieir  examination  by  the 
jur}',  who  may  take  judicial  notice  thereby  of  the  value  of  the 
goods.'''* 

Property  brought  from  the  building  entered  at  the  time  of  the 
trial  is  admissible  to  identify  similar  property  found  in  the  de- 
fendant's house."'"* 

"'Woodruff  V.    State    (Tex.,    1891),        ""People    v.    Van    Dam,    107    Mich. 
20  S.  W.  573.  425,  65  N.  W.  277. 

**  State  V.  Peach,  70  Vt.  283,  40  Atl. 
72,2. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


§  380.  Adultery  and   fornication — De-     §  395. 
fined  and  distinguished.  396. 

381.  Evidence    to    prove    the    inter- 
course —  Acts      of      aduhery       397. 
other  than  that  charged. 

SS2.  Competency  of  accomplice. 

383.  Character  of  evidence  to  prove       398. 

the  fact  of  marriage. 

384.  Lascivious   cohabitation   or  liv- 

ing in  unlawful  cohabitation.        399. 

385.  Seduction  defined. 

386.  The    sexual    intercourse — Rele-        400. 

vancy  of  evidence. 

387.  Evidence    to    prove    the    prom-        401. 

ises.  402. 

3S8.  Relevancy  of  the  previous  con- 
duct of  the  parties.  403. 

389.  The      examination,      credibility 

and     corroboration     of     the 
prosecutrix.  404. 

390.  Character  of  corroborative  evi- 

dence required. 

391.  The  marriage  of  the  accused  to 

the  seduced  female. 

392.  The    chastity    of    the    female —       405. 

What      constitutes      chastity 
and   how    it   may  be   proved. 

393-  The  presumption  of  chastity. 

394.  Defilement  of   female  ward  or       406. 
servant. 


Incest  defined. 

Evidence  to  show  the  sexual 
intercourse. 

The  kinship  existing  between 
the  parties — Evidence  of  ac- 
complices. 

Bigamy — The  intent — Invalid- 
ity or  annulment  of  former 
marriage. 

Presumption  and  proof  of 
death  of  spouse. 

Competency  of  wife  of  ac- 
cused. 

Absence  of  lawful  spouse. 

Proof  of  marriage  by  eye-wit- 
ness or  certificate. 

Proof  of  marriage  by  reputa- 
tion, cohabitation  and  con- 
duct. 

The  admissions  of  the  accused 
as  evidence  to  prove  the 
marriage — Primary  evidence 
of  the  ceremony — When  re- 
quired. 

Marriage  certificates  and  tran- 
scripts of  records  as  evidence 
— Presumption  of  validity — 
Venue. 

Bigamous  cohabitation. 


§  380.  Adultery  and  fornication — Defined  and  distinguished. — 
l-Vjrnicalion  i.s  sexual  intercourse  between  a  man,  married  or 
single,  and  an  unmarried  woman.'    Adultery  is  .sexual  intercour.se 

'State    V.    Chandler,    96    Ind.    591,     593;    State   v.    Hasty,    121    Iowa   507. 

96  X.  W.  1115. 


42 — Undkkiiii.i.  Crim.  Ev. 


(<^>S7) 


§  38i 


CRIMINAL    EVIDIiXCE. 


658 


between  a  married  i)ersoii  and  one  of  the  opposite  sex,  whether 
married  or  sinjjle." 


>i  381.  Evidence  to  prove  the  intercourse — Acts  of  adultery  other 
than  that  charged. — Direct  evidence  of  the  act  of  sexnal  inter- 
course can  seldom  be  obtained.  Proof  of  opportunity  and  inchna- 
tion  will  support  a  con\-iction  of  adultery.  But  opportunity  means 
more  than  mere  chance  and,  as  evidence  of  inclination  there  must 
be  circumstances  reasonably  suggestive  of  an  adulterous  tendency 
of  each  of  the  parties  to  the  other.^  Hence,  evidence  of  all  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  parties,  their  relations  to  one  another,  their 
domestic  and  social  surroundings,  their  acquaintance,  conduct  and 
familiarity,  the  facts  that  they  went  out  together  and  visited  each 
ether,  and  often  expressed  a  desire  to  be  together  are  relevant.* 
Improper  familiarities  and  adulterous  acts  betw^een  the  same 
parties  prior,^  or  subsequent  to,"  the  act  charged,  but  not  too  re- 


•  Aliner  v.  People.  58  111.  59;  State 
v.  Fellows,  so  Wis.  65,  6  N.  W.  239; 
Hood  V.  State,  56  Ind.  263,  271,  274, 
26  Am.  2in;  Helfrich  v.  Common- 
wealth, 3S  Pa.  St.  68,  75  Am.  Dec. 
579;  Cook  V.  State,  11  Ga.  53,  56  Am. 
Dec.  410;  State  v.  Wilson,  22  Iowa 
364;  State  V.  Donovan,  61  Iowa  278, 
16  N.  W.  130;  State  v.  Clark,  54  N. 
H.  456;  White  V.  State,  74  Ala.  31; 
State  V.  Taylor,  58  X.  H.  331; 
Walker  v.  State,  104  Ala.  56,  16  So. 
7;  Banks  v.  State,  96  Ala.  78,  11  So. 
404;  State  V.  Anderson  (Iowa,  1908), 
118  N.  W.  772.  As  to  mistake  of 
fact  under  which  a  man  marries  and 
cohabits  with  a  woman  married  to 
another,  see  State  v.  Andette,  81  Vt. 
400,  70  Atl.  833. 

•■'Till  V.  State,  132  Wis.  242.  iii  X. 
W.  1 109;  State  V.  Thompson,  134 
Iowa  25,  III  N.  W.  328.  See  also, 
Elliott  Evidence,  §§  2790,  2791,  2792, 
2793,  2794.  Proof  not  limited  as  to 
time  and  place,  see  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2796;  relation  as  to  single  act. 
S  2797.  Proof  of  corpus  delicti  in 
adulterj',   see  68   L.   R.    A.   44,   note. 


Evidence  of  other  crimes  in  prose- 
cution for  criminal  offenses,  see  6j 
L.  R.  A.  193,  note;  105  Am.  St.  1003. 
note.  Evidence  of  character  of  hus- 
band or  wife,  see  14  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
749,  note. 

*  State  V.  Brecht,  41  Minn.  50,  55. 
42  N.  W.  602;  People  v.  Girdler.  65 
Mich.  68,  31  X.  W.  624;  Starke  v. 
State,  97  Ga.  193,  23  S.  E.  832;  State 
V.  Ean,  90  Iowa  534,  58  N.  W.  898; 
State  V.  Brink,  68  Vt.  659,  35  .-Ktl. 
492;  Coons  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  256, 
91  S.  W.  1085;  Palmer  v.  State  (Ala., 
1909),  51  So.  358;  State  V.  Baker 
(Iowa,  1910),  125  X.  W.  659.' 

^'  Cross  V.  State,  78  Ala.  430,  433 : 
People  V.  Jenness,  5  Mich.  305,  322, 
324;  Brevaldo  v.  State,  21  Fla.  789; 
State  V.  Cannon,  72  X.  J.  L.  46,  60 
Atl.  177;  Xobles  V.  State,  127  Ga. 
212,  56  S.  E.  125 ;  Coons  v.  State,  49 
Tex.  Cr.  256,  91  S.  W.  1085;  Radford 
V.  State  (Ga.  .-^pp.,  1910),  67  S.  E. 
707.     See  also,  §  388. 

"State  V.  Stubbs,  108  X.  Car.  774- 
r3  S.  E.  90:  Coons  v.  State,  49  Tex. 
Cr.  256,  91  S.  W.  1085;  Hill  V.  State, 


659 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


§    382 


mote,'  or,  if  remote,  connected  with  it  so  as  to  form  a  part  of  a 
continuous  course  of  conduct,  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of 
bringing  out  the  relations  and  adulterous  disposition  of  the  de- 
fendant.^ 


§  382.  Competency  of  accomplice. — The  party  with  wdiom  the 
adultery  was  committed  is  always  a  competent  witness,"  though, 
as  he  or  she  is  an  accomplice,^"  a  conviction  may  not  be  had  upon 
his  or  her  uncorroborated  testimony, ^^  nor  is  her  confession  ad- 
missible against  the  accused  unless  connected  with  his.^"  Her  un- 
chastity  is  immaterial,  but  evidence  to  show  her  previous  bad 
character,  as,  for  example,  that  she  was  a  prostitute,  has  been  re- 


137  Ala.  66,  34  So.  406;  State  v. 
Brown  (Iowa,  1909),  121  N.  W.  513. 

'  People  V.  Hendrickson,  53  Mich. 
525.  526,  19  N.  W.  169;  State  v.  Eg- 
gleston,  45  Ore.  346,  TJ  Pac.  738. 

*  State  V.  Witham,  72  Me.  531 ; 
Owens  V.  State,  94  Ala.  97,  10  So. 
669;  State  V.  Henderson,  84  Iowa 
161,  so  N.  W.  758:  State  v.  Briggs, 
68  Iowa  416,  423,  2-j  N.  W.  358; 
State  V.  Bridgman,  49  Vt.  202,  24 
Am.  124;  State  v.  Marvin,  35  N.  H. 
22;  Bodiford  v.  State,  86  Ala.  67,  5 
So.  559,  II  Am.  St.  20;  Common- 
wealth V.  Nichols,  114  Mass.  285,  288, 
19  Am.  346n ;  State  v.  Potter,  52  Vt. 
33 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Merriam,  14 
Pick.  (Mass.)  518,  520,  25  \m.  Dec. 
420n ;  Commonwealth  v.  Morris,  i 
Ciish.  (Mass.)  391,  394;  Common- 
wealth V.  Lahey,  14  Gray  (Mass.) 
91,  93;  Richardson  v.  State,  37  Tex. 
346;  Cole  V.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
239:  State  V.  Way,  5  Neb.  283;  Searls 
V.  People,  13  III.  597.  Cf.  State  v. 
Donovan,  61  Iowa  278,  282,  16  N.  W. 
130.  In  the  case  of  an  indictment 
for  such  intercourse,  previous  famil- 
iarity, and  the  general  or  hal)itual 
submission  of  the  female  to  his  sex- 
ual embraces,  must,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  tend  to  render  it  more  prob- 
able  that  like   intercourse   took   place 


on  the  occasion  charged.  Such  is  the 
force  and  ungovernable  nature  of 
this  passion,  and  so  likely  is  its  in- 
dulgence to  be  continued  between  the 
same  parties,  when  once  yielded  to, 
that  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind  must  be  entirely  changed  l)c- 
fore  any  man's  judgment  can  resist 
the  force  of  such  an  inference  to  bo 
drawn  from  previous  acts  of  inter- 
course. People  V.  Jenness,  5  Mich. 
30s,  322. 

°  State  V.  Colby,  51  Vt.  291 ;  State 
V.  Crowley,  13  Ala.  172;  Garland  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  643,  104  S.  W.  898. 

"State  V.  Scott,  28  Ore.  331,  42 
Pac.  I  ;  Jackson  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr. 
220,  loi  S.  W.  807;  Howe  V.  State, 
SI  Tex.  Cr.  174,  102  S.  W.  409,  q8 
.Am.  St.  179,  note. 

"  People  V.  Hendrickson,  53  Mich. 
525,  19  N.  W.  169;  Jackson  v.  State, 
51  Tex.  Cr.  220,  loi  S.  W.  807; 
Powell  v.  State  (Tex.,  1898),  44  S. 
W.  504;  Palmer  v.  State  (Ala.,  19a)), 
51  So.  358;  State  v.  Brown  (Iowa, 
1910),  124  N.  W.  899;  Blue  V.  State 
(Xcb.,  1910),  125  .\".  \V.  136;  State 
V.  Walsh  (S.  I).,  1910),  125  N.  W. 
^295.  But  compare  State  v.  Atiiey,  133 
Iowa  382,  108  N.  W.  224. 

"Stale  V.  Minis,  39  S.  Car.  557.  1; 
S.  IC.  850. 


§  3S3 


CRI M I X A L    EMDE X (^K. 


660 


ccived  to  show  the  i)iohabiHty  of  the  intercourse."  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute  requiring  a  prosecution  to  be  commenced  on  the  com- 
plaint of  the  husband  or  wife/^  this  fact  need  not  be  sliown,'"' 
nor  tliat  an  a(hiherous  cohabitation  continued  (huMug  all  the 
l)eriod  as  charged,  if  it  existed  during  any  portion  of  the  ])criod.^'^ 

;<  383.  Character  of  evidence  to  prove  the  fact  of  marriage. — It 
must  be  proved  that  one  of  the  parties  to  the  adultery  was  married 
at  the  time.^^  A  much  stricter  degree  of  proof  is  required  to  show 
marriage  in  criminal  proceedings  than  will  suffice  in  a  civil  trial.  ^'* 
Often  by  statute  the  marriage  certificate  is  made  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  the  marriage.  Such  a  statute  does  not,  by  implication 
alone,  exclude  other  proof/"  and  the  introduction  of  the  certifi- 
cate must  always  be  supplemented  by  some  evidence  from  which 
the  jury  may  identify  the  party  named  therein  as  the  accused."" 


•  "  Commonwealth  v.  Gray,  129 
Mass.  474,  476,  37  Am.  378;  United 
States  V.  Bredemeyer,  6  Utah  143,  22 
Pac.  no;  State  v.  Eggleston,  45  Ore. 
346,  77  Pac.  738;  Sutton  v.  State,  124 
Ga.  815,  53  S.  E.  381. 

"  State  V.  Stout,  71  Iowa  343,  32 
N.  W.  372;  State  v.  Andrews,  95 
Iowa  451,  64  N.  W.  404;  State  v. 
Wesie,  17  N.  Dak.  567,  118  N.  W.  20; 
State  V.  Clemenson,  123  Iowa  524,  99 
X.  W.  139. 

'^  State  V.  Brecht,  41  Minn.  50,  42 
N.  W.  602;  State  v.  Harmann,  135 
Iowa  167,  112  N.  W.  632. 

'"Bailey  v.  State,  36  Xeb.  808,  55 
X.  W.  241. 

"  Banks  v.  State,  96  Ala.  78,  11  So. 
404;  Tison  V.  State,  125  Ga.  7,  53  S. 
E.  809;  Elliott  V.  State,  125  Ga.  31, 
53  S.  E.  809,  holding  that  on  a  failure 
to  prove  marriage  the  verdict  must 
be  set  aside.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2798. 

'*  See  post,  §§  402-405.  The  bur- 
den of  proof  of  marriage  is  on  the 
prosecution.  Zackery  v.  State,  6  Ga. 
App.  125,  64  S.  E.  281.  Method 
of     proving,     see     Elliott     Evidence, 


§  2799 ;  proof  by  record,  §  2800 ; 
proof  of  marriage — prima  facie  case, 
§  2803. 

'°  People  V.  Stokes,  71  Gal.  263,  12 
Pac.  71;  Thomas  v.  State  (Tex.), 
26  S.  W.  724;  State  V.  Clark,  54  X. 
H.  456,  560. 

""  State  V.  Brink,  68  Vt.  659,  35  Atl. 
492;  People  V.  Broughton,  49  Mich. 
339,  340,  13  X.  W.  621 ;  State  v. 
Brecht,  41  Minn.  50,  53,  42  X.  W. 
602 ;  Wedgwood's  Case,  8  Me.  75 ; 
People  V.  Isham,  109  Mich.  72,  67  X. 
\V.  819.  In  a  prosecution  for  adul- 
tery the  husband  or  wife  of  the  de- 
fendant cannot  testify  for  the  state 
as  to  her  marriage  to,  or  cohabita- 
tion with,  him  or  her.  People  v. 
Isham,  109  Mich.  72,  67  X.  W.  819; 
People  V.  Imes,  no  Mich.  250,  68  X. 
W.  157;  State  V.  Russell,  90  Iowa 
569,  58  X.  W.  915;  State  V.  Vollan- 
der,  57  Minn.  225,  58  X.  W.  878; 
Commonwealth  v.  Sparks,  7  Allen 
(Mass.)  534,  535,  536;  State  v. 
Welch,  26  Me.  30,  45  Am.  Dec.  94; 
State  V.  Gardner,  i  Root  (Conn.) 
485;  State  V.  Berlin,  42  Mo.  572,  577. 
See  ante,  §  186. 


66i 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


O^v) 


Ihe  certificate  should  show  a  ceremony  performed  by  a  duly  au- 
thorized official.  He  will  be  presumed  to  have  acted  within  the 
scope  of  his  authority.-^  But  the  certificate  is  not  conclusive  of 
all  facts  necessary  to  constitute  a  valid  marriage.  Thus,  if  it 
appears  that  one  of  the  parties  \vas  under  age,  ratification  must 
be  shown.--  The  certificate  is  not  the  best  evidence,  even  when 
admissible  by  statute.""  The  ceremony  may  be  proved  by  the 
testimony  of  any  one  who  was  present  and  saw  it  performed.-* 
But  it  is  not  enough  that  he  shall  testify  that  he  saw  a  ceremony 
performed  by  some  one.  He  ought  to  be  able  to  testify  that  all 
the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  apparently  constitute  a  legal 
marriage  ceremony.-'  Despite  some  uncertainty  in  the  early  cases, 
it  is  now  well  settled  that  the  marriage  of  the  accused  may  be 
proved  by  his  admissions,  oral  or  in  writing.  But  his  statement 
that  he  is  married,  to  be  admissible,  must  have  been  made  vol- 
untarily and  with  deliberation.-*' 

A  lawful  marriage,  when  proved,  will  be  presumed  to  continue 
until  the  contrary  is  shown.  The  fact  that  the  marriage  was  void, 
or  had  been  terminated  by  death,  divorce  or  otherwise,  is  always 
relevant  in  adultery.'^ 


''  State  V.  Clark,  54  X.  H.  456,  459. 

-  People  V.  Bennett,  39  Mich.  208, 
209. 

^  State  V.  Marvin,  35  X.  H.  22,  27, 
2  Grcenl.  on  Ev.,  §  461,  i  Phil.  Ev., 
410. 

"  State  V.  Clark,  54  X.  H.  456,  560 ; 
Owens  V.  State,  94  Ala.  97,  10  So. 
669:  Commonwealth  v.  Littlejohn,  15 
Mass.  163 :  Commonwealth  v.  Morris. 
I  Cush.  (Mass.)  391,  394:  Chew  v. 
State,  23  Te.\.  App.  230.  5  S.  W.  373. 
Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  an  eye- 
witness, if  living,  must  be  produced. 
Commonwealth  v.  Xorcross.  9  Mass. 
492,  493 ;  Wood  V.  State,  48  Ga.  192, 
15  -Am.  664;  P.uchanan  v.  State,  55 
-Ma.  154;  Elliott  I'.videncc.  §  2801. 

°  State  V.  lloflgskins,  19  Mo.  155. 
157.  3^>  Am.  Dec.  742n. 

"People  V.  Imcs,  no  Mich.  250,  M 
X.  W.  157:  Ham's  Case.  11  Me.  391, 
396;   State  V.   Ilod^skins,   19  .Me.    155, 


157.  36  Am.  Dec.  742n ;  State  v. 
Libby,  44  Me.  469,  69  Am.  Dec.  115; 
State  V.  Medbury,  8  R.  I.  543;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Holt,  121  Mass.  61 ; 
State  V.  Still,  68  S.  Car.  37,  46  S.  E. 
524.  102  Am.  St.  657;  State  v.  Moore 
(Utah,  1909),  105  Fac.  293.  A  photo- 
graph of  the  defendant,  with  an  in- 
dorsement in  his  handwriting  "from 
your  dear  husband,"  has  been  received 
as  an  admission.  State  v.  Rehrman, 
114  X.  Car.  797,  19  S.  E.  220,  25  L. 
R.  A.  44911.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2802. 

"Banks  v.  State.  96  Ala.  78.  ri  .So. 
404.  The  liurden  to  show  this  is 
upon  the  defendant.  People  v. 
Stokes,  71  Cal.  263.  12  Pac.  71  ; 
State  V.  Weatherby.  43  Me.  258.  263, 
69  .\m.  Dec.  59.  The  intermarriage 
(if  the  parties  to  tlu'  adultery  will 
not  be  i)resume<I.  If  they  are  jointly 
indicted   the  burden   of  proving   their 


§  384 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


662 


§  384.  Lascivious  cohabitation  or  living  in  unlawful  cohabitation. 
— It  must  appear  that  the  parties  lived  together  openly  and 
notoriously  as  though  husband  and  wife.  The  crime  of  living  in 
adultery  must  of  necessity  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence. 
The  mere  fact  that  the  parties  lived  together  in  one  house  or 
were  guilty  of  a  single  act,  or  even  of  several  acts,  of  adultery,-' 
is  not  enough.""  They  must  live  together,  if  only  for  a  short 
time,  as  for  a  single  day,-"^  as  though  the  marriage  relation  ex- 
isted, and  the  evidence  must  be  such  that  a  continuance  in  adultery 
may  be  inferred.^"  There  need  not  be  direct  proof  of  even  a  single 
act  of  adultery.  The  crime  is  sufficiently  proved  by  showing  cir- 
cumstances which  will  raise  the  presumption  of  an  unlawful  inti- 
macy, and  the  continuance  of  sexual  and  adulterous  intercourse.^' 
Thus  it  may  be  shown  that  the  defendant  and  the  paramour  were 
living  together  in  the  same  dwelling,  that  the  woman  cooked  the 
meals  and  performed  the  usual  household  duties  of  a  wife,  that 
accused  paid  the  living  expenses,^-  that  both  ate  at  the  same  table 
and  occupied  the  same  room,  that  their  clothing  was  mingled  in 


intermarriage  is  upon  them,  as  it  is 
a  fact  peculiarly  within  their  own 
knowledge.  State  v.  McDuffie,  107 
X.  Car.  885,  12  S.  E.  83;  State  v. 
Pope,  109  N.  Car.  849,  13  S.  E.  700. 
As  it  is  the  sexual  intercourse  rather 
than  the  intent  or  knowledge  with 
which  it  is  accompanied  that  consti- 
tutes the  crime,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  prove  that  the  accused  did  or  did 
not  know  that  the  other  party  was 
married.  Fox  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App. 
329,  30  Am.  144.  Invalid  divorce  no 
defense,  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2805. 

^  State  V.  Cassida,  67  Kan.  171,  72 
Pac.  522. 

^  As  master  and  servant  not  suf- 
ficient. Boswell  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr. 
47,  85  S.  W.  1076,  122  Am.  St.  731. 

^a  Alpine  v.  State,  117  Ala.  93,  23 
So.  130  (intending  to  continue  the 
relation). 

^  State  V.  Chandler,  132  Mo.  155,  33 
S.  W.  797;  State  V.  Chandler,  96 
Ind.  591,  593;  Wright  v.  State,  108 
Ala.  60,  18  So.  941 ;  State  v.  Miller, 


42  W.  Va.  215,  24  S.  E.  882;  Schou- 
del  V.  State,  57  N.  J.  L.  209,  30  Atl. 
598;  State  V.  Cassida,  67  Kan.  171, 
72  Pac.  522;  Collins  v.  State,  46  Tex. 
Cr.  550,  80  S.  W.  372.  See  Shaw  v. 
State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  379,  91  S.  W. 
1087;  State  v.  Poyner  (Wash.,  1910), 
107  Pac.  181.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2795. 

^  Brown  v.  State,  108  Ala.  18,  18 
So.  8ti;  Searls  v.  People,  13  111.  597; 
Richardson  v.  State,  37  Tex.  346; 
Pruner  v.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  115, 
10  Va.  L.  J.  520;  Cranberry  v.  State, 
61  Miss.  440;  State  v.  Chandler,  96 
Ind.  591,  593;  Jackson  v.  State,  it6 
Ind.  464,  465,  19  N.  E.  330;  People 
V.  Gates,  46  Cal.  52;  Van  Dolsen  v. 
State,  I  Ind.  App.  108,  no;  Bird  v. 
State,  27  Tex.  App.  63S,  n  S.  W. 
641,  II  Am.  St.  214;  Kahn  v.  State 
(Tex.,  1897),  38  S.  W.  989;  Counts 
V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  329,  94  S.  W. 
220. 

''Hill  V.  State,  137  Ala.  66,  34  So. 
406. 


663 


SEXL'AL    CRIMES. 


§    385 


the  wardrobe,  that  there  was  but  one  bed  in  the  house,  and  that 
each  spoke  of  the  other  as  though  the  marriage  relation  existed 
between  them. 

§  385.  Seduction  defined. — Seduction  may  be  defined  as  the  per- 
suading or  inducing  a  woman  of  previous  chaste  character  to 
depart  from  the  path  of  virtue  by  an}-  species  of  arts,  persuasions 
or  wiles  which  are  calculated  to  have  and  do  have  that  effect,  and 
which-  result  in  her  ultimately  submitting  to  the  sexual  embrace 
of  the  accused. ^^ 

§  386.  The  sexual  intercourse — Relevancy  of  evidence. — The  sex- 
ual intercourse  must  be  proved,  and,  if  it  is  proved,  the  accused 
may  be  convicted  of  adultery,  though  a  promise  be  not  proved.^* 
Any  evidence  admissible  to  prove  adultery  may  be  received.  The 
time  the  parties  were  together,  the  particular  places  they  visited, 
and  their  opportunities  to  indulge  in  intercourse  without  detec- 
tion are  all  relevant. ^^  The  record  of  a  conviction  of  bastardy 
secured  by  the  prosecutrix  against  the  defendant  is  not  admissible 
on  his  subsequent  trial  for  seduction.  It  is  in  no  way  res  adjitdi- 
cata  as  to  any  issue  involved. ^^    But  proof  of  the  birth  of  a  child 


^  People  V.  Gibbs,  70  Mich.  425, 
430,  38  N.  W.  257,  260;  People  v.  De 
Fore,  64  Mich.  693,  699,  31  X.  W. 
585,  8  Am.  St.  86311.  "Where  con- 
sent is  given,  pending  a  virtuous  en- 
gagement, in  consequence  of  a  repeti- 
tion of  a  promise  to  marry  already 
made  and  accepted,  the  woman  yield- 
ing in  reliance  on  the  plighted  faith 
of  her  lover,  and  he  intending  that 
she  shall  trust  and  be  deceived,  the 
case  is  one  of  seduction."  Wilson 
V.  State,  58  Ga.  328,  331. 

'*  Dinkey  v.  Commonwealth,  17  Pa. 
St.  126,  129,  55  .'Xm.  Dec.  542;  Nich- 
olson V.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa.  St. 
.390,  392;  Hopper  V.  State,  54  Ga. 
389:  Disharoon  v.  State,  95  Ga.  351, 
22  S.  E.  698. 

"^  Bailey  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  540, 
38  S.  W.  185;  ante,  §  381.    Res  gestce 


in  prosecution  for  seduction,  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  3149;  circumstantial  evi- 
dence in  prosecution  for  seduction, 
§  3153;  admission,  §  3150;  burden  of 
proof,  §  3142;  question  of  law  and 
fact,  §  3144. 

^  State  V.  Wenz,  41  Minn.  196,  197, 
42  N.  W.  933.  It  is  not  proper  to 
permit  the  prosecution  to  exhibit  a 
very  young  infant  to  the  jury,  as  di- 
rectly relevant  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the 
accused,  charged  with  either  seduction 
or  rape,  or  merely  to  corroborate  the 
prosecutrix,  because  of  a  supposed 
resemblance  between  the  child  and 
accused.  State  v.  Dan  forth,  48  Iowa 
43,  30  Am.  387.  See  also,  Hanawalt 
V.  State,  64  Wis.  84,  24  N.  W.  489. 
54  Am.  588;  Risk  v.  State,  19  Ind. 
152:  Reitz  V.  State,  33  Ind.  187; 
Barnes  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  320,  39 


^  3^7 


CRIMINAL    EMDKXCE. 


664 


to  the  prosecutrix  is  some  exidcncc  and  may  be  shown  by  the  evi- 
dence of  the  prosecutrix  to  corroborate  her  testimony.^' 

.^  387.  Evidence  to  prove  the  promise. — Tlie  sexual  intercourse  is 
an  essential  element  of  the  seduction,  and  must  always  be  proved 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  But  mere  illicit  sexual  intercourse 
alone  does  not  constitute  seduction."''^  It  must  appear  that  it  was 
procured  by  some  artifice,  deception  or  promise,  usually  an  un- 
conditional promise  of  marriage,  and  that  it  was  solely  because 
of  this  promise  that  the  female  was  induced  to  surrender  her 
\irtue.""'^    What  cxidence  will  justify  the  jury  in  finding  that  the 


S.  W.  684.  But  in  State  v.  Horton, 
100  X.  Car.  443,  449,  6  S.  E.  238,  6 
Am.  St.  613,  it  was  held  that  a  child 
might  be  exhiliited  to  the  jury  to 
prove  the  sexual  intercourse.  The 
exact  date  of  the  intercourse  is  im- 
material. State  V.  Moore,  78  Iowa 
494,  43  N.  W.  273;  State  v.  AlcClin- 
tic,  7S  Iowa  663,  665,  35  X.  W.  696; 
State  V.  Deitrick,  51  Iowa  467,  472,  i 
X.  W.  732. 

^  State  V.  Xugent,  134  Iowa  2^~, 
III  N.  W.  927. 

^  People  V.  Gumacr,  4  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  412,  39  X.  Y.  S.  326. 

^  State  V.  Knutson,  91  Iowa  549, 
60  X.  W.  129;  State  V.  Lingle,  128 
^lo.  528,  31  S.  W.  20;  State  v. 
Crowell,  116  X.  Car.  1052,  21  S.  E. 
502;  Smith  V.  State,  107  Ala.  139,  18 
So.  306;  Anderson  v.  State,  104  Ala. 
83,  16  So.  108;  Powell  V.  State 
(Miss.,  1896),  20  So.  4;  State  v. 
Sharp,  132  Mo.  165,  33  S.  W.  795; 
Barnes  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  320,  39 
S.  W.  684;  People  V.  De  Fore,  64 
Mich.  693,  31  X.  W.  585,  8  Am.  St. 
863n ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa 
268,  270,  19  X.  W.  202;  State  V. 
Hemm,  82  Iowa  609,  616,  48  X.  W. 
971;  People  V.  Clark,  33  Mich.  112; 
State  V.  Heatherton,  60  Iowa  175,  14 
X.  W.  230;  People  V.  Kane,  14  Abb. 


Pr.  (X.  Y.)  15;  Carnc.v  v.  State,  79 
Ala.  14;  Phillips  v.  State,  108  Ind. 
406,  9  X.  E.  345;  Bowers  v.  State,  29 
Ohio  St.  542,  546;  Spenrath  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.,  1898),  48  S.  W.  192;  Wal- 
ton V.  State,  71  Ark.  398,  75  S.  W. 
I ;  State  v.  Sortviet,  100  Minn.  12, 
no  X.  W.  100;  Xeary  v.  People,  115 
111.  App.  157;  Simmons  v.  State,  54 
Tex.  Cr.  619,  T14  S.  W.  841:  State 
V.  Attcrbury,  59  Kan.  237.  52  Pac. 
451 ;  Xolan  v.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  436, 
88  S.  W.  242;  Howe  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  174,  102  S.  W.  409.  The  promise 
of  marriage  must,  according  to  the 
majority  of  the  cases,  be  an  uncon- 
ditional promise,  and  must  be  made 
under  such  circumstances  that  the 
one  to  whom  it  was  made  might 
reasonably  rely  on  it.  Russell  v. 
State,  77  Xeb.  519,  no  X.  W.  380. 
To  establish  the  charge  of  seduction 
it  must  be  made  to  appear  that  the 
intercourse  was  accomplished  by 
some  artifice.  Something  more  than 
an  appeal  to  lust  or  passion  must  be 
proved.  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa 
268,  19  X.  W.  202;  Powell  V.  State 
(Miss.,  1896),  20  So.  4.  See  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  3148.  Circumstantial  evi- 
dence to  prove  seduction,  see  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  3151 ;  presumptions  in 
prosecution     for     seduction,     §  3143. 


665  SEXUAL    CRIMES.  §    388 

intercourse  was  procured  by  a  promise  depends  on  the  circum- 
stances of  each  case.^"  The  evidence  to  proxe  the  making  of  a 
promise  or  of  the  employment  of  an  artifice  which  was  the  in- 
chicement  for  the  sexual  intercourse  must  necessarily  take  a  wide 
range. ^^ 

The  promise  to  marry  need  not  be  proved  to  have  been  made  in 
any  particular  form  of  words.  It  is  enough  if  language  has  been 
used  implying  such  a  promise,  intended  to  convey  that  meaning, 
and  it  is  so  understood  by  the  woman.*-  An  express  promise  to 
marry  need  not  be  proved  for  a  conviction  will  be  sustained,  if 
from  all  the  evidence  the  jury  can  fairly  infer  that  the  seduction 
was  accomplished  b}^  reason  of  the  promise,  gixing  the  accused  the 
benefit  of  any  reasonable  doubt. ■*^  The  character  and  intelli- 
gence of  the  woman  must  be  considered.  \\'hat  might  be  insuf- 
ficient to  overcome  or  deceive  the  mind  of  a  mature  and  edu- 
cated woman  might  succeed  in  the  case  of  a  young  and  ignorant 
girl.''*  The  prosecuting  witness  may  be  permitted  to  testify  that 
she  submitted  her  person  to  the  embraces  of  the  accused  because 
of  his  promise  to  marry  her.'*^ 

^  388.  Relevancy  of  the  previous  conduct  of  the  parties. — The 
conduct  of  the  parties  prior  to  the  alleged  seduction,  their  rela- 
tions toward  one  another,  the  fact  that  the  accused  was  accus- 
tomed to  visit  the  woman  as  her  lover,  was  welcomed  by  her 
mother  at  her  house  and  was  treated  well,*"  or  met  her  clan- 
Testimony  of  accomplice  in  prosecu-  406,  9  N.  E.  345 ;  Woodward  v.  State, 
tion  for  seduction,  see  98  Am.  St.  5  Ga.  App.  447,  63  S.  E.  573;  State 
179,  note.  Character  of  victim  of  v.  Stolley,  121  Iowa  iii,  96  N.  W. 
crime,  see  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  727,  707. 
note.  *-  State  v.  Brinkhaus,  34  Minn.  285, 

'"People  V.   Wallace,   109  Cal.  611,     286,  25  N.  W.  642. 
42    Pac.    159,   and  cases   in  last   note.         '"State  v.  Ring,  142  N.  Car.  596,  55 
Knight   V.  State,    147  Ala.  93,  41    So.     S.  E.  194,  115  Am.  St.  759. 
S50.  r  19  Am.  St.  58.    It  is  not  material         "  State  v.  EitzRcrald,  63  Iowa  26S, 
that  the  promise  was  made  previous     270,  19  N.  W.  202. 
to  the  time  of  the  seduction.     State        **  State    v.    Rcnnctt,    137    Iowa   427, 
V.  Raynor,  145  N.  Car.  472,  59  S.  E.     no  X.  W.   150;  State  v.  Raynor,  145 
344-  ^'-   Car.  472,  59  S.    E.   344;    State  v. 

"  State  V.  Sharp,  132  Mo.  165,  33  Whitley,  141  X.  Car.  S2T;.  53  S.  E. 
S.  W.  795;   People  V.  Kane,   14  Abb.     820. 

Pr.  ex.  'y.)  15;  Carney  v.  State,  79  *"  Howe  v.  Slate.  51  Te.\.  Cr.  174. 
Ala.    14;    Phillips   v.   State,    108   Ind.     102  S.  W.  409. 


§    388  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  666 

(leslinely,  and  kept  company  with  her;'"  that  he  expressed  a  pref- 
erence for  her  society,  and  said  he  intended  to  have  sexual  inter- 
course with  her,*"*  or  boasted  that  he  had  enjoyed  sexual  favors 
at  her  hands,""'  or  that  he  intended  to  marry  her,"'"  that  she  ex- 
pected he  would  marry  her  and  that  the  day  had  been  fixed, ''^  are 
always  relevant." 

So,  to  corroborate  the  woman's  evidence,  it  may  be  shown  that 
the  demeanor  of  the  parties  was  that  of  an  engaged  couple  and 
that  it  was  admitted  by  them,  and  currently  reported  among 
their  friends  and  acquaintances  that  they  were  engaged.  The 
declarations  of  the  accused  to  the  effect  that  he  loved  the  woman 
and  wanted  or  intended  to  marry  her  are  always  relevant  to  cor- 
roborate her  testimony."'"  The  fact  that  the  woman  had  made 
preparations  for  the  celebration  of  the  marriage  is  relevant.  On 
the  other  hand  evidence  of  i)rior  acts  of  intercourse  is  admissible 
to  sliow  that  the  act  charged  was  not  under  a  promise  of  mar- 
riage.^'* 

The  conduct  and  relations  of  tlie  parties  after,  as  well  as  before, 
the  date  of  the  alleged  seduction,  may  be  shown.  Such  evidence 
is  relevant  to  sliow  tliat  consent  was  obtained  by  promises  and  in- 
ducements and  wliat  they  consisted  of.^"'    So  a  promise  of  mar- 

"  State  V.   McCIintic,   72)   Iowa  663,  to  complaints  by  the  prosecuting  wit- 

665,  35  N.  W.  696 ;  Faulkner  v.  State,  ness  to  her  mother.     State  v.  Whit- 

53  Tex.  Cr.  258,  109  S.  W.  199.  ley,  141  N.  Car.  823,  53  S.  E.  820. 

**  Bailey  v.  State   (Tex.),  30  S.  W.  ""  Weaver  v.   State,   142  Ala.  2,3^  39 

669.  So.  341. 

"  State  V.  Hill,  91  Mo.  423,  4  S.  W.  "  Bowers  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  542, 

121.  546;  State  V.  Brassfield,  81   Mo.   151, 

■■'"Munkers  v.  State,  87  Ala.  94,  97,  159,  51  Am.  234. 

6  So.  357.  "State  v.  Curran,  51   Iowa  112,  49 

"Faulkner    v.    State,    53    Tex.    Cr.  X.    W.     1006;     People    v.    Gibbs,    70 

258,  109  S.  W.  199.  Mich.  425,  38  N.  W.  257,  260;  People 

"The  declarations  of  the  prosecut-  v.  Clark,  33  Mich.  112,  114;  Bracken 

ing  witness  are  not  receivable  to  in-  v.   State,  iii   Ala.  68,  20  So.  636,  56 

criminate   the   defendant   unless   they  Am.    St.    23.      The    promise    may   be 

are  a  part  of  the  res  f/cstcr  or  were  very  properly  proved  by  the  written 

made  in   his   presence   and  were   not  admission     of     the     defendant     con- 

contradicted  by  him.     State  v.  Sibley,  tained  in  a  letter  sent  by  him  to  the 

131  Mo.  519,  3S  S.  W.   167;   State  v.  prosecutrix,  expressly  mentioning  the 

Bennett,    137    Iowa    427,    no    N.    W.  engagement    as    existing.      Webb    v. 

150;  Fine  v.   State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  290,  State  (Miss.,  1897),  21  So.  I33- 
77  S.   W.  806.     Compare,  contra,  as 


66/  SEXUAL    CRIMES.  §    389 

riage  made  subsequently  to  the  alleged  crime  but  at  a  period  when 
tlie  immoral  relations  between  the  parties  continued  is  relevant, 
and  may  be  considered  as  a  circumstance  to  prove  the  prior 
promise/^ 

^  389.  The  examination,  credibility  and  corroboration  of  the  prose- 
cutrix.— From  the  necessity  of  the  case,  the  making  of  the  prom- 
ise, and  the  sexual  intercourse  are  usually  provable  by  the  direct 
evidence  of  the  female  only.  Her  situation  as  a  witness  is  pecul- 
iar. The  novelty  and  embarrassment  of  her  position,  the  presence 
around  her  of  a  gaping  and  curious  crowd,  the  confronting  with 
court  and  jury,  the  terror  produced  by  the  examination  and  cross- 
examination,  the  memory  of  her  shame  ever  before  her,  all  com- 
bine to  depress  and  confuse  her.  If  she  is  a  modest  woman  her 
answers  are  likely  to  be  in  monosyllables  and  to  present  but  a 
feeble  account  of  the  manner  of  her  seduction.  Much  must  of 
necessity  be  left  to  the  jurors  to  gather  from  her  appearance  and 
demeanor  as  well  as  from  her  language.  In  weighing  her  testi- 
mony the  jurors  must  consider  her  age  and  situation,  and  what 
they  would  expect  of  their  own  daughters  if  similarly  placed. 
How  many  or  what  kind  of  seductive  arts  are  necessary  to  estab- 
lish the  crime  cannot  be  exactly  defined.  Every  case  must  depend 
on  its  own  circumstances,  considering  the  condition  in  life,  ad- 
vantages, age  and  intelligence  of  the  parties. ^^ 

^  State  V.  Waterman,  75  Kan.  253,  and  surrender  her  virtue,  we  must  in- 

88  Pac.  1074.  elude  all  acts,  artifices,  promises,  en- 

"  State  V.  Higdon,  32  Iowa  262,  ticements  and  inducements  calculated 
264;  State  V.  Fitzgerald,  63  Iowa  268,  to  accomplish  this  object.  All  tests 
19  X.  W.  202.  The  prosecutrix  may  having  any  tendency  to  establish  any 
be  asked  if  she  authorized  any  one  to  of  these  should  be  admitted  to  prove 
settle  the  matter  for  her  and  to  take  the  criminal  conduct.  The  age,  ex- 
money  to  dismiss  it.  State  v.  Eckler,  pcrience,  artfulness  and  blandish- 
106  Mo.  585,  17  S.  W.  814.  27  Am.  mcnts  of  the  offender,  and  the  youth- 
St.  372.  Evidence  to  show  a  con-  fulness,  innocence,  guilelcssness  and 
spiracy  between  the  complainant  and  confiding  nature  of  the  injured  party, 
her  father  and  mother  to  inveigle  the  will  be  found  to  enter  largely  into 
defendant  into  a  marriage,  and,  fail-  the  causes  of  the-  act.  The  largest 
ing  this,  to  prosecute  him,  has  been  latitude,  consistent  with  safety, 
received.  People  v.  Clark,  33  Mich,  should  be  allowed  in  developing  the 
r[2,  119.  In  considering  the  means  evidence  in  the  case.  People  v.  Ciibbs. 
iiscfi    to   induce    the   woman    to    yield  70  Mich.  425,  428,  429,  38  N.  \V.  257. 


^  390 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


668 


§  390.  Character  of  corroborative  evidence  required. — \\'here  a 
statute  requires  that  the  evidence  of  the  prosecuting  witness  shall 
be  corroborated,  it  has  been  held  sufficient  if  she  was  corroborated 
as  to  some  material  fact  or  part  of  the  case,  so  that  the  jury  were 
satisfied  that  her  whole  evidence  was  credible.""^  Some  statutes 
require  corroboration  only  as  regards  the  promise  of  marriage,^" 
while  elsewhere  the  corroboration  must  extend  to  every  material 
fact,  including  the  promise  to  marry,  the  seductive  arts  or  decep- 
tion used,  the  chastity  of  tlie  woman,  the  intercourse,  and  that  the 
last  was  the  result  of  the  promise.*'**  The  circumstances  relied  on 
as  corroboration  of  the  evidence  offered  to  i)rove  the  promise  of 
marriage  must  be  so  convincing  as  to  equal  the  testimony  of 
a  disinterested  witness.  It  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  corrobo- 
rative evidence  should  come  from  some  other  witness  than  the 
woman. ^'^  On  the  other  hand  some  cases  hold  that  the  corrobora- 
tion need  not  be  direct  or  positive,  or  sufficient  in  itself  to  con- 
vict."- It  may  consist  of  proof  of  circumstances  which  customarily 


'*  Boyce  v.  People,  55  X.  Y.  644, 
647;  People  V.  Orr,  92  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
199,  36  N.  Y.  S.  398;  Wilson  v.  State, 
"/S  Ala.  527,  534;  Tedford  v.  United 
States,  7  Ind.  Terr.  254,  104  S.  W. 
608.  See,  as  to  corroboration  in  se- 
duction under  California  Penal  Code, 
§  1 108,  People  V.  Wade,  118  Cal.  672, 
50  Pac.  841.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3152. 

'"'  State  V.  Hill,  91  Mo.  423,  4  S.  W. 
121 ;  State  v.  Reeves,  97  Mo.  668,  673, 
ID  S.  W.  841,  10  Am.  St.  349;  Spen- 
rath  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1898),  48  S. 
W.  192. 

'"La  Rosae  v.  State,  132  Ind.  219, 
31  X.  E.  798;  State  v.  Bauerkemper, 
95  Iowa  562,  64  X.  W.  609;  State 
V.  Timmens,  4  Minn.  325,  332 ;  An- 
dre V.  State,  5  Iowa  389,  398,  68  Am. 
Dec.  7o8n ;  State  v.  Painter,  50  Iowa 
317;  Zabriskie  v.  State,  43  X.  J.  L. 
640,  647,  39  Am.  610;  Woolley  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  214,  96  S.  W.  27 ; 
Wisdom  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  215,  75 


S.  W.  22\  Burnett  v.  State,  76  Ark. 
295,  88  S.  W.  956;  Hart  v.  State, 
117  Ala.  183,  23  So.  43. 

'"a  Russell  v.  State,  -/-  Xeb.  519,  no 
X.  W.  380. 

"^  State  V.  Dolan,  132  Iowa  196,  109 
X.  W.  609:  State  V.  Sortviet,  100 
Minn.  12,  no  X.  W.  100;  People  v. 
Tibbs,  143  Cal.  100,  76  Pac.  904; 
State  V.  Hill,  91  Mo.  423,  426,  4  S. 
W.  121 :  ]\IcCullar  v.  State,  36  Tex. 
Cr.  213,  36  S.  W.  58s;  61  Am.  St. 
847;  State  V.  Reeves,  97  Mo.  668,  10 
S.  W.  841 ;  State  v.  McCaskey,  104 
Mo.  644,  16  S.  W.  511,  512;  Mills 
V.  Commonwealth,  93  Va.  815,  22  S. 
E.  863 ;  Cooper  v.  State,  90  Ala.  641, 
642,  8  So.  821  ;  Munkers  v.  State,  87 
Ala.  94,  97,  6  So.  357;  Barnard  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.),  76  S.  W.  475- 

"Wright  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  354, 
20  S.  W.  756,  2>7  Am.  St.  822;  State 
V.  Waterman,  75  Kan.  253,  88  Pac. 
1074;  Lasatcr  v.  State,  77  Ark.  468, 
94  S.  W.  59. 


669  SEXUAL    CRIMES.  §    39I 

accompany  a  marriage  engagement,  such  as  lover-like  attentions, 
the  receipt  of  love  letters  and  of  visits  from  the  defendant,  going 
with  him  to  church  and  to  places  of  amusement,  consultations 
with  the  woman's  parents  and  preparations  for  marriage,  to- 
gether with  the  fact  that  she  was  at  that  time  not  receiving  at- 
tentions from  any  other  man.*'^  The  proof  of  the  admission  by  the 
accused  that  he  had  promised  to  marry  the  prosecuting  witness, 
and  that  he  had  subsequently  had  sexual  intercourse  with  her  is 
sufficient  corroboration  alone  without  other  circumstances  to  sus- 
tain a  verdict  of  guilty  when  the  statute  requires  corroboration/'* 
\Miether  the  female  can  testify  that  she  did  or  did  not  voluntarily 
submit  to  intercourse  with  the  defendant,  or  state  the  reason  that 
she  yielded,  has  been  differently  decided.  It  has  been  held  that  it 
is  exclusively  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  intercourse 
\\-as  brought  about  by  the  arts  or  promises  of  the  man,  or  by  the 
ungovernable  passions  of  the  w^oman.*^^ 

;<  391.  The  marriage  of  the  accused  to  the  seduced  female. — An 
offer  to  marry  the  female  seduced  does  not  in  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute exempt  the  accused  from  prosecution  or  punishment.*^®  By 
statute  in  many  of  the  states  if  the  accused  makes  such  an  offer 
in  open  court  and  the  prosecutrix  declines  to  accept  it,  the  charge 
must  be  dismissed.*^'  The  state  cannot  be  permitted  to  introduce 
evidence  to  show  the  bad  faith  of  the  defendant  in  making  the 

"  State  V.   Hill,  91   Mo.  423,  426,  4  "^  Wilson  v.  State,  73  Ala.  527,  532. 

S.  W.  121;  State  V.  Brassfield,  81  Mo.  Contra,  Ferguson  v.   State,   71   Miss. 

151,    156,   160,  51   Am.   234;   State  v.  805,  15  So.  66,  42  Am.  St.  492. 

Timmens,  4  Minn.  325,  333;  State  v.  *' State    v.    Brandenburg,    118    Mo. 

Crawford,  34  Iowa  40;  State  v.  Fitz-  t8i,   186,  23  S.  W.   1080,  40  Am.   St. 

gerald,  63  Iowa   268,  272,    19   N.   W.  362;  State  v.  O'Keefe,   141   Mo.  271, 

202;    State    V.    Lauderbeck,    96    Iowa  42  S.  W.  725;  State  v.  Bauerkemper, 

258,   65   X.    W.    158;    State  V.   Eisen-  95  Iowa  562,  64  N.  W.  609;  Williams 

hour,    132   Mo.    140,   33    S.    W.    785;  v.  State,  92  Miss.  70,  45  So.  146. 

State  V.  Ayers,  8  S.   Dak.  517,  67  N.  "'Commonwealth  v.  Wright   (Ky.), 

W.  611;  Bailey  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  27  S.  W.  815;  State  v.  Otis,  135  Ind. 

540.  38  S.  W.  185;  State  V.  Waterman,  267,  270,  34  N.   E.  954,  21   L.   R.  A. 

75  Kan.  253,  88  Pac.  1074:  Lasater  v.  733;   People  v.  Gould,  70  Mich.  240, 

State,    77    Ark.    468,    94    S.    W.    59;  245,  38  N.  W.  232,  14  Am.  St.  493n ; 

Cooper   V.    State,  86  Ark.  30,   109  S.  Wright  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  354.  20 

W.  1023.  S.  W.  756,  37  Am.  St.  822;  People  v. 

■■■*  State  V.  Raynor,  145  X.  Car.  472,  Frost  (N.  Y.,  1910),  91  N,  E.  376. 
59    S.    E.    344;    Wilhitc    V.    State,   84 
Ark.  67,  104  S.  W.  531. 


392 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


670 


offer.  It  cannot  be  j^rovcd  that  lie  had  previously  declared  that  he 
would  never  live  with  her,  or  that  he  would  leave  her  at  the  first 
opportunity. '^•- 

The  state  must  prove  that  the  woman  was  unmarried."''  'fhi> 
will  not  be  presumed.  She  may,  and  perhaps  should,  testify  to  the 
facts,  or.  if  she  is  silent,  it  may  be  inferred  from  her  extreme 
youth,  the  fact  that  she  resided  in  her  father's  house  under  her 
maiden  name  and  received  the  attentions  of  the  accused  and  of 
other  men,  and  the  surrounding  circumstances  and  relations  of 
the  parties,'"  all  of  which  are  relevant. 

§  392.  The  chastity  of  the  female — What  constitutes  chastity  and 
how  it  may  be  proved. — Seduction  is  usually  a  statutory  crime.  It 
is  often  provided  by  statute  that  the  female  must  have  been  chaste 
or  virtuous,  or  of  chaste  character  or  repute  previous  to  the  inter- 
course with  the  accused.'"^  It  is  for  the  court  to  construe  the 
meaning  of  these  words  in  a  statute.'^  .\s  a  matter  of  law,  every 
woman  who  has  never  been  married  and  who  is  a  virgin  is  chaste. 
The  test  is  usually  illicit  sexual  intercourse.'-  Whether  the  fe- 
male is  a  virgin  is  always  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.  The 
evidence  upon  this  question  need  not  be  direct.    Positive  evidence 


■^^  People  V.  Gould,  70  Mich.  240, 
245,  38  N.  W.  232,  14  Am.  St.  493n; 
People  V.  Samonset,  97  Cal.  448,  32 
Pac.  520;  Smith  v.  State,  108  Ala.  i, 
19  So.  306,  54  Am.  St.  140.  The 
offer  of  marriage  ought  to  be  made 
to  the  female  in  person  and  kept 
open  until  the  time  of  the  trial.  La- 
sater  v.  State,  TJ  Ark.  468,  94  S. 
W.  59- 

""State  V.  Wheeler,  108  Mo.  658, 
18  S.  W.  924,  927;  People  V.  Krusick, 
93  Cal.  74,  28  Pac.  794;  Mesa  v. 
State,  17  Tex.  App.  395;  State  v. 
Bryan,  34  Kan.  63,  8  Pac.  260. 

'"Lewis  V.  People,  zi  Mich.  518, 
520;  Bailey  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  540, 
38  S.  W.  185;  State  V.  Waterman,  75 
Kan.  253,  88  Pac.  1074. 

'"a  Walton  V.  State,  71  Ark.  398,  75 
S.  W.  I. 


'^  Where  the  statute  merely  require 
that  the  female  shall  be  of  "good  re 
pute,"  or  "of  chaste  character,"  some 
of  the  cases  hold  that  proof  of  actual 
physical  chastity  is  not  necessary. 
State  V.  Sharp,  132  Mo.  165,  Z2>  S.  W. 
795 ;  Kerr  v.  United  States,  7  In<]. 
T.  486,  104  S.  W.  809;  Woodard  v. 
State,  5  Ga.  App.  447,  63  S.  E.  57.^, 
in  which  it  was  said  the  test  of  vir 
tue  within  the  seduction  statute  i- 
whether  the  female  had  ever  had  a' 
the  time  of  the  seduction  unlawful 
sexual  intercourse,  not  purity  of  mind 
or  heart,  but  actual  physical  purity  of 
person.  Contra,  Mills  v.  Common- 
wealth, 93  Va.  815,  22  S.  E.  863.  See 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3145. 

"  State  V.  Whitley,  141  N.  Car.  82.^, 
53  S.  E.  820. 


6/1 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


39-2 


of  an  act  of  sexual  intercourse  with  a  man  is  of  course  conclusive 
evidence  of  unchastity.'^  Physical  unchastity  may  also  be  inferred 
from  proof  of  indecent  familiarities  with  men,  or  indecent  lan- 
guage and  conduct,  and,  perhaps,  from  mere  indiscretion  and  im- 
proper associations.' *  All  the  previous  acts,  conduct  and  conversa- 
tions of  the  woman  are  received  to  prove  or  disprove  her  chastity, 
if  actual  physical  unchastity  is  not  proved.'^  And  where  actual 
chastity  of  the  female  is  admitted,  the  moral  and  mental  chastity 
of  the  female  may  be  relevant  to  enable  the  jury  to  determine 
whether  the  woman,  though  physically  chaste,  was  seduced,  or 
whether  the  intercourse  was  indulged  in  by  her  for  the  purpose  of 
gratifying  her  lascivious  desires.'^  The  facts  that  the  prosecutrix 
lived  with  her  parents,  relatives  or  guardians,'"  moved  in  the 
society  of  respectable  people,  and  was  reputed  to  be  chaste  ;"*  went 
to  church  and  to  social  gatherings,  are  always  relevant  to  prove 
her  actual  chastity.  To  prove  that  the  prosecutrix  was  unchaste  at 
the  time  of  her  alleged  seduction  her  previous  reputation  as  an 
unchaste  woman   is  admissible.     The  evidence  must  be   strictlv 


"  Simmons  v.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr. 
619.  114  S.  W.  841. 

"*  Wood  V.  State,  48  Ga.  192,  289, 
299,  15  Am.  664;  O'Neill  v.  State,  85 
Ga.  383,  408,  II  S.  E.  856;  State  v. 
Rell,  49  Iowa  440,  443;  State  v. 
Wheeler,  94  Mo.  252,  7  S.  W.  T03 ; 
Crozier  v.  State,  i  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.) 
453.  457;  Barnes  v.  State,  z-j  Tex.  Cr. 
320,  39  S.  W.  684;  Kenyon  v.  People, 
26  X.  Y.  203,  207,  84  .^m.  Dec.  177; 
People  V.  Brewer,  27  Mich.  134,  135; 
Powell  V.  State  (Miss.,  1896),  20  So. 
4;  People  V.  Nelson,  153  X.  Y.  90, 
46  X.  E.  1040,  60  Am.  St.  592;  Sim- 
mons V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  619,  114 
S.  W.  841;  State  V.  Whitley,  141  X. 
Car.  ^2T,,  53  S.  E.  820.  Compare 
State  V.  Hummer,  128  Iowa  505,  104 
X.  W.  722. 

".\nflrc  V.  State,  5  Iowa  389,  68 
Am.  Dec.  7o8n ;  People  v.  McArdlc, 
5  Park.  Cr.  CN.  Y.)  180,  184;  Nolan 
V.   State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  436.  88  S.   W. 


242;  Jeter  v.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  212, 
106  S.  W.  371.  Specific  instances  to 
prove  character  for  chastity,  see  14 
L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  727,  note. 

'"O'Neill  V.  State,  85  Ga.  383.  409, 
Ti  S.  E.  856;  Smith  v.  State,  108  Ala. 
I,  19  So.  306,  54  Am.  St.  140;  State 
V.  Aker  (Wash.,  1909),  103  Pac.  420. 
There  can  be  no  seduction,  though  the 
woman  be  a  virgin,  unless  she  has 
been  actually  seduced ;  on  that  ques- 
tion, her  moral  qualities,  as  well  as 
her  physical  chastity,  are  relevant. 

"  People  V.  Rodcrigas,  49  Cal.  9. 
The  head  of  a  family  of  which  the 
prosecuting  witness  was  a  member 
for  three  months  may  state  his  opin- 
ion as  to  her  previous  chaste  char- 
acter based  on  his  acquaintance  with 
her  and  on  what  he  has  seen  of  her 
conduct.  People  v.  Wade,  118  Cal. 
672,  50  Pac.  841. 

"Vandivcer,  In  re,  4  Cal.  .\pp.  650, 
88  Pac.  993,  under  Penal  Code.  S  268. 


^  392 


CRIMINAL    HVIDEN'CE. 


G']2 


coiitined  to  her  rcpulation  for  nioialily  in  sexual  relations.'-'  and 
must  also  be  limited  to  her  reputation  for  chastity  or  unchastitv 
before  the  seduction.^"  Derogatory  rumors  are  sometimes  re- 
ceived, though  a  witness  who  has  not  testified  on  his  direct  exam- 
ination to  the  reputation  for  chastity  of  the  prosecutrix  cannot 
be  cross-examined  as  to  derogatory  reports."*^  It  may  always  be 
shown  that  a  witness  had  never  heard  her  reputation  for  chastity 
called  in  question.''-  The  woman  may  testify  to  her  own  chastity,**^ 
and  may  be  cross-examined  as  to  specific  unchaste  acts  and  con- 
versations with  men  other  than  the  defendant,***  whose  names  are 
t;iven  or  whose  names  are  unknown.  She  may  refuse  to  answer 
wiiere  the  answer  would  incriminate  her.  Actual  unchastity,  \.  c, 
criminal  intimacy  and  lascivious  conduct  with  other  men  exist- 
ing after  the  date  of  the  alleged  seduction,  is  excluded  as  proof  of 
the  fact  that  prosecutrix  was  unchaste  by  the  probability  that  it 
resulted  from  it."*"' 

Where  the  evidence  shows  the  actual  physical  unchastity  of  the 
female  it  may  be  jiroved  that  she  had  reformed  and  was  leading 
a  chaste  life  at  the  date  of  the  seduction.'"^  A  presumption  of  re- 
form may  arise  where  a  reasonable  time  has  elapsed  since  the 


""  State  V.  Hummer,  128  Iowa  505, 
104  X.  W.  -22.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3T46. 

'-People  V.  Wade,  118  Cal.  672,  50 
Pac.  841. 

"  State  V.  Whitley,  141  X.  Car.  823, 
53  S.  E.  820. 

"Zabriskie  v.  State,  43  X.  J.  L. 
640,  644,  39  Am.  610;  State  v.  Bryan, 
34  Kan.  63,  '/2,  8  Pac.  260;  State  v. 
Deitrick,  51  Iowa  467,  469,  i  X.  W. 
732;  Xight  V.  State,  147  Ala.  93,  41 
So.  850,  119  Am.  St.  58.  Evidence 
of  reputation  for  chastity  must  refer 
to  a  time  subsequent  to  the  seduc- 
tion. People  V.  Brewer,  27  Mich. 
134.  135- 

^''Kenyon  v.  People,  26  X.  Y.  203, 
209,  84  Am.  Dec.  T77. 

"  State  V.  Sutherland,  30  Iowa  570. 


''Bracken  v.  State,  in  Ala.  68,  20 
So.  636,  56  Am.  St.  23 ;  State  v. 
Wells,  48  Iowa  671 ;  Slocum  v.  Peo- 
ple, 90  111.  274;  Mann  v.  State,  34 
Ga.  I ;  Boyce  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  644, 
646;  Russell  V.  State,  ^^  Neb.  519, 
no  X.  \y.  380;  State  v.  Atterbury, 
59  Kan.  237,  52  Pac.  451.  Contra. 
Xolan  V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  436.  88 
S.  W.  242. 

^  Kenyon  v.  People,  26  N.  Y.  203, 
84  Am.  Dec.  177;  Wilson  v.  State,  •/}, 
Ala.  527;  State  v.  Timmens,  4  Minn. 
325 ;  State  v.  Dunn,  53  Iowa  526,  5  X. 
W.  707;  People  V.  Clark,  n  Mich.  112; 
State  V.  Fogg,  206  ^lo.  696,  105  S. 
W.  618.  The  burden  is  on  the  prose- 
cution. State  V.  Bennett,  137  Iowa 
427,  no  X.  W.  150.  See  Elliott  Evi- 
dence. §  3147. 


67 


/o 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


§    393 


intercourse  but  when  it  was  frequently  repeated  at  short  intervals 
the  burden  of  proving  reformation  is  on  the  prosecutrix.®" 

§  393.  The  presumption  of  chastity. — Two  views  are  held  upon 
the  question  whether  any  presumption  of  law  exists  as  to  the 
chastity  of  the  female  in  a  trial  for  seduction.  Some  of  the  cases, 
basing  their  reasoning  upon  the  presumption  of  the  prisoner's 
innocence,  deny  the  existence  of  any  presumption  of  chastity  and 
require  the  state  to  produce  some  evidence  that  the  prosecutrix 
IS  chaste.^^^ 

Other  cases  hold  that  as  chastity  is  the  general  rule  in  modern 
society,  and  a  want  of  it  the  exception,  the  prosecutrix  starts  with 
a  presumption  of  chastity  in  her  favor.'*'* 


*' People  V.  Clark,  33  Mich.  112, 
117;  People  V.  ^lillspaugh,  11  Mich. 
278.  282.  Where  a  woman  previously 
unchaste  reforms  and  maintains  her 
personal  chastity  for  such  a  time  that 
the  jury  could  see  that  she  was  ac- 
tually chaste  at  the  time  of  the  al- 
leged seduction,  then  if  accused  ob- 
tained carnal  knowledge  of  her  per- 
son by  the  false  express  promise  of 
marriage  he  should  be  convicted,  and 
if  it  appeared  that  the  woman  at  the 
time  of  the  seduction  was  not  pos- 
sessed of  actual  personal  chastity  he 
should  be  acquitted.  Cooper  v.  State, 
86  Ark.  30,  109  S.  W.  1023.  Defenses 
in    seduction,    see    Elliott    Evidence, 

S  3153- 

"'  People  v.  Squires,  49  Mich.  487, 
4.S9,  13  X.  W.  828;  Zabriskie  v.  State, 
43  X.  J.  L.  640,  644,  39  Am.  610; 
State  v.  Wenz,  41  Minn.  196,  197,  42 
\.  W.  933;  People  v.  Wallace,  109 
Cal.  611,  42  Pac.  159;  West  v.  State, 
I  Wis.  209.  217,  218;  Commonwealth 
V.  Whittakcr,  131  Mass.  224,  225; 
Oliver  V.  Commonwealth,  loi  Pa.  St. 
215.  218,  47  Am.  704;  State  v.  Mc- 
Caskey,  104  Mo.  644,  16  S.  W.  511; 
Underbill  on  Ev.,  234 ;  Walton  v, 
43 — L'nderuill  Cri.m.  Ev. 


State,  71  Ark.  398,  75  S.  W.  i.  On 
a  trial  for  seduction,  the  previous 
want  of  chastity  of  the  prosecutrix 
is  defensive  matter,  and  accused  has 
the  burden  of  proving  it  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence,  and 
where  there  is  a  reasonable  doubt  of 
his  guilt  on  the  whole  case  he  is  en- 
titled to  the  benefit  of  it,  but  it  is  not 
proper  to  charge  that  the  jury  must 
be  convinced  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  the  previous  chastity  of  the 
prosecutrix  to  warrant  a  conviction. 
Wilhite  V.  State,  84  Ark.  67,   104  S. 

w.  531. 

""Tedford  v.  United  States,  7  Ind. 
Terr.  254,  104  S.  W.  608;  Woodard 
V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  447,  63  S.  E. 
573;  Weaver  v.  State,  142  Ala.  33,  39 
So.  341 ;  Kerr  v.  United  States,  7 
Ind.  Terr.  486,  104  S.  W.  809;  Nor- 
ton v.  State,  72  Miss.  128,  16  So.  264, 
18  So.  916,  48  Am.  St.  538:  State  v. 
Baucrkemper,  95  Iowa  562.  64  N.  W. 
609;  Mills  v.  Commonwealth,  93  Va. 
815,  22  S.  E.  863;  Crozicr  v.  People, 
I  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  453.  457;  Slocum 
v.  People.  90  111.  274,  281  ;  State  v. 
Higdon,  32  Iowa  262,  264 ;  Wilson 
V.  State,  73  Ala.  527,  533,  535;  Fcr- 


§  394 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


6/4 


§  394.  Defilement  of  female  ward  or  servant. — A  statute  which 
provides  punishment  for  any  guardian  of  a  female  under  the  age 
of  eighteen  years,  or  any  person  to  whose  care  or  protection  such 
female  shall  have  been  confided,  who  shall  defile  her  while  in  his 
care,  custody  or  employment  is  sustained  by  proof  tliat  a  person 
in  whose  family  the  female  w^as  employed  as  a  servant  had  defiled 
her  when  the  evidence  showed  that  he  had  promised  the  girl's 
father  to  w^atch  over  and  care  for  her."°  It  is  not  necessary  to 
prove  an  express  agreement  confiding  the  girl  to  the  defendant's 
care."^  The  character  of  the  woman  is  immaterial.  Hence  her 
acts  of  illicit  sexual  intercourse  w'ith  others  cannot  be  shown,°- 
but  the  continuation  of  the  intercourse  with  the  defendant  after 
the  termination  of  the  employment  is  always  relevant."^ 

§  395.  Incest  defined. — "Incest,  where  statutes  have  not  modi- 
fied its  meaning,  is  sexual  commerce,  either  habitual  or  in  a  single 


guson  V.  State,  71  Miss.  805,  S08,  15 
So.  66,  42  Am.  St.  492.  "The  question 
is  not  'Are  the  majority  of  women 
chaste?'  but  rather  was  this  woman 
chaste  who  admits  she  consented  to 
illicit  intercourse  and  who  carries 
with  her  the  bastard  which  is  the 
result  and  evidence  of  her  shame? 
The  presumption  of  chastity  in  such 
a  case  not  only  encounters  the  pre- 
sumption of  the  prisoner's  innocence, 
but,  as  it  must  be  universally  appli- 
cable, raises  the  future  presumption 
that  all  women  who  bear  illegitimate 
children,  and  seek  the  punishment  of 
their  seducers,  were  absolutely  chaste 
and  pure  before  their  seduction.  This 
is  manifestly  untrue  and  absurd." 
Zabriskie  v.  State,  43  N.  J.  L.  640, 
644,  39  Am.  610;  State  v.  IMcClintic, 
73  Iowa  663,  667,  35  N.  W.  696 ;  State 
V.  Hemm,  82  Iowa  609,  612,  48  N.  W. 
971 ;  People  v.  Brewer,  27  Mich.  134, 
138;  State  V.  Gates,  27  Minn.  52,  6 
N.  W.  404;  Carpenter  v.  People,  8 
Barb.  (\.  Y.)  603;  State  v.  Shean, 
32  Iowa  88,  90,  91 ;  State  v.  Carron, 


18  Iowa  372,  375,  87  Am.  Dec.  40m; 
Andre  v.  State,  5  Iowa  389,  398,  68 
Am.  Dec.  7o8n;  People  v.  Clark,  33 
Mich.  112;  State  v.  Sutherland,  30 
Iowa  570. 

'"  State  v.  Young,  99  Mo.  284,  288, 
289,  12  S.  W.  642;  State  V.  Strattman, 
100  Mo.  540,  550,  13  S.  W.  814;  State 
V.  Terry,  106  Mo.  209,  215,  17  S.  W. 
288.  The  statute  applies  to  the  case 
of  a  female  pupil  under  18  years  of 
age  who  is  seduced  by  her  teacher 
and  the  fact  that  the  pupil's  mother 
knew  of  the  illicit  relations  of  her 
daughter  with  the  teacher  and  con- 
sented thereto  is  no  defense.  State 
V.  Oakes,  202  Mo.  86,  100  S.  W.  434, 
119  Am.  St.  792. 

'"■  State  V.  Sibley,  131  Mo.  519,  33  S. 
W.  167;  State  V.  Hill,  134  Mo.  663, 
36  S.  W.  223. 

"-  State  V.  Rogers,  108  Mo.  202,  204, 
18  S.  W.  976;  State  V.  Sibley,  131  Mo. 
519,  33  S.  W.  167. 

"'State  V.  Young,  99  Mo.  284,  290, 
12  S.  W.  642;  State  V.  McClain,  137 
Mo.  307,  38  S.  W.  906. 


^7: 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


§    396 


instance,  and  either  under  a  form  of  marriage  or  without,  be- 
tween two  persons  too  nearly  related  in  consanguinity  or  affinity 
to  intermarry."^* 

Incest  was  not  indictable  at  the  common  law.  It  is  so  only  by  the 
various  statutes  which  have  been  enacted  both  in  England  and 
the  United  States,  and  which  usually  define  the  crime  in  express 
terms  prescribing  what  are  its  essential  ingredients  and  particu- 
larly the  prohibited  degrees  of  kinship.^^  The  sexual  intercourse, 
whether  habitual  or  not.  must  of  necessity  be  a  concurrent  act. 
The  evidence  must  show  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
woman  voluntarily  consented  to  it.  If  it  appears  that  she  was  com- 
pelled either  by  force  or  fraud  to  submit  without  consent,  the 
crime  is  not  incest  but  rape,  though  the  parties  are  related  within 
the  forbidden  degrees."^ 

§  396.  Evidence  to  show  sexual  intercourse. — Proof  of  a  single 
act  of  sexual  intercourse  is  enough. °^     Intermarriage,   though 


**  Bishop's  St.  Cr.,  §  727 ;  State  v. 
Brown,  47  Ohio  St.  102,  23  X.  E.  747, 
21  Am.  St.  790n.  For  other  defini- 
tions see  Daniels  v.  People,  6  Mich. 
381;  Commonwealth  v.  Lane,  113 
Mass.  458,  463,  18  Am.  Sogn ;  De 
Groat  V.  People,  39  ]\Iich.  124;  Ter- 
ritory V.  Corbett,  3  Mont.  50,  55; 
Shelly  V.  State,  95  Tenn.  152,  31  S. 
W.  492,  49  Am.  St.  926;  Porath  v. 
State,  90  Wis.  527,  63  X.  W.  io6r,  48 
\m.  St.  954;  Barrett  v.  State,  55 
Tex.  Cr.  182,  115  S.  W.  1187:  Gilles- 
pie V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  530,  93  S. 
W.  556;  Pate  V.  State  TTex.  Cr.),  93 
S.  W.  556;  People  V.  Koller,  142  Cal. 
-T,  76  Pac.  500;  Adams  v.  State,  78 
Ark.  16,  92  S.  W.  1 123. 

'■*  Sexual  intercourse  between  a 
stepfather  and  his  unmarried  step- 
dauRhter  is  incest.  Xcphcw  v.  State, 
5  Ga.  A  pp.  841,  63  S.  E.  930. 

"  State  V.  Jarvis,  20  Ore.  437,  26 
Pac.  302,  303,  23  Am.  St.  141 ;  State 
V.  Ellis.  74  Mo.  385.  41  Am.  321 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Harridcn,  i  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.) 


344;  State  V.  Hurd,  loi  Iowa  391,  70 
X".  W.  613.  This  offense  can  only  be 
committed  by  the  concurrent  act  of 
two  persons  of  opposite  sexes;  and 
the  assent  or  concurrence  of  the  one 
is  as  essential  to  the  commission  of 
the  offense  as  that  of  the  other,  and 
as  a  general  rule  both  must  be  guilty 
or  neither.  People  v.  Jenness,  5 
Mich.  305,  321 ;  Delany  v.  People,  10 
Mich.  241 ;  Croghan  v.  State,  22  Wis. 
444;  Schoenfeldt  v.  State,  30  Tex. 
App.  695,  18  S.  W.  640;  De  Groat  v. 
People,  39  Mich.  124,  125.  The  ac- 
quittal of  one  is  a  bar  to  the  trial  of 
the  other.  Baumer  v.  State,  49  Ind. 
544,  549,  TQ  Am.  691  ;  State  v.  Thom- 
as, 53  Iowa  214,  217,  4  X.  W.  908; 
Yeoman  v.  State,  21  Xcb.  171,  31  X. 
W.  669.  Cf.  Mathis  v.  Common- 
wealth (Ky.).  13  S.  W.  360,  II  Ky.  L. 
?S.2.  See  Elliott  Evidence.  §  3168. 
Character  of  victim  of  crime,  sec  14 
L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  725. 

"State  V.  Brown,  47  Ohio  St.    roj. 
23  X.  v..  747,  21  .'\in.  St.  79011. 


§    397  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  676 

rele\ant,  need  not  be  proved/""  Any  evidence  which  is  relevant 
to  prove  adultery  between  a  man  and  woman  is  admissible. '''■*  The 
relation  and  conduct  of  the  parties  toward  one  another,  their  op- 
portunities for  meeting,  their  oral  expressions  of  affection  or 
liking,  and  their  inclination  to  seek  each  other's  societv  are  alwa\'S 
relevant.  Prior  acts  of  incest  between  the  same  parties  may  al- 
ways be  proved.^""  So,  too.  it  may  be  shown  that  they  indulged 
in  familiarities  and  caresses  when  alone  or  in  the  presence  of 
others.  But  evidence  of  demonstrations  of  aff'ection  indulged  in 
by  the  parties  should  always  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  the  light 
cf  the  kinship  of  the  parties.^ 

§  397.  The  kinship  existing  between  the  parties — Evidence  of  ac- 
complices.— The  kinship  between  the  parties  to  the  incest  may  be 
proved  by  the  evidence  of  relatives  and  friends;  and,  perhaps,  by 
family  reputation.  The  jury  are  to  determine  from  the  evidence 
what  degree  of  consanguinity  or  affinity  has  been  shown.  But 
whether  the  kinship  thus  proved  is  or  is  not  within  the  prohibited 
degrees  is  a  question  wdiich  is  for  the  judge  exclusively." 

The  la\v  regards  both  parties  to  the  incestuous  adultery  as 
accomplices.  Hence,  the  rule  requiring  the  testimony  of  an  ac- 
complice to  be  corroborated  is  applicable  to  the  testimony  of  either 
testifying  against  the  other.^ 

**  Simon  v.  State,  31   Tex.  Cr.  186,  forbidden    degrees.       State    v.     Bul- 

20  S.  W.  399,  716,  37  Am.  St.  802.  linger,  54  Mo.   142;    Simon   v.   State, 

•"See  §§  381,  386.  31  Tex.  Cr.  186,  20  S.  W.  399,  7i6,  Zl 

^°"  People  V.  Cease,  80  Mich.  576,  45  Am.  St.  802. 
N.  W.  585 ;  Lefforge  v.  State,  129  Ind.        ^  State  v.  Streeter,  20  Nev.  403,  22 

551,  29  X.  E.  34.    See  ante,  §  390.  Pac.  758,  759;   State  v.  Dana,  59  Vt. 

^  Evidence   to   show   the   bad  char-  614,   10  Atl.  727 ;    State  v.  Jarvis,   18 

acter  of  the  woman  previous   to  the  Ore.  360,  23  Pac.  251,  253;  Freeman 

incest  and  that  defendant  lived  upon  v.    State,    11    Tex.    App.    92,   40    Am. 

the  wages  of  her  shame  is  irrelevant.  787;  Coburn  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  257, 

People  V.  Benoit,  97  Cal.  249,  31  Pac.  Z^  S.  W.  442 ;  State  v.  Jarvis,  20  Ore. 

1 128.  437,  26  Pac.  302,  304,  23  Am.  St.  141; 

'  State  V.  Brown,  47  Ohio  St.  102,  State  v.  Miller,  65  Iowa  60,  21  N.  W. 
23  N.  E.  747,  749,  21  Am.  St.  790n.  181,  182;  Clifton  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 
The  fact  that  the  daughter  was  ille-  18,  79  S.  W.  824;  Watkins  v.  State 
gitimate  is  no  defense  to  a  charge  of  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1910),  124  S.  W.  959. 
incest  against  the  father.  People  v.  It  seems  that  a  person  may  be  con- 
Lake,  no  X.  Y.  6t,  17  X^.  E.  146,  6  victcd  of  incest  though  he  gains  his 
Am.  St.  344.  It  is  not  necessary  to  ends  hy  such  force  as  would  render 
prove  that  the  accused  knew  that  the  him  guilty  of  rape.  Here,  as  the 
other   party   was    related    within    the  woman  is  not  an  accomplice,  her  evi- 


677 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


§    398 


§  398.  Bigamy — The  intent — Invalidity  or  annulment  of  first 
marriage. — Bigamy  may  be  defined  as  the  crime  of  going  through 
the  marriage  ceremony  with  another,  while  a  former  husband  or 
wife  is  living,  and  not  divorced,  knowing  or  having  reason  to  be- 
lie^■e,  that  the  former  spouse  is  still  alive.  The  material  facts  are 
the  first  and  second^  marriages  and  the  fact  that  the  first  consort 
was  alive''  and  undivorced  at  the  date  of  the  void  marriage.  From 
such  facts  a  bigamous  intent  may  be  inferred.*^  That  the  first 
marriage  was  void,'  or  had  been  annulled  or  dissGl\-ed  by  a 
divorce,  is  always  relevant  as  a  defense.'*  But  the  good  faith  of 
the  accused,  or  his  belief  or  opinion  that  the  first  marriage  was 
\  oid,  or  that  he  had  been  granted  a  divorce  before  his  second 
marriage,  is  no  defense.^ 

§  399.  Presumptions  and  proof  of  death  of  spouse. — The  accused 
may  prove  that  he  has  been  credibly  informed  that  his  wife  had 
procured  a  di\'orce  from  him,  and  may  show  that  he  had  made 
due  inquiry,  and  endeavored  to  ascertain  the  truth.  If  he  believed, 
v.ith  good  reason,  that  such  was  the  case,  he  should  be  acquitted, 
as  the  criminal  intent  is  not  present."   The  state  must  prove  af- 


dence  does  not  need  corroboration. 
Smith  V.  State,  108  Ala.  r,  19  So.  306; 
54  Am.  St.  140;  Whittaker  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 95  Ky.  632,  27  S.  W.  83, 
16  Ky.  L.  173;  State  v.  Hurd,  lOi 
Iowa  391,  70  X.  W.  613.  Contra, 
State  V.  Aker  (Wash.,  1909),  103 
Pac.  420. 

*  Elliott  Evidence,  §§2864,  2865. 
Proof  of  jurisdiction,  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2860.  Second  marriage  in 
good  faith,  when  defense,  Elliott  Ev- 
idence, §  2872;  when  not,  §  2871. 
Polygamy,  proof  under  Edmunds' 
Law,  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2870.  Proof 
of  corpus  delicti  in  bigamy,  sec  68 
I..  R.  A.  42. 

^  Elliott  Evidence,  §§  2866,  2869. 

"  People  V.  Spoor,  235  111.  230,  85 
N'.  E.  207,  126  Am.  St.  r97n;  Robin- 
son V.  State,  6  Ga.  .A pp.  696,  65  S. 
E.  792. 

'3    Grccnl.    on    Ev.,    §  203;     Hal- 


brook  V.  State,  34  Ark.  511,  517,  36 
Am.  i/n;  People  v.  Chase,  27  Huh 
(N.  Y.)  256,  270;  McCombs  v.  State, 
50  Tex.  Cr.  490,  99  S.  W.  1017,  123 
Am.  St.  855.  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  I036n. 

*  Commonwealth  v.  Boyer,  7  Allen 
(Mass.)  306;  Tucker  v.  People,  122 
111.  583,  13  X.  E.  809.  The  fact  that 
the  first  marriage  was  voidable  only 
is  no  defense  and  is  never  relevant. 
People  v.  Beevers,  99  Cal.  286,  33 
Pac.  844;  Barber  v.  People,  203  111. 
543,  68  N.  E.  93;  Elliott  Evidence. 
§  2861.     Divorce  as  defenses,  §  2S73. 

"Russell  v.  State,  66  Ark.  185,  49 
S.  W.  821,  74  Am.  St.  78;  Rice  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.).  105  S.  W.  123, 
31  Ky.  L.  1354,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2804. 

'"Squire  v.  State,  46  Ind.  459,  463. 
Cf.  State  v.  Hughes,  58  Iowa  165,  11 
X.  W.  706. 


ij  400 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


678 


firmalively,  and  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  tlie  first  husl)an(l 
or  wife  was  alive  at  the  date  of  the  void  marriage.  This  is  not 
presumed,  as  matter  of  law,  from  proof  that  he  or  she  was  ali\e 
at  a  prior  date,  for  the  presumption  that  the  accused  is  innocent 
will  nullify  the  presumption  of  the  continuance  of  life.  Hence,  in 
the  absence  of  direct  evidence,  that  the  earlier  spouse  is  alive 
when  the  later  marriage  was  solemnized,  the  jury  must  acquit. ^^ 

§400.  Competency  of  wife  of  accused. — The  first  and  true  wife 
will  never  be  i)crniitted  to  testify  against  her  husliand  when  he  is 
accused  of  bigamy.^"  The  second  wife  may  testify  to  prove  the 
second  marriage,  but  only  if  the  first  marriage  is  already  proved 
or  admitted.  As  the  existence  or  validity  of  the  first  marriage  is 
usually  the  sole  issue,  and  is  not  usually  established  until  a  verdict 
is  reached,  the  rule  often. results  in  excluding  botli  women  as  wit- 
nesses. As  the  fact  of  the  first  marriage  alone  renders  the  second 
wife  competent,  it  must  be  proved  by  independent  witnesses  be- 
fore she  testifies.  Even  then  she  is  competent  only  to  prove  the 
second  marriage,  or  show  facts  rendering  it  void.'^  The  unchas- 
tity  of  the  second  wife  is  inadmissible  to  impeach  her  evidence.^* 


"  IMitchcll  V.  Commonwealth,  78 
Ky.  204,  39  Am.  227;  Commonwealth 
V.  Parker,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  263,  43 
Am.  Dec.  396;  Commonwealth  v. 
Bangs,  9  Mass.  387;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hayden,  163  Mass.  453,  40  N.  E. 
846,  47  Am.  St.  468,  28  L.  R.  A.  3i8n ; 
State  V.  Howard,  32  Vt.  380;  Hilcr  v. 
People,  156  111.  511,  41  X.  E.  t8i,  47 
Am.  St.  22in ;  Wilson  v.  State,  2 
Ohio  St.  319;  Squire  v.  State,  46  Ind. 
459,  467;  Cameron  v.  State,  14  Ala. 
546,  48  Am.  Dec.  11  in;  Reg.  v.  Liim- 
ley,  L.  R.  i  C.  C.  196.  Some  authori- 
ties hold  that  the  jury  may  consider 
the  fact  that  she  was  alive  at  a  prior 
date  and  base  an  inference  of  fact 
upon  it  that  she  wa5  alive  at  the  date 
of  the  second  marriage.  Common- 
wealth V.  Caponi,  155  Mass.  534,  30 
N.  E.  82 ;  Commonwealth  v.  McGrath, 


140  Mass.  296,  6  N.  E.  515.  See  El- 
liott Evidence,  §  2867. 

"See  §  I  Hale  P.  C.  693;  i  East. 
469 ;  Miles  v.  United  States,  103  U.  S. 
304,  309,  313-315,  26  L.  ed.  481 ;  State 
V.  Patterson,  2  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  346, 
38  Am.  Dec.  699;  Williams  v.  State, 
44  Ala.  24;  State  v.  McDavid,  15  La. 
Ann.  403.  Contra,  State  v.  Sloan,  55 
Iowa  217,  7  X.  W.  516.  Under  stat- 
ute in  Maryland  making  the  husband 
or  wife  competent  the  wife  is  compe- 
tent. Richardson  v.  State,  103  Md. 
112,  63  Atl.  317.  Evidence  of  hus- 
band or  wife,  see  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2868;  first  and  second  wives  as 
witnesses,  §  2874. 

"3  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  206;  Miles  v. 
United  States,  103  U.  S.  304,  315,  26 
L.  ed.  481. 

"State  v.  Xadal,  69  Iowa  478,  482, 
29  X.  W.  451. 


6/9  SEXUAL    CRIMES.  §    4OI 

^  40i.  Absence  of  lawful  spouse. — It  is  sometimes  provided  by 
statute  that  the  absence  of  a  husband  or  a  wife  without  having 
been  heard  from  during  a  period  specified,  ranging  from  two  to 
>even  years,  may  be  proved  as  a  defense  by  a  party  who  marries 
again.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  absentee  was  not  heard  from  as 
alive  during  the  statutory  period.  ^^  But  this  presumption  of 
death  from  unexplained  silence  and  absence  may  be  overcome  by 
evidence  that  the  absentee  was  alive  a  short  time  before  the  sec- 
ond marriage.  As  we  ha\e  seen,  the  burden  of  proof  is  always  on 
the  state  to  show  the  first  spouse  is  alive,  and  that  the  accused 
knows  it.^*'  And  the  absence  of  a  wife  resulting  from  having  been 
dri\-en  away  by  the  husband  is  not  such  absence  as  will  excuse 
him  though  more  than  seven  years. ^' 

The  absence  of  circumstances  from  which  death  may  be  pre- 
sumed does  not  justify  an  inference  that  the  party  is  alive.  There 
must  be  positive  evidence  that  he  or  she  is  alive,  and  whether  the 
presumption  of  death  from  unexplained  absence  has  been  rebutted 
is  for  the  jury.  The  burden  is  on  the  accused  to  show  that  he  did 
not  know  his  wife  was  living  during  the  seven  years  prior  to  his 
second  marriage.^^  Whether  evidence  of  a  reasonable  belief  on 
the  part  of  the  prisoner  that  tlie  former  luisband  or  wife  is  dead 
is  admissible  in  his  defense,  has  been  differently  decided.  Some 
cases  maintain  the  affirmative  of  this  proposition,^''  though  later 
cases  support  a  contrary  view."*^ 

§  402.  Proof  of  marriage  by  eye  witness  or  certificate. — A  higher 
degree  of  proof  of  a  marriage  is  required  in  criminal  trials  than 

"  Poss  V.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  486,  S3  6y  Ala.   84,   the  court  said :     "Every 

S.  W.  1 109;  Robinson  v.  State,  6  Ga.  act  was  done    *    *    *    which  is  de- 

App.  696,  65  S.  E.  792.  clarcd  criminal,  and  from  the  act  and 

"Gibson  v.  State,  38  Miss.  313,  322.  the  circumstances,  the  criminal  intent 

"  State  V.  Goulden,  134  X.  Car.  743,  must  be  deduced.     There  was  the  in- 

47  S.  E.  450.  tent    to    marry    a    second    time,    not 

''State  V.  Goulden,  134  X.  Car.  743,  ktwiving  the  husband  to  be  dead,  who 

47  S.  E.  450.  had  been  absent  for  a  period  of  about 

"Reg.  V.  Horton,  11  Cox  C.  C.  670;  one  year  only,  and  this  is  the  criminal 

RcK.  V.  Turner,  9  Cox  C.  C.  145.  intent,  and  the  only  intent  which   is 

"  Medrano    v.    State,    32    Tex.    Cr.  of  the  essence  of  the  offense,"  and  sec 

214,  22  S.  W.  684;  Reg.  V.  Gibbons,  12  State    v.    Zichfcld,    23    Ncv.    304,    46 

Cox  C.  C.  237.  238;  Rep.  V.  Bennett.  Pac.  802,  62  Am.  St.  800,  34  L.  R.  A. 

14  Cox  C.  C.  45.     In  Jones  v.  State,  784. 


§  403 


CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE. 


680 


is  necessary  in  ci\'il  actions,"'  in  whicli  marriage  may  be  inferred 
to  exist  from  evidence  of  reputation  coupled  with  cohabitation.  A 
marriage  in  fact  must  be  proved.  This  may  l^e  done  by  the  testi- 
mony of  an  eye  witness  to  the  ceremony,--  by  that  of  the  person 
who  performed  it,  or  by  a  marriage  certificate."^ 


§  403.  Proof  of  marriage  by  reputation,  cohabitation  and  conduct. 
— Though  mere  cohabitation  and  holding  out  do  not  constitute 
marriage,  in  civil  cases  the  existence  of  the  marital  relation  may 
be  inferred  from  evidence  that  the  parties  cohabited  as  man  and 
wife,  and  were  reputed  to  be  such  among  their  friends  and  ac- 
quaintances. In  a  prosecution  for  bigamy  such  evidence  alone 
is  not  sufficient  to  prove  the  first  marriage.  Some  of  the  cases 
admit  evidence  of  cohabitation,  conduct  and  reputation"*  to  cor- 


^  Halbrook  v.  State,  34  Ark.  511, 
517,  36  Am.  1711. 

"  Crane  v.  State,  94  Tenn.  S6,  28  S. 
W.  317;  People  V.  Perriman,  72  Mich. 
184,  40  N.  W.  425.  Method  of  prov- 
ing first  marriage,  see  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2862. 

-^2  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  461;  2  Stark, 
on  Ev.,  698;  Faustre  v.  Common- 
wealth, 92  Ky.  34,  17  S.  W.  189,  T3 
Ky.  L.  347;  State  v.  Johnson,  12 
]\Iinn.  476,  481,  93  Am.  Dec.  24in ; 
State  V.  Armstrong,  4  Minn.  335,  344 ; 
State  V.  Hodgskins,  19  Me.  155,  158, 
36  Am.  Dec.  742n;  State  v.  Clark,  54 
N.  H.  456,  459;  State  v.  Williams,  20 
lov^a  98;  Arnold  v.  State,  53  Ga. 
574.  575;  Johnson  v.  State,  60  Ark. 
308,  30  S.  W.  31 ;  Swartz  v.  State,  7 
Ohio  Cir.  Dec.  43.  Proof  that  the 
ceremony  was  performed  by  a  justice 
or  other  official  will  suffice  without 
proving  his  appointment.  This  will 
be  presumed,  i  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  92 ; 
State  V.  Abbey,  29  Vt.  60,  65,  67  Am. 
Dec.  754.  A  constitutional  provision 
that  the  accused  shall  be  confronted 
with  the  witnesses  against  him  does 
not  exclude  certified  copies   of  mar- 


riage records  which  are  made  re- 
ceivable by  a  statute.  State  v.  Mat- 
lock, 70  Iowa  229,  30  X.  W.  495.  A 
marriage  certificate,  though  inadmis- 
sible as  such  because  not  properly 
authenticated  and  certified  according 
to  statute,  may,  perhaps,  be  received 
as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce  of  the  mar- 
riage if  it  is  shown  to  have  been 
made  and  delivered  at  the  time.  Peo- 
ple V.  Crawford,  133  X.  Y.  535,  30  N. 
E.  1 148.  See,  also,  ante,  §  383,  as  to 
proof  of  marriage. 

■*  Gahagan  v.  People,  i  Park.  Cr. 
(X.  Y.)  378,  383;  People  v.  McQuaid, 
85  Mich.  123,  48  N.  W.  161 ;  Hayes  v. 
People,  25  X^.  Y.  390,  393,  396,  82  Am. 
Dec.  364;  State  v.  Xadal,  69  Iowa  478, 
29  X.  W.  451 ;  United  States  v.  Ten- 
ne}%  2  Ariz.  127,  it  Pac.  472;  Rice  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  105  S.  W.  123, 
31  KJ^  L.  1354;  State  v.  Pendleton, 
67  Kan.  180,  72  Pac.  527;  People  v. 
Mendenhall,  119  Mich.  404,  78  N.  W. 
325,  75  Am.  St.  408;  Hearne  v.  State, 
50  Tex.  Cr.  431,  97  S.  W.  1050; 
Coons  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  256,  91 
S.  W.  1085. 


68 1 


SEXUAL    CRIMES. 


$    404 


roborate  direct  evidence  and  to  prove  the  continuance  of  the  mar- 
riage.  Other  authorities  reject  it  ahogether.-^ 


^  404.  The  admissions  of  the  accused  as  evidence  to  prove  the  mar- 
riage— Primary  evidence  of  the  ceremony — When  required. — The 
cases  are  not  harmonious  on  the  question  whether  the  declarations 
of  the  accused  are  receivable  to  prove  the  ceremony  of  marriage, 
the  names  of  the  parties,  or  the  time  and  place,  when  these  facts 
are  material.  The  admissions  of  the  accused,  deliberately  made, 
that  the  marriage  relation  existed  have  been  repeatedly  received.-^ 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  repeatedly  decided  that  the  de- 
fendant's admissions  would  not  dispense  with  primary,  i.e.,  writ- 
ten e\idence,  of  the  specific  facts  regarding  the  ceremony,  etc.,  at 
least  where  such  evidence  was  in  existence  and  could  be  pro- 
cured.-'   Such  e\-idence  is  not  conclusive  and  creates  no  presump- 


"  State  V.  Roswell,  6  Conn.  446 ; 
State  V.  Johnson,  12  Minn.  476,  482, 
93  Am.  Dec.  24in;  Adkisson  v.  State, 
34  Tex.  Cr.  296,  30  S.  \V.  357;  State 
V.  Cooper,  103  Mo.  266,  15  S.  \V.  327; 
Tison  V.  State,  125  Ga.  7,  53  S.  E. 
809. 

"  State  V.  Goulden,  134  X.  Car.  743, 
47  S.  E.  450;  Caldwell  v.   State,  146 

\la.  141,  41  So.  473;  Le  Grand  v. 
State,  88  .-\rk.  135,  113  S.  W.  1028; 
Murphy  v.  State,  122  Ga.  149,  50  S. 
E.  48;  Tucker  v.  People.  117  111.  88, 
rx),  7  X.  E.  51 ;  State  v.  Melton,  120 
\'.  Car.  591,  26  S.  E.  933;  State  v. 
Abbey,  29  Vt.  60,  64,  67  Am.  Dec. 
754;  Commonwealth  v.  Jackson,  ir 
liush  (Ky.)  679,  21  .\ni.  225;  Hal- 
brook  V.  State,  34  Ark.  511,  517,  36 
Am.  I7n;  Oncalc  v.  Commonwealth, 
17  Gratt.   (Va.)   582:  State  v.  Xadal, 

'>  Iowa  478,  482,  29  X.  W.  451 ;  Miles 
United  States,  103  U.  S.  304,  311, 

''>  L.  ed.  481 ;  StanKlein  v.  State,  17 
'  )hio   St.  453,   561  ;    United   States  v. 

I  enncy,  2  Ariz.  2(),  8  I'ac.  295;  State 
V  HrxlKskins,  ig  Mi-.  155,  158,  36  .Am. 
Dec.    742n ;    Commonwealth    v.    Mur- 


tagh,  I  Ashm.  (Pa.)  272,  275;  War- 
ner V.  Commonwealth.  2  Va.  Cas.  95 ; 
State  V.  Hilton,  3  Rich.  ( S.  Car.) 
434.  435.  45  Am.  Dec.  783;  Wolver- 
ton  V.  State,  16  Ohio  173,  17S,  47  Am. 
Dec.  373 ;  Crane  v.  State,  94  Tenn.  86, 
28  S.  W.  317;  State  V.  Ulrich,  no 
Mo.  350,  19  S.  W.  656;  State  v. 
Hughes,  35  Kan.  626,  12  Pac.  28,  57 
Am.  195;  State  v.  Jenkins,  139  Mo. 
535,  41  S.  W.  220.  See  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2863.  Letters  written  by 
the  accused  to  his  first  wife  were  re- 
ceived against  him  in  Tucker  v.  Peo- 
ple, 122  III.  583,  13  X.  E.  809.  The 
silence  of  the  accused  under  circum- 
stances where  it  is  his  duty  to  speak 
may  doubtless  be  proved  against  him 
as  an  admission  of  his  marriage. 

■'  People  V.  Humphrey,  7  Johns. 
( X.  Y.)  314;  State  v.  Roswell.  6 
Conn.  446,  449:  Commonwealth  v. 
Xorcross,  9  Mass.  492;  Common- 
wealth v.  Littlejohn.  15  Mass.  163: 
Miner  v.  People.  58  111.  59,  60:  Sher- 
man V.  People.  13  Hun  (X.  Y.)  575; 
South  V.  People.  t)H  III.  j6i.  265: 
State  V.  Armstrong.  4  Minn.  335.  344. 


v;  405  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  682 

lion  of  law  that  a  \alitl  marriage  existed  at  the  time  of  the  biga- 
mous union.  It  should  go  to  the  jury  for  what  it  is  w^orth.  Coup- 
led with  evidence  of  reputation  and  cohabitation,  it  is  very  strong 
proof  of  a  valid  marriage."^ 

,^  405.  Marriage  certificates  and  transcripts  of  records  as  evidence 
— Presumption  of  validity — Venue. — A  marriage,  celebrated  in  a 
foreign  country,  may  be  proved  by  a  transcript  of  the  foreign 
record,-''  if  it  is  also  shown  that  the  law  of  the  place  of  the  mar- 
riage required  that  a  record  should  be  made  and  kept,  and 
that  the  record  was  made  and  kept  under  and  in  conform- 
ity with  that  law.''"  A  marriage  certificate  or  a  license  and 
the  return  are  competent  as  evidence  under  the  rule  admitting 
the  entries  of  third  persons  made  in  the  course  of  their  profes- 
sional employment,  though  there  be  no  evidence  of  the  ofifiicial 
character  of  the  person  performing  the  ceremony  except  his  own 
statement  following  his  signature. ^^  But  a  certified  copy  of  a 
marriage  license  and  of  the  return  thereto  by  the  person  officiating 
at  the  marriage  were  held  to  be  inadmissible  on  a  trial  for  bigamy 
to  prove  the  prior  marriage  under  a  statute  providing  that  certi- 
fied copies  of  certain  records  may  be  admitted  in  evidence  on 

"^  State    V.    Sanders,    30    Iowa    582,  1059.    But  in  State  v.  Sharkey,  73  N. 

584;  State  V.  Cooper,  103  Mo.  266,  15  J.  L.  491,  63  Atl.  866,  a  record  of  a 

S.  W.  327;   People  V.  Crawford,  133  divorce  suit  b}^  the  prosecuting  wit- 

^'-  Y.  535,  30  N.   E.   1 148.    Evidence  ness  against  accused  was  held  to  be 

that  the  defendant  cohabited  with   a  inadmissible    as    proof    of    a    former 

woman  and  had  children  by  her  who  marriage  on  the  ground  that  the  suit 

lived    with     him,     that     the    woman  was  a  civil  proceeding  and  not  admis- 

signed    and    acknowledged    deeds    as  sible  because  the  proof  was  not  be- 

his  wife,  sued  for  and  was  granted  a  j-ond  a  reasonable  doubt.    As  to  a  pe- 

divorce,  the  defendant   answering  in  tition  for  a  divorce,  see  Adkisson  v. 

the  suit,  is  competent,  and  has  been  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  296,  30  S.  W.  357. 
held   sufficient  proof  of  a   marriage.        ""  State   v.    Dooris,   40    Conn.    145 ; 

State  v.  Gonce,   79  Mo.  600.     Proof  Stanglein  v.   State,  17  Ohio   St.  453; 

that  A  was  granted  a  divorce   from  State  v.  Melton,  120  N.  Car.  591,  26 

B  on  a  given  date  is  strong  evidence  S.  E.  933;  Nelson  v.   State,  151  Ala. 

that  a  marriage  had  existed  between  2,  43  So.  966. 

A  and  B  at  that  date,  as  a  divorce  is        '"Tucker  v.  People,  117  111.  88,  7  N. 

never   granted   unless    a   marriage   is  E.  51 ;  Pontier  v.  State,  107  Md.  384, 

proved    or    admitted.      Halbrook    v.  68  Atl.  1059. 

State,  34  Ark.  511,  519,  36  .'^m.  I7n;         ^' Baker   v.    State    (Tex.    Cr.),    118 

Pontier  v.  State,  107  ISId.  384,  68  Atl.  S.  W.  542. 


683  SEXUAL    CRIMES.  §    406 

three  days'  notice  when  notice  was  not  given. ^-  A  marriage 
shown  to  have  been  solemnized  will  be  presumed  to  be  valid  until 
its  invalidity  is  shown.  The  rule  that,  when  a  marriage  has  been 
consummated,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  former  marriage  of 
one  of  the  parties  has  been  legally  dissolved,  does  not  apply  in 
a  prosecution  for  bigamy,  so,  where  the  state  showed  that  the  ac- 
cused had  been  married  to  a  woman  who  was  still  living  at  the 
time  of  his  second  marriage  to  another,  the  burden  was  on  him  to 
show  that  his  former  marriage  had  been  legally  dissolved. ^^  The 
burden  of  proof,  where  the  validity  of  the  first  marriage  is  dis- 
puted, is  upon  the  prosecution,^*  and  direct  evidence  of  non-as- 
sent by  either  party  to  the  marriage  is  relevant  to  rebut  the  pre- 
sumption of  validity.^^  The  burden  is  on  the  accused  to  prove  the 
validity  of  a  decree  of  divorce  granted  before  the  alleged  big- 
amous marriage  and  offered  by  him  in  evidence  where  its  validity 
is  attacked  by  the  prosecution.^''  The  venue  of  the  bigamous  mar- 
riage, unless  essential  to  confer  jurisdiction,^'  or  to  establish  the 
specific  character  of  the  offense,  need  not  be  proved  precisely  as 
laid.^' 

§  406.  Bigamous  cohabitation. — The  corpus  delicti  of  bigamy  is 
the  unlawful  marriage  contract.  Cohabitation  in  a  bigamous 
union  is  not  material,  and  need  not  be  proved  unless  its  proof  is 
required  by  statute."'*  But  proof  of  unlawful  cohabitation  is  al- 
ways admissible  as  tending  to  show  the  relations  of  the  parties 
and  to  corroborate  the  evidence  of  a  marriage.*'^  The  first  wife 
will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  against  the  defendant.''^ 

^Burton  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  196,  ''State  v.  Nadal,  69  Iowa  478,  483, 

loi  S.  W.  226.  29  N.  W.  451. 

"Fletcher  v.  State,  169  Ind.  77,  81  •'"' State  v.  Sloan,  55  Iowa  217,  7  N. 

N.  E.  1083,  124  Am.  St.  219.  W.  516;  Nelms  v.  State,  84  Ga.  466, 

"People  V.  Chase,  27  Hun  (N.  Y.)  20  Am.  St.  377,  10  S.  E.   T087;  Gise 

256,  260;  Weinberg-  v.  State,  25  Wis.  v.    Commonwealth,    8r    Pa.    St.    428; 

370;      Bird     V.     Commonwealth,     21  State  v.  Patterson,  2  Ircd.  (N.  Car.) 

Gratt.    (Va.)    800.     Contra,   Sokcl   v.  346,  38  Am.  Dec.  699. 

People,  212  111.  238,  72  N.  E.  382.  ''"United  States  v.  Tcnncy,  2  Ariz. 

"Kopke  V.   People,  43  Mich.  41,  4  127,  11  Pac.  472. 

N.  W.  551.  •"  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  168;  State  v. 

"People  V.   Spoor,  235   111.  230,  85  Patterson,  2  Ired.    (N.  Car.)    346,  38 

N.  E.  207,  126  Am.  St.  r97n.  Am.  Dec.  699;  Williams  v.   State,  44 

"Tucker  v.   People,   117  111.  88,  92,  Ala.    24;    State    v.    McDavid,    15    La. 

7  N.  E.  51.  .Ann.  403. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


RAPE. 


§  407.  Rape  defined — The  non-consent 
of     the     prosecutrix  —  Pre- 
sumption    of     incapacity     to 
consent. 
4c8.  Rape  by  infants. 

409.  Relevancy  of  the  victim's  com- 

plaints— Proving    the    details 
of  what  she  said. 

410.  Proving  the  details  to  impeach 

or  corroborate. 

411.  Delay    in    making    complaint — 

Reasons  for  delay. 

412.  Medical  testimony. 

413.  Relevancy  of  the  physical  con- 

dition of  the  prosecutrix. 


§  414.  The  prosecutrix  as  a  witness 
— Her  competency  and  credi- 
bility— Infancy  of  the  prose- 
cutri.x  when  rendering  her 
incompetent  as  a  witness. 

415.  The  prior  relations  of  the  par- 

ties. 

416.  Proof     of     carnal     knowledge 

requisite. 

417.  The  force  or  fraud  employed — 

Threats    and    mortal    fear — 
Failure  to  make  outcry. 

418.  Reputation    of    the   prosecutrix 

for    chastity — Proof    of    spe- 
cific unchaste  acts. 


§  407.  Rape  defined — The  non-consent  of  the  prosecutrix — Pre- 
sumption of  incapacity  to  consent. — Rape  is  the  crime  of  obtaining 
carnal  knowledge  of  a  female  forcibly  and  without  her  consent/ 
or  "against  her  will,"  the  latter  word  as  thus  used  being  synony- 
mous with  desire  or  inclination. - 

The  absence  of  consent,  where  it  is  not  presumed  from  the 
immaturity  of  the  female,  must  always  be  proved  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt. ^  The  absence  of  consent  need  not  be  the  result  of 
a  concious  exercise  of  volition  withholding  it.    It  is  not  always 


*4  Bl.  Com.  210.  In  Hale's  Pleas 
of  the  Crown  this  crime  is  defined  as 
"the  carnal  knowledge  of  any  woman 
above  the  age  of  ten  years  against  her 
will,  and  of  a  woman  child  under  the 
age  of  ten  years  with  or  against  her 
will."  It  is  not  easy  to  express  in  one 
definition  all  the  refinements  of  the 
cases.      Statutory     definitions     differ, 


and  cases  may  be  stated  which  art- 
punishable  as  rape  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, while  not  in  others. 

-  People  V.  Crosswell,  13  Mich.  427. 
432,  S7  Am.  Dec.  774 ;  Brown  v.  State. 
127  Wis.  193,  106  N.  W.  536.  See 
State  v.  Pickett,  11  Xev.  255,  21  .-Xm. 

754- 
•■'  Elliott  Evidence.  §  3093. 


(684) 


68: 


RAPE. 


8  407 


necessary  to  prove  active  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  female. 
Absence  of  consent  will  be  presumed  whenever  sexual  intercourse 
is  procured  by  fraud,  or  the  woman  is  physically  or  mentally  in- 
capable of  consenting,  because  she  has  been  drugged,  is  non  com- 
pos iiiciitis,  or  is  under  the  statutory  age  of  consent.*  If  the 
woman  having  legal  capacity  to  consent,  shall  consent  to  the  con- 
summation of  the  intercourse,  a  verdict  of  guilty  cannot  be  sus- 
tained, no  matter  how  reluctant  or  tardy  her  consent  may  have 
been,  or  how  much  force  had  been  used."  The  question  whether 
she  consented  is  for  the  jury.  As  consent,  that  is  the  concurrence 
of  her  will  with  the  will  of  the  accused,  is  purely  a  mental  con- 
dition, its  existence,  when  put  in  issue,  must  be  inferred  from  the 
facts  in  the  case.  From  the  secret  nature  of  the  crime,  evidence 
of  circumstances  from  which  intent  must  be  inferred  should  be 
carefully  scrutinized.'^  Among  the  facts  which  are  relevant  to 
show  the  absence  or  presence  of  consent  are  the  resistance  which 
was  offered  by  the  w^oman,  her  physical  condition  and  strength, 
and  tiiat  of  the  accused,"  and  the  means  employed  by  the  latter  to 
inspire  her  with  fear. 

A  child  under  the  age  of  ten  years  was,  at  common  law,  con- 
clusi\'ely  presumed  incapable  of  consenting  to  sexual  intercourse,^ 


*2  Bish.  Crim.  Law,  §  11 15;  i  Hale 
P.  C.  629;  Hubert  v.  State,  74  Neb. 
220,  104  X-  W.  276,  106  N.  W.  774; 
Harlan  v.  People,  32  Colo.  397,  76 
Pac.  792 ;  State  v.  Whimpey,  140  Iowa 
199,  118  X.  W.  281;  State  V.  Peyton 
(.•\rk.,  1910),  125  S.  W.  416;  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  3094. 

'Mills  V.  United  States,  164  U.  S. 
644,  41  L.  ed.  584,  17  Sup.  Ct.  210; 
Conners  v.  State,  47  Wis.  523,  2  N. 
W.  1 143;  Pollard  v.  State,  2  Iowa 
567;  Wliittakcr  v.  State,  50  Wis.  518, 
7  N.  W.  43r,  36  Am.  856n;  Reynolds 
V.  State,  27  Xeb.  90.  92,  42  N.  W.  903, 
20  Am.  St.  659;  Hollis  V.  State,  27 
Ma.  3^*7.  .191-394,  9  So.  67. 

".Anderson  v.  State.  41  Wis.  430; 
P>rown  V.  State,  76  Ga.  623,  626.  "The 
importance  of  resistance  is  simply  to 
bow  two  elements  in  the  crime;  car- 
nal knowledge  by  force  by  one  of  the 


parties,  and  non-consent  thereto  by 
the  other."  State  v.  Shields,  45  Conn. 
256. 

""  Brown  v.  Commonwealth,  82  Va. 
653,  656;  State  V.  Cunningham,  100 
Mo.  382,  391,  12  S.  W.  376. 

*  Commonwealth  v.  Sugland,  4 
Gray  (Mass.)  7;  Commonwealth  v. 
Roosnell,  143  Mass.  32,  37,  39,  8  N. 
E.  747;  State  V.  Sullivan,  68  Vt.  540, 
35  Atl.  479;  Proper  v.  State,  85  Wis. 
615,  631,  632,  55  N.  W.  1035;  Farrell 
V.  State,  54  N.  J.  L.  416,  419,  24  Atl. 
723;  State  V.  Miller,  42  La.  Ann.  1186, 
8  So.  309,  21  .Am.  St.  418;  People  v. 
Crosswcll,  13  Mich.  427,  87  Am.  Dec. 
774:  People  V.  McDonald,  9  Mich. 
150:  Moore  V.  State,  17  Ohio  St.  521, 
525;  Coates  V.  State.  50  .Ark.  330.  335. 
356,  7  S.  W.  304.  The  mother  of  the 
child   may   testify   to   her   age.     Mc- 


4oS 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


686 


though,  if  she  were  so  developed  mentally  and  physically  as  to 
understand  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  act,  the  presump- 
tion was  sometimes  regarded  as  rehuttahle.  The  statutory  age  of 
consent  now  varies  in  the  several  states."  If  the  female  is  under 
the  statutory  age,  the  presumption  of  non-consent  is  conclusive, 
and  evidence  to  show  that  force  was  or  was  not  used,  or  generally 
that  she  did  or  did  not  consent,  is  alike  inadmissihle.^"  If  the  fe- 
male is  over  the  age  of  consent,  proof  of  mere  absence  of  consent 
is  enough,  and  evidence  of  facts  constituting  an  active  and  posi- 
tive dissent  is  not  required.  The  non-consent  may  be  inferred  by 
the  jury  from  proof  that  the  female  was  mentally  weak,  at  least 
where  such  a  degree  of  imbecility  is  shown  that  it  is  evident  that 
she  did  not  realize  the  meaning,  or  the  nature  and  consequences  of 
the  sexual  act.^^ 

§  408.    Rape  by  infants. — In  England  at  common  law  a  boy, 
under  the  age  of  fourteen,  was  conclusively  presumed  unable  to 


Math  V.  State,  55  Ga.  303,  307.  See 
Elliott  Evidence,  §§  3095,  3096.  Re- 
sistance of  the  female,  see  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  3097. 

°3  Crim.  L.  Mag.  347. 

"People  V.  Miller,  96  Mich.  119,  55 
X.  W.  675;  State  V.  Wray,  109  Mo. 
594,  599,  19  S.  W.  86;  Reg.  v.  Beale, 
10  Cox  C.  C.  157;  White  v.  Common- 
wealth, 96  Ky.  180,  28  S.  W.  340,  16 
Ky.  L.  421 ;  State  v.  Eberline,  47  Kan. 
155,  157,  ^7  Pac.  839;  State  v.  Stor- 
key,  63  N.  Car.  7;  Murphy  v.  State, 
120  Ind.  115,  116,  22  X.  E.  106;  State 
V.  Dancy,  83  X.  Car.  608,  609;  Wil- 
liams V.  State,  47  Miss.  609,  613 ; 
State  V.  Wright,  25  Xeb.  38,  41,  40  X. 
W.  596;  Wood  V.  State,  46  Xeb.  58, 
64  X.  W.  355;  McMath  v.  State,  55 
Ga.  303;  Farrell  v.  State,  54  X.  J.  L. 
416,  419,  24  Atl.  ^22,',  Comer  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.),  20  S.  W.  547;  State  v. 
Lacey,  in  Mo.  513,  516,  20  S.  W. 
238;  Givens  v.  Commonwealth,  29 
Gratt.  (Va.)  830,  832;  Davis  v.  State, 
31  Xeb.  247,  47  X.  W.  854;  ]\Iayo  v. 
State,  7  Tex.  App.  342;  Fizell  v. 
State,  25  Wis.  364;  People  v.  Goulette, 


82  Mich.  36,  45  X.  W.  1 124;  State  v. 
Tilman,  30  La.  Ann.  1249,  31  Am. 
236 ;  State  v.  Grossheim,  79  Iowa  75, 
44  X.  W.  541 ;  Proper  v.  State,  85 
Wis.  615,  55  N.  W.  1035;  Common- 
wealth v.  Murphy,  165  Mass.  66,  42 
X.  E.  504,  52  Am.  St.  496,  30  L.  R. 
A.  734;  State  V.  Forsythe,  99  Iowa  i, 
68  X.  W.  446;  State  v.  Bricker,  135 
Iowa  343,  112  X^.  W.  645;  State  v. 
Mehojovich,  118  La.  1013,  43  So.  660; 
Sigerella  v.  State  (Del,  1909),  74  Atl. 
1081;  Heath  v.  State  (Ind.,  1909), 
90  X.  E.  310;  State  v.  Jones  (Iowa, 
1909),  123  X.  W.  960;  Perkins  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.,  1909),  124  S. 
W.  794- 

"  State  v.  Enright,  90  Iowa  520,  58 
X.  W.  901 ;  Rodriguiz  v.  State,  20 
Tex.  App.  542;  Reg.  v.  Barratt,  12 
Cox  C.  C.  498;  People  v.  Crosswell, 
13  ]\Iich.  427,  432,  87  Am.  Dec.  774; 
State  V.  Cunningham,  100  Mo.  382, 
392,  12  S.  W.  376.  If  the  female  is 
actually  under  the  statutory  age  of 
consent,  evidence  to  show  facts  from 
which  the  accused  might  have  in- 
ferred that  she  was  of  age  to  consent 


68; 


RAPE. 


§    409 


commit  rape.^-  ]Most,  if  not  all  the  American  authorities,  reason- 
ing from  the  difference  in  climate  between  England  and  Amer- 
ica, the  diversity  of  habits  of  living  and  the  peculiar  intermingling 
of  races  in  America,  ha\'e  regarded  this  presumption  as  rebut- 
table/^ 

But  the  evidence  of  physical  capacity  or  of  the  actual  maturity 


of  the  infant  must  be  clear  and  cogent. 


Slight  or  unconvincing 


evidence  of  actual  capacity  will  not  be  enough  to  justify  submit- 
ting the  case  to  the  jury.^'* 

§  409.  Relevancy  of  the  victim's  complaint — Proving  the  details 
of  what  she  said. — The  fact  that  the  victim  of  a  rape  was  weep- 
ing,^^  or  that  she  made  immediate  complaint,  as  well  as  when  she 
made  it  and  to  whom,  being  material  and  relevant  to  show  the 
commission  of  the  crime,  may  be  proved  as  original  evidence  on 
the  direct  examination  of  the  prosecutrix^*^  as  an  exception  to 


is  inadmissible.  People  v.  Ratz,  115 
Cal.  132,  46  Pac.  915. 

"Reg.  V.  Philips,  8  C.  &  P.  7z(i; 
Reg.  V.  Jordan,  9  C.  &  P.  118;  Rex 
V.  Groombridge,  7  C.  &  P.  582;  State 
V.  Handy,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  566,  567; 
McKinny  v.  State,  29  Fla.  565,  10  So. 
'/Z'2',  30  Am.  St.  140. 

"  Williams  v.  State,  14  Ohio  222,  45 
Am.    Dec.   536;    People  v.   Randolph, 

2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  174,  177;  Heilman 
V.  Commonwealth,  84  Ky.  457,  461,  i 
S.  W.  731,  8  Ky.  L.  451, 4  Am.  St.  207 ; 
State  V.  Jones,  39  La.  Ann.  935,  936, 

3  So.  57;  Beason  v.  State  (Miss., 
1909),  50  So.  488, 

"Godfrey  v.  State,  31  Ala.  Z'^s^  Z'^^^ 
70  \m.  Dec.  494n ;  State  v.  Goin,  9 
Humph.  (Tcnn.)  174,  177;  Peckham 
V.  People,  32  Colo.  140,  75  Pac.  422. 
A  boy  over  fourteen  is  presumed  ca- 
pable. State  V.  Handy,  4  Harr. 
TDcI.)  566,  567;  State  v.  Goin,  supra. 
If  a  crime  be  not  merely  the  result  of 
boyish  pugnacity,  but  of  some  pas- 
sion such  as  lust  in  the  case  of  rape, 
the  law  will  interpose  and  the  infant, 
though  under  fourteen,  will  be  pun- 
i^icd.      Malice    and    wickedness    will 


supply  the  want  of  age.  State  v. 
Pugh,  7  Jones  (N.  Car.)  61,  63.  C/. 
Heilman  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Ky. 
457,  I  S.  W.  '/2,i,'&  Ky.  L.  451,  4  Am. 
St.  207. 

"State  V.  Bedard,  65  Vt.  278,  26 
Atl.  719. 

'"  State  V.  Patrick,  107  ]\Io.  147,  163, 
17  S.  W.  666;  Poison  v.  State,  137 
Ind.  519,  35  X.  E.  907;  Griffin  v. 
State,  76  Ala.  29,  Z^'^  Territory  v. 
Godfrey,  6  Dak.  46,  50  N.  W.  481; 
People  V.  Barney,  114  Cal.  554,  47 
Pac.  41;  Oleson  v.  State,  11  Neb.  276, 
279,  9  N.  W.  38,  38  Am.  366;  People 
V.  Scalamiero,  143  Cal.  343,  76  Pac. 
1098;  State  V.  Carpenter,  124  Iowa 
5,  98  N.  W.  775 ;  State  v.  Sudduth, 
52  S.  Car.  488,  30  S.  E.  408;  People 
V.  Scattura,  238  III.  313,  87  N.  E.  2,^2; 
State  V.  Neil,  13  Idaho  539,  90  Pac. 
860,  91  Pac.  318;  State  v.  Symens,  138 
Iowa  113,  IIS  N.  W.  ^-j^;  State  v. 
Bebb,  125  Iowa  494,  loi  N.  W.  189; 
State  V.  Stincs,  138  X.  Car.  686,  50  S. 
E.  851;  Dickey  v.  State,  86  Miss.  525. 
38  So.  776;  Posey  V.  State,  143  Ala. 
54,  38  So.  1019;  State  V.  Egbert,  125 
Iowa  443.   loi    N.   W.    191 ;    State  v. 


§  410 


CRIMINAL    EVaDENCE. 


688 


the  rule  exchiding  hearsay  e\i<leiice,  or  of  anv  other  witness.  It 
may  be  shown  that  the  complaint  was  made,  where  and  to  whom 
it  was  made,  and  that  some  person  was  accused  who  must  not  be 
named.  But  the  details  of  wliat  the  ])rosecutrix  said,  and  par- 
ticularly the  name  of  the  person  she  accuses  of  the  crime. ^'  can- 
not be  proved  on  the  direct  examination.^^  unless  the  complaint  is 
so  closely  connected  with  the  time  or  place  of  the  crime  as  to 
form  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc.^'' 

§  410.    Proving  details  to  impeach  or  corroborate. — Though  the 
particulars  of  the  complaint  are  not  generally  receivable  from  the 


Alyrberg  (Wash.,  1909),  105  Pac.  622. 

'"  State  V.  Griffin,  43  Wash.  591,  86 
Pac.  951. 

"  Hannon  v.  State,  70  Wis.  448,  451, 
36  N.  W.  I ;  Lee  v.  State,  74  Wis.  45, 
41  N.  W.  960;  State  v.  Langford,  45 
La.  Ann.  1177,  1179,  14  So.  181,  40 
Am.  St.  277;  Lowe  v.  State,  97  Ga. 
792,  25  S.  E.  676;  Baccio  v.  People, 
41  N.  Y.  265,  272 ;  Thompson  v.  State, 
38  Ind.  39;  Ellis  V.  State,  25  Fla.  702, 
708,  6  So.  768;  State  v.  Shettleworth, 
18  Minn.  208,  212;  People  v.  Stewart, 
97  Cal.  238,  32  Pac.  8;  Stephen  v. 
State,  II  Ga.  225;  State  v.  Campbell, 
20  Nev.  122,  17  Pac.  620;  State  v. 
Mitchell,  68  Iowa  116,  119,  26  N.  W. 
44 ;  State  v.  Richards,  33  Iowa  420 ; 
State  V.  Clark,  69  Iowa  294,  28  N. 
W.  606;  Parker  v.  State,  67  Md.  329, 
TO  Atl.  219,  I  Am.  387;  Stevens  v. 
People,  158  111.  in,  41  N.  E.  856; 
Pefferling  v.  State,  40  Tex.  486;  Peo- 
ple V.  Tierney,  67  Cal.  54,  7  Pac.  37; 
People  V.  IMayes,  66  Cal.  597,  6  Pac. 
691,  56  Am.  126;  Hornbeck  v.  State, 
35  Ohio  St.  277,  35  Am.  608;  Oleson 
V.  State,  II  Neb.  276,  279,  9  N.  W. 
3S,  38  Am.  366;  Hoist  V.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  I,  3  S.  W.  757,  59  Am. 
770;  Reg.  V.  Walker,  2  Moo.  &  R. 
212;  People  V.  Bernor,  115  Mich.  692, 
74  N.  W.  184;  People  v.  Lambert,  120 
Cal.  170,  52  Pac.  307;  Anderson  v. 
State,  82  Miss.  784,  35  So.  202;  State 


V.  Fowler,  13  Idaho  317,  89  Pac.  757; 
People  V.  Scattura,  238  111.  313,  87  N. 

E.  332;  State  V.  Griffin, -43  Wash.  591, 
86  Pac.  951 ;  Jeffries  v.  State,  89  Miss. 
643,  42  So.  801 ;  People  v.  Weston, 
236  111.  104,  86  N.  E.  188;  State  v. 
Symens,  138  Iowa  113,  115  N.  W.  878. 

"State  V.  Fitzsimon,  18  R.  I.  236, 
27  Atl.  446,  49  Am.  St.  766;  People 
V.  Glover,  71  Mich.  303,  38  N.  W. 
874;  People  V.  Gage,  62  Mich.  271, 
274,  28  N.  W.  835,  4  Am.  St.  854; 
Castillo  V.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  145,  150, 
19  S.  W.  892,  37  Am.  St.  794 ;  Barnett 
V.  State,  83  Ala.  40,  3  So.  612; 
Barnes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  204,  208,  7 
So.  38,  16  Am.  St.  48;  State  v.  Byrne, 
47  Conn.  465,  467;  State  v.  Kinney, 
44  Conn.  153,  26  Am.  436;  State  v. 
Patrick,  107  Mo.  147,  163-168,  17  S. 
W.  666;  State  v.  Jerome,  82  Iowa 
749,  48  N.  W.  722;  Laughlin  v.  State, 
18  Ohio  99,  51  Am.  Dec.  444;  Mc- 
Math  v.  State,  55  Ga.  303,  307;  Bac- 
cio v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  265 ;  Stephen 
V.  State,  II  Ga.  225;  Reg.  v.  Eyre,  2 

F.  &  F.  579;  Cunningham  v.  People, 
210  111.  410,  71  N.  E.  389;  Adams  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  586,  99  S.  W.  1015; 
Skaggs  V.  State,  88  Ark.  62,  113  S.  W. 
346;  State  V.  Colombo  (Del.  O.  &  T., 
1909),  75  Atl.  616;  Huey  v.  State 
(Ga.  App.,  1910),  66  S.  E.  1023. 

Declarations  of  prosecutrix  as  res 


689 


RAPE. 


§    411 


witness  who  testifies  to  the  fact  that  it  was  made,  counsel  for  the 
accused  may.  with  propriety,  bring  out  the  details  upon  cross- 
examination  to  contradict  or  to  impeach  the  witness,  or  the  prose- 
cutrix if  she  testifies.-" 

As  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  the  details  of  the  complaint 
are  sometimes  allowed  to  be  shown,  sometimes  upon  the  direct 
examination  but  usually  in  rebuttal  solely  to  corroborate  the  pros- 
ecutrix (and  then  only  after  she  has  been  impeached  on  cross- 
examination),  by  showing  that  she  told  the  same  story  to  several 
persons  in  or  out  of  court. -^ 

But  the  details  of  the  complaint  cannot  be  introduced  if  the 
prosecutrix  refuses  to  testify,  or  if  she  cannot  testify  because  she 
has  died  before  the  trial,'-  or  because  she  is  an  imbecile.-^ 

>j  411.  Delay  in  making  complaint — Reasons  for  delay. — Undue 
delay  and  e\-en  delay  for  a  few  days,  unless  reasonably  explained. 


(jcstcc,  see  19  L.  R.  A.  744,  note; 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3098.  Admissions 
and  confessions,  see  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3103;  corroboration,  §  3102;  cir- 
cumstantial evidence,  §  3104;  vari- 
ance, §  3109;  clothing  worn  by  prose- 
cutrix or  by  defendant,  admissible, 
§  3106. 

■"  State  v.  Freeman,  100  X.  Car.  429, 
433,  5  S.  E.  921 ;  Wood  v.  State,  46 
Xeb.  58,  64  X.  W.  355;  State  v.  Clark, 
69  Iowa  294,  296,  28  X.  W.  606;  Bar- 
nett  V.  State,  83  Ala.  40,  44,  3  So.  612; 
Griffin  v.  State,  76  Ala.  29,  32;  Pleas- 
ant v.  State,  15  Ark.  624;  Thompson 
v.  State,  38  Ind.  39,  3  Greenl.  on  Ev., 
§  213;  Parker  v.  State,  67  Md.  329, 
331,  10  Atl.  219;  Sc.xton  V.  State 
(.\rk.,  1909),  I2r  S.  W.  1075.  "If 
these  declarations  are  in  accordance 
with  the  testimony  given  irr  court,  they 
tend  to  strengthen  and  give  effect  to 
that  testimony;  if  against  it,  the  tes- 
timony is  destroyed."  Johnson  v. 
State,  17  Ohio  593;  approved  in  State 
v.  Patrick.  107  Mo.  147,  \C,t.,  17  S    W. 

44 — L'niiki!IIIi.i.  Ckim.   1-.\. 


^Castillo  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  145, 
151,  19  S.  W.  892,  2)7  Am.  St.  794; 
State  v.  Byrne,  47  Conn.  465,  467; 
State  V.  Kinney,  44  Conn.  153,  26  Am. 
433;  Barnett  v.  State,  83  Ala.  40,  44, 
3  So.  612;  Oleson  v.  State,  11  Neb. 
276,  281,  9  N.  W.  38,  38  Am.  366; 
Proper  v.  State,  85  Wis.  615,  55  N. 
W.  1035 ;  State  v.  Langford,  45  La. 
Ann.  1 177,  1 180,  14  So.  i8r,  40  Am. 
St.  277;  State  V.  Hutchinson,  95  Iowa 
566,  64  X.  W.  6to;  State  v.  Werner, 
16  N.  Dak.  %2„  112  X.  W.  60;  State 
V.  Carpenter,  124  Iowa  5,  98  N.  W. 
775;  State  v.  Parker,  134  N.  Car. 
209,  46  S.  E.  511,  and  see  cases  in  last 
note. 

~  Reg.  V.  ]\Iegson,  9  C.  &  P.  420. 

"  State  V.  Meyers,  46  Xeb.  152,  64 
N.  W.  697,  37  L.  R.  A.  423n.  Such 
evidence,  though  in  corroboration, 
may  be  received  before  she  testifies. 
Proctor  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  20 
S.  W.  213,  14  Ky.  L.  248:  State  v. 
Mitchell.  68  Iowa  116,  119.  26  X.  W. 
44.  Contra,  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ohio 
593- 


§  411 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


690 


may,  it  seems,  result  in  the  rejection  of  evidence  of  the  fact  that 
a  complaint  was  made.-* 

No  invariable  rule  can  be  laid  down  defining  what  weight  delay 
will  have.  It  is  so  natural  that  a  virtuous  female  should  immedi- 
ately complain  of  such  an  outrage  to  those  connected  with  her  by 
ties  of  blood  or  friendship,  that  her  neglect  to  do  so  is  a  circum- 
stance which  may  discredit  her.  Silence  and  delay  in  making 
complaint  would  be  likely  to  awaken  suspicion  and  doubt  as  to 
the  truth  of  the  complaint.  F'ailure  to  make  an  outcry  or  com- 
plaint is  always  relevant. "°  How  much  it  ought  to  discredit 
her  depends  wholly  upon  the  circumstances  and  upon  the  nature 
and  validity  of  the  reasons  for  her  silence. -'' 


"*  Hornbeck  v.  State,  35  Ohio  St. 
277,  35  Am.  608;  Bueno  v.  People,  i 
Colo.  App.  232,  28  Pac.  248;  Higgins 
V.  People,  58  N.  Y.  zil',  Thompson 
V.  State,  Z2>  Tex.  Cr.  472,  26  S.  W. 
987;  State  V.  Reid,  39  Minn.  277,  280, 
39  X.  \V.  796;  State  V.  Wilkins,  66 
Vt.  I,  ID,  28  Atl.  323;  State  v.  Byrne, 
47  Conn.  465,  467;  Jackson  v.  State, 
91  Wis.  253,  64  N.  W.  838;  State  v. 
Peter,  8  Jones  (N.  Car.)  19;  Maillet 
V.  People,  42  ]\rich.  262,  3  X.  W.  854; 
People  V.  Brown,  53  Mich.  531,  19  N. 
W.  172;  People  V.  Glover,  71  ]\Iich. 
303,  38  N.  W.  874;  State  v.  Xiles,  47 
Vt.  82;  Johnson  v.  State,  27  Xeb. 
687,  43  X.  W.  425;  Bailey  v.  Com- 
monwealth, "^2  Va.  107,  113,  3  Am. 
St.  87;  State  V.  Cassidy,  85  Iowa  145, 
52  X.  W.  I,  2 ;  People  v.  Lambert,  120 
Cal.  170,  52  Pac.  307;  People  v.  Gon- 
zalez, 6  Cal.  App.  255,  91  Pac.  1013; 
Kearse  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  88  S.  W. 
363;  Cowles  V.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  498, 
102  S.  W.  1128;  State  V.  Griffin,  43 
Wash.  591,  86  Pac.  951.  "Mere  lapse 
of  time  between  the  perpetration  of 
the  act  and  the  complaint  is  not  the 
test  of  its  admissibility.  The  time 
that  intervenes  is  a  subject  for  the 
jury  to  consider  in  passing  upon  the 


weight  of  her  testimony;  and  the  de- 
gree of  credit  to  be  given  it  on  ac- 
count of  the  delay  in  making  it  de- 
pends on  the  particular  circumstances 
of  the  case."  The  court  in  State  v. 
]^Iulkern,  85  Me.  106,  107,  26  Atl. 
1017;  People  V.  Gage,  62  Mich.  271, 
275,  28  X.  W.  835,  4  Am.  St.  854- 

■^  People  V.  Fong  Chung,  5  Cal. 
App.  587,  91  Pac.  105.  In  a  prosecu- 
tion for  rape,  a  concealment  of  the 
injury  for  any  considerable  time  after 
the  woman  has  had  an  opportunity  to 
complain,  and  a  failure  on  her  part 
to  make  an  outcry  where  the  act  is 
committed  within  the  probable  hear- 
ing of  other  persons,  are  circum- 
stances which  will  justify  a  strong, 
but  not  conclusive,  inference  that  the 
act  was  with  her  consent,  and  not  by 
force.  State  v.  Goodale,  210  Mo.  275, 
109  S.  W.  9. 

=°  Higgins  V.  People,  58  X.  Y.  zn, 
379;  State  V.  Knapp,  45  X.  H.  148; 
Baccio  V.  People,  41  X.  Y.  265 ;  State 
V.  Wilkins, •  66  Vt.  i,  17,  28  Atl.  323; 
State  V.  Xiles,  47  Vt.  82;  Vaughn  v. 
State,  78  Xeb.  317,  no  X.  W.  992; 
People  V.  Keith,  141  Cal.  686,  75  Pac. 
304. 


691 


RAPE. 


§    412 


If  the  silence  or  the  delay  of  the  prosecutrix  in  complaining  is 
urged  to  lessen  the  force  or  credibility  of  her  evidence,  she  should 
always  be  permitted  to  explain  why  she  was  silent.  Her  delay 
may  be  explained  and  excused  by  proof  of  sufficient  cause  there- 
for, as,  for  example,  by  want  of  opportunity,  or  by  duress  or 
threats  by  the  perpetrator  of  the  wn'ong.-'  Thus,  if  she  is  a  child 
she  may  show  she  did  not  complain  immediately  to  her  mother 
because'  she  was  afraid  of  a  whipping,  or  because  the  latter  was 
away  from  home  when  the  crime  was  committed,-^  or  because 
shame  prompted  her  to  suppress  the  fact,"'*  or  that  she  w^as  deaf 
and  dumb,^**  or  was  very  young,  lived  with  the  defendant  and  was 
influenced  and  threatened  by  him.^^ 

§  412.  Medical  testimony. — A  physical  examination  to  procure 
evidence  is  not  indispensable,^-  nor  should  the  refusal  of  a  modest 
prosecutrix  to  submit  to  one  be  allowed  to  discredit  her  as  a  wit- 
ness.^^  But  a  physician,  after  he  has  made  such  an  examination, 
may  state  the  age  of  the  prosecutrix,  that  he  found  bruises  on 
her,^*  may  state  in  detail  the  appearance  of  the  limbs  and  genital 


■^  State  V.  Bebb,  125  Iowa  494,  loi 
N.  W.  189. 

^Poison  V.  State,  137  Ind.  519,  35 
N.  E.  907,  908;  People  v.  Terwilliger, 
74  Hun  (N.  Y.)  310,  26  N.  Y.  S.  674, 
aflf'd  142  N.  Y.  629,  Z7  X-  E.  565. 

=*  State  V.  Wilkins,  66  Vt.  i,  10,  28 
Atl.  323,  2)27.  Whether  the  reason  is 
a  good  one  is  for  the  jury.  State  v. 
Reid,  39  Minn.  277,  281,  39  N.  W. 
796;  Baccio  V.  People,  41  N.  Y.  265, 
271.  And  it  is  for  them  to  estimate 
the  force  and  effect  of  the  silence 
and  delay  of  the  prosecutrix,  keeping 
in  view  the  reasons  which  caused 
them. 

'^  State  V.  DeWolf,  8  Conn.  93,  20 
Am.  Dec.  90. 

^'  State  V.  Byrne,  47  Conn.  465 ; 
State  V.  Baker,  136  Mo.  74,  37  S.  W. 
«^io.  Cf.  People  V.  O'Sullivan,  104 
.\'.  Y.  481,  490,  10  N.  E.  880,  58  Am. 
530.       "It     would     then     clearly     be 


proper  to  show  the  reasons  of  such 
delay,  whether  caused  by  the  threats 
of  the  prisoner,  inability  caused  by 
the  violence,  want  of  opportunity,  or 
the  fear  of  injury  by  the  communi- 
cation to  the  only  persons  at  hand." 
State  V.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  148,  155; 
People  V.  Glover,  71  Mich.  303,  307, 
38  N.  W.  874;  People  v.  Knight 
(Cal.,  1895),  43  Pac.  6. 

^"Frazier  v.  State,  56  Ark.  242,  19 
S.  W.  838. 

"  Barnett  v.  State,  '^z  Ala.  40,  3  So. 
612.  Defendant  cannot  insist  that 
the  prosecutri.x,  though  a  young  child, 
shall  submit  to  a  medical  examina- 
tion. It  is  wholly  discretionary  with 
the  court.  McGufF  v.  State,  88  Ala. 
147.  153,  7  So.  35,  16  Am.  St.  25. 

■'"Myers  v.  State,  84  Ala.  11,  12,  4 
So.  291 ;  Poison  v.  State,  137  Ind. 
519.  3.'?  N.  K.  907;  Neill  v.  State,  49 
Tex.  Cr.  219,  91  S.  W.  791.    The  fact 


§    413  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  692 

organs  of  the  female.''"  and  llial  there  had  been  actual  penetra- 
tion,^'' or  he  may  give  an  opinion  whether  penetration^^  or  com- 
plete sexual  intercourse  was  jiossible,"'-  and  whether  pregnane)- 
would  ensue  if  a  rape  had  been  committed.^''  Expert  testimony 
of  the  physical  strength  and  condition  of  the  prosecutrix  is  always 
received  to  show  her  ability  or  inability  to  resist."  The  medical 
expert  witness  may  give  an  opinion  based  upon  a  hypothetical 
question  containing  material  facts  proved  or  assumed  to  be 
proved,  or  he  may  base  his  opinion  as  to  the  causes  of  the  physical 
condition  of  the  prosecutrix  upon  the  evidence  of  another  physi- 
cian who,  having  examined  her,  describes  her  condition  as  he 
observed  it.*^ 

A  physician  cannot  testify  as  to  the  mental  effects  of  indecent 
liberties  on  a  woman's  person/-  or  whether  the  accused  could 
have  had  sexual  intercourse  with  a  woman  without  her  consent, 
without  resorting  to  extraordinary  physical  violence,'*^  as  the 
question  of  consent  is  for  the  jury.  The  victim's  exclamations 
evincing  her  present  feelings,  or  her  statements  of  present  suffer- 
ing made  to  a  physician  in  the  course  of  medical  treatment  or 
examination  may  be  proved  by  any  one  who  heard  them.  They 
are  original  evidence,  and  whether  the  feelings  were  or  were  not 
simulated  is  for  the  jury.** 

§  413.    Eelevancy  of  the  physical  condition  of  the  prosecutrix. — 

that,  on  an   examination   six   months  ^People   v.    Clark,    S3    Mich.    112; 

later  than  the  alleged  rape,  the  hymen  Proper  v.   State,  85  Wis.  615,  55   N. 

was  found  unruptured,  is  admissible,  W.  1035. 

the  remoteness  of  such  evidence  go-  ^"People  v.  Tarbox,  115  Cal.  57,  46 

ing    merely    to    its    probative    force.  Pac.  896. 

Gifford  V.    People,   148   111.    173,    178,  ^°  State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  148,  154. 

35   N.    E.    754.      Cf.   State  v.    Evans,  '"State  v.  Watson,  81  Iowa  380,  46 

138  Mo.  116,  39  S.  W.  462,  60  Am.  St.  N.  W.  868. 

549.    As  to  physical  examination  and  *'  People  v.  Royal,  53  Cal.  62. 

medical    testimony,    see    Elliott    Evi-  ■"  Woodin    v.    People,    i    Park.    Cr. 

dence,  §  3107;  68  Am.  St.  252,  note.  (N.  Y.)  464,  467. 

"State   v.    Symens,    138   Iowa    113,  *^  Poison  v.  State,   137  Ind.  519,  35 

115  N.  W.  878.  N.    E.    907,    919;    Underbill    on    Ev., 

^Woodin    v.    People,    i    Park.    Cr.  §  52.     Cf.   State  v.   Yocum,   117  Mo. 

(N.  Y.)  464,  467.  622,  23   S.  W.  765,  which  holds  that 

"Hardtke    v.    State,    67    Wis.    552,  whatever  the   female  told  her  physi- 

554.  30  N.  W.  72;^ ;  State  v.  Watson,  cian  is  not  admissible. 
81  Iowa  380,  46  X.  W.  868. 


693 


RAPE. 


§    413 


Evidence  of  the  physical  appearance  and  condition  of  the  prose- 
cutrix subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  alleged  rape  is  always  rele- 
vant to  corroborate  her  evidence  and  as  tending  to  show  the  prob- 
ability or  improbability  that  a  rape  was  committed.'*-  Non-expert 
witnesses,  who  have  had  adec[uate  opportunities  for  observation, 
may  testify  to  facts  relating  to  her  condition,  if  within  their  own 
knowledge,  where  their  observation  does  not  require  or  presup- 
pose the  possession  of  special  scientific  or  medical  training.*"' 
Thus,  the  husband,  mother  or  other  relative  of  the  prosecuting 
witness  may  testify  that  they  found  bruises  and  other  marks  of 
violence  on  her  body,*"*  or  to  the  condition  of  her  underclothing, 
or  the  bedding  used  by  her,  if  it  is  first  shown  that  they  were 
worn  when  the  alleged  rape  was  committed.*^  The  birth  of  a 
child  to  the  prosecuting  witness  on  such  a  date  as  it  would  occur 
in  the  course  of  nature,  assuming  that  she  had  had  sexual  inter- 
course with  the  accused  at  the  date  mentioned  is  always  rele- 
vant,**' and  the  prosecuting  witness  may  herself  testify  to  the 
birth  of  a  child.*'  It  is  not  permissible  to  prove  a  resemblance 
between  the  prisoner  and  a  child  born  to  the  prosecutrix  by  exhib- 


*^  Myers  v.  State,  84  Ala.  11,  12,  4 
So.  291 ;  Brauer  v.  State,  25  Wis. 
413,  418;  Commonwealth  v.  Allen, 
13s  Pa.  St.  483,  19  Atl.  957:  People 
V.  Baldwin,  117  Cal.  244,  49  Pac.  186; 
Skaggs  V.  State,  88  Ark.  62,  113  S. 
W.  346;  Sigerella  v.  State  (Del., 
1909),  74  Atl.  1081 ;  State  v.  Colomba 
(Del.  O.  &  T.  1909),  75  Atl.  616. 

*■'' State  V.  Murphj%  ri8  Mo.  7,  25 
S.  W.  95 ;  State  v.  Sanford,  124  Mo. 
484,  27  S.  W.  1099;  Poison  V.  State, 
137  Ind.  519,  35  N.  E.  907;  State  v. 
Suddiith,  52  S.  Car.  488,  30  S.  E. 
408.  One  who  has  married  the  prose- 
cutrix after  the  crime  may  testify 
that  he  had  discovered  she  was  not 
a  virgin.  Smith  v.  State,  52  Tex. 
Cr.  344,  106  S.  W.  1 161. 

"  Ilannon  v.  State,  70  Wis.  448,  451, 
36  X.  W.  T ;  State  v.  Harness,  10 
Idaho  18,  76  Pac.  788. 

"  Gonzales  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
61  r,  620,  25  S.  W.  781.  The  clothing 
worn  by  the  woman  assailed,  as  well 


as  that  worn  b}^  tlie  accused,  may  be 
received  in  evidence  to  corroborate 
the  evidence  of  the  prosecutrix  and 
as  independent  evidence  to  prove  the 
commission  of  the  crime.  Ransbot- 
tom  v.  State,  144  Ind.  250,  43  N.  E. 
218;  State  V.  Murphy,  118  Mo.  7,  16, 
25  S.  W.  95 ;  State  v.  Duffy,  124  Mo. 

I,  10,  27  S.  W.  358,  360;  McMurrin 
V.  Rigby,  80  Iowa  322,  324,  45  N.  W. 
877.  But  the  clothing  must  be  iden- 
tified as  that  which  she  wore  at  the 
time  of  the  crime.  Gonzales  v.  State, 
32  Tex.  Cr.  611,  25  S.  W.  781. 

'"State  V.  Walke,  69  Kan.  183,  76 
Pac.   408;    State  v.   Danforth.   73   N. 

II.  215,  60  .Atl.  839,  rii  Am.  St.  600; 
Druin  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.,  1910), 
124  S.  W.  856. 

■"State  v.  Miller,  71  Kan.  joo.  80 
Pac.  51  ;  State  v.  Stone,  74  Kan.  189, 
85  Pac.  808;  and  compare  People  v. 
Robertson,  88  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
198,  84  N.  Y.  S.  401. 


§  414  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE,  694 

iting  an  infant  three  months  old  to  the  jury,'*''  though  the  con- 
trary has  been  held  in  the  case  of  an  older  infant.'"  nor  can  her 
statement  that  the  accused  is  the  father  of  her  child  be  received.'"* 
It  may  be  shown  that  the  female  was,  upon  an  examination, 
found  to  have  a  venereal  disease.  To  connect  the  accused  with 
the  rape  evidence  is  then  admissible  to  show  that  he  had  a  sim- 
ilar disease  when  he  was  arrested,  and  if  he  denies  this  he  may 
be  cross-examined  upon  his  physical  condition  at  that  time."'^'- 
Evidence  that  the  prosecutrix  had  a  venereal  disease  is  not  ad- 
missible to  discredit  her,"  though  it  may  be  proved  by  the  ac- 
cused by  medical  testimony  that  she  had  such  a  disease  at  the  date 
of  the  rape,  that  it  was  contagious  and  that  accused  never  had 
it." 

?  414.  The  prosecutrix  as  a  witness — ^Her  competency  and  credi- 
bility— Infancy  of  prosecutrix  when  rendering  her  incompetent  as  a 
v;itness. — The  woman  is  competent  to  testify  to  the  facts  of  the 
rape,  though  her  evidence,  because  of  the  customary  secrecy  of 
the  crime,  and  the  ease  with  which  such  a  charge  may  be  made, 
should  be  somewhat  carefully  scrutinized.  It  has  been  held  that 
to  sustain  a  conviction  her  evidence  must  be  corroborated  on  all 
material  facts  and  circumstances  if  the  accused  goes  on  the  stand 
and  denies  the  crime.^*    But  it  would  seem  that  in  the  absence  of 

''  State  V.  Danforth,  48  Iowa  43-48,  Cal.  App.  626,  95  Pac.  380.    The  tes- 

30  Am.  387.  timony  of  a  physician  to  the  physical 

*' State  V.  Danforth,  78  N.  H.  215,  condition  of  the  defendant,  gained 
60  Atl.  839;  State  V.  Falmberg,  199  by  an  examination  in  the  jail,  sub- 
Mo.  232,  97  S.  W.  566,  116  Am.  St.  mitted  to  voluntarily,  the  defendant 
476-  being   told    that    the    prosecuting    at- 

°°  State  V.  Hussey,  7  Iowa  409,  411.  torney  had  sent  the  physician  for  that 

°*  People  V.    Glover,   71    Mich.   303,  purpose  only,  is  not  privileged.     Peo- 

305,    38    X.    W.    874.      Such    a    coin-  pie  v.  Glover,  71    ]\Iich.   303,  307,  38 

cidence    may    create    a    very    strong  N.  W.  874.     See  also,  §   178,  et  scq. 

presumption  of  guilt  in  the  minds  of  Privileged  communications, 

the    jurors    which    the    accused    may  ^- State  v.    Smith,    18    S.    Dak.   341, 

endeavor    to    rebut    by    proving   that  100  N.  W.  740. 

prior  to  the  date  of  the  alleged  rape  ""People    v.    Fong    Chung,    5    Cal. 

the    woman    had    sexual    intercourse  App.  587,  91  Pac.  105. 

with  other  men.     Nugent  v.  State,  18  "Innis     v.     State,     42     Ga.     473; 

Ala.  521,  526;   State  v.  Otey,  7  Kan.  Thompson  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  472, 

69,  77.     See   People  v.  Ah  Lean,  7  26  S.  W.  987;  Mathews  v.  State,  19 


695 


RAPE. 


414 


Statute  the  credibility  of  her  evidence  should  be  left  wholly  to  the 
jury  as  in  other  cases.  They  will  be  justified  in  convicting  the 
defendant  on  her  evidence  alone,  though  it  may  be  uncorrobo- 
rated, if  it  convinces  them  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
accused  is  guilty.'^''  But  her  testimony  should  be  carefully  scru- 
tinized, and  court  and  jury  should  diligently  guard  themselves 
from  the  undue  influence  of  the  sympathy  in  her  behalf  which  the 
circumstances  are  apt  to  excite. ^^     So  on  appeal  the  testimony 


Neb.  330,  336-338,  27  N.  W.  234; 
People  V.  Kunz,  76  Hun  (N.  Y.)  610, 
27  N.  Y.  S.  945;  State  v.  Connelly, 
57  ]Minn.  482,  485,  59  N.  W.  479; 
Bradshaw  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  165, 
94  S.  \V.  223 ;  Livinghouse  v.  State, 
76  Neb.  491,  107  N.  W.  854;  Klawit- 
ter  V.  State,  ^6  Neb.  49,  107  N.  W. 
121 ;  Fitzgerald  v.  State,  78  Neb.  i, 
no  N.  W.  676;  People  v.  Farina,  118 
N.  Y.  S.  817;  Donovan  v.  State,  140 
Wis.  570,  122  N.  W.  1022.  By  statute 
in  Iowa  Code,  §  5488;  State  v.  Norris, 
127  Iowa  683,  104  N.  W.  282,  corrob- 
oration is  required  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  connecting  accused  with 
the  crime.  State  v.  Bartlett,  127  Iowa 
689,  104  N.  W.  285;  State  v.  Black- 
burn flowa,  1907),  no  N.  W.  275. 

"Scott  V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  479,  60 
S.  E.  112;  Hill  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.), 
T7  S.  W.  808;  Hammond  v.  State, 
39  Neb.  252,  58  N.  W.  92;  State  v. 
Lattin,  29  Conn.  389;  Shirwin  v. 
People,  69  111.  55 ;  Givens  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 29  Gratt.  (Va.)  830,  835; 
State  V.  Hert,  89  Mo.  590,  591,  i  S. 
W.  830;  State  V.  Wilcox,  in  Mo. 
569,  20  S.  W.  314,  33  Am.  St.  551; 
Fager  v.  State,  22  Neb.  332,  35  N. 
W.  195 ;  Barnett  v.  State,  83  Ala.  40, 
3  So.  612;  Lynn  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  13  S.  W.  74,  n  Ky.  L.  772; 
State  V.  Dusenberry,  112  Mo.  277, 
296,  20  S.  W.  461.  Cf.  State  v.  Con- 
nelly, 57  Minn.  482,  485,  59  N.  W. 
479;    State   V.   McLaughlin,  44   Iowa 


82 ;  2  Bish.  on  Cr.  Pro.,  §  963 ;  i 
Phill.  on  Ev.,  7 ;  Curby  v.  Territorj^ 
4  Ariz.  371,  42  Fac.  953.  Cf. 
Mathews  v.  State,  19  Neb.  330,  2^  N. 
W.  234;  People  V.  Doyle  (Fla.,  1897), 
22  So.  272;  State  V.  Fetterly,  33 
Wash.  599,  74  Pac.  810;  State  v.  Day, 
188  Mo.  359,  87  S.  W.  465;  Brown 
V.  State,  127  Wis.  193,  106  N.  W. 
536;  Thomas  v.  Commonwealth,  106 
Va.  855,  56  S.  E.  705;  State  v.  Con- 
lin,  45  Wash.  478,  88  Pac.  932 ;  State 
V.  Jones,  32  Mont.  442,  80  Pac.  1095 ; 
Allen  V.  State  (Miss.,  1908),  45  So. 
833 ;  People  v.  Keith,  141  Cal.  686,  75 
Pac.  304;  Druin  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.,  1910),  124  S.  W.  856.  Admis- 
sions showing  a  plan  to  commit  a 
rape  or  the  flight  of  the  accused 
have  been  held  to  be  sufficient 
corroboration.  Loar  v.  State,  76 
Neb.  148,  107  N.  W.  229;  State  v. 
Hetland,  141  Iowa  524,  119  N.  W.  961. 
But  the  refusal  of  the  accused  to  be 
examined  by  a  physician  is  not  suffi- 
cient corroboration.  Rc.x  v.  Gray,  68 
J.  P.  Z2T. 

""  Boddie  v.  State,  52  Ala.  395,  398 ; 
State  V.  Hatfield,  75  Iowa  592,  596, 
39  N.  W.  910;  Smith  v.  State,  ^^  Ga. 
705,  711-716.  The  party  ravished 
may  give  evidence,  but  the  credibility 
of  her  evidence  must  be  left  to  the 
jury.  If  she  be  of  good  fame,  pres- 
ently disclosed  the  ofTeiise  and  made 
search  for  the  offender,  these  and 
like  circumstances  give  greater  prob- 


8  414 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


696 


of  the  prosecutrix  will  be  closely  scrutinized  and  if  it  appears 
incredible  a  judgment  of  guilty  should  be  reversed.'' 

A  conviction  will  not  be  sustained  if  the  prosecutrix  is  unable 
to  identify  the  prisoner.  Her  statements,  describing  the  man 
who  assaulted  her,  cannot  be  proved  at  the  trial  by  a  witness  to 
whom  she  made  them  out  of  court/''*  If  the  complainant  is  too 
young  to  comprehend  the  nature  and  responsibility  of  an  oath, 
her  testimony  is  not  admissible,"'^"  nor  are  her  statements  made 
out  of  court  permitted  to  be  proved.""  But  the  infancy  or  im- 
becility of  the  prosecutrix,''"^  though  of  such  a  nature  as  to  pre- 
clude her  from  giving  consent  or  making  resistance,  will  not  ex- 
clude her  evidence  if  she  is  shown  to  have  sufficient  mental  capac- 
ity to  comprehend  and  appreciate  the  nature  of  an  oath."^  Much 
latitude  is  allowable  in  the  cross-examination  of  the  prosecutrix. 
She  may  be  asked  if  she  consented  to  the  intercourse  with  the 
accused,"-  and  she  may  also  be  interrogated  upon  her  silence  in 
reference  thereto.  She  may  be  asked  if  she  reported  the  outrage 
to  her  priest,"^  or  if  she  said  that  the  accused  was  innocent,  and 
that  his  prosecution  was  for  blackmailing  purposes.''* 


ability  to  her  testimony.  If  she  be 
of  evil  fame,  unsupported  in  her  tes- 
timony by  others,  concealed  the  in- 
jury a  considerable  time,  and  might 
have  been  heard,  yet  made  no  out- 
cry, these  and  like  circumstances  cre- 
ate a  strong  but  not  a  conclusive  pre- 
sumption that  her  testimony  is  in- 
credible. 4  Bl.  Comm.  213.  When 
the  woman  is  the  sole  witness  for 
the  prosecution,  and  her  evidence  is 
impeached  and  contradicted,  it  may 
be  proved  that  she  had  made  charges 
of  a  like  nature  against  her  brother 
and  man}'  others  which  she  subse- 
quently admitted  were  false.  People 
V.    Evans,   72   Mich.   367,  381,  40   N. 

w.  473. 

"State  V.  Goodale,  210  Mo.  275, 
109  S.  W.  9. 

^*  Brogy  V.  Commonwealth,  10 
Gratt.   (Va.)   '/22,  725. 

'"^  Reg.  V.  Cockburn,  3  Cox  C.  C. 
543;  McMath  v.  State,  55  Ga.  303, 
308.     See  also,  65  L.  R.  A.  316,  note. 


'■"Reg.  V.  Nicholas,  2  C.  &  K.  246; 
Rex  V.  Williams,  7  C.  &  P.  320. 

""a  State  V.  Crouch,  130  Iowa  478, 
107  N.  W.  173. 

"^  Smith  V.  Commonwealth,  85  Va. 
924,  927,  9  S.  E.  148;  Rodgers  v. 
State,  30  Tex.  App.  510,  17  S.  W. 
T077;  IMcMath  V.  State,  55  Ga.  303, 
308;  State  V.  Lattin,  29  Conn.  389. 
The  witness,  if  young  and  very  ig- 
norant, may  be  plied  with  leading 
questions  by  the  prosecutor.  Ellis 
V.  State,  25  Fla.  702,  6  So.  768.  See 
§  204.  People  V.  Baldwin,  T17  Cal. 
244,  49  Pac.  186. 

"■Woodin  V.  People,  i  Park.  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  464;  Brown  v.  State,  127 
Wis.  T93,  106  N.  W.  536;  Schults  v. 
State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  351,  91  S.  W.  786. 

"'Maillet  v.  People,  42  Mich.  262, 
264,  3  N.  W.  854- 

•"  Shirwin  v.  People,  69  111.  55,  59! 
People  V.  Knight  (Cal.,  1895),  43 
Pac.  6. 


697 


RAPE. 


415 


^  415.  The  prior  relations  of  the  parties. — The  state  may  prove 
improper  acts  and  solicitations  to  sexual  intercourse  by  the  ac- 
cused toward  the  prosecutrix  and  other  assaults  by  the  accused 
on  her,"^  as  well  as  acts  of  voluntary  sexual  intercourse  between 
them  prior  to  the  rape  charged,''^^  in  order  to  show  his  probable 
motive  or  intent."'^  On  the  other  hand,  to  prove  consent,  it  may 
be  shown  that  the  prosecutrix  sought  the  company  of  the  ac- 
cused,'^' and  that  their  relations  were  always  friendly,  though 
chaste  and  proper.*"*  But  evidence  that  the  prosecutrix  knew  the 
accused  was  a  man  of  bad  character,"'^  or  evidence  to  show  acts 
of  sexual  intercourse  by  the  accused  with  other  women,  is  not 
admissible."" 


'^  State  V.  Campbell,  210  Mo.  202, 
109  S.  W.  706;  State  V.  Allison  (S. 
Dak.,  1909),  124  X.  W.  747. 

•"a  State  V.   Palmberg,  199  Mo.  233, 

97  S.  W.  566,  I  r6  Am.  St.  476 ;  State 
V.  Johnson,  133  Iowa  38,  no  N.  W. 
70;  State  V.  Mobley,  44  Wash.  549,  87 
Pac.  815;  Leedom  v.  State,  81  Xeb. 
585,  116  X.  W.  496. 

°*  State   V.   Carpenter,    124    Iowa   5, 

98  X.  W.  775 ;  State  v.  Crouch,  130 
Iowa  478,  107  X.  W.  173;  People  v. 
Morris,  3  Cal.  App.  i,  84  Pac.  463 ; 
State  V.  Fetterly,  ss  Wash.  599,  74 
Pac.  810;  State  v.  Trusty,  122  Iowa 
82,  97  X.  W.  989;  State  V.  Borchert, 
68  Kan.  360,  74  Pac.  iro8;  People  v. 
Manahan,  32  Cal.  68;  State  v.  Robi- 
son,  32  Ore.  43,  48  Pac.  357;  People 
V.  Abbott,  97  Mich.  484,  486,  56  N^. 
W.  662,  37  Am.  St.  360;  Hardtke  v. 
State,  67  Wis.  552,  554,  30  X.  W.  723 ; 
State  V.  Knapp,  45  X.  H.  148,  156; 
State  V.  Patrick,  107  Mo.  147,  155,  17 
S.  W.  666;  People  v.  O'SuUivan,  104 
X.  Y.  481,  484,  10  X.  E.  880,  58  Am. 
530;  Barnes  v.  State,  88  .Ma.  204, 
207,  7  So.  38,  16  Am.  St.  48;  Taylor 
V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  529,  545,  3  S. 
W.  753,  58  Am.  656n;  State  v.  Sysin- 
Kcr  (S.  Dak.,  19 10),  125  X.  W.  879. 
Evidence    of    a    previous    attempt    to 

ommit    a    rape    is    not    incompetent, 


because  it  comes  from  the  prosecu- 
trix. People  V.  O'Sullivan,  104 
X.  Y.  481,  484,  10  X.  E.  880,  58 
Am.  530;  State  v.  Parish,  104  X. 
Car.  679,  ID  S.  E.  457,  and  she  may 
be  asked  why  she  did  not  complain  of 
the  previous  attempts.  People  v. 
Lenon,  79  Cal.  625,  631,  21  Pac.  967. 
Evidence  of  other  rapes,  or  attempts 
at  rape,  by  the  defendant  upon  the 
prosecutrix  or  other  females,  is 
usually  irrelevant.  Janzen  v.  People, 
159  111.  440,  42  X'.  E.  862;  State  v. 
Stevens,  56  Kan.  720,  44  Pac.  992; 
State  V.  Thompson,  14  Wash.  285,  44 
Pac.  533.  //  seems,  that  such  evi- 
dence is  admissible  to  account  for 
the  absence  of  an  outcry  and  to  ex- 
plain why  there  was  no  laceration  of 
the  female  organ.  People  v.  Fultz, 
109  Cal.  258,  41  Pac.  1040;  State  v. 
Gaston,  96  Iowa  505,  65  X.  W.  415. 

"Shirwin  v.  People,  69  111.  55,  6r ; 
Warren  v.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  443,  114 
S.  W.  3B0. 

"'Hall  V.  People,  47  ^hch.  636,  11 
X.  W.  414. 

'"State  v.  Porter,  57  Iowa  691.  n 
X.  W.  644. 

■"'  People  V.  Bowcn,  49  Cal.  654. 
The  girl  may  testify  that  the  accused, 
lu-r  father,  was  a  man  of  great 
strength,  iiad  beaten  her  mother,  was 


4i6 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


698 


§  416.  Proof  of  carnal  knowledge  requisite. — Despite  some  lack 
of  harmony  in  the  early  English  cases,  it  is  now  settled  that  an 
allegation  of  carnal  knowledge  is  sustained  by  proof  of  actual 
penetration  alone ;  and  it  is  not  now,  and  never  seems  to  have 
been,  required  in  iVnicrica,  that  actual  emission  should  be 
proved.'^  Penetration  may  be  proved  by  the  direct  evidence  of 
the  female,  though  her  evidence  is  neither  the  best  nor  the  only 
proper  evidence  of  that  fact.  Her  ex'idence  on  this  point  ought 
to  be  convincing  and  consistent  to  sustain  a  conviction.'-  It  may 
be  inferred  from  the  circumstances,  as  from  the  physical  condi- 
tion of  the  female,  the  marks  of  violence  on  her  and  her  com- 
plaints of  pain  and  soreness.  This  rule  is  very  important,  and  of 
frequent  application  in  the  case  of  the  rape  of  children,  who, 
from  ignorance  and  inexperience,  arc  incapable  of  testifying  in- 
telligently to  this  essential  fact.'''  Proof  of  penetration  beyond 
a  reasonable  doubt  is  always  absolutely  essential, ""^  both  at  com- 
mon law  and  under  tlie  statutes."  Evidence  that  the  woman  vol- 
untarily remained  with  the  defendant  in  a  room  all  night  is  not 
sutiicient  to  sustain  a  conviction.'^"  But  proof  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt  of  the  least  penetration  is  sufficient." 


drunk  when  he  outraged  her,  and 
that  she  was  frightened  and  in  great 
fear.  Maillet  v.  People,  42  Mich. 
262,  263,  3  N.  W.  854.  Cf.  Bean  v. 
People,  124  111.  576,  583,  16  N.  E. 
656.  Statements  by  the  defendant, 
made  months  before  the  crime,  tend- 
ing to  show  his  passion  towards  the 
woman,  are  receivable.  Barnes  v. 
State,  88  Ala.  204,  7  So.  38,  16  Am. 
St.  48. 

"  Comstock  V.  State,  14  Xeb.  205, 
206,  IS  N.  W.  355 ;  Waller  v.  State, 
40  Ala.  325,  332;  People  v.  Crowley, 
102  N.  Y.  234,  237,  6  X.  E.  384; 
State  V.  Hargrave,  65  X.  Car.  466, 
467;  Osgood  V.  State,  64  Wis.  472, 
25  N.  W.  529;  State  v.  Shields,  45 
Conn.  256;  Taylor  v.  State,  iii  Ind. 
279,  12  X^.  E.  400;  I  Hale  P.  C.  628; 
2  Bish.  Cr.  Law,  §  1127;  Bradburn 
V.  State,  162  Ind.  689,  71  X.  E.  133. 

""  State  V.  Forshee,  199  Mo.  142,  97 
S.  W.  933- 


"  Brauer  v.  State,  25  Wis.  413,  415; 
Taylor  v.  State,  iii  Ind.  279,  280,  12 
X.  E.  400;  Wesley  v.  State,  65  Ga. 
73i>  734;  People  v.  Crowley,  102  X. 
Y.  234,  237,  6  X.  E.  384;  Comstock 
V.  State,  14  Xeb.  205,  209,  15  X.  W. 
355 ;  State  v.  Depoister,  21  Xev.  107, 
25  Pac.  1000;  Givens  v.  Common- 
wealth, 29  Gratt.  (Va.)  830,  835;  Peo- 
ple V.  Bernor,  115  Mich.  692,  74  X.  W. 
184;  State  V.  Biggs  (Wash.,  1910), 
107  Pac.  374. 

^^Hardtke  v.  State,  67  Wis.  552, 
SS3,  30  X.  W.  72^;  State  v.  Dalton, 
106  Mo.  463,  17  S.  W.  700;  State  v. 
Grubb,  55  Kan.  678,  41  Pac.  951 ; 
Vickers  v.  United  States,  i  Okla.  Cr. 
452,  98  Pac.  467. 

''"  People  V.  Sheffield,  9  Cal.  App. 
130,  98  Pac.  67. 

™  Dickey  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  430, 
2  S.  W.  809;  Jacques  v.  People,  66 
III.  84,  86. 

"  People  V.  Crowley,  102  X^  Y.  234, 


699 


RAPE. 


§    417 


§  417.  The  force  or  fraud  employed — Threats  and  mortal  fear — 
Failure  to  make  outcry. — To  convict,  the  jury  must  be  satisfied  that 
the  sexual  intercourse  was  either  obtained  by  force,  or  if  it' was 
actually  obtained  by  trick  or  fraud,  that  the  accused  intended  to 
employ  force  if  the  fraud  should  fail.'*  An  actual  force  used  by 
the  accused  sufficient  to  create  an  apprehension  of  death  in  the 
mind  of  the  victim  need  not  be  proved.'"  If  a  less  degree  of 
force  is  used  but  coupled  with  threats  to  kill  or  to  inflict  bodily 
harm,  in,  fear  of  which  she  involuntarily  submits,  the  intimidation 
practiced  will  be  regarded  as  constructive  force. *°    The  kind  and 


237,  6  X.  E.  384;  People  v.  Courier, 
79  :Mich.  366,  367,  44  N.  W.  571; 
Brauer  v.  State,  25  Wis.  413,  415; 
State  V.  Shields,  45  Conn.  256;  Bailey 
V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  107,  113,  3 
Am.  St.  87;  Bean  v.  People,  124  111. 
576,  583,  16  N.  E.  656;  People  v. 
Rivers,  147  Mich.  643,  iii  N.  W.  201, 
14  Det.  Leg.  N.  6.  If  the  evidence 
satisfies  the  jury  that  any  part  of  the 
membrum  virile  of  the  accused  was 
within  the  labia  of  the  pxidenduin,  a 
verdict  of  guilt}'  should  be  rendered. 
Reg.  V.  Lines,  i  C.  &  K.  393,  47  E.  C. 
L.  393- 

''  Commonwealth  v.  Fields,  4  Leigh 
(Va.)  648;  State  v.  Shepard,  7  Conn. 
54;  Eberhart  v.  State,  134  Ind.  651, 
655,  34  N.  E.  627',  Garrison  v.  Peo- 
ple, 6  Xeb.  274;  McNair  v.  State,  53 
Ala.  453;  Lewis  v.  State,  30  Ala.  54, 
56,  68  Am.  Dec.  113;  Osgood  v.  State, 
64  Wis.  472,  474,  25  N.  W.  529;  Reg. 
V.  Stanton,  i  C.  &  K.  415;  Reg.  v. 
Camplin,  i  C.  &  K.  746;  State  v. 
Urie,  lor  Iowa  411,  70  N.  W.  603; 
State  V.  Neil,  13  Idaho  539,  90  Pac. 
860,  91  Pac.  318.  It  is  usually  said 
that  the  utmost  reluctance  and  re- 
sistance by  the  woman  should  appear. 
People  V.  Morrison,  i  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  625;  People  V.  Crosswell,  13 
Mich.  427,  433,  87  Am.  Dec.  774; 
People  V.   Abbot,  19  Wend.    (N.   Y.) 


192,  195;  Whittaker  v.  State,  50  Wis. 
S18,  523,  7  N.  W.  431,  36  Am.  856n; 
State  V.  Burgdorf,  53  Mo.  65,  67; 
Don  Moran  v.  People,  25  Mich.  356, 
12  Am.  283n;  Anderson  v.  State,  104 
Ind.  467,  474,  4  N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  711 ; 
People  V.  Murphy,  145  Mich.  524,  108 
N.  W.  1009;  Gaskin  v.  State,  105  Ga. 
631,  31  S.  E.  740;  3  Greenl.  on  Ev. 
210.  "The  resistance  must  be  up  to 
the  point  of  being  overpowered  by 
actual  force,  or  of  inability  from  loss 
of  strength  longer  to  resist,  or  from 
the  number  of  persons  attacking  re- 
sistance must  be  dangerous  or  abso- 
lutely useless,  or  there  must  be  du- 
ress or  fear  of  death."  People  v. 
Dohring,  59  N.  Y.  374,  382,  383,  17 
Am.  349;  People  v.  Bransby,  32  N. 
Y.  525,  531,  540. 

"Waller  v.  State,  40  Ala.  325,  331. 

^  Pleasant  v.  State,  13  Ark.  360 ; 
State  V.  Urie,  loi  Iowa  411,  70  N.  W. 
603 ;  Huston  v.  People,  121  111.  497, 
499,  13  N.  E.  538;  State  v.  Ward,  y^ 
Iowa  532,  35  N.  W.  617;  State  v.  Du- 
scnberry,  112  Mo.  277,  282,  296,  20 
S.  W.  461 ;  Turner  v.  People,  33 
Mich.  363;  llubcr  v.  State,  126  Ind. 
185,  186,  25  N.  E.  904.  To  establish 
the  crime  of  rape,  the  utmost  re- 
luctance on  the  part  of  the  woman 
must  be  shown,  and  also  that  she 
availed   herself    of   every    reasonable 


§  417 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


700 


degree  of  resistance  which  must  be  exerted,  and  which  may  rea- 
sonably be  expected,  depend  upon  the  physical  and  mental  con- 
dition of  the  parties,  their  ages  and  the  relations  existing  between 
them  and  the  surrounding  circumstances.  No  invariable  rule 
can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  amount  or  character  of  the  facts  which 
must  be  proved  to  show  a  reasonable  resistance.-^  Facts  must 
be  shown.  The  testimony  of  the  woman  that  she  fought  accused 
or  did  her  utmost  to  resist  him  is  merely  an  opinion  or  conclusion 
and  not  proof.''" 

It  is  always  admissible,  as  bearing  on  the  cjuestion  of  resist- 
ance, and  consent,  to  show  that  the  woman  screamed  or  cried  out 
for  aid  when  she  was  assaulted  by  the  defendant.  And  proof 
that  she  was  silent  or  that  her  garments  were  neither  torn,  soiled 
nor  disarranged  may  also  be  received.  Such  evidence,  though 
by  no  means  conclusive,  is  of  weight  in  favor  of  the  defendant 
if  not  sufficiently  explained.  From  proof  of  her  silence  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  commission  of  the  crime,  taken  in  connection 
with  evidence  of  her  mature  age  and  general  intelligence,  the  jury 
may  be  justified  in  the  inference  that  she  consented  to  the  inter- 
course.*^    But  her  silence  is  always  open  to  explanation.     Hence 


opportunity  to  make  the  utmost  re- 
sistance in  repelling  the  assailant  and 
preventing  him  from  accomplishing 
his  purpose;  and  a  showing  of  a 
passive  demeanor  is  not  sufficient, 
where  the  woman  is  sufficiently  pos- 
sessed of  her  mental  faculties  to  ap- 
prehend her  danger  and  to  control 
her  physical  powers  in  her  defense. 
Devoy  v.  State,  122  Wis.  148,  99  N. 
W.  455. 

*"a  Hawkins  v.  State,  136  Ind.  630, 
36  N.  E.  419;  Anderson  v.  State,  104 
Ind.  467,  474,  4  N.  E.  63,  5  N.  E.  711 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  McDonald,  no 
Mass.  405,  406;  Eberhart  v.  State, 
134  Ind.  651,  655,  34  N.  E.  637;  Fom- 
eroy  v.  State,  94  Ind.  96,  48  Am.  146; 
People  V.  Dohring,  59  N.  Y.  374,  383, 
17  Am.  349;  Waller  v.  State,  40  Ala. 
325 ;  State  v.  Sudduth,  52  S.  Car.  488, 
30  S.  E.  408;  State  v.  Carpenter,  124 
Iowa  5,  98  N.  W.  775. 


^  "The  nature  and  extent  of  resist- 
ance which  ought  reasonably  to  be 
expected  in  each  particular  case, 
must  necessarily  depend  verj'  much 
upon  the  peculiar  circumstances  at- 
tending it,  and  it  is  hence  quite  im- 
practicable to  lay  down  any  rule  upon 
that  subject  as  applicable  to  all  cases 
involving  the  necessit}^  of  showing  a 
reasonable  resistance."  Anderson  v. 
State,  104  Ind.  467,  474,  4  N.  E.  63, 
5  N.  E.  711;  Eberhart  v.  State,  134 
Ind.  651,  655,  34  N.  E.  637;  Huber 
V.  State,  126  Ind.  185,  186,  25  X.  E. 
904;  Davis  V.  State,  63  Ark.  470,  39 
S.  W.  356. 

*- Devoy  v.  State,  122  Wis.  148,  99 
N.  W.  455;  Brown  v.  State,  127  Wis. 
193,  106  N.  W.  536. 

^  State  V.  Cone,  i  Jones  (N.  Car.) 
18;  Eberhart  v.  State,  134  Ind.  651, 
656,  34  N.  E.  637;  State  v.  Cross,  12 
Iowa  66,  70,  79  Am.  Dec.  519;  Peo- 


yoi 


RAPE. 


§  418 


her  evidence  explaining  and  giving  reasons  for  her  silence,  as 
for  example,  where  she  testifies  that  she  did  not  make  an  outcry 
hecause  she  was  gagged  or  choked  by  the  accused,  or  because  she 
was  terrified  by  his  threats,  or  because  she  was  unconscious,  must 
always  be  considered  by  the  jury  in  determining  the  evidential 
value  of  her  silence.** 

It  is  never  absolutely  necessary  to  prove  that  her  screams 
were  heard  by  every  person  who  was  within  earshot,  if  her  state- 
ment that  she  made  an  outcry  is  corroborated  by  some  evidence.*^ 
The  clothing  of  the  prosecutrix,  an  infant  properly  identified  by 
her  mother,  is  competent  to  show  the  force  employed  which  may 
be  inferred  from  their  torn  condition.'^'' 

§  418.  Reputation  of  the  prosecutrix  for  chastity — Proof  of  specific 
unchaste  acts. — The  bad  reputation  of  the  prosecuting  witness  for 
unchastity  existing  prior  to  the  date  of  the  crime  is  always  rele- 
^•ant  in  evidence  to  show  that  the  sexual  intercourse  may  have 
been  consented  to  by  her.*^     An  exception  to  this  rule  is  made 


pie  V.  Morrison,  i  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 
625,  644;  State  V.  Brown,  54  Kan. 
71,  72,  2)7  Pac.  996;  People  v.  Kir- 
wan,  22  X.  Y.  S.  160,  67  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  652,  without  opinion;  Warren  v. 
State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  443,  114  S.  W. 
380. 

**  State  V.  Reid,  39  Minn.  277,  279,  39 
N.  W.  796. 

^'Bean  v.  People,  124  111.  576,  580, 
16  N.  E.  656.  Cf.  Brown  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 82  Va.  653 ;  Reynolds  v. 
People,  41  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  179; 
Barney  v.  People,  22  111.  160;  State 
V.  Marcks,  140  Mo.  656,  41  S.  W.  973, 
43  S.  W.  1095. 

*^  State  V.  Brannan,  206  Mo.  636, 
105  S.  W.  602. 

"State  V.  Barrick,  60  W.  Va.  576, 
55  S.  E.  652;  People  v.  Ryno,  148 
Mich.  137,  III  X.  W.  740,  14  Det. 
Lcj?.  X.  69;  State  v.  Dctwiler,  60  W. 
Va.  583,  55  S.  E.  654 ;  Black  v.  State, 
\\()  Ga.  746,  47  S.  E.  370;  Clark  v. 
Commonwealth   (Ky.),  92  S.  W.  573, 


29  Ky.  L.  154;  14  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
714;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3101; 
O'Blenis  v.  State,  47  N.  J.  L.  279, 
280;  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624, 
645-653 ;  People  v.  Johnson,  106  Cal.  \r 
289,  39  Pac.  622;  People  v.  Hart- 
man,  103  Cal.  242,  246,  2)7  Pac.  153, 
42  Am.  St.  108;  State  v.  Hollenbeck, 
67  Vt.  34,  30  Atl.  696;  Brown  v. 
State,  72  Miss.  997,  17  So.  275;  State 
V.  Eberline,  47  Kan.  155,  27  Pac. 
839;  State  V.  Brown,  55  Kan.  766,  42 
Pac.  363 ;  State  v.  Forshner,  43  N.  H. 
89,  80  Am.  Dec.  132;  Shields  v.  State, 
32  Te.x.  Cr.  498,  502,  23  S.  W.  893; 
Commonwealth  v.  Kendall,  113  Mass. 
210,  211,  18  Am.  469;  Rex  v.  Barker, 
3  C.  &  P.  589;  State  V.  Daniel,  87  N. 
Car.  507 ;  Anderson  v.  State,  104  Ind. 
467,  471,  4  N.  E.  62,  5  N.  E.  711: 
State  V.  Johnson,  28  Vt.  512,  514; 
Boddic  V.  State,  52  Ala.  395,  398; 
Rex  V.  Clarke,  2  Starkie  214.  Cf. 
Fry  V.  Commonwealth,  82  Va.  334; 
Tyler  V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  10,  79  S. 


4i8 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE, 


702 


where  the  female  is  under  the  age  of  consent.  Evidence  of  her 
reputation  for  unchastity  or  of  acts  of  sexual  intercourse  with 
the  accused  or  with  other  men  is  then  irrelevant  as  her  consent  is 
immaterial.'"'*  When  tlie  accused  attacks  the  chastity  of  the  pros- 
ecuting witness  by  evidence  of  reputation  for  unchastity  or  of 
illicit  intercourse,  the  prosecution  may  introduce  evidence  of  her 
reputation  for  chastity  to  discredit  such  testimony.'^'' 

The  cases  are  not  harmonious  upon  the  question  whether  the 
reputation  for  unchastity  of  a  woman  over  the  age  of  consent, 
existing  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  alleged  crime,  is  admissible. 
The  weight  of  the  cases  is  against  it.''"  The  evidence  of  un- 
chaste reputation  must  come  from  a  witness  who  has  been  a  resi- 
dent in  the  neighborhood  where  the  female  also  resided.  The 
report  of  what  a  detective  heard  about  the  woman,  on  inquiring 
among  her  acquaintances,  is  inadmissible.'*^ 

Acts  of  voluntary  sexual  intercourse  by  the  prosecuting  wit- 
ness with  the  defendant  prior  to  the  date  of  the  crime  may  be 
proved  by  her  extra-judicial  admissions, °-  by  her  answers  on  her 


W.  558;  Shoemaker  v.  State  (Tex. 
Cr.  App.,  1910),  126  S.  W.  887.  Her 
bad  character  for  chastity  may  show, 
or  tend  to  show,  that  the  prisoner 
believed  he  would  meet  with  little  or 
no  resistance.  Pratt  v.  State,  19  Ohio 
St.  277,  279.  Cf  Myers  v.  State,  51 
Neb.  517,  71  N.  W.  S3.  Evidence  of 
good  character  of  defendant  in  prose- 
cution for  rape,  see  103  Am.  St.  899, 
note. 

^  State  V.  Smith,  18  S.  Dak.  341, 
100  X.  W.  740;  People  V.  Abbott,  97 
Mich.  484,  486,  56  N.  W.  862,  37  Am. 
St.  360;  People  V.  Glover,  71  Mich. 
303,  38  N.  W.  874;  Plunkett  v.  State, 
72  Ark.  409,  82  S.  W.  845;  State  v. 
Lawrence,  74  Ohio  St.  38,  77  N.  E. 
266;  Renfroe  v.  State,  84  Ark.  16, 
104  S.  W.  542;  State  V.  Rivers  (Conn., 
1909),  74  Atl.  757.  Compare,  contra, 
Sykes  v.  State,  1 12  Tenn.  572, 82  S.  W. 
185,  105  Am.  St.  972n. 

""Leedom  v.  State,  8t  Neb.  585,  116 
N.  W.  496;  Warren  v.  State,  54  Tex. 
Cr.  443,  114  S.  W.  380. 


""State  V.  Ward,  73  Iowa  532,  35 
N.  W.  617;  State  v.  Forshner,  43  N. 
H.  89,  90,  80  Am.  Dec.  132;  Rex  v. 
Clarke,  2  Stark.  214;  People  v.  Ab- 
bot, 19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  192;  State  v. 
Day,  188  Mo.  359,  87  S.  W.  465 
(where  prosecutrix  was  under  the 
age  of  consent).  Contra,  Rex  v. 
Barker,  3  C.  &  P.  589,  3  Greenl., 
§  214;  Lake  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
104  S.  W.  1003,  31  Ky.  L.  1232. 

"'State  v.  Forshner,  43  N.  H.  89, 
80  Am.  Dec.  132.  It  may  not  be  nec- 
essary to  prove  that  the  reputation 
for  unchastity  is  well  known  or  an- 
cient. Thus  evidence  of  the  general 
reputation  of  the  prosecutrix  for 
chastity  in  the  community  is  relevant 
where  it  appeared  that  she  had  only 
been  in  town  for  about  twenty-four 
hours,  during  which  time  she  had 
openly  solicited  sexual  intercourse 
with  several  men.  State  v.  Brown, 
55  Kan.  766,  42  Pac.  363. 

^  State  V.  Cook,  65  Iowa  560,  562, 
22  N.  W.  675. 


/^6 


RAPE, 


418 


cross-examination."''  or  otherwise.''^  Such  evidence  is  relevant 
to  show  that  the  apparently  forced  intercourse  was  voluntarily 
submitted  to  by  her. 

The  great  majority  of  the  cases  maintain  the  rule  that  acts 
of  sexual  intercourse  participated  in  by  the  alleged  victim  of  the 
rape  prior  to  the  date  of  the  crime  but  with  other  men  than  the 
accused  cannot  be  shown  to  prove  her  consent. '•'•"'  This  rule  is 
said  to  be  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  prosecutrix  is 
unprepared  to  confute  and  disprove  sudden  and  unexpected  ac- 
cusation of  adulterous  acts.  In  the  main,  how^ever,  it  is  founded 
upon  the  theory  that  no  inference  can  be  drawn  that  she  con- 
sented to  intercourse  with  the  accused  from  the  fact  that  she  had 
previously  submitted  to  the  embraces  of  other  men.  Though 
evidence  of  adulterous  acts  with  other  men  is  not  generally  ad- 
missible, evidence  of  other  acts  indicating  the  possession  of  an 
immoral  character  is  relevant.     Evidence  of  drunkenness  and 


"  Bedgood  v.  State,  115  Ind.  275,  17 
X.  E.  621 ;  Shirwin  v.  People,  69  111. 
55 ;  State  v.  Gereke,  74  Kan.  196,  86 
Pac.  160,  87  Pac.  759;  State  v.  Se- 
christ  (Mo.,  1910),  126  S.  W.  400. 

"People  V.  Abbott,  97  Mich.  484, 
486,  56  N.  W.  862,  37  Am.  St.  360; 
Barnes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  204,  207,  7 
So.  38,  r6  Am.  St.  48;  State  v.  Jef- 
ferson, 6  Ired.  (X.  Car.)  305;  Woods 
V.  People,  55  N.  Y.  515,  14  Am.  309; 
Rex  V.  Martin,  6  C.  &  P.  562;  Bed- 
good  V.  State,  IIS  Ind.  275,  279,  17 
N.  E.  621 ;  Hall  v.  People,  47  Mich. 
636,  II  N.  W.  414;  State  v.  Cassidy, 
85  Iowa  14s,  52  X.  W.  I ;  State  v. 
Forshner,  43  X.  H.  89,  80  Am.  Dec. 
132;  People  V.  Grauer,  12  App.  Div. 
rX.  Y.)  464.  42  X.  Y.  S.  721;  State 
V.  Conlin,  45  Wash.  478,  88  Pac.  932; 
People  V.  Xichols  (Mich.,  1909),  124 
X.  W.  25,  16  Det.  Leg.  X.  890;  Boyd 
V.  State  (Ohio.  1910),  90  X.  E.  355. 

**  State  V.  Cassidy,  85  Iowa  145, 
149,  52  X.  W.  I ;  State  v.  Brown,  55 
Kan.  766,  42  Pac.  363;  Common- 
wealth   V.    Harri':,     131    Mass.    336; 


Commonwealth  v.  Kendall,  113  Mass. 
210,  211;  State  V.  Fitzsimon,  18  R.  I. 
236,  27  Atl.  446,  49  Am.  St.  766; 
Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624,  648; 
O'Blenis  v.  State,  47  X.  J.  L.  279; 
State  V.  Knapp,  45  X.  H.  148,  156; 
McCombs  V.  State,  8  Ohio  St.  643, 
646;  People  V.  Abbott,  97  Mich.  484, 
486,  56  X.  W.  862,  37  Am.  St.  360; 
State  V.  Patrick,  107  Mo.  147,  17  S. 
W.  666;  State  v.  Campbell,  20  Xev. 
122,  17  Pac.  620;  McQuirk  v.  State, 
84  Ala.  435,  4  So.  775,  5  Am.  381; 
People  V.  McLean,  71  Mich.  309,  38 
X.  W.  917,  IS  Am.  St.  263;  2  Phil, 
on  Ev.,  §  940;  I  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  458; 
Rose.  Cr.  Ev.  903 ;  State  v.  Turner,  i 
Hous.  C.  C.  (Del.)  76.  Contra,  State 
V.  Johnson,  28  Vt.  512,  513,  515;  Ben- 
nett, J.,  dissenting;  People  v.  Ab- 
bot, 19  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  192;  Benstine 
V.  State,  2  Lea  (Tenn.)  169,  173,  31 
Am.  593;  People  v.  Benson,  6  Cal. 
221,  65  Am.  Dec.  506;  People  v. 
Knight  (Cal.,  1895),  43  Pac.  6;  State 
V.  Whitescll,  142  Mo.  467,  44  S.  W. 
332.  Evidence  of  other  offenses  in 
prosecution  for  rape,  see  Elliott  Evi- 


§  4i8 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


704 


dissipation,  of  the  keeping  of  late  hours  and  of  street  walking  on 
the  part  of  the  prosecutrix  will  always  be  received.'"' 

Because  of  the  irrelevancy  of  adultery  with  other  men  it  has 
been  held,  according  to  the  majority  of  the  earlier  cases  in  both 
England  and  America,  that  when  on  her  cross-examination 
a  question  is  put  to  the  woman  as  regards  her  illicit  relations 
with  other  men,  and  she  waives  her  privilege  of  refusing  to 
answer  and  denies  the  act,  the  accused  is  bound  by  her  answer.''" 
The  more  recent  cases  hold,  however,  that  the  accused  under  such 
circumstances  is  not  concluded  by  her  answer,  though  the  matter 
may  not  be  strictly  relevant;  but  may  contradict  it  solely  for  im- 
peachment, by  proving  adulterous  actions  with  other  men  if  they 
are  not  too  remote  in  point  of  time."*' 

The  admissions  of  the  defendant,  particularly  an  offer  on  his 
part  to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  to  the  prosecutrix  or  her 
mother  to  settle  the  matter,  are  always  relevant  against  him."''' 
And  on  the  other  hand  it  is  competent  for  the  prosecution  to 
prove  that  the  prosecutrix  felt  friendly  toward  the  accused  and 
did  not  wish  to  have  him  indicted."" 


dence,  §  3105;  62  Am.  St.  193,  note; 
105  Am.  St.  1004,  note. 

""Brennan  v.  People,  7  Hun  (X. 
Y.)  171.  This  reasoning  clearly  pos- 
sesses little  validity  or  application 
where  the  accused  is  shown  to  be  a 
prostitute,  who  disposes  of  her  fa- 
vors to  all  men  indiscriminately. 

*'Reg.  V.  Cockcroft,  11  Cox  C.  C. 
410;  Reg.  V.  Holmes,  12  Cox  C.  C. 
137 ;  People  v.  Jackson,  6  X.  Y.  Cr. 
393- 

"'People  V.  Flaherty,  79  Hun  (X. 
Y.)  48,  29  X.  Y.  S.  641;  People  v. 
Knight  (Cal.,  1895),  43  Pac.  6.  "In 
determining  that  question  [of  con- 
sent], which  is  purely  a  mental  act, 
it  is  important  to  ascertain  whether 
her  consent  would,  from  her  previous 
habits,  be  the  natural  result  of  her 
mind,  or  whether  it  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  her  previous  life,  and 
repugnant  to  all  her  moral  feelings." 
By  the  court  in  State  v.  Johnson,  28 


Vt.  512;   Strang  v.   People,  24  Mich. 

h  7. 

"'■*  Hardtke  v.  State,  67  Wis.  552,  30 
X.  W.  723;  McMath  V.  State,  55  Ga. 
303,  308.  But  evidence  to  prove  acts 
of  sexual  intercourse  by  him  with 
other  women  must  be  rejected.  Peo- 
ple V.  Stewart,  85  Cal.  174,  24  Pac. 
722;  State  V.  La  Alont  (S.  Dak.,  1909), 
120  X.  W.  1 104.  Where  the  evidence 
tends  to  show  that  the  prosecutrix  is 
pregnant,  and  the  accused  denies  the 
sexual  intercourse,  it  may  be  shown 
that  the  woman  had  intercourse  with 
another  man  at  a  period  which  would 
account  for  her  pregnancy.  Rice  v. 
State,  37  Tex.  Cr.  38,  38  S.  W.  803. 
Contra,  State  v.  Blackburn  (Iowa, 
1907),  no  X.  W.  275,  permitting  evi- 
dence of  adulter}^  with  other  men  t'l 
take  a  wide  range  as  impeachment. 

'~  Huff  V.  State,  106  Ga.  432,  32  S. 
E.  348;  Denton  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 
193,  79  S.  W.  560. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 


FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG   AND    FALSE    PRETENSES. 


i  419.  Forgery — Definition  and  classi-     §  432. 
fication. 

420.  Competency  of  witnesses. 

421.  Variance  in  proving  the  writ- 

ing- 433- 

422.  Fraudulent    intent    and    guilty 

knowledge  —  Circumstantial 
evidence  to  show. 

423.  Evidence  of   similar  crimes   to 

show  the  intent — Effect  of  434. 
acquittal — Relevancy  of  pos-  435. 
session  of  forged  papers  on  436. 
charge  of  forgery. 

424.  Proof    of   uttering   forged   pa-       437. 

per.  438. 

425.  The    writing    alleged    to    have 

been     forged    as    evidence — 
Primary  evidence. 

426.  Proving  the  venue.  439. 

427.  Fictitious    names — Evidence    to 

prove  existence  or  non-exist-  440. 
ence  of  person. 

428.  Proving    the    corporate    exist-       441. 

ence  of  the  bank  upon  which 

the  forged  check  is  drawn.  442. 

429.  Proving  the   handwritinj — Ex- 

pert evidence — Standards  of  443. 
comparison. 

430.  Evidence     to     show     that     the 

forged  writing  could  not  ac- 
complish    the     purpose     in-       444. 
tended. 

431.  Sufficiency   of    evidence — Pccu-        445. 

niary    condition    of    the    ac- 
cused. 


Counterfeiting  —  Elements  of 
the  crime — Intent  and  guilty 
knowledge — Evidence  of  simi- 
lar offenses. 

Evidence  to  show  that  counter- 
feit money  or  implements  for 
its  manufacture  were  found 
in  the  possession  of  the  ac- 
cused. 

Resemblance  to  the  genuine. 

False  pretenses. 

Evidence  to  show  the  inten- 
tion of  the  owner. 

The  intent  to  defraud. 

Evidence  of  other  similar 
crimes  not  inadmissible  when 
relevant  to  show  the  intent 
to  defraud. 

The  pretenses  made  and  evi- 
dence to  show  their  falsity. 

The  pretenses  must  have  been 
calculated  to  deceive. 

The  value  of  the  property  ob- 
tained. 

Belief  in  the  false  representa- 
tions. 

Evidence  of  the  pecuniary  con- 
dition of  the  accused  at  the 
date  of  making  tiic  repre- 
sentations. 

The  false  pretenses  not  neces- 
sarily verl)al. 

Proving  the  venue. 


.^419.    Forgery — Definition   and   classification. — l-'orj^crv    at    ll 
common  law  i.s  the  fraudulent  making  or  alteration  of  a  writii 
45— Underhill  Ckim.  Ev.  (  705  ) 


§  419 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


706 


to  the  prejudice  of  another's  right.  It  may  be  committed  in  any 
writing,  which,  if  genuine,  would  operate  as  the  foundation  of 
another's  HabiHty  or  the  evidence  of  his  right. ^  The  following 
facts  must  be  shown.  First,  that  a  false  writing  has  been  made. 
Second,  that  it  was  apparently  capable  of  accomplishing  a  fraud- 
ulent purpose.  And  third,  the  fraudulent  intent."  A  material 
alteration  in  a  true  document  may  under  some  circumstances  be 
forgery.^  To  constitute  an  alteration  a  forgery  it  must  be  proved 
that  some  material  part  of  the  instrument  has  been  altered.^ 
Whether  an  alteration  is  material  or  not  is  a  question  of  law  for 
the  court. ^  Generally,  any  alteration  in  an  instrument  which 
makes  it  speak  a  language  which  is  different  in  its  legal  effect 
from  that  which  it  originally  spoke  or  which  creates  some  change 
in  the  rights,  interests  or  obligations  of  the  parties  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  material  alteration." 


^  State  V.  Thompson,  19  Iowa  299 ; 
McLean  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  660,  60 
S.  E.  332;  Goodman  v.  People,  228 
111.  154,  81  N.  E.  830. 

"  Mr.  Bishop  thus  defines  the  crime  : 
"Forgery  is  the  false  making,  or  ma- 
terially altering,  with  intent  to  de- 
fraud, of  any  writing  which,  if  genu- 
ine, might  apparently  be  of  legal  ef- 
ficacy, or  the  foundation  of  a  legal 
liability."  2  Bish.  Cr.  L.  adopted  as 
correct  in  Rembert  v.  State,  53  Ala. 
467,  468,  25  Am.  639.  Forgery  is  the 
fraudulent  making  of  a  false  writing, 
which,  if  genuine,  would  apparently 
be  of  some  legal  efficacy ;  and  the 
uttering,  publishing,  and  putting  off 
as  true  of  the  same,  with  intent  to 
defraud,  is  the  offense  specified  in 
Gen.  St.  1894,  §  6702.  State  v.  Wills 
(Minn.),  ^2,  N.  W.  177.  A  fraudu- 
lent insertion  of  additional  words, 
or  an  alteration  in  a  material  part  of 
a  true  document  by  which  another 
may  be  defrauded  is  a  forgery.  State 
V.  Brett,  16  Mont.  360,  40  Pac.  873, 
877;  Commonwealth  v.  Boutwell,  129 
Mass.    124,    125;   Rex   v.    Dawson,   i 


Stra.  19;  State  v.  Flye,  26  Me.  312, 
318;  State  V.  Floyd,  5  Strobh.  (S. 
Car.)  58,  S3  Am.  Dec.  689;  State  v. 
Weaver,  13  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  491,  493; 
State  V.  Maxwell,  47  Iowa  454,  455; 
State  V.  Marvels,  2  Harr.  (Del.) 
527;  Haynes  v.  State,  15  Ohio  St. 
455,  457;  State  v.  Van  Auken,  98 
Iowa  674,  68  N.  W.  454;  State  v. 
Wills  (Minn.,  1897),  7Z  N.  W.  177; 
Murphy  v.  State,  118  Ala.  137,  23  So. 

719. 

^  State  V.  Mitton,  36  Mont.  376,  92 
Pac.  969;  State  v.  Barrett,  121  La. 
1058,  46  So.  1016;  Fischl  v.  State,  54 
Tex.  Cr.  55,  iii  S.  W.  410;  State  v. 
Lotono,  62  W.  Va.  310,  58  S.  E.  621 ; 
People  v.  Collins,  9  Cal.  App.  622, 
99  Pac.  1 109;  State  v.  Floyd,  169  Ind. 
136,  81  N.  E.  1 1 53. 

^  State  V.  Mitton,  36  Mont.  376,  92 
Pac.  969. 

''State  V.  Lotono,  62  W.  Va.  310, 
58  S.  E.  621. 

"  State  V.  Lotono,  62  W.  Va.  310, 
58  S.  E.  621.  An  alteration  of  the 
figures  in  a  check  is  an  immaterial 
alteration,    the    words    of    the    check 


707     FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    42O 

;<  420.  Competency  of  witnesses. — A  subscribing  witness  or  a 
person  taking  an  acknowledgment  to  a  forged  instrument  may 
testify  that  what  purports  to  be  his  signature  is  forged.^ 

In  England  at  common  law  the  person  bound  on  the  forged 
instrument,  if  not  discharged  from  his  liability  was  incompetent 
because  of  interest.  If  the  instrument  were  genuine  he  would  be 
liable  thereon;  while,  if  it  were  a  forgery,  the  writing  was  for- 
feited to  the  crown  and  destroyed.*  This  rule,  though  followed 
in  a  few  early  cases,  is  now  universally  rejected  in  America.  The 
obligor  is  always  competent  for  the  state,^  and  if  he  can  be  pro- 
duced he  is  a  proper  witness  and  should  be  called  by  the  state. ^^ 
His  interest  as  obligor  may  be  proved  to  affect  the  credibility  of 
his  evidence. ^^  He  is  not  an  indispensable  witness.  The  falsity 
of  the  writing  may  be  proved  by  other  witnesses.^^ 

.^  421.  Variance  in  proving  the  writing. — Any  material  variance 
between  the  alleged  forged  writing  as  proved  and  as  set  forth  in 
the  indictment  is  fatal  when  the  writing  is  pleaded  according  to 
its  tenor. ^^    The  cases  are  strict  in  defining  the  diversity  between 

determining  its  legal  effect.     State  v.  forged  was  absent  from  the  state  liis 

Lotono,  62  W.  Va.  310,  58  S.  E.  621.  partner  may  testify  that  the  signature 

Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof  in  was  not  in  the  handwriting  of  the  ab- 

prosecution    for    forgery,    see    Elliott  sentee.   Washington  v.  State,  143  Ala. 

Evidence,  §  2986,  2987.  62,  39   So.  388.     Condonation  by  the 

'  People  V.  Sharp,  53  Mich.  523,  19  obligor   is   irrelevant.     State  v.   Tull, 

X.   W.    168.      See  Underbill   on    Ev.,  119  Mo.  421,  24  S.  W.  lOio. 

§§  138-142.  '"Simmons    v.    State,    7    Ohio    116. 

*2  Stark.  Ev.  338,  339.     See  Elliott  Cf.  Anson  v.  People,  148  111.  494,  505, 

Evidence,  §  2989.  35  K.  E.  145. 

*  Anson  v.  People,  148  111.  494,  505,  "  State   v.    Henderson,  29   W.   Va. 

35   X.    E.    145;    State   v.    Bateman,   3  147,  i  S.  E.  225. 

Ired.    (X.   Car.)    474,  479;    People  v.  ^  State  v.  Farrington,  90  Iowa  673, 

Howell,  4  Johns.    (X\   Y.)    296,  302;  57    X.    W.    606;    Commonwealth    v. 

State   v.    Phelps,    11   Vt.    116.    122,  34  Smith,   6    S.    &    R.    (Pa.)    568,    570; 

.\m.     Dec.    672;     Commonwealth     v.  State  v.   Hooper,  2  Bailey    (S.  Car.) 

Waitc,  5  Mass.  261;  State  v.  Hooper,  37,  40;    Hess  v.   State,   5  Ohio  5,  22 

2  Bailey   (S.  Car.)  27,  40;   Simmons  Am.  Dec.  767n;  2  Stark.  Ev,  585.   Sec 

v.    State,    7    Ohio    116;    Williams    v.  t^ost,  §  429. 

State  CTex.  Cr.,  1895),  2)2  S.  W.  532;  "  Mackquirc  v.  Stale,  or   Miss,   i.sr, 

-McClasson  v.  State,  37  Tc.x.  Cr.  620,  44   So.  802;   State  v.   Handy,  20  Mo. 

40  S.  W.  503,  66  Am.  St.  842.    Where  81.    83;    LuttrdI    v.    State,    85    Tenn. 

one  of   a   firm   whose   signature  was  2^2,  239,  1  S.  W.  886,  4  .Am.  St.  7(0; 


§  4^1 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


tlie  indictment  and  the  writing  as  proved  which  shall  constitute 
a  material  variance  and  which  shall  exclude  the  alleged  forged 
instrument  from  evidence. 

The  misspelling/"*  or  the  omission  of  a  linal  letter  from  the 
alleged  forged  name  as  proved,  or  of  a  single  figure  from  the 
amount/^  or  reversing  the  order  of  names/"  are  some  extreme 
instances  of  material  and  fatal  variance.^'  But  other  cases  per- 
ni.it  a  wider  latitude  in  the  proof  and  disregard  unimportant  dis- 
crepancies in  names  and  dates,  particularly  if  the  names  are  idem 
sojians.^^  An  allegation  of  forging  a  writing  is  sustained  by 
proving  an  instrument  partly  written  and  partly  printed,^"  and 
the  fact  that   tlie  instrument  proved  was  acknowledged,  while 


Wilson  V.  State,  70  Miss.  595,  12  So. 
332,  13  So.  225,  35  Am.  St.  664;  Has- 
lip  V.  State,  10  Neb.  590,  592,  7  N.  W. 
331 ;  Thomas  v.  State,  103  Ind.  419, 
435,  2  N.  E.  808;  People  v.  Marion, 
29  Mich.  31;  State  v.  Carlson  (Iowa, 
1909),  123  X.  W.  765.  Though  it  is 
not  necessary  for  the  indictment  to 
describe  the  writing  with  extreme  mi- 
nuteness, 3'et  when  so  described  strict 
proof  must  be  had.  Powell  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  9  S.  W.  245,  ID  Ky. 
L.  329;  State  V.  Smith,  31  Mo.  120, 
121 ;  Hess  v.  State,  5  Ohio  5,  9,  22  Am. 
Dec.  767n ;  State  v.  Fleshman,  40  W. 
Va.  726,  22  S.  E.  309;  Common- 
wealth V.  Wilson,  2  Gray  (Mass.) 
70,  71;  McDonnell  v.  State,  58  Ark. 
242,  24  S.  W.  105. 

"Westbrook  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App. 
401,  403,  5  S.  W.  248;  McClellan  v. 
State,  32  Ark.  609,  611  ;  Hale  v.  State, 
120  Ga.  183,  47  S.  E.  531. 

"  Burress  v.  Commonwealth,  27 
Gratt.   (Va.)  934,  944. 

^'  State  V.  Lane,  80  X.  Car.  407 ; 
State  V.  Woodrow,  56  Kan.  217,  42 
Pac.  714. 

"A  note  signed  "J.  C.  Orr"  will 
not  sustain  an  allegation  of  forging 
one  signed  "James  C.  Orr."  State  v. 
Fay,  65  J\Io.  490,  494.  See  State  v. 
Pease,  74  Ind.  263,  264. 


"People  V.  Munroe  (Cal.,  1894), 
3S  Pac.  776;  Bench  v.  State,  63  Ark. 
488,  39  S.  W.  360;  Davis  V.  State,  37 
Tex.  Cr.  218,  39  S.  W.  296;  Agee 
V.  State,  113  Ala.  52,  21  So.  207;  All- 
good  V.  State,  87  Ga.  668,  13  S.  E. 
569;  Sutton  V.  Commonwealth,  97 
Ky.  308,  30  S.  W.  661,  17  Ky.  L.  184; 
State  V.  Collins,  115  N.  Car.  716,  20 
S.  E.  452;  People  v.  Smith,  103  Cal. 
563,  37  Pac.  516;  Stewart  v.  State, 
113  Ind.  505,  508,  16  N.  E.  186; 
Trask  v.  People,  151  111.  523,  38  X. 
E.  248;  Roush  V.  State,  34  Neb.  325, 
51  N.  W.  755;  State  v.  Bibb,  68  Mo. 
286,  288;  State  V.  Gryder,  44  La. 
Ann.  962,  965,  II  So.  573,  32  Am.  St. 
358;  Cross  V.  People,  47  111.  152,  95 
Am.  Dec.  474;  Hennessy  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  340,  354,  5  S.  W.  215; 
State  V.  Lane,  80  N.  Car.  407,  409; 
State  V.  Blanchard,  74  Iowa  628,  38 
N.  W.  519,  520.;  Langdale  v.  People, 
TOO  III.  263,  268;  Garmire  v.  State, 
104  Ind.  444,  446,  4  N.  E.  54;  Las- 
sitcr  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  540,  34  S. 
W.  751 ;  Telfair  v.  State,  56  Fla.  104, 
47  So.  863 ;  People  v.  Dole,  122  Cal. 
486,  55  Pac.  581,  68  Am.  St.  50. 

'"State  V.  Jones,  i  McMuIlen  (S. 
Car.)  236,  243,  36  Am.  Dec.  257. 


709      FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES. 


§    422 


that  alleged  was  not.  is  immaterial.-"  The  delivery  of  a  writing 
containing  blanks  which  are  evidently  intended  to  be  filled  creates 
an  implied  authority  on  the  recei\-er  to  complete  the  instrument. 
This  is  a  rule  in  the  law  of  contracts  but  it  does  not  apply  to  a 
prosecution  for  forgery  where  it  appears  that  the  instrument  was 
complete  when  delivered  and  the  filling  of  the  blank  was  not  only 
without  the  consent  of  the  person  who  signed  the  instrument  but 
was  a  material  alteration  of  it.-^ 

^  422.  Fraudulent  intent  and  guilty  knowledge — Circumstantial 
evidence  to  show. — The  intent  of  the  accused  to  defraud  is  the  es- 
sence of  the  crime  and  must  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt. -^  And  if  it  is  shown,  evidence  that  the  party  whose  name 
was  forged  had  no  legal  capacity  to  sign  is  irrelevant.-^ 


'"People  V.  Baker,  100  Cal.  188, 
190,  34  Pac.  649,  38  Am.  St.  276; 
Lassiter  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  540,  34 
S.  W.  751.  The  peculiar  strictness 
required  at  the  common  law  was 
largely  the  outcome  of  the  severity 
of  the  punishment  inflicted.  In  con- 
sequence of  the  more  humane  rules 
now  in  force,  a  wider  latitude  in  va- 
riance would  doubtless  be  allowed. 
Thomas  v.  State,  103  Ind.  419,  437,  2 
X.  E.  808.  See  also,  Reg.  v.  Wil- 
son, 2  C.  &  K.  527.  An  allegation  of 
an  intent  to  defraud  several  persons 
is  sustained  by  proving  an  intent  to 
defraud  any  one  of  them.  McDon- 
nell v.  State,  58  -Ark.  242,  24  S.  W. 
105. 
■^  ■*  State  V.  Mitton,  37  Mont.  366,  96 
Pac.  926,  127  Am.  St.  732. 

~  People  v.  Corrigan,  129  .App.  Div. 
<N'.  Y.)  75,  113  X.  Y.  S.  513;  Mont- 
gomery v.  State,  12  Te.x.  A  pp.  323, 
330;  People  V.  Wiman,  148  X.  Y. 
29.  42  X.  E.  408;  Sntll  v.  State,  2 
Humph.  (Tcnn.)  347;  Common- 
wtalth  V.  Lad<l.  15  .Mass.  526.  529; 
People  V.  Stearns,  21  Wend.  (X.  Y.) 
409;  Fox  V.  People,  95  III.  7r.  75; 
Elscy  V.  State,  47  Ark.  572,  2  S.  W. 


3:i7 ;  Barfield  v.  State,  29  Ga.  127,  74 
Am.  Dec.  49;  Leonard  v.  State,  29 
Ohio  St.  408;  State  v.  Shelters,  51 
Vt.  102,  105,  31  Am.  679;  State  v. 
Gavigan,  36  Kan.  322,  13  Pac.  554; 
State  V.  Redstrake,  39  N.  J.  L.  365, 
369;  State  V.  Williams,  66  Iowa  573, 
24  X.  W.  52;  People  V.  Caton,  25 
Mich.  388;  Couch  v.  State,  28  Ga. 
367,  368;  Stephens  v.  State,  56  Ga. 
604 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Connolly,  1 1 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  414;  Agee  v.  State,  113 
Ala.  52,  21  So.  207;  People  v.  Elphis, 
72  Pac.  838,  139  Cal.  XIX,  not  re- 
ported in  full ;  Xorton  v.  State,  129 
Wis.  659,  109  X.  W.  531,  116  Am. 
St.  979;  Wells  v.  Territory  (Okla. 
Cr.  App.,  1908),  98  Pac.  483;  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  2990;  Feeney  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.  .App.,  1910),  124  S.  W.  9.^4. 
One  who,  with  intent  to  defraud, 
utters  a  promissory  note  as  the 
note  of  a  person  other  than  the 
signer  and  procures  to  it  the  name 
of  an  innocent  person  who  does  not 
thereby  intend  it  to  bind  himself, 
is  guilty  of  forgery.  "When  that 
intent  exists,  and  the  instrument  is 
•the  fruit  of  it.  the  author  of  the 
fraud    cannot    escape   the   charge    of 


§    422 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


710 


It  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  de- 
fendant to  defraud  any  particular  person.  It  is  enough  that  a 
general  intent  to  defraud  is  shown."* 

The  intent  is  always  a  Cjuestion  for  the  jury.  It  may  be  in- 
ferred by  them  from  what  the  accused  does  and  says  and  from  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  involved  in  the  transaction."" 

The  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
accused  doing  an  act  which  he  knows  the  law  forbids,  as  signing 
a  name  not  his  own.""  or  making  a  false  entry  to  conceal  a  pre- 
vious defalcation,-'  but  not  alone  from  an  act  not  criminal  per  sc 
and  which  may  be  innocent  under  particular  circumstances."'* 

A  false  or  fictitious  entry  or  written  instrument  may  be  made 
by  mistake,  or  for  book-keeping  purposes,  or  a  forged  writing 
may  be  innocently  uttered.  Guilty  knowledge  is  always  material. 
It  must  be  strictly  proved,  though  direct  and  positive  evidence  is 
not  required  if,  from  existing  circumstances,  it  may  be  inferred 
that  the  accused  knew  the  fraudulent  character  of  the  transac- 
tion, as  where  he  makes  a  false  statement  that  he  was  the  payee 
of  the  alleged  forged  note.^® 


forgery  by  procuring  one  who  hap- 
pens to  bear  a  name  that  suits  his 
purpose  to  supply  him  with  a  pre- 
tended genuine  signature."  Com- 
monweahh  v.  Foster,  114  Mass.  311, 
322,  19  Am.  353. 

^  People  V.  Krummer,  4  Park.  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  217;  State  v.  Eades,  68  Mo. 
150,  152,  30  Am.  780. 

"*  McClure  v.  Commonwealth,  86 
Pa.  St.  353,  356;  State  v.  Keneston, 
59  X.  H.  36,  37;  Snell  v.  State,  2 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  347,  350;  United 
States  V.  Moses,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  726,  728, 
27  Fed.  Cas.  15825;  Reg.  v.  Vaughan, 
8  C.  &  P.  276,  281.  Cf.  Common- 
wealth V.  Brown,  147  Mass.  585,  18 
N.  E.  587,  9  Am.  St.  736n,  i  L.  R. 
A.  620;  Henderson  v.  State,  14  Tex. 
503,  517;  Green  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr. 
109,  35  S.  W.  971 ;  Rohr  v.  State,  60 
X.  J.  L.  576,  38  Atl.  673;  People  v. 
Campbell  (Mich..  1910'),  125  X.  W. 
42,  16  Det.  Leg.  X.  1082. 


-'State  V.  Williams,  66  Iowa  573, 
575,  24  X.  W.  52;  Timmons  v.  State, 
80  Ga.  216,  4  S.  E.  766;  Reg.  v. 
Cooke,  8  C.  &  P.  582,  585;  State  v. 
Mitton,  37  Mont.  366,  96  Pac.  926, 
127  Am.  St.  732;  Fischl  v.  State,  54 
Tex.  Cr.  55,  ii'i  S.  W.  410;  Spears 
V.  People,  220  111.  72,  77  X.  E.  112, 
4  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  402n. 

-"  State  V.  Hahn,  38  La.  Ann.  169, 
172;  Smith  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1895), 
32  S.  W.  696;  United  States  v. 
Houghton,  14  Fed.  544,  549. 

"'  Phelps  V.  People,  72  X.  Y.  365,  6 
Hun  (X.  Y.)  428. 

^Fox  V.  People,  95  111.  71. 

^  State  V.  Williams,  66  Iowa  573, 
575,  24  N.  W.  52;  Parker  v.  People, 
97  111.  32,  38;  Reg.  V.  Geach,  9  C.  & 
P.  499,  503.  In  proving  a  charge  of 
uttering  forged  writings,  it  must  be 
proved  that  the  accused  knew  they 
were  forged.  State  v.  Lowry.  42  W. 
Va.  205,  24  S.  E.  561 ;  Sands  v.  Com- 


711      FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AXD    FALSE    PRETENSES. 


§    423 


^  423.  Evidence  of  similar  crimes  to  show  intent — Effect  of  ac- 
quittal— Relevancy  of  possession  of  forged  papers  on  charge  of  for- 
gery.— Evidence  of  similar  forgeries,  or  of  the  possession  of 
forged  papers  about  the  same  time,  is  admissible  to  show  a  uni- 
form course  of  acting  from  which  guilty  knowledge  and  criminal 
intent  may  be  inferred,^'^  though  an  indictment  is  pending  against 


monwcalth,  20  Gratt.  (Va.)  800,  823; 
United  State  v.  Mitchell,  Bald.  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  366,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15787; 
Commonwealth  v.  Searle,  2  Binn. 
(Pa.)  332,  4  Am.  Dec.  446;  Miller 
V.  State,  51  Ind.  405,  406.  The  jury 
may  infer  guilty  knowledge  if  they 
are  satisfied  that  the  accused  had 
reason  to  believe  the  writing  was 
forged.  Wells  v.  Territory,  i  Okla. 
Cr.  469,  98  Pac.  483. 

^'Lingafelter  v.  State,  28  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  800;  Wooldridge  v.  State,  49  Fla. 
137,  38  So.  3;  Wright  V.  State,  138 
Ala.  69,  34  So.  1009;  State  v.  Mitton, 
2,7  Mont.  366,  96  Pac.  926,  127  Am. 
St.  732;  People  V.  Peck,  139  Mich. 
680,  103  X.  W.  178,  12  Det.  Leg.  N. 
28;  Dillard  v.  United  States,  141  Fed. 
303,  ^2  C.  C.  A.  451 ;  People  v.  Do- 
lan,  186  X.  Y.  4,  78  X.  E.  569,  116 
Am.  St.  521 ;  People  v.  Harben,  S 
Cal.  App.  29,  91  Pac.  398;  People  v. 
Dolan,  III  .App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  600,  97 
N.  Y.  S.  929;  State  v.  Stark,  202  Mo. 
210,  100  S.  W.  642;  Jurctich  v.  Peo- 
ple, 223  111.  484,  79  X.  E.  181 ;  State 
V.  Newman,  34  Mont.  434,  87  Pac. 
462;  State  V.  Murphy,  17  X.  Dak. 
48,  115  X.  W.  84;  Wooldridge  v. 
State,  49  Fla.  137,  38  So.  3;  Lang- 
ford  V.  State.  ZZ  F'^-  233,  242,  14 
So.  815;  Carver  v.  People,  39  Mich. 
786,  79^\  People  V.  Everhardt,  104 
N.  Y.  591,  594,  II  X.  E.  62;  People 
V.  Bibby,  91  Cal.  470,  477,  27  Pac. 
781;  Fox  V.  People.  95  111.  71.  75; 
State  V.  Myers,  82  Mo.  558.  564-570, 
52    Am.    389;    People    v.    I'rank,    28 


Cal.  507,  515;  Commonwealth  v.  Rus- 
sell,   156   Mass.    196,    30    N.    E.    763; 
Hennessy  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  340, 
5  S.  W.  215;  Devere  v.  State,  5  Ohio 
Cr.  Ct.  509;  United  States  v.  Burns, 
5  McLean    (U.   S.)   23,  24  Fed.   Cas. 
14691 ;  Anson  v.  People,  148  111.  494, 
503,   35  ^'-  E.   145;    Strang  v.    State, 
32  Tex.  Cr.  219,  22  S.  W.  680;  State 
V.     Minton,     116    Mo.    605,    613,    22 
S.     W.     808;     State     v.     McAllister, 
24     Me.     139,      143 ;     Commonwealth 
V.    Edgerly,     10    Allen  (Mass.)     184, 
186,      187;       State      V.      Twitty,      2 
Hawks    (X.    Car.)    248,   258;    Martin 
V.    Commonwealth,    2    Leigh     (Va.) 
745,   749;    Harding  v.    State,   54  Ind. 
359;  Thomas  v.  State,   103  Ind.  419, 
432,  2  X.  E.  808;  Card  v.  State,  109 
Ind.  415,  421,  9  N.  E.  591 ;  Common- 
wealth V.   Stearns,   10  Met.    (Mass.) 
256 ;     Wash     v.     Commonwealth,     16 
Gratt.    (Va.)    530;   Commonwealth  v. 
Turner,  3  Met.  (Mass.)   19,  24;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Stone,  4  Met.    (Mass.) 
43,  47;    Smith  V.   State,  29  Fla.  408, 
421,  TO  So.  894;  Lindsey  v.  State,  38 
Ohio  St.  507;  United  States  v.  Craig, 
4  Wash.  C.  C.   (U.  S.)   729,  25  Fed. 
Cas.     14883;     State    v.     Williams,    2 
Rich.  (S.  Car.)  418,  45  Am.  Dec.  74^  ; 
Bishop  V.  State,  55  Md.  138,  141.    Cj. 
People  v.    Sanders,    114  Cal.   216,   46 
Pac.  153.    It  is  error  not  to  warn  the 
jury  against  accepting  such  evidence 
as  proof  of  the  corpus  delicti.     An- 
son v.  People,  148  111.  494,  S04.  35  ^^• 
E.  145;  Francis  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 
501;  Carver  v.   People,  39  Mich.  7?f), 


§  4^3 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


'12 


the  accused  for  the  other  acts.'"  Evidence  that  the  accused  had 
heen  indicted  for  another  forgery,  or  for  having  forged  papers 
in  his  possession,  is  not  inachnissible  because  he  had  been  ac- 
quitted. The  acquittal  merely  exempts  him  f  roni  punishment  and 
from  another  prosecution.  It  does  not  necessarily  show  that  he 
was  innocent.^-  Proof  of  possession  and  of  use  of  forged  i)apers, 
whether  by  the  accused  or  by  an  accomplice,  is  admissible  whether 
before  or  after  the  date  of  the  alleged  forgery  for  which  the  ac- 
cused is  upon  trial.^^  But  the  admission  by  the  accused  of  any 
facts  concerning  the  false  instrument  found  in  his  possession,  or 
which  he  is  shown  to  have  uttered,  is  not  receivable,"  thougli 


788;  People  V.  Everhardt,  104  N.  Y. 
59T,  594,  II  N.  E.  62.  Evidence  of 
other  crimes  in  prosecutions  for  for- 
ger\%  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2994;  62 
L.  R.  A.  193,  note;  105  Arri.  St.  976, 
note. 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Wiiite,  145 
Mass.  392,  395,  14  X.  E.  611;  State 
V.  Williams,  2  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  418, 
45  Am.  Dec.  741 ;  State  v.  McAllister, 
24  Me.  139,  143;  United  States  v. 
Doebler,  i  Bald.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  519, 
527,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14977 ;  Bell  v.  State, 
57  Md.  108,  115. 

^=Bell  v.  State,  57  Md.  108,  117; 
McCartney  v.  State,  3  Ind.  353,  354, 
56  Am.  Dec.  510;  State  v.  Houston, 
I  Bailey  (S.  Car.)  300,  303;  State  v. 
Jesse,  3  Dev.  &  Bat.  (N.  Car.)  98, 
103,  108,  109;  State  V.  Robinson,  16 
X.  J.  L.  507,  508,  509.  In  McCartney 
V.  State,  3  Ind.  353,  on  pp.  354  and 
355,  the  court  says:  "We  can  see  no 
reason  why  the  fact  that  indictments 
had  been  found,  or  that  convictions 
or  acquittals  had  been  had  upon 
them,  should  affect  the  admissibility 
of  such  utterings.  Neither  the  in- 
dictments nor  the  records  of  con- 
viction or  acquittal  need  be,  nor,  it 
strikes  us  (though  the  point  is  not 
for  decision  in  this  case),  should  be 
given  in  evidence,  but  the   facts  and 


attendant  circumstances  alone  of  the 
utterings  as  though  no  indictments 
had  been  found.  N^or  do  we  think 
that  the  fact  that  some  of  these  other 
counterfeit  or  false  bills  purported  to 
be  upon  banks  different  from  that  on 
which  the  indictment  being  tried  was 
based,  should  render  the  evidence  in- 
admissible. It  might  affect  its  force, 
but  not,  we  think,  its  competency." 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Price,  10  Gray 
(Mass.)  472,  476,  71  Am.  Dec.  668n ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Coe,  115  Mass. 
481,  501 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Hall,  4 
Allen  (Mass.)  305,  306;  Common- 
wealth V.  White,  145  Mass.  392,  395, 
14  N.  E.  611;  Harding  v.  State,  54 
Ind.  359,  365;  I  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  53. 
See  ante,  note.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  prove  that  they  were  technically 
forgeries  if  they  were  fabricated 
with  an  intent  to  deceive.  People  v. 
Altman,  147  N.  Y.  473,  42  S.  E.  180; 
Commonwealth  v.  Ayer,  3  Cush. 
(Mass.)  150,  152;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hinds,  loi  ]\Iass.  209,  210. 

**  People  V.  Corbin,  56  X.  Y.  363, 
365,  15  Am.  427;  Anson  v.  People, 
148  III.  494,  506,  35  X.  E.  145;  Fox 
V.  People,  95  111.  71,  75.  Evidence  of 
other  forgeries  is  competent  where 
the  accused  admits  he  signed  a  name 
and  claims  he  was  authorized  to  do 


713      FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AXD    FALSE    FRETEXSES.      §    423 

liis  admissions  or  statements  of  any  fact  regarding  the  note  with 
whose  forgery  he  is  charged  are  always  receivable. ^^ 

Evidence  of  the  possession  of  forged  papers  by  the  accused  or 
by  an  accomplice,^"  while  always  admissible  upon  the  question  of 
intent,  is  never  conclusive  upon  the  general  issue  of  the  guilt  of 
the  accused.  The  fact  that  a  forged  writing  is  found  in  the  de- 
fendant's possession  raises  no  presumption  of  law  that  he  forged 
it  or  any  other  writing.^^  The  possession  or  uttering  may  be 
proved  upon  a  charge  of  forgery,  but  merely  as  a  circumstance 
to  be  considered  by  the  jury.  The  defendant  should  then  be 
allowed  to  prove  any  facts  which  may  rebut  the  possible  inference 
of  guilt  or  of  guilty  knowledge.^**  If,  however,  it  is  proved  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  the  accused  had  forged  notes 
in  his  possession,  with  the  plates  or  other  instruments  used  in 
forging  them,  a  prima  facie  case  is  made  out'  against  him.  Such 
facts,  unexplained,  may  create  as  strong  a  presumption  that  the 
person  in  whose  possession  they  were  found  is  the  actual  forger, 
as  the  possession  of  stolen  goods  creates  that  the  one  in  whose 
possession  they  are  found  is  the  actual  thief.  Both  presumptions 
may  be  repelled  by  proof.  But  in  the  absence  of  any  explanation 
the  inference  may  be  as  strong  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other."'''' 


so.  Usher  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  93, 
81  S.  W.  309. 

"Thus  it  may  be  shown  that  he 
had,  after  indictment,  released  a 
judgment  taken  on  the  note  without 
consideration.  Burdge  v.  State,  53 
Ohio  St.  512,  42  X.  E.  594.  Evi- 
dence that  forged  notes  were  found 
in  the  possession  of  the  wife  of  the 
accused  is  not  received  against  him 
unless  a  concert  of  action  is  proved 
between  them  or  it  appears  that  she 
was  cognizant  of  their  character  and 
of  the  connection  of  the  accused  with 
them.     People  v.  Thorns,  3  Park.  Cr. 

X.  Y.)  256,  271. 

^United  Stales  v.  Ilinman,  i  Bald. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  292,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15370. 

"Miller  v.  State,  51  Tnd.  405,  406; 
I'ox  V.  People,  95  III.  71.  75. 

"People   V.    Evcrhardt,    104    N.    Y. 


59i>  595,  II  ^^-  E.  62;  Crossland  v. 
State,  77  Ark.  537,  -92  S.  W.  776. 
Proof  of  the  existence  or  the  pro- 
duction of  the  collateral  forged  writ- 
ings is  always  indispensable.  State  v. 
Breckenridge,  67  Iowa  204,  205,  25 
N.  W.  130;  Fox  v.  People,  95  111. 
71,  74;  Anson  v.  People,  148  111.  494. 
506,  35  N.  E.  14s ;  Reg.  v.  Cooke,  8 
C.  &  P.  582;  3  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §§  107- 
113.  Cf.  Reed  v.  State,  15  Ohio  217, 
and  Barnes  v.  Commonwealth,  loi 
Ky.  556,  41  S.  W.  772,  19  Ky.  L.  803. 
^"Spencer's  Case,  2  Leigh  (Va.) 
751,  757;  Gardner  v.  State,  96  Ala. 
12,  II  So.  402;  State  V.  Morgan,  2 
Dcv.  &  B.  (N.  Car.)  348;  State  v. 
Britt,  3  Dev.  (N.  Car.)  122;  State  v. 
Lane,  80  N.  Car.  407.  4C0.  "The  con- 
ditions to  the  introduction  of  such 
evidence  are,  that  where  such  instru 


4-'4 


CRI.MIXAI.    EVIDEXCE. 


7M 


\) 


§  424.  Proof  of  uttering  forged  paper.— Proof  tliat  a  forged  writ- 
ing was  delivered  lo  a  person  for  \-alue  with  an  intent  to  pass  it 
as  good,  or  was  used  to  obtain  money  or  credit,  directly  or  in- 
directly, is  enough  to  sustain  a  charge  of  uttering,""'  without  proof 
of  forging  it."*^  It  must  also  be  proved  that  there  was  a  declara- 
tion or  assertion,  either  by  language  or  actions,  that  the  signature 
was  valid  and  the  instrument  good."*" 

§  425.  The  writing  alleged  to  have  been  forged  as  evidence — Pri- 
mary evidence. — 'I'his  must  usually  be  produced  in  evidence  by  the 
prosecution,  or  its  absence  satisfactorily  accounted  for.*^     It  is 


ments  are  offered  in  proof  of  guilty 
knowledge,  there  must  be  strict  proof 
that  they  are  forgeries,  and  the  for- 
gery, possession  or  uttering  must,  in 
point  of  time  or  circumstances,  be 
so  near  the  commission  of  the  al- 
leged offense,  that  the  inference 
arises  that  the  defendant  must  have 
intended,  by  the  principal  forgery,  to 
perpetrate  a  fraud,  or  knew  that  the 
instrument  uttered  was  spurious."  3 
Greenl.,  §  in;  Rose.  95;  Anson  v. 
People,  148  111.  494,  504,  35  N.  E.  145 ; 
People  V.  Whiteman,  114  Cal.  338,  46 
Pac.  99. 

'"State  V.  Redstrake,  39  N.  J.  L. 
365;  State  V.  Horner,  48  Mo.  520, 
522;  People  V.  Ah  Woo,  28  Cal.  205, 
212;  People  V.  Brigham,  2  Mich.  550; 
United  States  v.  Mitchell,  i  Bald.  C. 
C.  (U.  S.)  366,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15787; 
People  V.  Rathbun,  21  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  509;  Thurmond  v.  State,  25  Tex. 
App.  366,  8  S.  W.  473;  Espalla  v. 
State,  108  Ala.  38,  19  So.  82;  State 
V.  Sherwood,  90  Iowa  550,  58  N.  W. 
911,  48  Am.  St.  461.  The  note  must 
have  been  parted  with  or  tendered  or 
offered  in  some  wa}^  to  get  money  or 
credit.  Rex  v.  Shukard,  Russ.  &  Ry. 
200.  A  person  is  guilty  of  forgery, 
notwithstanding  he  intends  ultimately 
to  take  up  the  forged  paper,  and  al- 
though   he    supposes    that    the    man 


whose  name  is  forged  will  suffer  no 
loss.  If  the  jury  are  satisfied  that 
the  accused  knew  the  writing  was 
forged,  and  uttered  it  as  true  and 
believed  that  the  party  to  whom  he 
offered  it  would  advance  money  upon 
it,  they  have  ample  evidence  of  an 
intent  to  defraud.  That  the  forged 
bill  has  since  been  paid  by  the  pris- 
oner is  immaterial  if  the  offense  was 
complete  at  the  time  of  the  uttering. 
Reg.  V.  Geach,  9  C.  &  P.  499,  505. 

^  State  V.  Fisk,  170  Ind.  166,  83  N. 
E.  995;  Maloney  v.  State  (Ark., 
1909),  121  S.  W.  728.  The  making  of 
a  forged  instrument,  and  the  uttering 
it  by  the  same  person  at  the  same  time 
as  one  transaction,  constitute  but  one 
offense.  State  v.  Klugherz,  91  Minn. 
406,  98  N.  W.  99. 

"  People  V.  Brigham,  2  Mich.  550 ; 
Chahoon  v.  Commonwealth,  20  Gratt. 
(Va.)  733;  Folden  v.  State,  13  Neb. 
328,  14  N.  W.  412,  413;  Couch  V. 
State,  28  Ga.  367,  368;  Common- 
wealth V.  Searle,  2  Binn.  (Pa.)  332, 
4  Am.  Dec.  446;  Koch  v.  State,  115 
Ala.  99,  22  So.  471. 

'■^  State  V.  Breckenridge,  67  Iowa 
204,  25  N.  W.  130;  Haun  v.  State, 
13  Tex.  App.  383,  387,  44  Am.  706; 
Butler  V.  State,  22  Ala.  43 ;  Manaway 
V.    State,  44    Ala.   375,  379',   2  Arch. 


715      FORGERY,    COUNTERFEITING    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    425 


immaterial  that  it  is  badly  written,  if  it  is  decipherable.'**  Its 
meaning  may  be  ascertained  by  parol  evidence;  and.  if  it  is  am- 
biguous, the  jury  may  infer  its  true  meaning  from  all  the  evi- 
dence."*^ Where  the  alleged  forged  writing  is  shown  to  have 
1)een  lost  or  destroyed,  or  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction  or  suppressed 
by  the  accused,  or  if  it  is  so  mutilated  that  its  identity  is  unascer- 
tainable.  its  contents  may  be  proved  by  secondary  evidence.*'^  If 
the  state  alleges  that  the  writing  is  in  the  hands  of  the  accused,  or 
his  friends,  it  must  prove  a  seasonable  demand  on  him  or  his 
counsel  before  secondary  e^■idence  is  admissible.*'  In  order  that 
the  contents  of  the  forged  writing  or  its  signature  shall  be  proved 
by  secondary  evidence  it  is  necessary  to  show  that  a  diligent 
search  has  been  made  for  the  original  in  a  place  where  it  was 
likely  to  be  found.*'^  The  best  evidence  in  the  possession  of  the 
state  is  always. required.  If  a  copy  exists,  oral  proof  wih  be  re- 
jected, and  the  copy  must  be  produced.*" 

A  photograph  is  admissible  to  prove  the  language  of  the  writ- 


er. Pr.  &  PI.  395;  2  Bish.  Cr.  Pro., 
§  433;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2992;  Deal 
V.  State  (Miss.,  1909),  50  So.  495.  Sec- 
ondary evidence  of  forged  instru- 
ments, see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2993. 

"  Hagar  v.  State,  71  Ga.  164,  166; 
McGarr  v.  State,  75  Ga.  155,  158. 

*°McGarr  v.  State,  75  Ga.  155,  158. 

"Thornlcy  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr. 
118,  34  S.  W.  264,  61  Am.  St.  837; 
Mead  v.  State,  53  N.  J.  L.  601,  605,  23 
Atl.  264;  State  V.  Potts,  9  N.  J.  L. 
26,  17  Am.  Dec.  449;  State  v.  Davis, 
69  N.  Car.  313,  317;  Henderson  v. 
State,  14  Te.x.  503,  511.  See  Under- 
bill on  Ev.,  §  130,  132;  State  v. 
Champoux,    33    Wash.    339,    74    Pac. 

557- 

*''  State  v.  Lowry,  42  W.  Va.  205, 
24  S.  E.  561 ;  Rollins  v.  State,  2r 
Tex.  App.  148,  152,  17  S.  W.  4^)6; 
Henderson  v.  State,  14  Tex.  503,  511  ; 
Dcvere  v.  State,  5  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  509; 
Johnson  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  249, 
258;  State  v.  Flanflcrs.  118  Mo.  227, 
'37,  239,  23  S.  \V.  10H6;  State  v. 
Saunders,  68  Iowa  370,  27  X.  W.  455; 


State  V.  Potts,  9  N.  J.  L.  26,  17  Am. 
Dec.  449;  3  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  107;  2 
Bish.  Cr.  Pro.,  §  433;  2  Arch.  Cr.  Pr. 
&  PI-  555;  Rex  V.  Haworth,  4  Car. 
&  P.  254.  On  the  general  subject  of 
notice  to  produce  writings,  see  Un- 
dcrhill  on  Ev.,  §  126. 
■""Sims  v.  State  (.Ala.,  1908),  46  So. 

493- 

^"Thompson  v.  State,  30  Ala.  28; 
Commonwealth  v.  Sncll,  3  Mass.  82, 
86;  Pendleton's  Case,  4  Leigh  (Va.) 
694,  26  Am.  Dec.  342;  State  v.  Ford, 
2  Root  (Conn.)  93.  When  it  is  sought 
to  prove  the  forged  paper  by  a  certi- 
fied or  examined  copy,  under  a  stat- 
ute permitting  such  proof,  it  must  ap- 
pear from  the  copy  itself  that  all  the 
requirements  of  the  statute  have  been 
rigidly  complied  with,  or  the  copy 
may  he  rejected.  The  copy  siiould 
he  supplcniciitcd  by  the  oath  of  .some 
competent  witness  that  it  is  a  true 
and  correct  copy.  Uiulcriiill  on  K\\, 
§  r42c ;  Johnson  v.  State,  9  Tex.  .App. 
249,  258. 


§    4-6  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  716 

ing-  when  the  ink  lias  faded,  if  it  is  shown  In-  any  witness  that  it 
is  hterally  rcprochiced.  But  when  the  question  is.  does  the  photo- 
graph exactly  reproduce  the  form,  color  and  shading  of  the  orig- 
inal? supplementary  expert  evidence  may  be  required.''" 

^  426.  Proving  the  venue. — The  difficulty  of  proving  the  locality 
in  which  the  writing  was  actually  forged,  because  of  the  cus- 
tomary secrecy  by  which  this  act  is  accompanied,  is  elsewhere 
adverted  to.^^  It  need  only  be  said  in  this  i)lace  that  the  posses- 
sion of  forged  instruments,  or  the  uttering  of  them  in  the  county 
where  the  indictment  was  found,  is  strong  evidence  in  law  that 
the  forgerv  was  committed  in  the  same  county.''" 

>^  427.  Fictitious  names — Evidence  to  prove  existence  or  non-ex- 
istence of  persons. — l^'orgery  is  committed  when  a  fictitious  name,^^ 
or  the  name  of  a  dead  person,^*  is  signed  to  an  instrument  with  a 
fraudulent  intent.  The  name  signed  must  be  that  of  some  other 
person  than  the  accused  though  it  may  be  of  a  man  of  the  same 
name,  if  by  signing  that  name  the  accused  meant  to  defraud 
someone.^^  Hence,  evidence  is  relevant,  which  shows  or  tends 
to  show  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  the  person  who  is  sup- 
posed, or  pretended  to  be  indicated  by  the  name.  But  the  state 
need  not  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  there  was  no  such 

°"  Duffin  V.  People,  107  III.  113,  122,     Am.  183;  Commonwealth  v.  Costello, 

47  Am.  431.  See  Underbill  on  Ev.,  120  Mass.  358,  370;  Thompson  v. 
§§  38a,  132.  State,  49  Ala.   16;   Peete  v.   State,  2 

'^  See  ante,  §  37.  Lea  (Tenn.)  513;  State  v.  Covington, 

"  State  V.  Yerger,  86  Mo.  33 ;  State  94  N.  Car.  913,  55  Am.  650n ;  State  v. 

V.    Rucker,  93   Mo.  88,  90,   5   S.   W.  Bauman,  52  Iowa  68,  2  N.   W.  956; 

609;   Spencer's   Case,  2  Leigh    (Va.)  People  v.  Warner,  104  Mich.  337,  62 

751,  757;  Heard  v.  State,  121  Ga.  138,  N.   W.   405,  406;   Davis   v.    State,  34 

48  S.  E.  905.  Tex.  Cr.  117,  29  S.  W.  478;  Lasister 
"^Lascelles  v.   State,  90  Ga.  347,  16  v.   State,  49  Tex.   Cr.   532,  94  S.  W. 

S.   E.  945,  35  Am.   St.   2x6;   Rex  v.  233;  People  v.  Browne,  118  App.  Div. 

Bolland,  i  Leach  C.  C.  97;  Ex  parte  (N.  Y.)  793,  103  N.  Y.  S.  903;  Logan 

Ilibbs,.  26  Fed.  421,  423 ;  Johnson  v.  v.  United  States,  123  Fed.  291,  59  C. 

State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  271,  33  S.  W.  231;  C.  A.  476;   IMaloney  v.   State    (Ark., 

State  v.  Hahn,  38  La.  Ann.  169,  170;  1909),  121  S.  W.  728. 

People  V.  Krummer,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  "Brewer  v.   State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  74, 

Y.)    217;    State  V.    jMinton,    116   Mo.  22  S.  W.  41,  40  Am.  St.  760. 

605,  610,  22  S.  W.  808;  State  V.  Vine-  "Murphy  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  488, 

yard,  16  Mont.  138,  40  Pac.  173,  175;  93  S.  \V.  543. 

People   V.   Brown,   72   N.   Y.    571,   28 


71  7   FORGERY,  COUXTERFEITIXG  AXD  FALSE  PRETENSES.   §§  427-428 

person.^'^  A  resident  of  the  town  in  which  he  is  alleged  to  have 
lived  is  competent  to  prove  that  he  was  unknown  there,  though 
the  witness  may  not  be  able  to  swear  absolutely  that  he  knew 
every  resident.^'  It  is  not  always  necessary  for  the  prosecution 
to  produce  in  court  the  person  whose  name  is  alleged  to  have  been 
forged.  The  fact  that  he  did  not  consent  to  the  signing  of  his 
name  may  be  proved  from  the  circumstances.^^  It  may  be  shown 
in  general  that  policemen,  postmen  and  residents  had  never  heard 
of  him,"''  and  that  an  officer  of  the  court,  as  a  sheriff,  though  he 
made  a  diligent  search  among  persons  most  likely  to  know  him, 
was  unable  to  find  him,  or  to  secure  any  information  of  his 
whereabouts.*"'  The  searcher  may  state  what  he  did  and  the  fact 
that  he  had  a  conversation  with  some  one,  and  with  whom,  and 
could  get  no  information,  though  he  may  not  repeat  answers 
made  to  his  inquiries  (as  these  would  be  hearsay)  for  the  pur- 
pose of  proving  the  fictitious  character  of  the  person. °^  Evidence 
of  this  sort,  proving  prima  facie  the  non-existence  of  the  person 
whose  name  was  signed,  may  be  sufficient  in  the  absence  of  re- 
buttal. The  defendant  may  prove  any  facts  by  which  the  infer- 
ence that  the  name  is  fictitious  may  be  overcome.  So,  when  it 
was  shown  that  no  one  could  be  found  to  answer  to  the  name 
which  was  signed,  the  accused  was  allowed  to  show  that  the  per- 
son, being  threatened  with  a  criminal  prosecution,  had  left  the 
state,  and  that  he  had  endeavored  in  vain  to  find  him.*''- 

.§  428.    Proving  the  corporate  existence  of  the  bank  upon  which 
the  forged  check  is  drawn. — The  existence  of  the  bank  must  be 

'"State  V.  Allen,  116  Mo.  548,  22  S.  state   may   prove  the    falsity  of   that 

W.  792.  person's  statement  regarding  his  busi- 

"  Commonwealth    v.    Meserve,    154  ness,  residence,  occupation  and  own- 
Mass.  64,  71,  27  X.  E.  997,  998.  crship  of  property.     This  is  so,  even 

"People  V.  Browne,  118  App.  Div.  when  the  accused  admits  the  name  is 

(X.  Y.)  793,  103  X.  Y.  S.  903.  fictitious.    Commonwealth  v.  Costello, 

"State  V.   Hahn,  38  La.  Ann.   169,  120  Mass.  358,  359. 

172.  "'  People  v.  Jones.   106  X.   Y.   523, 

"*  People    v.    Sharp,    53    Mich.    523,  526,  13  X.  E.  93 ;  Wiggins  v.  People, 

525,  19  X.  W.  168.    The  extent  of  the  4  Ilun  (X.  Y.)  540;  State  v.  Ryno,  68 

search  goes  to  the  weight  not  to  the  Kan.  348,  74  Pac.    1114.  64   \..  R.   .\. 

competency  of  this  evidence.     When  303n. 

the  accused  having  signed  a  fictitious  "Commonwealth    v.    Costello,     no 

name  has  procured  some  one  to  repre-  Mass.  214,  215. 
i-nt    himself   as    of   that    name,    the 


f 


-t 


§    429  CRIMINAL    EXIDEXCE.  718 

shown  under  an  allegation  of  forginj;-  l)ank  notes  or  checks/"''  The 
charter  or  articles  of  incorporation  need  not  be  produced.  It 
is  enough  to  prove  the  existence  of  the  bank  cic  facto  by  parol 
e\"idence  that  it  had  a  banking  house,  issued  bills  and  exercised 
banking  powers,*^^  or  by  the  production  of  a  note  whose  genuine- 
ness is  proved  or  admitted/^  and  in  the  case  of  a  foreign  bank  by 
rei)utation,""  whether  the  intent  charged  was  to  defraud  the  bank 
or  an  indi\'idual."^ 

§  429.  Proving  the  handwriting — Expert  evidence — Standards  of 
comparison. — Expert  evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  the  genuine- 
ness or  falsity  of  the  writing.  The  expert  may  testify  to  his 
opinion  and  may  then  state  the  reasons  for  his  opinion."®  He 
may  explain  how  writing  may  be  removed  from  paper  by  chem- 
icals or  other  means,  and  the  blank  space  filled  with  other  writ- 
ing; and  this  he  may  do  even  where  it  lias  not  first  been  proved 
that  the  accused  was  acquainted  with  this  method  of  treating 
wnntings.*'^  The  expert  may  illustrate  his  testimony  by  illustra- 
tions on  the  blackboard.  The  expert  may,  as  a  rule,  state  his 
opinion  based  upon  a  comparison  made  by  him  of  the  forged 
instrument  with  any  writing  pro\'ed  to  have  been  made  by  the  de- 
fendant, whether  it  has  been  introduced  in  evidence  or  not.'°  The 

"^  State  V.  Murphy,  17  R.  I.  698,  707,  Y.)  469,  473;  State  v.  Sharpless,  212 

24  Atl.  473,   16  L.  R.  A.  550;  Com-  Mo.  176,  iii  S.  W.  69.    Contra,  Jones 

monwealth  v.  Smith,  6  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  v.  State,  5  Sneed  (Tenn.)  346,  347. 

568,  570;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2956.  ""State   v.    Ryno,    68    Kan.   348,   74 

"  Cady  V.  Commonwealth,  10  Gratt.  Pac.  11 14,  64  L.  R.  A.  303 n ;  Ausmus 

.  (Va.)    776,  779;   People  v.   Caryl,  12  v.  People  (Colo..  19T0),  107  Pac.  204. 

Wend.    (N.   Y.)    547,  548;    People  v.  ""People   v.   Dole,    122  Cal.  486,  55 

Chadwick,  2  Park.  Cr.    (N.  Y.)    163,  Pac.  581,  68  Am.  St.  50. 

165;    Dennis   v.    People,    i    Park.    Cr.  '"Mallory  v.  State,  2>7  Tex.  Cr.  482, 

(N.  Y.)  469,  473.  36  S.  W.  751,  66  Am.  St.  808;  State 

°°  People   V.    Davis,   21    Wend.    (N.  v.   Calkins,   72)   Iowa   128,   131,   34  N. 

Y.)   309,  313;  People  V.  Peabody,  25  W.  777;  State  v.  Farrington,  90  Iowa 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  472,  473.  673,  57  N.  W.  606;  State  v.  Phair,  48 

*■  People  V.   Ah   Sam,  41   Cal.  645,"  Vt.  366;   State  v.  Bibby,  91   Cal.  470, 

People    V.    D'Argencour,     18    N.    Y.  476,  27  Pac.  781 ;  State  v.  Tompkins, 

Wkly.   Dig.  532;   Sasser  v.   State,    13  71  Mo.  613,  616;  State  v.  David,  131 

Ohio  453 ;  Cady  v.  Commonwealth,  10  Mo.  380,  t,2,  S.  W.  28.     See,  on  this 

Gratt.   (Va.)  776,  779;  Reed  v.  State,  subject,  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §§  140.  141 5 

IS  Ohio  217;  Stone  v.  State,  20  N.  J.  State  v.  Scott,  45  Mo.  302;   State  v. 

L.  401.  Shinborn,  46  N.  H.  497,  501,  88  Am. 

"Dennis  v.  People,  i  Park.  Cr.  (N. 


719      FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AXD    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    429 

remoteness  of  the  date  of  making  the  comparison  from  the  trial, 
or  the  fact  that  the  accused  was  not  present  when  the  compar- 
ison was  made,  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  opinion  of  the 
expert  based  on  a  comparison.'^  This  would  seem  the  most 
reasonable  rule,  but  some  cases  hold  that  the  standard  of  com- 
parison can  be  selected  only  from  writings  which  are  relevant, 
and  which  are  actually  introduced  as  evidence.'-  The  court  must 
usually  by  statute  first  find  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  the  standard 
was  written  by  the  accused  before  it  should  go  to  the  expert  or 
to  the  jury.  Press  copies  and  copies  made  by  machine  cannot  be 
used  as  standards."  Any  one  who  is  familiar  with  a  person's 
writing  from  having  seen  him  write,  though  only  once,  or,  never 
having  seen  him  write,  from  canying  on  a  correspondence  with 
him,  or  from  opportunities  afforded  from  frequently  handling 
writings  known  to  have  been  written  by  the  person,  is  competent, 


Dec.  224;  People  v.  Hutchings,  137 
Mich.  527,  100  X.  W.  753;  State  v. 
Webb,  18  Utah  441,  56  Pac.  159; 
Johnson  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1907), 
102  S.  \V.  1 133;  Warren  v.  State,  54 
Tex.  Cr.  443,  114  S.  W.  380;  State 
V.  Skillman  (N.  J.  Eq.  1908),  70  Atl. 
83;  Riley  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1898),  44 
S.  W.  498;  Rinker  v.  Unted  States, 
151  Fed.  755,  81  C.  C.  A.  379;  Wool- 
dridge  v.  State,  49  Fla.  137,  38  So.  3; 
Ausmus  V.  People  (Colo.,  1910),  107 
Pac.  205. 

■'Riley  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1898), 
44  S.  W.  498. 

"  People  V.  Parker,  67  Mich.  222, 
224,  34  X.  W.  720,  II  Am.  St.  578; 
Merritt  v.  Campbell,  79  X.  Y.  625 ; 
Hynes  v.  McDermott,  82  X.  Y.  41,  52, 
2,7  Am.  538;  Vinton  v.  Peck,  14  Mich. 
287,  293,  294;  Van  Sickle  v.  People, 
29  Mich.  6r,  64;  State  v.  Clinton,  67 
Mo.  380,  383,  385,  29  Am.  506;  State 
V.  Scott,  45  Mo.  302,  305;  Manaway 
V.  .State,  44  Ala.  375 ;  Moore  v. 
United  States,  91  U.  S.  270,  274,  23 
L.  c(l.  346;  Morgan's  Case,  i  Mood. 
&•  R.  134 ;  People  V.  Schoolcy,  149  N. 
Y.  99,  43  N.  E.  53^^;  People  v.  Crcc- 


gan,  121  Cal.  554,  53  Pac.  1082;  State 
V.  F"illpot,  51  Wash.  223,  98  Pac.  659. 
The  papers  to  be  used  as  standards  of 
comparison  must  be  admitted,  ac- 
knowledged or  otherwise  proved  to 
be  in  the  handwriting  of  the  accused. 
State  V.  Ezekiel,  2>Z  S.  Car.  115,  116, 
II  S.  E.  63s;  Johnson  v.  Common- 
wealth, 102  Va.  927,  46  S.  E.  789. 

"  Commonwealth  v.  Eastman,  i 
Cush.  (Mass.)  189,  48  Am.  Dec.  596; 
State  V.  Simmons,  52  Wash.  132,  100 
Pac.  269;  Gaut  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr. 
493,  94  S.  W.  JO34;  Washington  v. 
State,  143  Ala.  (i2,  39  So.  388.  The 
condition  of  a  person,  whether  drunk 
or  sober,  when  he  wrote  the  standard, 
is  competent.  People  v.  Parker,  67 
Mich.  222,  228,  34  X.  W.  720,  II  Am. 
St.  578.  In  Oregon  the  statute  pro- 
vides that  comparison  shall  be  made 
only  with  writings  "admitted  or  treat- 
ed as  genuine"  by  the  party  against 
whom  offered;  this  means  the  ac- 
cused in  a  criminal  proceedings  and 
limits  the  comparison  to  instruments 
actually  admitted  l)y  him  to  have  been 
written  by  him.  State  v.  Hranton,  49 
Ore.  Kr..  87  P.-ir,  535. 


§  429 


CRIMINAL    F.VIDEXCE, 


720 


as  a  non-expert,  to  give  his  opinion  as  to  the  gentiinencss  of  his 
signature.'^  The  weight  of  the  evidence  to  prove  the  genuineness 
of  handwriting,  whether  given  by  experts  or  by  those  who  know 
the  party's  handwriting,  is  wholly  for  the  jury,  who,  of  course, 
may  be  guided  in  their  deliberations  by  the  instructions  of  the 
court  relative  to  the  force  and  credibility  of  expert  evidence.  But 
as  a  matter  of  law,  evidence  of  witnesses  who  knew  the  hand- 
writing of  tb.e  accused,  to  the  efifect  tliat  the  signature  to  the 
alleged  forged  writing  is  not  his,  is  of  little  value,  as  the  forger 
seeks  to  disguise  his  own  handwriting  and  to  imitate  that  of  the 
man  whose  signature  he  forges.'''  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not 
relevant  to  show  that  the  accused  was  skilled  in  imitating  writ- 
ing.'^" The  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused  is  not  to  be  de- 
termined on  such  grounds.  No  inference  of  guilt  can  be  estab- 
lished by  proving  that  the  accused  had  the  ability  to  commit  the 
crime." 


'*  State  V.  Goldstein,  74  X.  J.  L.  598, 
62  Atl.  1006;  De  La  Alotte's  Case,  21 
How.  St.  Tr.  564,  810 ;  State  v.  Hoop- 
er, 2  Bailej'  (S.  Car.)  yi,  42;  State  v. 
Gay,  94  N.  Car.  814,  819;  State  v. 
Stair,  ^-j  :Mo.  268,  56  Am.  449;  State 
V.  Farrington,  90  Iowa  673,  57  N.  W. 
606;  State  V.  Minton,  116  Mo.  605, 
22  S.  W.  808;  Commonwealth  v. 
Smith,  6  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  568,  571; 
Thomas  v.  State,  103  Ind.  419,  429,  2 
N.  E.  808;  Redd  v.  State,  65  Ark. 
475,  47  S.  W.  119;  State  V.  Fresh- 
water, 30  Utah  442,  85  Pac.  447, 
116  Am.  St.  853;  Bess  v.  Common- 
wealth, 118  Ky.  858,  82  S.  W.  576, 
26  Ky.  L.  839;  Rinker  v.  United 
States,  151  Fed.  755,  81  C.  C.  A.  379; 
State  V.  Goldstein,  72  N.  J.  L.  336, 
62  Atl.  1003;  State  V.  Simmons,  52 
Wash.  132,  100  Pac.  269;  Common- 
wealth V.  Meehan,  170  Mass.  362,  49 
N.  E.  648;  State  v.  Olds,  217  Mo.  305, 
116  S.  \V.  1080;  Wooldridge  v.  State, 
49  Fla.  137,  38  So.  3 ;  Pittman  v.  State, 
51  Ala.  94,  41  So.  385.   The  letters  re- 


ceived may  be  produced  and  identi- 
fied, and  the  genuineness  of  their  sig- 
natures proved  by  another  witness  to 
corroborate  the  first.  Thomas  v. 
State,  103  Ind.  419,  429,  2  N.  E.  808; 
I  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  577;  Rose.  174,  175. 
Any  person  accustomed  to  receive, 
handle  or  pay  out  bank-notes  may  tes- 
tif\-  to  the  signatures  to  them  though 
he  may  never  have  seen  the  person 
write.  May  v.  State,  14  Ohio  461,  45 
Am.  Dec.  548;  United  States  v.  Keen, 
I  McLean  (U.  S.)  429,  26  Fed.  Cas. 
155 ro;  People  v.  Caryl,  12  Wend.  (X. 
Y.)  547;  Commonwealth  v.  Carey,  2 
Pick.  (Mass.)  47.  As  to  testimony  by 
person  familiar  with  the  handwriting 
of  the  accused,  see  Underbill  on  Ev., 

§  139- 

'"Langdon  v.  People,  133  111.  382, 
394,  24  X^  E.  874;  People  v.  Sanders, 
1 14  Cal.  216,  46  Pac.  153. 

'"  State  v.  Hopkins,  50  Vt.  316,  2>?>^. 

"The  subject  of  comparison  of 
handwriting  is  fully  discussed  in  Un- 
derbill on  Ev.,  §  140,  ct  scq. 


721      FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    43O 

.^  430.  Evidence  to  show  that  the  forged  writing  could  not  ac- 
complish the  purpose  intended.— It  may  be  shown  by  producing  the 
writing  itself  that  it  could  not,  in  law,  be  employed  to  defraud  or 
prejudice  any  person.'**  If  this  fact  is  shown  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  jury-  the  accused  should  be  acquitted.  In  other  words  it 
is  necessary  to  show  not  only  that  the  document  forged  was  not 
signed  by  the  party  whose  name  purports  to  be  attached  to  it. 
but  also  that  the  forged  writing  was  so  similar  to  the  genuine 
writing  of  the  party  that  persons  ordinarily  would  be  deceived 
thereby.  But  the  similarity  between  the  forged  and  the  genuine 
handwriting  need  only  be  sufficient  to  deceive  a  reasonable  and 
ordinary  person  into  accepting  the  same  as  true  and  genuine.  The 
forged  writing  need  not  be  so  skillfully  done  as  to  require  an  ex- 
pert to  detect  its  falsity.'"  The  writing  should  be  such  a  one  as 
would  be  available  in  law  to  produce  the  result  required.  It  must 
be  such  an  instrument  as,  if  genuine,  would  have  a  legal  validity, 
and  hence  an  instrument  which  on  its  face  shows  that  it  has  no 
legal  force  is  not  the  subject  of  forgery.*"  It  matters  not  how 
clearly  a  fraudulent  intent  may  be  proved,  a  writing  which  is 
upon  its  face  illegal  or  innocuous,  or  which  is  intrinsically  void 
and  incapable  of  creating  a  legal  obligation,  as,  for  example,  an 
unattested  will,  or  a  mere  letter  of  recommendation,  is  not  enough 
to  support  a  charge  of  forgery.  But  extrinsic  circumstances  may 
be  proved  showing  how  such  a  writing  may  have  been  used  to 
defraud,'*^  if  such  extrinsic  facts  and  circumstances  are  set  out 

"Waterman    v.    People,   67    111.   91,  209;  People  v.  Stearns,  21  Wen"a.  (X. 

93;  People  V.  Tomlinson,  35  Cal.  503;  Y.)  409,  414;  People  v.  Shall,  9  Cow. 

Xorton  V.  State,  129  Wis.  659,  109  N.  (N.  Y.)  778;  State  v.  Smith,  8  Ycrg. 

W.  531,  116  .\m.  St.  979.  (Tenn.)   150,  152;  People  v.  Tomlin- 

"  Goodman   v.    People,  228  111.  154,  son,  35  Cal.  503,  507;  Brown  v.  Peo- 

81   X.  E.  830;   Wilson  V.   State   (Ga.  pie,  86  111.  239,  242,  29  Am.  25;  Com- 

App.,  1910),  67  S.  E.  705.  monweplth    v.    Ladd.    15    Mass.    526, 

*°Farrcll.   In   re,   36   Mont.   254,  92  527;    Rcmbcrt  v.   State,   53  .Ma.   467, 

Pac.  785;  People  v.  Di  Ryana.  8  Cal.  469,    47h    25    Am.    639;    Finlcy,    Ex 

App.    333,  96    Pac.   919;    Crayton   v.  t>artc,  66  Cal.   262,  263.   5   Pac.   222; 

State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  88,  80  S.  W.  839;  People   v.   Galloway.    17   Wend.    (X. 

People   V.    McGIade,    139   Cal.   66.   72  Y.)     540,     541;     State     v.     Wheeler. 

Pac.  600.  19    Minn.   98,    100;    Roodc    v.    State, 

*"  LinKafclicr  v.  State,  28  Ohio  Cir.  5  Xch.  174,   177.  25  Am.  475;  Re.\  v. 

Ct.  800;  Howell  V.  State,  37  Tex.  591 ;  Moffatt.   2  Leach  C.    C.   483;   United 

Commonwealth  v.  Ilinrls,  loi  Mass.  States  v.  Williams,  14  Fed.  550.  552- 
46 — Unufrhill  Crim.  Ev. 


§    431  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  722 

with  reasonable  certainty  in  tlie  averments  of  the  indictment.^" 
If  the  writing  purports  to  be  a  vahd  instrument  it  is  enough,*^ 
nor  is  it  necessary  to  show  that  any  particular  person  has  been 
defrauded  if  the  writing  was  effectual  for  that  purpose.^* 
Whether  the  writing  shows  on  its  face  that  it  is  capable  of  creat- 
ing a  legal  obligation  is  a  question  of  construction,  and  for  this 
reason,  is  for  the  court  to  determine.  Where  there  is  ambiguity 
.  in  the  meaning  of  the  language  the  introduction  of  parol  evidence 

to  explain  the  writing  may  raise  a  question  of  fact  which  would 
be  for  the  jury  under  instructions  from  the  court.  In  the  case 
of  an  order  for  the  payment  of  money,  as  a  check  or  draft  on  a 
bank,  or  directing  the  delivery  of  goods,  the  wn-iting  is  a  subject 
of  forgery  if  there  appears  on  the  face  of  the  waiting  itself  that 
the  drawer  has  the  disposing  power  over  the  goods  or  money, 
that  it  indicates  a  person  who  is  under  an  obligation  to  him  to 
pay  or  to  deliver  the  goods,  and  someone  is  sufficiently  described 
therein  to  whom  delivery  or  payment  must  be  made.*^ 

§  431.    Sufficiency  of  evidence — Pecuniary  condition  of  the  accused. 

— The  weight  of  evidence  is  for  the  jury.  They  may  be  justified 
in  convicting  the  accused  upon  proof  of  a  few  essential  facts,  if 
they  are  convinced  of  his  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  The 
evidence  of  the  person  whose  name  was  forged  to  that  fact,  with 
proof  that  the  accused  had  passed  the  forged  check  or  other  in- 
strument, or  had  obtained  money  or  credit  thereon,  may,  unless 
rebutted  or  explained,  be  sufficient. ^"^ 

554;  Henry  v.  State,  35  Ohio  St.  128,  *- Goodman  v.   People,  228  111.    154, 

130;   State  V.   Dalton,  2  Murph.    (N.  81  N.  E.  830. 

Car.)   379;  Bennett  v.  State,  62  Ark.  *^  United    States   v.   Turner,   7    Pet. 

516,  36  S.  W.  947;  State  V.  Van  Au-  (U.  S.)   132,  134,  8  L.  ed.  633;  State 

ken,  98  Iowa  674,  68  N.  W.  454;  Bur-  v.   Hauser,  112  La.   313,  36   So.  396; 

den  V.  State,  120  Ala.  388,  25  So.  190,  Shelton  v.  State,  143  Ala.  98,  39  So. 

74  Am.   St.   y];   State  v.   Mitton,   ■^y  yjj. 

]\Iont.  366,  96  Pac.  926,  127  Am.   St.  "  State  v.   Hahn,  38  La.   Ann.    169, 

732;  Belden  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  565,  172;  State  v.  Gullette,  121  Mo.  447,  26 

99  S.  W.  563 ;  McLean  v.  State,  3  Ga.  S.  W.  354. 

App.  660,  60   S.   E.  2>Z'2.     Whether  a  "Russell  v.    State,  51   Fla.    124,  40 

paper  is  so  imperfect  and  inaccurate  So.  625. 

as  not  to  deceive  a  man  of  ordinary  ^°  Allgood  v.   State,  '^'j  Ga.  668,   13 

prudence  is  a  question   for  the  jury.  S.    E.    569;    Henderson    v.    State,    14 

State  V.  Warren,  109  ]\Io.  430,  19  S.  Tex.  503.     Weight  and  sufficiency  of 

W.  191,  32  Am.  St.  681. 


']2^      FORGERY,    COUNTERFEITING    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    43 1 

It  may  be  shown  that  a  person  accused  of  forging-  a  deed  had 
a  record  title  to  the  property  conveyed,**'  or  that  shortly  before 
uttering  the  forged  deed  he  claimed  the  land  under  another  deed. 
A  genuine  deed  on  record  is  not  notice  to  the  prisoner,  and  can- 
not be  proved  to  bring  home  to  him  knowledge  that  his  own  deed 
was  a  forgery.  Constructive  or  actual  notice  of  the  genuine  deed 
is  not  a  substitute  for  guilty  knowledge  in  a  criminal  trial. '^^  Thus 
it  is  an  error  to  charge  the  jury  that  the  accused  had  knowledge 
of  the  character  of  a  forged  instrument  passed  by  him,  if  he  had 
notice  of  any  suspicious  circumstance  sufficient  to  put  a  reason- 
ably prudent  man  on  an  inquiry  which,  if  followed  up,  would 
have  led  him  to  a  knowledge  of  the  forgery.^''  In  spite  of  the 
general  rule  that  mere  constructive  notice  raises  no  presumption 
of  actual  knowledge  that  a  deed  or  other  writing  is  forged,  it 
has  been  held  in  one  case  that  the  possession  by  the  accused  of  a 
forged  instrument  payable  to  his  order  raises  a  presumption  that 
he  knew  that  it  was  forged.  The  presumption,  however,  is  one 
of  fact  and  may  be  overcome  by  proof  showing  the  accused  was 
ignorant  of  the  false  character  of  the  instrument."'^ 

As  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  the  pecuniary  condition  of 
the  accused  may  sometimes  be  shown,  as,  for  example,  where  he 
stands  charged  with  forging  a  receipt  for  money  alleged  to  have 
been  paid  by  him.  The  fact  that  he  was  impecunious  immediately 
before  or  at  the  date  of  the  receipt  may  justify  the  inference 
that  no  money  was  paid  and  that  the  receipt  was  forged.  And 
where  the  accused  is  charged  with  the  forgery  of  a  check 
cashed  for  him  it  may  be  shown  that  he  was  without  money  be- 
fore the  check  was  cashed  and  immediately  thereafter  had  a  con- 
siderable sum  in  his  possession."^ 

the    evidence,    see    Elliott    Evidence,  ^'  Pearson  v.  State,  55  Ga.  659,  662 ; 

§  2997.    Evidence  in  general  in  prose-  State  v.  Harness,  10  Idaho  18,  76  Pac. 

cution    for   forgery,   see    Elliott    Evi-  788. 

dcnce,    §  2995.      Evidence   in    defense  '"'  Wells    v.    Territory,    i    Okla.    Cr. 

in  prosecution  for  forgery,  see  Elliott  469,  98  Pac.  483. 

Evidence,    §  2996.     Questions  of  law  °°  State  v.  Waterbury,  133  Iowa  135, 

or   fact   in   prosecutions   for   forgery,  no  N.  W.  328. 

sec  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2988.  "^Valkcr  v.  State.  127  Ga.  48,  56  S. 

"People  V.    Parker,  d-j   Mich.   222,  K.   113,   t  19  Am.  St.  3i4n,  8  L.  R.  \. 

227,  34  N.  W.  720,  II  Am.  St.  578.  (N.  S.)  11 75"- 


§  432 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


724 


§  432.  Counterfeiting — Elements  of  the  crime — Intent  and  guilty 
knowledge — Evidence  of  similar  offenses. — It  must  be  shown  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  the  defendant  uttered  the  note"-  with 
the  intention  to  defraud  the  person  receiving  it,  or  some  other 
person  through  him,  and  that  the  note  uttered  was  a  counterfeit."'^ 
The  existence  of  the  bank  by  which  the  note  purports  to  have 
been  issued  need  not  be  shown,"*  even  when  the  court  permits 
an  expert  to  testify  that  a  bill  submitted  to  his  inspection  is,  in 
his  opinion,  a  counterfeit."^  The  knowledge  of  the  defendant 
that  he  was  passing  counterfeit  money  must  be  shown. 

Evidence  that  the  defendant  was  seen  several  times  in  com- 
pany with  another  person  when  the  latter  passed  counterfeit 
bills,*'''  and  evidence  to  show  that  the  accused  and  some  third 
person  had  conspired  to  pass  counterfeit  money,  or  that  a  coun- 
terfeit had  been  passed  by  some  person  resembling  the  defend- 
ant,"' or  that  he  had,  about  the  same  time,  knowingly  uttered  a 
counterfeit,"*  or  that  he  had  been  indicted  and  convicted  at  an- 
other time  for  the  same  offense,""  is  always  admissible  to  show 


"'United  States  v.  Weikel,  8  Mont. 
124,  19  Pac.  396. 

"^United  States  v.  Provenzano,  171 
Fed.  675,  Elliott  Evidence,    §  2954. 

"*  State  V.  Cole,  19  Wis.  129,  135,  88 
Am.  Dec.  678;  People  v.  Peabody,  25 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  472;  Jennings  v.  Peo- 
ple, 8  Mich.  81;  State  v.  Playden,  15 
^'-  H.  355,  359;  Kennedy  v.  Common- 
wealth, 2  Met.  (Ky.)  36. 

"^  Jones  V.  State,  1 1  Ind.  357,  360. 

""  State  V.  Spalding,  19  Conn.  233, 
238,  48  Am.  Dec.  158;  Martin  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 2  Leigh  (Va.)  745. 

*^  People  V.  Clarkson,  56  Mich.  164, 
165,  22  N.  W.  258. 

As  to  mode  of  proving  corporate 
existence  of  bank  without  producing 
its  charter,  see  People  v.  McDonnell, 
80  Cal.  285,  22  Pac.  190,  13  Am.  St. 
159;  Sasser  v.  State,  13  Ohio  453; 
Commonwealth  v.  Riley,  Thach.  Cr. 
Cas.  (Mass.)  67;  People  v.  Davis,  21 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  309;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2956. 


"^  State  v.  Cole,  19  Wis.  129,  134, 
88  Am.  Dec.  678;  Commonwealth  v. 
Stearns,  10  Mete.  (Mass.)  256,  258; 
Commonwealth  v.  Bigelow,  8  Mete. 
(Mass.)  235,  236;  Hendrick's  Case, 
5  Leigh  (Va.)  707;  Steele  v.  People, 
45  111.  152,  157;  State  v.  Tindal,  5 
Harr.  (Del.)  488,  490;  United  States 
v.  Noble,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  371, 
27  Fed.  Cas.  15895.  If  it  is  sought  to 
prove  that  defendant  passed  other 
counterfeit  bills  of  the  same  denomi- 
nation, and  on  the  same  bank,  they 
should  have  been  produced,  if  within 
reach  of  the  prosecution.  State  v. 
Cole,  19  Wis.  129,  135,  88  Am.  Dec. 
678;  People  V.  Lagrille,  i  Wheel.  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  412;  Reed  v.  State,  15  Ohio 
217;  Commonwealth  v.  Edgerly,  10 
Allen  (Mass.)   184,  186. 

"'' McCartney  v.  State,  3  Ind.  353, 
56  Am.  Dec.  510;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  2954. 


725      FORGERY,    COUNTERFEITING    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    433 

the  criminal  intent.  And  the  defendant's  declarations  when 
passing  other  counterfeit  money  may  be  proved  against  him  for 
the  same  purpose.^""  But  evidence  of  similar  offenses  is  only 
admissible  to  prove  guilty  knowledge,  never  solely  to  show  that 
the  bill  or  coin  was  a  counterfeit.^  The  inference  of  guilty 
knowledge  which  the  jury  may  draw  from  such  evidence  may  be 
rebutted.  Thus  the  defendant  may  bring  out  facts  and  circum- 
stances tending  to  show  that  he  was  so  drunk  as  not  to  know 
what  he  was  doing;'  he  supposed  the  money  was  genuine;  that 
it  was  so,  in  fact,  and  may  also  prove  that  his  belief  in  the  genu- 
ineness of  the  money  was  founded  upon  information  derived 
from  the  most  approved  sources.^ 

§  433.    Evidence  to  show  that  counterfeit  money  or  implements 
for  its  manufacture  were  found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused. — 

The  possession  of  implements  or  appliances,  such  as  plates  and 
dies  adapted  or  designed  for  making  counterfeit  coin  or  bills,  or 
the  possession  of  the  counterfeits,  with  a  knowledge  of  their 
spurious  character,  and  with  an  intent  to  pass  them,  is,  in  many 
states,  a  felony  by  statute.*  And  the  finding  of  tools  or  machin- 
ery^ for  the  coining  of  money,  or  of  spurious  coin,*^  in  defendant's 

^°°  State   V.    Smith,   5    Day    (Conn.)  session    must   be    proved.      People   v. 

175.   178,   5  Am.  Dec.   132;   Common-  White,  34  Cal.   183,  187;  Hutchins  v. 

wealth  V.  Edgerly,   10  Allen   (Mass.)  State,  13  Ohio  198,  200.     See  United 

184,    186;   United   States   v.    Doebler,  States  v.  Taranto,  74  Fed.  219. 

Baldw.    (U.    S.)    519,    25    Fed.    Cas.  ^  State    v.    Antonio,    3    Brev.     (S. 

14977.  Car.)  562;  Hess  v.  State,  5  Ohio  5,  9, 

^  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2954.  22  Am.  Dec.  767n ;  United  States  v. 

^  Jones  v.    State,    11    Ind.    357,   360.  Provenzano,    171    Fed.   675.    Whether 

■^  State  V.  Morton,  8  Wis.  167.    Evi-  he  knew   the    false   character   of  the 

dence  of  other  crimes  in  prosecution  money   in    his    possession    is    for   the 

for    counterfeiting,   see   62    L.    R.    A.  jury.      United    States    v.    Stevens,    52 

193,    note;    105    Am.    St.    996,    note.  Fed.  120. 

Presumptions   and    burden    of   proof,  "Stalker  v.  State,  9  Conn.  341,  343; 

see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2953.     Admis-  United    States   v.    Hinman,    i    Baldw. 

sions  in   prosecution   for  counterfeit-  (U.    S.)    292,    26    Fed.    Cas.    15370; 

ing.  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2957.    Ev-  People    v.    Thorns.   3    Park.    Cr.    (N. 

idcnce  of  accomplice,  see  Elliott   Ev-  Y.)   256,  262,  270;   State  v.  Twitty,  2 

idence,    §  2958.      Evidence    of    good  Hawks    (N.  Car.)   248,  258;   State  v. 

character  of  dcfenrlant,  see   103  Am.  Bridgman,   49   Vt.    202,   210,   24    .Am. 

St.  903.  124;    People   V.    White,   34   Cal.    183, 

*  The  criminal  intention  of  the  pos-  189.     The    counterfeit    money    found 


§  434 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


726 


possession,  even  subsequenlly  to  the  act  for  which  he  is  indicted." 
may  always  be  proved  for  the  purpose  of  showing  guihy  knowl- 
edge and  criminal  intent."*  But  the  accused  must  be  allowed  to 
explain  his  possession,  in  order  to  rebut  any  presumption  that 
may  arise  against  him.**  His  failure  to  explain  how  he  became 
possessed  of  counterfeit  money  may  be  proved.' ^^  The  possession 
must  be  exclusive  and  actual.  The  fact  that  counterfeiter's  tools 
were  found  in  the  possession  of  the  wife  of  the  accused  is  not 
relevant  where  he  exercised  no  control  over  tliem." 


§  434.  Resemblance  to  the  genuine. — This  is  a  question  for  the 
jury,'-  and  must  l)e  proved  by  evidence  that  will  show  an  imita- 
tion or  a  resemblance  that  will  deceive  persons  of  ordinary  in- 


must,  it  seems,  be  similar  in  kind  to 
that  for  uttering  which  he  is  on  trial. 
Bluflf  V.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  547. 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Price,  10  Gray 
(Mass.)  472,  476,  71  Am.  Dec.  668n; 
Reg.  V.  Forster,  6  Cox  C.  C.  521 ; 
Bottomle}-  v.  United  States,  i  Story 
(U.  S.)  135,  3  Fed.  Cas.  1688;  Elliott 
Evidence,  §  2955 ;  25  Am.  St.  387,  389. 
Defenses  in  prosecution  for  counter- 
feiting, see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2961. 

*"The  object  of  the  testimony  is 
not  to  convict  or  accuse  him  of  other 
crimes,  but  to  establish  the  fact  of 
such  a  knowledge,  on  his  part,  of  the 
true  character  of  the  bill  uttered  by 
him,  and  which  is  proved  to  be  coun- 
terfeit, as  will  justify  the  jury  in  in- 
ferring his  guilt  in  the  case  on  trial. 
And  so  far  as  this  may  be  deemed  a 
departure  from  the  technical  rules  of 
evidence,  it  is  a  departure  justified 
by  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  crime  of 
passing  counterfeit  money;  consisting 
not  in  the  fact  of  passing,  which  may 
be  done  by  an  innocent  person,  but 
in  the  guilty  knowledge  connected 
with  such  passing."  Commonwealth 
V.  Bigelow,  8  Met.  (Mass.)  235; 
United  State  v.  Mitchell,  Baldw.  CU. 
S.)  366,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15787;  United 


State  v.  Noble,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 
S.)  371,  27  Fed.  Cas.  15895;  State  v. 
Brown,  4  R.  I.  528,  70  Am.  Dec.  168. 

"  United  States  v.  Burns,  5  McLean 
(U.  S.)  23,  24  Fed.  Cas.  14691  r 
United  States  v.  King,  5  McLean  (U. 
S.)  208,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15535;  United 
States  V.  Craig,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U. 
S.)  729,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14883. 

'"  United  States  v.  Kenneally,  5  Biss. 
(U.  S.)   122,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15522. 

"  People  V.  Thoms,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  256,  262.  It  may  be  proved  that 
the  prisoner  attempted  to  utter  the 
note  at  different  times  and  places, 
where  it  had  been  suspected  and  chal- 
lenged as  false,  that  he  had  declared 
it  to  be  genuine  and  true;  or  that  he 
attempted  to  secrete  himself,  or  to 
destroy  a  note  found  on  him.  State 
V.  Smith,  5  Day  (Conn.)  175,  178,  5 
Am.  Dec.  132.  A  person  who,  in  con- 
cert with  the  police,  buys  counterfeit 
money  of  the  accused  for  the  purpose 
of  entrapping  him,  is  not  an  accom- 
plice, and  the  rule  requiring  corrobo- 
ration does  not  apply  to  him.  People 
v.  Farrell.  30  Cal.  316. 

^United  States  v.  Stevens,  52  Fed. 
120. 


727     FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AXD    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    435 

telligence  and  powers  of  observation.^"  Expert  evidence  is  admis- 
sible to  prove  the  genuineness  of  the  alleged  counterfeit/*  though 
it  seems  that  experience  acquired  in  judging  bank  notes  when 
receiving,  handling  and  paying  them  out  does  not  necessarily 
qualify  a  witness  as  an  expert  upon  the  genuineness  of  the  signa- 
tures.^^ The  money  which  it  is  alleged  has  been  counterfeited 
ought  to  be  produced  in  court.  Evidence  that  bills  or  coin  were 
counterfeit  is  not  ordinarily  received  unless  this  is  done,  though  if 
the  money  has  been  lost  or  destroyed  secondary  evidence  may  be 
received  to  show  what  sort  of  money  it  was.^*^  It  is  not  usually 
necessary  in  the  case  of  the  counterfeiting  of  bank  bills  to  pro- 
duce an  officer  of  the  bank  to  prove  that  the  signatures  of  the 
bank  officers  to  the  bills  are  forged  or  to  prove  that  the  bills  are 
counterfeit.^' 

§  435.  False  pretenses. — At  common  law  defrauding  a  person  of 
money  or  of  other  property  by  mere  lying  was  no  offense.  It  was 
necessary  to  prove  that  the  fraud  was  accomplished  by  means  of 
some  false  token^*  or  writing,  or  by  means  of  false  weights  or 
measures,  or  that  there  was  a  conspiracy  to  defraud.  In  other 
Avords,  besides  the  intention  to  cheat,  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
means  employed  were  such  as  would  deceive  persons  who  used 
due  diligence  and  precautions.^" 

"State   V.    McKenzie,   42   Me.   392,  2   Leigh    (Va.)    745;   Commonwealth 

394:    People   V.   Osmer,   4    Park.    Cr.  v.  Carej-,  2  Pick.   (Mass.)   47;  Com- 

(X.  Y.)  242,  244.     See  ante,  §  430.  monwealth      v.      Taylor,      5      Cush. 

''United  States  v.  Keen,  i  McLean  (Mass.)  605;  Sarles,  In  re,  4  City  H. 

(U.  S.)  429,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15510;  Hess  Rcc.  (X.  Y.)  T07. 

V.    State,  5   Ohio   5,  7,  22  Am.    Dec.  '*  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2977. 

767n;  Keating  v.  People,  160  111.  480,  "Commonwealth     v.      Warren,     6 

43  X.  E.  724;  Elliott  Evidence,  §2959.  Mass.  72,  73;   People  v.  Johnson,   12 

"State    V.    Allen,    r     Hawks     (N.  Johns.    (X.   Y.)    292,  293;    People  v. 

Car.)    6,    10,  9  Am.   Dec.  6i6n.     See  Babcock,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  201,  204,  5 

ante,  §  429.  Am.  Dec.  256;  Rex  v.  Lara,  6  T.  R. 

"State  V.  Orsborn,  i  Root  (Conn.)  565;    State  v.    Patillo,  4  Hawks    (X. 

152;  State  V.  Phelps,  2  Root  (Conn.)  Car.)    348;    State    v.    Stroll,    i    Rich. 

87;   Armitage  v.    State,    13   Ind.  441;  (S.    Car.)    244;    State    v.    Justice.    2 

State  v.  Potts,  9  X.  J.  L.  26,  17  Am.  Dev.   (N.  Car.)    199,  201;  Hughes  v. 

Dec.  449.  People,   223    111.   417,   79   X.    E.    137: 

"State    V.    Hooper,    2    Bailey     (S.  Commonwealth  v.   Burton,   183  Mass. 

Car.)   37;   Martin  v.  Commonwealth,  461,  67  X.   E.  419;   Elliott  Evidence, 


§    435  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  728 

Four  essential  facts  must  be  proved  to  constitute  the  crime  of 
false  pretenses.  First,  the  intent  to  defraud  some  particular  per- 
son or  peojile  generally.  Second,  an  actual  fraud  committed. 
Third,  the  false  pretense,  and  fourth,  that  the  fraud  resulted 
from  the  employment  of  the  false  pretense.-'^  But  this  rule  that 
to  obtain  money  or  property  by  mere  lying  did  not  constitute  a 
crime,  was  found  inadequate  as  soon  as  the  employment  of  com- 
mercial credit  became  general  in  consequence  of  the  increase  of 
commerce,  domestic  and  foreign.  Hence  by  statute,  30  George 
IL,  ch.  24,  it  was  enacted  that  "All  persons  who  knowingly  and 
designedly,  by  false  pretense  or  pretenses,  shall  obtain  from  any 
person  or  persons"^  money,  goods,  wares  or  merchandises  with 
intent  to  cheat  or  defraud  any  person  or  persons  of  the  same 
*  *  *  shall  be  deemed  offenders  against  law  and  the  public 
peace."  The  crime  of  false  pretenses  is  distinct  from  larceny  in 
the  following  particulars:  If  the  evidence  shows  that  the  trick 
or  fraud  practiced  resulted  only  in  inducing  the  owner  of  the 
property  to  part  with  the  naked  possession  of  the  same,  he  in- 
tending to  retain  in  himself  his  right  and  title  as  owner,  the  tak- 
ing Vv^ill  be  larceny  only;  but  if  the  owner  intended  not  only  to 
part  with  possession  but  with  the  title  or  right  of  property  in 
the  goods,  the  offense  is  false  pretenses. " 

§  2978.     Evidence  to  prove  the  false  tenses  must  be  used  for  the  purpose 

pretense,  see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2980;  of    perpetrating    the    fraud,    and    the 

10  L.  R.  A.  307,  note.  fraud  must  be  accomplished  by  means 

""  Commonwealth  v.  Drew,  19  Pick,  of  the  false  pretenses  made  use  of  for 

(Mass.)   179;  State  v.  Clark,  46  Kan.  that  purpose.     Clawson  v.   State,  129 

65,  66,  26  Pac.  481;  People  v.  Jordan,  Wis.  650,  109  N.  W.  578,  116  Am.  St. 

66  Cal.  10,  12,  4  Pac.  ■/■jz,  56  Am.  73 ;  972. 

People  V.  Wakely,  62  Mich.  297,  303,        ^^  Which  obviously  in  modern  times. 

28  X.  W.  871;   State  V.  Bingham,  51  at  least  would  include  a  corporation. 

Wash.   616,   99    Pac.   735;    Morris   v.  State  v.  Briscoe   (Del.),  67  Atl.  154; 

State,  54  Fla.  80,  45  So.  456;  Young  State  v.  Harnett  (Del.,  1909),  74  Atl. 

V.    State,   156  Ala.  670,   46   So.   580;  82. 

Ryan  v.   State,  104  Ga.  78,  30  S.  E.         "2  Russell  on  Crimes  (9th  Am.  Ed.) 

678;  Griffin  V.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  476,  618;   Smith  v.   People,  53  X.  Y.   rii, 

60  S.  E.  277;  State  v.  Wedbee  (X.  C,  114,  13  Am.  474;  Lewer  v.  Common- 

1910),  67  S.  E.  60;  People  v.  Point-  wealth,  15  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  93;  Cline  v. 

dexter,  243  111.  68,  90  X.  E.  261.     To  State,    43    Tex.    494,    497;    Miller    v. 

constitute    the    ofifense    of    obtaining  Commonwealth,  78  Ky.  15,  19,  39  Am. 

property  by  false  pretenses  there  must  194 ;  State  v.  Anderson,  47  Iowa  142, 

be  an  intent  to  defraud,  there  must  be  14S ;  People  v.  Rae,  66  Cal.  423,  425,. 

an  actual  fraud  committed,  false  pre-  6  Pac.  i,  56  Am.  102;  Zink  v.  People, 


729   FORGERY,  COUXTERFEITIXG  AND  FALSE  PRETEXSES.   §§436-437 

If  the  accused,  having  obtained  legal  possession  of  tlie  goods 
with  the  owner's  consent,  and,  as  a  bailee  or  trustee,  afterwards 
converts  them  to  his  own  use  he  is  guilty  of  embezzlement 
only.  To  constitute  the  crime  of  false  pretenses  it  must  be 
proved  that  the  accused,  at  the  time  of  the  taking  of  the  prop- 
erty, was  acting  dishonestly  and  with  a  fraudulent  intent  and 
that  he  then  and  there,  by  false  pretenses,  induced  the  owner  to 
part  with  both  the  title  and  the  possession  and  not  with  the  pos- 
session alone. "^ 

§  436.  Evidence  to  show  the  intention  of  the  owner. — It  will  thus 
be  seen  that  the  intention  of  the  owner  as  respects  his  title  to  the 
property  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  for  it  is  upon  his  intention 
that  the  character  of  the  crime  depends.  He  may  always  testify 
to  the  intention  with  which  he  transferred  the  property  to  the 
accused.-*  He  may  relate  in  evidence  at  length  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  transfer  was  made,  includins:  evervthine  that 
was  said  or  done,  either  by  him  or  by  the  accused,  as  a  part  of  the 
res  gestcc;  and  from  these  circumstances  the  jury  may  infer  that 
he  consented  to  divest  himself  of  his  title  in  the  property  upon 
the  strength  of  the  false  representations.*^ 

^  437.  The  intent  to  defraud. — An  intent  to  defraud  must  always 
be  proved-"  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.     The  intent  is  always  a 

77  N.  Y.  114,  ZZ  Am.  589;  Canter  v.  Ky.  510,  513,    18  S.   W.  358,  775,   i3 

State,  7  Lea   (Tenn.)   349,  350;  Peo-  Ky.  L.  929,  36  Am.  St.  609.    Cf.  State 

pie  V.  Martin,   102  Cal.  558,  36  Pac.  v.    Vaughan,    i    Bay    (S.    Car.)    282, 

952;  Jones  V.  State,  93  Ga.  547,  553,  283;  State  v.  Benson,  no  Mo.  18,  21, 

19  S.  E.  250;  Commonwealth  v.  Call,  19  S.  W.  213;  State  v.  Bingham,  51 

21  Pick.   (Mass.)  515.  Wash.   616,    99    Pac.    735;    People    v. 

^^Commonwealth      v.      Barry,      124  Snyder,   no  App.   Div.    (N.  Y.)   699, 

Mass.  325,  327 ;   State  v.   Keyes,  196  97  X.  Y.  S.  469. 

Mo.  136,  93  S.  W.  801,  6  L.  R.  A.  (X.        =»  Sharp  v.   State,  53  X.  J.  L.  511, 

S.)     369n ;     Day     v.     Commonwealth  513,   21    .\\\.    1026;   Carlisle   v.   State, 

CKy.),  no  S.  W.  417,  T,?i  Ky.  L.  560:  76  Ala.   75;   Todd   v.    State,  31    Ind. 

State  V.  Dickinson,  21   Mont.  595,  55  514,    516;    State    v.    Fields,    n8    Ind. 

Pac.  539;   Beckwith   v.  Galice  Mines  491,   492,    21    X.    E.    252;    Bowler  v. 

Co.,  50  Ore.  542,  93  Pac.  453,   16  L.  State,  41    Miss.    570,   578:    People    v. 

R.  A.  (N.  S.)  723.  Kendall.  25  Wend.   fX.  Y.)  309.  401, 

"Commonwealth      v.      Drew,      153  37  Am.   Dec.  240;   Commonwealth  v. 

Mass.  588,  595.  27  X.  E.  593.  Devlin,    141    Mass.   423,  430.  6   X.   E. 

^Commonwealth    v.    Schwartz,    92  64;    People   v.    Baker,  96  X.    Y.   340, 


§  437 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


730 


question  for  the  jury."'  The  intent  to  defraud  may  be  inferred 
from  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  as,  for  example, 
from  the  fact  that  llie  representaiions  were  false  and  that  the 
accused  knew  they  were  so  when  he  made  them.-'*  And  where  the 
alleged  fraudulent  transaction  is  at  all  complicated,  it  is  compe- 
tent to  prove,  not  only  the  facts  constituting  the  transaction 
itself,  but  also  all  facts  and  circumstances  involved  in  the  steps 
preliminary  thereto,  and  all  facts  which  tend  to  show  the  course 
of  dealing  between  the  parties  before  and  after  the  date  of  the 
offense  laid  in  the  indictment.  The  widest  latitude  is  allowed. 
All  available  information  should  be  received  and  no  circum- 
stances should  be  excluded  which  w^ill  throw,  or  tend  to  throw, 
any  light  upon  the  intent  of  the  parties,  or  upon  the  falsity  of 
the  representations.-" 

An  intention  upon  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  pay  for  the 
property  obtained,  or  to  return  the  money  procured  by  false  pre- 
tenses, is  immaterial.  Hence  the  defendant  cannot  prove,  to  re- 
but the  intent  to  defraud,  that  he  promised  to  repay,  or  that  he 
was  able  or  willing  to  repay,^"  wanted  to  procure  work  so  as  to 


349;  People  V.  Getchell,  6  Mich.  496, 
504;  Ager  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  158, 
58  S.  E.  374;  State  v.  Briscoe  (Del., 
1907),  67  Atl.  154;  25  Am.  St.  387, 
note ;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2975 ;  Mar- 
tins V.  State,  17  Wyo.  319,  98  Pac. 
709;  State  V.  Luff  (Del.,  1909),  74  Atl. 
1079.  Presumption  and  burden  of 
proof  in  prosecution  for  false  pre- 
tense, see  25  Am.  St.  380,  389.  De- 
fenses in  prosecutions  for  false  pre- 
tense, see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2982. 
Evidence  of  good  character  of  de- 
fendant, see  103  Am.  St.  902;  suf- 
ficiency of  evidence — variance,  see  El- 
liott Evidence,  §  2984;  25  Am.  St. 
389. 

^  State  V.  Norton,  76  Mo.  180,  182; 
Brown  v.  People,  16  Hun  (X.  Y.) 
53S>  537;  People  v.  Thomas,  3  Hill 
(N.  Y.)  169;  Parmelee  v.  People,  8 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  623;  Dorsey  v.  State, 
III  Ala.  40,  20  So.  629. 

-^People  v.  Herrick,  13  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  87,  91;  State  v.  Walton,  114  N. 


Car.  783,  787,  18  S.  E.  945;  Pepple  v. 
Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340,  2  N.  Y.  Cr.  218. 
Cf.  People  v.  Getchell,  6  Mich.  496, 
505;  State  V.  Briscoe  (Del.,  1907),  67 
Atl.  154;  People  V.  Leavens  (Gal. 
App.,  1909),  106  Pac.  1 103. 

*•  People  V.  Gibbs,  98  Cal.  661,  665, 
33  Pac.  630;  State  v.  Rivers,  58  Iowa 
102,  no,  12  N.  W.  117,  43  Am.  112; 
People  v.  Shelters,  99  Mich.  2>22,>  334. 
58  N.  W.  362;  People  v.  Winslow,  39 
Mich.  505,  506;  State  v.  Hartnett 
(Del.,  1909),  74  Atl.  82.  As  to  deeds, 
letters  and  telegrams  forming  a  part 
of  the  res  gestce,  see  Commonwealth 
V.  Jeffries,  7  Allen  (Mass.)  548,  561, 
83  Am.  Dec.  7l2n,  and  State  v.  Alex- 
ander, 119  Mo.  447,  462,  24  S.  W. 
1060. 

™  People  V.  Oscar,  105  Mich.  704, 
63  X.  W.  971 ;  People  v.  Lennox,  106 
Mich.  625,  64  X^  W.  488;  Common- 
wealth V.  Coe,  115  Mass.  481,  503; 
Commonwealth  v.   Mason,   105  Mass. 


731      FORGERY,    COUNTERFEITING    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    438 

earn  money  to  repay, "^  or  actually  did  repay,  persons  from  whom 
money  had  been  obtained.^-  Xor  can  he  prove  that,  in  procuring 
the  money,  he  was  acting  under  legal  adx'ice  unless  he  shows, 
first,  that  he  stated  to  the  attorney  who  advised  him,  fullv  and 
fairly  all  the  facts,  and  unless  it  also  appears  that  he  acted  m 
perfect  good  faith.^^ 

§  438.  Evidence  of  other  similar  crimes  not  inadmissible  when 
relevant  to  show  the  intent  to  defraud. — Evidence  of  similar  of- 
fenses, involving  the  making  of  other  false  representations,  is 
admissible  against  the  prisoner  to  show  that  he  was  aware  of  the 
falsity  of  the  statements  made  by  him  in  the  present  instance, 
and  that,  knowing  them  to  be  false,  he  made  them  with  the  intent 
to  deceive.^*  Evidence  of  similar  false  pretenses  is  particularly 
relevant  when  it  appears  that  the  fraudulent  act  for  which  the 
accused  is  on  trial  does  not  stand  alone,  but  is  a  part  of  a  scheme, 
not  merely  to  defraud  one  individual,  but  to  swindle  the  com- 


163,  7  Am.  507;  State  v.  Thatcher,  35 
X.  J.  L.  445,  448;  People  v.  Wieger, 
100  Cal.  352,  34  Pac.  826;  Reg.  v. 
Xaylor,  10  Cox  C.  C.  149;  Reg.  v. 
Boulton,  I  Den.  C.  C.  508,  509;  State 
V.  Hill,  72  Me.  238,  242 ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Schwartz,  92  Ky.  510,  514, 
18  S.  W.  358,  775,  13  Ky.  L.  929,  36 
Am.  St.  609;  State  v.  Hartnett  (Del., 
1909),  74  Atl.  82.  Contra,  People  v. 
Herrick,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  87,  92. 

"^^  Meek  v.  State,  117  Ala.  116,  23 
So.  155. 

"'Commonwealth  v.  Howe,  132 
Mass.  250,  261. 

"State  V.  Oppenheimer,  41  Wash. 
630,  84  Pac.  588. 

^Hutcherson  v.  State  (Tex.,  1896), 
35  S.  W.  375;  Martin  v.  State,  36 
Tex.  Cr.  r25,  35  S.  VV.  976;  People 
V.  Hensslcr,  48  Mich.  49,  11  N.  W. 
804;  State  V.  Walton,  114  N.  Car. 
783,  18  S.  E.  945;  TroRclon  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 31  Gratt.  (Va.)  862,  871- 
875;  State  V.  Myers,  82  Mo.  558,  52 
Am.  389;  State  v.  Lonf.;,  103  Ind.  481, 


485,  3  N.  E.  169;  State  v.  Jackson, 
112  Mo.  585,  589,  20  S.  W.  674;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Eastman,  i  Cush. 
(Mass.)  189,  48  Am.  Dec.  596;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Jeffries,  7  Allen 
(Mass.)  548,  83  Am.  Dec.  7i2n; 
State  V.  Lapage,  57  N.  H.  245,  24 
Am.  69;  Bielschofsky  v.  People,  3 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  40;  Mayer  v.  People,  80 
N.  Y.  364,  372;  Strong  v.  State,  86 
Ind.  208,  213,  44  Am.  292n.  Contra, 
State  V.  Bokicn,  14  Wash.  403,  44 
Pac.  889;  People  v.  Garrahan,  19 
App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  347,  46  N.  Y.  S. 
497;  Meek  v.  State,  117  Ala.  116,  23 
So.  155;  State  V.  Sparks,  79  Neb. 
504,  113  N.  W.  154;  State  v.  Jackson, 
21  S.  Dak.  494,  113  N.  W.  880:  Peo- 
ple V.  Levin,  119  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.) 
233,  104  N.  Y.  S.  647,  affirmed  in  194 
X.  Y.  SS4,  87  N.  K.  1 124.  Evidence 
of  other  offenses  in  prosecution  for 
false  pretense,  see  62  L.  R.  \.  193, 
note;  25  Am.  St.  387,  note;  105  .Am. 
St.  looi,  note. 


§  439 


CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE. 


1Z-2- 


miinity  at  large. ^''  Thus,  where  the  representations  consist  of 
statements  by  the  accused  of  his  financial  condition,  and  the  ex- 
hibition of  a  memorandum  claimed  by  him  to  be  a  correct  ac- 
count of  the  profits  of  his  business,  it  may  be  shown  that  previous 
to  these  statements  he  had  made  similar  statements  to  other  per- 
sons and  by  such  statements  had  procured  money  from  others.^" 
The  same  rule  has  been  applied  to  statements  of  the  accused  in  an 
endeavor  to  sell  stock  in  a  corporation.^'  The  theory  upon  which 
similar  statements  by  the  accused  are  admitted  in  evidence  is  that 
they  bring  home  to  him  a  knowledge  of  the  falsity  of  the  repre- 
sentations, when  he  made  them  and  also  show  his  intent  to  de- 
ceive. 

§  439.    The  pretenses  made  and  evidence  to  show  their  falsity. — 

The  burden  of  proving  the  nature  of  the  representations  is  always 
upon  the  prosecution.  An  indictment  charging  two  or  more  false 
pretenses  is  sustained  by  proving  one  or  more  of  them.^*    Having 


'^Rafferty  v.   State,  91   Tenn.   655, 
666,   16  S.  W.  728;  Carnell  v.   State, 

85  Md.  I,  36  Atl.  117;  Common- 
wealth V.  Howe,  132  Mass.  250,  260; 
Commonwealth  v.  Coe,  115  Mass. 
481,  SOI ;  People  v.  Henssler,  48  Mich. 
49,  53,  II  N.  W.  804;  Strong  v.  State, 

86  Ind.  208,  217,  44  Am.  292n;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Blood,  141  Mass.  571, 
576,  6  N.  E.  769;  State  v.  Gibson, 
132  Iowa  53,  106  N.  W.  270; 
State  V.  Sparks,  79  Neb.  504;  113 
N.  W.  154,  rehearing  denied,  79 
Neb.  SI  I,  114  N.  W.  S98;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Burton,  183  Mass.  461, 
67  N.  E.  419;  State  v.  Newman,  73 
N.  J.  L.  202,  (i2  Atl.  1008;  State  v. 
Seligman,  127  Iowa  415,  103  N.  W. 
357;  State  V.  Poole,  42  Wash.  192, 
84  Pac.  727;  People  v.  Weil,  244  111. 
176,  91  N.  E.  112.  But  independent 
fraudulent  acts  unconnected  with  the 
crime  in  question  were  rejected  in 
Todd  V.  State,  31  Ind.  514,  519;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Jackson,  132  Mass.  16, 
21.    The  entire  history  of  the   fraud 


may  be  shown.  If  the  facts  disclose 
that  other  similar  crimes  have  been 
committed,  this  does  not  render  them 
incompetent.  Commonwealth  v.  Blood, 
141  Mass.  571,  575,  6  N.  E.  769. 

"■"  People  V.  Noblett,  184  N.  Y.  612, 
'J^  N.  E.  II93- 

^'People  V.  Whalen,  154  Cal.  472, 
98  Pac.  194. 

^Woodruff  V.  State,  61  Ark.  157, 
32  S.  W.  102;  Limouze  v.  People,  58 
III.  App.  314;  State  V.  Vandimark,  35 
Ark.  396,  402 ;  Skiff  v.  People,  2 
Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  139,  146;  Todd  v. 
State,  31  Ind.  514,  523;  Rex  v.  Ady, 
7  C.  &  P.  140;  Commonwealth  v. 
Morrill,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  571,  574; 
State  V.  Mills,  17  Me.  211;  Webster 
V.  People,  92  N.  Y.  422,  427;  People 
V.  Blanchard,  90  N.  Y.  314,  319;  2 
Bish.  Cr.  Pro.  (4th  ed.),  §  187(2): 
State  V.  Keyes,  196  Mo.  136,  93  S.  W. 
801,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  36911;  Cun- 
ningham V.  State,  61  N.  J.  L.  666,  40 
Atl.  696 ;  Day  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  no  S.  W.  417,  ZZ  Ky.  L.  560. 


"JT^T^      FORGERY,    COUNTERFEITING    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES. 


439 


proved  the  making  of  the  pretenses,  the  burden  remains  upon  the 
state  to  prove  their  falsity.""  The  admissions  of  the  defendant 
tending  to  show  the  falsity  of  the  representations  made  by  him, 
though  not  usually  enough  to  sustain  a  conviction,  unless  corro- 
borated,*" may  always  be  received  in  evidence  against  him,*^  their 
weight  being  left  to  the  jury,  who  must  determine  whether  the 
representations  made  were  false  or  true.  Direct  evidence  to  es- 
tablish the  falsity  of  the  representations  is  not  indispensable. 
This  may  be  inferred  from  evidence  of  circumstances  which  tend 
legitimately  and  necessarily  to  show  it.*^  The  false  representa- 
tion must  be  of  some  existing  or  past  material  fact,  as  distinct 
from  a  mere  promise  or  opinion.'*^  Only  such  pretenses  can  be 
proved  as  relate  to  events  past  or  present  which  are  complete  and 
certain.  The  representations  must  be  of  such  a  character  that 
their  truth  or  falsity  can  be  determined.  This  necessarily  cannot 
be  done  where  the  representations  relate  to  future  events  which 
are  uncertain  and  contingent,  or  where  they  consist  of  promises 
or  vague  opinions  concerning  the  truth  of  which  no  person  can 
tell  anything.**     But,  though  false  representations  as  to  future 


'''Babcock  v.  People,  15  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  347,  352;  Bowler  v.  State,  41 
Miss.  570,  577;  State  v.  Wilbourne, 
87  N.  Car.  529,  532;  People  v.  Leav- 
ens (Cal.  App.,  1909),  106  Pac.  1 103. 

■"State  V.  Lewis,  45  Iowa  20,  22; 
State  V.  Penny,  70  Iowa  190,  30  N. 
W.  561. 

"State  V.  Long,  103  Ind.  481,  3  N. 
E.  169;  Meek  v.  State,  117  Ala.  116, 
23  So.  155 ;  Lawrence  v.  State,  103 
Md.  17,  63  Atl.  96;  People  v.  Chrones, 
75  Pac.  180,  141  Cal.  XVIII,  not  re- 
ported in  full. 

*"  People  V.  Pinckney,  67  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  428,  430,  22  X.  Y.  S.  118. 

"2  Bish.  Cr.  L.,  §  429;  Biddle  v. 
L'nited  States,  156  Fed.  759,  84  C.  C. 
A.  415;  State  V.  Hollingsworth,  132 
Iowa  471,  109  N.  W.  1003;  Cook  v. 
State,  71  Xeb.  243,  98  N.  W.  810; 
Goddard  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  154,  58 
.S.  K.  304;  People  v.  Huggins,  no 
App.    Div.    (X.  Y.)   613,  97   X.  Y.  S. 


187;  State  V.  Phelps,  41  Wash.  470, 
84  Pac.  24;  Young  v.  State  (Ala., 
1908),  46  So.  580. 

"  Dillingham  v.  State,  5  Ohio  St. 
280,  285;  Rex  V.  Codrington,  i  C.  & 
P.  661 ;  People  v.  Morphy,  100  Cal. 
84,  87,  34  Pac.  623 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Drew,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  179,  185; 
Commonwealth  v.  Warren,  94  Ky. 
615,  619,  23  S.  W.  193,  IS  Ky.  L.  249; 
Commonwealth  v.  Moore,  99  Pa.  St. 
570,  574;  Gray  v.  State,  55  Ala.  86; 
Ryan  v.  State,  45  Ga.  128,  129; 
Thomas  v.  State,  90  Ga.  437,  440,  16 
S.  E.  94;  Keller  v.  State,  51  Ind.  iii, 
117;  Commonwealth  v.  Stevenson,  127 
Mass.  446,  449;  Snyder,  In  re,  \y 
Kan.  542,  557 ;  State  v.  Green,  7  Wis. 
571;  State  V.  Phifcr,  65  X.  Car.  321, 
325;  State  V.  Daniel,  114  X.  Car.  823, 
824,  19  S.  E.  100;  People  v.  Hlanch- 
ard,  90  X.  Y.  314,  325;  Allen  v.  State, 
16   Tex.   App.    150,    151 ;    Johnson   v. 


§    440  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  734 

events  which  of  necessity  are  in  the  nature  of  a  promise  or  opin- 
ion, may  not  be  enough  alone  to  sustain  a  conviction  of  false 
pretenses,  it  often  happens  that  false  representations  of  material 
facts  and  promises  are  intermingled  in  the  same  statement.  This 
does  not  necessarily  keep  out  the  statement  if  the  statement  of  a 
fact  and  the  promise  can  be  separated.  And  if  it  is  proved  that 
the  person  defrauded  relied  in  part  on  the  statement  of  fact  the 
promise  may  be  disregarded  by  the  jury  and  the  defendant  prop- 
erly convicted.'*^  For  if  the  statement  of  an  existing  fact  which  is 
false  produces  its  result  only  because  it  is  coupled  with  a  promise 
that  is  also  false  a  statement  of  fact  and  the  promise  may  be 
reasonably  regarded  as  constituting  a  false  misrepresentation, 
upon  which  the  prosecuting  witness  relied.**'  Representations  of 
value  of  property  as  an  existing  fact  are  not  mere  opinion,  but  are 
material ;  and  if  made  with  a  knowledge  of  their  falsity,  with  an 
intent  to  procure  money  or  property,  and  if  the  party  to  whom 
they  are  made  parts  with  money  or  property  to  the  person  making 
them  in  reliance  upon  their  truth,  a  conviction  will  be  sustained. 
It  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine  upon  all  the  facts  and 
circumstances  whether  a  representation  of  value  is  a  mere  opinion 
or  the  statement  of  a  fact.'*^ 

§  440.    The  pretenses  must  have  been  calculated  to  deceive. — Not 

only  must  the  representations  be  proved  to  have  been  false,  but  it 
must  also  be  shown  that  they  were  such  as  were  calculated  to 

State,  41  Tex.  65,  67;  State  v.  Haines,  the  owner  of  a  lucrative  business  and 

23  S.  Car.  170,  173;  Canter  v.  State,  had    a    substantial    bank    account,    it 

7    Lea    (Tenn.)    349,    351;    State    v.  will   not   be   permissible   to   prove   in 

Petty,  119  Mo.  425,  24   S.  W.    lOio;  his  defense  that  he  was  the  owner  of 

State    V.    Stanley,    64    I\Ie.    157,    159;  considerable    real    estate.      Such    evi- 

Commonwealth  v.  Jackson,  132  Mass.  dence,  however,  would  be  admissible 

16,  17;    State  V.  Moore,   iii   N.  Car.  where  his  statement  was  merely  that 

667,  673,  16  S.  E.  384;  State  v.  King,  he  was  a  man  of  wealth.     Carnell  v. 

67  N.  H.  219,  34  Atl.  461.     The  evi-  State,  85  Md.  i,  36  Atl.  117. 

dence   to   prove   the   truth   or    falsity  *°  Morris  v.  State,  54  Fla.  80,  45  So. 

of  the   representations   will  vary  ac-  456;     McDowell     v.     Commonwealth 

cording    to    their    nature.      The    evi-  (Ky.,  1909),  123  S.  W.  313. 

dence  must  be  relevant  to  the  specific  **  Morris  v.  State,  54  Fla.  80,  45  So. 

facts  contained  in  the  representations.  456. 

Thus,    if     the     statement    upon     the  ''"Williams    v.    State,    77    Ohio    St. 

strength    of   which    goods   were    sold  468,  83  N.  E.  802. 
on  credit  was   that  the   accused  was 


735      FORGERY,    COUNTERFEITING    AND    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    44I 


deceive  a  person  of  ordinary  caution  and  intelligence.**  Hence 
evidence  is  always  admissible  to  show  that  the  person  who  was 
defrauded  could  have  ascertained  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  state- 
ments of  the  accused.'*''  Whether  the  representations  were  cal- 
culated to  deceive,  whether  the  owner  relied  upon  them  as  the 
main  inducement,  and  whether  they  were  known  to  be  false,  by 
the  accused,  are  questions  for  the  jury.  In  determining  them  the 
jurors  must  consider  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  such  as  tlie 
ages  of  the  parties,  their  experience  and  knowledge  of  the  world, 
the  customs  of  the  business  or  profession  in  which  they  are  en- 
gaged, and  their  several  means  of  acquiring  knowledge.^" 

§  441.  The  value  of  the  property  obtained. — It  must  be  proved, 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  property  which  was  ob- 
tained by  means  of  the  false  representations  had  some  value  ;^^ 
and  that  the  representation^  operated  to  prejudice  or  injure  the 
person  to  whom  they  were  made.^-  In  a  prosecution  for  obtain- 
ing  a   specified    sum    of   money   proof    of   obtaining   any    sum 


**Higler  v.  People,  44  Mich.  299, 
303,  6  N.  W.  664,  38  Am.  267;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Moore,  99  Pa.  St.  570; 
Scott  V.  People;  62  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
62,  75-81 ;    Shaffer  v.   State,  82   Ind. 

221,  224,  225;  State  V.  Burnett:  119 
Ind.  392,  393,  21  N.  E.  972;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Grady,  13  Bush  (Ky.) 
285,  286,  26  Am.  192;  Thomas  v. 
People,  113  111  531,  533,  537;  Delaney 
V.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  28,  30; 
Miller  V.  State,  7Z  Ind.  88,  91 ;  Mc- 
Corkle  v.  State,  i  Cold.  (Tenn.)  zzi'. 
People  V.  Cook,  41  Hun  (X.  Y.)  67, 
69,  State  V.  DeHart,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

222,  224;  Watson  V.  People,  87  N.  Y. 
561,  565,  41  Am.  397n ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Haughey,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  223; 
Meek  V.  State,  117  Ala.  116,  23  So. 
155;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  2979. 

**  People  V.  Hcnsslcr,  48  Mich.  49, 
II  X.  VV.  804;  Wagoner  v.  State,  90 
Ind.  504,  507;  People  v.  Oyer  &  Ter- 
miner, 83  X.  Y.  436,  449;  People  v. 


Dimick,  41  Hun  (X.  Y.)  616;  State 
V.  Jones,  70  X.  Car.  75,  "JT,  McKee 
V.  State,  III  Ind.  378,  381,  12  X.  E. 
510;  Shaffer  v.  State,  100  Ind.  365, 
368;  Goddard  v.  State,  2  Ga.  App. 
154,  58  S.  E.  304. 

^"  See  also.  Commonwealth  v. 
Grady,  13  Bush  (Ky.)  285,  286,  26 
Am.  192;  Winslow  v.  State,.  97  Ala. 
68,  12  So.  423;  Woodbury  v.  State, 
69  Ala.  242,  44  Am.  515;  McDowell 
V.   Commonwealth    (Ky.),   123   S.  W. 

313- 

"State  V.  Lewis,  26  Kan.  123,  129; 
State  V.  Shaeffer,  89  Mo.  271,  278,  i 
S.  W.  293 ;  Rosales  v.  State,  22  Tex. 
App.  673,  675,  3  S.  W.  344;  Moore 
V.  Commonwealth,  8  Pa.  St.  260 ; 
Morgan  v.  State,  42  Ark.  131,  140,  48 
Km.  55;  State  v.  Gibson,  132  Iowa 
53,  106  X.  W.  270. 

"People  V.  Galloway,  17  Wend. 
(X.  Y.)  540;  People  v.  Cook,  41  Hun 
(X.  Y.)  67,  70. 


§  442 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


736 


is  sufficient,^"'  as  this  crime  is  not  usuall}-  graded  according  to 
the  amount  taken.'"* 

§  442.  Belief  in  false  representations. — The  prosecuting  witness 
may  testify  that  he  behevcd  in  the  false  pretenses.'"'"'  The  evidence 
must  show  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  he  believed  that  the 
representations  were  true  and  that,  relying  and  acting  upon  them. 
he  parted  with  his  property  upon  faith  in  them.^''  But  they  need 
not  be  proved  to  have  been  the  sole,  exclusive  and  decisive  cause 
thereof.  He  may  have  been  influenced  by  considerations  of 
friendship,  or  the  desire  of  gain,  and  wliether  he  was  so  in- 
fluenced, and  by  what  and  to  what  extent,  are  questions  for  the 
jury.^'  It  is  a  false  pretense  under  the  statute  for  the  accused  to 
represent  himself  or  his  firm  to  be  in  a  sound  pecuniary  condition, 
or  worth  so  much,  or  to  have  a  certain  sum  of  money  in  his  or 
tlieir  hands  or  in  the  bank,  knowino-  these  assertions  to  be  false. ^'^ 


"State  V.  Briscoe  (Del.),  (^y  Atl. 
154;  Bowman  v.  State,  54  Fla.  16,  45 
So.  308;  People  V.  Osborn  (Cal.  App., 
1910),  106  Pac.  891. 

"As  to  procuring  a  promissory 
note  by  false  pretenses,  Clawson  v. 
State,  129  Wis.  650,  109  N.  W.  578, 
116  Am.  St.  972.  Cf  Brunaugh  v. 
State  (Ind.,  1910),  90  N.  E.  1019. 

°^  People  V.  Herrick,  13  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  87,  91 ;  Snyder,  /;;.  re,  17  Kan. 
542,  553;  People  V.  Weil,  244  111.  176, 
91  N.  E.  112. 

"^Trogdon  v.  Commonwealth,  31 
Gratt.  (Va.)  862,  884;  Reg.  v.  Mills, 
7  Cox  C.  C.  263;  Meek  v.  State,  117 
Ala.  116,  2.Z  So.  155;  Swift  V.  State, 
126  Ga.  590,  55  S.  E.  478;  People  V. 
Sattlekau  (App.  Div.  (N.  Y.))  104 
N.  Y.  S.  805 ;  Goddard  v.  State,  2  Ga. 
App.  154,  58  S.  E.  304;  State  v.  Bing- 
ham, 51  Wash.  616,  99  Pac.  735; 
State  V.  Pickett,  174  Mo.  663,  74  S. 
W.  844;  Elliott  Evidence,  §2981.  See 
also  cases  in  next  note. 

"  State  V.  Thatcher,  35  X.  J.  L.  445, 
449;  Therasson  v.  People,  20  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  55,  67;  Van  Buren  v.  Peo- 
ple,  7  Colo.   .-\pp.    136,  42   Pac.    599; 


People  V.  Haynes,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
546-555,  28  Am.  Dec.  530;  People  v. 
Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340,  348;  Berry  v. 
State,  97  Ga.  202,  23  S.  E.  833;  Skiff 
V.  People,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  139; 
State  V.  Williams,  103  Ind.  235,  237, 
2  X.  E.  585;  Woodbury  v.  State,  69 
Ala.  242,  246,  44  Am.  515;  Wax  v. 
State,  43  Xeb.  18,  61  X.  W.  117;  State 
V.  Dunlap,  24  Me.  TJ ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Stevenson,  127  Mass.  446;  Fay  v. 
Commonwealth,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  912; 
Cowen  V.  People,  14  111.  348;  Britt 
V.  State,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  30;  State 
V.  Fooks,  65  Iowa  196,  21  X.  W.  561, 
'/Ty,  Snyder,  In  re,  17  Kan.  542; 
State  V.  Tessier,  32  La.  Ann.  1227; 
Smith  V.  State,  55  Miss.  513;  People 
V.  Gibbs,  98  Cal.  661,  663,  33  Pac. 
630 ;  Donohoe  v.  State,  59  Ark.  375 ;  27 
S.  W.  226;  State  v.  Palmer,  50  Kan. 
318,  32  Pac.  29. 

^^  Commonwealth  v.  Schwartz,  92 
Ky.  510,  51S,  18  S.  W.  358,  775.  U  Ky. 
L-  929,  36  Am.  St.  609;  Rothschild  v. 
State,  13  Lea  (Tenn.)  294,  300-302; 
Commonwealth  v.  Drew,  153  Mass. 
588,    595.    27    X.    E.    593;    State    v. 


"J^J     FORGERY.    COUXTERFEITIXG    AXD    FALSE    PRETENSES.      §    443 

ij  443.  Evidence  of  the  pecuniary  condition  of  the  accused  at  the 
date  of  making  the  representations. — The  rule  that  the  pecuniary 
condition  of  the  accused  is  irrelevant  is  subject  to  an  exception  in 
the  case  of  the  crime  of  false  representation.  That  a  man  is  desti- 
tute or  embarrassed  with  debt  does  not  justify  an  inference  that 
he  will  forge  or  steal  and  evidence  that  the  defendant  is  very  pooi 
should  be  rejected  in  a  prosecution  for  larceiiy  or  forgery.  But 
where  one  person  procures  the  property  of  another  because  of 
the  confidence  the  owner  has  in  his  financial  responsibility  and 
mtention  to  pay.  the  fact  that  the  person  obtaining  the  goods 
was  insolvent,  and  that  he  knew  it,  would  indicate  very  strongly 
that  he  intended  to  deprive  the  owner  of  his  property  without 
paying  for  it,  and  with  an  intention  to  defraud.  Hence,  evidence 
tending  to  show  the  solvency  or  insolvency  of  the  accused,^"  or 
of  some  other  person,*'"  upon  whose  credit  property  is  procured. 
is  relevant  to  prove  that  he  made  the  statements  in  good  faith,  or 
the  reverse." 

If  the  accused  refers  the  owner  of  the  property  to  a  third  per- 
son for  information,  who,  on  being  questioned,  and  while  the 
transaction  is  pending,  makes  a  statement,  upon  faith  in  which 


Xeimeier,  66  Iowa  634,  d^l^  24  N.  W. 
247 ;  Higler  v.  People,  44  IMich.  .299, 
303,  6  N.  W.  664,  38  Am.  267;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Wallace,  114  Pa.  St. 
405,  411,  6  Atl.  685,  60  Am.  353; 
Reg.  V.  Howarth,  11  Cox  C.  C.  588; 
State  V.  Pryor,  30  Ind.  350,  351 ; 
Hathcock  v.  State,  88  Ga.  91,  13  S.  E. 

959- 

"  State  V.  Hill,  ^2  Me.  238,  242. 

'"^  Where  a  person  was  defrauded 
by  a  false  statement  as  to  which  of 
two  persons  of  the  same  name  was 
the  maker  of  a  note,  evidence  of  the 
financial  standing  of  the  alleged 
maker,  and  of  the  irrcsponsibilitj'  of 
the  other,  is  admissible  to  show  in- 
tent. People  V.  Cook,  41  linn  (.\. 
Y.  67.  71. 

•"f<cg.  V.  Howarth.  ir  Cox  C.  C. 
588.  592:  Wood  V.  People,  53  X-  V- 
511;  Brown  v.  State,  yj  Tex.  Cr.  104, 

47 — Unijerhm.i.  Ckim.  Iw. 


38  S.  W.  1008,  66  Am.  St.  794-  "Evi- 
dence of  the  pecuniary  condition  of 
the  accused  in  such  a  case  is  not 
offered  to  show  that  he  was  under  a 
peculiar  temptation  to  commit  the  of- 
fense, or  was  more  likely  to  cheat 
and  defraud  because  he  was  in  em- 
barrassed circumstances,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  the  natural  and 
necessary  consequence  of  his  act, 
which  the  law  presumes  he  intended." 
Commonwealth  v.  Jeffries,  7  .Mlon 
(Mass.)  548,  569,  83  .'\m.  Dec.  7i2n; 
Commonwealth  v.  Drew,  153  Mass. 
588,  595,  27  N.  E.  593.  Evidence  that 
the  accused  mortgaged  all  his  prop- 
i.'v\y,  including  the  goods  obtained, 
three  days  thereafter,  is  relevant. 
State  V.  Call,  48  N.  H.  126,  131.  See 
also.  State  v.  Long,  103  Ind.  481,  484, 
3  .\.  \\.  169. 


§  444  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  738 

the  owner  acts,  the  statement  is  received  as  the  statement  of  the 
accused.*^-  Where  the  representations  of  financial  ahihty  made  by 
the  accused  were  alleged  to  be  false,  his  subsequent  declaration 
that  he  was  too  poor  to  retain  counsel  are  relevant. "^^  But  the  ad- 
missions of  the  accused,  made  upon  an  examination  in  proceed- 
ings supplementary  to  execution,  are  not  receivaljle  where  the 
statute  expressly  provides  that  such  admissions  cannot  ho.  used 
against  him  upon  a  criminal  prosecution.*^*  The  insolvency  of  tlie 
defendant  may  be  pro\-ed  by  any  witness  having  a  competent 
knowledge  of  his  financial  condition."^ 

§  444.  The  false  pretenses  not  necessarily  verbal. — It  is  never 
necessary  for  the  prosecution  to  prove  that  the  false  pretenses 
were  made  by,  or  contained  in,  verbal  statements  or  communica- 
tions, oral  or  written.  Actions  often  speak  louder  than  words. 
The  language  of  the  accused  is  always  relevant  in  evidence;  but 
evidence  of  his  actions,  unaccompanied  by  language,  may  also 
be  received  a;nd  the  false  representations  may  be  implied  by  the 
jury  from  evidence  of  such  actions.*''^ 

If  the  ideas  properly  and  naturally  conveyed  by  the  actions  of 
the  accused  produce  a  false  impression  upon  the  mind  of  the 
owner  of  the  property  wdiich  is  obtained,  and  it  also  appears  from 
all  the  facts  in  evidence  that  the  accused  knew  and  intended  that 
they  should  produce  such  a  false  impression,  an  allegation  of  false 
pretenses  is  sustained.*^"  Thus  it  has  repeatedly  been  held  that 
the  action  of  the  accused  in  drawing  a  check  upon  a  bank  in  which 
he  has  no  funds,  and  which  he  therefore  knows  will  not  be 
honored  on  presentation,  and  passing  the  same,  is  by  implication 

"^Todd  V.   State,  31   Ind.   514,  520.  len   (Mass.)   548,  83  Am.   Dec.  71211. 

Cf.  State  V.  McCormick,  ^7  Kan.  440,  The   notes   of   the   accused   are   rele- 

46  Pac.  777,  57  Am.  St.  341.  vant  to  show  what  he  owes.     Hath- 

"'^  State  V.  Fooks,  65  Iowa  196,  198,  cock  v.  State,  88  Ga.  91,  13  S.  E.  959. 

452,  21  N.  W.  561,  773.   If  the  indict-  ""State  v.   Briscoe    (Del.,   1907),  67 

ment    does    not    negative    the    repre-  Atl.  154. 

sentations    of    solvency,    evidence    of  ""  Musgrave  v.  State,   133  Ind.  297, 

insolvency   is    not    admissible.      State  306,  32  N.  E.  885 ;  Commonwealth  v. 

v.  Long,  103  Ind.  481,  3  N.  E.  169.  Murphy,  96  Ky.  28,  27  S.  W.  859,  16 

"Barber    v.    People,    17    Hun    (X.  Ky.  L.  224;  Brown  v.  State,  37  Tex. 

Y.)  366,  368.  Cr.   104,  38  S.   W.   1008,  66  Am.   St. 

"  Commonwealth   v.  Jeffries,  7  Al-  794. 


739     FORGERY,    COUXTERFEITIXG    AND    FALSE    TRETENSES.      §    445 

a  false  representation  that  he  has  money  in  the  bank  on  which 
the  check  is  drawn. "^^ 

§  445.  Proving  the  venue. — The  false  representation  may  be 
proved  to  have  been  made  in  one  place  and  the  property  may  have 
been  obtained  in  another.  This  occurs  where  the  accused  has  writ- 
ten and  mailed  a  letter  to  the  owner  of  the  money  or  goods,  who 
resides  or  does  business  in  a  distant  city,  and  the  property  is  sent 
to  him  upon  faith  in  the  false  representations  contained  in  the 
letter.  The  place  in  which  the  owner  parts  with  his  property  deter- 
mines the  venue  of  the  crime.  Hence,  evidence  to  prove  where  the 
false  representations  were  made  is  immaterial.  But  it  must  al- 
ways be  proved  where  the  false  statements  were  acted  upon  by 
the  ow^ner  and  where  the  money  or  goods  were  obtained.*'^ 


**  People  V.  Donaldson,  70  Cal.  116, 
118,  II  Fac.  681;  Commonwealth  v. 
Drew,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  179,  27  N. 
E.  593 ;  Rex  v.  Jackson,  3  Campb. 
370,  371;  Foote  V.  People,  17  Hun 
(N  Y.)  218,  219;  Reg.  V.  Radcliffe,  12 
Cox  C.  C.  474.  Contra,  Reg.  v.  Part- 
ridge, 6  Cox  C.  C.  182,  186 ;  Brown  v. 
State,  27  Tex.  Cr.  104,  38  S.  W.  1008, 
66  Am.  St.  794.  The  fact  that  a  per- 
son, not  a  member  of  the  university, 
went  to  a  shop  wearing  a  cap  and 
gown  and  obtained  goods  is  sufficient 
evidence  of  false  pretenses  though 
he  said  nothing.  Rex  v.  Barnard,  7 
C.  &  P.  784,  785.  See  also,  Speer  v. 
State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  273,  97  S.  W.  469. 

"'State  V.  Shaeffer,  89  Mo.  271,  278, 
I  S.  W.  293 ;  State  v.  House,  55  Iowa 


466,  472,  8  X.  W.  307;  Norris  v. 
State,  25  Ohio  St.  217,  18  Am.  291 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Van  Tuyl,  i  Met. 
(Ky.)  I,  4,  71  Am.  Dec.  455;  People 
v.  Adams,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.)  190,  45 
Am.  Dec.  468;  Commonwealth  v. 
Karpouski,  15  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  280.  A 
letter  may  be  relevant  evidence  aside 
from  the  writing  contained  in  it  to 
show  the  representations  made  and 
the  place  of  their  making.  The 
printed  matter  at  the  head  of  the 
letter  may  indicate  the  false  character 
which  the  accused  has  assumed  in  or- 
der to  effect  his  criminal  designs  and 
purposes.  Taylor  v.  Commonwealth, 
94  Ky.  281,  284,  22  S.  W.  217,  15  Ky. 
L.  49- 


CHAPTER   XXX. 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§  446.  Obstructing  justice  and  resist- 
ing arrest — Proof  of  official 
character  of  officer  resisted— 
Validity  of   his  appointment. 

447.  Intention   to   obstruct  justice — 

Evidence  of  threats  or  to 
show  validity  of  warrant. 

448.  Preventing  attendance    of   wit- 

nesses. 

449.  False  swearing. 

450.  Embracery — Evidence  required. 

451.  Bribery     defined — Evidence    of 

circumstances  to  prove  cor- 
rupt intention. 

452.  Judicial  notice  of  official  char- 

acter and  acts. 

453.  Necessity   for   reliance   on   evi- 

dence of  accomplices  in  the 
bribery — Compulsory  exami- 
nation of  accomplice. 

454.  Proving  other  acts  of  bribery. 

455.  Bribery  of  voters — Jud-cial  no- 

tice of  elections. 

456.  Extortion  —  Intent    and    guilty 

knowledge — E  v  i  d  e  n  c  e  to 
prove  ignorance  or  mistake 
of  law  or  fact. 

457.  Value   of   the   thing  extorted — 

Burden  of  proving  exception 
to  statute. 


§  458.  Compounding  offenses  —  The 
intent  to  screen  the  offender 
— Mode  of  proving  that  a 
crime  was  committed. 

459.  Contempt  defined — Inherent  ju- 

dicial power  to  punish. 

460.  Direct    and    constructive    con- 

tempt distinguished  —  Court 
may  take  notice  of  without 
evidence. 

461.  Procedure     in     receiving     evi- 

dence of  constructive  con- 
tempt. 

462.  Escape — Distinct     from    prison 

breach. 

463.  Intention   of   permitting  escape 

— Negligence  of  officer. 

464.  Aiding  prisoner  to  escape. 

465.  Illegality  of  arrest,  when  rele- 

vant. 

466.  Perjury — The    intent    to    swear 

to  what  is  false. 

467.  Materiality  of  the  testimony. 

468.  Number   of  witnesses   required 

and  corroboration  of  single 
witness  to  prove  falsity. 

469.  Falsity  of  the  testimony. 

470.  Proof  of  the  testimony  alleged 

to  be  false. 


g  446.  Obstructing  justice  and  resisting  arrest — Proof  of  official 
character  of  officer  resisted — Validity  of  his  appointment. — Though 
in  civil  cases  the  courts  will  judicially  notice  that  certain  persons 
are  officers/  on  a  trial  for  resisting  or  assaulting  an  officer  it 


^  Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  240. 


(740) 


741 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§    446 


must  be  shown  that  the  person  resisted  was  an  officer  and  that 
the  accused  was  aware  of  his  official  character."  These  facts  can- 
not be  presumed."  The  officer  who  issued  or  served  the  writ 
may  testify  orally  that  he  was  an  officer  and  acted  as  such.  It 
is  enough  that  he  was  an  officer  dc  facto,*  and  evidence  to  prove 
the  invalidity  of  his  appointment  is  usually  inadmissible.^  If  the 
officer  is  alleged  with  unnecessary  particularity  "to  have  been 
legally  appointed  and  duly  qualified,"  the  court  may  require  his 
appointment  to  be  proved.''    In  the  case  of  an  indictment   for 


"  Pettibone  v.  United  States.  148  U. 
S.  197,  205,  27  L-  ed.  419,  13  Sup.  Ct. 
542;  Merritt  v.  State  (Miss.,  1889), 
5  So.  386 ;  Rex  v.  Osmer,  5  East  304 ; 
State  V.  Carpenter,  54  Vt.  551 ;  State 
V.  Maloney,  12  R.  I.  251 :  State  v. 
Downer,  8  Vt.  424,  429,  30  Am.  Dec. 
482;  Commonwealth  v.  Israel,  4 
Leigh  (Va.)  675;  Yates  v.  People,  32 
N.  Y.  509;  Commonwealth  v.  Kirby, 
2  Cush.  (Mass.)  577;  State  v.  Hilton, 
26  Mo.  199;  State  v.  Smith,  11  Ore. 
205,  8  Pac.  .343 :  Horan  v.  State,  7 
Tex.  App.  183;  Duncan  v.  State,  7 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  148;  State  v.  Bea- 
som,  40  N.  H.  z'^j;  State  v.  Murphy 
(Del.,  1907),  ()6  Atl.  335.  Cf.  Put- 
man  V.  State,  49  Ark.  449,  453,  5  S. 
W.  715;  State  V.  Pickett.  118  N.  Car. 
1231,  24  S.  E.  350;  Johnson  v.  State, 
51  Fla.  44,  40  So.  678.  Evidence  of 
other  oflFenses  to  show  that  accused 
was  resisting  arrest  for  another 
crime,  see  105  hm.  St.  99T,  note. 

^  State  V.  Downer,  8  Vt.  424,  429, 
30  Am.  Dec.  482;  State  v.  Carpenter, 
54  Vt.  551,  553.  It  may,  and  perhaps 
must,  be  proved  that  the  officer  stated 
he  came  to  arrest  the  defendant,  or 
that  he  read  a  warrant  to  him,  or 
stated  he  had  a  warrant  for  him. 
These  facts  are  essential,  though  if 
the  accused  began  his  resistance  on 
seeing  the  officer  it   is  not  necessary 


to  prove  the  warrant  was  read.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Cooley,  6  Gray  (Mass.) 
350,  356.  See  Ormond  v.  Ball,  120 
Ga.  916,  48  S.  E.  383 ;  State  v.  Smith, 
II  Ore.  205,  207,  8  Pac.  343;  State 
V.  Maloney,  12  R.  I.  251 ;  Oliver  v. 
State,  17  Ark.  508,  510;  Common- 
wealth V.  McCue,  16  Gray  (Mass.) 
226,  227 ;  State  v.  Zeibart,  40  Iowa 
169,  175- 

*  Floyd  V.  State,  79  Ala.  39,  42; 
Cockerham  v.  State  (Miss.,  1895),  ^9 
So.  195 ;  State  v.  Bates,  23  Iowa  96, 
99.  To  require  every  officer  to  estab- 
lish the  validity  of  his  appointment 
in  collateral  proceedings  would  be  in- 
tolerable and  a  dangerous  obstruction 
of  justice.  Heath  v.  State,  36  .A.la. 
273,  276. 

^  Robinson  v.  State.  %2  Ga.  535,  546, 
9  S.  E.  528;  Commonwealth  v.  Kirby, 
2  Cush.  (Mass.)  577,  581;  State  v. 
Armistead,  106  N.  Car.  639,  642,  10 
S.  E.  872 ;  People  v.  Hopson,  i  Denio 
(X.  Y.)  574.  Contra,  Creighton  v. 
Commonwealth,  ^2  Ky.  142,  147,  4 
.^m.  St.  143.  It  seems,  however,  that 
the  validity  of  a  written  warrant  of 
appointment  may  be  inquired  into  and 
if  invalid,  it  is  inadmissible.  United 
States  V.  Phelps,  4  Day  (Conn.)  469, 
470. 

"State  v.  Sherburne,  50  N.  IT.  99; 
State  V.  Copp,  15  X.  M.  212. 


§    447  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  742 

resisting  arrest  it  must  be  shown  to  authorize  a  conviction  that  an 
attempt  was  made  to  arrest  the  accused." 

i:^  447.  Intention  to  obstruct  justice — Evidence  of  threats,  or  to 
show  invalidity  of  warrant. — The  intention  to  obstruct  the  otiicer 
may  be  inferred  from  the  language  of  the  accused.  Threats  and 
violent  epithets  against  the  officer  are  admissible,^  though  not 
alone  sufficient  to  constitute  the  offense  of  obstructing  an  officer," 
nor  is  it  necessary  to  prove  that  the  officer  was  beaten  or  as- 
saulted.^" Evidence  that  the  obstruction  was  unsuccessful/^  or 
that  the  person  wdiose  arrest  the  accused  tried  to  prevent  was 
not  in  fact  guilty,^"  or  that  property  which  the  officer  attached, 
believing  it  belonged  to  tlie  defendant,  did  not  belong  to  him," 
has  been  held  not  relevant. 

The  motive  which  prompts  the  conduct  of  the  accused  in  resist- 
ing arrest  is  important.  The  accused  may  show  any  fact  tending 
to  prove  that  the  officer  used  undue  violence  or  force  in  arresting 
him,  and  that  he,  in  self-defense,  used  force  necessary  to  repel 
it.^'*  If,  however,  having  submitted  to  an  arrest  which  was  ac- 
companied wnth  undue  violence  or  force,  he  subsequently  resists 
the  officer  wdiile  in  his  custody,  a  verdict  of  guilty  will  be 
sustained. ^^  The  validity  of  the  warrant  under  which  an  arrest 
w-as  attempted  will  be  presuined  until  the  contrary  is  shown. ^'^ 
The  burden  to  prove  its  invalidity  is  on  the  defendant."  The 
illegality  or  invalidity  of  the  w'arrant  is  always  relevant.    Any 

'^Cooksey  v.  State,  84  Ark.  485,  106  "Commonwealth  v.  Tracy,   5   Met. 

S.  W.  674.  (Mass.)   536,  553;  State  v.  Bates,  23 

^  State   V.    Morrison,   46    Kan.    679,  Iowa    96,    98;    State    v.    Garrett,    So 

684-689,  27  Pac.  133;  State  v.  Seery,  Iowa  589,  590,  46  N.  W.  748. 

95  Iowa  652,  64  N.  W.  631 ;  Wood-  "  State  v.   Downer,  8  Vt.  424.  428, 

ward  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  App.,  1910),  30  Am.  Dec.  482;  State  v.  Fifield,  18 

126  S.  W.  271.  N.  H.  34,  38. 

'Allen  V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  237,  62  "State  v.   Dennis,  2  Marv.    (Del.) 

S.  E.  1003.  433- 

"Woodworth  v.  State,  26  Ohio  St.  '''State  v.    Dennis,  2  Marv.    (Del.) 

196,  200.     But  evidence  showing  only  433. 

an  effort  to  elude  arrest  will  not  sus-  '"  Undcrhill  on  Ev.,  §  231. 

tain  a  charge  of  resisting  an  officer.  "  State  v.  Freeman,  8  Iowa  428,  74 

State  V.  Welch,  37  Wis.  196,  202,  203;  Am.   Dec.   317;   Kernan,   v.    State,   11 

Clay  v.   State    (Miss.,    1897),  22    So.  Ind.  471,  472;  Spear  v.  State,  120  Ala. 

62.  351,  25  So.  46.     Cf.  Gibson  v.  State, 

"  State  v.  Gilbert,  21  Ind.  474.  118  Ga.  29,  44  S.  E.  811. 


743  OFFEXSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE.       §§    448-449 

person  may  resist  arrest  and  may  use  such  force  as  is  necessary 
to  prevent  the  arrest  under  an  illegal  warrant  and  may  show  its 
invalidity  on  his  trial  by  parol  evidence/"* 

The  defendant  cannot  be  permitted  to  prove  that,  after  having 
resisted  arrest,  he  offered  to  surrender  himself  and  to  go  before 
some  other  justice  if  his  attorney  should  advise  him  the  warrant 
was  valid/ '^ 

§448.  Preventing  attendance  of  witnesses. — A  willful  and  cor- 
rupt attempt  to  prevent  the  attendance  of  a  witness  before  a 
lawful  tribunal  is  an  offense  at  common  law.  The  essence  of 
the  oft'ense  is  the  attempt  to  interfere  with  and  obstruct  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.""  No  physical  act  of  intervention  is 
necessary  to  constitute  the  crime,  but  it  may  be  committed  by 
persuasion,  advice  or  threats.-^  At  common  law  it  need  not  be 
proved  that  the  witness  was  under  a  subpoena,"^  that  he  was  called 
in  behalf  of  either  party,  or  that  his  evidence  was  material."^ 

§  449.  False  swearing, — This  crime  consists  in  testifying  know- 
ingly and  falsely  under  oath  in  a  non-judicial  proceeding,  as,  for 
example,  on  applying  for  a  marriage  license,  or  on  registration  as 
a  voter.    The  language  used  by  the  accused  and  his  knowledge 

"  State  V.  Wimbush,  9  S.  Car.  309,  ""  State  v.  Holt,  84  Me.  509,  24  Atl. 

317;    State    V.    ?Iailey,    2    Strob.    (S.  951;   Perrow   v.    State,  67   Miss.   365, 

Car.)    73;   Underbill   on   Ev.,    §  208;  368,  7  So.  340;  State  v.  Curdy  (Del., 

State    V.    Knapf,    50    Wash.    229,   96  1910),  75  Atl.  868. 

Pac.   1076,  21   L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   66;  -^  State  v.  Bringgold,  40  Wash.   12, 

Lee  V.    State,  45   Tex.   Cr.  94,  74  S.  82  Pac.  132. 

W.  28 ;  Ryan  v.  City  of  ChicaRO,  124  "  State  v.   Keyes,  8  Vt.  57,  66,  67, 

111.     App.     188.      It    is    sufficient    to  30   Am.    Dec.    450;    State    v.    Horner 

charge    resistance    or    obstruction    in  (Del.),  26  Atl.  72,  74',  State  v.  Bring- 

the  language  of  the  statute.    The  par-  gold,  40  Wash.  12,  82  Pac.  132;  Com- 

ticular  manner  is  matter  of  evidence,  monwealth  v.  Bailey  (Ky.),  87  S.  W. 

Oliver    V.    State,    17    Ark.    508,    509;  299,  26  Ky.  L.  583. 

United    States    v.    Bachelder,   2    Gall.  ^  Commonwealth    v.    Reynolds,    14 

(U.  S.)  15,  24  Fed.  Cas.  14490;  State  Gray    (Mass.)    87,   89,   74   Am.    Dec. 

V.  Copp,    15   N.   H.  212,  215;   Gibson  665.    Sec  Gandy  v.  State,  77  Neb.  782, 

v.   State,    118   Ga.  29,   44   S.    E.   811.  no  X.  W.  862.     See  post,  §  470.    Cf. 

Contra.  Horan  v.  State,  7  Tc.k.  App.  Tcdford  v.  People,  219  III.  2^,  76  N. 

1H3,  191  ;  Lambcrton  v.  State,  it  Ohio  E.  60;  Young,  In  re,  137  N.  Car.  552, 

282.  .150  S.  E.  220. 

'"Kin^   V.   State,  89  Ala.  43,  46,  8 
So.  120,  18  Am.  St.  89. 


§    45^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  744 

of  its  falsit}^  must  be  proved.-*  If  the  accused  is  alleged  to  have 
sworn  falsely  to  several  facts,  proof  that  he  swore  falsely  to  one 
is  insufficient.-^  A  conviction  will  not  be  sustained  unless  founded 
on  the  evidence  of  two  credible  witnesses,  or  on  that  of  one  such 
witness  corroborated  strongly  by  circumstances  pointing  to  the 
falsity  of  the  statements.-" 

False  swearing  is  a  statutory  offense,  and  is  distinct  from 
perjury  at  common  law.-'  Neither  can  be  sustained  by  proving 
the  other,  nor  can  a  statute  requiring  a  grand  juror  to  disclose 
the  testimony  of  a  witness  on  the  trial  of  the  latter  for  perjury 
before  the  grand  juiy  be  construed  to  apply  to  his  indictment 
for  false  swearing  before  them.-^ 

§  450.  Embracery — Evidence  required. — This  crime,  which  may 
be  regarded  as  a  particular  form  of  bribery,  is  defined  as  an  at- 
tempt to  influence  a  juror  or  jurors  corruptly  by  gifts,  per- 
suasions or  threats,  or  by  any  other  means  (except  the  evidence 
or  argument  submitted  in  open  court),  by  a  party  or  by  a 
stranger,  whether  tlie  verdict  be  given  or  not  and  whether  the 
verdict,  if  given,  be  true  or  false.-"  Proof  of  giving  money  to 
a  person  to  be  distributed  among  jurors  is  sufficient,  though  the 
money  never  reached  them.  For  proof  of  an  actual  tender  or 
offer  of  the  money  so  as  to  enable  the  juror  to  expressly  re- 
ceive or  reject  it  is  not  necessary.^"  A  proposal  or  expression  of 
a  willingness  to  bribe  is  sufficient.  A  mere  attempt  to  bribe  a 
jury  is  embracery,  though  it  may  for  any  reason  have  been  un- 
successful.^^ 

-*Aguierre    v.    State,    31    Tex.    Cr.  ^i   Russell  on  Cr.    (9th  Am.   Ed.) 

519,  21  S.  W.  256.  264;  4  Bl.  Com.  140;  Doan's  Case,  5 

^Reg.   V.    Chapman,    i    Den.   C.    C.  Pa.  Dist.  211. 

432.  ^"  State  V.  Woodward,  182  Mo.  391, 

''  State  V.  Miller,  44  Mo.  App.   159,  81  S.  W.  857,  103  Am.  St.  646n. 

165;   Aguierre  v.    State,  31   Tex.   Cr.  ^"a  State  v.  Miller,   182  Mo.  370,  81 

519,    520,    21     S.    W.    256:    Reg.    V.  S.  W.  867;   State  v.   Davis,   112   Mo. 

Browning,  3  Cox  C.  C.  437,  438.     See  App.  346,  87  S.  W.  33. 

post,  §  468.  ^^  State  V.  Williams,  136  Mo.  293,  38 

"State  V.  Coleman,  117  La.  973.  42  S.  W.  75;  State  v.  Sales,  2  Nev.  268; 

So.  471.  Rose.  Cr.  Ev.  721.    Evidence  that  de- 

^  Commonwealth    v.    Scowden,    92  fendant    has    solicited   money   to   use 

Ky.  120,  122,  17  S.  W.  205,  13  Ky.  L.  in  corruptly  influencing  the  jurors  is 

404.     See  ante,  §§  192-194.  also  sufficient.     ]\Iere  words  may  con- 


745  OFFENSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE.  §    45 1 

The  presence  of  a  criminal  intention  to  corruptly  influence 
the  juror  must  be  shown.  This  is  now  doubtless  the  correct  rule 
in  this  country,  though  the  earlier  common  law,  because  of  its 
intense  abhorrence  of  any  act  savoring  of  maintenance,  punished 
as  embracery  a  mere  exhortation  on  the  part  of  a  stranger  that 
a  juror  should  appear  and  act  according  to  his  conscience.^' 

§  451.  Bribery  defined — Evidence  of  circumstances  to  prove  cor- 
rupt intention. — The  crime  may  be  defined  as  an  attempt,  whether 
successful  or  the  reverse,  to  influence  an  officer  in  his  official 
conduct,  either  in  the  executive,^^  legislative^*  or  judicial  depart- 
ment of  the  government,  by  the  offer  of  a  reward  or  pecuniary 
consideration.^^    The  scope  of  this  definition  is  as  broad  as  the 

stitute  an  attempt  to  bribe  or  influ-  officer.    Haynes  v.  Commonwealth,  104 

ence    a    juror.      Thus    evidence    that  Va.  854,  52  S.  E.  358. 

the  accused  said  to  a  juror  "you  are        ^*  State  v.    Sullivan,    no   Mo.   App. 

the  only   friend  I   have  on  the  jury,  75,  84  S.  W.  105. 

and    I    want    you    to    look    after    my        ^The  offer  of  a  bribe,  though  un- 

right.     How  will  it  go?     I  will  make  accepted,  is  bribery  at   common  law. 

it  all   right.     It  will  not  be  to  your  Walsh  v.  People,  65  111.  58,  59,  61,  16 

loss  when  we  meet  again"  has  been  Am.    569;    Rex    v.    Plympton,    2    Ld. 

held  to  constitute  an  attempt  to  bribe  Raym.   1377;   State  v.  Ellis,  33  N.  J. 

a    juror.      State    v.    Dankwardt,    107  L.   102,  97  Am.  Dec.  707n;  People  v. 

Iowa  704,  77  N.  W.  495.  Ah  Fook,  62  Cal.  493,  495 ;  Barefield 

^i    Russ.    on   Cr.    (9th   Am.   Ed.)  v.    State,   14  Ala.  603,  607;   State  v. 

264.    It  is  not  essential  to  prove  that  Miles,  89  Me.  142,  36  .A.tl.  70;  People 

the   person   to   whom   the  bribe   was  v.  Hammond,  132  Mich.  422,  93  N.  W. 

offered  had  been  drawn  as   a  juror,  1084,  9  Det.  Leg.  X.  667.     It  is  not 

if  it  appears  that  he  was  summoned  necessarj'    to    prove    the    money   was 

as  such.     And  the  testimony  of  other  either  actually  tendered  or  produced, 

jurors    that    the    defendant    tried    to  Jackson  v.  State,  43  Tex.  Cr.  260,  64 

bribe    them    is    admissible.      State    v.  S.  W.  864.     See  Glover  v.  State,  109 

Williams,  136  Mo.  293,  38  S.  W.  75;  Ind.  391,  401,  10  N.  E.  282;  State  v. 

State  v.  Woodward,  182  Mo.  391,  81  Geyer,  3  Ohio  X.  P.  242.     As  to  the 

S.   W.   857,    103   Am.   St.  646n.     Rut  solicitation     of     a     bribe.     State     v. 

in  the  case  of  State  v.  Williford,  iii  Bowles,  70  Kan.  821,  79  Pac.  726,  69 

Mo.  App.  668,  86  S.   W.  570,  it  was  L.  R.  A.  176;  punishable  at  common 

held   that  a  conviction  could   not  be  law.     Walsh  v.  People.  65  111.  58,  16 

sustained    unless    it    was    shown    that  Am.   569;    People   v.    Hammond,    132 

the    juror    had    been    impaneled    and  Mich.   422,  93   X.   W.    1084:    .State  v. 

sworn  in  a  criminal  case  then  pend-  Desforges,   48    La.    Ann.    73.    18    So. 

ing.  912.      The    tender    and    taking    of    a 

"  A    police   officer   is   an    executive  check  is  not  bribery  under  U.  S.  R.  S. 


§    45-  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  746 

duty  of  the  officer  who  accepts  a  bribe.  If  the  object  of  the  offer- 
ing is  to  influence  the  officer  in  any  matter  which  may'''  come 
before  him,  that  is,  which  is  within  his  official  jurisdiction  and 
duty,  it  is  immaterial  that  he  fails,  or  has  no  opportunity  or 
power  to  carry  out  the  illegal  agreement.^'  On  the  trial  of  the 
person  giving  the  bribe,  corrupt  intent  on  the  part  of  the  recipient 
need  not  be  proved.  If  the  briber  parted  with  the  bribe  with  an 
intent  to  bribe,  the  offense  is  proved,  though  the  officer  did  not 
know  what  it  was,  or  its  purpose,  and  kept  it  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  public  justice.^®  The  corrupt  intention  of  the  officer 
receiving,"^  or  of  the  person  offering  a  bribe,  must  be  proved, 
when  necessary,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. ■*"  The  briber's  in- 
tention to  influence  can  be  inferred  only  from  his  language  where 
no  money  or  other  valuable  thing  is  produced.  He  may  show  his 
intoxication  at  the  time  to  rebut  the  inference  of  corrupt  intent 
by  proving  he  did  not  know  what  he  was  saying.  But  the  witness 
will  not  be  permitted  to  state  that  the  accused  was  so  drunk  as 
not  to  know  what  he  was  doing. ^^ 

§  452.    Judicial  notice  of  official  character  and  acts. — The  courts 
will  take  notice  that  the  person  who  was  bribed  was  a  public 

5451,  as  the  check  is  void.     Green  v.  316,  gg  N.  W.  147,  11  Det.  Leg.  N.  10; 

MacDougall,    igg    U.    S.    601,    50    L.  State  v.  Lehman,  182  Mo.  424,  81  S. 

ed.   328,   26   Sup.   Ct.   748.     Defenses  W.  11 18,  103  x\m.  St.  670,  66  L.  R.  A. 

in  prosecution  for  bribery,  see  Elliott  4go;  People  v.  Van  de  Carr,  87  App. 

Evidence,  §  2go8 ;  what  need  not  be  Div.  386,  84  N.  Y.  S.  461 ;  People  v. 

proved,    §  2905;   confessions  and  ad-  Mol,  137  Mich.  692,  100  N.  W.  913,  68 

missions,  §  2907;  financial  standing  of  L.  R.  A.  87in,   11   Det.  Leg.  N.  446; 

parties,  §  2904;  documentary  evidence,  People  v.  Jackson,  47  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

§    2903.      Evidence    of    indebtedness,  60,  95  N.  Y.  S.  268. 

see  116  Am.  St.  40,  note.  ^Commonwealth    v.    Murray,     135 

^^  State  v.   Butler,   178  j\Io.  272,  77  Mass.  530,  532. 

S.  W.  560.  '"' State   v.    Pritchard,    107   N.    Car. 

"Ruffin  V.   State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  565,  921,  926,  12  S.  E.  50;  People  v.  Sals- 

38  S.  W.  169;  Newman  v.  People,  23  bury,   134  Mich.  537,  96  N.  W.  936; 

Colo.    300,    47    Pac.    278;    People    v.  State  v.  Ames,  91   Minn.  365,  98  N. 

Markham,  64  Cal.   157,   161,  30  Pac.  W.  igo. 

620,  4g  Am.  700.    Cf.  Messer  v.  State,  "  White  v.  State,  103  Ala.  72,  16  So. 

37  Tex.  Cr.  635,  40  S.  W.  488,  as  to  63,   67:    State  v.   Campbell,   73   Kan. 

receipt  of  bribes  by  an  agent  of  the  688,  85  Pac.  784,  9  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.) 

accused.      State   v.    Ames,   90   Minn.  533n. 

183,  96  N.  W.  330.     As  to  power  of  ^  White  v.  State,  103  Ala.  72,  16  So. 

officer.    People  v.  McGarry,  136  Mich.  63;  ante,  §  166. 


747 


OFFEXSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


453 


officer/-  of  the  date  of  his  appointment  or  accession/"  of  his 
pubHc  acts/*  and  of  the  date  when  his  term  expires  by  death  or 
limitation.*^  It  suffices  if  the  officer  is  an  officer  dc  facto.  The 
regularity  and  validity  of  his  tenure  are  irrelevant.  The  defend- 
ant will  not  be  permitted  to  show  that  the  officer  was  not  ap- 
pointed in  writing,  or  sworn,  or  that  he  was  otherwise  unqualified 
imder  a  statute.**^ 

§  453.  Necessity  for  reliance  on  evidence  of  accomplices  in  the 
"bribery — Compulsory  examination  of  accomplice. — As  soon  as  the 
crime  is  consummated  by  the  delivery  of  the  money  or  valuable 
thing  by  the  briber  to  the  bribed,  the  latter  is  an  accomplice  of 
the  former.*'  The  voluntary  testimony  of  either  may  be  used 
against  the  other  separately  tried.*'*  It  is  sometimes  provided  by 
statute  that  an  accomplice  in  bribery  may  be  compelled  to  testify 
at  any  trial  or  investigation,  that  his  evidence  thus  given  cannot 
be  used  against  him,  and  that  he  shall  not  be  liable  to  indictment 
or  prosecution  for  the  bribery.*^    Because  of  the  secret  nature 


*^Rath  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  142,  33 
S.  W.  229;  State  V.  McDonald,  106 
Ind.  233,  235,  6  N.  E.  607. 

^^  Hizer  v.  State,  12  Ind.  330,  334; 
State  V.  Boyd,  34  Neb.  435.  437. 

**  State  V.  Gramelspacher,  126  Ind. 
398,  403,  26  X.  E.  8r,  citing  cases; 
Jones  V.  United  States,  137  U.  S.  202, 
34  L.  ed.  691,  ir  Sup.  Ct.  80.  As  to 
member  of  congress.  United  States 
V.  Dietrich,  126  Fed.  676. 

"  Doe  V.  Riley,  28  Ala.  164,  65  Am. 
Dec.  334.  For  civil  cases  holdingthat 
the  courts  will  judicially  notice  of- 
ficial names,  etc.,  see  Underbill  on 
Ev.,  §  244. 

■^' Florez  v.  State,  11  Tex.  .'Xpp.  102, 
104 ;  State  v.  Gardner,  54  Ohio  St.  24, 
42  N.  E.  999,  31  L.  R.  A.  660;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Saulsbury,  152  Pa.  St. 
554.  558,  25  Atl.  610  (extortion).  See 
ante,  §§  446,  447;  Commonwealth  v. 
Wotton,  201  Mass.  81,  87  N.  E.  202; 
State  V.  Haas,  163  Fed.  908. 


"  Ruffin  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  565, 
38  S.  W.  169.  One  who  gives  money 
to  a  person  who  solicits  a  bribe,  in- 
tending to  denounce  him,  and  to  pro- 
cure his  arrest,  is  not  an  accomplice. 
It  is  proper,  however,  to  subject  the 
decoy  to  a  rigid  cross-examination  as 
to  his  motive.  People  v.  Liphardt, 
105  Mich.  80,  62  N.  W.  1022;  New- 
man V.  People,  23  Colo.  300,  47  Pac. 
278.  The  admission  of  evidence  from 
witnesses  employed  to  entrap  the  ac- 
cused is  not  contrary  to  public  policy. 
People  V.  Bunkers,  2  Cal.  App.  197, 
84  Pac.  364,  rehearing  denied,  84  Pac. 
370.  Testimony  of  accomplices,  de- 
coys and  conspirators,  see  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  2906.  Testimony  of  accom- 
plices in  prosecution  for  bribery,  see 
98  Am.  St.  176,  note. 

**See  ante,  §  71,  et  scq. 

*'  Penn.  Const.,  §  32,  Art.  Ill,  N.  Y. 
Penal  Code,  §  79. 


§    454  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  748 

of  the  crime,  and  the  necessity  that  tliere  slionld  always  be  at 
least  two  participants,  it  is  both  necessary  and  customary  to  rely 
largely  on  accomplice  evidence.  When  an  accomplice  is  used  as  a 
witness,  the  utmost  good  faith  should  be  observed  in  dealing  with 
him.  The  spirit  as  well  as  the  letter  of  the  statute  should  be 
regarded.^" 

§  454.  Proving  other  acts  of  bribery. — The  giving  or  the  receipt 
of  other  bribes,  remote  in  time,  differing  in  purpose  and  distinct 
from  the  act  charged,  is  inadmissible.'^^  Where  defendant  was 
indicted  for  receiving  a  bribe  to  permit  gambling,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  other  bribes  should  be  paid  in  the  future,  separate 
acts  of  bribery  are  relevant  as  part  of  a  system  and  to  show 
the  intent,  purpose  and  understanding  with  which  the  money  was 
received. ^^  The  declarations  of  the  accused  before  the  commission 
of  the  crime  to  the  person  from  whom  he  is  charged  with  solicit- 
ing a  bribe  are  admissible  on  the  question  of  his  intent.  The 
objection  that  they  tend  to  show  a  separate  crime  w'ill  not  cause 
their  rejection. ^'^  The  rule  that  the  acts  and  declarations  of  one 
of  several  conspirators  during  the  conspiracy  and  intended  to 
carry  it  into  effect  are  admissible  against  the  others,  is  applicable 
to  a  prosecution  for  bribery  where  it  appears  from  the  evidence 
that  there  was  a  conspiracy  to  bribe  and  the  accused  is  connected 
with  it.^'*  Everything  the  accused  said  to  his  confederates  and 
did  to  carry  out  the  plan  to  bribe  is  admissible.^^ 

A  witness  for  the  prosecution  may  testify  what  he  did  after 
a  conversation  with  one  involved  in  a  conspiracy  to  bribe  on  the 
separate  trial  of  a  co-conspirator.  This  testimony  may  be  admis- 
sible on  the  question  whether  the  witness  was  or  was  not  an  ac- 

°"  People   V.    Spencer,   66  Hun    (N.  '^^  Guthrie  v.  State,  16  Neb.  667,  672, 

Y.)    149,  151,  21  X.  Y.  S.  33;  People  21    N.    W.    455;    State    v.    Ames,    90 

V.   Singer,   18  Abb.  N.   Cas.    (N.   Y.)  Minn.    183,  96   N.   W.   330;    State   v. 

96 ;  People  V.  Clark,  14  N.  Y.  S.  642 ;  Schnettler,    181    Mo.    173,    79    S.    W. 

Counselman  v.   Hitchcock,   142  U.   S.  1123.     See  ante,  §  88,  ef  seq. 

547,  35  L.  ed.   mo,  12  Sup.  St.  195;  ^^  State   v.    Durnam,    72   Minn.    150, 

People  V.  Clements,  5  N.  Y.  Cr.  282,  75  N.  W.  1127. 

298,  300;  Commonwealth  v.  Bell,  145  °*  People  v.  McGarry,  136  Mich.  316, 

Pa.  St.  374,  391,  22  Atl.  641,  644.  99  N.  W.  147,  II  Det.  Leg.  N.  10. 

"  People  V.   Sharp,   107  N.  Y.  427,  ^  People  v.  McGarry,  136  Mich.  316, 

457-463.  14  N.  E.  319,  I  Am.  St.  851.  99  N.  W.  147,  11  Det.  Leg.  N.  10. 
See  ante,  §  87. 


749  OFFENSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE.  §    455 

complice,  in  a  case  where  the  prosecution  aUeges  that  the  witness 
was  employed  to  entrap  the  accused.^''  So  conversations  between 
third  persons  may  be  admitted  where  it  appears  that  the  money 
was  obtained  from  them  for  the  purposes  of  bribery,  in  order  that 
the  jury  may  see  the  connection  between  the  source  from  which 
the  money  came  and  the  accused."" 

§  455.  Bribery  of  voters — Judicial  notice  of  elections. — Bribery, 
and  attempts  to  influence  voters  at  elections,  were  in  England 
indictable  at  common  law,^'^  and  this  rule  is  generally  recognized 
in  the  United  States.'"  A  conviction  of  bribing  a  \-oter  has  been 
sustained  on  proof  of  a  promise  to  pay  for  loss  of  time,*'"  to 
pay  the  traveling  expenses  of  the  voters,"^  or  by  showing  that  a 
candidate  supplied  voters  with  refreshments,"-  or  that  he  publicly 
declared  that  if  he  were  elected  he  was  willing  to  perform  the 
duties  of  the  office  for  a  smaller  compensation  than  was  allowed 
by  law,''"  or  promised  to  appoint  an  opposing  candidate  as  his 
deputy  if  the  latter  would  withdraw  from  the  contest.*''*  But  a 
conviction  for  receiving  a  bribe  to  vote  for  a  particular  candidate 
is  not  sustained  unless  the  state  proves  that  the  vote  was  cast. 
This  fact  must  not  be  left  to  the  jury  to  infer  from  the  former 
political  convictions  of  the  accused.  Under  the  secret  ballot  it  is 
extremely  difficult  for  this  to  be  done,  unless  the  voter  shall  vol- 
untarily lift  the  veil  of  secrecy.  No  one  can  examine  his  ballot, 
or  testify  to  its  contents,  unless  his  knowledge  was  acquired  from 
the  voter  himself.'"'    The  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the 

•"People  V.    Emmons,   7  Cal.   App.  626,  38  L.  J.  Q.  B.  313,  21  L.  T.  (N. 

685,  95  Pac.  1032.  S.)  56. 

"  People    V.    Bunkers,   2    Cal.    App.  "  Bayntun  v.  Cattle,  i   Mood.  &  R. 

197,  84  Pac.  364,  rehearing  denied,  84  265. 

Pac.  370.  "'Duke  v.  Asbee,  11  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 

"^Russell  on  Crimes  (9th  Am.  Ed.)  112,   114,   115. 

224..  "^  State  V.  Purdy,  36  Wis.  213,  216, 

'"State  V.   Jackson,  72,   Me.  91,  94,  223,    17  Am.  485;   State  v.   Dustin,  5 

40  Am.  342  (attempt)  ;  2  Bish.  Cr.  L.  Ore.  375,  378,  20  Am.  746. 

(7th    Ed.),    §   86;    Commonwealth    v.  "*  Lewis  Cr.  L.  126. 

Hoxey.  16  Mass.  385;  Commonwealth  "'Johnson     v.     Commonwealtli,     90 

V.    McHalc,   97   Fa.    St.   397,   39   Am.  Ky.  53,  58,   13   S.  W.  520,   12  Ky.  L. 

808,  24  Albany  L.  J.  412.     See  Doyle  20.     Cf.    State   v.   Minnick,   15   Iowa 

V.  Kirby,  184  Mass.  409,  68  N.  E.  843.  123,  127. 

""  Simpson  v.  Ycend,  L.  R.  4  Q-  B. 


§    J^.^6  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  75O 

days  of  holding  general  elections  and  of  the  officers  voted  for.'''' 
that  an  election  has  in  fact  been  held."'  the  whole  nnmber  of  votes 
cast  and  the  result.''''  together  with  the  fact  that  the  result  is  con- 
tested.°° 

^  456.  Extortion — Intent  and  guilty  knowledge — Evidence  to 
prove  ignorance  or  mistake  of  law  and  fact. —  I  extortion  is  an  unlaw- 
ful taking  bv  an  officer,  under  color  of  his  office,  of  money  or 
other  valuable  thing  not  due  him,  or  more  than  is  due  him,  or 
before  it  is  due.'"  Whether  a  corrupt  intention  and  knowledge 
are  always  essential  is  not  positively  decided.  The  majority  of 
the  cases  require  them  to  be  proved,  leaving  their  existence  to  be 
determined  by  the  jury,''^  and  permit  the  accused  officer  to  show 
that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  law,  and  thought  he  was  entitled  to 
the  fee,  or  that  he  erred  in  computing  the  fees  due  him.  But  evi- 
dence of  a  usage  among  officials  to  take  the  illegal  fees,  or  of 
the  construction  w'hich  is  placed  upon  the  statute  by  officers 
generally  to  disprove  a  criminal  intent,  has  been  rejected.'-  But 
some  authorities  hold  that  corrupt  knowledge  or  intent  to  extort 
is  not  essential,  and  where  this  is  the  rule,  evidence  to  prove 
official  ignorance  or  mistake  is  inadmissible."  This  lack  of 
harmony  arises  from  a  failure  to  distinguish  between  the  quality 
and  character  of  an  act  done  under  a  mistake  or  in  ignorance  of 
fact,  and  an  act  arising  from  a  mistake  or  ignorance  of  law.   The 

"*  State  V.  Minnick,  15  Iowa  123.  People  v.  Summers,  40  Misc.  (X.  Y.) 

"'Urmston    v.    State,    73    Ind.    175,  384,  82  X.   Y.   S.   297,    17   X-   Y.   Cr. 

177.  321.     Maine  statute,  State  v.  Hanna, 

'''*  Thomas     v.     Commonwealth,     90  99  Me.  224,  58  Atl.  1061. 

Va.  92,  17  S.  E.  788;  State  v.  Swift,  '^Commonwealth   v.   Shed,   i   Mass. 

69  Ind.  505,  526,  527.  227;  Cutter  v.  State,  36  X.  J.  L.  125, 

'"'Lewis  V.  Bruton,  74  Ala.  317,  49  127;  Cleaveland  v.  State,  34  Ala.  254, 

Am.  816.  259;   People  v.  Whaley,  6  Cow.    (X. 

'"4   Bl.   Com.    141;    Commonwealth  Y.)   661;   State  v.   Pritchard,    107  X. 

V.  Wilson,  30  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  26;  State  Car.  921,  927,  12  S.  E.  50. 

V.  Cooper,  120  Tenn.  549,  113  S.  W.  '- Commonwealth  v.  Dennie  (Mass.), 

1048;    Commonwealth    v.    Saulsbury,  Thach.  Cr.  Cas.   165. 

152    Pa.    St.    554,    559,    25    Atl.    610;  "United  States  v.  Harned,  43  Fed. 

United  States  v.  Deaver,  14  Fed.  595 ;  376,   377 ;    Commonwealth    v.    Bagley, 

People   V.    McLaughlin,   2   App.    Div.  7    Pick.    (Mass.)    279,    281:    State   v. 

(X.  Y.)  419,  37  X.  Y.  S.  1005;  Kirby  Jones,  71  Miss.  872,  15  So.  237;  State 

V.  State,  57  X.  J.  L.  320,  31  Atl.  213.  v.  Merritt,  5  Sneed  (Tenn.)  67,  69. 
See,    under    the    Xew    York    statute. 


751  OFFEXSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE.       §§    457-458 

rule  that  a  mistake,  or  misapprehension  of  fact,  may  be  proved 
to  negative  a  criminal  intent  is  broad  enough  to  include  and  ex- 
culpate officials  accused  of  extortion.  On  the  other  hand  the 
maxim,  "ignorance  of  law  excuses  no  one,"  will  not  permit  an 
officer  to  prove  that  he  did  not  know  the  law,  and  hence  that  he 
thought  he  was  taking  legal  and  statutory  fees."'' 

^  457.  Value  of  the  thing-  extorted — Burden  of  proving  exception 
to  statute. — It  is  absolutely  essential  to  a  conviction  to  prove  that 
the  thing  extorted  had  some  value,'"  and  that  the  money  or 
thing  taken  was  unwillingly  paid  or  given. ^"^ 

An  allegation  of  taking  higher  fees  than  the  officer  is  entitled 
to  may  be  sustained  by  evidence  which  leaves  the  exact  amount 
in  doubt."  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  a  defendant  who  claims 
he  has  a  legal  right  to  the  fee  under  an  exception  in  a  statute.'^ 
If  an  officer  is  indicted  for  extortion  for  receiving  a  fee  for  the 
pretended  service  of  a  writ  the  truth  of  his  return,  showing  serv- 
ice, is  directly  in  issue.  While  the  return  is  prima  facie  evidence 
of  the  service,  under  the  presumption  that  the  officer  did  his 
duty,  it  is  never  conclusive."^ 

§  458.  Compounding  offenses — The  intent  to  screen  the  offender — 
Mode  of  proving  that  a  crime  was  committed. — Compounding  a 

•'  People    V.    Monk,   8  Utah   35,   28  "  The  giving  of  a  promissory  note, 

Pac.    1 1 15,    1 1 16;    Birney  v.    State,   8  necessarily  void,  because  of  illegality 

Ohio  230.     A  taking  under  color  of  of  consideration,  does  not  constitute 

office  is  of  the  essence  of  the  offense,  extortion.    Commonwealth  v.  Cony,  2 

It  must  be  proved  that  the  money  was  Mass.  523,  524. 

taken  in  right  of  office,  and  that  the  '"United  States  v.  Harncd,  43  Fed. 

person   paying  unwillingly  yielded   to  376,  377. 

official    authority.      Money    paid    for  "  Spcnce  v.  Thompson,  ir  Ala.  746. 

services  not  official,  or  to  an  officer  in  "  United    States    v.    Rose,    12    Fed. 

his  private  capacity,  is  not  extorted.  576.     See  atilc,  §  24. 

Collier    V.    State,    55    Ala.    125,    128;  "Williams     v.      State,     2      Snccd. 

United  States  v.  Deaver,  14  Fed.  595,  (Tcnn.)   160,  163.    For  the  effect  and 

509;   State  v.  Pritchard,   107  N.  Car.  conclusiveness   of    official    returns    as 

921,  927,    12   S.   E.   50.  ■  Evidence  of  evidence,    the    power    of    the    courts 

other  extortionate  acts  distinct   from  over    them    and    the   admissibility    of 

that  alleged  is  not,  it  seems,  admis-  parol  evidence  to  show  tluir  invalid- 

iblc  to  raise  a  presumption  of  crimi-  ity    and    to    contradict    their    recitals, 

ii.il  intent.     Commonwealth   v.   Sauls-  see    I'nderliill   on    Ev.,    §   150a,   pages 

bury,    152    Fa.    St.    554,    558,   25    Atl.  2-7--230. 
'lie.     See  ante,  §  87,  ct  seq. 


§    45^  CRIMINAL    i:\Il)KXCE.  752 

crime  consists  in  taking  goods  or  other  amends  on  an  agreement 
not  to  prosecute.  Compounding  a  felony  is,  at  common  law, 
equally  criminal  with  the  felony,  and  is  also  a  misdemeanor 
against  public  justice."""  The  material  facts  are  knowledge  of 
the  actual  commission  of  a  crime,  the  taking  of  the  money  or 
property  of  another  and  the  intent  to  conceal  or  to  compound  the 
felony.''' 

The  gist  or  essence  of  this  crime  is  the  intention  to  screen  an 
offender  and  to  smother  a  criminal  prosecution.  Hence  evidence 
of  the  giving  of  a  note  on  condition  that  the  promisee  would  re- 
frain from  prosecuting  the  promisor  will  sustain  a  conviction. 
The  note  is  a  valuable  consideration.  It  is  voidable  only  and  may 
never  be  disputed.^"  Evidence  that  no  benefit  came  to  the  de- 
fendant, he  having  acted  as  an  agent  for  another,  is  also  ir- 
relevant.*"' 

The  felony,  which  is  alleged  to  have  been  compounded,  must 
be  proved  to  have  been  committed  by  someone  beyond  a  reason- 
?.ble  doubt,®*  and  this  may  be  done  prima  facie,  by  producing  a 
record  of  a  conviction.®^  It  seems  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove 
that  any  particular  person  suspected  or  accused  was  convicted,^" 
or  even  tried:®'  if  the  jury  are  satisfied,  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  and  on  all  the  evidence,  that  the  accused  knew  the  criminal 
and  took  the  money  corruptly,  not  intending  to  bring  him  to 
justice  but  to  shield  him.®® 

^4  BI.  Com.  136.  '"Fribly  v.   State.  42  Ohio  St.  205, 

"  People  V.  Bryon,  10.3  Cal.  675,  677,  206 ;  State  v.  Hanson,  69  N.  J.  L.  42, 

37    Pac.    754.      As    to    misprision    of  54  Atl.  841. 

felony  which  is  either  a  criminal  neg-  ^' Watt  v.  State,  97  Ala.  72,  11  So. 

lect  to  prevent  a   felony  from  being  901. 

committed   or   to   bring   the   offender  *'  Reg.  v.  Pascoe,  i  Den.  C.  C.  456, 

to  justice  after  its  commission,  State  458.      The    person    accused    of    com- 

V.  Wilson,  80  Vt.  249,  67  Atl.  533.  pounding  cannot  prove  the  acquittal 

*"  Commonwealth  v.  Pease,  16  Mass.  of  the  criminal,  as  it  may  have  been 

91,  94.  procured    by    his    own    corrupt    act. 

'^  State   v.    Ruthven,    58    Iowa    121,  People    v.    Buckland,    13    Wend.    (N. 

124,  12  N.  W.  235.  Y.)  592,  596.    As  to  proof  of  judicial 

**  State  v.  Hanson,  69  N.  J.  L.  42,  records,  see  Underhill  on  Ev.,  Chap. 

54  Atl.  841.  XHI. 

"  State     v.     Duhammel,     2     Harr. 
(Del.)   532.     Cf.  ante,  §  195. 


■yjT,  OFFENSES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE.       §§    459-460 

v;  459.  Contempt  defined — Inherent  judicial  power  to  punish. — 
Contempt  of  court  is  an  offense  the  essential  ingredients  of  which 
are  disobedience  to  the  court  or  despising  or  opposing  its  author- 
ity or  dignity.  It  may  consist  of  disorderly  or  insolent  behavior 
or  language  indulged  in  in  the  actual  presence  of  the  court,  in 
willful  disobedience  to  its  mandate,  in  resisting  or  evading  its 
process,  or  in  assaulting  its  officer.  So,  too,  using  language  which 
is  scornful  or  reproachful,  or  which  tends  to  diminish  the  respect 
for  or  authority  of  the  court,  or  which  is  likely  to  obstruct  the 
service  or  execution  of  its  process  or  orders,  is  contempt.  And 
generally  to  abuse  judicial  process  by  willfully  executing  it  in 
an  illegal  manner,  or  making  use  of  it  to  do  wrong  under  the 
color  or  pretense  of  the  authority  of  the  court,  is  a  contempt.®** 

The  power  to  punish  for  contempt  is  inherent  in  e^•ery  court 
of  justice.  And  to  deny  this  power,  or  to  abridge  it  in  any  mate- 
rial respect,  is  to  deprive  the  court  of  the  power  to  protect  itself 
from  insult,  to  render  it  the  mark  of  insult  and  obloquy,  and  to 
take  from  it  the  ability  to  enforce  its  mandates  and  decrees,  or 
to  perform  the  functions  and  powers  wnth  which  it  is  invested 
by  the  law.«^ 

^  460.  Direct  and  constructive  contempt  distinguished — Court  may 
take  notice  of  without  evidence. — A  contempt  is  direct  where  it  is 
the  doing  of  any  improper  act  in  the  presence  of  the  court  while 
in  session,  tending  directly  to  disturb  the  proceedings,  as.  for 
example,  noisy  or  tumultuous  conduct  on  the  part  of  a  person 

"  4  Bl.  Com.  283 ;  Cohen,  Ex  parte,  Howell,  80  Conn.  668,  69   Atl.    1057, 

5  Cal.  494.     Criminal  contempts  em-  125  Am.  St.  141. 

brace  all  acts  committed  against  the  ""  State  v.  Morrill,  16  Ark.  384,  389 ; 

majesty  of  the  law,  and  the  primary  State    v.    Howell,    80    Conn.    668,    69 

purpose   of  their  punishments  is  the  Atl.    1057;   Cossart  v.    State,   14  Ark. 

vindication      of      pulilic       authority.  s;\S;    United     States    v.     Hudson,    7 

Clark,  Ex  parte,  208  Mo.   121,  106  S.  Cranch   (U.  S.)  32,  34,  3  L.  cd.  259; 

W.  990.    15   L-   R-   A.    ex.   S.)    389n.  Adams,  Ex  parte,  25  Miss.  883,  885. 

.'\   proceeding  for  contempt  is  not  a  59  .Am.  Dec.  234;  Cartwright's  Case, 

criminal    prosecution   though   of   that  114     Mass.     230,    238;    Anderson    v. 

nature;  courts  without  criminal  juris-  Dunn,   6   Wheat.    (U.    S.)    204,   5    L. 

diction  having  jurisdiction  to  punish  cd.  242;  Tcnncy's  Case,  23  N.  II.  162; 

for  contempt,  and  contempt  being  an  State   v.   Copp,   15   N.    II.   212:   State 

oflfcnsc  against  the  court  as  an  organ  v.  Matthews,  ^7  N.  II.  450,  453:  Mid- 

f>i  public  justice,  is  not  strictly  a  vio-  dlcbrnok  v.  State,  43  Conn.  257,  268, 

lation  of  the  criminal  law.     State  v.  21  Am.  650. 
48 — Under  HILL  Ckim.  Ev. 


§    4^0  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  754 

present  in  the  courtroom  or  tending  to  defeat,  to  disturb,  or  to 
impair  the  administration  of  justice,  as,  for  example,  open  de- 
fiance of  the  powers  of  the  court  or  disrespectful  behavior  or 
language  to  the  judge.  It  may  also  consist  in  the  refusal  to  do  a 
proper  act  required  to  be  done  in  open  court ;  where  the  refusal 
directly  tends  to  disturb  the  proceedings  or  to  defeat  the  interests 
of  justice."^  As  soon  as  the  contempt  is  committed,  the  court  may 
act  at  once,  for  though  the  guilty  party  immediately  withdraws 
and  goes  beyond  the  reach  of  the  court,  the  jurisdiction  remains. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  be  brought  into  court.  He  may 
be  sentenced  for  contempt,  though  absent."-  The  power  to  com- 
mit for  a  direct  contempt  must  of  necessity  be  arbitrarily  and 
summarily  exercised,  that  disorder  may  be  quelled  without  delay 
and  the  dignity  of  the  court  maintained.  The  facts  of  the  con- 
tempt, together  w^ith  the  judgment,  are  usually  entered  upon  the 
record,  which  is  conclusive  as  evidence  of  all  facts  which  it  con- 
tains.°^  Because  of  this  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  con- 
temptuous act,  tw^o  methods  of  procedure  and  of  proof  have  been 
adopted.  The  court  will  of  its  own  motion  notice  and  punish  a 
direct  contempt.  The  judge  acts  upon  knowledge  which  he  has 
acquired  by  his  own  organs  of  hearing  and  siglit.  The  judicial 
power  may  act  summarily  to  punish  the  contempt  which  the  ju- 
dicial eye  has  seen  and  the  judicial  mind  has  apprehended."* 
There  need  be  no  charge,  no  plea,  no  issue,  no  trial,  no  examina- 
tion, no  proof  and  no  record. ^^ 

"^  Stuart  V.  People,  4  111.  395 ;  Ferri-  ®*  ]\Iahoney   v.    State,   33   Ind.   App. 

man    v.    People,    128    111.    App.    230;  655,  72  N.  E.  151,  104  Am.  St.  276. 

Clark,  Ex  parte,  208  Mo.  121,  106  S.  '^  People  v.  Turner,  i  Cal.  152,  155; 

W.  990,  IS  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  389n.  State  v.  Matthews,  37  N.  H.  450,  453; 

*- Middlebrook    v.    State,   43    Conn.  Clarke  Ex  parte,  208  Mo.  121,  106  S. 

257,  269,  21  Am.  650.  W.  990,  15  L.  R.  A.   (N.   S.)    389n; 

^^  State  V.  Woodfin,  5  Ired.  (N.  Council  v.  State,  80  Xeb.  296,  114  N. 
Car.)  199,  200,  42  Am.  Dec.  161;  Ma-  W.  294.  The  court  says  in  Wright, 
honey  v.  State,  33  Ind.  App.  655,  72  Ex  parte,  65  Ind.  504,  508:  "A  con- 
N.  E.  151,  104  Am.  St.  276.  It  has  tempt  of  court  is  either  direct  or  con- 
been  held  that  a  prosecution  for  a  structive ;  or,  as  the  latter  was  an- 
contempt  is  a  criminal  proceeding  and  ciently  called,  consequential.  A  di- 
the  accused  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  rect  contempt  is  an  open  insult,  in  the 
of  every  reasonable  doubt.  Council  face  of  the  court,  to  the  person  of 
V.  State,  80  Neb.  296,  114  N.  W.  294;  the  judges  while  presiding,  or  a  re- 
United  States  V.  Carroll,  147  Fed.  sistance  to  its  powers  in  their  pres- 
947-  ence.     A  constructive  contempt  is  an 


/:)D 


OFFEXSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


461 


§  461.  Procedure  in  receiving  evidence  of  constructive  contempt. 
— The  contempt  is  constructive  when  it  is  committed  out  of  the 
actual  presence  and  hearing  of  the  court,  so  that  the  court  has  no 
personal  knowledge  of  it."" 

The  contempt  must  be  proved  by  the  affidaxits""  of  eye-wit- 
nesses,"*^ upon  which  an  order  to  show  cause  may  issue.""  It  is 
only  when  the  contempt  is  flagrant  and  clearly  shown  that  an 
attachment  will  issue  in  the  first  instance."*'  The  proceedings  on 
ihe  return  of  the  writ  are  regarded  as  criminal,^  and  the  accused 
h.as  the  right  to  be  heard  and  to  defend  himself."  He  may  file 
counter  affidavits,  or  demand  that  the  prosecutor  shall  file  inter- 
rogatories for  him  to  answer.  These  are  usually  filed  with  the 
clerk, ^  and,  with  the  answers  of  the  accused  thereto,  may  be  taken 
down  by  the  clerk,  or  by  a  commissioner  appointed  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  referred  to  the  court."*   Where  the  statute  provides  for 


act  done,  not  in  the  presence  of  the 
court,  but  at  a  distance,  which  resists 
their  authority,  as  disobedience  to 
process,  or  an  order  of  the  court, 
such  as  tends  in  its  operation  to  ob- 
struct, interrupt,  prevent  or  embar- 
rass the  administration  of  justice." 
Hamma  v.  People,  42  Colo.  401,  94 
Pac.  326,  15  L.  R.  A.  CN.  S.)  62in; 
Ferriman  v.  People,  128  III.  App.  230. 

"■  State  v.  IMatthews,  zi  N.  H.  450, 
454;  Clarke,  Ex  parte,  208  Mo.  121, 
106  S.  W.  990,  15  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
389n ;  People  v.  News-Times  Pub. 
Co.,  35  Colo.  253,  84  Pac.  912;  Sny- 
der V.  State,  151  Tnd.  553,  52  N.  E. 
152.  In  a  contempt  proceeding  for 
the  violation  of  an  injunction  guilt 
need  not  be  proved  beyond  a  reason- 
able doubt.  Flannery  v.  People,  225 
111.  62,  80  N.  E.  60. 

"Snyder  v.  State,  151  Ind.  553,  52 
\.  E.  152. 

"'State  V.  Newton,  16  N.  Dak.  151, 
112  N.  W.  52;  Saunderson  v.  State, 
151  Ind.  550,  52  N.  K.  i.sr. 

"Jordan  v.  Circuit  Court,  69  Iowa 
177,  28  N.  W.  548;  French  v.  Com- 


monwealth (Ky.),  97  S.  W.  427,  30 
Ky.  L.  98,  holding  that  the  order  in 
criminal  contempt  need  not  be  as  pre- 
cise as  an  indictment. 

'~  State  v.  Mathews,  2,1  N.  H.  450, 
454;  Judson,  In  re,  3  Blatch.  (U.  S.) 
148,  14  Fed.  Cas.  7563. 

^  Langdon,  Ex  parte,  25  Vt.  680 ; 
United  States  v.  Wayne,  Wall.  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  134,  28  Fed.  Cas.  16654; 
United  States  v.  Richards,  i  Alaska 
613;  State  V.  Matthews,  2,7  N.  H. 
450,  455.  Contra,  Flannery  v.  People, 
225  111.  62,  80  N.  E.  60. 

"  People  V.  Wilson,  64  111.  195,  16 
Am.  528;  Jordan  v.  Circuit,  69  Iowa 
177,  28  N.  W.  548. 

'If  not  filed  as  required  by  a  stat- 
ute the  commitment  is  void.  Walker 
V.  Kennedy,  133  Iowa  284,  no  X.  W. 
581. 

*  Commonwealth  v.  Snowdcn,  i 
Rrcw.  (Pa.)  218,  219;  Slate  v.  Mat- 
thews, 37  N.  H.  450,  453;  People  v. 
Hrowii,  6  Cow.  ex.  Y.)  41  ;  Ilollings- 
worth  V.  Du.-mo.  Wall.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 
y7,  \2  I'cd.  Cas.  C616. 


§  46i 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


756 


a  rule  to  sliow  cause  based  on  duly  verified  information  by  an 
officer  of  the  court  or  some  responsible  person  the  prosecution 
cannot  be  by  indictment.*^ 

One  charged  with  criminal  or  quasi  contempt,  committed  out 
of  the  presence  of  the  court,  enjoyed  at  common  law  the  right  to 
purge  himself  if  possible,  by  his  oath,  and  all  evidence  which 
would  controvert  his  sworn  answer  on  any  matter  of  fact  was 
rigidly  excluded.""'  The  rule  in  equity  was  otherwise,"  and  doubt- 
less the  modern  practice  would  be  to  receive  proofs  on  both 
sides,  including  the  sworn  answers  of  the  respondent,  admitting 
them  as  evidence  in  his  favor,  to  be  considered  and  weighed  as 
part  of  the  evidence.'  The  accused  is  not  confined  to  his  answers, 
but  may  examine  witnesses  in  his  own  favor.*  If  from  his  an- 
swers it  appears  that  lie  was  not  intentionally  contumacious,  but 
was  acting  in  good  faith,  he  should  be  discharged. **  The  contempt 
must  be  prox'ed  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  either  by  the  re- 
spondent's answers  or  by  other  witnesses  in  addition  to  the  affida- 
vits."  It  must  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  that  the  ac- 


*^  Saunderson  v.  State,  151  Ind. 
550,  52  N.  E.  151. 

^  Ex  parte  Pitman,  In  re,  I  Curtis 
(U.  S.)  186,  190,  19  Fed.  Cas.  11184; 
United  States  v.  Dodge,  2  Gall  (U. 
S.)  313,  25  Fed.  Cas.  14975;  State  v. 
Tipton,  I  Blackf.  (Ind.)  166;  Mur- 
dock's  Case,  2  Bland.  (Md.)  461; 
Burke  v.  State,  47  Ind.  528;  State  v. 
Earl,  41  Ind.  464;  People  v.  Comp- 
ton,  I  Duer  (N.  Y.  Super.)  512;  Rex 
V.  Wheeler,  i  W.  Bl.  311,  3  Burr 
1256;  People  V.  News-Times  Pub. 
Co.,  35  Colo.  253,  84  Pac.  912;  Chris- 
tensen  v.  People,  114  111.  App.  40; 
Longenbook  v.  People,  130  111.  App. 
320;  Coleman  v.  State  (Tenn.,  1908), 
113  S.  W.  1045. 

"4  Bl.  Com.  288;  Rex  v.  Vaughan, 
2  Doug.  516;  Cartwright's  Case,  114 
Mass.  230,  239;  Employers'  Teaming 
Co.  V.  Teamsters'  Joint  Council,  141 
Fed.  679. 

'Coleman  v.  State  (Tenn.,  1908), 
113  S.  W.  1045. 


®  Magennis  v.  Parkhurst,  4  X.  J. 
Eq.  433;  Whittem  v.  State,  36  Ind. 
196,  213;  Commonwealth  v.  Dan- 
dridge,  2  Va.  Cas.  408;  State  v.  Mat- 
thews, 37  N.  H.  450,  455.  The  ac- 
cused is  entitled  to  reasonable  notice 
of  the  proceedings  sufficient  to  pre- 
pare his  defense.  Clark,  Ex  parte, 
208  Mo.  121,  106  S.  W.  990,  15  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  389n.  As  to  rule  in 
United  States  Supreme  Court,  see 
United  States  v.  Shipp,  203  U.  S.  563, 
51  L.  ed.  319,  27  Sup.  Ct.  165;  United 
States  V.  Carroll,  147  Fed.  947. 

"People  V.  Few,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
290;  State  V.  Trumbull,  4  N.  J.  L. 
i39;Beebees,  Ex  parte,  2  Wall.  Jr.  C. 
C.  (N.  S.)  127,  3  Fed.  Cas.  1220; 
Meeks  v.  State,  80  Ark.  579,  98  S.  W. 
378;  McHenry  v.  State,  91  Miss.  562, 
44  So.  83T,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  io62n. 

^"  Commonwealth  v.  Davis,  i  W.  N. 
C.  (Pa.)  18;  Albany  City  Bank  v. 
Schermerhorn,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  372, 
38    Am.    Dec.    55in;    State   v.    Mat- 


757  OFFENSES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE,  §    461 

cused  willfully  and  maliciously  intended  to  lower  or  assail  the 
dignity  of  the  court  or  to  interfere  in  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice.'^ Where  the  respondent  fails  to  appear,  or,  if  he  appears 
and  admits  his  guilt,  the  court  may  at  once  render  its  decision  and 
inflict  summary  punishment.    He  is  not  entitled  to  a  jury  trial/" 

The  determination  by  the  court  that  the  accused  is  in  contempt 
may  be  regarded  as  a  conviction  of  a  crime.^^  AVhether  an  ap- 
peal may  be  taken  depends  upon  the  statutes.  Usually  the  pro- 
ceedings may  be  reviewed  on  habeas  corpus."  In  the  United 
States  supreme  court  a  writ  of  error  may  be  brought  to  review  a 
judgment  for  contempt.  Where  the  contempt  consists  of  a  re- 
fusal of  a  witness  to  testify,  the  court  will  not  consider,  on  the 
writ  of  error  whether  the  testimony  to  be  given  w^as  or  was  not 
material. ^^  The  presumption  of  innocence  should  be  considered 
by  the  court  even  where  a  proceeding  to  punish  for  contempt  is 
not  strictly  a  criminal  proceeding;  it  is  enough,  usually,  that  the 
contempt  is  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  by  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  evidence.^''  If  the  proceedings  for  punishment 
for  contempt  be  regarded  as  criminal  the  rule  that  there  can  be 
no  conviction  on  the  uncorroborated  testimon}'  of  an  accomplice 
may  apply. ^" 

To  show  the  motive  of  the  accused  in  publishing  certain  articles 
in  a  newspaper  which  tended  to  bring  the  court  in  contempt  it 
may  be  shown  that  on  other  occasions  he  had  published  similar 
articles  relating  to  the  same  case  and  these  articles  are  admissible 
in  evidence  to  show  his  intention. ''' 

Contemptuous  language  may  be  proved  b>-  anyone  who  heard 
it  and  the  meaning  is  for  the  court  to  determine.   The  accused  will 

thews,   37    X.    If.   430,  455;    State   v.  "Clark,  Ex  f^arfe,  208  Mo.  121,  T06 

Small,  49  Ore.  595,  90  Pac.   mo.  S.  W.  990,  15  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  38911. 

"Powers   V.    People,    114   111.    App.  ''^  Xelson    v.   United    States,  201   U. 

323.  S.  92.  50  L.  ed.  673,  26  Sup.  Ct.  358. 

"State  V.  Matthews,  37  X.  II.  450,  '"  McCormick,  /;;  re,  132  App.  Div. 

456;  Necl  V.  State,  9  Ark.  259,  270,  50  (N.  Y.)  921,  T17  X.  Y.  S.  70. 

Am.    Dec.    209;    State    v.    Bccht,    23  "  Frencli   v.  Commonwealth    (Ky.), 

Minn.  411.  412.  97  S.  W.  427,  30  Ky.  L.  98. 

"Mahoncy   v.    State,   33    liid.    .\pp.  "State  v.  Howell.  80  Conn.  668,  69 

655,  72  N.  E.  151,  104  Am.  St.  276.  Atl.  1057,  125  Am.  St.  141. 


§    462-463  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  758 

not  be  permitted  to  pro\-e  the  truth  of  statements  made  by  him 
as  a  justification.^'* 

§  462.  Escape — Distinct  from  prison  breach. — A  person  who,  be- 
ing a  prisoner  in  lawful  confinement  or  custody,  regains  his  lib- 
erty with  or  without  force,  prior  to  his  legal  discharge,  or  who, 
having  a  prisoner  lawfully  in  his  custody,  suffers  him  to  regain 
his  liberty  before  his  legal  discharge,  is  guilty  of  an  escape. ■"  The 
flight  of  a  prisoner  while  being  worked  on  the  highway  from  the 
custody  of  a  jailer  is  an  escape  to  the  same  extent  as  though  from 
jail.--'^ 

§  463.  Intention  of  permitting  escape — Negligence  of  officer. — A 
sheriff  or  other  officer  is  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  if  through  his 
negligence  a  prisoner  escapes  from  his  custody  without  his  con- 
sent and  is  not  recaptured  before  he  is  out  of  sight.  The  defend- 
ant may  offer  evidence  to  show  the  escape  was  the  result  of  the 
act  of  God,  or  of  the  public  enemy ;  but  not  to  show  that  the  place 
of  custody  was  defectively  constructed."-  \Miether  the  defendant 
was  negligent  in  permitting  an  escape  is  for  the  jury.  Omitting 
to  handcuff  a  prisoner  and  letting  him  go  out  of  sight  does  not 
constitute  negligence  in  law,  but  are  facts  from  which  it  may  be 
inferred."^  Actual  negligence  need  not  be  proved.  It  may  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  of  the  escape  alone.  The  defendant  then 
has  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  due  diligence,  the  use  of  all  law- 

"  Stewart  v.   Reid,    118  La.  827,  43  an  officer  dc  facto,  capable  of  mak- 

So.  455.  ing   an    arrest,   is    an   off'ense   and    it 

^2  Hawk's  P.  C,  chaps.  18,   19;  2  cannot    be   proved    that    his    appoint- 

Bish.  Cr.  L.,  §§  1064-1066;  2  Whart.  ment   was    conditional    when    he    has 

Cr.  L.,  §   1667.     An  escape  is  distin-  actually  served  as  an  officer.     Robin- 

guished  from  prison  breach  and  res-  son  v.  State,  82  Ga.  535,  547,  9  S.  E. 

cue  in  that  the  latter  off'enses  are  nee-  528. 

essarily    accomplished    by    force    ex-  "^  Saylor  v.  Commonwealth,  122  Ky. 

erted  by  the  prisoner  himself  in  the  776,  93  S.  W.  48,  29  Ky.  L.  3:^7. 

case  of  prison  breach  and  by  others  ~  Shattuck   v.    State,   51    Miss.   575, 

in   the    case    of    rescue.      An    actual  580,   584;    State  v.   Halford,   6  Rich, 

breaking  is  not  necessary  to   consti-  (S.  Car.)   58. 

tute    prison    breach.      A    constructive  "^  State  v.  Hunter,  94  N.  Car.  829, 

breaking  is  enough.    Randall  v.  State,  835;  Shattuck  v.  State,  51  Miss.  575, 

53  N.  J.  L.  488,  490,  22  Atl.  46.    An  580. 
escape   from   the   lawful   custody   of 


759  OFFENSES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE.  §    464 

fill  means  to  prevent  the  escape,  and  that  it  was  caused  by  the 
act  of  God,  or  by  some  irresistible  force.-* 

A  material  and  important  distinction  is  made  between  the 
voluntary  act  of  an  officer,  who  knowingly  and  voluntarily  gi\es 
a  prisoner  his  liberty,  and  one  who  suffers  his  prisoner  to  escape 
because  of  his  negligence  in  guarding  him.  In  the  former  case, 
the  intention  to  do  a  wrong  is  an  essential  and  fundamental  fact, 
but  may  be  inferred  from  the  facts  in  the  case.-"'  At  common  law 
an  official  who  permitted  a  voluntary  escape  involves  himself  in 
tlie  guilt  of  the  crime  charged  against  his  prisoner.-*^  But  a  neg- 
ligent escape  is  at  most  a  misdemeanor  only.-^  The  accused  cus- 
todian may  always  show,  to  rebut  the  intention  of  allowing  a 
voluntary  escape,  that  he  acted  bona  fide  in  discharging  a  prisoner 
or  that  he  did  not  know  that  a  discharge  regular  on  its  face  was 
invalid  and  illegal."^ 

§  464.  Aiding-  prisoner  to  escape. — At  common  law,  and  fre- 
quently by  statute,  a  person  who  conveys  disguises,  instruments, 
weapons  or  any  information,-'''  etc.,  into  a  jail  with  the  intent  to 
facilitate  the  escape  of  a  prisoner,  or  in  any  other  way  assists 
in  an  escape,  is  guilty  of  felony.^*'  A  general  intent  to  aid  some 
prisoner  to  escape  must  be  proved  and  may  be  inferred  from 
proof  of  an  intentional  prison-breaking  by  the  accused.    But  an 

'*  See     cases     in     last     note.       So  L.    355,    358.      See    also,    Martin    v. 

strongly  does  the  law  incline  to  pre-  State,  ^2  Ark.  124,  126. 

sume  negligence  in  the  officer,  where  '^  2  Hawk's  P.  C.  192. 

an   escape  occurs,   that,  though  such  "  State  v.  Sparks,  78  Ind.  166,  167. 

prisoner    should    break    jail,    yet    it  The   intent    is   immaterial    under   the 

seems  that  it  will  be  deemed  a  negli-  statute.      Lynch    v.     Commonwealth, 

gent  escape   in  the  jailer,  because  it  115  Ky.  309,  72,  S.  W.  745,  24  Ky.  L. 

will  be  attributed  to  a  want  of  due  2180. 

vigilance  on  the  part  of  the  jailer  or  ™  Mcehan  v.  State,  46  X.  J.  L.  353, 

his  officers.     2  Bish.  Cr.  L.,  §  1096.  358. 

°  In  order  to  constitute  the  crime  "°  People  v.  Buckley,  91   App.   Div. 

of  voluntary  escape,  the  act  must  be  (X.  Y.)   586,  87  X'^.  Y.  S.  191,  18  X. 

done  by  the  officer  vialo  auimo,  and  Y.  Cr.  215. 

if  he  discharge  the  prisoner  through  ^Wilson  v.  State,  61  .Ma.  T51,  154; 

an    erroneous    interpretation    of    the  I'luty   v.    Commonwealth    (Ky.),    105 

law  he  is  not  guilty  of  that  crime,  but  S.   W.    1.^8,  32  Ky.  L.  80;    Maxcy  v. 

of    the    minor    offense    of    negligent  State,  76  Ark.  276,  88  S.  W.  1009. 
escape.     Meehan   v.   State,   46   N.   J. 


§    465  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  760 

especial  intent  to  ]il)cratc  or  to  aid  in  the  escape  of  any  particular 
prisoner  need  not  be  proved.""  i"'x])ert  testimony  will  be  received 
to  show  how  articles,  which  arc  alleged  to  have  been  furnished 
to  aid  an  escape,  may  be  used  for  iliat  purpose. "'- 

By  statute  it  is  also  a  crime  for  a  person  confined  in  jail  to 
attempt  to  escape.  The  accused  under  such  a  statute  cannot  show 
as  a  defense  that  he  was  sent  out  to  work  without  a  guard  to  a 
certain  place  and  that  because  he  was  without  a  guartl  he  es- 
caped.^^ 

vj  465.  Illegality  of  arrest,  when  relevant. — It  is  generally  pre- 
sumed, in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that  courts 
of  general  or  superior  jurisdiction  have  acted  regularly  and 
legally  within  the  boundaries  of  their  powers  and  jurisdiction,^* 
and  that  public  officials  have  obeyed  the  law  and  done  their  duty. 
But  the  accused,  whether  a  prisoner  under  indictment  who  has 
escaped  or  attempted  to  do  so,  a  person  confined  under  civil  proc- 
ess,^^  or  an  official  charged  with  a  voluntary  escape,^"  may  show 
that  the  detention  was  without  any  w^arrant,^^  or  under  one  issued 
by  a  court  having  no  jurisdiction.^'*  If  the  legality  of  the  custody 
is  attacked  the  burden  of  proof  to  convince  the  jury  of  the  legality 
of  the  custod}'  is  upon  the  state.^''  The  records  of  the  committing 
court  and  the  warrant  itself  are  relevant  to  show  the  la w^ fulness 
of  the  custody.*"   If  the  lawfulness  of  the  custody  is  proved,  evi- 

^^  Hurst    V.    State,    79   Ala.    55,    58;  State   v.    Hollon.    22    Kan.    580,    584; 

Holland     v.     State,     60     Miss.     939;  State  v.  Clark  (Xev.,  1909),  104  Pac. 

Vaughan  v.   State,  9  Tex.  App.  563;  593. 

Simmons  v.   State,  88  Ga.  169,   14  S.  ''  Housh  v.  People,  75  111.  487,  491 ; 

E.  122.  Martin  v.  State,  32  Ark.  124,  129. 

="=  Watson  V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  80,  ="  State  v.  Hollon,  22  Kan.  580,  584 ; 

22  S.  W.  46.  State  V.  Beebe,  13  Kan.  589,  593,  595, 

^  State  V.   Wright,  81   Vt.   281,  69  19  Am.  93;  State  v.  Jones,  78  N.  Car. 

Atl.  761.  420,    422;    State    V.    Baldwin,    80    N. 

^  Underhill  on  Ev.,  §  232.  Car.  390,  393 ;  2  Bish.  C.  L.,  §  1065. 

^ Housh  V.  People,  75  111.  487,  49T ;  '"State  v.  Whalen,  98  Mo.  222,   11 

State  V.  Leach,  7  Conn.  452,  456,  18  S.   W.  576.     The  fact  that  a  person 

Am.  Dec.  118.  was  in  lawful  custody  who  was  ac- 

^  Commonwealth     v.     Barker,     133  cused  of  resisting  his  jailer  must  be 

!Mass.  399;   Housh  v.    People,  75  111.  proved    by   the    mittimus.     People   v. 

487,491.  :\Iuldoon,   2    Park.    Cr.    (N.    Y.)    13. 

^  People  V.  Ah  Teung,  92  Cal.  421,  The  distinction  is  very  clear  between 

425,  28  Pac.  577,   15  L.   R.  A.    I90n;  an  imprisonment  without  process,  and 


76i 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§    466 


dence  that  the  prisoner  was  subsequently  acquitted  is  irrelevant.*^ 
Nor  can  the  accused  be  permitted  to  introduce  evidence  of  the 
filtliv  and  unwholesome  condition  of  the  jail  to  show  his  escape 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve  his  health  unless  he  shows 
he  had  exhausted  all  lawful  means  of  obtaining  relief  by  com- 
plaining to  the  authorities.'*-  Nor  can  one  who  is  on  trial  for  an 
escape  prove  in  his  defense  that  he  was  a  trusty,  or  that  after 
his  escape  he  paid  his  fine  to  the  sheriff,  or  that  he  escaped  to 
avoid  unmerited  punishment  at  the  hands  of  his  jailer.*^ 

§  466.  Perjury — The  intent  to  swear  to  what  is  false. — This  crime 
may  be  defined  as  the  taking  of  a  willful  false  oath  by  one  who, 
being  lawfully  required  to  depose  the  truth  in  any  judicial  pro- 
ceeding.** swears  absolutely  in  a  matter  material  to  the  point  in 
question. ■'^  Proof  of  a  willful  intention  to  swear  falsely  is  neces- 
sary.**'  It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  accused  was 


hence  wholly  illegal,  and  an  imprison- 
ment under  process  which  is  sub- 
stantially legal,  but  which  may  be 
technically  irregular.  The  fact  that 
the  imprisonment  was  without  process 
may  always  be  shown.  But  the 
courts  rather  discourage  the  practice 
of  attacking  process  collaterally  by 
rejecting  evidence  of  mere  technical 
irregularities  therein.  State  v.  Mur- 
ray, 15  Me.  100,  103,;  State  v.  Armi- 
stead,  106  N.  Car.  639,  644,  10  S.  E. 
872;  Commonwealth  v.  Morihan,  4 
Allen  (Mass.)  585;  People  v.  Ah 
Teung.  92  Cal.  421,  426,  28  Pac.  577, 
15  L.  R.  A.  I90n. 

"  State  V.  Lewis,  19  Kan.  260,  265, 
27  Am.  Ii3n. 

■"  State  V.  Davis,  14  .W-v.  439,  445, 
.-^^  Am.  563. 

"Johnson  v.  State,  122  Ga.  172.  50 
S.  E.  65;  State  v.  King,  71  Kan.  287, 
80  Pac.  606. 

"  A  prosecution  in  a  nuinicipal 
court  for  the  violation  of  an  ordi- 
nance is  within  the  statute.  Gardner 
V.  State,  80  Ark.  264.  97  S.  W.  48. 


^^Commonwealth  v.  Smith,  11  .Al- 
len  (Mass.)   243. 

*"  I  Hawk's  P.  C,  p.  429,  §  2 ;  Mc- 
Laren V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  643,  62  S. 
E.  138;  People  V.  Martin,  175  X.  Y. 
315,  67  N.  E.  589,  97  Am.  St. 
628;  affirming  17  App.  Div.  (X. 
Y.)  396.  79  X.  Y.  S.  340;  State 
V.  Faulkner,  175  Mo.  546,  75  S. 
W.  116;  State  V.  Luper  (Ore., 
1908),  95  Pac.  811  ;  Goodwin  v.  State, 
118  Ga.  770,  45  S.  E.  620;  Pilgrim  v. 
State  (Okla.  Cr.  App.,  1909),  104  Pac. 
:^S':^;  Elliott  Evidence.  §  3078.  To  con- 
stitute perjury  the  party  charged  must 
take  an  oath  before  some  competent 
tribunal  or  dlTiccr  that  he  will  testify, 
declare,  depose  or  certify  truly  that 
his  written  testimony,  declaration  or 
certificate  by  him  submitted  was  true; 
when  in  fact  some  material  matter 
so  testified,  declared,  or  certified  by 
him  was  false  and  untrue  ami  known 
by  him  at  the  time  of  taking  such 
natli  to  have  been  false  and  untrue. 
United  States  v.  Richards,  i.jo  IVil, 
443.  'i'lu-  elements  of  the  crime  of 
perjury  to  be  alleged  and  proved  arc 


466 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


76: 


or  was  not  honestly  mistaken  in  testifying.  It  is  not  sufficient  to 
prove  that  testimony,  alleged  to  be  false,  has  been  given,  and  thai 
it  was  false.  It  must  also  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that  the  accused  knew  its  falsity,  and  that  he  willfully,  corruptly, 
and  with  deliberation  and  consideration,  swore  to  it  as  true.'*^ 
Evidence  of  the  conduct  and  actions  of  the  accused  while  he  was 
testifying,  as,  for  example,  that  he  was  insolent,  and  had  to  be 
rebuked  by  the  court,'"*  and  of  his  manner  of  speaking  when  on 
the  witness  stand,  is  relevant  to  show  guilty  knowledge  and  in- 
tent. It  may  also  be  shown  for  the  same  purpose  that  the  accused 
had  tried  to  induce  another  witness  to  give  false  testimony."  The 
fact  that  perjury  is  the  result  of  a  conspiracy  to  commit  some 
other  crime  permits  the  evidence  to  take  a  wide  range.  The  facts 
connected  with  or  growing  out  of  the  conspiracy  may  be  shown 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the  guilty  intent  of  the  accused, 
or  to  show^  knowledge  on  his  part  though  such  evidence  may  tend 
to  show  that  he  has  committed  another  crime. '^'^ 


a  judicial  proceeding  or  course  of 
justice;  the  swearing  of  defendant  to 
give  testimony  therein ;  his  testi- 
mon\- :  its  falsity,  and  its  materiality 
to  the  issue  or  point  of  inquiry.  Peo- 
ple V.  Tatum,  60  Alisc.  (N.  Y.)  311, 
112  N.  Y.  S.  36.  Circumstantial  evi- 
dence in  prosecution  for  perjury,  see 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3087;  103  Am. 
St.  902,  note.  Proof  of  other  offenses 
in  prosecution  for  perjury,  see  105 
Am.  St.  983,  note;  materiality  of  evi- 
dence, see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3079; 
presumptions,  §  3072;  burden  of 
proof,  §  3071;  materiality^  §§  3080, 
3081;  the  best  evidence,  §  3083;  ad- 
missions and  confessions,  §  3088. 
Evidence  of  good  character,  see  103 
Am.  St.  902.  The  res  gesta,  see  El- 
liott Evidence,  §  3086.  Testimony  of 
accomplice,  see  98  Am.  St.  175,  note. 
Weight  and  .sufficiency  of  evidence, 
see  10  L.  R.  A.  749,  note.  Defenses, 
see  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3090;  vari- 
ance, §  3091 ;  questions  of  law  and 
fact,  §  3073. 


^'People  V.  German,  no  Mich.  244, 
68  X.  W.  150;  People  v.  Ross,  103 
Cal.  425,-37  Pac.  379;  Davidson  v. 
State,  22  Tex.  App.  372,  3  S.  W.  662 ; 
People  V.  Stone;  32  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
41;  McClerkin  v.  State,  20  Fla.  879: 
Williams  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa. 
St.  493;  State  v.  Brown,  no  La.  591, 
34  So.  698;  Xurnberger  v.  United 
States,  156  Fed.  721,  84  C.  C.  A.  2>77\ 
People  V.  Van  Tassel,  26  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  445,  50  N.  Y.  S.  53;  United 
States  V.  Kennej',  90  Fed.  257;  Tid- 
well  V.  State,  40  Tex.  Cr.  38,  47  S. 
W.  466,  48  S.  W.  184;  Goodwin  v. 
State,  n8  Ga.  770,  45  S.  E.  620;  State 
v.  Loos  (Iowa,  1909),  123  N.  W.  962. 

^*  Foster  v.  State,  22  Tex.  Cr.  39, 
22  S.  W.  21. 

'"Heflin  v.  State,  88  Ga.  151,  14  S. 
E.  112,  30  Am.  St.  147. 

""  Williamson  v.  United  States,  207 
U.  S.  425,  28  Sup.  Ct.  163,  52  L. 
ed.  — . 


yo^o 


OFFEXSES    AGAINST    FUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§    467 


§  467.  Materiality  of  the  testimony. — The  materiality  of  the 
testimony  which  is  alleged  to  be  false  must  be  established  satis- 
factorily."'^ Where  there  "is  no  dispute  as  to  what  the  accused 
testified  whether  the  testimony  was  material  is  for  the  court. ^" 
The  opinions  of  witnesses  who  heard  it  that  it  was  or  was  not 
material  are  never  recei\-ed.^^ 

As  a  rule  of  law  the  evidence  which  is  alleged  to  be  false  is 
material  if  it  prove  or  tend  to  prove  or  to  disprove  any  fact  which 
iiself  was  material.  Whether  e\-idence  is  or  is  not  material  is 
not  to  be  determined  by  the  effect  which  it  in  fact  did  have  on  the 
case  but  rather  by  the  effect  which  it  could  have  had  assuming 
that  it  were  true.^*  Tims,  for  example,  all  the  testimony  by  a  wit- 
ness before  the  grand  jury  which  might  legally  affect  their  find- 


"^  State  V.  Faulkner,  175  Mo.  546, 
75  S.  \V.  it6;  State  v.  Dineen,  203 
Mo.  62^,  102  S.  W.  480;  State  v. 
Brown,  iii  La.  170,  35  So.  501; 
Bledsoe  v.  State,  64  Ark.  474,  42  S. 
W.  Sgg;  State  v.  Moran,  216  Mo. 
550,  115  S.  W.  1 126;  State  V.  Cline, 
146  N.  Car.  640,  61  S.  E.  522;  State 
V.  Faulkner,  175  Mo.  546,  75  S.  W. 
116;  People  V.  Corrigan,  195  N.  Y. 
I,  87  X.  E.  792;  Gardner  v.  State, 
80  Ark.  264,  97  S.  W.  48;  State  v. 
Dineen,  203  Mo.  628,  102  S.  W.  480; 
People  V.  Chadwick,  4  Cal.  App.  6^, 
87  Pac.  384,  389;  Brown  v.  State,  47 
Fla.  16,  36  So.  705;  Wilkinson  v. 
People,  226  111.  135.  80  N.  E.  699; 
Leak  V.  State,  61  Ark.  599,  ^^  S.  W. 
1067;  Masterson  v.  State,  144  Ind. 
240,  43  N.  E.  138;  State  v.  Swafford, 
98  Iowa  362,  67  X.  W.  284;  People 
V.  Macard,  109  Mich.  623,  67  X.  W. 
968;  Rich  V.  United  States,  i  Okla. 
354.  ii  Pac.  804.  Perjury  may  be  as- 
signed on  the  giving  of  false  testi- 
mony which  if  true  would  have  been 
incriminating,  as  where  a  witness  be- 
fore a  grand  jury  is  compelled  to  in- 
criminate himself.  Stale  v.  Lehman, 
175  Mo.  619,  75  S.  W.  1.19. 

"  State   v.    Caywood,  96   Iowa   3C)7, 


65  X.  W.  385;  State  V.  Swafford,  98 
Iowa  362,  67  X.  W.  284;  Hanscom 
v.  State,  93  Wis.  273,  67  N.  W.  419; 
State  V.  Park,  57  Kan.  431,  46  Pac. 
71s;  Powell  V.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  ^77, 
T,7  S.  W.  322 ;  Grissom  v.  State, 
88  Ark.  115,  113  S.  W.  ion;  State 
V.  Brown,  128  Iowa  24,  102  N.  W. 
799;  Wilkinson  v.  People,  226  111. 
135,  80  X.  E.  699;  State  v.  Dineen, 
203  Mo.  628,  102  S.  W.  480;  Maroney 
V.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  524,  78  S.  W. 
696;  Saucier  v.  State  (Miss.),  48  So. 
840;  Brooks  y.  State  (Ark.,  1909), 
121  S.  W.  740;  People  v.  Bradbury 
(Cal.,  1909),  103  Pac.  215. 
"  Foster  v.    State,  32  Tex.   Cr.   .39, 

22  S.    W.  21 ;    Washington   v.    State, 

23  Tex.  App.  336,  5  S.  W.  119;  Gor- 
don V.  State,  48  X.  J.  L.  611,  7  All. 
476;  Peters  v.  United  States,  2  Okla. 
'if>.  i?>  Pac.  1031;  Butler  v.  State,  36 
Tex.  Cr.  444,  37  S.  W.  746;  State  v. 
Sutton,  147  Ind.  158,  46  X.  E.  468. 
The  fact  that  evidence  is  cumulative 
does  not  prevent  it  from  being  ma- 
terial. State  v.  Faulkiu-r,  175  Mo. 
546,  75  S.  W.  116. 

"State    V.    lloel,   77    Kan.    334,   <)| 
I'ac.  267. 


4C8 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


764 


ins^  or  re  fusilier  to  find  an  indiclniont  is  material.'"'^  It  is  not 
necessary  to  show  that  the  accused  knew  his  testimony  was  mate- 
rial.'^" Testimony  of  the  accused  falsely  denying  that  he  had 
made  contradictory  statements  is  material." 

^  468.  Number  of  witnesses  required  and  corroboration  of  single 
witness  to  prove  falsity. — According  to  the  earlier  cases  no  con- 
viction of  perjury  could  be  had  unless  the  falsity  of  the  evidence 
given  under  oath  was  proved  by  the  direct  evidence  of  two  cred- 
ible witnesses,  the  evidence  of  the  second  witness  being  required 
to  overcome  the  ])resumi)tion  of  innocence  which  the  law  indulged 
in  favor  of  the  accused. '''''  Such  is  not  now  the  law.  The  accused 
may  be  convicted  on  the  evidence  of  one  witness,  which,  however, 
must  in  all  cases  be  corroborated.  The  corroboration  by  circum- 
stances must  be  strong,  though  it  need  not  be  equivalent  or  tanta- 
mount to  another  witness. ^'''  But  it  must  be  clear  and  positive  and 
so  strong  that,  with  the  evidence  of  the  witness  who  testifies  di- 
rectly to  the  falsity  of  the  defendant's  testimony,  it  will  convince 
the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. *^'' 


"State  V.  Sargood,  80  Vt.  415,  68 
Atl.  49- 

""  State  V.  Sargood,  80  Vt.  415,  68 
Atl.  49. 

^^  Rrown  v.  State,  47  Fla.  16,  36 
So.  70s. 

^  I  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  257 ;  4  Rl. 
Com.  358;  3  Russell  on  Crimes  Cgth 
Am.  Ed.)  78. 

°'  I  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  257 ;  State  v. 
Peters,  107  N.  Car.  876,  12  S.  E.  74; 
Sweat  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  96  S. 
W.  843,  29  Ky.  L.  1067;  Saucier  v. 
State  (Miss.),  48  So.  840;  Kelley  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  507,  103  S.  W. 
189;  Parham  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App. 
468,  60  S.  E.  123 ;  Stamper  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  100  S.  W.  286,  30 
Ky.  L.  992;  State  v.  Rutledge,  37 
Wash.  523,  79  Pac.  1123;  Brooks  v. 
State  (Ark.,  1909),  121  S.  W.  740. 
See  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3089. 

""  Commonwealth  v.  Rutland,  IT9 
Mass.   317;    State   v.   Blize,    in    Mo. 


464,  20  S.  W.  210;  State  V.  Miller,  44 
]\Io.  App.  159;  State  v.  Gibbs,  10 
Mont.  213,  25  Pac.  289,  10  L.  R.  .A. 
749n ;  People  v.  Stone,  32  Hun  (X. 
Y.)  41;  Waters  v.  State,  30  Tex. 
.^pp.  284,  17  S.  W.  411;  ]\IcClerkin 
v.  State,  20  Fla.  879;  Heflin  v.  State, 
88  Ga.  151,  14  S.  E.  112,  30  Am.  St. 
147;  United  States  v.  Wood,  14  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  430,  10  L.  ed.  527;  United 
States  V.  Hall,  44  Fed.  864,  10  L.  R. 
A.  324;  Harris  v.  People,  64  X.  Y. 
148;  People  V.  Hayes,  70  Hun  (X. 
Y.)  Ill,  24  X.  Y.  S.  194;  Reg.  V. 
Rraithwaite,  8  Cox  C.  C.  254;  Reg. 
V.  Shaw,  10  Cox  C.  C.  66;  Common- 
wealth V.  Parker,  2  Cush.  (Mass.) 
212;  State  V.  Pratt,  21  S.  Dak.  305, 
112  N.  W.  152;  Grady  v.  State,  49 
Tex.  Cr.  3,  90  S.  W.  38;  Stamper  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  100  S.  W. 
286,  30  Ky.  L.  992;  State  v.  Rutledge, 
37   Wash.    523,    79   Pac.    1123;    State 


7^1 


OFFEXSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§    468 


The  rule  as  to  the  corroboration  of  the  evidence  of  an  ac- 
complice applies  to  a  prosecution  for  a  perjury.  If  the  statute 
requires  corroboration,  the  corroboration  cannot  be  furnished  by 
the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  and  usually  whether  the  witness 
is  or  is  not  an  accomplice  is  for  the  jury  to  determine."'^ 

The  direct  evidence  of  the  witness  may  be  corroborated  by 
circumstantial  evidence.  All  relevant  evidence  which,  if  true, 
tends  to  corroborate  him,  should  go  to  the  jury,  and  it  is  for 
them  to  determine  whether  the  corroboration  is  sufficient  to  con- 
vince them  of  the  falsity  of  the  defendant's  testimony  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt."-  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  while  cor- 
roboration is  essential  the  additional  evidence  need  not  be  such  as, 
standing  by  itself,  would  justify  a  conviction  in  case  where  the 
testimony  of  a  single  witness  is  sufficient  for  a  conviction."^  And 
the  written  or  oral  admissions  of  the  accused,"*  or  documentary 
evidence  found  in  his  possession,  or  in  the  possession  of  those 
who  may  be  criminally  associated  wit.h  him.  may  be  received  as 
corroborative,  and  these,  if  believed  by  the  jury,  will  be  equivalent 
to  another  witness."^ 


V.  Hunter,  i8i  Mo.  316,  80  S.  W. 
955;  Nance  v.  State,  126  Ga.  95,  54 
S.  E.  932;  Howell  V.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  104  S.  \V.  685,  31  Ky.  L.  983; 
Parham  v.  State,  3  Ga.  App.  468,  60 
S.  E.  123;  State  v.  Pratt,  21  S.  Dak. 
305,  112  X.  W.  152;  State  V.  Faulk- 
ner, 175  Mo.  546,  75  S.  W.  116;  Bell 
V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  701,  63  S.  E.  860 
(holding  that  the  procuring  of  one 
to  commit  perjury  may  be  proved  by 
the  evidence  of  the  person  suborned). 

"'  Peop'e  V.  Gilhooley,  187  X.  Y. 
551,  80  X.  E.  1 1 16. 

•"State  V.  Blize,  in  Mo.  464,  20  S. 
W.  210;  Beach  v.  State,  22  Tex.  Cr. 
240,  22  S.  W.  976;  State  V.  Swaim, 
07  X.  Car.  462,  2  S.  E.  68;  People 
V.  Hayes,  70  Hun  (X.  Y.)  in,  24 
X.  Y.  S.  194;  Maines  v.  State,  26 
Tex.  App.  14,  9  S.  VV.  51 ;  Gartman 
V.  State.  16  Tex.  App.  215;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Parker,  2  Cush. 
(Mass.)   212;   State  v.   Heed,  57   Mo. 


252;  People  V.  Davis,  61  Cal.  536; 
Williams  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa. 
St.  493 ;  IMaroney  v.  State,  45  Tex. 
Cr.  524,  78  S.  W.  696.  Under  a  stat- 
ute requiring  a  credible  witness  with 
corroboration,  an  accomplice  being  by 
law  discredited  is  not  a  credible  wit- 
ness, so  that  there  must  be  at  least 
one  credible  witness  aside  from  the 
accomplice.  Conant  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  610,  103  S.  W.  897. 

•"State  V.  Hunter,  i8r  Mo.  316,  80 
S.  W.  955. 

°*  State  V.  Swafford,  98  Iowa  362, 
67  N.  W.  284;  United  States  v.  De 
Amador,  6  N.  Mex.  173,  27  Pac.  488; 
Brooks  V.  State.  29  Tex.  App.  582,  16 
S.  W.  542:  United  States  v.  Wood. 
14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  430,  440,  441.  10  L. 
ed.  527;  State  v.  Hunter,  181  Mo. 
316,  80  S.  W.  955:  Schmidt  v.  L^iited 
States,  133  Fed.  257,  66  C.  C.  A.  380. 

"The  circumstances  in  whiili  tin- 
corroboration  by  a  living  witness  may 


§  469 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


766 


Where  the  indictment  contains  several  assignments  of  perjury, 
a  conviction  cannot  be  had  on  the  direct  exidence  of  a  Hving  wit- 
ness to  the  falsity  of  one  with  circumstantial  evidence  of  the 
falsity  of  another.  The  evidence  of  the  witness  and  the  evidence 
of  circumstances  must  both  bear  upon  tlie  falsity  of  the  same 
statement  of  fact.*^"  But  several  assignments  on  material  matters 
may  be  joined  where  they  all  relate  to  the  same  transaction  and 
if  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  sustain  one  or  more  of  them  the 
l)rosecution  need  not  prove  all.""  Whether  a  witness  is  credible, 
under  a  statute  requiring  corroboration  by  evidence  of  a  credible 
witness,  is  a  question  for  the  jury."®  In  conclusion,  it  may  be  said 
that  any  fact  essential  to  conviction,  except  the  falsity  of  the  testi- 
mony given  by  the  accused,  may  be  proved  by  the  uncorroborated 
testimony  of  a  single  living  witness."" 

§  469.  Falsity  of  the  testimony. — The  falsity  of  the  statement, 
or  of  the  evidence  to  the  truth  of  which  the  accused  has  sworn, 
must  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.'** 


be  dispensed  with  are  thus  tersely 
enumerated  in  United  States  v. 
Wood,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  430,  on  page 
440: 

1.  Where  the  accused  has  sworn  to 
a  fact  which  is  directly  disproved  by 
documentary  or  written  testimony 
springing  from  himself  (/.  e.,  a  writ- 
ten admission)  under  circumstances 
showing  a  corrupt  intent. 

2.  Where  the  fact  sworn  to  is  di- 
rectly contradicted  by  a  public  record 
with  which  the  accused  is  proved  to 
have  had  an  actual  acquaintance. 

3.  Where  he  swears  to  what  he 
must  necessarily  have  known  to  be 
false,  and  where  the  truth  can  be 
proved  by  his  own  letters  relating  to 
the  fact,  or  by  other  written  evi- 
dence found  in  his  possession,  and 
which  has  been  treated  by  him  as 
containing  a  true  account  of  the  facts 
stated. 

•^Reg.  V.  Virrier,  12  A.  &  E.  317, 
324;  Reg.  V.  Parker,  i  C.  &  M.  639; 


Williams  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa. 
St.  493,  501 ;  State  v.  Hascall,  6  X. 
H.  352;  Harris  v.  People,  64  N.  Y. 
148;  Commonwealth  v.  DeCost,  35 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  88;  Adellberger  v. 
State  (Tex.  Cr.,  1897),  39  S.  W.  103. 
"It  will  not  be  sufficient  to  prove  by 
one  inadequate  line  of  testimony  that 
one  statement  made  by  the  defendant 
is  false,  and  then  by  another  inade- 
quate line  of  testimony  that  another 
statement  made  by  him  is  false." 
Wharton  Cr.  Ev.,  §  387. 

"^  State  v.  Taylor,  202  Mo.  i,  100 
S.  W.  41 ;  McLaren  v.  State,  4  Ga. 
App.  643,  62  S.  E.  138. 

"^  IMeeks  v.  State,  22  Tex.  Cr.  420, 
24  S.  W.  98;  Kitchen  v.  State,  29 
Tex.  App.  45,  14  S.  W.  392. 

""United  States  v.  Hall,  44  Fed. 
864,  ID  L.  R.  A.  324;  People  v. 
Haves,  70  Hun  (X.  Y.)  in.  24  X. 
Y._  S.  194. 

""Howell  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.), 
104  S.  W.  685,  31  Ky.  L.  983;  People 


76; 


OFFENSES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§    470 


Any  fact  is  relevant  which  proves  or  tends  to  prove  or  to  dis- 
prove either  its  truth  or  its  falsity.'*  Though  both  at  common 
law  and  by  statute  corroboration  is  required,  the  falsity  of  the 
statement  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence."" 

§  470.  Proof  of  the  testimony  alleged  to  be  false. — Tt  must  1)e 
shown  that  the  accused  was  sworn. '^  by  an  officer  who  had  legal 
authority  to  administer  the  oath.'* 

The  form  of  the  oath  is  not  material.  The  most  important 
question  is,  did  the  accused  intend  to  be  sworn  and  was  he  sworn 
in  a  form  and  manner  wliich  he  regarded  as  binding?'''  For  lie 
must  by  some  unequivocal  act  consciously  take  upon  himself 
the  obligation  of  an  oath.'"^  All  the  circumstances  connected  with 
the  taking  of  the  oath  are  relevant.  The  person  who  has  ad- 
ministered the  oath  or  any  person  who  is  present  must  be  ])er- 
mitted  to  testify  as  to  all  the  facts  connected  with  it  ui)on  the 


V.  Strassman.  IT2  Cal.  6Ss,  45  Pac. 
3;  Goslin  V.  Commonwealth,  121  Ky. 
698,  90  S.  W.  223.  28  Ky.  L.  683; 
Baker  v.  State,  87  Ark.  564,  113  S. 
W.  205 ;  Cook  V.  United  States,  26 
App.  D.  C.  427.  See  Elliott  Evi- 
dence, §  3077. 

"  Walker  v.  State,  107  .Ma.  5,  t8 
So.  393;  People  V.  Macard,  109  Mich. 
623,  67  X.  VV.  968;  Rogers  v.  State, 
35  Te.\.  Cr.  221,  32  S.  W.  1044; 
United  States  v.  Shinn,  8  Saw.  (U. 
S.)  403,  410,  411;  United  States  v. 
Moore,  2  Low.  (U.  S.)  232,  235,  2.18, 
26  Fed.  Cas.  15803;  State  v.  Smith, 
119  X.  Car.  856,  25  S.  E.  871;  State 
V.  Gordon,  196  Mo.  185,  95  S.  VV.  420. 
Hut  the  fact  that  the  accused  was 
acfjuittcd  on  the  former  trial,  durinR 
which  he  is  charRcd  with  having 
committed  the  perjury,  is  not  ad- 
mis-^ihlc  to  prove  the  truth  f)f  his 
testimony  then  fjivcn.  Hemphill  v. 
State.  7r  Miss.  877,  16  So.  261; 
Ifutcherson  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  67, 
24  S.  W  'X^)8. 


"  Plummcr  v.  State.  35  Tex.  Cr. 
202,  33  S.  W.  228;  Gandy  v.  State,  23 
Xeb.  436,  36  X.  W.  817;  People  v. 
Porter,  104  Cal.  415,  38  Pac.  SS; 
State  V.  Hunter,  181  Mo.  316,  80  S. 

w.  955. 

"Sloan  v.  State,  71  Miss.  459.  14 
So.  262.  A  copy  of  an  oath  may  be 
received  if  the  original  is  missing. 
State  V.  Matlock,  5  Pen.  (Del.)  401, 
64  .Xtl.  259. 

''United  States  v.  Curtis,  107  U. 
S.  671,  27  L.  ed.  534,  2  Sup.  Ct.  507; 
People  V.  Xolte,  19  Misc.  (X.  Y.) 
674,  44  X.  Y.  S.  443;  Marki-y  v. 
State,  47  I'la.  .^8,  37  So.  53;  Manning 
V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  326,  81  S.  \V. 
957;  Phillips  v.  State,  5  Ga.  .Vpp. 
."197,  ^>3  S.  E.  (/>7\  State  v.  Pratt.  21 
S.  Dak.  30s,  U2  X.  W.  152.  (By 
clerk  in  open  court  is  sufficient.) 

"State  v.  Day.  108  Minn.  I2i,  lai 
X.  W.  611.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
»  .1074. 

"  Markey  v.  State.  47  Kla.  38.  37 
So.  5j. 


§    4/0  CRIMINAL    EV'IDENCE.  768 

question  of  whether  the  accused  was  actually  sworn  or  not." 
Thus,  is  may  be  shown  that  the  oath  was  interpreted  to  the  ac- 
cused.'** The  authority  of  the  officer  to  administer  the  oath  may 
be  presumed  under  some  circumstances.  The  burden  is  on  the 
slate  to  prove  that  the  officer  was  authorized  to  administer  an 
oath,  as  c.  g.,  where  he  is  a  notary  public,  to  show  his  jurisdiction 
included  the  place  of  the  oath  and  the  time  when  it  was  taken."''' 
Usually  proof  of  an  officer  dc  facto  will  suffice  and  his  written 
appointment  need  not  be  produced. ^°  The  official  character  may 
always  be  shown  1\v  the  production  of  the  written  appointment,"^ 
though,  if  the  original  appointment  cannot  be  found  secondary 
evidence  is  admissible.^"  The  fact  that  there  are  irregularities  in 
an  appointment  of  an  officer  to  take  testimony  or  that  the  order 
appointing  him  fails  to  designate  him  by  any  official  title. ■'^•'  or 
that  the  officer  who  administered  the  oath  knew  at  that  time  that 
it  was  false  and  that  it  was  made  for  a  fraudulent  purpose  is  not 
material.^* 

The  testimony  in  giving  which  the  perjury  is  alleged  to  have 
been  committed  must  be  shown ;  the  best  evidence  is  the  record 
or  a  certified  copy.  A  stenographer  may  read  his  notes  of  the 
testimony  given  by  the  accused,  and  which  is  alleged  to  be  false, 
if  he  is  able  to  swear  that  the  notes  contained  a  true  and  correct 
transcript  of  all  the  testimony  given  by  the  accused.*^  It  has 
also  been  held  that  parol  evidence  given  by  one  who  has  heard 
the  alleged  false  testimony  is  admissible  even  though  a  record 
may  be  in  existence. ^"^    It  is  not  necessary  that  the  witness  shall 

"Markey   v.    State,  47   Fla.   38,   37  "■' Markey  v.    State,   4"   F'a-   38,    37 

So.  53.  So.  53. 

'*Trevinio    v.    State,    48    Tex.    Cr.  "Thompson  v.   State,   120  Ga.   132, 

350,  88  S.  W.  356.  47  S.  E.  566. 

'*  Commonwealth       v.       Schwieters  ^  State    v.    Vandemark,    77    Conn. 

(Ky.),  93  S.  W.  592,  29  Ky.  L.  417.  201,  58  Atl.  715;    People  v.   Macard, 

*"  State    V.    Geer,    48    Kan.    752,    30  109  Mich.  623,  67  N.   W.  968;   State 

Pac.  236.  V.    Camley,  67  Vt.   322,  31    Atl.  840; 

^'JNIahon  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  234,  Leaptrot  v.   State,  51   Fla.  57,  40  So. 

79  S.  W.  28,  67  L.  R.  A.  499n.  616;   State  v.   Pratt, -21   S.  Dak.  305. 

*=  People  V.   Ellenbogen,   186  N.  Y.  112  N.  W.  152. 

603,  79  N.  E.   1112;    State  v.   Horin,  **  State  v.  Gibbs,   10  Mont.  213,  25 

70  Kan.  256,  78  Pac.  411.  Pac.  289,  10  L.  R.  A.  749";  State  v. 


769 


OFFENSES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    JUSTICE. 


§    470 


testify  to  the  identical  language  which  it  is  alleged  in  the  indict- 
ment was  used  by  the  accused,  or  that  he  should  recollect  all 
that  the  accused  said,  if  he  can  repeat  in  substance  that  which 
was  alleged  to  be  false.""'  One  who  was  present  may  testify  to 
oral  statements  made  by  the  accused  corresponding  in  substance 
to  the  contents  of  the  alleged  false  affidavit, -**  and  the  fact  that  the 
signature  to  an  affidavit  was  in  the  handwriting  of  the  accused 
need  not  be  proved,  but  will  l^e  presumed  where  the  affidavit  was 
actually  used  for  him  in  court.""'  It  must  usually  be  proved  that 
the  perjury  was  committed  in  a  judicial  proceedings.  Proof  that 
the  perjury  was  committed  in  a  judicial  proceedings  usually  con- 
sists of  the  record  of  such  proceedings  with  oral  evidence  to 
identify  the  accused  as  the  witness  who  testified  falsely.'""'  The 
object  of  the  introduction  of  such  evidence  is  to  show  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court,  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings  and  the 
materiality  of  the  evidence.^^  Jurisdiction  will  usually  be  pre- 
sumed where  the  record  is  apparently  regular  in  the  absence  of 
proof  to  the  contrary.  The  fact  that  the  proceedings  are  avoidable 
only  does  not  destroy  jurisdiction  and  perjury  may  be  com- 
mitted."" Nor  can  the  fact  that  the  accused  was  not  warned  that 
any  statements  made  by  him  might  be  used  against  him,  author- 
ize the  court  to  exclude  his  evidence  given  in  a  former  trial  or  in 
some  other  prior  proceedings  where  he  is  subsequently  tried  for 
perjury  committed  under  such  circumstances.''* 


Woolridge,  45  Ore.  389,  78  Pac.  333; 
Stanley  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  74  S. 
W.  318.  Stenographer's  notes,  see 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3084;  records  of 
former  proceedings,   §  ,3082. 

"  McLaren  v.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  643, 
62  S.  E.  138. 

"  Simpson  v.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr. 
77,  79  S.  W.  530. 

■*  Markcy  v.  State,  47  Fla.  38,  37 
So.  53. 

'"Ik-nin  V.  State.  88  Ga.  151.  14  S. 
E.  F12,  30  Am.  St.  147;  King  v.  State, 
32  Tex.  Cr.  463,  24  S.  W.  514;  Par- 
49 — Underiull  Crim.  Ev. 


tain  V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  100,  2  S. 
W.  854 ;  Washington  v.  State,  23  Tex. 
App.  336,  5  S.  W.  119;  State  v.  How- 
ard, 137  Mo.  289,  38  S.  W.  908. 

"State  V.  Brown,  iii  La.  170,  35 
So.  501  ;  State  v.  Justescn  (Utah), 
99  Pac.  456. 

"'AL-irkey  v.  State,  47  F'a.  38.  37 
So.  53 ;  State  v.  Brown,  68  X.  H. 
200,  38  Atl.  731. 

"'Stanley  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  74 
S.  VV.  318;  People  v.  Cahill,  193  N. 
Y.  232,  86  N.  E.  39.  -'o  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)   1084. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


CRIMES    AGAINST     PUBLIC     POLICY.     PUBLIC     PEACE     AND     PUBLIC 

HEALTH. 


§  4/1.  Lotteries  and  gaming  or  gam-     §  483. 
bling — What  constitutes. 

472.  Evidence   to   prove   manner   of       484. 

playing. 

473.  The  bet   or  wager — Plaj-ing  in 

public.  485. 

474.  Accomplice  evidence. 

475.  Keeping  gambling  houses.  486. 

476.  Presumptions    and    burden    of 

proof.  487. 

477.  Gambling    instruments    as    evi-       488. 

dence.  489. 

478.  Mailing  obscene  literature,  etc.       490. 

479.  Evidence     obtained     b\-     decoy       491. 

letters.  492. 

480.  Adulteration    of    food,    drugs, 

etc. 

481.  Evidence    furnished    by    analy-       493. 

sis. 

482.  Keeping  disorderly  house. 

494- 


Dueling — Sending  a  challenge 
to  light  a  duel. 

Carrying  concealed  weapons — 
How  concealment  may  be 
proved — Intent. 

Apprehension  of  danger  as  a 
defense. 

Character  of  the  defendant  as 
an  officer  or  traveler. 

Forcible  entry  and  detainer. 

Affray. 

Riot. 

Conspiracy. 

Circumstantial  evidence. 

Admissibility  of  acts  and  dec- 
larations of  fellow-conspira- 
tors. 

Must  be  made  during  exist- 
ence of  and  in  furtherance 
of  the  conspiracy. 

Order  of  proving  conspiracy  to 
let  in  declarations. 


§  471.    Lotteries  and  gaining  or  gambling — What  constitutes. — 

Gaming  or  gambling  is  a  misdemeanor  by  statute  in  many  states. 
Under  such  statutes  it  is.  of  course,  always  necessary,  in  order 
to  sustain  a  conviction,  to  prove  the  necessary  constituents  of  the 
crime,  i.  e.,  the  element  of  chance  in  the  game  itself,  and  that  a 
wager  was  actually  made.  A  game  of  chance  may  be  defined  as 
one  in  which  the  result  is  determined  by  luck  or  lot,  and  not  by 
adroitness,  practice,  skill,  or  judgment  in  play,  such  as.  for  exam- 
ple, cards, ^  dominoes,-  bagatelle.^  bowls,'*  baseball,''  dice  throwing,'' 

^  Commonwealth  v.  Coding,  3  Met. 


*  Drawpoker,  Shreveport  v.  Bowen, 
116  La.  522,  40  So.  859;  State  v. 
Mathias,  206  Mo.  604,  105  S.  W.  604, 
121  Am.  St.  687n. 

"Harris  v.  State,  31  Ala.  362. 


(Mass.)  130. 

^  Mace  V.  State,  58  Ark.  79,  22  S.  W. 
1 108;  People  V.  Weithoff,  51  Mich. 
203,  209,  212,  16  X.  W.  442,  47  Am. 


'Neal's  Case,  22  Gratt.    (Va.)  917,    557- 
giQ.  "  State  V.  DeBoy,  117  X-  Car.  702.  2t, 

S.  E.  167;  Jones  v.  State,  26  Ala.  i55- 

(770) 


7/1       CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    472 

or  keno."  Such  games  are  gambling  when  played  for  money  or 
other  valuable  thing.  And  generally,  betting  on  elections,^  horse 
races."  a  coin  in  the  slot  machine,^"  shooting  matches, ^^  billiards, 
or  other  game  of  skill,  is  gambling  under  the  statute.^" 

§  472.  Evidence  to  prove  manner  of  playing. — The  jury  are  not 
presumed  to  know  how  an  unlawful  game  is  played,  and  the 
mode  of  playing  may  be  explained  to  them  by  professional 
players  as  expert  witnesses.^^  Such  testimony  is  not  indispensa- 
ble. Any  witness  may  describe  a  game  he  has  seen,  though  he  has 
only  played  it  twice,  and  seldom  seen  it  played,"  and  the  depth 
and  extent  of  his  knowledge  and  experience  are  relevant  to  dimin- 
ish or  increase  the  value  of  his  evidence." 


'  Miller  v.  State,  48  Ala.  122. 

*  Sharkey  v.  State,  33  Miss.  353,  355 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Kennedy,  15  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  531,  533;  Commonwealth 
V.  Wells,  no  Pa.  St.  463,  467,  i  Atl. 
310.  Contra,  Hickerson  v.  Benson,  8 
Mo.  8,  40  Am.  Dec.  115. 

"  State  V.  Falk,  66  Conn.  250,  33  Atl. 
913 ;  Debardelaben  v.  State,  99  Tenn. 
649,  42  S.  W.  684;  People  V.  Weithoff, 
51  Mich.  203,  16  N.  W.  442,  47  Am. 
557;  Watson  V.  State,  3  Ind.  123,  124; 
Redman  v.  State,  33  Ala.  428.  A  horse 
race  is  not  a  game  under  a  statute 
making  it  criminal  to  bet  on  a  game. 
State  V.  Vaughan,  81  Ark.  117,  98  S. 
W.  685,  118  Am.  St.  29,  7  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  889n;  as  to  bookmakers' 
Ijooth,  Miller  v.  United  States,  6  App. 
D.  C.  6. 

"Lang  V.  Mcrwin,  99  Me.  486,  59 
Atl.  1021,  105  Am.  St.  293. 

"Myers  v.  State,  3  Snecd  (Tenn.) 
98,  106,  107. 

"'i'hc  charge  of  selling  lottery  tick- 
ets is  sufficiently  proved  by  evidence 
that  the  defendant  received  money  for 
them,  sent  for  them  and  received  a 
commission  for  his  trouble.  The  ticket 
itself  ought  to  be  produced  or  its  ab- 


sence satisfactorily  accounted  for.  An- 
derson V.  State  (Tex.,  1897),  39  S.  W. 
109.  A  poolroom  where  betting  is 
done  on  horse  races  is  a  gaming  house 
and  a  nuisance  at  common  law.  State 
V.  Nease,  46  Oreg.  433,  80  Pac.  897; 
though  not  productive  of  any  disorder. 
Commonwealth  v.  Huber,  126  Ky.  456, 
104  S.  W.  345,  31  Ky.  L.  929. 

Evidence  of  sale  of  lottery  ticket, 
3  L.  R.  A.  404. 

"State  V.  Behan.  T13  La.  701,  37  So. 
607;  Commonwealth  v.  Adams,  160 
Mass.  310,  312,  35  N.  E.  851. 

"  Nuckolls  v.  Commonwealth,  32 
Gratt.  (Va.)  884.  887;  Miller  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 117  Ky.  80,  77  S.  W.  682, 
25  Ky.  L.  1236. 

"One  witness  may  testify  he  saw 
the  defendant  conduct  a  game  for 
money,  describing  it  in  detail,  and 
another  may  then  state  it  was  a  cer- 
tain game,  though  the  latter  may  have 
seen  the  game  played  only  two  or 
three  times.  People  v.  Sam  Lung,  70 
Cal.  515,  517,  518,  II  Pac.  673.  The 
courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
meaning  of  the  words  "gift  ciiter- 
j)rise,"  Lohnian  v.  State,  81  In<l.  15,  18, 
and  of  the  use  of  billiard  tables  for 


X      1--. 

b   4/0 


CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE. 


77^ 


§  473.  The  bet  or  wager— Playing-  in  public— Tt  must  be  proved 
that  a  bet  or  wager  was  made,  whether  tlie  game  be  one  of 
chance  or  of  skill,'"  and  that  the  stake  had  value  intrinsically ; 
or  that,  by  agreement  among  the  bettors,  it  represented  value/" 
The  amount  and  character  of  the  articles  wagered  are  immaterial. 
A  conviction  of  gambling  will  be  sustained  by  proof  of  playing 
for  chips  or  checks,^®  for  the  price  of  refreshments,^"  or  for  the 
hire  of  the  table  or  other  apparatus."'*  The  making  of  tlie  wager 
may  be  inferred  from  an  offer  and  acceptance,  and  neither  of 
these  need  be  proved  to  ha\e  been  made  orally  or  in  express 
terms.-^  Both  may  be  inferred  by  the  jury  from  evidence  that 
the  accused  placed  money  or  chips  upon  a  table  where  a  game  was 
in  progress,  without  objection  from  other  players,--  or  stated  he 
would  pay  the  amount  wagered  after  the  game  was  ended, -^  and 
even  from  evidence  that  the  accused  was  sitting  and  playing  at  a 
table  or  in  a  circle  around  a  box"-*  upon  which  money  and  gam- 
bling devices,  such  as  cards  and  a  faro  box,  were  lying.-^ 


gambling  purposes.  State  v.  Price.  12 
Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  260,  Z7  Am.  Dec.  81 ; 
that  "craps"  is  a  game  played  with 
dice,  Sims  v.  State,  i  Ga.  App.  ']'j6,  57 
S.  E.  1029;  but  not  of  the  fact  that 
policy  is  a  game  of  chance.  State  v. 
Sellner,  17  Mo.  App.  39. 

Prima  facie  evidence  of  gaming,  36 
Am.  St.  685 ;  illegality  of  contract  for 
future  delivery,  i  Am.  St.  764;  com- 
mon gamblers,  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3008;  minors  plaj'ing,  §  3010;  lot- 
teries, §  301 1 ;  variance,  §  3007. 

"  Middaugh  v.  State,  103  Ind.  78,  80, 
2  N.  E.  292;  Jackson  v.  State  (Tex., 
1894),  25  S.  W.  773;  Jackson  v.  State, 
117  Ala.  155,  23  So.  47;  Proctor  v. 
Territory,  t8  Okla.  378,  92  Pac.  389; 
Barker  v.  State,  127  Ga.  276,  56  S.  E. 

419. 

^"  Oder  V.  State,  26  Fla.  520,  522,  7 
So.  856 ;  State  v.  Bishel,  39  Iowa  42. 

"Porter  v.  State,  51  Ga.  300,  301; 
Ransom  v.  State,  26  Fla.  364,  7  So. 
860. 

"People  V.  Cutler,  28  Hun  (X.  Y.) 


465,  466;  Hitchins  v.  People,  39  N.  Y. 

454,  456;  Walker  v.  State,  2  Swan 
(Tenn.)  287,  290,  291 ;  Hopkins  v. 
State,  122  Ga.  583,  50  S.  E.  351,  69  L. 
R.  A.  117. 

=°Hall  v.  State  (Tex.,  1896),  34  S. 
W.  122;  Alexander  v.  State,  99  Ind. 
450,  451 ;  Hamilton  v.  State,  75  Ind. 
586,  587;  Bachellor  v.  State,  10  Tex. 
258,  261 ;  Middaugh  v.  State,  103  Ind. 
78,  79,  2  X.  E.  292. 

■^Rainbolt  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  153, 
TCI  S.  W.  217;  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3004. 

'"  Thompson  v.  State,  99  Ala.  173,  13 
So.  753;  Goslin  V.  Commonwealth,  121 
Ky.  698,  90  S.  W.  22Z,  28  Ky.  L.  683. 

-^  State  V.  Leicht,  17  Iowa  28. 

-^  Butler  V.  State,  2  Ga.  App.  623, 
58  S.  E.  1 1 14. 

^  State  V.  Andrews,  43  Mo.  470,  471 ; 
State  V.  Boyer,  79  Iowa  330,  44  X.  W. 
558;  St.  Louis  V.  Sullivan,  8  Mo.  App. 

455.  457.  458;  Cohen  v.  State,  17  Tex. 
142.  Cf.  Middaugh  v.  State,  103  Ind. 
78,  80,  2  X.  E.  292;  Harmon  v.  State, 


-J-J},      CRIMES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    473 

Publicity  is  often  by  statute  essential  to  make  it  a  crime  to  bet 
on  a  game  or  sport,  and  must  be  shown.  The  court  cannot  take 
notice  that  certain  places  are  public,  under  a  statute  which  forbids 
gambling  in  public  places.-^  ^^'hether  a  game  is  public,  or  whether 
it  is  carried  on  in  a  building  or  place  which  is  within  the  prohi- 
bition of  the  statute""  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine"* 
on  all  the  circumstances.-'*  Evidence  that  a  game  was  carried 
on  in  a  shop,^**  or  public  road,'^  in  the  office  of  a  physician,^" 
magistrate,^^  or  broker,^*  aboard  a  steamboat  in  a  navigable 
stream, ^^  or  in  a  barn.^'^  will  sustain  an  allegation  that  a  game  was 
played  in  public.^'  Where  the  place  where  the  gambling  took 
place  is  not  per  sc  a  public  place,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon 
the  prosecution  to  prove  that  it  is  a  public  place.  Proof  that 
prior  to  the  occasion  in  question  other  games  had  been  played  in 
that  place  is  relevant  to  show  that  it  is  a  public  place. ^* 


120  Ga.  197,  47  S.  E.  547.  Evidence 
that  other  persons,  present  with  the 
accused  in  the  room  where  gambling 
is  alleged  to  have  taken  place,  were 
playing  or  betting,  is  relevant ;  and 
perhaps  indispensable,  as  the  defend- 
ant conld  not  play  a  game  alone  or 
bet  with  himself.  Thompson  v.  State, 
99  .Ala.  173,  13  So.  753,  754.  See 
Griffin  V.  State,  2  Ga.  .A-pp.  534,  58  S. 
E.  781. 

-"  Grant  v.  State,  Z2>  Tex.  Cr.  527,  27 
S.  W.  127. 

'"  In  Texas  the  playing  of  cards  at 
any  place  not  a  private  residence  is 
prohibited,  Fallwell  v.  State,  48  Tex. 
Cr.  35,  85  S.  W.  1069,  as  for  example 
in  a  schoolhouse,  Mapes  v.  State 
(Tex.  Cr.),  8s  S.  W.  797-  See  also, 
Waggoner  v.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  260, 
92  S.  W.  38. 

^  Lewis  V.  State,  140  Ala.  126,  Zl 
So.  99;  Ferrell  v.  Opclika,  144  Ala. 
135.  39  So.  249.  The  yard  of  a  board- 
ing house.  Walker  v.  State  (Ala.), 
41  So.  176;  a  lodging  house,  Winston 
v.  State,  145  Ala.  91,  41  So.  174;  or  a 


room  occupied  in  a  jail  h\  the  keeper. 
Lewis  v.  State,  140  .-Ma.  126,  2>1  So. 
99,  is  not  a  public  place. 

^  The  burden  is  upon  the  prosecu- 
tion to  prove  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  place  is  public.  Brad- 
ford V.  State,  147  Ala.  118,  41  So. 
1024. 

^Bentley  v.  State,  32  Ala.  596; 
Tatum  v.  State,  156  Ala.  144,  47  So. 

339- 

='  Mills  V.  State,  20  Ala.  ^. 

'=  Williams  v.  State  (Tex.,  1896),  34 
S.  W.  271 ;  Redditt  v.  State,  17  Tex. 
610. 

"Burnett  v.  State,  30  Ala.  19. 

^'Wilson  V.  State,  31  .\la.  371. 

*=  Dickey  v.  State,  68  Ala.  508. 

"  Huffman  v.  State,  29  Ala.  40. 

^  Xickols  v.  State,  in  Ala.  58,  20 
So.  564.  See,  also,  Downey  v.  State, 
1 10  Ala.  99,  20  So.  4.39 ;  Gomprccht  v. 
State.  36  Tex.  Cr.  434.  11  S.  W.  734- 

"  Winston  v.  State,  145  Ala.  91.  41 
So.  174;  Dennis  v.  State.  139  Ala.  109, 
35  So.  651 :  Lee  V.  State.  136  Ala.  31, 
2>i  So.  894;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3004. 


§    474  CRIMINAL   EVIDENCE.  '  774 

^  474.  Accomplice  evidence.— The  rules  oovcrning  the  introduc- 
tion and  employment  of  this  species  of  evidence^*^  have  been  often 
modified  by  statute,  so  far  as  the  offense  of  gambling  is  con- 
cerned. Thus  it  has  been  enacted  that  a  conviction  may  be  had 
upon  the  uncorroborated  evidence  of  an  accomplice,*''  and  that  he 
shall  not  be  excused  from  testifying  because  his  evidence  may 
incriminate  him.*^  No  person  is  an  accomplice  unless  proved  to 
have  actually  taken  part  in  the  game  or  to  have  had  a  bet  depend- 
ing on  its  result.*" 

§  475.  Keeping  gambling  houses. — Keeping  a  public  gambling 
or  gaming  house,  or  keeping  or  exhibiting  implements  for  gam- 
bling was  indictable  as  a  nuisance  at  common  law.  It  is  now 
generally  a  statutory  misdemeanor.  The  statutes  differ  greatly 
in  their  details  and  should  invariably  be  consulted  to  ascertain 
what  facts  are  essential  to  be  proven.*^  That  a  'certain  house  or 
other  place  was  maintained  or  kept  as  a  public  gaming  house 
may  be  shown  by  proof  of  its  general  reputation  in  the  community 
by  the  reputation  of  its  inmates  and  frequenters  as  professional 
gamblers  and  by  the  fact  that  gambling  paraphernalia  were  found 
there.**  Proof  that  the  accused  had  actual  custody,  control  or 
possession  of  a  public  gambling  house,  that  he  presided  o\-er  a 
gambling  table  and  admitted  persons  to  the  house,*^  or  the  fact 
that  he  derived  or  expected  to  derive  gain  or  profit  from  it,  is 
always  relevant  and  may  justify  an  inference  that  he  was  keep- 
ing it  in  the  statutory  sense.*"  Proof  of  a  single  act  of  possession 

"*  See  ante,  §§  69-75.  202,  87  S.  W.  152;  State  v.  Oswald,  59 

*°  Wright  V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  670,  Kan.  508,  53  Pac.  525 ;  Strong  v.  State, 

3  S.  W.  346;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3006.  52  Tex.  Cr.  133,  105  S.  W.  785;  State 

*'  Cheesum  v.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  v.  Oldham,  200  Mo.  538,  98  S.  W.  497 1 

332,  44  Am.  Dec.  771.     See  Moore  v.  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3009. 

State,  97  Ga.  759,  25  S.  E.  362.     See  ^  State  v.  Hoyle,  98  Minn.  254,  107 

ante,  §  72.  N.  W.  11 30. 

*^  Commonwealth     v.     Baker,     155  *^  Groves  v.  State,  123  Ga.  570,  51  S. 

Mass.  287,  29  N.  E.  512.  E.  627. 

^'Cox  v.  State,  95  Ga.  502,  20  S.  E.  ""Lettz  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S. 

269;    Commonwealth   v.    Blankinship,  W.  371;  Harman  v.  State  (Tex.),  22 

165  Mass.  40,  42  N.  E.  115;  State  v.  S.  W.  1038;  Wren  v.  State,  70  Ala.  i, 

Metcalf,  2  Mo.  App.  1269;  Copeland  4;  Nelson  v.  United  States,  28  App. 

V.   State,  36  Tex.   Cr.  576,  38  S.  W.  D.  C.  32;  Robbins  v.   People,  95   IH- 

189;   Coleman  v.   State,  48  Tex.   Cr.  175,    178;    Commonwealth   v.    Clancy, 


■J-Jl      CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    475 

or  supervision  may  not  be  enough  to  sustain  a  con\-iction  of  keep- 
ing, for  the  offense  is  continuous.*"  Nor  can  the  fact  that  the 
house  where  gambhng  was  going  on  was  owned  or  conducted  by 
the  accused  be  proved  by  the  declarations  of  third  persons  whicli 
are  hearsay  merely."**  Under  a  statute  prohibiting  gcnerallv  the 
keeping  of  gambling  houses,  the  particular  game  which  was  played 
need  not  be  alleged/''  or  proved."'*'  The  reputation  of  those  who 
frequent  a  particular  house,  including  the  defendant,  as  being 
gamblers,  may  always  be  shown. "'^  Under  a  prosecution  for  being 
a  common  gambler,  it  may  be  shown  that  the  defendant  visited 
the  house  named  in  the  indictment  and  then,  to  show  he  did  so 
for  the  purpose  of  gaming,  his  visits  to  other  gaming  houses  may 
be  shown. •"'- 

A  charge  of  frequenting  gaming  houses  is  not  sustained  by 
showing  that  the  defendant  was  in  such  a  place  on  one  occasion 
only.""    So  in  order  to  sustain  a  conviction  for  leasing  premises 


154  Alass.  128,  27  X.  E.  looi ;  Hamil- 
ton V.  State.  75  Ind.  586,  591 ;  Ford  v. 
State,  86  Miss.  123,  38  So.  229 ;  Groves 
V.  State,  123  Ga.  570,  51  S.  E.  627; 
State  v.  Mathis,  206  Mo.  604,  105  S. 
W.  604,  121  Ain.  St.  687n. 

*'  United  States  v.  Smith,  4  Cranch 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  659,  27  Fed.  Cas.  16329; 
Jessup  V.  State,  14  Ind.  App.  230,  42 
X.  E.  948.  Contra,  State  v.  Crogan,  8 
Iowa  523,  524;  Bryan  v.  State,  120 
Ga.  201,  47  S.  E.-  574;  Xelson  v. 
United  States,  28  App.  D.  C.  32. 

"  Machen  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  115, 
109  S.  W.  126. 

*' State  V.  Dole,  3  Black f.  (Ind.) 
294. 

"'When  alleged  it  must  be  strictly 
proved.  Dudncy  v.  State,  22  Ark.  251, 
252.  The  same  rule  is  applicable 
where  the  statute  forbids  the  playing 
of  games  specified  and  the  games  arc 
expressly  mentioned  in  the  indict- 
ment. Webb  V.  Slate,  17  Tex.  App. 
205. 

"  State  V.  Mosby,  53  Mo.  App.  571, 
577;  Bashinski  v.  State,  122  Ga.   164, 


50  S.  E.  54;  State  v.  Behan,  113  La. 
701,  37  So.  607. 

'"  Courtney  v.  State,  5  Ind.  App.  356, 
367,  32  X.  E.  335 ;  White  v.  State,  127 
Ga.  273,  56  S.  E.  425. 

"Green  v.  State,  109  Ind.  175,  176, 
9  X.  E.  781 ;  DeHaven  v.  State,  2  Ind. 
App.  376,  380,  28  X.  E.  562.  §  2128, 
Burns'  R.  S.  1908,  of  Indiana,  pro- 
vides that  it  shall  be  sufficient  evidence 
that  a  room  or  house  was  rented  for 
gaming,  if  gaming  is  carried  on  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  owner  or  under 
such  circumstances  that  he  has  good 
reason  to  believe  his  property  is  so 
used.  Any  evidence  is  relevant  to 
show  the  use  of  the  room,  and  the 
owner's  knowledge,  as,  for  example, 
the  general  reputation  of  the  room, 
the  fact  that  the  lessee  had  been  con- 
victed of  gambling,  and  that  the  lessor 
resided  near  by.  It  need  not  be  shown 
that  there  was  any  specific  agreement 
as  to  the  use  of  the  room.  Voght 
V.  State,  124  Ind.  358,  362,  24  N.  E. 
680;  iMshcr  V.  State.  2  Ind.  .\pp.  365. 
3C9,  28  X.  E.  565. 


§    476  CRIMIXAL    EVIDEXCE.  776 

for  gambling  purposes  it  must  always  l)c  ])rove(l  beyond  a  reason- 
able (loul)t  that  at  the  date  that  the  landlord  executed  the  lease 
he  actually  knew  that  the  premises  were  to  be  used  for  gambling 
purposes.^* 

§  476.  Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof. — The  owner  of  a  house 
is  not  presumed,  as  matter  of  law,  to  know  tliat  gambling  is 
carried  on  there.  His  knowledge  must  l)e  shown.''"'  But  the  occu- 
pant of  a  house  or  room  is  conclusively  presumed  to  know'  while 
he  occupies  it  that  gambling  is  going  pn  therein,'^''  though  not 
subsequently.'''" 

The  burden  of  proof  is  always  on  the  state  to  show'  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt,  by  direct  or  circumstantial  evidence,  the  essen- 
tial elements  of  the  offense,"'-  including  the  want  of  consent, 
where  a  statute  makes  it  a  misdemeanor  to  permit  a  minor  to  play 
without  his  guardian's  consent.^"  Under  a  statute  making  it  a 
misdemeanor  for  one  to  visit  a  gambling  house,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  prove  or  to  allege  one  went  there  to  gamble,  though  if  the 
accused  had  a  legitimate  reason  for  visiting  the  house  the  burden 
is  on  him  to  show  it."^" 

§  477.  Gambling  instruments  as  evidence. — On  a  trial  for  keep- 
ing a  gambling  house,  implements  employed  in  playing  illegal 
games  are  always  admissible,  if  found  in  his  possession  or  prop- 
erly identified  and  connected  with  the  accused.*'^  Sometimes  the 
police  are  authorized  by  statute  to  seize  articles  which  may  be 

"  Flynn  v.  People,  123  111.  App.  591.  the   accused  may   show  that   he   used 

■^Harris  v.  State,  5  Tex.  11.  care  to  ascertain  the  age  of  the  player, 

**  Robinson  v.  State,  24  Tex.  152.  and  for  this  purpose  may  introduce  in 

"  Barnaby   v.    State,    106    Ind.    539,  evidence  facts  descriptive  of  his  per- 

543,  7  N-  E.  231.  sonal    appearance    and    his    replies   to 

°*Rodifer  v.   State,  74  Ind.  21,  23;  questions  put  to  him.    Stern  v.  State, 

Fleming  v.  State,  125  Ga.  17,  53  S.  E.  53  Ga.  229,  21  Am.  266;  Goetz  v.  State, 

579;  Abies  V.  State,  49  Tex.  Cr.  292,  41  Ind.  162. 

92  S.  W.  414;  Herr  v.  Commonwealth  ""State  v.   Bridgewater,   171   Ind.   i, 

(Ky.),  91  S.  W.  666,  28  Ky.  L.  1131;  85  N.  E.  715. 

3  Elliott  Evidence,  §  i  Am.  St.  764.  "People  v.  Sam  Lung,  70  Cal.  515, 

^"Conyers  v.  State,  50  Ga.  103,  106,  517,  11  Pac.  673;  State  v.  Harmon,  70 

107,   15  Am.   1686.     Under  an  indict-  Kan.   476,   78   Pac.   805;    Elliott   Evi- 

ment  for  permitting  a  minor  to  play  dence,  §  3005. 

without  the  consent  of  his  guardian. 


-■J-      CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    478 

used  for  gambling  purposes,  as  tables,  cards,  etc.''-  \\1iile  they 
cannot  be  confiscated  or  destroyed  without  due  notice  to  their 
owner  and  an  opportunity  for  him  to  be  heard  and  to  prove  their 
lawful  character  in  judicial  proceedings,""  the  summary  methods 
by  which  the  prosecution  has  acquired  them  does  not  prevent  their 
use  as  evidence  upon  the  grounds  that  the  accused  is  protected  by 
constitutional  provisions  from  being  compelled  to  furnish  evi- 
dence against  himself."*  And  a  statute  which  makes  the  possession 
of  certain  gambling  instruments  presumptive  evidence  of  an  un- 
lawful possession  contrary  to  the  statute  is  constitutional  and 
simply  prescribes  a  rule  of  evidence. *^^ 

ii  478.  Mailing  obscene  literature,  etc. — It  is  provided  by  stat- 
ute'''' that  all  printed  matter  which  is  obscene  in  its  character,  and 
everything"  which  is  designed  to  pre\'ent  conception  or  procure 
an  abortion,  or  for  any  immoral  or  indecent  purpose,  with  all 
advertisements  giving  information  where  such  printed  matter 
may  be  obtained,  are  not  mailable,  and  the  act  of  mailing  them  is 
punishable.  To  sustain  a  conviction  under  this  statute  the  follow- 
ing facts  must  be  proved :  First,  that  the  article  or  printed  matter 
was  obscene  or  intended  for  an  immoral  use.""  Second,  that  the 
defendant  was  cognizant  of  the  fact.    Third,  that  he  or  his  agent 


""  Ridgeway  v.  West,  60  Ind.  371 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Gaming  Imple- 
ments, 119  Mass.  332. 

•^  State  V.  Robbins,  124  Ind.  308,  24 
X.  E.  978,  8  L.  R.  A.  438;  Lowry  v. 
Rainwater,  70  Mo.  152,  35  Am.  420. 

■^  Commonwealth  v.  Smith,  166 
Mass.  370,  44  N.  E.  503;  State  v. 
Pomcroy,  130  Mo.  489,  32  S.  W.  1002. 

"^People  V.  Adams,  176  X.  Y.  351, 
68  X.  E.  6.36.  98  Am.  St.  67511,  63  L. 
R.  A.  406,  aff'g  85  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.) 
390.  83  X.  Y.  S.  481. 

-U.  S.  R.  S.  §  3893  ^U.  S.  Comp. 
St.  1901,  p.  2658). 

''  Hanson  v.  United  States,  157  Fed. 
749.  85  C.  C.  A.  325.  The  obscenity 
of  a  writing,  ox  the  intention  with 
whirh   it   is  to  Ik-  used,   is  a  question 


for  the  jury  on  all  the  evidence.  The 
court  may  instruct  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  words  used.  Dunlop  v.  United 
States,  165  U.  S.  486,  41  L.  ed.  799.  17 
Sup.  Ct.  375 ;  Swearingen  v.  United 
States,  161  U.  S.  446,  40  L.  ed.  765.  16 
Sup.  Ct.  562;  United  States  v.  Davis. 
38  Fed.  326,  328;  Rosen  v.  United 
States,  161  U.  S.  29,  40  L.  ed.  606,  16 
S.  Ct.  434.  The  test  of  obscenity  is 
the  tendency  to  corrupt  or  deprave  the 
minds  of  those  who  are  open  to  such 
influences.  Macl'adden  v.  Ignited 
States,  165  F'ed.  51.  91  C.  C.  .\.  S(). 
The  newspaper  or  other  printed  mat- 
ter which  is  allegetl  to  be  obscene  may 
be  admitted  in  evidence.  Dunlop  v. 
United  Stales.  165  U.  S.  486,  41  L.  ed. 
79^;,  17  Sup.  Ct.  375. 


^    479  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  778 

deposited  in  tlie  mail,'"'"'  or  that  it  was  deposited  in  ihc  mail  as 
a  natural  consequence  of  some  intentional  act  by  the  accused."" 
The  gist  of  the  crime  is  the  mailing.  If  this  be  not  shown,  evi- 
dence that  the  defendant  wrote  the  article  is  irrelevant.'" 

If  upon  an  examination  of  a  book  it  is  apparent  upon  the  whole 
that  its  contents  are  calculated  to  deprave  the  morals  of  the 
reader  by  exciting  sexual  desires  and  licentious  thoughts,  it  is 
obscene  under  the  statute.  This  is  a  question  for  the  court  to 
determine  as  it  is  usually  held  upon  the  language  of  the  book, 
though  in  some  cases  the  question  of  obscenity  has  been  permitted 
to  go  to  the  jury  under  proper  instructions.  It  has  been  held  that 
evidence  to  show  that  the  information  conveyed  by  the  book 
is  accurate  and  scientific,  that  such  information  tends  to  prevent 
disease  by  dispelling  ignorance  on  such  topics,  and  that  the  book 
would  be  of  value  to  men  in  the  medical  profession  and  to  per- 
sons in  the  marriage  relation  was  irrelevant."^ 

§  479.  Evidence  obtained  by  decoy  letters. — From  the  very  neces- 
sity of  the  case,  evidence  obtained  by  the  use  of  decoy  letters  is 
received.  The  deceit  and  underhand  methods  employed  do  not,  in 
law,  discredit  such  testimony,  though  of  course  these  may  be 
sho\vn  to  enable  the  jur}^  to  ascertain  the  motives  prompting  the 
prosecution.'"   The  action  of  agents  of  the  postofiice  department 

*' United   States  v.   Clark,   2)7  Fed.  ''•  Thomas  v.  State,  103  Ind.  419,  2 

106,  108;  United  States  v.  Bebout,  28  N.   E.  808.      If,   however,   it   appears 

Fed.  522,  523.     The  government  may,  that  he  mailed  it,  evidence  to   show 

to   prove   the   mailing,   give   evidence  that   he  also  wrote   it  is   relevant  to 

showing  the  i:sual  course  of  business  show  guilty  knowledge.    The  fact  that 

in  the  post-oflfice  and  the  methods  used  he  wrote  it  may  be  shown  by  any  of 

in  collecting  and  distributing  the  mail,  the    methods    employed     in    proving 

So  it  may  be  shown  that  on  the  same  handwriting.     United    States   v.    Ma- 

daj'    that    a    certain    newspaper    was  thias,  36  Fed.  892.     As  to  proof  of 

mailed  which  is  proved  or  admitted  to  handwriting,    see    Underbill    on    Ev., 

have  been  received,  other  copies  of  the  §§  131-141,  pp.  185-205. 

same   newspaper   were   mailed   which  "  Burton  v.  United  States,  142  Fed. 

have   not   been   shown   to   have   been  57,  ^2)  C.  C.  A.  243. 

received.      Dunlop   v.    United    States,  "-  United  States  v.  Whittier,  5  Dill. 

165  U.  S.  486,  41  L.  ed.  799,  17  Sup.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  35,  39,  45,  28  Fed.  Cas. 

Ct.  375.  16688;  United  States  v.  Wightman,  29 

''' Demolli  v.  United  States,  144  Fed.  Fed.  636;  United  States  v.  Slenker,  32 

363,  75  C.  C.  A.  365,  6  L.  R.  A.   (N.  Fed.  6qi  ;   United   States  v.   Bott,   11 

S.)  424n.  Blatchf.  C.  C.   (U.   S.)   346,  24  Fed. 


779      CRIMES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE.    HEALTH.       §    480 

in  writing  decoy  letters  by  which  the  accused  is  led  to  commit  a 
criminal  act  does  not  make  the  agents  parties  to  the  offense  so  as 
to  render  their  testimony  subject  to  the  rule  relating  to  accom- 
plices.'^ 

Sealed  mail  matter  cannot  legally  be  opened  except  bv  the 
addressee.  It  it  is  sought  to  discover  whether  a  package  con- 
tains obscene  articles  or  writings,  a  search  warrant  must  be  pro- 
cured.'* When  the  matter  inclosed  is  admitted  in  evidence,  the 
wrapper  or  envelope  should  also  be  recei\ed  as  a  part  of  the  res 
gcstcc  to  show  how  it  reached  the  party  addressed."^ 

If  the  meaning  of  the  language  of  an  alleged  obscene  writing 
is  not  clear  to  the  casual  reader,  parol  evidence  is  admissible 
to  show  that  it  was  intended  to  give,  and,  in  fact,  does  give,  in- 
formation regarding  obscene  literature.'^'' 

§  480.  Adulteration  of  food,  drugs,  etc. — Bv  the  common  law. 
and  also  frequently  by  statute,  the  mingling  of  unwholesome 
ingredients  with  food,  or  the  selling  or  offering  for  sale  of 
adulterated  or  impure  articles  of  food  is  a  misdemeanor.  A 
criminal  intent  need  not  be  proved  under  a  statute  making  the 
mere  act  of  selling  food  adulterated  below  a  certain  standard 
a  misdemeanor."    Xor  need  it  be  shown  that  the  accused  knew 

Cas.  14626 ;  Bates  v.  United  States,  10  their  duties,  the  accused  is  not  entitled 

Fed.    92,    97,    100;    Price    v.    United  an  instruction  that,  as  a  rule  of  law. 

States,   165  U.  S.  311.  41   L.  cd.  727,  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  to  be 

I-    Sup.    Ct.    366;    Goode    V.    United  given    greater   weight    than    the    prc- 

States,  159  U.  S.  663,  40  L.  ed.  297,  16  sumption  of  the  proper  performance 

S.  Ct.   136.     For  other  cases  bearing  of  dut3^    Dunlop  v.  United  States,  165 

on  the  general  principles  of  evidence  U.  S.  486,  41  L.  ed.  799,  17  Sup.  Ct. 

obtained  by  artifice,  see  Underbill  on  375. 

Fvidcnce.  §  127,  p.  177.  Evidence  of  other  crimes  to  show 

■"  Shepard  v.  United  States,  160  Fed.  intent,  62  L.  R.  A.  239. 

584.  87  C.  C.  A.  486.  ■"  People  v.  Kibler,  106  N.  Y.  321,  12 

'*  Jackson,  Ex  parte,  96  U.  S.  727,  24  X.  K.  795;  Commonwealth  v.  Wheeler 

L.  ed.  877.  (Mass..  i9io).9i  X.  K.  415.  A  statute 

"  United      States     v.      Xoclke,      17  making  proof  of  sale  and  false  repre- 

I'.latchf.  C.  C.   (U.  S.)   554.  sentation     presumptive     evidence     of 

■'United  States  v.  Grimm,  50  Fed.  guilt     is     constitutional.     .And     such 

528.     Where  the  fact  of  the  delivery  an     inference    of     guilt,     when     cre- 

of   obscene   printed   matter   rests    for  ated,   cannot    be    overcome   by    proof 

proof  largely  upon  the  presumption  of  of  actual  ignorance  and  abst-nce  of  .11 1 

law   that   public  officials   in  the  post-  intent   to   deceive.     "Whether  or   not 

office  department  properly  performed  the  seller  knows  his  representations  to 


48 1 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


780 


of  the  adulteration,  unless  the  statute  ex])ressly  requires  him  to 
know  of  it."''  If  by  statute  it  is  essential  that  the  accused  should 
know  of  the  adulterated  condition  of  the  article,  it  must  be 
proved.'-'  If  actual  adulteration  is  proved  it  may  be  presumed 
to  have  been  done  for  a  fraudulent  purpose,  particularly  if  the 
article  sold  was,  either  expressly  or  by  implication  of  law  (as  is 
the  case  in  the  sale  of  provisions),  represented  to  be  adulterated 
or  of  standard  quality.-"  When  the  crime  is  alleged  with  extreme 
particularity,  it  must  be  proved  as  laid.^^  Thus,  evidence  that  the 
accused  had  impure  milk  in  his  possession,  or  that  he  brought  it 
to  market,  will  not  sustain  an  indictment  for  selling  it  or  expos- 
ing it  for  sale.''" 

i?  481.  Evidence  furnished  by  analysis. — The  evidence  contained 
in  a  certificate  of  a  milk  inspector,''''  or  that  resulting  from  a  test 
made  with  a  lactometer,  while  not  irrebutable  or  conclusive  of  the 
guilt  of  the  accused'-'*  charged  with  selling  watered  milk,  is  always 


be  false,  or  intends  to  deceive,  is  im- 
material. He  subjects  himself  to  the 
penalties  of  the  statute  by  making  the 
representation,  not  knowing  it  to  be 
true."  People  v.  Mahaney,  41  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  26.  See  Elliott  Evidence, 
§  3165. 

'*  Commonwealth  v.  Evans,  132 
Mass.  1 1 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Vieth, 
155  Mass.  442,  29  N.  E.  577;  Bissman 
V.  State,  9  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  714;  Myer 
V.  State,  ID  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  226;  State  v. 
Bockstruck,  136  Mo.  335,  38  S.  W. 
317;  Chicago  V.  Bowman  Dairy  Co., 
234  111.  294,  84  N.  E.  913,  T23  Am. 
St.  100,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  684. 
The  courts  will  take  notice  of  scien- 
tific facts  of  an  elementary  char- 
acter, and  of  the  meaning  of  words. 
The  nature  and  quality  of  various  ar- 
ticles of  food  in  common  use,  as  but- 
ter, milk,  bread  and  the  like,  need  not 
be  shown.  It  is  otherwise  with  drugs 
and  substances  not  in  ordinary  use. 
State  V.  Hutchinson,  56  Ohio  St.  82, 
46  N.  E.  71. 

™Cantee  v.  State  (Tex.,  1889),  10  S. 


W.  757.  Such  knowledge  will  not  be 
presumed  from  the  fact  of  possession 
alone.  Sanchez  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App. 
14,  10  S.  W.  756.  Evidence  that  de- 
fendant was  seen  on  a  wagon,  contain- 
ing cans  of  milk,  that  his  name  was 
painted  on  the  wagon,  and  that  he 
gave  samples  of  milk  taken  from  the 
cans  to  the  inspector,  is  relevant  to 
show  that  he  had  adulterated  milk  in 
his  possession.  Commonwealth  v. 
Rowell,  146  Mass.  128,  15  N.  E.  154. 
The  possession  of  a  servant  is  the  pos- 
session of  his  master.  Commonwealth 
V.  Proctor,  165  Mass.  38,  42  N.  E.  335. 

""  People  V.  West,  106  N.  Y.  293,  12 
N.  E.  610,  60  Am.  452 ;  State  v.  Hutch- 
inson, 55  Ohio  St.  573,  45  N.  E.  1043. 

"Commonwealth  v.  Luscomb,  130 
Mass.  42. 

^  Polinsky  v.  People,  73  N.  Y.  65. 
See  also,  People  v.  Wright,  19  Misc. 
(N.  Y.)  13s,  43  N.  Y.  S.  290. 

*^  Commonwealth  v.  Waite,  1 1  Allen 
(Mass.)  264,  87  Am.  Dec.  711. 

**  People  V.  Salisbury,  2  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)   39,  37  N.  Y.  S.  420.     As  to 


/Si     crimes  agaixst  public  policy,  peace,   health.     §  481 

relevant/''  if  it  appears  that  the  test  was  not  too  remote  in  point 
of  time  from  the  violation  complained  of.  The  defendant  may 
introduce  evidence  to  discredit  the  results  of  an  analysis  made  by 
an  official.  He  may  show  that  there  has  been  no  physical  inter- 
ference with  the  milk  since  it  was  taken  from  the  cows,"''  that  the 
chemist  was  inefficient  or  inexperienced,  that  the  test  was  made 
inaccurately,^'  or  under  unfair  conditions,  as  when  the  sample 
taken  does  not  fairly  represent  the  article  whose  quality  is  in 
question.  ^'^ 

The  facts  ascertained  by  a  test  or  analysis  may  by  statute  be 
made  conclusive.  Such  a  statute  is  not  unconstitutional  as  depriv- 
ing one  of  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law  pro- 
vided it  is  also  enacted  that  the  accused,  as  well  as  the  prosecu- 
tion may  ofter  in  evidence  the  result  of  an  analysis. ^'^  In  the 
absence  of  express  provision  a  statutory  mode  of  procuring  a 
sample  by  a  food  inspector  is  not  exclusive.  In  Xew  York  the 
statute  provides  that  the  accused  shall  be  furnished  with  a  sample 
of  the  milk  taken  by  the  inspector  which  shall  be  placed  in  a 
sealed  jar  and  given  to  the  person  who  delivers  the  adulterated 
milk.  The  question  whether  the  sample  given  by  the  inspector 
fairly  represents  the  milk  is  for  the  jury  on  all  the  facts. "°  The 
e\-idence  against  the  prisoner  arising  from  an  analysis  of  a  sample 
cannot  be  rejected  because  the  sample  was  obtained  by  purchase 
rather  than  by  a  taking  under  the  statute."^    A  food  inspector  is 

skimincd  milk,  see  People  v.   Kostcr,  cused  may  prove  that  some  statutory 

121  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  852,  106  X.  Y.  requirement,   as   delivering-  to   him   a 

S.  793.  sealed    bottle    containing    a    duplicate 

"  It    may    be    dispensed    with    and  sample   of   the   article,   has   not   been 

adulteration  otherwise  proved.     Cope-  complied     with.       Commonwealth     v. 

land  V.  Boston  Dairy  Co.,  189  Mass.  Lockhardt,   144  Mass.   132,   10   N.   E. 

342.  75  X.  E.  704;  Commonwealth  v.  511. 

Nichols.    10  Allen    (Mass.)    199.     See  *"  People  v.  Cipperly.  lOi  N.  Y.  634. 

as  to  analysis  of  oleomargarine,  Peo-  4    N.    E.    107;    following    People    v. 

pie  v.  Wahlc,  124  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  Eddy,  59  Hun  (N.  Y.)  615.  12  N.  Y. 

762,  109  \.  Y.  S.  629.  S.  628.     Compare    St.    Louis   v.    Bip- 

*"  People  V.   Salisbury,  2  ;\pp.   Div.  pen,  201  Mo.  528,  100  S.  VV.  1048. 

(N.  Y.)  39,  i7  N.  Y.  S.  420.  •"  People  v.  Weaver,  116  App.   Div. 

"State  v.  Groves.  15  R.  I.  208.  (N.  Y.)  594,  loi  N.  Y.  S.  961. 

"People   V.    Hodnctt,  68   llun    (N.  "'Commonwealth    v.    Coleman,    157 

Y.)   34r,  22  N.   Y.   S.  809.      The  ac-  Mass.  460,  32  N'-  I'--  662. 


§    4^2  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  782 

not  the  only  proper  witness  to  prove  adulteration.    Any  person 
having  competent  knowledge  may  testify."" 

§482.  Keeping  disorderly  house. — A  disorderly  house  is  one 
where  lewd,  drunken,  idle  and  dissolute  persons  resort ;  or  whose 
inmates  behave  themselves  so  badly  that  it  is  a  nuisance  to  the 
neighbors;"^  as  a  bawdy  house,  gambling  house,"*  or  liquor 
saloon  carried  on  so  as  to  violate  the  law,"'  or  any  habitation 
which  is  obnoxious  by  reason  of  the  habitual  disturbance,  noise 
or  violent  conduct  which  prevails  there.  Proof  that  a  house  was 
resorted  to  by  persons  for  the  purpose  of  prostitution  is,  at  com- 
mon law,  sufHcient  to  sustain  the  charge  of  keeping  a  disorderly 
house."®  It  is  not  usually  necessary  to  show  that  the  house  was 
kept  for  gain.  And  specific  acts  of  immorality  committed  else- 
where by  persons  who  frequent  the  house  are  admissible  to  estab- 
lish the  reputation  of  such  persons."^  The  evidence  of  those  who 
have  gone  to  the  house  for  such  purpose  is  always  competent, 
though  not  indispensable,  for  any  witness  having  a  knowledge  of 
the  circumstances  may  relate  what  he  knows.  And  the  commission 
of  an  act  of  prostitution  may  be  inferred  from  circumstances  that 
would  ordinarily  justify  an  inference  of  sexual  intercourse  in 
a  trial  for  adultery  or  fornication."^  Direct  evidence  is  not  neces- 
sary."" 

"'Commonwealth      v.      Spear,      143  States,  155  Fed.  50,  83  C.  C.  A.  646; 

Mass.    172,   9   X.    E.   632;    People   v.  Hall  v.  United  States,  155  Fed.  52,  84 

Bailey,  120  N.  Y.  S.  618;   People  v.  C.  C.  A.  215. 

Jones,  195  N.  Y.  547,  88  N.  E.  1127;  °*Arenz  v.  Commonwealth,  125  Ky. 

State  V.  Martin  (N.  J.,  1909),  73  Atl.  -7^7,  102  S.  W.  238,  31  Ky.  L.  321. 

548.      It    need    not    be    shown    that  "^People  v.   Eckman,  dz  Hun    (N. 

imitation     butter     or     any     adulter-  Y.)  209,  18  N.  Y.  S.  654. 

ated    article    was    calculated    to    de-  ^^  Cornmonwealth    v.    Goodall,    165 

ceive     the     particular     person     who  Mass.   588,   43   N.    E.    520;    State   v. 

bought  it,  if  it  appears  that  it  was  an  Young,  96  Iowa  262,  65  N.  W.  160,  59 

intentional  imitation  and  calculated  to  Am.    St.    371 ;    State   v.    Wilson,    124 

deceive  some  person.     People  v.  Ar-  Iowa  264,  99  N.  W.  1060,  4  L.  R.  A. 

ensberg,  105  N.  Y.  123,  11  N.  E.  277,  676n. 

59  Am.  483.  '■"  State  v.  Baans  (N.  J.  L.),  71  All. 

"^Cahn  V.  State,  no  Ala.  56,  20  So.  in. 

380;  Price  V.  State,  96  Ala.  i,  n  So.  "*  State  v.  Price,  ns  ]\Io.  App.  656, 

128;   People  V.  Jones,  129  App.  Div.  92  S.  W.  174. 

(N.  Y.)  772,  \\z  N.  Y.  S.  1097;  Arenz  ""State  v.  Steen,  125  Iowa  307,  loi 

V.  Commonwealth,  125  Ky.  Tn,  T02  S.  N.  W.  96. 
W.  238,  31  Ky.  L.  321 ;  Botts  v.  United 


/St,     crimes  against  public  policy,  peace,  health.     §  4S2 

In  a  prosecution  for  keeping  a  house  of  ill  fame,  evidence  that 
some  of  the  inmates  were  women  of  ill  fame  or  reputed  to  b^ 
common  prostitutes  is  admissible^"*'  to  prove  that  the  accused 
knew  the  character  of  the  house,  and  it  seems  that  the  character 
of  the  house  may  be  inferred  from  tlie  reputation  of  those  who 
resort  there  without  direct  proof  of  disorderly  acts  or  proof  of 
a  knowledge  by  the  defendant  of  the  purpose  of  their  coming/ 

In  a  prosecution  for  keeping  a  disorderly  house  the  character 
of  the  house  may  be  proved  by  showing  its  general  reputation 
in  the  community."  A  statute  which  provides  for  the  introduction 
in  evidence  of  the  general  reputation  of  a  house  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional."^ 

The  reputation  of  the  house  as  given  in  evidence  may  extend 
for  two  or  three  years  prior  to  the  earliest  date  alleged  in  the 
indictment  provided  it  was  during  that  time  occupied  by  the 
accused  f  but  proof  that  the  premises  mentioned  in  the  indictment 
had  possessed  for  several  years  past  the  reputation  of  being  a 
disorderly  house  will  not  alone  be  sufficient  to  warrant  a  convic- 
tion for  there  must  be  some  evidence  aside  from  reputation  which 
corroborates  the  proof  of  reputation,  and  this  may  be  either  direct 
or  circumstantial.*    A  statute  providing  that  the  character  of  the 

^""People  V.  Russell,   no  Mich.  46,  =  Sprague  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1898), 

67  N.  W.  1099;  State  v.  Plant,  67  Vt.  44  S.  W.  837;  State  v.  Steen,  125  Iowa 

454,  32  Atl.  237,  48  Am.  St.  821 ;  State  307,  lOi  N.  W.  96;  Wimberly  v.  State, 

V.  Bresland,  59  Minn.  281,  61  N.  W.  53  Tex.  Cr.  11,  108  S.  W.  384;   Ma- 

450,  20  L.  R.  A.  612;  State  v.  Steen,  chen  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  115,  109  S. 

125  Iowa  307,  loi  N.  W.  96;  Brown  v.  W.    126;    McConnell  v.    State,   2   Ga. 

State  (Tex.  Cr.  1898),  48  S.  W.  176;  App.    44S,    SS    S.    E.    546;    Owens    v. 

State  V.  Price,  115  Mo.  App.  656,  92  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  i,  108  S.  W.  379; 

S.  W.  174.  Moore  v.  State,  53  Tex.  Cr.  559,  no 

^  Weideman  v.    State,  4   Ind.    App.  S.  W.  911 ;  State  v.  Anderson  (Conn., 

397.  30  N.  E.  920.    C/.  People  V.  Rus-  1909),  75   .Atl.   81;   Lismore  v.    State 

sell,  no  Mich.  46,  67  N.  W.  1099;  Cal-  (Ark.,  1910),  126  N.  W.  853. 

laKhan   v.   State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  536,  38  "a  State  v.  Wilson,  124  Iowa  264,  99 

S.  W.  188;  State  V.  Olds,  217  Mo.  305,  N.  W.  1060. 

116  .S.   W.    1080;   State  V.   Price,   115  '  Sprauue  v.  State  (Tex.  Cr.  1898), 

Mo.  App.  656,92  S.  W.  174;  Beard  v.  44   S.    W    837;    Frazier   v.    State,   47 

State.  71  Md.  275,  17  All.  1044,  17  Am.  Tex.  Cr.  24,  81   S.  W.  5.32:  People  v. 

St.  536,  4  L.  R.  A.  67Sn;  Hcnson  v.  Wheeler,   142   Mich.  212,    105   X.  W. 

State,  62  M<1.  230,  50  Am.  204n ;  Her-  607,  12  Det.  Loj,'.  N.  684. 

zinRcr  v.   State,  70  Md.  278,   17  Atl.  *  Botts   v.   United   States,   155   Fed. 

81:  State  V.  Kelly.  76  N.  J.  L.  57O,  70  50,  83  C.  C  A.  646;   Hall  v.  United 

\tl.  342.  States,  155  Fed.  5-'.  84  C.  C.  A.  215; 


§    483  CRIMIXAL    EVIDENCE.  784 

house  as  a  disorderly  house  ma}-  he  i)ro\-cd  hy  reputation  is  cuniu- 
lati\e  and  does  not  exckide  evidence  of  facts  and  circumstances 
which  may  prove  the  character  of  the  house  independently  of 
reputation.  Any  evidence  tending  to  show  what  business  was 
carried  on  in  the  house,  and  in  what  manner,  the  situation  of  and 
furniture  in  the  rooms,  the  character  of  persons  who  went  there, 
how  and  when  they  made  their  visits,  what  they  did  at  the  house, 
the  purpose  of  their  visits  and  similar  facts  is  admissible.  It  may 
be  shown  that  liquor  was  sold  at  the  house,  that  prostitution  was 
indulged  in  and  that  men  came  to  the  house  at  all  hours  of  the 
night  in  cabs  and  otherwise."'  Evidence  is  always  relevant  which 
tends  to  show  the  disorderly,  lewd,"  or  boisterous^  actions  of  the 
occupants,  inmates  and  frequenters  of  the  house;  and  the  noise 
and  uproar  which  were  observed  to  proceed  therefrom.  The  char- 
acter of  the  house,  and  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  used,  are  ques- 
tions for  the  jury.® 

A  person  may  be  convicted  of  keeping  °  a  disorderly  house, 
though  no  direct  evidence  was  offered  to  show  he  was  a  lessee  or 
tenant ^°  or  that  he  had  power  to  suppress  the  disorder ;  or  that  he 
took  part  therein.  Whether  the  bad  character  of  the  defendant 
for  chastity  is  admissible,  depends  largely  upon  the  purpose  with 
which  the  disorderly  house  is  kept.  If  it  is  a  bawdy  house,  the 
previous  unchastity  of  the  accused  and  of  the  inmates  is  rele- 
vant,^^  otherwise  not. ^- 

§  483.    Dueling — Sending  a  challenge  to  fight  a  duel. — The  act  of 

participating  in  a  duel,  either  as  a  i)rincipal.  second  or  spectator 

JilcConnell  v.   State,  2  Ga.  App.  445,  *  People  v.  Drum,  127  App.  Div.  (N. 

58  S.  E.  546.  Y.)  241,  no  N.  Y.  S.  1096. 

''  State  V.  Cambron,  20  S.  Dak.  282,  °  State  v.  Schaffer,  74  Iowa  704,  39 

105  N.  W.  241 ;  Beard  v.  State,  71  Md.  N.  W.  89 ;  Griffin  v.  People,  44  Colo. 

275,  17  Atl.  1044,  17  Am.  St.  536,  4  L-  533.  99  Pac.  321. 

R.  A.  675 ;  Commomvealth  v.  Cardoze,  "  Stone  v.  State,  47  Tex.  Cr.  575,  85 

1 19  Mass.  210;   Sullivan  v.  State,  75  S.  W.  808. 

Wis.  650,  44  N.  W.  647 ;  State  v.  Wil-  "  Betts  v.  State,  93  Ind.  375 ;  Whit- 

liams,  30  N.  J.  L.  102.  lock  v.  State,  4  Ind.  App.  432,  30  N. 

"Beard  v.  State,  71  Md.  275,  17  Atl.  E.  934. 

1044,  17  Am.  St.  536,  4  L.  R.  A.  675n ;  ^  Gamel  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  357. 

State  V.  Cambron,  20  S.  Dak.  282,  105  17    S.    W.    158.     No   actual   lease   or 

N.  W.  241.  rental  to  disorderly  persons  need  be 

'People  V.  Jones,  129  App.  Div.  (N.  proved.     Stratton  v.   State   (Tex.  Cr. 

Y.)  772,  113  N.  Y.  S.  1097,  1898),  44  S.  W.  506,  20  L.  R.  A.  6ion. 


7S5       CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    4S4 

is  merely  a  misdemeanor,  unless  one  of  the  principals  is  slain,  in 
\vhich  case  all  participants  are  guilty  of  murder/-^  Where  one  is 
indicted  for  taking  part  in  a  duel,  it  is  not  absolutely  necessary  to 
allege  and  prove  the  actual  sending  of  a  challenge,  either  spoken 
or  written/*  If.  however,  it  is  alleged  that  a  written  challenge 
was  sent,  it  will  be  necessary  to  prove  it  substantially  as  alleged, 
and,  a  fortiori,  this  is  the  case  where  the  indictment  is  merelv 
for  sending  the  challenge.^^  The  question  whether  the  accused 
intended  to  challenge  another  person  to  fight  a  duel  is  ordinarily 
a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury/"  The  written  challenge  must  be 
proved  by  producing  it  as  primary  evidence,  or  by  secondary 
evidence,  after  sufficiently  accounting  for  its  absence.  If  the  chal- 
lenge is  set  out  at  full  length  in  the  indictment,  a  failure  to  prove 
it  in  some  slight  particular  is  not  material.^'  The  meaning  of  the 
writing  purporting  to  be  a  challenge  and  the  intent  of  the  sender 
are  for  the  jury.  A\'hether  it  was  intended  for  a  deliberate  chal- 
lenge to  mortal  combat  or  was  merely  a  foolish  and  idle  boast,  or 
the  meaningless  outpouring  of  irrepressible  passion,  is  for  them 
to  determine.^-  As  all  who  participate  in  any  capacity  in  the 
duel  are  accomplices,  the  declarations  of  any  one  of  them,  uttered 
in  furtherance  of  the  common  undertaking,  are  admissible  against 
any  or  all  the  others.^" 

;^  484.  Carrying  concealed  weapons — How  concealment  may  be 
shown — Intent. — To  protect  indixiduals  against  sudden  and  deadly 
violence,  inflicted  with  weapons  concealed  about  or  conveniently 
near  the  person,  whether  used  on  sudden  impulse  or  deliberately, 
statutes  have  been  passed  forbidding  the  carrying  of  concealed 
weapons.  Though  the  open  carrying  of  unusual  and  dangerous 
weapons  was  an  offense  at  common  law.  because  it   tended  to 

"4   Bl.  Com.   199,   145;  2  Bisli.  Cr.  '"Ward     v.     Commonwealth     (Ky.. 

L.  8§  311-315;   I  Russ.  Cr.    (Qtli  cdi-  1909),  116  S.  W.  786. 

tion)    413;    3    Chitty    Cr.    Law    728,  "State    v.    Farrier,    i    Hawks    (X. 

848;   Bundrick  v.   State,   125  Ga.  753,  Car.)  487. 

54  S.  E.  683.  "  Ivcy  V.  State,  23  Ga.  576. 

"DauRhtry  V.  State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  394,  "State   v.    Dupont,   2  McCord    (  S. 

113  S.  W.  14.  Car.)    3.34;    State  v.   Taylor.   3   Brcv. 

"'Commonwealth         v.         Hooper,  (S.     Car.)     243;     Commonwealth     v. 

Thatcher  C.  C.  (Mass.)  400;  Ward  v.  Boott,  Thatcher  Cr.  Cas.  (Mass.)  390. 
Commonwealth    ( Ky..    hkj*;),    wd    S. 
W.  786. 

50 — UNriKRiiii.i.  Chim.  Rv. 


484 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


786 


terrify  and  alarm  peaceable  persons,-"  evidence  is  always  admis- 
sible, under  these  statutes,  to  show  that  the  weapon,  though 
carried,  was  not  concealed  on  the  occasion  charged  ;-^  but  not  that 
the  accused  was  generally  in  the  habit  of  carrying  weapons  on  his 
person,  openly  exposed  to  view."  The  concealment  of  the 
weapon,  with  an  intent  to  produce  the  impression  of  being  un- 
armed, must  be  shown  affirmatively.*" 

If  concealed,  the  jury  may  infer  that  the  weapon,  if  a  pistol, 
was  loaded,  and  was  worn  as  a  weapon.  This  is  a  presumption  of 
fact,  not  of  law,  and  is  rebutable."'*  The  burden  is  upon  the  prose- 
cution to  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  weapon  was 
concealed  or  carrying  in  concealment  on  the  person  of  the 
accused.-^  That  the  weapon  was  so  hidden  that  it  could  not  pos- 
sibly be  seen,  in  whatever  posture  the  accused  might  be,  need  not 
be  proved.  If  it  was  not  visible  to  those  meeting  him  in  the 
customary  and  ordinary  associations  of  social  and  commercial 
intercourse,  the  jury  will  be  justified  in  finding  that  it  was  con- 
cealed.-*^   Hence,  proof  that  the  weapon  was  carried  in  a  locked 


■°4  Bl.  Com.  149;  State  v.  Huntlj-, 
3  Ired.  (N.  Car.)  418,  421,  40  Am. 
Dec.  4x6.  It  is  sometimes  bj'  statute 
made  a  misdemeanor  to  point  a  fire- 
arm at  another  person,  whether  the 
weapon  be  loaded  or  not.  Herrington 
V.  State,  121  Ga.  141,  48  S.  E.  908; 
Elliott  Evidence,  §  3x66;  Davenport  v. 
State,  1x2  Ala.  49.  20  So.  97X ; 
Sturgeon  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  2>7 
S.  W.  679,  8  Ky.  L.  668 ;  Anderson  v. 
State,  133  Wis.  601,  1x4  N.  W.  XX2. 

"^  Stockdale  v.  State,  32  Ga.  225,  227 ; 
State  V.  Roten,  86  X.  Car.  70X,  703; 
Smith  V.  State,  69  Ind.  X40-X43 ;  Plum- 
mer  v.  State,  X35  Ind.  308,  318,  34  N. 
E.  968;  Brown  v.  State,  X4X  Ala.  80, 
Zl  So.  408. 

"  Washington  v.  State,  36  Ga.  242, 
244. 

"State  V.  Pigford,  XX7  N.  Car.  748, 
23  S.  E.  182;  State  v.  Gilbert,  87  N. 
Car.  527,  528,  42  Am.  5x8;  Ridenour 
V.  State,  65  Ind.  4xx,  4x3;  Burst  v. 
State,  89  Ind.  IZZ',  Carr  v.  State,  34 


Ark.  448,  450,  36  Am.  X5;  State  v. 
Johnson,  x6  S.  Car.  X87;  Martin  v. 
State,  93  Miss.  764,  47  So.  426;  State 
v.  Miles,  X24  Mo.  App.  283,  lox  S.  W. 
67X ;  Edwards  v.  State,  126  Ga.  89,  54 
S.  E.  809. 

-*  Carr  v.  State,  34  Ark.  448,  450,  36 
Am.  X5. 

"^  People  V.  Carvelto,  12.2,  App.  Div. 
(X.  Y.)  822,  X08  X.  Y.  S.  126; 
Schroeder  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  xii,  99 
S.  W.  1003. 

=^  Smith  V.  State,  96  Ala.  66,  68,  ix 
So.  71 ;  State  v.  Bias,  zi  La.  Ann. 
259;  Killct  V.  State,  2)'2'  Ga.  292,  294; 
Sutton  V.  State,  12  Fla.  135;  Hainey 
V.  State,  X47  Ala.  146,  41 '  So.  968. 
Under  the  rule  that  as  between  wit- 
nesses having  equal  opportunities  of 
observation,  the  positive  testimony  of 
one  that  "an  event  happened  is  en- 
titled to  more  weight  than  the  evi- 
dence of  another  that,  though  present, 
he  did  not  see  it;  a  conviction  upon 
the  testimonv  of  one  who  swears  he 


y'B^'J      CRIMES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    484 

satchel,"'  in  a  wagon  box  on  which  the  defendant  was  seated,-^ 
in  a  bundle,"^  in  the  pocket,"''"  in  a  scabbard, ^^  in  a  basket  on  one's 
arm,^-  or  standing  near  by  in  a  railroad  car,^^  not  as  a  means  of 
transportation,  but  for  more  convenient  access  and  use,  is  admis- 
sible, and  will  sustain  a  conviction.^*  Evidence  that  the  defendant, 
when  arrested  for  another  offense  which  is  not  proved,  voluntarily- 
surrendered  a  weapon,  is  admissible  as  a  ^«a^i-confession  of 
concealment,  and  will  alone  sustain  a  conviction.^^  Evidence  that 
he  threatened  a  man  with  a  weapon,  or  had  one  in  his  possession 
shortly  before  the  act  charged,  is  admissible.^*' 

The  accused  may  show  that  the  concealment  involved  no  crim- 
inal intent.    He  will  not  usually  be  permitted  to  testify  in  express 


saw  the  weapon  will  be  sustained, 
though  another  swears  he  looked  at- 
tentively but  did  not.  Fitzgerald  v. 
State,  12  Ga.  213,  216;  but  contra, 
Haskew  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  107; 
Underbill  on  Ev.,  §  385.  As  to  what 
evidence  is  negative,  see  Hunter  y. 
State,  4  Ga.  App.  761,  62  S.  E.  466. 
The  jury  may,  in  weighing  the  testi- 
mony of  a  witness  who  says  that  he 
did  not  see  the  weapon,  consider  what 
opportunity  he  had  to  see  it  in  con- 
nection with  all  the  evidence.  Newell 
V.  State,  109  Ala.  5,  19  So.  511.  Cf., 
also,  Howe  v.  State,  no  Ala.  54,  20 
So.  451.  The  witness  will  be  permitted 
to  state  that  he  saw  "something  that 
looked  like  a  pistol"  in  the  pocket  of 
defendant.  Mayberry  v.  State,  107 
Ala.  64,  18  So.  219. 

^  Warren  v.  State,  94  Ala.  79,  10 
So.  838;  Commonwealth  v.  Sturgeon 
(Ky.),  37  S.  W.  680,  18  Ky.  L.  613. 

™  Barnes  v.  State,  89  Ga.  316,  318,  15 
S.  E.  313. 

'■*  Edwards  v.  State,  126  Ga.  89,  54 
S.  E.  809. 

""Scott  v.  State,  94  Ala.  80,  8r,  10 
So.  505.  Ha  weapon  was  seen  in  the 
defendant's  hand  a  few  minutes  after 
he     had     made     a     manual     motion 


towards  his  pocket,  concealment  in  the 
pocket  may  be  inferred.  State  v.  Live- 
say,  30  J\Io.  App.  622,  636. 

^Barton  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
105;  Williams  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  27  S.  W.  680,  18  Ky.  L.  663. 

"^  Boles  v.  State,  %6  Ga.  255,  257,  12 
S.  E.  361;  Johnson  v.  State,  51  Tex. 
Cr.  648,  104  S.  W.  902. 

^'Diffey  v.  State,  86  Ala.  66,  67,  5 
So.  576. 

^  State  V.  McManus,  89  X.  Car.  555. 

^  Terry  v.  State,  90  Ala.  635,  636,  8 
So.  664.  A  person  imder  arrest  for 
any  crime  may  be  searched  for  con- 
cealed weapons  and  disarmed.  The 
facts  thus  ascertained  may  be  proved 
against  him  on  his  trial  for  carrying 
such  weap'ons,  and  may  be  sufficient 
for  his  conviction.  His  constitutional 
rights  are  not  infringed  thereby,  nor 
is  he  required  to  furnish  evidence 
against  himself.  Chastang  v.  State,  83 
Ala.  29,  30,  3  So.  304;  Springer  v. 
State,  121  Ga.  155,  48  S.  E.  907; 
Shields  v.  State,  104  Ala.  35,  16  So. 
8s,  ST,  Am.  St.  17. 

'"O'Neal  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  42, 
44,  22  S.  W.  25 ;  Dean  v.  State,  98 
Ala.  71,  13  So.  318;  Etress  v.  State, 
88  Ala.  191,  7  So.  49. 


485 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


788 


terms  that  he  did  not  intend  to  carry  the  weapon.^''  He  mav  prove 
that  the  weapon  was  not  concealed  or  carried  as  arms,^^  but  for 
the  purpose  of  having  it  cleaned,"''  or  repaired,*"  or  returning  it  to 
its  owner,*^  or  shooting  at  a  mark,*-  or  that  he  had  found  it," 
or  bought  it  to  sell  again,**  and  was  carrying  it  home,  to  negative 
the  criminal  intent.*^ 

§  485.  Apprehension  of  danger  as  a  defense. — The  burden  is  on 
the  defendant  to  prove,  as  an  affirmative  defense,  that  he  feared 
bodily  harm,*"  but  it  is  not  enough  for  him  to  show  apparent  or 
simulated  threats,  or  those  couched  in  vague  and  general  lan- 
guage,*" or  made  by  a  person  who  is  under  bonds  to  keep  the 
peace,*^  or  that  a  criminal,  whom  the  defendant  arrested,  was 


^  State  V.  Simmons,  143  N.  Car.  613, 
56  S.  E.  701. 

^Page  V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Temi.) 
ipSn,  holding,  also,  that  proof  of  a 
single  act  of  carrying  a  weapon  will 
sustain  a  conviction. 

^Boissean  v.  State,  (Tex.,  1890),  15 
S.  W.   it8. 

*"  Pressler  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  52, 
53  Am.  383 ;  Fitzgerald  v.  State,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  265,  106  S.  W.  365,  124  Am. 
St.  1095. 

"  State  V.  Brodnax,  91  X.  Car.  543, 
544;  State  V.  Roberts,  39  Mo.  App. 
47,  48. 

■*-  State  V.  Murray,  39  Mo.  App.  127, 
130. 

^^Mangum  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App. 
362,  363. 

"State  V.  Gilbert,  87  X.  Car.  527, 
529,  42  Am.  518;  Irvin  v.  State,  51 
Tex.  Cr.  52,  100  S.  W.  779. 

■"*  State  V.  Harrison,  93  X.  Car.  605 ; 
Granger  v.  State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  488,  98 
S.  W.  836;  Carr  v.  State,  34  Ark.  448, 
450,  36  Am.  15;  State  v.  Chippey,  9 
Houst.  (Del.)  583;  Christian  v.  State, 
37  Tex.  475 ;  but  contra,  Cutsinger  v. 
Commonwealth,  7  Bush  (Kj^.)  392, 
393;  State  V.  Martin,  31  La.  Ann.  849; 


Walls  V.  State,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  572, 
573 ;  Goldsmith  v.  State,  99  Ga.  253,  25 
S.  E.  624;  State  v.  Woodfin,  87  X. 
Car.  526,  527,  holding  the  intention  in 
concealment  immaterial. 

^°  Skeen  v.  State,  34  Tex.  Cr.  308,  30 
S.  W.  554;  State  v.  Livesay,  30  Mo. 
App.  633,  637 ;  Curlee  v.  State,  53  Tex. 
Cr.  395,  no  S.  W.  65. 

"  Strother  v.  State,  74  Miss.  447,  21 
So.  147;  State  V.  Speller,  86  X.  Car. 
697,  699;  Coffee  V.  State,  4  Lea 
(Tenn.)  245,  246;  Shorter  v.  State,  63 
Ala.  129,  132.  A  threat,  if  recent, 
though  unaccompanied  by  violence,  is 
admissible  if  communicated  to  the  ac- 
cused. State  V.  Venable,  117  Mo.  App. 
501,  93  S.  W.  356;  but  if  enough  time 
has  elapsed  to  give  the  person  threat- 
ened an  opportunity  to  seek  legal  pro- 
tection, it  is  inadmissible.  State  v. 
Workman,  35  W.  Va.  367,  375,  14  S. 
E.  9,  14  L.  R.  A.  6oon.  The  accused 
ought  to  convince  the  jury  that  he  in 
fact  believed  the  threats  would  be  ex- 
ecuted. State  V.  Casto,  119  Mo.  .^.pp. 
265,  95  S.  W.  961. 

''O'Xeal  V.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  42, 
45,  22  S.  W.  25. 


789      CRIMES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    486 

known  to  be  armed,''"  or  that  the  accused  feared  a  savage  dog.^*' 
Evidence  that  many  lawless  men  lived  near  the  defendant,^^ 
that  he  had  been  shot  at  two  years  before,^-  and  that  he  had  been 
advised  to  go  armed,  is  inadmissible.^^  The  fact  that  the  accused 
\\'as  expressly  threatened  b}'  name  by  an  armed  man  with  whom 
he  had  quarreled,^*  and,  a  fortiori,  that  his  life  is  in  imminent 
danger,"^  is  enough.  He  need  not  prove  that  an  attack  was  antici- 
pated by  him  at  any  particular  date,''"'''''  or  place,""'"  to  justify  his 
belief  that  he  is  in  immediate  danger.  To  establish  this  defense, 
the  accused  must  show  facts  from  which  the  jury  may  infer  that 
his  purpose  in  carrying  a  weapon  was  defense  against  an  attack 
which  he  had  reason  to  apprehend.  The  conduct  of  the  accused 
and  of  the  prosecuting  witness,  their  altercations  and  rencontres, 
specific  threats,  reported  to  the  defendant  as  made,  though  not 
made  in  fact,  hostile  demonstrations  or  actual  preparations  for 
an  assault,  are  all  admissible  to  establish  the  defense  of  an  appre- 
hended attack.^' 

^  486.  Character  of  the  defendant  as  an  officer  or  traveler. — The 
peaceable  character  of  the  accused  is  relevant  to  determine  his 
motives  and  purpose  in  carrying  the  weapon.  So  it  is  sometimes 
provided  by  statute  that  he  must  be  acquitted  if  he  shall  prove 
satisfactorily  that  he  is  a  quiet  and  peaceable  person,  of  good 
character  in  the  community,  and  that  he  carried  the  weapon 
because  he  believed  himself  to  be  in  great  bodily  danger.^'^   The 

"Reach  v.  State,  94  Ala.  113,  11  So.  Commonwealth  v.  Murphy,  166  Mass. 

414.  17T,  44  X.  E.  138.  32  L.  R.  A.  606. 

""  State  V.  Barnett,  34  W.  Va.  74,  75,  '-^  Dooley  v.  State,  89  Ala.  90,  91,  8 

76,  II  S.  E.  735.  So.  528. 

"  O'Xeal   V.   State,  32  Tex.   Cr.  42,  "Coleman    v.    State.   28   Tex.   App. 

44,  22  S.  W.  25.    Evidence  that  lawless  173,  174.  12  S.  W.  590. 

men  who  had  once  ill  used  and  threat-  *"»  Sudduth  v.  State,  70  Miss.  250,  11 

ened    the    defendant    were    prowling  So.  680. 

about,    armed,    and    without    employ-  "Bailey  v.  Commonwealth,  11  Bush 

ment,  is  relevant.     Hardin  v.  State,  63  (Ky.)  688,  692. 

Ala.  38,  40.  "Shorter  v.  State,  63  Ala.  129,  133, 

"Hopkins     v.     Commonwealth,     3  citinjj^    Baker   v.    State,   49   Ala.    350; 

Bush  (Ky. )  480.  State  v.   Venable,   117   Mo.   App.   501, 

"Sec    Dillingham    v.    State    (Tex.,  93  S.  W.  356. 

'895),    32    S.    W.    771;    Brnwnlee    v.  '•' 103  Am.  St.  904n. 
State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  213,  32  S.  VV.  1043; 


§  486 


CRi:kIIXAL    FA'IDENCE. 


790 


official  character  of  the  clcfcnclant  is  often  by  statute  relevant  as 
a  valid  defense,  and  in  such  a  case  evidence  is  admissible,'^'*  to 
show  that  he  is  a  sheriff,  marshal,  deputy  marshal, ''"  or  other 
officer  charged  with  the  duty  of  preserving  the  peace,  or  serving 
judicial  process,*'"  or  a  mail  carrier."^  The  officer  must  show  that 
he  was  actually  engaged  in  executing  process,"^  or  searching  for 
or  arresting  a  criminal,"^  and  of  these  facts  the  existence  of 
process  is  evidence.  The  process  itself  or  a  certified  copy  is  the 
best  evidence  of  its  existence,  and  must  be  produced."* 

A  written  appointment  offered  to  prove  official  character  need 
not  be  technically  correct  if  it  was  sufficient  to  cause  the  defendant 
to  believe  that  he  was  exempt."''"'  Persons  traveling  are  sometimes 
privileged  to  carry  concealed  weapons.  Whether  a  person  is  a 
traveler  is  usually  for  the  jury  to  determine  upon  all  the  facts,"" 
as,  for  example,  quitting  the  neighborhood  of  one's  accjuaintances 
and  friends,  going  among  strangers,  the  distance  covered  and  the 
purpose  and  objects  contemplated  in  going,  loitering  or  return- 
ing.   These  facts  are,  therefore,  admissible  in  evidence."^    The 


^^  Including  the  declarations  of  the 
defendant,  made  while  carrying  the 
weapon,  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce. 
Irvine  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  51,  52. 

^^  Lee,  In  re,  46  Fed.  59,  62,  63. 

'"  State  V.  Williams,  72  Miss.  992,  18 

50.  486 ;  Irvine  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 

51,  53;  Snell  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App. 
171,  172;  Carmichael  v.  State,  ii  Tex. 
App.  27,  28;  Mclntyre  v.  State,  170 
Ind.  163,  83  N.  E.  1005. 

"'  Lott  V.  State,  122  Ind.  393,  395,  24 
N.  E.  156;  A  person  specially  depu- 
tized by  the  court  to  make  an  arrest 
where  a  constable  is  not  procurable 
may  carry  a  pistol.  Jenkins  v.  State, 
47  Tex.  Cr.  224,  82  S.  W.  1036. 

"Miller  v.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
449,  450. 

*^  State  V.  Wisdom,  84  IMo.  177,  190. 

**Beasley  v.  State,  5  Lea  (Tenn.) 
705,  706.  The  declaration  of  the  ac- 
cused that  he  carried  a  weapon 
coupled  with  a  statement  that  he  had 
a  right  to  do  so  is  not  a  confession. 


State  V.  Abrams,  131  Iowa  479,  108  N. 
W.  1041. 

"'Lyle  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  153, 
17  S.  W.  425.  Evidence  that  he 
thought  he  was  still  an  officer  is  inad- 
missible, if  it  clearly  appears  that  his 
term  had  expired.  O'Neal  v.  State, 
32  Tex.  Cr.  42,  22  S.  W.  25. 

"^Lawson  v.  State  (Tex.,  1895),  31 
S.  W.  645 ;  Blackwell  v.  State,  34  Tex. 
Cr.  476,  31  S.  W.  380;  Price  v.  State, 
34  Tex.  Cr.  102,  29  S.  W.  473;  Dil- 
lingham v.  State  (Tex.,  1895),  Z^  S. 
W.  771 ;  Hathcote  v.  State,  55  Ark. 
181,  184,  17  S.  W.  721 ;  Impson  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  677; 
Wilson  v.  State,  68  Ala.  41 ;  Lott  v. 
State,  122  Ind.  393,  395,  24  N.  E.  156; 
Stiewell  v.  State  (Ark.,  1890),  12  S. 
W.  1014. 

"Davis  V.  State,  45  Ark.  359,  361; 
Wilson  V.  State,  68  Ala.  41;  Carr  v. 
State,  34  Ark.  448,  449,  2>^  Am.  15; 
Burst  V.  State,  89  Ind.  133,  135. 


791       CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    48/ 

presumption  is  that  the  accused  is  not  a  traveler  and  the  burden 
of  proof  is  on  him  to  show  this  excuse."^ 

§487.  Forcible  entry  and  detainer. — This  is  often  by  statute 
made  a  crime  and  consists  of  forcibly  taking  or  keeping  posses- 
sion of  lands  and  tenements  by  menaces,  force  and  arms,  and 
without  authority  of  law."'' 

Evidence  to  show  title  in  the  defendant  or  in  some  person  for 
whom  he  is  acting  is  irrelevant.'"  The  object  of  the  statute  is  not 
to  determine  to  whom  the  premises  belong  of  right,  but  to  dis- 
courage a  resort  to  violence  and  prevent  a  breach  of  the  peace. 

But  it  may  be  shown  that  the  accused  took  possession  by  virtue 
of  a  judicial  writ  or  order,  regular  upon  its  face,  issuing  from 
a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  It  cannot  be  proved  collaterally 
that  the  process  is  void.^^ 

Evidence  tending  to  show  the  employment  of  force  by  the 
accused  is  always  relevant.  And  to  sustain  a  conviction  such 
high-handed  proceedings,  or  such  a  show  of  force  must  be 
proved  as  overawed  and  intimidated  the  injured  party,  and  either 
deterred  him  from  defending  his  possession,  or  coerced  him  into 
surrendering  it."'  If  the  evidence  shows  the  taking  possession 
was  peaceable  and  with  the  consent  of  all  parties  the  accused 
must  be  acquitted.'^  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  to  show  that 
the  accused  actually  assaulted  the  owner  or  the  person  in  posses- 
sion.^^ 

■"''Wiley  V.   State,  52  Ind.  516,  519;  with  force,  with  violence,  and  unusual 

Brownlec  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  213,  32  weapons."    4  Bl.  Com.  148. 

S.  W.  1043;  EasHck  V.  United  States,  '"Lasserot  v.  Gamble    (Cal.,   1896), 

7  Ind.  Ter.  707,  104  S.  W.  941 ;  Col-  46  Pac.  917;  Vess  v.  State,  93  Ind.  211, 

son  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  138,  105  S.  215. 

W.  507;  State  V.  Miles,  124  Mo.  App.  '^Vcss  v.  State,  93  Ind.  211,  215. 

283,  loi  S.  W.  671.     As  to  when  the  "Strong  v.   State,   105  Ind.   i,  4,  4 

accused  ceased  to  be  a  traveller  by  N.   E.  293 ;   State  v.  Glenn,   130   Mo. 

reaching  his  destination,  see  Holland  App.    145,    108  S.   W.    1073;    State  v. 

V.  State,  ^^  Ark.  425,  84  S.  W.  468;  Leary,  136  N.  Car.  578,  48  S.  E.  570; 

Rosaman  v.  Okolona,  85  Miss.  583,  Z7  State   v.    Pollok,   4    Ired.    (N.    Car.) 

So.  641,  107  Am.  St.  257;  Navarro  v.  305,  42  Am.  Dec.  140. 

State,  50  Tex.  Cr.  326,  96  S.  W.  932.  "  Strong  v.  State,  105  Ind.  i,  5,  4  X. 

•"  "The  entry  now  allowed  by  law  is  E.  293. 

a    peaceable    one:    that    forbifldcn    is  "  Ellis  v.  Stale,  124  Ga.  91.  52  S.  E. 

uch  as  is  carried  on  and  maintained  147,  in  which  the  court  said:  "If,  at 


488 


CRIMINAL    FA-IDI-.XC-IC 


792 


§  488.  Affray. — Tliis  offense  lias  1)cen  defined  as  the  fighting 
of  two  or  more  persons  in  some  ])ul)hc  place  to  the  terror  of  his 
majesty's  subjects.'''  If  the  fighting  be  private  it  is  not  an  affray 
but  an  assault.'"  The  state  must  prove  as  elements  of  the  crime : 
First,  the  fighting.  Second,  the  fact  that  it  was  in  a  public  place. 
Third,  that  it  was  in  terror  of  the  king's  subjects,  and,  fourth, 
that  two  or  more  persons  were  engaged  in  it."  Evidence  of  any 
fact  which  shows  or  tends  to  show  an  assault  and  battery  by  one 
person  on  another  is  admissible  to  prove  the  figliting.'**  The  dec- 
larations of  any  one  implicated,  uttered  during  the  affray  or 
v\iiich  are  otherwise  a  part  of  the  res  gcsfcr,  are  admissible  against 
any  of  the  others.^"  The  accused  may  always  prove  in  justifica- 
tion that  he  was  attacked  and  that  he  fought  to  defend  himself.^" 
But  he  cannot  put  in  evidence  his  belief  that  he  was  in  danger 
to  sustain  this  defense.  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  him  to  show 
that  he  fought  in  self-defense.*^  It  must  also  be  proved  that  the 
fighting  was  in  public.*^ 


the  time  the  effort  to  re-enter  is  made, 
there  be  an  exhibition,  b}'  words,  acts, 
or  circumstances,  calculated  to  intim- 
idate the  former  possessor,  and  to  im- 
press on  him  an  intention  on  the  part 
of  the  person  unlawfully  detaining  the 
premises  to  hold  possession  of  them 
by  force  and  violence,  the  offense  is 
complete." 

'^4  Bl.  Com.  145;  Thompson  v. 
State,  70  Ala.  26;  State  v.  Brewer,  33 
Ark.  176;  State  v.  Davis,  65  N.  Car. 
298;  State  V.  Perry,  5  Jones  (N.  Car.) 
9,  69  Am.  Dec.  768 ;  State  v.  Priddy,  4 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  429;  Simpson  v. 
State,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  356;  Pollock  v. 
State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  29,  22  S.  W.  19; 
State  V.  Freeman,  127  X.  Car.  544,  37 
S.  E.  206. 

™  Thompson  v.  State,  70  Ala.  26; 
State  V.  Stanly,  4  Jones  (X.  Car.) 
290;  State  V.  Heflin,  8  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  84;  Simpson  v.  State,  5  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  356. 

""  Roscoe's  Crim.  Ev.  270. 


''Ohio  V.  Foy,  Tappan  (Ohio)  71; 
Simpson   v.    State,    5    Yerg.    (Tenn.) 

'"  State  V.  Harrell,  107  X.  Car.  944, 
12  S.  E.  439;  McClellan  v.  State,  53 
Ala.  640;  Childs  v.  State,  15  Ark.  204; 
Commonwealth  v.  Simmons,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh  (Ky.)  614;  State  v.  Warren, 
57  Mo.  App.  502;  State  v.  Huntly,  3 
Ired.  (X.  Car.)  418,  40  Am.  Dec.  416. 

^'Coyle  V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  72  S. 
W.  847;  People  V.  Moore,  3  Wheeler 
Cr.  (X.  Y.)  82. 

*^  State  V.  Barringer,  114  X.  Car. 
840,  19  S.  E.  275. 

^Skains  v.  State,  21  Ala.  218;  Car- 
wile  V.  State,  35  Ala.  392;  Taylor  v. 
State,  22  Ala.  15;  State  v.  Heflin,  8 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  84;  State  v.  War- 
ren, 57  Mo.  App.  502 ;  State  v.  Woody, 
2  Jones  (X.  Car.)  335;  State  v.  Sum- 
ner, 5  Strobt.  (S.  Car.)  53;  Shelton 
V.  State,  30  Tex.  431;  Reg.  v.  Hunt, 
I  Cox.  C.  C.  177;  Gamble  v.  State,  113 
Ga.  701,  39  S.  E.  301 ;  State  v.  Fritz, 
133  X.  Car.  725,  45  S.  E.  957;  P'per 
V.  State  (Tex.  Cr.),  51  S.  W.  1118. 


793      CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    489 


^  489.  Riot. — Where  three  or  more  actually  do  an  unlawful  act 
of  violence,  either  with  or  without  a  common  cause  or  quarrel, 
as,  if  they  beat  a  man,  or  do  other  unlawful  act  with  force,  or 
even  a  lawful  act,  as  removing  a  nuisance,  in  a  violent  and  tumult- 
uous manner,®^  it  is  a  riot.  There  must  not  only  be  a  common 
intent  to  do  an  unlawful  act  or  some  lawful  act  in  a  violent 
manner  but  also  concert  of  action.^*  An  unlawful  assembly  must 
be  proved.  Then  whatever  act  will  constitute  a  trespass  may  sub- 
stantiate a  charge  of  riot.^^^  The  defendant's  connection  with  the 
unlawful  assembly  must  be  shown  by  evidence  satisfactory  to  the 
jury.  His  purpose  and  intent  may  be  inferred  from  the  circum- 
stances.^" As  soon  as  it  is  proved,  he  will  become  responsible  for 
all  the  acts  and  declarations  of  the  others  made  during  the  prog- 
ress of  the  riot.*^  If  during  the  riot  some  one  is  killed,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  prove  that  he  struck  the  fatal  blow.    It  is  suffi- 

*^4  Bl.  Com.  146;  Whitley  v.  State,  57  S.  E.  953;  Jemley  v.  State,  121  Ga. 

66  Ga.  656.  As  by  cursing  and  threat-  346,  49  S.  E.  292. 

ening  a  man  in  his  house  and  by  re-  ^"A  riot  is  a  common-law  offense, 

peatedly  firing  a  gun.    Lewis  v.  State,  and  is  said  to  be  a  tumultuous  disturb- 


2  Ga.  App.  659,  58  S.  E.  1070;  Croy 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  457,  61  S.  E.  847. 
If  three  persons  have  a  common  pur- 
pose to  do  an  unlawful  violent  act  it  is 
not  material  that  the  act  of  each  indi- 
vidual was  separate.   State  v.  Mizis,  48 


ance  of  the  peace,  bj'^  three  or  more 
persons,  assembled  together,  of  their 
own  authority,  with  an  intent  mutually 
to  assist  one  another,  against  any  who 
shall  oppose  them,  in  the  execution  of 
some  enterprise  of  a  private  nature. 


Ore.  165,85  Pac.  611,  rehearing  denied,    and  afterwards  actually  executing  the 


86  Pac.  361.  In  Reg.  v.  Soley,  11 
Modern  115,  the  court,  on  p.  116, 
said :  "The  books  are  obscure  in 
the  definition  of  riots.  I  take  it,  it 
is  not  necessary  to  say  they  assem- 
bled for  that  purpose,  but  there  must 
be  an  unlawful  assembly,  *  *  *  such 
an  act  as  will  make  a  trespass  will 
make  a  riot.  If  a  number  of  men 
assemble  with  arms,  in  tcrrorcm  f>op- 
uli,  though  no  act  is  done,  it  is  a  riot. 
If  three  come  out  of  an  alehouse  and 
go  armed,  it  is  a  riot.  Though  a  man 
may  ride  with  arms,  yet  he  cannot 
take  two  with  him  tr)  defend  himself, 
even  though  his  life  is  threatened,  for 
he  is  in  the  |)rntection  of  the  law, 
which  is  sufTicient  for  his  dofcnsf." 
•*Stanfield  v.  Stale,  I  Ga.  App.  532, 


same  in  a  violent  and  turbulent  man- 
ner, to  the  terror  of  the  people, 
whether  the  act  intended  were  of  itself 
lawful  or  unlawful."  State  v.  Russell, 
45  N.  H.  83,  84;  Commonwealth  v. 
Runnels,  10  Mass.  518,  6  Am.  Dec. 
148;  People  V.  Judson.  il  Daly  (N. 
Y.)  i;  State  v.  Cole,  2  McCord  (S. 
Car.)  117;  State  v.  Connolly,  3  Rich. 
(S.  Car.)  Tii7;  State  v.  Brooks,  4 
Hill  (S.  Car.)  361;  People  v.  Greg- 
ory. 120  Cal.  16,  52  Pac.  41 ;  Hunter 
V.  State,  127  Ga.  43,  55  S.  E.  1044: 
Carter  v.  State  (Ga.  App.,  1909),  65 
S.  E.  1072. 

".State  V.  Seiliy,  51  Ong.  13'.  ()4 
Pac.  ?,7. 

"Shnler  v.  Slate,  I  JO  Ga.  030,  55 
S.  E.  496. 


§    490  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  794 

cient  to  prove  that  some  one  implicated  in  the  unlawful  assembly 
struck  the  blow,  though  it  may  not  appear  who  it  was.-'*  All  the 
circumstances  attending  the  riotous  assemblage  including  the  facts 
showing  the  violence  or  force  employed,  the  threats,  oaths  and 
outcries  of  those  participating,  and  their  other  declarations  being 
a  part  of  the  res  gestcc  and  showing  intention  are  relevant  in 
evidence.  It  may  also  be  shown  what  was  done  by  the  prosecu- 
ting witness  or  by  members  of  his  family  or  other  persons  not 
incriminated  with  the  accused.  It  may  be  shown  that  the  prosecut- 
ing witness  or  his  wife  fainted  and  was  terrified  by  the  action  of 
the  rioters,  and  missiles  or  arms  used  by  the  rioters  and  identified 
with  the  scene  of  the  riot  may  also.be  introduced  in  evidence.^'* 

v:^  490.  Conspiracy. — When  two  or  more  persons  unite  to  execute 
a  purpose  to  injure  or  destroy  the  life,  or  the  property,  or  per- 
sonal rights  of  another,  a  conspiracy  exists.  The  mere  combina- 
tion of  persons  to  do  a  criminal  act  is  a  crime,  even  though  the 
object  of  the  combination  is  not  consummated.  Here  the  gist 
of  the  crime  is  the  conspiracy,  and,  both  at  common  law  and 
under  statute,  any  participant  may  be  indicted  for  his  share  in  the 
illicit  transaction.  But  usually  the  proof  of  a  conspiracy  is  merely 
incidental  to  proving  some  other  crime  in  which  several  have 
taken  part.    Thus,  where  a  man  has  been  killed  as  the  result  of 

*' State    V.    Jenkins.    14    Rich.     (S.  "Where  many   individuals  are  acting 

Car.)  215,  94  Am.  Dec.  I32n.   See  gen-  separately,  or  in  small  parties  distinct 

erally,  Hawk.  P.  C.  Ch.  65;  5  Burns  from  each  other,  at  different  times  and 

Justice   142;   2   Chitty  Cr.   Law  488;  at  different  places,  but  manifestly  for 

3  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  216;  2  Wharton  Am.  the  same  general  purpose,  as  to  break 

Cr.  L.  (loth  ed.),  §  1542;  Roscoe  Cr.  into  a  theater,  or  to  injure  it  by  the 

Ev.,  902 ;  and  State  v.  Renton,  15  N.  throwing  of  stones,  and  missiles,  or  to 

H.  169,  172.    "The  law  does  not  dis-  resist  or  attack  those  who  are  there  in 

tinguish  between   the  relative    degree  authority  to  preserve  the  peace,  it  is 

of  violence   used  by  individuals,  but  not  a  series  of  affrays  but  a  general 

every  one  who  participates  is  respon-  riot."    People  v.  Judson,  11  Daly  (N. 

sible  for  all  that  has  taken  place.    *  *  *  Y.)   i,  17,83,84. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  a  party  should  *"  Johnson  v.  State,  124  Ga.  656,  52 

commit      personal      violence;      being  S.  E.  880;  Elliott  Evidence,  §  3128. 

armed    with     offensive    weapons,    or  Order    of   proof,    Elliott    Evidence, 

making  use  of  threatening  speeches  or  §  3124;   presumptions  and  burden  of 

turbulent  gestures ;  indeed,  any  act  of  proof,    §    3124;    number    of    persons, 

assistance   or  encouragement  is  suffi-  §  3125;  proof  of  participation,  §  3126; 

cient     to     make    him     a     principal."  proof  of  terror  of  the  people,  §  3127. 


795       CRIMES    AGAIXST    "'UBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.      §    49 1 

a  preconcerted  assault  upon  him  by  several  persons,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  prove  a  conspiracy  to  show  the  relations  of  the  ac- 
cused persons  to  one  another.  But  generally  it  is  not  material  that 
the  plan  which  was  carried  out  differs  widely  from  the  original 
plan,  nor  will  it  be  required  to  show  the  existence  of  any  previous 
plan  if.  from  the  evidence,  it  seems  clear  that  there  had  been 
negotiations  to  the  same  end.°° 

^  491.  Circumstantial  evidence. — Direct  evidence  is  not  essential 
to  pro\-e  the  conspiracy.  It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  parties 
actually  came  together  and  agreed  in  express  terms  to  enter  in  and 
pursue  a  common  design.®^  The  existence  of  the  assent  of  minds 
which  is  involved  in  a  conspiracy  may  be,  and,  from  the  secrecy 
of  the  crime,  usually  must  be,  inferred  by  the  jury  from  proof 
of  facts  and  circumstances  which,  taken  together,  apparently 
indicate  that  they  are  merely  parts  of  some  complete  whole.®-   If 


*^Grogan  v.  State,  63  Miss.  147. 152; 
Spies  V.  People,  122  111.  i,  229,  12  N. 
E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am.  St.  32011; 
Commonwealth  v.  Waite,  11  Allen 
(Mass.)  264,  87  Am.  Dec.  711;  State 
V.  Messner,  43  Wash.  206,  86  Pac.  636. 

At  common  law  the  crime  of  con- 
spiracy is  complete  without  an  overt 
act,  State  v.  Dalton,  134  Mo.  App. 
517.  114  S.  W.  1 132;  but,  under  the 
United  States  statute,  there  must  not 
only  be  a  combination  to  commit  a 
crime,  but  also  an  overt  act  done  to 
carry  into  effect  the  object  of  the  con- 
spiracy. United  States  v.  Cole,  153 
Fed.  801.  If  the  object  of  a  con- 
spiracy is  criminal,  or  if  the  means  by 
which  a  legal  purpose  is  to  be  carried 
out  arc  criminal,  the  conspiracy  is  a 
criminal  conspiracy.  State  v.  Stock- 
ford,  77  Conn.  227,  58  Atl.  769,  107 
Am.  St.  28;  but  a  conspiracy  may  be 
criminal  though  the  purpose  to  be  car- 
ried out  would  not  have  been  crimi- 
nal if  performed  by  a  single  individ- 
ual, 'nie  means  of  accomi»lishing  the 
purpose  or  the  purpose  itself  may  be- 


come criminal  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  the  combination  renders  it  more 
easy  of  accomplishment.  State  v.  Dal- 
ton, 134  Mo.  App.  517,  114  S.  W.  1132. 

"United  States  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  581,  585,  24  Fed.  Cas. 
14487;  People  v.  ]Miles,  123  App.  Div. 
(N.  Y.)  862,  108  N.  Y.  S.  510 ;  Mor- 
ris V.  State,  146  Ala.  66,  41  So.  274; 
McLeroy  v.  State,  125  Ga.  240.  54 
S.  E.  125;  State  v.  Walker,  124  Iowa 
414,  100  N.  W.  354;  People  v.  Woods, 
147  Cal.  265,  81  Pac.  652. 

"-Hunter  v.  State,  112  Ala.  77,  21 
So.  65;  McKee  v.  State,  in  Ind.  378, 
12  N.  E.  510;  Spies  v.  People,  122  III. 
I,  101-158,  12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E. 
898,  3  Am.  St.  320n ;  United  States  v. 
Sacia,  2  Fed.  754.  758;  Mussel  Slougli 
Case,  5  Fed.  680,  683.  684;  State  v. 
Anderson,  92  N.  Car.  732,  747;  Keiley 
v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565.  576.  14  Am. 
.342;  United  States  v.  Graff,  14 
Blatchf.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  .181;  O'Brien 
v.  State,  69  Neb.  691,  q6  N.  W.  6.10; 
Sanderson  v.  State,  169  Iiid.  .^oi,  H2 
N,  K.  525;  Chaplinc  v.  State,  77  Ark. 


§  491 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


796 


it  is  proved  that  two  or  more  persons  aimed  l)v  tlieir  acts  towards 
the  accompHshment  of  the  same  unlawful  dhject,  each  doing-  a 
part  so  that  their  acts,  though  apparently  independent,  were  in 
fact  connected  and  co-operati\e,  indicating  a  closeness  of  personal 
association  and  a  concurrence  of  sentiment,  a  conspiracy  may  be 
inferred  though  no  actual  meeting  among  them  to  concert  means 
is  proved."^  Evidence  of  actual  participation,  rather  than  of 
passive  acquiescence,  is  desirable.  But  proof  of  acquiescence  in, 
or  consent  to,  the  actions  of  others  is  relevant  to  show  the  crim- 
inal intention  of  the  passive  party,  and  generally  the  smallest  de- 
gree of  consent  or  collusion  among  parties  lets  in  the  act  or  words 
of  one  against  the  others."*  The  details  of  the  conspiracy  need  not 
be  proved.  If  a  community  of  jiurpose  among  the  parties  to  do 
some  criminal  act  or  acts  is  shown,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
acts  which  are  charged,  or  of  which  evidence  has  been  given,  were 
specifically  contemplated  by  them  or  included  in  the  original  de- 
sign. In  other  words,  if  some  general  community  of  interest  and 
purpose  to  do  some  act  is  shown,  the  declarations  are  admissil)le. 


444,  95  S.  W.  477 ;  Brummett  v.  Com- 
monwealth (Ky.),  108  S.  W.  861,  33 
Ky.  L.  355;  People  v.  Simmons,  125 
App  Div.  (N.  Y.)  234,  109  N.  Y.  S. 
190;  Lawrence  v.  State,  103  Ind.  17,  63 
Atl.  96;  Collins  V.  State,  138  Ala.  57, 
34  So.  993;  Butt  V.  State,  81  Ark. 
173,  98  S.  W.  723,  118  Am.  St.  42; 
Smith  V.  State,  46  Tex.  Cr.  267,  8r 
S.  W.  936,  108  Am.  St.  991 ;  State  v. 
Lewis,  51  Ore.  467,  94  Pac.  831 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Moran,  144  Cal.  48,  TJ  Pac. 
"^-JT,  Ripley  v.  State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  126, 
100  S.  W.  943 ;  United  States  v.  Cole, 
153  Fed.  801. 

Classification  of,  97  Am.  St.  T]2)-, 
note;  liberality  of  rule  admitting,  97 
Am.  St.  782;  necessity  for  receiving, 
97  Am.  St.  772;  facts  admissible,  97 
Am.  St.  782;  relative  value  of  circum- 
stantial and  direct  evidence,  97  Am. 
St.  774;  when  regarded  as  secondary, 
97  Am.  St.  788;  to  corroborate  other 


evidence,  97  Am.  St.  788;  instances  of 
admissibility,  97  Am.  St.  782;  flight 
admissible  as,  97  Am.  St.  784;  not  ad- 
missible when  direct  evidence  is  with- 
held, 97  Am.  St.  788 ;  when  insufficient 
to  sustain  a  conviction,  97  Am.  St. 
774^778 ;  must  exclude  every  reason- 
able hypothesis  except  that  of  guilt, 
97  Am.  St.  776;  failure  of  to  explain 
suspicious  circumstances,  97  Am.   St. 

783- 

®*  Spies  v.  People,  122  III.  i,  loi- 
158,  12  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am. 
St.  320n;  Archer  v.  State,  106  Ind. 
426,  7  N.  E.  225 ;  Lawrence  v.  State, 
103  Md.  17,  62,  Atl.  96.  Evidence  to 
show  that  the  conspirators  were  ac- 
quainted with  one  another,  and  were 
endeavoring  to  meet  each  other,  is 
relevant.  Reinhold  v.  State,  130  Ind. 
467,  470,  30  N.  E.  306. 

"^  State  V.  Anderson,  92  N.  Car.  ']7>2, 
72,7,  7A7- 


797      CRIMES    AGAIXST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.      §    492 

thougli  a  conspiracy  to  commit  the  offense  in  question  is  not 
proved. °^ 

§  492.    Admissibility  of  acts  and  declarations  of  co-conspirators. 

If  a  conspiracy  is  proved  prima  facie  the  acts  or  the  declarations 
of  any  conspirator  done  in  its  prosecution  and  furtherance,  or 
whicli  form  a  part  of  the  res  gcstcc  of  any  act  designed  to  advance 
the  object  of  the  conspiracy,  which  is  already  in  evidence  are 
admissible  against  any  or  all  of  the  conspirators.®"    The  safest 


^  State  V.  Anderson,  92  N.  Car.  732, 
737,  7X7  \  State  v.  Morton,  27  Vt.  310, 
65  Am.  Dec.  201. 

■^  People  V.  ;McKane,  143  N.  Y.  455, 
470,  38  N.  E.  950;  State  v.  Ford,  yj 
La.  Ann.  443;  Card  v.  State.  109  Ind. 
415,  419,  422.  9  N.  E.  591 ;  Williams  v. 
State.  81  Ala.  i,  60  Am.  133;  Spies  v. 
People,  122  111.  I,  224,  228^-9rT2^N.  E. 
865.  17  X.  E.  898,  3  Am.  St.  320n; 
State  V.  Glidden,  55  Conn.  46,  8  Atl. 
890,  3  Am.  St.  23 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
O'Brien,  140  Pa.  St.  555,  561,  21  Atl. 
385 ;  Horton  v.  State,  66  Ga.  690,  693 ; 
State  V.  James.  34  S.  Car.  49,  53,  12 
S.  E.  657;  People  v.  Collins,  64  Cal. 
293.  295,  30  Pac.  847;  McKenzie  v. 
State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  568.  25  S.  W.  426, 
40  \m.  St.  795 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Brown,  14  Gray  (Mass.)  419;  Wil- 
liams V.  State.  47  Ind.  568,  572;  State 
V.  Carson,  2,fi  S.  Car.  524,  15  S.  E.  588; 
State  V.  Green,  40  S.  Car.  328,  18  S. 
E.  9.33,  42  Am.  St.  872;  People  v. 
Collins,  64  Cal.  293,  30  Pac.  847; 
Priest  V.  State,  10  Neb.  393,  399,  6 
X.  W.  468;  State  V.  Weasel,  30  La. 
.^nn.  919;  State  v.  Thibcau,  30  Vt. 
100,  104;  Bennett  v.  State,  62  Ark. 
516,  36  S.  W.  947;  State  V.  Lewis,  96 
Iowa  286,  65  X.  W.  295;  State  v. 
I'.yers,  \G  Mont.  565,  41  Pac.  708; 
Hunter  V.  State,  112  Ala.  77,  21  So. 
^5;  Commonwealth  v.  Huntor,  168 
Mass.  130,  46  N.  E.  404;  Wcisenbach 


V.  State,  138  Wis.  152,  119  N.  W.  843: 
Price  V.  State,  i  Okla.  Cr.  358,  98 
Pac.  447 ;  Van  Wyk  v.  People,  45  Colo. 
I,  99  Pac.  1009;  Long  v.  State,  55  Tex. 
Cr.  55,  114  S.  W.  632;  Baldwin  v. 
State,  46  Fla.  115,  35  So.  220;  San- 
derson V.  State,  169  Ind.  301,  82  X.  E. 
525;  O'Brien  v.  State,  69  Neb.  691. 
96  N.  W.  649;  Chadwick  v.  United 
States,  141  Fed.  225,  72  C.  C.  A.  343; 
State  V.  Kennard,  74  N.  H.  76,  65  Atl. 
376;  Carter  v.  State,  106  Ga.  yj^,  32 
S.  E.  345,  71  Am.  St.  262n;  State  v. 
Kenny,  j-j  S.  Car.  236,  57  S.  E.  859; 
Morris  v.  State,  146  Ala.  66,  41  So. 
274;  Toliver  v.  State,  142  Ala.  3,  38 
So.  801 ;  United  States  v.  Francis,  144 
Fed.  520;  People  v.  Gregory,  120  Cal. 
16,  52  Pac.  41 ;  People  v.  Stokes,  5 
Cal.  App.  205,  89  Pac.  997;  State  v. 
Vaughan,  200  ^lo.  i,  98  S.  W.  2;  State 
V.  Dix,  33  Wash.  405,  74  Pac.  570; 
Butt  V.  State,  81  Ark.  173,  98  S.  W. 
72}, ;  Porter  v.  People,  31  Colo.  508. 
74  Pac.  879;  Schultz  v.  State,  133  Wis. 
215,  113  N.  W.  428;  Collins  V.  State, 
138  Ala.  57,  34  So.  993;  Eacock  v. 
State,  169  Ind.  488,  82  N.  E.  1030; 
Raymond  v.  People,  226  III.  433,  80 
N.  E.  996;  State  v.  Arthur,  135  Iowa 
48,  109  N.  W.  1083;  Richards  v.  State, 
53  Tex.  Cr.  400.  no  S.  W.  432;  State 
V.  Dilley,  44  Wash.  207,  87  Pac.  133; 
State  V.  White,  48  Ore.  416,  87  Pac. 
137;  Lawrence  v.  State,  103  Md.  17,  63 


§    49-  CRIMINAL    EVIDEXCE.  798 

rule  is  to  satisfy  the  jury  by  a  prima  facie  case  that  a  conspiracy- 
existed  and  then  to  offer  evidence  of  the  declarations  of  any  con- 
spirator."' Ho\veyer,  as  will  be  elsewhere  explained,  the  declara- 
tions are  often  receiyed  before  there  is  any  proof  of  a  conspiracy, 
and  then,  if  the  conspiracy  be  not  shown,  the  jury  is  instructed  to 
disregard  the  declarations.  The  rule  is  applicable  where  the  con- 
spirators are  separately  tried.  The  declarations  of  other  con- 
spirators jointly  indicted,  but  separately  tried  may  be  received 
against  the  accused  who  is  on  trial.  It  is  not  necessary  to  show 
that  the  accused  took  part  in  every  act  of  the  conspiracy  or  that  he 
had  actual  knowledge  of  every  act.''®  But  mere  knowledge  by  one 
of  the  conspirators  that  the  others  were  involved  in  some  criminal 
scheme  does  not  necessarily  permit  the  declarations  or  acts  of  the 
others  to  be  received  against  him.  It  is  only  where  knowledge  and 
active  participation  or  an  express  or  implied  ratification  can  be 
proved  that  one  conspirator  is  bound  by  the  statements  or  dec- 
larations of  another.*'" 

For  illustration,  where  a  conspiracy  is  proved  in  substance  the 
state  may  prove  the  acts  and  declarations  of  one  conspirator  on 
the  trial  of  another  though  the  person  whose  conduct  and  lan- 
guage are  proved  has  not  been  arrested."''    The  principle  at  the 

Atl.  96;  Graff  v.  People,  208  111.  312,  745,  note;   3   Am.   St.  482,   485;   two 

70  N.  E.  299 ;  State  v.  Stockford,  77  or    more    engaged,    Elliott    Evidence, 

Conn.  227,  58  Atl.   769,  107  Am.  St.  §  2935;  order  of  proof,  §  2934;  proof 

28;    State   V.    Roberts,   201    Mo.    702,  of    formal    agreement    not    necessary, 

100  S.  W.  484;  Hanners  v.  State,  147  §  2938;  presumptions,  3  Am.  St.  843; 

Ala.    27,    41     So.    973 ;     Marrash    v.  proof     when     conspirators     are     not 

United  States,  168  Fed.  225;  Cabrera  named,  Elliott  Evidence,   §   2945;   la- 

V.  State   (Tex.  Cr.,  1909),  118  S.  W.  bor     combinations,     strikes,     boycotts 

1054;  Chicago,  &c..  Coal  Co.  v.  Peo-  and    picketing,    Elliott    Evidence,    §§ 

pie,  214  111.  421,  7Z  N.  E".  770;  Holt  2945,   2951;   proof  of   overt   acts,   §§ 

V.  State,  39  Tex.  Cr.  282,  45  S.  W.  2946,    2947,    2948;    weight    and    suffi- 

1016,   46   S.   W.   829;    Christensen    v.  ciency  of  circumstantial  evidence,  68 

People,  114  111.  App.  40;   Snelling  v.  L.  R.  A.  213,  note. 

State    (Tex.  Cr.  App.,   1909),   123  S.  *"■  Schultz  v.  State,  133  Wis.  215,  113 

W.  610;   State  v.  Kennedy   (S.  Car.,  N.  W.  428. 

1910),  67  S.  E.  152.  *^  People    v.    :\Iiles,    123    App.    Div. 

Prima  facie  evidence  of  conspiracy,  (N.  Y.)   862,  108  N.  Y.  S.  510,  aff'd 

Elliott   Evidence,   §  2942;    admissibil-  in  192  N.  Y.  541,  84  N.  E.  1117. 

ity    of    declarations    of    conspirators,  ™  ]\Iarrash    v.    United    States,     168 

Elliott  Evidence,  §§  2936,  2939,  2940,  Fed.  225. 

2941.  2943.  2944;  I  L.  R.  A.  273,  note,  ^""Weisenbach    v.    State,    138    Wis. 

12  L.  R.  A.   197,  note;   19  L.   R.  A.  152,  119  N.  W.  843. 


799      CRIMES    AGAINST    TUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    493 

basis  of  this  rule  is  that  which  regulates  the  competency  of  the 
admissions  of  partners  against  each  other.  When  men  are  asso- 
ciated for  a  common  purpose,  and  with  a  common  object  in  view, 
the  law,  presuming  that  the  benefits,  if  any,  which  may  ensue 
from  their  accomplishment  will  be  shared  by  all,  impresses  upon 
the  conspirators  or  partners,  collectively,  the  attribute  of  indi- 
^'iduality  so  far  as  the  common  design  in  concerned.  No  member 
of  the  combination  will  be  permitted  to  escape  the  consequences 
of  the  actions  or  words  of  his  associates.  But  the  acts  or  declara- 
tions, in  order  to  be  admissible,  must  have  been  made  in  further^ 
ance  of  the  common  design,  or  must  accompany  and  explain  such 
an  act  or  declaration.^  The  fact  that  declarations  were  made  by 
a  conspirator  before  the  defendant  became  associated  with  the 
conspiracy  does  not  render  them  inadmissible  against  him.  But 
his  subsequent  connection  therewith  must  be  shown  and  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of  the  declarations  be  brought  home  to  him 
or  circumstances  shown  from  which  such  knowledge  and  a  rati- 
fication by  him  may  be  implied  or  inferred. - 

§  493.  Must  be  made  during  existence  of,  and  in  furtherance  of, 
conspiracy. — That  the  accused  was  not  present  when  the  declara- 
tion, which  is  introduced  against  him,  was  uttered  by  a  fellow- 
conspirator,  does  not  of  necessity  render  it  incompetent  if  it  con- 
forms to  the  rule  in  other  respects.^    But  those  declarations  only 

^  State  V.  McGee,  8i  Town  17,  22,  46  Commonwealth   (Ky.),  31   Ky.  L.  64, 

N.  W.     764;  Long  V.   State,   13  Tex.  loi    S.  W.  376;  Wallace  v.   State.  46 

App.    211;    Horton    v.    State,    (£   Ga.  Tex.  Cr.  341,  81  S.  W.  966;  Miller  v. 

690,  695;  Spies  V.  People,  122  111.  i,  12  State,   139  Wis.  57,   119  N.   W.  850; 

N.  E.  865,   17  N.   E.  898,  3  Am.  St.  O'Brien  v.  State,  69  Neb.  691,  96  N. 

320n;  People  v.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113,  W.  649;  Dolan  v.  United  States,  123 

120,  17  Am.  401;  Walton  v.  State,  88  Fed.  52,  59  C.  C.  A.  176. 

Ind.  9,    15;    Card  v.    State,    109    Ind.  ■  Lamar  v.  State,  63  Miss.  265,  272; 

415,  418,  9  N.  E.  591 ;  McKee  v.  State,  Cox  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  254,  34  Am. 

Ill  Ind.  378,  .382,  12  N.  E.  510;  State  746;  Browning  v.  State,  30  Miss.  656; 

V.  Melrose,  98  Mo.  594,  12  S.  W.  250;  Avery    v.    State,    10   Tex.    App.    199, 

Kiindc  V.  State,   22  Tex.   App.  65,  3  212;  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  i,  12  N. 

S.  W.  325;   People  V.   McQiiade,  no  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  ,'\m.  St.  320n ; 

N.  Y.  284.  18  N.  E.  156;  State  v.  Lar-  llnited   States  v.  Bahcock,  3  L)ill-   C. 

kin,  49  N.  H.  .39;  People  v.  Irwin,  ■77  C.    (U.    S.)    581,    5S6,    24   Fed.    Cas. 

Cal.  494,  20  Pac.  56;  State  v.  Grant,  14487. 

86  Iowa  2l6,  53  N.  W.   120;   Hall   v.  '  Statt-   v.    .McGce,   81    Iowa    17,   22, 


§  493 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


800 


are  admissible  which  are  made  by  a  conspirator  during  the  exist- 
ence of  the  conspiracy  and  in  furtherance  of  it.  The  statements  of 
a  conspirator,  made  after  the  conspiracy  has  ceased  to  exist,  either 
by  success  or  failure,  and  which  are  merely  narrative  of  past 
events  (though  in  form  a  confession,  /.  c,  an  admission  of  the 
conspiracy),  are  not  receivable  against  a  fellow  conspirator,*  un- 
less the  latter  was  present  when  they  were  made  and  heard  them, 
and  expressly  or  by  implication  acquiesced  in  them.'''  On  the  other 
hand,  declarations  made  after  the  conspiracy  are  always  admis- 
sible against  the  declarant,  the  jury  being  instructed  to  disregard 
them  as  far  as  they  refer  to  other  persons.**  A  declaration  by  one 
conspirator  made  at  any  time  while  the  conspiracy  exists  is  not 


46  N.  W.  764;  State  v.  Anderson,  92 
N.  Car.  732;  Hunter  v.  State,  112 
Ala.  77,  21  So.  65 ;  Grogan  v.  State, 
63  Miss.  147,  151 ;  Sanderson  v.  State, 
169  Ind.  301,  82  N.  E.  525;  Shiflett  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  530,  102  S.  W. 
1 147;  State  V.  Austin,  183  Mo.  478, 
82  S.  W.  5. 

■•Bennett  v.  State,  62  Ark.  516,  36 
S.  W.  947;  People  V.  Oldham,  iii 
Cal.  648,  44  Pac.  312;  Jenkins  v.  State, 
35  Fla.  737,  18  So.  182,  48  Am.  St. 
267;  Schwen  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Cr. 
368,  35  S.  W.  172;  State  v.  Duffy, 
124  Mo.  I,  27  S.  W.  358;  Everage  v. 
State,  113  Ala.  102,  21  So.  404;  State 
V.  Tice,  30  Ore.  457,  48  Pac.  367; 
Logan  V.  United  States,  144  U.  S. 
263,  309,  36  L.  ed.  429,  12  Sup.  Ct. 
617;  State  V.  Dean,  13  Ired.  (N.  Car.) 
63;  Patton  V.  State,  6  Ohio  St.  467; 
Rowland  v.  State,  45  Ark.  132,  135; 
State  V.  McGraw,  87  Mo.  161,  164; 
State  V.  Thibeau,  30  Vt.  100;  State 
V.  Larkin,  49  N.  H.  39;  Heine  v. 
Commonwealth,  91  Pa.  St.  145 ;  Reg. 
V.  Murphy,  8  C.  &  P.  297,  310,  311; 
Benton  v.  State,  78  Ark.  284,  94  S. 
W.  688;  Frazier  v.  Commonwealth 
(Ky.),  76  S.  W.  28,  25  Ky.  461 ;  State 
V.  Kennedy,  177  Mo.  98,  75  S.  W. 
979;  State  V.  Myers,  198  Mo.  225,  94 
S.  W.  242;   Chicago  &c.  Coal  Co.  v. 


People,  214  III.  421,  73  N.  E.  770; 
State  V.  Dickerhoff,  127  Iowa  404, 
103  N.  W.  350;  Choice  v.  State,  52 
Tex.  Cr.  285,  106  S.  W.  387 ;  Gambrell 
V.  Commonwealth,  130  Ky.  513,  113 
S.  W.  476;  State  V.  Horseman,  52  Ore. 
572,  98  Pac.  135;  Miller  v.  State,  139 
Wis.  57,  119  N.  W.  850;  Chapline  v. 
State  (Ark.)  95  S.  W.  477;  Berry  v. 
State,  122  Ga.  429,  50  S.  E.  345 ;  State 
V.  Philips,  73  S.  Car.  236,  53  S.  E. 
370;  State  V.  Walker,  124  Iowa  414, 
100  N.  W.  354;  Wallace  v.  State,  48 
Tex.  Cr.  318,  87  S.  W.  1041 ;  Nelson 
V.  State,  48  Tex.  Cr.  274,  87  S.  W. 
143;  Commonwealth  v.  Ellis  (Ky., 
1909),  118  S.  W.  973;  Wright  V.  State, 
40  Tex.  Cr.  447,  50  S.  W.  940 ;  Smith 
V.  People,  38  Colo.  509,  88  Pac.  453; 
Wiley  V.  State  (.^rk.,  1909),  124  S. 
W.  249;  State  V.  Smith  (Ore.,  1909), 
106  Pac.  797. 

^  Holden  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  91 ; 
Shelby  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Ky, 
563,  16  S.  W.  461,  13  Ky.  L.  178. 

"Rex  V.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221,  225; 
Crosby  v.  People,  137  H^-  325,  334.  27 
N.  E.  49;  People  v.  Arnold,  46  Mich. 
268,  277,  9  N.  W.  406;  State  v.  Dod- 
son,  16  S.  Car.  453,  461 ;  Van  Wyk  v. 
People,  45  Colo.  I,  99  Pac.  1009:  Bald- 
win V.  State,  46  Fla.  115,  35  So.  220. 


8oi       CRIMES    AGAINST    PUBLIC    POLICY,    PEACE,    HEALTH.       §    494 

admissible  against  another  merely  because  the  offense  for  which 
the  latter  is  on  trial  preceded  it.  The  several  successive  crimes 
committed  during  the  conspiracy  are  regarded  merely  as  the 
parts  of  one  indivisible  whole."  An  exception  to  the  general  rule 
may  be  mentioned  here.  At  common  law  proof  of  the  guilt  of 
the  principal  is  required  on  the  trial  of  a  person  as  an  accessory 
to  a  crime.  Hence  of  necessity  the  principal's  confession,  though 
in  form  a  declaration  made  after  the  conspiracy,  is  admissible  at 
the  trial  of  a  confederate  as  an  accessory,  whether  tried  jointly 
or  separately,  but  only  to  show  the  guilt  of  the  principal  as  such.* 

§  494.    Order  of  proving  conspiracy  to  let  in  declarations. — The 

general  rule  is  that  the  existence  of  the  conspiracy  must  be  proved, 
at  least  prima  facie,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  judge,  before  the 
declarations  or  acts  are  admitted  in  evidence.^  Many  authorities, 
however,  hold  that  the  order  of  the  proof  is  discretionary  with 
the  court,  and  that  the  court  may.  for  the  sake  of  convenience, 
admit  the  declarations  at  any  time  during  the  trial  on  the  promise 
to  prove  the  existence  of  the  conspiracy  and  the  connection  of  the 
defendant  therewith  subsequently."   This  is  particularly  the  case 


■  Card  V.  State,  109  Ind.  415,  9  N. 
E.  591. 

'United  States  v.  Hartwell,  3  Cliflf. 
(U.  S.)   221,  26  Fed.  Cas.  15318. 

*  Belcher  v.  State,  125  Ind.  419,  420, 
25  N.  E.  545;  Ford  v.  State,  112  Ind. 
37S,  14  N.  E.  241 ;  Card  v.  State,  109 
Ind.  415,  418,  9  N.  E.  591 ;  Tarbox  v. 
State,  38  Ohio  St.  581,  584;  Casey 
V.  State,  37  Ark.  67,  85 ;  McGraw  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.),  20  S.  W.  279, 
14  Ky.  L.  344;  Amos  v.  State,  96  Ala. 
120,  125,  II  So.  424;  Horton  v.  State, 
66  Ga.  690,  693 ;  Cook  v.  State,  169 
Ind.  430,  82  N.  E.  1047;  Wallace  v. 
State.  48  Tex.  Cr.  318,  87  S.  W.  1041 ; 
Schultz  V.  State,  133  Wis.  215,  113  N. 
W.  428;  Schutz  V.  State,  125  Wis. 
432,  104  N.  W.  90;  Proctor  v.  State, 
54  Tex.  Cr.  254,  112  S.  W.  770;  Peo- 
ple V.  Carson,  155  Cal.  164,  99  Pac. 
51 — Underhill  Crim.  Ev. 


970;  People  V.  Donnolly,  143  Cal.  394, 
77  Pac.  177;  State  v.  Crofford,  121 
Iowa  395,  96  N.  W.  889;  Ripley  v. 
State,  51  Tex.  Cr.  126,  100  S.  W.  943; 
State  V.  Roberts,  201  Mo.  702,  100  S. 
W.  484;  Wiley  v.  State  (Ark.,  1909), 
124  S.  W.  249. 

'"State  V.  Alushrush,  97  Iowa  444,  66 
N.  W.  746;  Hall  V.  State,  31  Fla.  176, 
188,  189,  12  So.  449;  State  V.  Ward, 
19  Nev.  297,  308,  10  Pac.  133,  7  Crim. 
L.  Mag.  748;  State  v.  Grant,  86  Iowa 
216,  S3  N.  W.  120;  Avery  v.  State,  10 
Tex.  App.  199,  210;  State  v.  Ander- 
son, 92  N.  Car.  732,  748;  State  v. 
McGee,  81  Iowa  17,  46  N.  W.  764; 
State  V.  Cardoza.  11  S.  Car.  195,  237; 
State  V.  Grant,  76  Mo.  236;  Hamilton 
V.  People,  29  Mich.  195.  197;  Schultz 
V.  State.  133  Wis.  215.  113  N.  W.  428; 
People  V.   Bunkers,  2  Cal.  App.   197. 


§    494  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  802 

where  establishing"  the  conspiracy  depends  npon  proving  a  large 
number  of  facts  or  a  vast  amount  of  circumstantial  evidence  and 
the  existence  of  the  conspiracy  be  inferred  from  numerous  ap- 
parently independent  facts  and  circumstances.^^ 

84  Pac.  364,  370;  Cook  V.  State,  169  691,  96  N.  W.  649;  State  v.  Lewis,  51 
Ind.  430,  82  N.  E.  1047;  People  v.  Ore.  467,  94  Pac.  831;  People  v.  Em- 
Miles,  123  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  862,  108  mons,  7  Cal.  App.  685,  95  Pac.  1032. 
N.  Y.  S.  510;  Butt  V.  State,  81  Ark.  "State  v.  Winner,  17  Kan.  298, 
173,  98  S.  W.  72^;  People  V.  Stokes,  5  305;  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  i,  238,  12 
Cal.  App.  205,  89  Pac.  997 ;  Cohen  v.  N.  E.  865,  17  N.  E.  898,  3  Am.  St. 
United  States,  157  Fed.  651,  85  C.  320n. 
C.  A.  113;  O'Brien  v.  State,  69  Neb. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 


EVIDENCE   IX    INTERXATIOXAL    AND    IXTERSTATE   EXTRADITION. 


495.  International    e  x  t  r  a  d  i  t  i  on — 

Treaties  and  statutory  regu- 
lation. 

496.  Burden    of   proof    and    amount 

of  evidence  required  in  in- 
ternational and  interstate 
extradition  to  show  crimi- 
nality and  other  essential 
facts. 

497.  Fugitive   character  of  the   per- 

son claimed  for  extradition. 

498.  Evidential   rules    governing    in- 

terstate extradition. 

499.  Character,    form    and   authenti- 

cation of  indictments,  etc., 
in  interstate  extradition. 

500.  Constitutional      and      statutory 

regulation    of    the    mode   of 


proving  and  effect  of  records 
of  other  states. 

501.  General     rules     regulating    the 

taking  of  evidence  in  foreign 
extradition. 

502.  Authentication       by       consular 

certificate  of  warrants  and 
other  papers  used  as  evi- 
dence in  international  ex- 
tradition. 

503.  The     competency     of     certified 

copies  as  evidence  of  crim- 
inality. 

504.  Proof     of     foreign     laws     and 

treaties  in  international  ex- 
tradition. 

505.  Proof  of  laws  in  interstate  ex- 

tradition. 


§  495.  International  extradition — Treaties  and  statutory  regula- 
tions.— The  demand  and  the  return  of  fugitives  from  justice 
as  between  independent  nations  and  states  are,  in  the  absence  of 
treaties  providing  for  the  reciprocal  return  of  such  persons, 
wholly  a  matter  of  international  comity.  The  law  of  nations  im- 
poses no  obligation  upon  the  sovereign  state  in  which  a  person 
charged  with  crime  has  sought  an  asylum,  to  return  him  to  the 
officials  of  the  state  against  the  law  of  which  he  has  offended.^ 
But  often  because  of  the  principles  of  international  comity,  as 
it  is  termed,  or  in  other  words  because  of  the  expectation  that  the 
favor  granted  by  the  asykim  state  would  be  reciprocated  by  the 
authorities  of  the  state  which  demands  the  return  of  tlie  fugitive 
from  its  criminal  jurisdiction,  persons  have  been  returned  in  tlie 


'  Rx  parte  McCabc.  46  Fed.  363.  12I..  R.  A.  SS9;  In  re  Cook,  49  Fed.  833, 
836. 

(803) 


§    49^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  804 

absence  of  treaty  to  meet  criminal  charges  pending  against  them 
in  the  country  of  their  domicil.-  At  the  present  time  treaties  exist 
between  the  United  States  and  nearly  all  civilized  states,  by  virtue 
of  which  all  persons  charged  with  certain  crimes  therein  speci- 
fied may  be  returned  to  the  country  whence  they  have  fled  to  the 
United  States.^  These  treaties  provide  what  evidence  shall  be  nec- 
essary in  any  case  to  procure  the  extradition  of  the  accused.  I1ie 
statutes  of  the  United  States  provide  that  all  hearings  in  extra- 
dition cases  shall  be  held  on  land,  in  a  room  or  office  which  is 
easily  accessible  to  the  public.  If  the  person  whose  extradition 
is  sought  shall  file  an  affidavit  that  he  can  not  go  to  trial  without 
the  evidence  of  certain  witnesses,  showing  also  what  he  intends 
to  prove  by  them,  and  that  he  is  not  possessed  of  sufficient  means 
and  is  actually  unable  to  pay  the  fees  of  such  witnesses,  the  judge 
or  commissioner,  before  whom  the  hearing  is  had,  may  order 
that  the  witnesses  shall  be  subpoenaed,  the  costs  to  be  paid  as 
similar  fees  are  paid  in  the  case  of  witness  subpoenaed  in  behalf  of 
the  United  States. 

§  493.  Burden  of  proof  and  amount  of  evidence  required  in  inter- 
national and  interstate  extradition  to  show  criminality  and  other 
essential  facts. — The  burden  of  proof  to  show  criminality,  and 
all  other   facts  which   will    warrant   the   return   of  the   alleged 

^l  Kent  Com.  2,6;  In  re  Metzger,  5  12  Statutes  at  L.  199,   15   Statutes  at 

How.   (U.  S.)   176,  188,  12  L.  ed.  104;  L.  688;  Hayti,  13  Statutes  at  L.  711; 

United  States  v.  Rauschcr,  119  U.  S.  Republic  of  Dominica,  15  Statutes  at 

407,  411,  30  L.  ed.  425,  7  Sup.  Ct.  234;  L.  473;  Italy,  11  Statutes  at  L.  629,  16 

United  States  v.  Davis,  2  Sumner  C.  Statutes  767,  24  Statutes  at  L.  looi ; 

C.    (U.  S.)    482,,  25   Fed.   Cas.   14932,  Salvador,   18  Statutes  at  L.  693,  796; 

and  see  the  remarks  of  Judge  Jenkins  Nicaragua,    17    Statutes    at    L.    815; 

in  49  Fed.  833,  on  page  837.  Peru,   18  Statutes  at  L.  719;  Orange 

^The  countries  with  which  treaties  Free  State,  18  Statutes  at  L.  751; 
have  been  made  are  as  follows :  Great  Ecuador,  18  Statutes  at  L.  756 ;  Bel- 
Britain,  8  Statutes  at  L.  576;  France,  gium,  18  Statutes  at  L.  804,  22  Statutes 
8  Statutes  at  L.  582,  617,  741 ;  Hawai-  at  L.  972 ;  Ottoman  Empire,  19  Statutes 
ian  Islands,  9  Statutes  at  L.  981;  at  L.  572;  Spain,  19  Statutes  at  L. 
Swiss  Confederation,  II  Statutes  at  L.  650;  22  Statutes  at  L.  991;  Nether- 
587;  Prussia,  10  Statutes  at  L.  964;  lands,  21  Statutes  at  L.  769;  Japan, 
Austria,  11  Statutes  at  L.  691,  17  24  Statutes  at  L.  1015.  See,  also, 
Statutes  at  L.  835;  Sweden  and  Nor-  United  States  Revised  Statutes, 
way,  12  Statutes  at  L.  1125;  Vene-  §§5270-5280. 
zuela,  12  Statutes  at  L.  143;  Mexico, 


805  IXTERNATIOXAL    AXD    INTERSTATE    EXTRADITION.       §    496 

fugitive  from  justice  to  the  state  under  whose  laws  he  is  charged 
with  crime,  is  upon  the  officer  sent  to  effect  his  return ;  or  on  the 
person  demanding  it.  It  was  formerly  held  that  the  proof  of 
criminality  should  be  as  full  and  satisfactory  as  in  the  judgment 
of  the  magistrate  would  suffice  to  authorize  a  conviction  if  he 
were  sitting  at  the  trial  of  the  accused.'* 

This,  however,  is  no  longer  the  law.  The  demanding  party  is 
never  required  to  produce  proof  of  the  necessary  facts  which  shall 
convince  the  court  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt ;  for  an  extradition 
proceeding  is  not,  in  strictness  of  law,  regarded  as  a  criminal 
trial,  nor  do  the  rules  of  evidence  which  apply  to  criminal  trials 
apply  to  it.  It  possesses  more  of  the  character  of  a  preliminary 
examination  of  a  person  accused  of  crime,  the  final  determination 
of  whose  criminality  will  take  place  in  the  jurisdiction  where  the 
alleged  crime  was  committed.^  Hence,  according  to  the  present 
state  of  the  law,  the  commissioner  or  magistrate  will  do  well  to 
avoid  acting  in  a  technical  spirit,  or  requiring  the  same  amount 
or  degree  of  proof  that  would  be  demanded  to  convict  the  accused 
before  a  jury.® 

Some  satisfactory  and  legal  evidence  of  guilt  will  be  required. 
But  if  the  necessary  facts,  i.  e.,  that  the  accused  is  a  fugitive,  and 
that  he  is  charged  with  crime,  are  satisfactorily  proved,  the 
examining  magistrate  ought  to  commit  the  accused  to  await  the 
action  of  the  executive  directing  his  return,  though  the  evidence 
of  guilt  does  not  possess  that  weight  and  cogency  which  would  be 
required  to  convict  him  were  he  on  trial  before  a  jury. 

But  in  any  case  tlie  evidence  to  show  criminality  must  be  legal, 
and  such  as  will  create  a  probability  that  the  alleged  fugitive  is 
guilty.  Though  it  may  be  unsatisfactory  and  far  from  convincing 
>et  if,  on  the  whole,  it  may  create  conllicling  presumptions  and 
probabilities  that  the  accused  is  guilty,  then  he  should  be  com- 

*  jSa- /'or/e  Kaine,  3  Rlatchf.  fU.  S.)  missioncr,    need    not    state    the    facts 

I,  14  Fed.  Cas.  7597; /n  rr  Macdonnell,  with  the  precision   of  an  indictment; 

II  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  C.  C.  170,  16  Fed.  hut  it  should  set  forth  the  suhstantial 

Cas.  8772.  features    of    the    crime    so    that    the 

"  See  Spear  on  Fxtradition,  page  25.  court  can  readily  sec  therefrom  that 

"  In  re  Rrecn.  7.1  Fed.  458,  45Q.    The  the  offense  is  one  of  those  which  arc 

complaint,  sif^ncd  hy  a  foreign  consul,  enumerated     in     the    treaty.       In    re 

on  which  is  based  a  warrant  f-f  extra-  Adutt,  55  Fed.  376,  379. 
dition  issued  by  a  United  States  com- 


497 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


806 


mitted.'  In  other  words  it  is  generally  required,  both  in  inter- 
national and  interstate  extradition,  that  such  an  amount  and 
degree  of  evidence  shall  be  produced  before  the  commissioner  or 
magistrate  as  would  justify  committing  the  accused  for  trial 
if  the  crime  charged  against  him  was  alleged  to  have  been  com- 
mitted in  the  state  where  the  examination  is  had.* 


§  497.    Fugitive  character  of  the  person  claimed  for  extradition. — 

Whether  the  person  whose  extradition  is  demanded  has  fled  from 
justice  to  the  country  or  state  in  which  he  is  found  is  a  question 
to  be  determined  in  the  first  instance  by  the  executive  of  that 
state. ^  The  proof  that  the  accused  is  a  fugitive  from  justice  must 
be  of  such  a  character  and  force  that  the  executive  is  satisfied 
that  he  is  such,  though  it  need  not  be  such  as  will  meet  the 
requirements  of  legal  evidence  on  a  trial.    A  copy  of  an  affidavit 


'  Sternaman  v.  Peck,  80  Fed.  883, 
884,  26  C.  C.  A.  214;  In  re  Oteiza,  136 
U.  S.  330,  336,  34  L.  ed.  464,  10  Sup. 
Ct.  1031. 

^  In  re  Bryant,  80  Fed.  282,  284; 
Bryant  v.  United  States,  167  U.  S. 
104,  42  L.  ed.  94,  17  Sup.  Ct.  744;  In 
re  Farez,  7  Blatchf.  C.  C.  345,  8  Fed. 
Cas.  4645,  40  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  107; 
In  re  Henrich,  5  Blatchf.  C.  C.  414, 
425,  12  Fed.  Cas.  6369;  In  re  Doo 
Woon,  18  Fed.  898,  899;  Ex  parte 
Morgan,  20  Fed.  298,  307;  Elias  v. 
Ramirez,  215  U.  S.  393,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
T31 ;  Benson  v.  McMahon,  127  U.  S. 
457,  461,  8  Sup.  Ct.  1240,  32  L.  ed.  234, 
in  which  the  court  said,  "We  are  not 
sitting  in  this  court  on  the  trial  of  the 
prisoner,  with  power  to  pronounce 
him  guilty  and  punish  him  or  declare 
him  innocent  and  acquit  him."  In  re 
Oteiza,  136  U.  S.  330,  335,  34  L-  ed. 
464,  ID  Sup.  Ct.  1031,  in  which  case 
the  court  held  that  there  was  no  error 
in  excluding  evidence  consisting  of 
depositions  offered  on  the  part  of  the 
accused  though  the  statute  permitted 
such  proof  offered  against  him. 

*Hess  V.  Grimes    (Kan.,   1897),  48 


Pac.  596;  Ex  parte  Reggel,  114  U.  S. 
642,  652,  29  L.  ed.  250,  5  Sup.  Ct. 
1 148;  In  re  White,  55  Fed.  54,  57,  5 
C.  C.  A.  29,  citing  and  approving 
Roberts  v.  Reilly,  116  U.  S.  80,  29  L. 
ed.  544,  6  Sup.  Ct.  291 ;  Dennison  v. 
Christian,  196  U.  S.  62,7,  49  L-  ed. 
630,  25  Sup.  Ct.  795.  A  prisoner  who 
is  allowed  to  go  outside  of  a  reforma- 
tory in  the  state  of  New  York  on 
parole  under  a  statute  of  that  state, 
he  promising  to  obey  the  directions  of 
the  parole,  which  are  that  he  shall  go 
to  IMichigan,  and  who,  instead  of  do- 
ing so,  comes  to  Connecticut,  is  a 
fugitive  from  justice  within  the  pro^ 
visions  of  the  United  States  consti- 
tution. Drinkall  v.  Spiegel,  68  Conn. 
441,  36  Atl.  830,  36  L.  R.  A.  486.  A 
person  may  in  law  be  regarded  as  a 
fugitive  from  justice  when  he  has 
committed  a  crime  in  a  state,  and 
withdraws  from  the  jurisdiction  of  its 
courts  without  waiting  to  abide  the 
consequences  of  his  action.  In  re 
White,  55  Fed.  54,  57>  5  C.  C  A.  29, 
citing  Roberts  v.  Reilly,  116  U.  S. 
86,  29  L.  ed.  544,  6  Sup.  Ct.  291. 


Soy  IXTERXATIOXAL    AND    INTERSTATE    EXTRADITION.       §    497 

sworn  to  before  a  notary  public  or  justice  of  the  peace  by  the 
governor  of  the  state  demanding  extradition  alleging  that  the 
accused  is  or  was  a  fugitive  from  justice  has  been  held  sufficient/" 

Some  few  authorities  hold  that  the  determination  of  this  ques- 
tion by  the  executive  of  the  state  is  conclusive  upon  the  courts; 
and,  where  this  view  is  admitted  to  be  the  correct  one,  the  courts 
will  not,  upon  the  return  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  receive  evi- 
dence to  show  that  the  accused  was  never  in,  and  had  not  in  fact 
fled  from,  the  state  which  demands  his  return  to  its  domain. 

Other  cases  support  the  proposition  that  the  decision  of  this 
question  by  the  executive  is  reviewable  by  the  federal  courts.  It 
must  be  made  to  appear  from  the  evidence  that  the  accused  is  a 
fugitive  from  the  justice  of  the  demanding  state.  The  federal 
statute  does  not  prescribe  the  character  of  the  proof  required  to 
show  that  he  is  a  fugitive.  An  affidavit,  sworn  to,  and  attested 
by  the  seal  of  the  court  in  which  an  indictment  is  pending  against 
the  accused,  and  stating  that  "he  is  a  fugitive  from  justice,"  and 
that  he  is  then  in  the  asylum  state,  has  been  held  sufficient  over 
an  objection  that  such  a  statement  is  only  a  conclusion  of  law 
and  does  not  state  any  facts."^'  And  the  accused  ought  to  be  per- 
mitted to  disprove  the  allegation  that  he  is  a  fugitive  from  justice 
by  any  proper  evidence,  as,  for  example,  by  proof  that  he  had 
never  been  a  resident  of  the  state  from  which  the  demand  came." 

^'' State  V.  Clough,  72  N.  H.  178,  55  laws  of  the  demanding  state,  without 

Atl.  554,  67  L.  R.  A.  946.  exception    as    to    the    nature    of    the 

"a£,t-  parte  Reggel,  114  U.  S.  642,  crime.    *    *    *    Upon     the     executive 

643,  29  L.   ed.  250,  5   Sup.   Ct.   1 148.  of  the  state  in  which  the  accused  is 

In  the  case  of  Reggel,  114  U.  S.  642,  found  rests  the   responsibility  of  de- 

650,    652,    the    court,   by    Harlan,    J.,  termining,      in      some      legal      mode, 

said :  "It  is  within  the  power  of  each  whether   he    is    a    fugitive    from    the 

state,  except  as  her  authority  may  be  justice  of  the  demanding  state.      He 

limited    by    the    constitution    of    the  does  not  fail  in  duty  if  he  makes  it 

United   States,  to  declare  what   shall  a    condition    precedent    to    the    sur- 

be    offenses    against    her    laws,    and  render  of  the  accused  that  it  be  shown 

citizens  of  other  states,  when  within  to  him,  by  competent  proof,  that  the 

her  jurisdiction,  are  subject  to  those  accused    is,    in    fact,   a    fugitive   from 

laws.      In    recognition    of    this    right  the  justice  of  the   demanding  state." 

*    *    *   the    words    of    the    clause    in  " /T.i-    (yartc    Smith    (The    Mormon 

reference    to    fugitives    from    justice  Prophet),  3   McLean   C.   C.    (U.    S.) 

were  made  sufficiently  comprehensive  121,    137,   22   Fed.    Cas.    12968;    In   re 

to  include  every   offense  against  the  Cook,  49  Fed.  833 ;  In  re  Manchester, 


§    498  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  808 

The  determination  of  the  question  wlictlier  the  person  wlio  is 
claimed  to  be  a  fugitive  is  "charged  with  treason,  felony,  or 
other  crime,"  is  exclusively  for  the  examining  magistrate  or  fed- 
eral commissioner  to  decide  upon  all  the  facts  in  evidence. 
Proof  that  the  defendant  was  in  the  demanding  state  when  a 
crime  was  committed  and  when  his  arrest  was  sought  he  was 
found  in  another  state  shows  that  he  is  a  fugitive  from  justice." 
Wliether  the  person  whose  extradition  is  demanded  is  charged 
with  any  crime  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  shown  by  the  evidence 
in  the  case.  Whether  the  crime  is  extraditable  under  the  consti- 
tution or  under  a  treaty  is  a  question  of  law.  The  determination 
of  the  former  question  cannot  be  reviewed  under  an  exception 
that  it  is  against  the  weight  of  the  evidence.  But  the  issue  of  law, 
whether  the  crime  as  proved  is  extraditable  under  the  statute  or 
treaty,  is  one  involving  the  construction  of  a  writing,  and  the 
judgment  of  the  magistrate  or  commissioner  thereon  may  be  re- 
versed if  palpably  erroneous  in  law.^^ 

§  498.  Evidential  rules  governing  interstate  extradition. — The 
constitution  of  the  United  States  provides,^*  "that  any  person 
charged  in  any  state  with  treason,  felony  or  other  crime,  who 
shall  flee  from  justice  and  be  found  subsequently  in  any  other 
state  of  the  Union,  shall,  on  the  demand  of  the  executive  of  the 
state  from  whence  he  has  fled,  be  delivered  up  to  be  removed  to 
the  state  having  jurisdiction  of  his  crime." 

At  a  very  early  period  congress  endeavored  by  statutory  enact- 
ment to  carry  into  effect  this  section  of  the  constitution.^^ 

5  Cal.  237;  Jones  v.  Leonard,  50  Iowa  Nichols,  203  U.  S.  192,  51  L.  ed.  148,27 

106,  32  Am.  116;  Hartman  v.  Aveline,  Sup.  Ct.  iii;  Appleyard  v.  Massachu- 

63  Ind.  344,   30  Am   217;  Wilcox   v.  setts,  203  U.  S.  222,  51  L.  ed.  161,  27 

Nolze,   34   Ohio    St.    520,    521 ;   In  re  Sup.  Ct.  122. 

White,  55  Fed.  54,  58,  5  C.  C.  A.  29;  "  Ornelas  v.  Ruiz,  161  U.  S.  502,  40 

Hyatt  V.  New  York,  188  U.  S.  691,  47  L.  ed.  787,  16  Sup.  Ct.  689. 

L.  ed.  657,  23  Sup.  Ct.  456,  aflf'g  Peo-  "  Art.  4.  §  2. 

pie  V.  Hyatt,  172  N.  Y.  176,  64  N.  E.  "United  States   Statute  of  1793.  c. 

825,  92  Am.  St.  706,  60  L.  R.  A.  774;  7,  §  i.    The  act  of  1793,  U.  S.  R.  S., 

where   accused   was   in    the   state   for  §  5278,  reads  as  follows :     "Whenever 

only  one  day.  the   executive   authority  of  any  state 

^  Straviss,  In  re,  126  Fed.  z^y,  63  C.  or  territory  demands   any   person   as 

C.  A.  99;  Hughes  v.  Pflanz.  138  Fed.  a  fugitive  from  justice  of  the  execu- 

980,    71    C.    C.    A.    234;    Pettibone    v.  tive   authority  of  any  state   or  terri- 


809  IXTERXATIOXAL    AXD    IXTERSTATE    EXTRADITION.       §    499       » 

In  construing  this  statute  the  courts  have  held:  First,  that  the 
return  of  the  fugitive  from  justice  must  have  been  demanded  by 
the  executive  authorities  of  the  state  from  whence  he  has  flecl. 
Second,  it  must  affirmatively  appear  by  the  evidence  that  he  is 
charged  with  the  commission  of  some  extraditable  crime  which 
is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  its  courts.  The  fact  that  he  is  charged 
with  such  a  crime  may  be  proved  by  the  production  of  a  warrant 
for  his  arrest,^ "^  or  an  indictment  duly  certified  and  authenticated 
as  provided  by  statute,  supplemented  by  an  affidavit  reciting  any 
other  facts  which  are  necessary  to  confer  jurisdiction  and  charg- 
ing him  substantially  with  a  crime  against  the  laws  of  the  state 
demanding  his  return.* ' 

^  499.  Character,  form  and  authentication  of  indictments,  etc.,  in 
interstate  extradition. — Hie  documents  accompanying  the  requisi- 
tion papers  to  be  admissible  in  evidence  must  be  certified  as  au- 
thentic by  the  governor  or  chief  magistrate  of  the  state  or  terri- 
tory from  whence  the  person  deinanded  has  fled.^*^  The  indict- 
ment which  is  produced  to  show  that  the  accused  is  charged  with 
a  crime  must  allege  some  definite  crime.     If  it  does  this,  and  if 

tory  to  which  such  person  has  fled  charged.  Ail  costs  or  expenses  in- 
and  produces  a  copy  of  an  indictment  curred  in  the  apprehending,  securing 
found  or  an  affidavit  made  before  a  and  transmitting  such  fugitive  to  the 
magistrate  of  any  state  or  territory,  state  or  territory  making  such  de- 
charging  the  person  demanded  with  mand  shall  be  paid  by  such  state  or 
having  committed  treason,   felony  or  territory." 

other  crime,  certified  as  authentic  by  "  People  v.  Warden  of  City  Prison, 

the   governor  or  chief  magistrate  of  83  App.   Div.    (N.  Y.)   456,  82  N.  Y. 

the  state  or  territory  from  whence  the  S.  439;    oral   evidence   as   to    requisi- 

person  so  charged  has  fled,  it  shall  be  tion   papers,    112   Am.    .St.    120,    note; 

the  duty  of  the  executive  authority  of  evidence  of  the  law  of  the  demanding 

the  state  or   territory  to  which   such  state,  112  Am.  St.  126. 

person  has  fled  to  cause  him  to  be  ar-  ^'  Ex  parte  Slcrnaman,  77  Fed.  595; 

rested  and  secured,  and  to  cause  no-  Ex  t^artc  Rcggcl,  114  U.  S.  642,  649, 

tice  of  the  arrest  to  be  given  to  the  29  L.  ed.  250,  5  Sup.  Ct.   1148. 

executive  authority  making  such   de-  "Kingsbury's  case,    106  Mass.  223; 

mand,  or  to  the  agent  of  such  author-  State  v.  Goss,  (^  Minn.  291,  68  N.  W. 

ity  appointed  to   receive  the   fugitive,  1089;    People  v.   Donohuc.   84    N.   Y. 

and  to  cause   the   fugitive   to  be   de-  438;    Ex   f^arlc    Powell.   20    Fia.   806. 

livered   to   such  agent  when  he   shall  .Sec.     also,     Mississippi     Code.     1892, 

apj)car.      If    no    such    agent    appears  §   2162;   oral   evidence   as  to   requisi- 

within   six   months    from  the   time  of  tion  papers,  112  .^m.  .St.  120,  note. 
the  arrest,   the  prisoner   may  be   dis- 


§  499 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


;io 


it  is  also  properly  aiilhenticated  by  the  executive  as  required  by 
statute,  it  will  be  sufficient  proof  of  the  fact  that  the  accused  is 
charged  with  crime  to  pre\'ent  his  discharge  from  custody  on  the 
return  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  though  the  indictment  is  in- 
artistically  drawn  or  is  otherwise  technically  defective  in  form/'' 
An  affidavit  alleging  upon  information  and  belief  that  the 
fugitive  has  committed  a  crime  is  wholly  insufficient  as  proof  of 
criminality.-''  The  general  rule  is  that  the  affidavits  and  the 
requisition  papers  which  are  used  as  evidence  in  an  interstate  ex- 
tradition proceeding  need  not  be  framed  with  extreme  technical 
precision  in  order  to  be  admissible.  But  they  must  show  with 
clearness  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  magistrate  that  the  party 
whose  extradition  is  sought  was  in  the  demanding  state  at  the 
time  of  the  crime, "^  that  he  is  a  fugitive  from  justice,--  as  well 
as  the  character  and  venue  of  the  crime  with  which  he  stands 
charged."^ 


"  Jackson  v.  Archibald,  12  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  155 ;  Davis's  case,  122  Mass.  324, 
329;  In  re  Greenough,  31  Vt.  279; 
State  V.  O'Connor,  38  Minn.  243,  36 
N.  W.  462;  In  re  Voorhees,  32  N.  J. 
L.  141;  Roberts  v.  Reilly,  116  U.  S. 
80,  29  L.  ed.  544.  6  Sup.  Ct.  291 ;  Ex 
parte  Reggel,  114  U.  S.  642,  651,  29 
L.  ed.  250,  5  Sup.  Ct.  1 148;  Hayes  v. 
Palmer,  21  App.  D.  C.  450;  Ex  parte 
Pierce,  155  Fed.  663. 

■"£4:  parte  Smith,  3  McLean  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  121,  137,  22  Fed.  Cas.  12968; 
Ex  parte  ^lorgan,  20  Fed.  298,  307. 
"It  must  appear,  therefore,  to  the 
governor  of  the  state  to  whom  such 
a  demand  is  presented,  before  he  can 
lawfully  comply  with  it,  first,  that  the 
person  demanded  is  substantial!}' 
charged  with  a  crime  against  the  laws 
of  the  state  from  whose  justice  he  is 
alleged  to  have  fled,  by  an  indict- 
ment or  an  affidavit,  certified  as  au- 
thentic by  the  governor  of  the  state 
making  the  demand,  and.  second,  that 
the  person  demanded  is  a  fugitive 
from  the  justice   of  that  state.     The 


first  of  these  prerequisites  is  a  ques- 
tion of  law,  and  is  always  open  upon 
the  face  of  the  papers  to  judicial  in- 
quiry, on  an  application  for  a  dis- 
charge under  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 
The  second  is  a  question  of  fact 
which  the  governor  of  the  state  upon 
whom  the  demand  is  m.ade  must  de- 
cide, upon  such  evidence  as  he  may 
deem  satisfactory."  A  certified  copy 
of  the  law  said  to  have  been  broken 
need  not  be  furnished.  The  courts  of 
the  United  States  take  judicial  notice 
of  the  law  of  all  the  states.  Remarks 
of  the  court  in  Roberts  v.  Reilly,  116 
U.  S.  80,  95-96,  29  L.  ed.  544,  6  Sup. 
Ct.  291. 

"People  V.  Conlin,  15  Misc.  (X. 
Y.)  303,  36  N.  Y.  S.  888. 

"In  re  Hey  ward,  i  Sandf.  (N.  Y. 
Super.)  701 ;  Ex  parte  Smith.  3  Mc- 
Lean c  c.  (u.  s.)  121,  137-139. 22 

Fed.  Cas.  12968;  Dennison  v.  Chris- 
tian, 72  Neb.  703,  loi  N.  W.  1045,  117 
Am.  St.  817. 

^ Ex  parte  Romanes,  i  Utah  2^; 
In   re   Manchester,    5    Cal.    237;    Ex 


8ll  IXTERXATIOXAL    AXD    IXTERSTATE    EXTRADITIOX.       §    5OO 

If  the  indictment  and  the  affidavit  are  properly  authenticated 
as  required  by  the  statute,  the  court  will  not,  upon  the  return  of 
a  writ  of  Jiabcas  corpus,  receive  evidence  to  prove  or  to  disprove 
its  validity,  or  to  contradict  its  allegations,  or  generally  to  inquire 
into  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused.'* 

^  500.  Constitutional  and  statutory  regulation  of  the  mode  of  prov- 
ing and  effect  of  records  of  other  states. — As  regards  the  mode  of 
proving  the  necessary  facts  in  interstate  extradition,  it  may  be 
sufficient  to  call  attention  to  the  provision  of  the  federal  consti- 
tution which  enacts  that  "full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in 
each  state  to  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of 
every  other  state ;  and  the  congress  may,  by  general  laws,  pre- 
scribe the  manner  in  which  such  acts,  records,  and  proceedings 
shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  thereof.""^ 

To  fully  efifectuate  this  constitutional  provision  congress  has 
enacted  "that  the  records  and  judicial  proceedings  of  the  courts 
of  any  state  shall  be  proved  or  admitted  in  any  other  court  within 
the  United  States  by  the  attestation  of  the  clerk,  and  the  seal  of 
the  court  annexed,  if  there  be  a  seal,  together  with  a  certificate 
of  the  judge,  chief  justice  or  presiding  magistrate,  as  the  case 
may  be,  that  the  said  attestation  is  in  due  form.  And  the  said 
records  and  judicial  proceedings,  authenticated  as  aforesaid, 
shall  have  such  faith  and  credit  given  to  them  in  every  court 
within  the  United  States  as  they  have  by  law  or  usage  in  the 
courts  of  the  state  from  whence  such  records  are  or  shall  be 
taken."-« 

parte  Smith,  3  McLean  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  N.  Y.  S.  888;  People  v.  Pinkerton,  77 

121,  134,  137,  22  Fed.  Cas.  12968;  Ex  N.  Y.  245;  In  re  White,  55  Fed.  54,  58. 

parte  Reggel,  114  U.   S.  642,  651,  29  5  C.  C.  A.  29.   So,  also,  of  a  record  of 

L.  ed.  250,  5  Sup.  Ct.  1148;  State  v.  a    conviction,   Hughes   v.   Pflanz,    138 

White,    40   Wash.    560,    82    Pac.    907,  Fed.  980,  71  C  C.  A.  234.    The  execu- 

2  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)   563n ;  Cheatham,  tive  warrant  is  prima  facie  proof  tliat 

Ex  parte,  50  Te.x.   Cr.  51,  95   S.   W.  the  accused  is  a  fugitive  from  justice, 

1077.  Ex   parte   Edwards,   91    (Miss.)    621, 

^  Ex  parte  Devine,  74  Miss.  715,  22  44  So.  827. 

So.  3;  Work  v.  Corrington,  34  Ohio  ^'Constitution  of  the  ITnitcd  States, 

St.  64,  32  Am.  345n ;  Ex  parte  Shcl-  article  4,  section  t. 

don,     34     Ohio     St.     319;     State     v.  '""United    States    Statute,    May    26, 

Schlemn,  4  Harr.   (Del.)   577;  People  1790;  United  States  Statutes  at  Large, 

V.   Conlin,   15   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    303,  36  L.  and  B.  Edition    122. 


§  500  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  8l2 

The  attestation  of  the  clerk  which  is  required  l)y  the  statute 
must  be  in  form  the  same  as  that  usually  employed  in  the  state 
wlience  it  comes.  If  the  court  has  a  seal  it  must  be  affixed  to  the 
certificate  of  the  clerk,  while  if  it  has  none  this  fact  must  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  certificate.^^ 

The  certificate  of  the  judge,  to  the  effect  that  the  attestation  is 
in  due  form,  must  show  on  its  face  that  the  judge  certifying  is 
the  chief  or  presiding  judge  at  the  date  of  certifying  the  record.-^ 
It  must  also  show  that  the  clerk  who  attests  is  at  the  date  of  the 
attestation  the  clerk  of  the  court,  and  that  his  attestation  is  in 
due  form.  Where  a  court  has  gone  out  of  existence,  the  clerk  and 
presiding  justice  of  another  court  with  which  it  has  been  consoli- 
dated, or  upon  which  its  powers  and  jurisdiction  have  been  con- 
ferred, may  furnish  the  requisite  certification  and  attestation. 

The  statute,  despite  the  mandatory  character  of  its  language, 
has  been  held  not  to  furnish  an  exclusive  mode  of  authenticating 
public  records.  And  for  the  reason  that  the  statute  refers  ex- 
pressly only  to  courts  having  a  presiding  judge,  a  clerk  and  a 
seal,  it  has  been  held  that  courts  not  of  record,  or  those  having 
only  limited  powers  and  jurisdiction,  were  not  included  in  its 
terms.  The  copies  of  the  records  and  the  proceedings  of  such 
courts  as,  for  example,  courts  of  justices  of  the  peace  and  minor 
municipal  courts,  are  to  be  proved  and  authenticated  according 
to  the  procedure  of  the  state  in  whose  tribunals  they  are  to  be 
used.-"  If  the  requirements  of  the  federal  statute  are  substantially 
complied  with,  a  certified  and  attested  copy  ought  not  to  be  re- 
jected because  of  mere  formal  verbal  and  technical  irregularities, 
as,  for  example,  because  it  does  not  show  the  identity  of  the  ac- 
cused, or  that  the  court  had  competent  jurisdiction,  or  the  facts 
upon  which  his  conviction  was  founded.^** 

§  501.  General  rules  regulating  the  taking  of  evidence  in  foreign 
extradition. — In  all  cases  of  foreign  extradition,  the  taking  of  the 
evidence  and  the  examination  of  the  accused,  so  far  as  these  mat- 

"For   a    full    citation    of   civil    and     Bibb.   (Kj^.)  369,  and  cases  cited  Un- 
criminal  cases,  see  Underbill  on  Evi-     derhill  on  Evidence,  note  4,  p.  224. 
dence,  §  148.  ^  See  Underbill  on  Evidence,  p.  225. 

^Settle  V.  Alison,  8  Ga.  201,  52  Am.     for  cases. 
Dec.  393 ;  Stephenson  v.  Bannister,  3        ^"  See    cases   cited    in    Underbill    on 

Evidence,  §§  148,  159. 


8l3  IXTERXATIOXAL    AXD    IXTERSTATE    EXTRADITION.       §    5OI 

ters  are  not  controlled  bv  statute,  must  be  conducted  according: 
to  the  laws  of  the  state  in  which  the  proceedings  are  had.  If  the 
law  of  that  state  entitles  the  accused  on  his  preliminary  examina- 
tion to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  a  person  under  examination  for 
extradition  is  entitled  to  be  so  examined. ^^  But  generally  the 
rules  and  principles  of  the  English  common  law  as  applied  to 
criminal  charges  are  not  controlling  to  their  fullest  extent  in  cases 
of  international  extradition.  Usually  the  statutes  and  treaties 
provide  for  the  character  of  the  evidence  and  what  form  it  shall 
assume.  Their  provisions  are  controlling  and  under  them  it  has 
been  held  that  the  accused  is  not  entitled  to  be  confronted  with 
the  witnesses  against  him.^" 

So,  too,  the  documentary  evidence,  if  properly  authenticated. 
must  receive  the  same  degree  of  credit  and  weight  as  proof  in  the 
court  wherein  it  is  offered,  as  would  be  accorded  to  living  wit- 
nesses who  give  testimony  personally  in  the  presence  of  that 
court.  ^^ 

The  federal  commissioner  should  keep  a  record  of  all  the  oral 
evidence  taken  before  him,  written  out  in  a  narrative  form  and 
not  by  question  and  answer.  Fie  should  note  therein  all  objec- 
tions to  the  admissibility  of  the  evidence  and  the  grounds  of  such 
objections.  The  party  seeking  the  extradition  of  the  fugitive 
ought  to  furnish  the  commissioner  with  an  accurate  translation 
of  every  piece  of  documentary  evidence  which  is  written  in  a 
foreign  language,  accompanied  by  an  affidavit  sworn  to  by  the 
translator  to  the  effect  that  the  translation  is  correct.^* 

The  statute  provides^ ^  that  the  commissioner  shall  receive  the 
testimony  of  such  witnesses  as  are  offered  by  the  accused.  He 
need  not  adjourn  the  proceedings  in  order  to  permit  the  accused 
to  procure  depositions  to  prove  an  alibi. ^^ 

"7«  re  Fare;:.  7  RIatchf.  C.  C.   (U.  205,  48  L.  cd.  938.  24  Sup.  Ct.  657. 

S.)    345,  8  Fed.   Cas.  4645,  40  How.  "=■/»  re  Farez,  7  Blatchf.  C.  C.  (U. 

Prac.  (N.  Y.)   107.  S.)    345,  8  Fed.   Cas.  4645;   Elias  v. 

"/«  re  Dupan.  2  Lowell  C.  C.   (U  Ramirez,  215  U.   S.  398,  30  Sup.  Ct. 

S.)  TMass.  District  Court)  367,7  Fed.  131. 

Cas.  4120.     The  evidence  of  criminal-  '**/»  re  Henrich,   5   Blatchf.   C.    C. 

ity  must  be  such  as  accordinj?  to  the  (U.  S.)  414.  425,  12  Fed.  Cas.  6369. 

laws  of  the  state  where  he  is  found  "*  3  Fed.  Stat..  §  5280 :  22  U.  S.  Stat, 

justifies  his  apprehension  and  commit-  at  Larpe.  p.  215,  Au^fust  3.  1882. 

mcnf  if  the  crime  had  been  committed  " /«    re  Wadge,    IS   Fed.  864,   aff'.c; 

there.     Pcttit    v.    Walshc,    194    U.    S.  21  Blatchf.  C.  C  (U.  S.)  300. 


S    502  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  814 

It  is  sufficient  if  there  is  some  competent  evidence  of  guilt  or 
that  probable  cause  exists  for  believing  the  accused  guilty.  The 
evidence  of  guilt  need  not  be  conclusixe  nor  must  the  commis- 
sioner be  absolutely  certain  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused. 

^  502.  Authentication  by  consular  certificate  of  warrants  and 
other  papers  used  as  evidence  in  international  extradition. — The 
statute  also  provides  that  where  any  deposition,  warrant  or  other 
papers,  or  copies  thereof,  shall  be  offered  in  evidence  upon  the 
hearing  of  any  case,  in  which  the  extradition  of  an  alleged  fugi- 
tive is  required,  the  same  shall  be  received  as  evidence  for  all  pur- 
poses of  the  hearing  if  they  shall  be  legally  authenticated  so  as  to 
entitle  them  to  be  received  for  similar  purposes  in  the  courts  and 
tribunals  of  the  foreign  country  whence  the  accused  is  alleged  to 
have  escaped.  And  it  is  further  provided  that  the  certificate  of  the 
principal  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  of  the  United  States  resi- 
dent in  such  foreign  country  shall  be  proof  that  any  deposition, 
warrant  or  other  paper  or  copies  thereof,  so  offered,  are  authen- 
ticated in  the  manner  required  by  this  act.^^ 

In  construing  this  statute  the  courts  have  held  that  it  provides 
for  the  introduction  of  two  sorts  of  documentary  evidence.  First. 
Original  depositions,  original  warrants  and  original  "other  pa- 
pers." Second.  Copies  of  any  such  depositions,  warrants  or 
"other  papers,"  which  must  be  originals  or  copies  of  such  orig- 
inals as  are  legally  entitled  to  be  received  in  the  tribunal  of  the 
foreign  country  as  proof  of  criminality  with  respect  to  the  offense 
charged  if  the  inquiry  were  had  in  the  foreign  tribunal.  And  all 
papers  are  to  be  authenticated  according  to  the  law  of  the  foreign 
country.^" 


s-  T  '.. 


'United   States  v.   Piaza,    133  Fed.  crime  by  the  party  held   for  extradi- 

gg8.  tion  "are  properly  and  legally  authen- 

^  United  States  R.  S.,  §5271;  In  re  ticated.   so   as   to   entitle   them   to  be 

Henrich,  5  Blatchf.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  414.  received   for  similar  purposes  by  the 

425,  426,  12  Fed.  Cas.  6369.    See,  also,  tribunals    of    Great    Britain."    is    the 

In  re  Wadge,  16  Fed.  332,  2,Z2-    In  a  proper  form,   and  the  documents  are 

case  of  international  extradition,  the  to  be  received  as  competent  evidence, 

certificate    of    the    American    embas-  In  re  Breen,  73  Fed.  458,  459. 

sador      to      Great      Britain      to     the  ^  In  re  Fowler,  4  Fed.  303,  309.  18 

effect  that  the  papers  containing  the  Blatchf.  C.  C.   (U.  S.)   430. 
evidence    of    the    commission    of    the 


8l5  IXTERXATIOXAL    AND    IXTERSTATE    EXTRADITIOX.       § 


D^O 


It  would  seem  from  the  language  of  the  statute  that  its  provi- 
sions were  mandatory.  But  it  has  been  held  that,  under  certain 
circumstances,  the  certificate,  if  it  is  presented  in  such  a  form  as 
not  to  comply  strictly  with  the  statute,  may  be  aided  and  supple- 
mented by  other  evidence,  either  documentary  or  oral.  Thus, 
where  the  consular  certificate  omitted  to  state  expressly  that  depo- 
sitions were  legally  authenticated  so  as  to  be  receivable  as  valid 
evidence  of  criminality  in  the  courts  of  the  kingdom  of  Prussia, 
it  was  permitted  to  introduce  the  certificates  of  court  officials  of 
that  country  to  the  effect  that  the  depositions  were  proper  and 
valid  evidence.  The  oral  testimony  of  a  police  officer,  to  the  effect 
that  the  depositions  attached  to  the  requisition  papers  had  been 
signed  and  sworn  to  in  his  presence,  that  they  were  originals  and 
that  they  would  be  received  to  show  criminality  in  the  tribunals 
of  the  foreign  country,  is  sufficient  to  supplement  an  insufficient 
authentication  by  a  diplomatic  official.'*'^ 

^  503.  The  competency  of  certified  copies  as  evidence  of  criminal- 
ity.— The  competency  of  the  evidence  offered  in  cases  of  foreign 
extradition  must  be  determined  according  to  the  law  of  the  place 
where  the  proceeding  is  had.  In  the  absence  of  statute,  copies  of 
ex  parte  depositions  taken  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  though  prop- 
erly attested  by  the  clerk  of  the  foreign  court,  are  never  evidence 
of  the  commission  of  a  crime  by  the  accused.'*^ 

If  the  fact  to  be  proved  is  only  the  existence  of  a  foreign  rec- 
ord, as,  for  example,  the  fact  that  the  accused  had  been  convicted 
of  a  crime,  a  certified  copy  of  the  record  is  competent  evidence 
of  that  fact,  even  in  the  absence  of  statute.  But  when  the  fact  to 
be  proved  is  the  commission  of  a  crime  by  the  accused,  and  when, 
as  in  the  present  instance,  such  proof  of  that  fact  is  required  as 
would  suffice  to  commit  him  on  a  preliminary  examination  were 
the  venue  of  the  crime  laid  in  this  country,  then  a  different  ques- 
tion is  presented  and  a  different  rule  applies. 

'"In  re  Wadfic,  15  Fed.  864,  16  Fed.  In  re  Kaine,  14  How.  U.  S.  10.1,  115. 

3.32,    3.34,  21    Rlatchf.   C.   C.    (U.   S.)  116,  144,  146,  14  L.  ed.  345.  10  N.  Y. 

300;   In   re   Fowler,  4  Fed.  303,   312,  Lep.  Observer,  257,  268;  evidence  re- 

18   Blatchf.    C.    C.    CU.    S.)    430,   437,  f|uircd  before  the  issuing  of  the  rov- 

438.  ernor's  warrant,  92  Am.  St.  731,  note. 

"In   re  Wadge,    \U   Fed.   332,   334; 


§    504  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  8l6 

Proof  that  there  is  legal  and  competent  proof  of  criminalitv 
elsewhere  on  file  in  some  other  court  is  never  equivalent  to  proof 
here.  The  documents,  whether  originals  or  copies,  must  be  such 
as  would  be  competent  for  a  similar  purpose,  i.  c,  as  evidence  of 
criminality,  in  the  tribunals  of  the  foreign  country.  The  full  cer- 
tificate of  the  diplomatic  officer  that  they  are  so  is  absolute  and 
conclusive,  and  admits  them  in  the  court  here,  whether  they  are 
originals  or  copies.  But  if  they  are  copies,  and  it  does  not  ap- 
pear either  from  this  certificate  or  from  some  other  competent 
evidence,  either  oral  or  written,  that  copies  of  original  depositions 
are  received  by  the  foreign  court  for  the  purpose  of  proving  crim- 
inality, they  will  not  be  received  for  that  purpose  here.^^ 

vj  504.  Proof  of  foreign  laws  and  treaties  in  international  extradi- 
tion.— In  the  case  of  foreign  extradition,  the  foreign  law.  which 
tlie  prisoner  is  charged  with  breaking,  will  not  be  judicially  no- 
ticed by  the  federal  court. ''^  The  existence,  contents  and  character 
of  the  foreign  law  must  be  proved.  This  may  usually  be  done,  in 
the  case  of  a  foreign  statute,  by  reading  it  from  a  printed  book 
purporting  to  contain  the  statute  in  question ;  and  which  is  prop- 
erly attested  or  authenticated  as  a  true  copy  of  the  statute  by  the 
supreme  executive  authority  of  the  foreign  country :  or  which  is 
otherwise  satisfactorily  proved  to  have  been  published  by  proper 
authority  and  wdiich  is  shown  to  have  been  received  as  ])roof  of 
the  statute  in  the  courts  of  the  foreign  state.**  Doubtless  under 
the  existing  statute  the  certificate  of  the  principal  diplomatic  or 
consular  officer  of  the  United  States,  to  the  effect  that  the  book 
was  authenticated,  so  as  to  entitle  it  to  be  received  for  a  similar 
purpose  in  the  foreign  country,  would  be  sufficient.*^ 

A  practicing  attorney  of  the  foreign  state,  or  some  other  per- 
son, official  or  otherwise,  Avho  has  had  some  practice  in  the  courts 
of  the  foreign  state,  and  who  is  familiar  with  its  laws,  may  testify 
to  his  knowledge  or  opinion  as  to  w'hat  that  law  is.  Such  a  wit- 
ness, called  to  prove  a  foreign  law,  may  refresh  his  memory  by 

^-  In  re  McPhun,  30  Fed.  57,  59.  60;  p.    t,-6,   n.    4,    for    a    full    citation    of 

In    re    Fowler,    4    Fed.    303,    312,    18  cases;  112  Am.  .St.  126.  note. 
Blatchf.  C.  C   (U.  S.)  430,  439.    See,        "*  See  Underbill  on  Evidence,  §  14.3. 

also,  Ex  parte  Ross,  2  Bond.  (S.  Dist.  p.  2ti. 
Ohio)  252,  20  Fed.  Cas.  12069.  "/n  re  Oteiza,  136  U.   S.  330.  2,?>7< 

"  See  Underhill  on  Evidence,  §  242,  34  L.  ed.  464,  10  Sup.  Ct.  1031. 


8l7  INTERXATIOXAL    AND    IXTERSTATE    EXTRADITION.      §    505 

reading  from  text-books  of  authority  and  from  the  reports  of 
cases  decided  in  the  courts  of  the  foreign  country,  and  he  may, 
perhaps,  read  such  books  to  the  court,  provided  he  is  able  to  swear 
that  they  are  admitted  as  authorities  by  the  courts  of  the  foreign 
country." 

All  treaties  entered  into  by  the  government  of  the  United  States 
with  foreign  nations  are,  as  soon  as  they  are  confirmed  by  the 
senate  of  the  United  States,  a  component  part  of  the  supreme 
statutory  law  of  tlie  land.  They  possess  the  character  and  efficacy 
of  an  act  of  congress,  and  are  to  be  regarded  in  that  light  for  all 
purposes  by  tlie  courts  and  by  all  officials  attached  to  them. 
Hence  the  courts,  both  federal  and  state,  will  take  judicial  notice 
of  their  existence,  the  date  upon  which  they  became  law,  their 
contents  and  provisions,  and  the  rights  and  obligations  of  all  par- 
ties, public  and  private,  under  them.'*^ 

So.  too.  the  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the  existence 
of  all  foreign  go\ernments  whose  existence,  either  dc  facto  or 
dc  jure,  has  been  acknowledged  by  the  executi\e  branch  of  the 
federal  government.  Whether  a  government  has  been  thus  ac- 
knowledged is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  proved  when  required  by 
a  certificate  from  the  secretary  of  state,  or,  perhaps,  by  oral  evi- 
dence of  the  fact  that  its  diplomatic  representatives  have  been 
dul}-  received  by  our  government.*'* 

^  505.  Proof  of  laws  in  interstate  extradition. — The  mode  above 
described  for  pro\'ing  foreign  laws  is  applicable  where  the  law 
of  one  state  of  the  Union  is  to  be  proved  in  the  courts  of  another 
state.  But  in  many  of  the  states  the  statutorv  law  of  a  sister  state 
may.  unrler  special  statutes,  be  proved  bv  reading  the  same  from 
a  printed  volume  which,  upon  its  face,  purports  to  contain  the 
statutory  law  of  that  state. "*" 

"^  I'nflcrhill    on    Evidence,    pp.    212,  "See  Underbill  on  Evidence,  §24,^ 

21.^;   112  .'\m.   St.   126,  note.  "Sloan   v.   Terry,  78   Mo.  623;    St. 

"  United     States    v.    Arredondo,    6  Louis,    etc.,    R.    Co.    v.    Weaver,    35 

Peters  (U.  S.)  691,  8  L.  ed.  547;  Fos-  Kan.  412,  11   Pac.  4aS,  57  Am.   I76n; 

ter  V.  Neilson,  2  Peters   fU.  S.)    253,  Eastman  v.  Crosby,  S  Allen    (Mass.) 

314,   7   L.   ed.   415.      .^nd   for   all    full  206;  and   see  cases  fully  cited  m  Un- 

ritation  of  cases  on  this  question,  see  rlerbill  on  Evidence,  p.  213.  and  8  242. 

(  nrlcTliill  (,n  Evidence,  8  242.  p.  37R,  p  377.  note  I;  112  Am  St.  126.  note 
nr)te   I. 

52 — U.N'DKKUII.I.    CRIM      Ev. 


§  50: 


CRIMINAL    F.VTDENCE. 


8l8 


The  federal  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  all  the  state  con- 
stitutions and  of  all  statutes  which  are  applicable  to  the  subject 
of  interstate  extradition.  The  statutory  law  of  the  various  states 
of  the  Union  is  in  no  sense  a  foreign  law  as  regards  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  federal  judges  to  be  pro^•ed  as  the  law  of  a  foreign 
country.  It  must  be  taken  notice  of  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
laws  of  the  United  Stales  are  taken  notice  of  bv  these  courts.^'* 


'"  See     remarks     of     Story,     J.,     in  36  Fed.  841 ;  Jasper  v.  Porter,  2  Mc- 

Owings  V.  Hull,  g   Pet.    (U.  S.)   607,  Lean  C.  C   (U.  S.)   579.  13  Fed.  Cas. 

624,  9  L.   ed.  246;   Jones  v.    Hays,  4  7229;  Gormley  v.   Bunyan,  138  U.  S. 

McLean  C.   C.    (U.    S.)    521,   13   Fed.  623,  34  L.  ed.   1086,   11   Sup.  Ct.  453, 

Cas.  7467;    Hanley  v.  Donoghue,   116  and    see    other    cases    fully    cited    in 

U.  S.  I,  29  L.  ed.  535,  6  Sup.  Ct.  242;  Underbill   on   Evidence,  §242,  p.  373, 

Course  v.  Stead,  4  Dall.   (U.   S.)   22,  n.  13. 
1   L.  ed.  724;  Newberry  v.  Robinson, 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 


EVIDENCE    OF    PREVIOUS    CRIME    TO    IN' CREASE    PENALTY. 


S  506.  Statutes   enhancing  tb.e  punisli- 
ment  of  habitual  criminals. 

507.  Constitutionality    of    legislation 

punishing   habitual    criminals. 

508.  Conviction  of  the  former  crime 

must  have  been  prior  to  the 
commission  of  the  crime  now 
being  tried. 

509.  Effect    of    pardon     of    former 

crime  in  excluding  proof  of 
prior  conviction. 


510.  Setting  out  the   former  convic- 

tion in  the  indictment — Vari- 
ance. 

511.  Effect  of  plea  of  not  guilty. 

512.  Order    of    trying    the    issue    of 

former  conviction. 

513.  Necessity  of  proving  discharge 

from   prison. 

514.  Proof  of  the  prior  conviction — 

How  made. 

515.  Proof  of  the  identity  of  the  ac- 

cused with  the  person  previ.- 
ouslv    convicted. 


§  506.  Statutes  enhancing  the  punishment  of  habitual  criminals. — 
In  England,  and  in  veiy  many  of  llie  states  of  the  American 
Union,  from  the  earliest  times  statntoiy  enactments  have  existed 
hy  \'irtue  of  which  a  severer  punisliment  has  been  inflicted  upon 
the  accused,  if  the  crime  of  which  he  is  convicted  is  a  second,  a 
third  or  a  subsequent  offense.^ 


*  Section  688  of  the  Xew  York 
Penal  Code  provides,  "that  a  person, 
who,  after  having  been  convicted 
within  this  state,  of  a  felony,  *  *  * 
commits  any  crime,  within  this  state,  is 
punishable  upon  conviction  of  such 
second  offense  as  follows:  (i)  If  the 
subsequent  crime  is  such  that,  upon  a 
first  conviction,  the  offender  might 
be  punished,  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court,  by  imprisonment  for  life,  he 
must  be  sentenced  to  imprisonment 
in  a  state  prison  for  b'fe;  (2)  if  the 
subsefjuent  crime  is  such  that,  upon 
a  first  conviction,  the  offender  would 


be  punishal)le  by  imprisonment  for 
any  term  less  than  his  natural  life, 
then  such  person  must  be  sentenced 
to  imprisonment  for  a  term  not  less 
than  the  longest  term  nor  more  than 
twice  the  longest  term,  prescribed 
upon  a  first  conviction."  In  the  state 
of  Massachu.setts  this  matter  is  regu- 
lated by  Statutes  of  1817,  chapter  176, 
which  provide  "that  whenever  any 
person  wdio  shall  l)e  convicted  of 
crime,  before  any  court  competent  to 
try  the  same,  the  punishment  whereof 
shall  be  confinement  to  bard  labor 
for  aiiv  term  of  vears,  shall  li.'ive  been 


(819) 


§    507  CRIMIxXAL    EVIDENCE. 


520 


These  statutes,  it  will  be  observed,  are  highly  penal  in  their 
character,  and  their  application  ought  not  to  be  extended  to  cases 
which  do  not,  by  the  strictest  rules  of  construction,  come  under 
their  provisions.  It  is  clear  that  they  were  intended  by  the  legis- 
lature to  prevent  the  repetition  of  crime  by  the  same  persons  by 
imposing  increased  penalties  upon  old  offenders,  and  inflicting  a 
severer  punishment  upon  the  repetition  of  certain  crimes." 

The  purpose  of  all  these  statutes  is  the  very  laudable  one  of 
reforming  offenders  by  grading  the  punishment  for  crime  in  such 
a  manner  that  a  person  who  has  once  offended  against  the  law, 
and  who  has  been  convicted  and  punished  for  his  crime,  will 
be  deterred  from  a  repetition  of  his  act  by  the  fear  of  an  en- 
hanced punishment  for  a  future  crime.  After  the  conviction  of 
the  earlier  offense,  the  offender  is  given  a  period  for  amendment 
and  reformation,  and  to  enable  him,  if  he  will,  to  return  to  the 
paths  of  rectitude  and  usefulness.  If  he  shall  fail  to  profit  by 
this  opportunity  for  his  moral  rehabilitation  and  shall  con- 
tinue in  his  criminal  career,  he  is  presumed  to  be  incorrigible,  and 
the  law  demands  that  he  shall  be  permanently  secluded  from 
association  with  other  persons  that  they  may  not  be  contaminated 
by  his  pernicious  example. 

§  507.  Constitutionality  of  legislation  punishing  habitual  crimi- 
nals.— The  statutes  enhancing  the  punishment  upon  a  subsequent 
conviction  are  not  open  to  the  objection  that  they  are  ex  post 
facto  laws,  or  in  the  nature  of  such  laws,  or  that  they  are  in 
any   sense  retrospective   in   their  action.^     Nor  can   they,   with 

before  sentenced  to  a  like  punishment  (Mass.)  165,  170;  Ex  parte  Gutierrez, 
by  courts  of  this  or  of  any  other  of  45  Cal.  429;  Com.  v.  Graves,  155 
the  United  States,  whether  such  con-  Mass.  163,  165,  29  N.  E.  579,  16  L. 
vict  shall  have  been  pardoned  or  not,  R.  A.  256;  Sturtevant  v.  Com.,  158 
he  shall  be  sentenced  to  solitary  im-  Mass.  598,  600,  33  N.  E.  648;  Black- 
prisonment,  etc.,  in  addition  to  the  burn  v.  State,  50  Ohio  St.  428,  438, 
punishment  by  law  prescribed  for  the  36  N.  E.  18;  Commonwealth  v.  Get- 
offense  for  which  he  shall  be  tried."  chell,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  452,  453". 
See  IDS  Am.  St.  983,  note.  Kinney  v.  State,  45  Tex.  Cr.  500,  78 

^Ex     parte      Seymour,      14      Pick.  S.  W.  226,  reversed  in  79  S.  W.  570; 

(Alass.)  40,  42.  Commonwealth  v.    Phillips,    11    Pick. 

^Rand  v.   Commonwealth,  9   Gratt.  (Mass.)    28;    Herndon    v.    Common- 

(Va.)    738;    People   v.    Raymond.    96  wealth,  105  Ky.  I97.  48  S.  W.  989.  20 

N.    Y.    38,   40;    Ross'    Case,    2    Pick.  Ky.  L.  11 14,  88  Am.  St.  303;  White 


821                      PREVIOUS    CRIME    TO  IXCREASE    PENALTY.                §    507 

justice,  be  regarded  as  inflicting  or  imposing  a  double  punishment 
for  the  one  offense/  or  as  inflicting  a  cruel  or  unusual  punish- 
ment,"' or  as  putting  the  accused  twice  in  jeopardy  for  the  same 
oft'ense.*^ 

V.    Commonwealth    (Ky.),    50    S.   W.  State  v.  Dowden,   137   Iowa  573,   115 

678,    20    Ky.    L.    1942;    Whorton    v.  N.  W.  211. 

Commonwealth,    7    Ky.    L.   826;    Mc-  "Moore  v.  Missouri,  159  U.  S.  ^^z, 

Donald   v.    Massachusetts,    180   U.    S.  ^77,  40  L.  ed.  301,   16  Sup.   Ct.   179; 

311,  313,  45  L.  ed.  542,  21  S.  Ct.  389;  affirming  Pace  v.  Alabama,  106  U.  S. 

People  V.  Craig,  195  N.  Y.  190,  193,  88  583,  27  L.  ed.  207,  i  Sup.  Ct.  637 ;  and 

N.  E.  38,  reversing  60  ]^lisc.   (N.  Y.)  Leeper  v.   Texas,  139  U.  S.  462,  468, 

529,  112  N.  Y.  S.  781.  35  L.  ed.  225,  ir  S.  Ct.  577;  Kelly  v. 

"People  V.  McCarthy,  45  How.  Pr.  People,  115  111.  583,  4  N.  E.  644,  56 
(N.  Y.)  97;  Chenowith  v.  Common-  Am.  184;  Ingalls  v.  State,  48  Wis. 
wealth  (Ky.),  12  S.  W.  585,  ir  Ky.  647,  658,  4  N.  W.  785;  People  v. 
L.  561 ;  People  v.  Raymond,  96  N.  Y.  Lewis,  64  Cal.  401,  i  Pac.  490.  In 
38,  40;  [Nlaguire  v.  State,  47  Md.  485,  Rand  v.  Commonwealth,  9  Gratt. 
497;  Blackburn  v.  State,  50  Ohio  St.  (Va.)  738,  People  v.  Stanley,  47  Cal. 
428,  438,  36  N.  E.  iS;  Rand  v.  Com-  113,  17  Am.  401;  McDonald  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 9  Gratt.  (Va.)  738,  743;  monwealth,  173  Mass.  322,  53  N.  E. 
People  V.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113,  116,  874,  72,  Am.  St.  293;  State  v.  Hodg- 
17  Am.  401 ;  Ingalls  v.  State,  48  Wis.  son,  (£  Vt.  134,  28  Atl.  1089,  on  page 
647,  4  N.  W.  785;  State  v.  Austin,  113  743,  the  court  says:  "No  constitu- 
Mo.  538,  21  S.  W.  31 ;  Johnson  v.  tional  or  other  obstacle,  however, 
People,  55  N.  Y.  512;  Kelly  v.  Peo-  seems  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  legis- 
ple,  115  111.  583,  4  N.  E.  644,  56  Am.  lature's  passing  an  act  declaring  that 
184;  People  V.  Bosworth,  64  Hun  (N.  persons  thereafter  convicted  of  cer- 
Y.)  72,  19  N.  Y.  S.  114;  Common-  tain  offenses  committed  after  the 
wealth  V.  Marchand,  155  Mass.  8,  9,  passage  of  the  act,  may.  if  shown  to 
29  N.  E.  578;  Commonwealth  v.  have  committed  like  offenses  before. 
Hughes,  133  Mass.  496,  497;  Riley's  be  subjected  to  greater  punishment 
Case,  2  Pick.  (IMass.)  172:  Hopkins  than  that  prescribed  for  those  whose 
V.  Commonwealth,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  previous  course  in  life  does  not  indi- 
460,  467;  State  V.  Benson,  28  Minn,  cate  so  great  a  degree  of  moral  de- 
424,  425,  ID  N.  W.  471 ;  Plumbly  v.  pravity.  One  convicted  under  such  a 
Commonwealth,  2  Mete.  (Mass.)  413,  statute  cannot  justly  complain  that 
415;  State  v.  Austin,  113  Mo.  538,  21  his  former  transgressions  have  been 
S.  W.  31.  brought  up  in  judgment  against  him. 

^  Moore  v.  Missouri,  159  U.  S.  (i7Z,  He    knew,    or    is    presumed    to    have 

(\77,  40  L.  ed.   ,301,   16  Sup.   Ct.   179;  known,  before  the  commission  of  the 

State  V.  Hodgson,  ^  Vt.  134,  157,  28  second    offense,   all   the   penalties    dc- 

Atl.   1089;   People  V.  Stanley,  47   Cal.  nounced   against   it;   and   if,   in   some 

113,  117,  17  Am.  401;  Borck  v.  State  sense,  the  additional  punishment  may 

r-Ma.   1905),  .39  So.   580;  In  re.  Fin-  be    said   to   be    a  consequence   of  the 

ley,    I    Cal.    App.    198,   81    Pac.    1041 ;  first  offense  (inasmuch  as  there  could 


§  5o8 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


§  508.  Conviction  of  the  former  crime  must  have  been  prior  to  the 
commission  of  the  crime  now  being  tried. — Many  of  the  statutes 
regulating  the  punishment  of  liabitual  criminals  expressly  declare 
that  it  must  appear  in  evidence  that  the  subsequent  crime  was 
committed  after  the  date  of  the  prior  conviction  of  the  accused. 
This  rule  requiring  it  to  be  proved  that  the  conviction  of  the 
earlier  crime  antedates  the  commission  of  the  latter  offense 
for  which  the  accused  is  now  on  trial  would  doubtless  apply  even 
where  the  statute  is  silent  on  this  point,  as  otherwise  the  offender 
would  have  had  no  opportunity  to  reform  because  of  the  salu- 
tary discipline  of  the  punishment  which  he  has  received  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  first  conviction." 

The  infliction  of  the  increased  punishment  is  a  consequence 
of  the  failure  to  reform  on  the  part  of  the  accused  after  his  earlier 
punishment.  Hence,  if  the  latter  crime  has  been  committed  ])rior 
to  the  con\-iction,  it  is  no  proof  whatever  that  the  sentence  and 
punishment  under  such  conviction  had  failed  in  their  reforma- 
tory effect  upon  the  accused.^  • 


he  no  sentence  for  such  punishment 
in  the  absence  of  proof  of  the  first 
conviction),  still  it  is  not  a  necessary 
consequence,  but  one  which  could 
only  arise  on  the  conviction  for  the 
second  offense,  and  one  therefore, 
which  being  fully  apprised  of  in  ad- 
vance, the  offender  was  left  free  to 
brave  or  avoid."  In  construing  such 
a  statute  the  court,  in  Commonwealth 
V.  Graves,  155  Mass.  163,  165,  29  N. 
E.  579,  16  L.  R.  A.  256,  said:  "It  is 
prospective  and  not  retrospective.  It 
deals  with  offenders  for  offenses  com- 
mitted after  its  passage,  but  it  pro- 
vides that,  in  considering  the  nature 
of  an  offense  and  the  condition  into 
which  the  offender  is  brought  by  it, 
his  previous  conduct  may  be  regarded. 
*  *  *  It  is  not  unconstitutional  as 
an  ex  post  facto  law.  In  punishing 
offenses  committed  after  its  passage,  it 
punishes  the  offenders  for  a  criminal 
liabit  whose  existence  cannot  be 
proved  without  showing  their  volun- 


tary criminal  act  done  after  they  are 
presumed  to  have  had  knowledge  of 
the  statute.  Such  an  act  is  a  manifes- 
tation of  the  habit,  which  tends  to  es- 
tablish and  confirm  it,  and  for  which 
the  wrongdoer  may  well  be  held  re- 
sponsible." 

''  Long  V.  State,  36  Tex.  6 ;  People 
V.  Butler,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  347; 
Brown  v.  Commonwealth,  100  Ky. 
127,  2>7  S.  W.  496,  18  Ky.  L.  630; 
Brown  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  61 
S.  W.  4,  22  Ky.  L.  1582;  Rand  v. 
Commonwealth.  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  738; 
Commonwealth  v.  Welsh,  2  Va.  Cas. 
57,  IDS  Am.  St.  983,  note;  Sharp  v. 
Commonwealth  (Ky.,  1909)  ;  124  S. 
W.  316. 

*  In  Rand  v.  Commonwealth,  9  Gratt. 
(Va.)  738,  746-748,  the  court  says: 
"The  statute  intended  that  convic- 
tion should  precede  the  second  of- 
fense; that  the  mischief  was  a  want 
of  reformation  by  the  first  punish- 
ment,  and   that  the  previous   convic- 


S23         PREVIOUS  CRIME  TO  INCREASE  TEXALTY.       §  509 

§  509.  Effect  of  pardon  of  former  crime  in  excluding  proof  of  prior 
conviction. — \\'hether  the  fact  that  the  accused  has  been  pardoned 
for  the  prior  crime  will  prevent  a  conviction  of  it  from  being- 
considered  in  enhancing  the  punishment  for  the  subsequent 
one  has  been  differently  determined.  Usually  the  statute  expressly 
provides  that  the  increased  penalty  shall  be  imposed  irrespective 
of  the  mode  in  which  tlie  accused  has  procured  his  discharge 
from  his  previous  imprisonment.  In  one  case,  however,  where 
the  statute  was  silent,  it  was  held  that,  as  a  pardon  relieved  the 
oft'ender  of  all  the  consequences  of  his  crime,  one  of  which  was 
liis  liability  under  the  statute  to  receive  an  additional  punishment 
in  case  of  a  subsequent  conviction,  the  prior  conviction  was 
immaterial.^ 

But  elsewhere  it  has  been  held  that  a  pardon  cannot  be  pros- 
pective in  its  operation,  so  as  to  operate  to  relieve  an  offender 
from  the  consequences  of  a  future  infraction  of  the  criminal 
law.  The  increased  punishment  is  not  one  of  the  consequences 
of  the  former  crime  from  which  the  pardon  relieves  the  prisoner, 
but  grows  out  of  and  is  the  result  of  his  failure  to  reform  prior 
to  the  latter  oft'ense,  upon  which  the  pardon  for  an  earlier  crime 
cannot  legally  operate.^" 

§  510.  Setting  out  the  former  conviction  in  the  indictment — Vari- 
ance.— The  commission  of  the  former  crime  by  the  accused,  its 
nature,  and  the  date  of  its  commission,  together  with  the  fact 
and  date  of  his  conviction  and  sentence,  must  be  set  forth  at 
length   in  the   indictment   or   information.^^     This   is  absolutely 

tion  was  required  as  evidence  that  the  monwealth,  105  Ky.  197,  48  S.  W.  989, 

mild  correction    for   one   offense   had  20  Ky.  L.  11 14,  88  Am.  St.  303;  State 

failed  of  its  effect ;  that  the  legislature  v.    Manickc,    139   Mo.   545,   41    S.   W. 

intended  that  the  culprit  should   first  223;  People  v.  Price,  53  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

hear  the  monitory  voice   of   the   law  185,  6  N.  Y.  S.  833. 
hcfore    the   heavier    doom    should    be        "Evans  v.    State,   150   Ind.  651,  50 

announced."  N.  E.  820;  People  v.  Sickles,   156  N. 

"  Edwards     v.     Commonwealth,     78  Y.  541 ;  57  N.  E.  288,  affirming  26  App. 

\'a.  39,  49  Am.  yjT,  State  v.  Martin,  Div.    (N.   Y.)    470.  47^.  5°   N.    Y.   S. 

50  Ohio  St.  212,  52  N.  E.  188,  69  Am.  },7i;   People  v.  Price,   119  N.  Y.  650. 

St.  762,  43  L.  R.  A.  94.  23  N.  E.   1 149;   People  v.  Craig,  195 

"Mount  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Duv.  N.  Y.  190,  194.  88  N.  E.  38;  Wood  v. 

(Ky.)  93;  Williams  v.  People  196  111.  People,  53  N.  Y.  511  ;  State  v.  Marku- 

173,  63  N.  E.  681;   Hcrndon  v.  Com-  son,  7  N.  Dak.  155,  Ti  N.  W.  82. 


§§    5II~5I2  CRIMINAL    EX'IUENCE.  824 

essential  in  order  that  the  accused  may  be  properly  informed 
of  the  nature  of  the  allegations  against  him  and  that  he  may 
thus  be  enabled  to  prepare  his  evidence  to  confute  and  disprove 
them.^"  It  is  not  necessary  to  set  forth  in  the  indictment  the 
entire  record  of  the  former  trial  and  conviction/^  It  is  enough  if 
the  place  and  the  nature  of  the  crime  are  stated  clearly,  and  the 
details  of  the  conviction  and  sentence,  including  the  date,  are 
given  with  such  precision  as  will  enable  the  court  to  determine 
whether  or  no  the  case  is  within  the  statute/*  In  case  several 
prior  convictions  are  alleged  in  the  indictment  it  is  no  variance 
if  only  one  is  proved/^ 

§  511.  Effect  of  plea  of  not  guilty. — Where  a  prior  conviction  is 
alleged  in  the  indictment,  a  plea  of  not  guilty  generally  puts  the 
fact  of  prior  conviction  in  issue,  as  well  as  the  commission  of  the 
subsequent  crime. ^'^  If  the  accused,  while  pleading  not  guilty, 
voluntarily  confesses  a  former  conviction  as  laid,  it  is  enough, 
and  the  jury  may  accept  his  admission  as  conclusive.^"  But  when 
the  accused,  on  his  arraignment,  pleads  not  guilty  merely,  and 
says  nothing  as  to  his  prior  conviction,  he  cannot  be  asked  on 
arraignment  if  he  has  been  previously  convicted  of  crime.^* 

§  512.  Order  of  trying  the  issue  of  prior  conviction. — Where  the 
accused  pleads  not  guilty  generally  and  an  indictment,  contain- 
ing an  allegation  of  his  former  conviction,  is  read  to  the  jurors, 

"^Maguire    v.    State,    47    Md.    485,  Pick.  (Mass.)  40.  42;  £.r  />ar/'t'  Dick, 

496;    Plumbly    V.    Commonwealth,    2  14  Pick.   (Mass.)  86,  88. 

Mete.   (Mass.)   413.    The  general  rule  '"People   v.    Carlton,    57    Cal.    559; 

is  that  the  indictment  must  contain  an  People  v.  Lewis,  64  Cal.  401,   i    Pac. 

averment  of  every  fact   necessary  to  490;   People  v.  Gutierrez,  74  Cal.  81, 

justify    the    infliction    of    the    proper  83,  15  Pac.  444;  Ex  parte  Young  Ah 

punishment.  Gow,   73   Cal.   438,  442,  445,    i5    Pac 

'^Plumbly     V.      Commonwealth,     2  76;  Hines  v.  State,  26  Ga.  614.    Contra 

Mete.  (Mass.)  413.  Thomas  v.   Commonwealth,  22  Gratt. 

"Wilde  V.   Commonweahh,  2  Mete.  (Va.)  912,  916. 

(]\Iass.)  408,  410.  "ii.r  parte  Young  Ah  Gow,  7^,  Cal. 

''Reg.  V.   Clark,  6  Cox   C.    C.   210.  438,  15  Pac.  76. 

Where   proof   of   a    conviction    for   a  '^^  Ex  parte  Young  Ah  Gow,  7^,  Cal. 

term  of  years  is  required,  proof  of  a  438,  446,  15  Pac.   76;   People  v.  King, 

conviction  for  at  least  two  years  must  64  Cal.  338,  30  Pac.  1028. 
be    proved.     Ex    parte    Seymour,    14 


525         PREVIOUS  CRIME  TO  INCREASE  PENALTY.       §  5 12 

it  is  extremely  probable  that  the  fact  of  his  former  conviction, 
as  thus  called  to  their  attention,  will  prejudice  him  greatlv  in 
their  minds,  and  tend  to  make  them  think  that  his  prior  character 
is  bad.^°  Notwithstanding  this  it  is  always  proper,  in  the  absence 
of  a  statute  providing  a  contrary  rule,  that  the  indictment  should 
be  laid  before  the  jury  and  read  to  them.  And  usually  the  state 
is  permitted  to  put  in  the  record  of  the  prior  conviction  as 
a  part  of  its  case  before  the  verdict  is  reached  on  the  substantive 
crime.'"  Often  by  statute  it  is  enacted  that  if  the  accused  admits 
the  prior  conviction,  and  that  he  was  the  person  thus  convicted, 
the  part  of  the  indictment  relating  thereto  need  not  be  read  to  the 
jurors,  nor  have  they  any  right  or  occasion  to  consider  it  in  any 
way.  No  evidence  of  any  sort  relating  to  the  prior  conviction 
can  then  be  produced  before  them,  nor  can  they  be  charged 
thereon  by  the  court. "^  But  in  New  York  it  has  been  held  that  as 
a  prior  conviction  is  a  fact  of  criminality  which  the  state  must 
prove,  the  admission  of  a  prior  conviction  by  counsel  for  the 
accused  does  not  preclude  the  state  from  proving  it,  particularly 
where  the  admission  does  not  concede  the  prior  conviction  as 
alleged  in  the  indictment  and  is  made  after  the  state  has  begun  its 
case.'' 

By  virtue  of  the  discretionary  power  of  the  court  to  regulate 
its  own  procedure,  the  court  may  withhold  from  the  jurors  the 
issue  of  former  conviction  until  after  a  verdict  is  reached,  and 
may  then  determine  the  issue  by  taking  judicial  notice  of  the 
prior  conviction,  or  by  the  production  of  the  record.  But  where 
this  is  done  it  may  be  that  the  issue  of  the  identity  of  the  accused 

"Commonwealth      v.      Morrow,     9  Smith,  129  Iowa  /C),   106  X.  W.   187, 

Phila.   (Pa.)  583.  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  539n. 

-"  Maguire    v.    State.    47    Md.    485,  ■'■  People  v.  Meyer,  73  Cal.  548.  .S49. 

497;   State  V.   Manicke,   139  Mo.   545,  550,  15  Pac.  95;  Ex  parte  Young  \\\ 

41  S.  W.  223;  People  V.  Sickles,  156  N.  Gow,  72,  Cal.  438,  443-451,  IS  Pac.  7^^ 

Y.    541,    51    N.    E.    288,    followed    in  construing  sections  1093,  1158  of  Cali- 

People  V.  Craig,   195  N.  Y.   190,   194.  fornia  Code. 

88   N.    E.   38;   which   expressly  holds  "People   v.   Jordan,   125   .App.    Div. 

that  a  prior  conviction  is  an  essential  (N.  Y.)   522,   109  N.  Y.  S.  840.    The 

element  of  the  criminality  of  the  pris-  rule  is  the  same  as  to  the  right  of  the 

oner  and  that  it  may  and  in  fact  must  state  to  prove  a  prior  conviction  even 

be  proved  by  the  state  as  a  part  of  its  when  it  was  conceded  before  the  jury 

case.    Compare    McWharter  v.    State,  was    impanelled.     People    v.    .Sickles, 

118   Ga.   55,  44   S.   E.   873;    State   v.  156  N.  Y.  541,  51  N.  E.  288. 


§§    5I3~5I4  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  826 

with  the  man  mentioned  in  the  record  ma}'  come  up,  and  this  issue 
of  identity  cannot  then  be  tried  by  the  jury  to  whom  it  of  right 
belongs. 

In  England  it  is  provided  by  statute^''  tha*  the  accused  shall 
only  be  called  on  to  plead  to  so  much  of  the  indictment  as  charges 
th.e  subsequent  offense.  If  he  pleads  guilty,  or  is  found  guilty,  he 
shall  then  be  asked  whether  he  has  previously  been  convicted,  and 
if  lie  denies  that  he  has  the  jury  may  determine  the  fact.'"' 

§  513.  Necessity  of  proving  discharge  from  prison. — Where  the 
statute  provides  in  terms  for  a  subsequent  crime  committed  "after 
a  conviction  and  a  discharge  from  prison,  by  reason  of  expira- 
tion of  sentence  or  pardon/'  it  will  be  necessary  not  only  to 
prove  the  conviction  but  the  discharge  from  prison  as  well.  The 
fact  of  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  imprisonment  or  the  pardon 
is  material  and  must  be  affirmatively  proved.  Neither  can  be 
presumed  from  mere  lapse  of  time,  so  as  to  require  that  the 
accused  shall  be  compelled  to  prove  that  he  was  not  discharged. -'' 
The  fact  of  the  discharge  may  be  proved  by  a  certified  copy  of 
the  prison  record  where  such  a  record  is  admissible  by  statute, 
or  by  the  oral  testimony  of  a  prison  official  who  has  a  competent 
knowledge  of  the  fact.  The  mode  of  proving  pardons  is  else- 
where fully  elucidated.'*' 

^  514.  Proof  of  the  prior  conviction — How  made. — The  prior  con- 
viction of  the  accused  can  only  be  proved  by  the  production  in 
court  of  an  attested  or  duly  authenticated  copy  of  the  record, 
which  usually  must  be  certified  as  a  true  copy  by  the  clerk,  under 
the  seal  of  the  court,  if  it  have  a  seal.'"   A  statute  which  provides 

■^24  and  25  Vic,  ch.  96,  §  116.  and  "' Maguire  v.  State.  47  Md.  485.  497; 

ch.  99,  §  2,-].  Reg.  V.  Clark,  20  Eng.  L.  &  E.  582; 

=*Reg.  V.  Fox,  10  Cox  C.  C.  502;  Commonwealth  v.  Miller,  8  Gray 
Reg.  V.  }^Iartin,  L.  R.  i  C.  C.  214;  (Mass.)  484,  485;  Kane  v.  Common- 
Reg.  V.  Hilton,  8  Cox  C.  C.  87,  5  Jur.  wealth,  109  Pa.  St.  541,  545;  Com- 
N.  S.  47,  28  L.  J.  M.  C.  28,  7  W.  R.  monwealth  v.  Phillips,  11  Pick. 
59;  Reg.  V.  Woodfield,  16  Cox  C.  C.  (Mass.)  28,  30;  Commonwealth  v. 
314.  Hughes,    133   Mass.  496,  497:    Rector 

"•''Wood   V.    People,    53    N.    Y.    511,  v.    Commonwealth,    80    Ky.   468,   470, 

514.  construing    Kentucky    General     Stat- 

'"See  ante,  §  208.  utes,   chap.  25,  art.   i,  §   12;   State  v. 


827  PREVaOUS    CRIME    TO    INCREASE    PENALTY.  §    515 

for  proof  of  previous  conviction  by  the  record  lets  in  only  the 
A'crdict,  judgment  of  conviction  and  sentence,  and  the  previous 
indictment  is  inadmissible.'^  Nor  can  the  prosecution  show  the 
facts  relating  to  the  prior  offense.  Sometimes  the  docket  entries 
of  the  clerk  have  been  received  when  no  other  record  has  been 
kept,  or  where  the  record  was  not  made  up.""  And  in  case 
documentary  evidence  cannot  be  procured  the  prior  conviction 
may  be  proved  by  parol,  if  no  objection  is  made.^° 

The  issue  of  the  prior  conviction  of  the  prisoner  is  for  the 
jury,  involving,  as  it  does,  a  question  of  the  identity  of  the  per- 
son now  accused  with  the  person  whose  name  is  mentioned  in 
the  record  of  the  prior  conviction. ^^  It  has  been  held  that  proof 
of  a  prior  conviction  is  not  open  to  the  objection  that  it  tends  to 
prejudice  the  jury  by  showing  that  the  accused  has  been  guilty 
of  a  separate  and  independent  crime ;  or  because  it  tends  to 
establish  his  bad  character  before  he  has  put  his  character  in 
issue,  as  the  purpose  of  this  evidence  is  not  solely  to  prove  bad 
character.^"  The  state  is  not  bound  to  prove  as  a  part  of  its 
case  that  the  prior  conviction  had  not  been  vacated,  set  aside  or 
reversed,  and  if  such  be  the  case  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the 
accused. ^^ 

§  515.  Proof  of  the  identity  of  the  accused  with  the  person  previ- 
ously convicted. — Tht  identity  of  the  accused  with  him  who  was 
previously  convicted  must  be  proved  and  the  burden  of  proof  is 

Vaughan,  199  Mo.  108,  97  S.  W.  879;  that   a    sentence    was   had.     State   v. 

Oliver  V.  Commonwealth,  113  Ky.  228,  Hines,  68  Me.  202,  203. 

67  S.  W.  983,  24  Ky.  L.  84;  People  v.  "State  v.  Lashus,  79  Me.  504,  506, 

Meyer,  y^  Cal.   548,    15    Pac.  gs;  Ex  11    Atl.    180;    State   v.    Robinson,    30 

parte  Young  Ah  Gow,  73  Cal.  438,  15  Me.  150,   155;  State  v.   Spaulding,  61 

Pac.   76;    Mitchell    v.   State,    52   Tex.  Vt.  505,   17  Atl.  844;   State  v.   Frec- 

Cr.  :i7,   106  S.   W.    124,   105  Am.   St.  man,  27  Vt.  523,  527;  State  v.  Hayncs, 

983,  note;  People  v.  Kochlcr,  146  111.  35  Vt.  570,  572;   Rector  v.  Common- 

App.  541.  wealth,  80  Ky.  468,  471 ;  Maguire  v. 

-*Tall  V.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  no  State,  47  Md.  485,  497- 

S.  W.  425,  33   Ky.  L.    541.    Nor  can  ^Johnson  v.   People,  55  N.  Y.  512, 

the  prosecution  show  the  facts  relat-  514,  affirming  65   Barb.    (N.  Y.)    342. 

ing  to  the  prior  ofTen.se.  and  compare  Kane  v.  Commoiiwfaltli, 

'^  State  V.    Hines,  68   Me.  202,  203;  109  Pa.  St.  541,  54.=^- 

State  V.  Neagle,  65  Me.  468,  469.  °^TaIl  v.  Connnonwealth  (Ky.),  no 

•■^' State  V.  Rockett.  87  Mo.  666.   'Ihe  S.  W.  4-'5.  n  Ky.  L.  541. 
certificate  of  the  clerk  need  not  show 


§  515 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


828 


on  the  state."'*  The  question  whether  the  person  who  was  con- 
victed at  the  former  trial  is  identical  with  the  person  who  is  now 
accused,  and  who  is  now  on  trial,  is  one  of  fact  for  the  jury.^^ 
The  defendant's  admission  of  identity  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
establish  it.''"  But,  in  the  absence  of  this,  the  identity  must  be 
proved."*' 

The  identity  of  the  name  of  the  convict  mentioned  in  the 
record  witli  the  name  of  the  prisoner  at  the  bar,  is  some  evidence 
of  identity  of  person.  Whether  it  shall  be  conclusive  depends 
on  the  connecting  circumstances.^^  In  most  cases,  however, 
identity  of  name  alone  is  not  sufficient,^"  but  ought  to  be  supple- 
mented by  other  evidence,  preferably  by  that  of  an  eye-witness 
of  the  former  trial  or  by  that  of  some  accjuaintance  of  the 
prisoner.""^ 

It  is  never  necessary  to  produce  an  eye-witness  who  can 
swear  of  his  own  knowledge  that  he  saw  the  accused  convicted.'*' 
The  proof  of  the  identity  may  relate  to  the  identity  while  the 
accused   was   in  custody   under   the   prior    sentence.*"     In   con- 


^  State  V.  Smith,  129  Iowa  709,  106 
N.  W.  187,  4  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   539n. 

""  State  V.  Freeman,  27  Vt.  5^23 ; 
State  V.  Haynes,  35  Vt.  570,  572 ; 
Hines  v.  State,  26  Ga.  614;  State  v. 
Lashus,  79  Me.  504,  11  Atl.  180. 

""  Kane  v.  Commonwealth,  109  Pa. 
St.  541,  545. 

^'  Commonwealth  v.  Briggs,  7  Pick. 
(Mass.)  177,  179;  Reg.  v.  Leng,  i  F. 
&F.77. 

"*  State  V.  Lashus,  79  Me.  504,  506, 
II  Atl.  180;  State  V.  Court  (Mo., 
1910),  125  S.  W.  451. 

^  State  V.  Smith,  129  Iowa  709,  106 
N.  W.  187,  4  L.  R-  A.  (N.  S.)  539n; 
Reg.  V.  Lev3^  8  Co.x  C.  C.  73 ;  Reg. 
V.  Crofts,  9  C.  &  P.  219,  38  E.  C.  L. 
137;  Reg.  V.  Leng,  i  F.  &  F.  77. 

*"  See,  also,  atite  cases,  cited  page 
668,  note  20,  as  to  identity  of  persons 
named  in  marriage  certificates.  In 
the  case  of  State  v.  Lashus,  79  ^le. 
504,  506,  II  At!.  180,  the  court  said: 
"The    identity    of    the    defendant    on 


trial,  with  the  person  named  in  the 
record  is  a  question  of  fact.  The 
identity  of  name  is  some  evidence  of 
identity  of  person,  more  or  less  potent, 
according  to  connecting  circum- 
stances, but  it  is  not.  certainly  in  this 
case,  sufficiently  conclusive  to  author- 
ize the  court  to  take  it  from  the  jury." 

''  Reg.  V.  Leng,  i  F.  &  F.  77,  78. 

■■■  Thus,  in  an  English  case,  evi- 
dence that  the  prisoner  was  brought 
to  the  Leeds  Borough  Gaol  under  a 
warrant  which  is  produced,  which  is 
signed  bj'  the  same  magistrate,  which 
bears  the  same  date,  having  the  same 
names  of  prosecutor  and  prisoner,  and 
for  the  same  offense,  and  having  the 
same  kind  and  duration  of  punish- 
ment as  was  imposed  under  the  com- 
mitment, and  which  are  recited  in  the 
certificate  of  the  record,  has  been  held 
sufficient  to  prove  identity.  Reg.  v. 
Leng,  I  F.  &  F.  77,  78.  In  Reg.  v. 
Crofts,  9  C.  &  P.  219,  the  governor  of 


829 


PREVIOUS    CRIME    TO    INCREASE    PENALTY. 


§    515 


tlusion  it  may  be  said  that  the  principal  crime  charged  for  which 
the  accused  is  now  on  trial  will  be  presumed  to  be  the  only  one 
that  the  accused  has  ever  committed  until  the  contrary  is 
proved/^ 


the  gaol  was  permitted  to  testify  on 
the  issue  of  identity  as  follows :  "The 
prisoner  was  in  mj'  custody  before  the 
Newbury  Borough  Sessions,  in  Oc- 
tober, 1837;  I  sent  him  to  Newbury  at 
that  time ;  I  was  not  at  the  trial,  but 
I    received  him   back    with   an   order 


from  the  Newbury  Sessions ;  and  he 
remained  in  my  custody  for  four 
months  under  that  sentence."  This 
was  held  sufficient. 

"  Kilbourn  v.  State.  9  Conn.  560, 
563;  People  V.  Cook,  45  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
34.  37;  I  Bish.  Cr.  Law,  §  961. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 


newly-disco\-eri-:d  kn'tdence. 


§  516.  General  considerations. 

517.  Diligent   efforts   to  find   and   to 

procure   the   evidence   in   sea- 
son must  be  shown. 

518.  Burden  of  proof — The  new  evi- 

dence must  be  set  out  in   the 
affidavits. 


§519.  Credibility  of  the  new  evidence. 

520.  Materiality  and  relevancy  of  the 

newly-discovered   evidence. 

521.  Xew        evidence        impeaching 

merel}^ 

522.  The  new  evidence  must  not  be 

cumulative  merely. 


§  516.  General  considerations. — In  tlie  absence  of  a  permissive 
statute,  a  court  has  no  power  to  grant  a  new  trial  in  case  of  a 
felony  on  account  of  newly-discovered  evidence.  As  regards 
misdemeanors,  a  court  possessing  general  jurisdiction  has  inher- 
ent power  at  common  law  to  grant  a  new  trial  on  motion,  if  it 
shall  appear  that  justice  will  be  advanced  thereby.  So  far  as 
felonies  are  concerned,  the  right  of  the  accused  to  a  new  trial, 
upon  the  grounds  of  newly-chscovered  evidence,  is  wholly  the 
creature  of  statutes,  which  usually  pro^■ide  for  the  cases  in  which 
the  right  may  be  recognized,^  and  the  mode  in  which  its  exercise 
may  be  secured.  The  right  to  a  new  trial  is  never  al)solute." 
Whether  a  new  trial  shall  be  granted  upon  the  grounds  of 
newly-discovered  evidence  is  in  the  legal  discretion  of  the  court. 
If  this  discretion  is  exercised  in  a  legal  and  proper  manner,  the 


'  "Where  it  is  made  to  appear,  by 
affidavit,  that  upon  another  trial,  the 
defendant  can  produce  evidence  such 
as,  if  before  received,  would  probably 
have  changed  the  verdict ;  if  such  evi- 
dence has  been  discovered  since  the 
trial,  is  not  cumulative ;  and  the  fail- 
ure to  produce  it  on  the  trial  was  not 
owing  to  want  of  diligence.  The 
court  in  such  cases  can,  however, 
compel  the  personal  appearance  of  the 
affiants  before  it  for  the  purposes  of 


their  personal  examination  and  cross- 
e.xamination,  under  oath,  upon  the 
contents  of  the  affidavits  which  they 
subscribed."  N.  Y.  Code  Criminal 
Procedure,  §  465,  subd.  7. 

-State  V.  Pell  (Iowa,  1909),  119  N. 
W.  154;  People  V.  Jones,  115  N.  Y. 
S.  800;  Byers  v.  Territory,  i  Okla. 
Cr.  (^-/T,  100  Pac.  261,  103  Pac.  532; 
I'homas  v.  State,  129  Ga.  419-  59  S.  E. 
246. 


(830) 


831 


XEWLY-DISCOVERED    EVIDEXCE. 


§    517 


action  of  the  court  denying  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  is  not 
reversible.  But  if  the  discretion  of  the  court  is  exercised  arbi- 
trarily or  capriciously,  or  in  such  a  manner  as  to  work  a  manifest 
injustice  to  an  innocent  person,  so  that  it  can  be  said  to  be  clearly 
and  unmistakably  abused,  the  action  of  the  court  will  not  be 
regarded  as  final. ^ 

§  517.  Diligent  efforts  to  find  and  to  procure  the  evidence  in  sea- 
son must  be  shown. — The  accused,  when  moving  for  a  re-trial  u])on 
the  grounds  of  newly-discovered  evidence,  must  show  by  affida- 
A'its  that  he  used  due  diligence  to  procure  the  exiclence  in  time 
for  use  at  the  trial  if  he  knew  of  its  existence  prior  to  his  con- 


^  People  V.  Trezza,  i2cS  N.  Y.  529, 
28  N.  E.  533,  8  N.  Y.  Cr.  291,  295; 
People  V.  Lane,  31  Hun  (N.  Y.)  13, 
15;  Commonwealth  v.  Ruisscau,  140 
Mass.  363,  365,  5  N.  E.  166;  People 
V.  Demasters,  109  Cal.  607,  608,  42 
Pac.  236;  People  v.  Urquidas,  96  Cal. 
239,  242,  31  Pac.  52;  People  v.  Sut- 
ton, 72  Cal.  243,  15  Pac.  86;  United 
States  V.  Williams,  i  Cliff.  C.  C.  5, 
28  Fed.  Gas.  16707 ;  State  v.  Powell, 
51  Wash.  372,  98  Pac.  741;  State  v. 
P>rown,  121  La.  599,  46  So.  664.  It 
may  be  well  in  this  place  to  call  at- 
tention to  the  rule  which,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statute  prescribing  when 
a  motion  for  a  new  trial  must  be 
made,  requires  that  it  shall  be  made 
before  the  e.xpiration  of  the  term  at 
which  the  trial  was  had.  People  v. 
Bradner,  107  N.  Y.  i,  13  N.  E.  87; 
People  V.  Hovey,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
354;  Ex  parte  Holmes,  21  Neb.  324, 
22  N.  W.  69.  In  Chandler  v.  'I'homp- 
son,  .30  Fed.  38,  the  court,  on  page 
44,  says:  "The  statute  conferring  jur- 
isdiction upon  the  Federal  cf)urts  to 
grant  new  trials  expressly  provides 
that  such  power  should  be  exercised 
'for  reasons  which  new  trials  have 
been  usually  grantcrl  in  courts  of  law.' 
This    provision    applies    only   to   jury 


trials,  and  is  directory  to  the  courts, 
to  be  governed  by  the  rules  and  prin- 
ciples of  the  common  law.  The  courts 
of  the  common  law  have  usually 
granted  new  trials  when  the  verdict 
is  against  the  weight  of  the  evidence, 
or  contrary  to  law;  *  *  *  for  the 
admission  of  illegal  evidence,  or  the 
rejection  of  competent  evidence"-  or 
when  a  part}^  has  been  deprived  of 
evidence  by  accident  and  without 
fault  on  his  part,  or  is  taken  by  sur- 
prise in  a  matter  that  he  could  not 
reasonably  anticipate,  for  misdirection 
of  the  court  upon  material  questions 
of  law  or  for  serious  irregularity  in 
the  trial;  or  misconduct  of  the  jury; 
or  unfair  conduct  of  the  prevailing 
party;  or  manifest  injustice  has  been 
done,  *  *  *  when  the  losing  party 
has  discovered  material  evidence  since 
the  trial,  and  satisfied  the  court  that 
he  had  used  due  diligence  in  preparing 
bis  case  fnr  trial;  that  tlic  newly-dis- 
covered evidence  will  tend  to  prove  a 
material  fact  which  was  not  directly 
in  issue  on  the  trial,  or  was  not  then 
known  and  investigated  by  proof,  ;ind 
will  probably  produce  a  different  re- 
sr.lt,  +  *  *  and  is  not  merely  cu- 
nudative." 


§  5: 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


832 


\  iction.  He  must  state  facts  in  the  affidavits  explicitly  and  spe- 
cifically accounting  for  his  failure  to  produce  such  evidence  and 
constituting  a  proper  degree  of  diligence  on  his  part.*  A  mere 
allegation  that  he  used  due  diligence  will  not  suffice.  The  affiant 
ought  to  set  forth  with  reasonable  length  and  with  some  par- 
ticularity the  various  measures  resorted  to  by  him  to  procure  the 
production  of  the  evidence  at  his  trial.  He  ought  also,  if  it  is 
possible,  to  state  the  reasons  why  his  efforts  were  not  successful. 
But  he  must  state  facts,  and  not  mere  conclusions,  opinions  or 
guesses.^ 

The  reasons  for  requiring  the  exercise  of  diligence  by  the 
accused  in  this  connection  are  obvious.  H  the  existence  and  the 
character  of  the  evidence  were  known  to  him  while  his  trial  was 
pending,  and  if  he  could  have  procured  it  in  season  by  the  exer- 


■*  Harper  v.  State,  131  Ga.  771,  63 
S.  E.  339 ;  State  v.  Pell,  140  Iowa  655, 
119  N.  W.  154;  Evans  v.  State,  55 
Tex.  Cr.  649,  117  S.  W.  820;  Williams 
V.  State,  4  Ga.  App.  853,  62  S.  E.  525 ; 
People  V.  Landiero,  192  N.  Y.  304, 
85  N.  E.  132;  Parker  v.  State,  3  Ga. 
App.  336,  59  S.  E.  823 ;  Davis  v.  State, 
52  Tex.  Cr.  149,  106  S.  W.  144;  Rog- 
ers v.  State,  129  Ga.  589,  59  S.  E.  288 ; 
Day  v.  State,  91  Miss.  239,  44  So.  813 ; 
State  V.  Sargood,  80  Va.  412,  68  Atl. 
515,  130  Am.  St.  992;  State  v.  Hall, 
97  Iowa  400,  66  N.  W.  725 ;  Sconyers 
V.  State,  85  Ga.  672,  678,  12  S.  E. 
1069;  Lynch  v.  State,  84  Ga.  726,  730, 
II  S.  E.  842 ;  Statham  v.  State,  86  Ga. 
331,  12  S.  E.  640;  Ford  v.  State,  91 
Ga.  162.  164,  17  S.  E.  103;  Gaddis  v. 
State,  91  Ga.  148,  151,  16  S.  E.  936; 
Meurer  v.  State,  129  Ind.  587,  29  N. 
E.  392;  Aholtz  V.  People,  121  111.  560, 
13  N.  E.  524;  Bean  v.  People,  124  111. 
576,  585,  16  N.  E.  656;  State  v. 
Koontz,  31  W.  Va.  127,  5  S.  E.  328; 
Field  v.  Commonwealth,  89  Va.  690, 
694,  16  S.  E.  865 ;  State  v.  Gunagy, 
84  Iowa  177,  182,  183,  30  N.  W.  882: 
Washington  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr.  154, 


32  S.  W.  693;  Bell  V.  State  (Tex.), 
20  S.  W.  362;  McVey  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  659,  5  S.  W.  174;  State  v. 
Moses,  139  Mo.  217,  40  S.  W.  883; 
State  V.  Musick,  loi  Mo.  260,  14  S.  W. 
212;  State  V.  Lichliter,  95  Mo.  402, 
408,  8  S.  W.  720;  State  v.  Keaveny, 
49  La.  Ann.  667,  21  So.  730 ;  State  v. 
Hanks,  39  La.  Ann.  234,  236,  i  So. 
458 ;  State  v.  Washington,  36  La.  Ann. 
341 ;  People  v.  McCurdy,  68  Cal.  576, 
10  Pac.  207;  People  v.  Jones  (Cal.),  8 
Pac.  611;  People  v.  Freeman,  92  Cal. 
359,  28  Pac.  261  ;  Klink  v.  People,  16 
Colo.  467,  27  Pac.   1062. 

^  State  v.  Crawford,  99  Mo.  74,  80, 
12  S.  W.  354;  Taylor  v.  State,  132 
Ga.  235,  63  S.  E.  1 1 16;  Orr  v.  State, 
5  Ga.  App.  76,  62  S.  E.  676;  Cheek  v. 
State,  171  Ind.  98,  85  N.  E.  779. 
Where  the  accused  submits  proper  af- 
fidavits showing  facts  constituting  dil- 
igence on  his  part,  the  state  may  ofifer 
counter  affidavits  for  the  purpose  of 
proving  that  he  did  not  use  due  dili- 
gence. Smith  V.  State,  143  Ind.  685. 
687,  42  N.  E.  913;  People  v.  Casena, 
90  Cal.  381,  383,  27  Pac.  300. 


833  XEWLY-DISCOVERED    EVIDENCE.  §    518 

cise  of  diligence,  it  was  his  duty  to  do  so  at  the  earhest  oppor- 
tunity/ A  person  indicted  for  a  crime  and  on  trial  cannot  be 
allowed  to  speculate  upon  the  outcome  of  his  trial  and  to  hold  back 
e^•idence  which  he  may  easily  procure,  with  the  hope  and  expecta- 
tion that,  should  the  proof  against  him  be  more  convincing  than 
he  anticipates,  he  can  put  the  state  to  the  additional  expense  of 
another  trial,  at  which  the  evidence  that  he  has  suppressed 
can  be  introduced.  The  law  favors  a  full  discovery  of  all  relevant 
evidence  which  has  a  bearing  upon  the  criminality  of  the  defend- 
ant. It  will  not  permit  the  accused  to  mask  his  batteries,  and, 
having  thus  drawn  all  the  fire  of  the  prosecution,  he  cannot, 
after  having  been  convicted,  take  the  chances  of  a  new  trial  in 
which  everything  would  be  in  his  favor. 

Hence  the  relevancy  of  the  evidence,  its  cogency  and  cred- 
ibility, and  even  the  reasonable  probability  that  its  introduction, 
if  a  new  trial  is  granted,  may  result  in  the  acquittal  of  the 
accused,  will  not  relieve  him  from  the  consequences  of  his  prior 
laches.  < 

sj  518.  Burden  of  proof — The  new  evidence  must  be  set  out  in  the 
affidavits. — The  burden  of  proof  to  show  that  the  accused  has  com- 
plied with  all  the  requirements  of  the  law  is  on  the  party  moving 
for  the  new  trial."  The  motion  for  a  new  trial  must  be  accom- 
[)anied  by  and  be  based  upon  a  proper  affidavit,  sworn  to  by 
the  accused,  showing  in  detail  all  the  essential  jurisdictional  facts, 
unless  some  xalid  reason  exists  for  its  non-production.^ 

So,  too,  all  the  facts  which  constitute  the  newly-discovered 
evidence  ought  to  be  set  forth  at  reasonable  length,  either  in 
the  affidavit  of  the  accused,  or  in  an  affidavit  of  the  witness 
whom  he  expects  to  testifv  to  them.  This  is  absolutely  necessary 
in  order  that  the  court  may  ascertain  the  materiality  and  cred- 
ibility of  the  testimony,  and  may  determine  if  it  be  cumulative  or 
not." 

"People  V.  Landiero,  192  N.  Y.  304,  Laughlin,  27  AIo.  ill;  State  v.  Camp- 

85  N.  E.  132.  bell,  IIS  Mo.  391,  393.  22  S.  W.  2,67; 

'  People  V.  Fice,  97  Cal.  459,  32  Pac.  State  v.  Ray,  53   Mo.  345 ;  Weeks  v. 

531.  State.  79  Ga.  3>^,  3   S.   E.  323:   Hear. 

'State  V.  Laycock,  136  .\lo.  93,  100.  v.  State,  93  Ga.  184,  18  S.  E.  557. 

27  S.  W.  802;  .State  v.  Nagel,  136  Mo.  •  State  v.  Moses,  139  Mo.  217,  49  S. 

45,  50,  2,7   S.   W.  821;    State  v.    Mc-  W.  883;  State  v.  Ilollier,  49  La.  Ann. 
53 — Underhill  Cki.M.  Ev. 


§519  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  834 

j^  519.  Credibility  of  the  new  evidence. — As  a  result  of  the  re- 
quirement that  the  new  evidence  must  be  such  as  would,  had 
it  been  introduced  at  the  trial,  have  probably  resulted  in  the 
acquittal  of  the  accused,  it  is  necessary  that  it  shall  appear  to 
the  court  hearing  the  motion  that  it  is  probably  true.^" 

The  witness  who  is  expected  to  testify  must  appear  to  the  court 
to  be  credible.  His  credibility  is  to  be  determined  by  the  judge 
hearing  the  motion,"  who  may  examine  him  in  open  court,  and 
he  may  also  examine  any  other  person  who  has  made  an  affidavit 
which  is  offered  to  support  the  motion  in  order  to  test  his  cred- 
ibility.^" And  the  prosecuting  attorney  may  submit  affidavits 
of  persons  who  know  the  reputation  for  veracity  of  the  proposed 
witness,  and  who  are  able  and  willing  to  swear  that  they  would 
not  believe  him  under  oath.^^ 

The  admission  by  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  that  he  had 
sworn  falsely  at  the  trial  does  not  alone  constitute  new  evidence. 
Even  though  he  shall  state  that  he  deliberately  gave  false  testi- 
mony to  some  material  facts,  and  it  shall  also  appear  that  the 
conviction  of  the  accused  was  largely  owing  to  his  testimony,  it 
does  not  follow  that  a  retrial  ought  to  be  had  ;  for  the  court  may 
not  believe  his  present  statement  is  true  and  made  in  good  faith. 
But  if  the  present  statement  of  the  witness  is  so  far  contradictory 

371,  21   So.  6s3;   People  v.   Eppinger,  Pro.,  §  465,  subd.  7;  Johnson  v.  State, 

114  Cal.  350,  46  Pac.  97;  Richardson  85    Ga.    561,    11    S.    E.   844;    Neill    v. 

V.  State,  47  Ark.  562,  2  S.  W.   187;  State,  79  Ga.  779,  4  S.  E.  871;  State  v. 

Slater  v.   United    States,    i    Okl.    Cr.  Tall,   43    Minn.    273,   45    N.   W.  449; 

275,  98  Pac.  no.    In  a  case  where  the  People  v.    Noonan,    14  N.  Y.   S.   519, 

accused  moved  for  a  new  trial  on  the  60  Hun    (N.   Y.)    578,  without   opin- 

ground  that  another  person  had  con-  ion,    38    St.    Reporter    (N.    Y.)    854; 

fessed  the   commission   of   the   crime  People  v.  Lane,   i   N.   Y.  Cr.  548,  31 

of  which  he  stood  convicted,  he  was  Hun    (N.   Y.)    13;    People  v.   Henry, 

required  to   state   in  his  affidavit  the  127   App.  Div.    (N.   Y.)    489,   in    N. 

name  of  the  person,  his  residence  and  Y.  S.  1005. 

whether  his  attendance  could  be  pro-  "People  v.  Shea,  16  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 

cured   in    season.     State   v.    Miller,   3  in,  38  N.  Y.  821. 

Wash.  St.  131,  28  Pac.  375.  "^  Moore  v.   State.  96  Tenn.  209,  33 

"Lawrence    v.    State,   36    Tex.    Cr.  S.    W.    1046;    Glidewell    v.    State,    15 

173,  36  S.  W.  90;  Clark  v.  State,  38  Lea    (Tenn.)    133;    N.    Y.    Code    Cr. 

Tex.  Cr.  30,  40  S.  W.  992;  Grant  v.  Pro.,  §  465,  and  see  United  States  v. 

State,  97  Ga.  789,  25  S.  E.  399;  People  Angney,  15  Wash.  Law  Rep.  560. 

V.  Mayhew,  19  ]\Iisc.   (N.  Y.)  313,  44  "Grant  v.  State,  97  Ga.  789,  25  S. 

N.    Y.    206,    construing    Code    Crim.  E.  399. 


83: 


NEWLY-DISCOVERED    EVIDEXCE. 


§    0 


20 


of  his  previous  testimony  as  to  wholly  obliterate  it  and  destroy  its 
effect,  the  court  ought  to  grant  a  retrial  if  it  believes  the  state- 
ment to  be  credible/'* 

§  520.  Materiality  and  relevancy  of  the  newly-discovered  evidence. 
— The  accused  must  show  by  affidavits  that  the  new  evidence 
would  have  been  material  if  it  had  been  offered  at  his  trial  and, 
had  it  been  produced  and  admitted,  that  it  would  have  probably 
resulted  in  his  acquittal. ^^  It  must  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  court  that,  if  a  new  trial  is  granted,  it  is  reasonably  probable 
that,  on  the  introduction  of  the  new  evidence,  the  accused  will 
be  acquitted.  If  the  new  evidence  is  so  weak,  unsatisfactory  or 
inconclusive,  or  if  it  is  so  far  reconcilable  with  the  guilt  of  the 
accused,  that  it  will  not  bring  about  a  different  result,  then,  as 
a  new  trial  would  be  useless,  it  will  not  be  granted. 

The  moving  j)art3'  must  show  that  the  new  evidence  would 
have  been  admitted  as  relevant  to  show  his  innocence  had  it  been 
offered  on  his  former  trial.  The  irrelevancy  of  the  evidence  alone 
may  prevent  the  granting  of  a  new  trial.  On  the  other  hand 
mere  relevancy  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  admit  the  evidence  if 
it  is  incredible,  cumulative,  unconvincing  or  otherwise  unsatis- 
factory.'*' 


"Dennis  v.  State,  103  Ind.  142,  151, 
2  X.  E.  349. 

"Taylor  v.  State,  132  Ga.  235,  63 
S.  R  1 1 16;  Reyes  v.  State,  55  Tex. 
Cr.  422,  117  S.  W.  152;  Howell  v. 
State,  5  Ga.  App.  612,  63  S.  E.  600; 
Weatherby  v.  State  (Miss.,  1909),  48 
So.  724;  Fleming  v.  State,  54  Tex. 
Cr.  339,  114  S.  VV.  383;  Ludwig  v. 
State,  170  Ind.  648,  85  N.  E.  345; 
Nioum  V.  Commonwealth,  128  Ky. 
685,  108  S.  W.  945,  33  Ky.  L.  62; 
Gibbs  V.  United  Stales,  7  Ind.  T.  182, 
104  S.  W.  583 ;  Washington  v.  State, 
(Tex.  Cr.  1907),  105  S.  W.  789; 
Davis  V.  State,  52  Tex.  Cr.  149,  106 
S.  W.  144;  I-'icld  V.  Commonwealth, 
89  Va.  690,  694,  16  S.  E.  865;  People 
V.  Lane,  i  N.  Y.  Cr.  548.  31  Hnn  (N. 
Y.)   13;  Tollcson  V.  State,  97  Ga.  352, 


23  S.  E.  993;  State  v,  Armstrong,  48 
La.  Ann.  314,  19  So.  146;  People  v. 
Stanford,  64  Cal.  27,  28  Pac.  106; 
Cooper  V.  State,  91  Ga.  362.  18  S.  E. 
303 ;  Williams  v.  United  States,  137 
U.  S.  113,  34  L.  ed.  590,  II  Sup.  Ct. 
43 ;  State  v.  Foster,  79  Iowa  726,  45 
N.  W.  385;  United  States  v.  Smith, 
I  Sawyer  (U.  S.)  277,  27  Fed.  Gas. 
16341 ;  United  States  v.  Gibcrt.  2 
Sumn.  (U.  S.)  19,  25  Fed.  Gas.  15204. 
'"Humphrey  v.  State,  78  Wis.  ^6c), 
47  N.  W.  836;  Field  v.  Common- 
wealth, 89  Va.  690,  694,  16  S.  E.  863 ; 
State  V.  Keaveny,  49  La.  Ami.  667,  21 
So.  730;  Briscoe  v.  State,  95  Ga.  496. 
20  S.  E.  211.  Where  the  new  evidence 
presents  a  theory  of  the  case  utterly 
at  variance  with  the  slatement  of  the 
accused    which   he  made  at  his   trial, 


§§  5-' 1-5^2 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


836 


§  521.  New  evidence  impeaching  merely. — A  motion  for  a  new 
trial  ought  to  be  denied  where  the  evidence  which  the  accused 
proposes  to  introduce  merely  impeaches  that  of  a  witness  at  the 
former  trial  whose  evidence  was  credible  or  fully  corroborated.^'^ 

§  522.  The  new  evidence  must  not  be  cumulative  merely. — A  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial  on  the  ground  of  newly-discovered  evidence 
must  be  denied,  if  it  appears  to  the  court  that  the  evidence  would 
have  been  cumulative  merely  if  it  had  been  introduced  at  the 
trial.'^ 


the  new  trial  was  held  to  be  properly 
refused.  Grant  v.  State,  97  Ga.  789, 
25  S.  E.  399. 

"State  V.  Pell,  140  Iowa  655,  T19  X. 
W.  154;  Bailey  v.  State  (Miss.),  48 
So.  227,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  409; 
Shelton  v.  State,  132  Ga.  413,  64  S.  E. 
262;  Clark  V.  State,  5  Ga.  App.  605, 
63  S.  E.  606;  State  v.  Sebastian,  215 
jMo.  58,  114  S.  W.  522;  Harrolson  v. 
State,  54  Tex.  Cr.  452,  113  S.  W.  544; 
Fletcher  v.  People,  117  111.  184,  189, 
7  N.  E.  80;  Hudspeth  v.  State,  55 
Ark.  323,  18  S.  W.  183 ;  State  v.  Pot- 
ter, 108  AIo.  424,  22  S.  W.  89;  State 
V.  Potts,  83  Iowa  317,  49  N.  W.  845; 
Pease  v.  State,  91  Ga.  18,  19,  16  S.  E. 
113;  Marable  v.  State,  89  Ga.  425,  15 
S.  E.  453;  Statham  v.  State,  84  Ga. 
17,  10  S.  E.  493 ;  Reid  v.  State,  81  Ga. 
760,  8  S.  E.  431 ;  Dominick  v.  State, 
81  Ga.  715,  8  S.  E.  432;  Johnson  v. 
State,  83  Ga.  553,  10  S.  E.  207;  Ram- 
sey V.  State,  89  Ga.  198,  202,  205,  15 
S.  E.  6;  Sutherlin  v.  State,  108  Ind. 
389,  391,  9  N.  E.  298;  Meurer  v. 
State,  129  Ind.  587,  588,  29  N.  E.  392; 
Evans  v.  State,  67  Ind.  68;  Winsett 
V.  State,  57  Ind.  26;  Grate  v.  State, 
23  Tex.  App.  458,  5  S.  W.  245 ;  People 
V.  Loui  Tung,  90  Cal.  y^y,  27  Pac. 
295 ;  Field  v.  Commonwealth.  89  Va. 
690,  694,  16  S.  E.  865;  Whitehurst  v. 
Commonwealth,  79  Va.  556,  559 ;  Read 


V.  Commonwealth.  22  Gratt.  (Va.) 
924;  State  V.  Chambers,  43  La.  Ann. 
1 108,  ID  So.  247.  In  case  the  new  evi- 
dence would  be  merely  cumulative,  or 
would  only  serve  the  purpose  of  im- 
peachment, a  new  trial  should  not  be 
granted  though  the  party  was  sur- 
prised by  the  witness  who  is  to  be 
impeached.  IMeurer  v.  State,  129  Ind. 
587,  588,  29  N.  K  392. 

^*  Young  v.  State,  131  Ga.  498,  62  S. 
E.  707;  People  V.  Probst,  237  111.  390, 
86  N.  E.  588;  State  v.  Turner,  122  La. 
371,  47  So.  685;  State  V.  Bridgham, 
51  Wash.  18,  97  Pac.  1096;  Adams  v. 
State,  55  Fla.  i,  46  So.  152;  Hamblin 
V.  State,  81  Neb.  148,  115  N.  W.  850; 
Rogers  v.  State,  129  Ga.  589,  59  S.  E. 
288;  Clements  v.  State,  80  Neb.  313, 
114  N.  W.  271;  People  v.  Demasters, 
109  Cal.  607,  608,  42  Pac.  236;  People 
V.  Cesena,  90  Cal.  381,  383,  27  Pac. 
300;  People  V.  Urquidas,  96  Cal.  239, 
242,  31  Pac.  52;  People  v.  Hong  Quin 
Moon,  92  Cal.  41,  27  Pac.  1096;  Lang- 
don  V.  People,  133  111.  382,  409,  24 
N.  E.  874;  Fletcher  v.  People,  117  111. 
184,  7  N.  E.  80;  Stalcup  v.  State,  129 
Ind.  519,  522,  28  N.  E.  1 1 16;  Suther- 
lin V.  State,  108  Ind.  389,  391,  9  N. 
E.  298;  Meurer  v.  State,  129  Ind.  587. 
29  N.  E.  392;  Smith  v.  State,  143 
Ind.  685,  688,  42  N.  E.  913;  State  v. 
Tyson,  56  Kan.  686,  44  Pac.  609,  689; 


837 


XEWLY-DISCOVERED    EVIDENCE. 


§    522 


The  court  must  decide  whether  the  evidence  offered  is  cumu- 
lative. Cumulative  evidence  is  additional  evidence  tending  to 
prove  facts  of  the  same  general  character  as  those  supported  by 
other  evidence  previously  produced.  Such  evidence  merely  re- 
peats in  substance  and  effect  what  has  already  been  put  in  proof 
by  other  evidence  of  the  same  character.  Thus,  for  example,  if 
the  accused  has  endeavored  to  prove  an  alibi  at  his  trial,  and  for 
this  purpose  lias  introduced  the  testimou}-  of  one  or  more  wit- 
nesses who  have  sworn  that,  at  the  time  of  the  crime,  he  was  in 
another  place,  the  evidence  of  another  witness  that,  at  the  same 
time,  he  had  seen  him  in  that  place  would  clearly  l)e  cumulati\"e. 
Or.  if  the  issue  in  the  trial  was  his  insanity,  and  he  had  called 
medical  experts  to  sustain  his  allegation  of  mental  incapacity, 
the  testimony  of  other  experts  to  this  same  fact  would  be  cumu- 
lative and  inadmissible.  But  the  new  evidence  is  not  cumulative 
where  it  is  of  a  different  kind  or  character  from  evidence  given  to 
sustain  the  same  point  on  the  prior  trial. ^'^ 


State  V.  Rohrer.  34  Kan.  427,  8  Pac. 
718;  State  V.  Stickney.  53  Kan.  308, 
36  Pac.  714,  42  Am.  St.  284;  State  v. 
Gleason,  68  Iowa  618,  619,  27  N.  W. 
785 ;  State  v.  Johnson.  72  Iowa  393, 
401.  34  X.  W.  177;  State  V.  Potts,  83 
Iowa  317,  319,  49  N.  W.  845;  State  v. 
Wliitmer.  77  Iowa  557.  560,  42  N.  W. 
442;  Scruggs  V.  State,  35  Tex.  Cr. 
622,  34  S.  W.  951 ;  King  v.  State,  91 
Tenn.  617,  20  S.  W.  169;  People  v. 
Peacock,  5  Utah  240.  14  Pac.  332; 
United  States  v.  Eldredge.  5  Utah  161, 
1 3  Pac.  673 ;  Casey  v.  State,  20  Neb. 
138,  29  N.  W.  264;  State  v.  Hendri.x, 
45  La.  Ann.  500.  12  So.  621 ;  State  v. 
Hanks,  39  La.  Ann.  234,  236,  i  So.  458; 
State  V.  Lamothe,  37  La.  Ann.  43,  44; 
Williams  v.  Commonwealth  (Ky.),  18 
S.  W.  364,  13  Ky.  L.  753;  State  v. 
Woodward,  95  Mo.  129,  8  S.  W.  220; 
Tripp  V.   St3te,  95  Ga.  502,  20  S.  E. 


248;  Dale  V.  State.  88  Ga.  552.  561,  15 
S  E.  287;  Greer  v.  State,  87  Ga. 
.S59.  13  S.  E.  552;  Neill  v.  'State.  79 
Ga.  779,  4  S.  E.  871 ;  Bond  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 83  Va.  581,  3  S.  E.  149; 
State  V.  Starnes,  97  N.  Car.  423,  2  S. 
E.  447 ;  State  v.  Workman,  39  S.  Car. 
151,  17  S.  E.  694;  People  v.  Noonan. 
14  N.  Y.  S.  519.  38  N.  Y.  St.  854,  60 
Hun  CN.  Y.)  578.  without  opinion. 

''' Fletcher  v.  People.  117  III.  184. 
190,  7  N.  E.  80,  citing  Wharton  on 
Grim.  PI.  &  Practice,  870;  Long  v. 
State,  54  Ga.  564,  and  see  People  v. 
Leighton,  i  N.  Y.  Grim.  468.  In  Peo- 
ple V.  Lane,  31  Hun  (N.  Y.)  13,  it 
was  held  that  newly-discovered  evi- 
dence of  general  good  character  was 
not  cumulative  when  the  accused  had 
not  offered  any  proof  of  good  charac- 
ter on  his  trial  though  his  character 
for  veracity  had  been  impeached. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 


EVIDENCE   IN    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


5  523.  Bastardy  proceedings — Whether 
criminal  or  civil  in  their 
character. 

524.  Degree  of  proof  required — Doc- 

trine of  reasonable  doubt  not 
applicable. 

525.  Evidence  for  the  jurj'  from  the 

inspection  of  the  child. 

526.  Presumption  of  legitimacy. 

527.  Evidence     rebutting     the     pre- 

sumption of  legitimacy. 

528.  The  relations  of  the  parties. 

529.  Competency    and   credibility   of 

the  prosecutrix. 


§  530.  Variance  in  proving  the  date  of 
the  conception. 

531.  The  reputation  of  the  prosecu- 

trix. 

532.  Sexual    intercouse    with    other 

men  during  the  period  of  ges- 
tation. 

533.  Admissibility  of  the  admissions 

and  declarations  of  the   par- 
ties. 

534.  Evidence  of  the  preliminary  ex- 

amination. 

535.  Evidence    of    compromise    and 

settlement. 


§  523.  Bastardy  proceedings — Whether  criminal  or  civil  in  their 
character. — In  the  absence  of  statute  at  the  common  law  no  re- 
sponsibility rested  upon  the  father  of  an  illegitimate  child  to 
provide  for  its  care,  education  or  maintenance,  or  for  the  expenses 
of  the  lying-in  or  nursing.^  But  at  the  present  time  in  nearly 
every  state  of  the  Union  statutes  exist  casting  this  responsibility 
upon  him,  and  providing  for  enforcing  the  same  by  appropriate 
legal  proceedings,  which  are  usually  commenced  at  the  instance 
of  the  mother.- 


'  Moncrief  v.  Ely,  19  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  405;  Birdsall  v.  Edgerton,  25 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  619;  Vetten  v.  Wal- 
lace, 39  111.  App.  390,  396 ;  Glenn  v. 
State,  46  Ind.  368,  376;  State  v.  Tie- 
man,  32  Wash.  294,  -z},  Pac.  375,  98 
Am.  St.  854. 

^  State  v.  ]\Iize,  117  N.  Car.  780, 
781,  23  S.  E.  330,  Code  N.  Car.,  §  31. 
Some  statutes  provide  that  the  pro- 
ceeding may  be  initiated  by  a  superin- 


tendent or  overseer  of  the  poor  or 
other  similar  ofificial.  Where  such  is 
the  case  the  mother  has  no  power  to 
prosecute  the  proceeding,  or  to  appeal 
from  any  order  which  is  made  there- 
in. People  v.  Ogden.  8  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  464,  40  N.  Y.  S.  827;  People  v. 
Shulman,  8  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  514, 
40  N.  Y.  S.  779;  construing  N.  Y. 
Code  Cr.  Pro.,  §  840.  Cf.  State  v. 
Bunker,  7  S.  Dak.  639,  65  N.  W.  2>Z. 


(838) 


839 


EVIDENCE    IN    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


523 


A  statutory  mode  of  ascertaining  who  is  the  father  of  the 
child  and  of  compelHng  the  father  to  assume  the  responsibihty 
for  its  support,  is  a  bar  to  a  civil  suit  against  him  brought  by  any 
person  who  has  incurred  expense  in  caring  for  or  supporting 
the  child.  ^  \\'hether  the  proceedings  given  by  the  statute  are 
civil  or  criminal  is  a  question  which  has  received  much  considera- 
tion in  the  cases.  In  some  states  the  begetting  of  a  bastard  is 
a  statutory  misdemeanor  ;*  and,  because  of  this  fact,  a  discussion 
of  the  rules  governing  the  procedure  and  the  presentation  of  evi- 
dence in  bastardy  proceedings  will  not  be  out  of  place  in  this 
treatise.  The  current  of  the  authorities  favors  the  view  that  the 
proceedings  under  the  statute  by  virtue  of  which  the  father  of 
the  bastard  is  compelled  to  contribute  towards  its  support^  is  a 


"Thej'  (the  proceedings)  are  partly 
for  the  benefit  of  the  complainant, 
and  may  be  instituted  in  her  name, 
and  partly  for  the  purpose  of  indem- 
nifying the  public,  and  may  be  insti- 
tuted in  the  name  of  the  people."  Sut- 
fin  V.  People,  43  ^lich.  y]>  4  N.  W. 
509;  State  V.  Patterson,  18  S.  Dak. 
251,  100  N.  W.  162. 

'"  Nixon  V.  Perry,  "j-  Ga.  530,  3  S. 
E.  253. 

"State  V.  Ostwalt,  118  N.  Car.  1208, 
1216,  24  S.  E.  660.  2,2  L..  R.  A.  396; 
Myers  v.  Stafford,  114  N.  Car.  689, 
figo,  19  S.  E.  764;  construing  Code 
N.  Car.,  §  35;  State  v.  Cagle,  114  N. 
Car.  835,  19  S.  E.  766;  State  v.  Brun- 
son,  38  S.  Car.  263,  268,  16  S.  E. 
looi,  Z7  Am.  St.  752n,  19  L.  R.  A. 
362;  General  Statutes,  S.  Car.,  §  1582; 
Georgia  Code,  §  4564,  as  amended  by 
Act  of  March  20,  1866;  Cady  v.  St. 
Clair  Cir.  Judge,  139  Mich.  618,  102 
N.  W.  1025,  12  Det.  Leg.  N.  2. 

°  Smith  V.  Lint,  Z7  Me.  546,  547 ; 
State  V.  Blackburn,  61  Ark.  407,  2>?< 
S.  W.  529;  People  V.  Harty,  49  Mich. 
490,  492,  13  N.  W.  829;  People  v. 
Cole,    113   Mich.  83,   71   N.   W.   455; 


Glenn  v.  State,  46  Ind.  368,  zi^'.  State 
V.  Shoemaker,  62  Iowa  343,  17  N.  W. 
5S9,  49  Am.  146;  Lewis  v.  People,  82 
111.  104;  State  V.  Mcintosh,  64  N.  Car. 
607;  Millett  V.  Baker,  42  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
215;  People  V.  Phalen,  49  Mich.  492, 
494;  Corcoran  v.  Higgins,  194  Mass. 
291,  80  N.  E.  231  ;  State  v.  Liles, 
134  N.  Car.  735.  47  S.  E.  750: 
Harley  v.  Jonia  Circuit  Judge,  140 
]Mich.  642,  104  N.  W.  21,  12  Det.  Leg. 
N.  260;  Gooding  v.  State,  39  Ind. 
App.  42,  78  N.  E.  257.  But  compare 
State  V.  Rogers,  119  N.  Car.  793,  26 
S.  E.  142,  143 ;  Baker  v.  State,  56 
Wis.  568,  14  N.  W.  718;  Jackson  v. 
State,  29  Ark.  62;  Semon  v.  People, 
42  Mich.  T41.  3  N.  W.  304;  Oldham 
V.  State,  5  Gill  (Md.)  90;  Bake  v. 
State,  21  Md.  422;  Dorgan  v.  State, 
72  Ala.  173;  Jn  re  Lee,  41  Kan.  318, 
21  Pac.  282;  State  v.  Lang  (X.  Dak., 
1910),  125  N.  W.  558;  Paulk  V.  State, 
52  Ala.  427,  holding  that  this  proceed- 
ing is  criminal  or  (7»rt.y/-criminal  in  its 
character.  Where  the  statute  in  terms 
provides  that  the  issue  of  paternity 
shall  be  tried  in  a  court  which  has  an 


524 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


840 


civil  action,  though  not  in  the  sense  of  that  term  as  it  is  used  in 
a  statute  forhidding  arrest  in  a  civil  action. ° 

And  the  amount  charged  against  the  father  of  the  bastard  as 
the  result  of  the  statutory  proceeding  is  not  a  debt  within  the 
meaning  of  a  statutory  or  constitutional  provision  prohibiting 
imprisonment  for  debt." 

>J  524.  Degree  of  proof  required — Doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  not 
applicable. — The  rules  and  principles  of  the  law  of  evidence  which 
are  applicable  to  civil  proceedings  are  also  applicable  to  bastardy 
proceedings.  The  defendant  may  be  compelled  to  testify  as  a  wit- 
ness for  the  mother  of  the  child, ^  and,  in  case  of  the  absence  of 
any  material  witnesses,  their  depositions  may  be  available  as 
evidence.'* 

The  burden  of  proof  to  show  the  paternity  of  the  child  is  upon 
its  mother,  but  this  fact  need  never  be  proved  by  her  beyond  a 


exclusive  criminal  jurisdiction,  pro- 
vides also  that  the  proceedings  shall 
be  commenced  by  a  warrant,  as  is  the 
case  in  other  criminal  actions,  uses 
the  words  "accused,"  "acquitted,"  and 
"convicted,"  and  furthermore  provides 
that  the  defendant  shall  be  liable  to 
an  execution  to  the  same  extent  as  are 
those  convicted  of  misdemeanors,  the 
conviction  is  irresistible  that  the  legis- 
lature intended  to  make  it  a  criminal 
offense.  State  v.  Brewer,  38  S.  Car. 
263,  268,  16  S.  E.  looi,  1004,  2>7  Am. 
St.  752n,  19  L.  R.  A.  362. 

"  Hodgson  V.  Nickell,  69  Wis.  308, 
34  X.  W.  118;  State  V.  Brewer,  38 
S.  Car.  263,  268,  z"/  Am.  St.  752n,  19 
L.  R.  A.  362.  Where  a  statute,  as 
Acts  1879,  chapter  92,  §  2,  provides 
that  the  accused,  if  he  is  found  to  be 
the  father  of  the  child,  may  be  fined 
a  certain  sum  for  the  benefit  of  the 
school  fund,  the  proceedings  may  be 
regarded  as  criminal.  Hence  a  stat- 
ute limiting  the  right  of  appeal  on  the 
part  of  the  state  in  criminal  actions  is 
applicable  in  such  case.  State  v.  Ost- 
walt,  118  N.  Car.  1208,  1216,  24  S.  E. 


660,  z^  L.  R.  A.  396,  construing  S. 
Car.  Code,  §  1237.  In  State  v.  All- 
rick,  63  Minn.  328,  65  N.  W.  639,  it 
was  held  that  a  statutory'  provision 
relating  to  appeals  in  civil  actions  had 
no  application  whatever  to  a  bastardy 
proceeding. 

"  State  V.  Brewer,  38  S.  Car.  263, 
268,  16  S.  E.  lOOi,  1003,  zi  Am.  St. 
752n,  19  L.  R.  A.  362 ;  In  re  Wheeler, 
34  Kan.  96,  8  Pac.  276;  Musser  v. 
Stewart,  21  Ohio  St.  353;  Ex  parte 
Cottrell,  13  Neb.  193,  13  N.  W.  174; 
State  V.  ]\Iushied.  12  Wis.  561 ;  State 
V.  Jager,  19  Wis.  235;  Bookhout  v. 
State,  66  Wis.  415,  28  N.  W.  I79- 
Where  the  defendant  is  acquitted  the 
costs  cannot  be  taxed  against  the 
county  or  other  governmental  subdi- 
vision instituting  the  proceeding,  as 
is  the  rule  in  criminal  proceedings. 
But  the  rule  may  be  otherwise  in  the 
case  of  express  statutory  provisions. 
State  v.  Blackburn,  61  Ark.  407,  33 
S.  W.  529. 

*  Booth  V.  Hart,  43  Conn.  480. 

"  State  V.  Hickerson,  72  N.  Car.  421, 
422;  Richardson  v.  People,  31  111.  170- 


841 


EVIDENCE    IX    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


§    525 


reasonable  doubt/"  nor  to  the  reasonable  and  conclusive  satisfac- 
tion of  the  jury." 

A  verdict  casting  the  paternity  of  the  child  on  the  accused  ought 
to  be  sustained  though  it  is  supported  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence  only/- 

^  525.    Evidence  for  the  jury  from  the  inspection  of  the  child. — 

An  irreconcilable  diversity  of  opinion  exists  upon  the  proprietv  of 
])ermitting  the  child,  whose  paternity  is  in  issue,  to  be  inspected 
by  the  jury.  Xo  principle  of  law  ought  to  be  permitted  to  operate 
to  prevent  the  mother  from  ha\-ing  her  infant  child  with  her  in 
the  court-room  during  the  trial.  ^■'  The  maternal  instinct,  and,  per- 
haps, necessity  both  may  prompt  her  to  have  the  child  with  her ; 
and,  if  such  is  the  case,  it  may  be  very  difficult  to  prevent  the 
members  of  the  jury  from  making  an  inspection  of  the  child,  and 


"Dibble  v.  State.  48  Ind.  470.  471; 
Askren  v.  State,  51  Ind.  592,  593;  Dc 
Priest  V.  State,  68  Ind.  569;  Reynolds 
V.  State,  115  Ind.  421,  422,  17  N.  E. 
909;  Dukehart  v.  Coiighman,  36  Neb. 
412,  414,  54  N.  W.  680;  State  v.  Nich- 
ols, 29  Minn.  357,  13  N.  W.  153;  State 
V.  Black,  89  Iowa  yyj,  738,  55  N.  W. 
105 ;  Satterwhite  v.  State,  28  Ala.  65 ; 
Knowles  v.  Scribner,  57  Me.  495 ; 
People  V.  Phalen,  49  Mich.  492,  494, 
13  N.  W.  830;  Semon  v.  People,  42 
Mich.  141,  149,  3  N.  W.  304;  Stovall 
V.  State,  9  Baxt.  (Tcnn.)  597,  598; 
Lewis  V.  People,  82  111.  104;  State  v. 
Rogers,  79  N.  Car.  609,  610.  But  see 
contra,  Van  Tassel  v.  State,  59  Wis. 
351,  352,  18  N.  W.  328;  State  v.  Knut- 
son,  18  S.  Dak.  444,  loi  N.  W. 
33:  Norwood  V.  State,  45  Md.  68; 
Sonnenberg  v.  State.  124  Wis.  124,  102 
N.  W.  233 ;  Altninowic7.  v.  People, 
117  111.  App.  415;  Bussc  V.  State,  129 
Wis.  171,  108  N.  W.  64. 

"  Miller  v.  State,  no  Ala.  69,  20  So. 
392. 

'"  State  V.  Romaine,  58  Iowa  46,  49, 
II   N.  W.  721;  Altschulcr  v.  Algaza, 


16  Neb.  631,  21  N.  W.  401 :  Olson  v. 
Peterson,  Z2>  Neb.  358,  50  N.  W.  155; 
Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Neb.  829,  66  N. 
W.  823;  State  V.  Bunker,  7  S.  Dak. 
639.  65  N.  W.  2,2) ;  People  v.  Tripicer- 
sky,  38  N.  Y.  S.  696.  4  App.  Div.  (N. 
Y.)  613,  not  reported  in  full.  So,  too, 
counsel  representing  the  prosecutrix 
may,  in  summing  up,  comment  upon 
the  failure  of  the  defendant  to  testify 
in  his  own  behalf  in  denial  of  the 
charge  against  him.  State  v.  Snure, 
29  ?ilinn.  132,  12  N.  W.  347;  Ingram 
V.  State,  24  Neb.  2>Z,  27  N-  W.  943; 
Miller  v.  State,  no  Ala.  69,  20  So. 
392. 

Character  of  victim  of  crime,  14  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  7i2<  note;  evidence  of 
declarations  to  show  maternity,  11  L. 
R.  A.  CN.  S.)  1052.  note;  evidence  of 
husband  or  wife  to  prove  illegitimacy. 
69  Am.  St.  571,  note. 

"  Hutchinson  v.  State,  19  Neb.  262, 
266,  27  N.  W.  113:  State  v.  Patter.son, 
18  S.  Dak.  251,  roc  N.  W.  162  (hold- 
ing that  counsel  may  call  attention  to 
the  child  where  it  is  in  court).  Esch 
V.  Graue,  72  Neb.  719,  loi  N.  W.  978. 


s  525 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


842 


a  comparison  of  its  features  with  those  of  the  accused,  though 
their  attention  is  not  expressly  called  to  the  matter.  The  Cjuestion 
is  has  the  court  a  right  to  instruct  the  jury  in  express  terms  that 
tliey  may,  from  a  personal  examination  of  the  child,  and  from  a 
comparison  of  its  appearance,  features  and  complexion  with  simi- 
lar characteristics  of  the  accused,  draw  the  inference  that  he  is 
the  father  of  the  child?  The  right  of  the  court  to  give  such  an 
instruction  is  supported  by  very  many  of  the  authorities.^*  But 
the  evidence  thus  procured  by  visual  inspection  has  often  been 
excluded,  particularly  when  the  child  was  very  young.  If  the  in- 
fant is  so  young  and  so  immature  and  undeveloped  that  its  fea- 
tures have  not  assumed  a  permanent  character,  any  resemblance, 
fancied  or  real,  would  doubtless  be  misleading. ^^ 


"State  V.  Britt,  78  N.  Car.  439. 
442;  State  V.  Woodruff,  6-]  N.  Car. 
89,  91.  92;  State  V.  Horton,  100  N. 
Car.  443,  448,  6  S.  E.  238,  6  Am.  St. 
613;  State  V.  Arnold.  13  Ired.  (N. 
Car.)  184;  Hutchinson  v.  State,  19 
Neb.  262,  266,  27  N.  W.  113;  Scott  v. 
Donovan,  153  Mass.  378,  379,  2(>  N. 
E.  871 ;  Finnegan  v.  Dugan,  14  Allen 
(Mass.)  197;  Risk  v.  State,  19  Ind. 
152,  153;  State  V.  Smith,  54  Iowa  104, 
106,  6  N.  W.  153,  2>7  Am.  192;  Crow  v. 
Jordon,  49  Ohio  St.  655,  656,  32  N.  E. 
750;  Gilmanton  v.  Ham,  38  N.  H. 
108,  115.  Compare,  Johnson  v.  Walk- 
er, 86  Miss.  757,  39  So.  49,  109  Am. 
St.  733n,  I  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  4700; 
Shailer  v.  Bullock,  78  Conn.  65,  61 
Atl.  65.  112  Am.  St.  87. 

'°Risk  V.  State,  19  Ind.  152,  153; 
Overlock  v.  Hall,  81  Maine,  348,  351, 
17  Atl.  169;  State  V.  Danforth,  48 
Iowa  43,  47,  30  Am.  387 ;  Hanawalt 
V.  State,  64  Wis.  84,  85-89,  24  N.  W. 
489,  54  Am.  588;  Gaunt  v.  State,  50 
N.  J.  L.  490,  493;  Reitz  v.  State,  ZZ 
Ind.  187;  Copeland  v.  State  (Tex., 
1897),  40  S.  W.  589;  Benes  v.  Peo- 
ple, 121  111.  App.  103.  In  those  states 
where  the  proceeding  is  not  regarded 
as   criminal  in  its  character,  the  ac- 


cused will  not  be  allowed  to  prove 
his  good  character,  nor  can  the  prose- 
cutrix attack  it.  Houser  v.  State,  93 
Ind.  228;  Sidelinger  v.  Bucklin,  64 
Main  371 ;  Low  v.  Mitchell,  18  Maine 
2,72.  "The  resemblance  of  the  child 
to  the  accused  alone,  however  striking 
it  may  be,  is  insufficient  evidence  to 
go  to  the  jury  as  sole  proof  of  pater- 
nity. It  is  merely  one  circumstance  to 
be  considered  in  connection  with  other 
relevant  evidence.  The  child  is  re- 
garded as  an  exhibit  from  which  the 
jury  alone  are  to  draw  inferences  with- 
out any  oral  comments  or  accompany- 
ing explanations  by  witnesses  in  the 
same  manner  applicable  to  any  rele- 
vant evidence.  The  personal  appear- 
ance of  the  infant,  his  form,  features 
and  complexion,  as  they  appear  to 
the  eyes  of  the  jury,  being  evidence  of 
facts  within  the  common  knowledge 
of  most  men,  is  an  invasion  of  their 
province  and  a  usurpation  of  their 
powers  to  admit  the  opinions  of  ex- 
pert or  other  witnesses  upon  such 
points  in  connection  with  the  inspec- 
tion itself."  Jones  v.  Jones,  45  Md. 
144,  148;  Warlick  v.  White,  -76  N. 
Car.  175,  179.  In  Clark  v.  Bradstreet, 
80  Maine  454,  on  p.  456,  15  Atl.  56,  6 


843  EVIDENCE    IX    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS.  §    526 

\Miether  an  inspection  by  the  jury  in  court  ]je  permitted  or 
not,  it  is  very  well  settled  that  an  inspection  by  the  jury,  out  of 
court,  during  an  adjournment,  is  erroneous.  But  perhaps  such  an 
error  might  be  cured  by  the  judicial  instruction  that  the  jury 
must  not  consider  the  appearance  of  the  child  in  determining  its 
paternity.^'^ 

Resemblance  of  features  is  largely  a  matter  of  opinion,  and  on 
this  point  the  jurors  are  as  competent  to  judge  as  any  witnesses. 
Hence,  a  witness  cannot  testify  that  the  child  which  is  in  court, 
and  which  the  jurors  can  see,  resembles  the  defendant, ^"^  thous^h, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  witness  may  testify  for  the  defendant  that 
the  child  resembles  some  other  m^an,  who,  it  is  alleged,  has  had 
sexual  intercourse  with  the  mother." 

§  526.  Presumption  of  legitimacy. — It  was  the  rule  at  the  com- 
mon law  that  if  the  husband  was  within  the  four  seas,  i.  e.,  if  he 
was  resident  either  in  Great  Britain  or  Ireland,  the  issue  of  the 
wife  born  during  coverture  was  conclusively  presumed  to  be 
legitimate.  The  only  exception  to  this  rule  was  where  the  hus- 
band was  shown  to  be  actually  impotent. ^^ 

But  in  the  early  days  of  the  present  century  this  rule  received 

Am.  St.  221,  where  it  was  sought  to  ous  doctrine  to  permit  a  child's  pater- 
have  an  inspection  of  a  six  weeks  old  nity  to  be  questioned  or  proved  by  the 
child,  the  court  said:  "Where  the  comparings  of  the  color  of  its  hair 
child  was  a  mere  infant,  such  evidence  or  eyes  with  that  of  the  alleged  par- 
is  too  vague,  uncertain  and  fanciful,  ent." 

and  if  allowed,  would  establish  not  ^^  La  Matt  v.  State,  128  Tnd.  123,  124, 
only  an  unwise,  but  a  dangerous  and  27  N.  E.  346.  It  seems  that  an  infant 
imcertain  rule  of  evidence."  In  the  may  be  exhibited  to  the  jurors  to  en- 
case of  People  V.  Carney,  29  Hun  (N.  able  them  to  determine  the  question 
Y.)  47,  where  a  young  child  was  ex-  whether  a  mulatto  child  can  possibly 
hibited  to  the  jury,  the  court  said:  be  born  of  parents  both  of  whom  are 
"This  evidence  enabled  the  court  to  white.  Watkins  v.  Carlton,  10  Leigh 
compare  the  color  of  the  child's  eyes  (Va.)  560.  See  remarks  of  court  on 
with  those  of  the  defendant  who  was  p.  576. 

present  in  court.     We  do  not  regard  "a  McCalman  v.  State.  121  Ga.  491, 

this  kind  of  evidence  as  safe  or  proper.  49  S.  E.  609. 

*    *    *    Common  observation   reminds  "State    v.    Rritt,    78    N.    Car.    439: 

us  that  in  families  of  children,  differ-  Paulk  v.  State,  52  Ala.  427. 

ent  colors  of  hair  and  eyes  are  com-  '' i    Black   Comm.   457;    Coke    Litt. 

mon    and   that    it   would   be   danger-  244. 


;26 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


844 


some  very  substantial  modifications/^  and  it  is  now  the  law  that 
the  presumption  of  legitimacy  may  be  rebutted  though  it  is  not 
shown  that  the  husband  is  out  of  England.-"  If  access  be  shown, 
meaning  b}'  that  word  the  opportunity  for  sexual  intercourse  be- 
tween the  parties  to  a  marriage,  the  presumption  of  legitimacy  is 
and  always  has  been  very  strong.-^  But  wliere  non-access  at  the 
date  of  the  conception  is  prox'ed  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court, 
the  presumption  is  readily  rebuttable,  e\'en  when  the  parties  to 
the  marriage  cohabit  after  the  conception  of  the  child. ■'■  So,  in  a 
bastardy  proceeding  the  presumption  of  legitimacy  which  attaches 
to  the  child  of  a  married  woman  may  be  rebutted  by  proving  the 
non-access  of  the  husband  or  by  showing  his  actual  impotency."^ 
A  man  who,  knowing  a  woman  is  pregnant,  marries  her  during 
her  pregnancy,  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  the  father  of  the 
unborn  child.  The  putative  father  of  a  bastard  is  not  responsible 
for  its  support  or  maintenance,  under  such  circumstances,  where 
another  man  has  thus  agreed  to  stand  ///  loco  parentis  to  the  un- 
born child, "^  even  though  the  child  is  born  so  soon  after  the  date 
of  the  marriage  that  its  conception  must  have  necessarily  preceded 
it.-^    But  it  will  not  be  presumed  that  a  man  who  marries  the 


"  Foxcroft's  case,  i  Rolle  Abr.  359. 

■°  Reg  V.  Murrey,  i  Salk.  122;  Pen- 
drell  V.  Pendrell,  2  Stra.  925 ;  Wright 
V.  Hicks,  12  Ga.  155,  56  Am.  Dec. 
451  ;  Morris  v.  Davies,  5  C.  &  F.  163. 

"^  Plowes  V.  Bossey,  31  L.  J.  Ch. 
681 ;  Vernon  v.  Vernon,  6  La.  An. 
242;  Woodward  v.  Blue,  T07  N.  Car. 
407,  12  S.  E.  453,  22  Am.  St.  897, 
10  L.  R.  A.  662n.  Thus  in  one  case 
it  was  held  that  the  issue  of  a  mar- 
riage, which  was  conceived  while  the 
parties  thereto  were  living  together, 
would  be  conclusively  presumed  to  be 
legitimate,  though  it  was  affirmatively 
proved  that  the  wife  had  been  guilty 
of  adultery.  Banbury  Peerage  Case, 
I  Sim.  &  Stu.  153. 

"Bullock  V.  Knox,  96  Ala.  195,  li 
So.  339;  State  V.  Worthingham,  23 
Minn.  528,  534;  Wright  v.  Hicks,  12 
Ga.  155,  56  Am.  Dec.  451;  Herring  v. 


Goodson,  43  Miss.  392,  396;  Cross  v. 
Cross,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  139,  23  Am. 
Dec.  778;  Vetten  v.  Wallace,  39  111. 
App.  390,  397 ;  Dean  v.  State,  29  Ind. 
483,  485 ;  State  v.  Pettaway,  3  Hawks 
(N.  Car.)   622,. 

-"  State  V.  ^McDowell,  loi  N.  Car. 
734.  735.  7  S.  E.  785 ;  State  v.  Lavin, 
80  Iowa  555,  562,  46  N.  W.  553 ;  State 
V.  Britt,  78  N.  Car.  439-  See,  also, 
cases  cited  in  last  note. 

-^  ■Miller  v.  Anderson,  43  Ohio  St. 
473,  476,  477,  3  N.  E.  605,  54  Am.  823 ; 
State  v.  Shoemaker,  62  Iowa  343,  344. 
17  N.  W.  589,  49  Am.  146;  State  v. 
Romaine,  58  Iowa  46,  48,  11  N.  W. 
721 ;  Rhyne  v.  Hoffman,  6  Jones  Eq. 
(N.  Car.)  335;  State  v.  Herman,  13 
Ired.  (N.  Car.)  502. 

-^Dennison  v.  Page,  29  Pa.  St.  4.20, 
72  Am.  Dec.  644n,  5  Amer.  Law  Reg. 
(O.  S.)  469- 


84: 


EVIDEXCE    IX    FiASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


§  S27 


mother  of  a  bastard  which  was  born  before  the  marriage  is  its 
father."'' 

§  527.  Evidence  rebutting  the  presumption  of  legitimacy. — Nei- 
ther husband  nor  wife  can  testify  to  the  fact  of  non-access  during 
coverture  to  rebut  the  presumption  of  legitimacy  in  an  action 
brought  by  a  married  woman  against  one  whom  she  claims  is  the 
father  of  her  bastard  child.-'  The  rule  is  stringent  and  excludes 
all  evidence,  direct  or  collateral,  from  which  the  fact  of  non- 
access  might  be  inferred.-'^ 

The  fact  of  non-access  may  be  established  by  other  evidence. 
It  may  be  proved  that  the  husband  was  absent  from  the  wife  at 
the  date  when  the  child  was  conceived.  If  it  appears  that  the  hus- 
band and  the  wife  were  not  living  together  at  the  time  of  the 


'"Janes's  Estate,  30  W.  N.  Cases 
Pa.  166. 

^  Easley  v.  Commonwealth  (Pa., 
1887),  II  Atl.  220;  Mink  v.  State.  60 
Wis.  583,  585,  19  N.  W.  445,  50  Am. 
386;  Cope  V.  Cope,  i  Moody  &  R. 
269;  Commonwealth  v.  Shepherd,  6 
Binney  (Pa.)  283,  285,  6  Am.  Dec. 
449;  Chamberlain  v.  People,  23  N. 
Y.  85,  88,  80  Am.  Dec.  255 ;  State  v. 
Pettaway,  3  Hawks  N.  Car.  623;  Rex 
V.  Sourton,  5  Ad.  &  E.  180;  Vetten  v. 
Wallace,  39  111.  App.  390,  397.  The 
fact  that  the  other  parent  is  dead  does 
not  alter  this  rule,  i  Taylor  Evidence 
837,  838.  The  recent  statutory  regu- 
lations removing  common  law  disqual- 
ifications do  not  remove  them  unless 
it  is  expressly  so  stated.  Tioga 
County  V.  South  Creek  Township,  75 
Pa.  St.  433.  The  fact  that  the  mother 
of  the  child  was  a  single  woman  will 
he  held  to  he  sufficiently  proved  by 
her  uncontradicted  testimony  to  the 
eflfect  that  she  was  engaged  to  marry 
the  defendant  and  that  she  is  unmar- 
ried at  the  time  of  trial.  La  Plant  v. 
People,  60  Til.  App.  340.  '{"he  fact 
that  the  brother  of  the  accused  with- 


out his  knowledge  attempted  to  com- 
promise the  matter  with  the  mother  is 
no  evidence  of  his  guilt.  People  v. 
Hawks,  107  Mich.  249,  65  N.  W.  100. 
■^  Questions  such  as  "Who  was  with 
you  on  a  certain  date?"  or  "Where 
was  your  husband  on  that  date?"  are 
objectionable  as  tending  to  prove  non- 
access  indirectly.  "The  presumption 
of  the  law  is  in  such  a  case  that  the 
husband  had  access  to  the  wife,  and 
this  presumption  must  be  overcome  by 
the  clearest  evidence  that  it  was  im- 
possible for  him  by  reason  of  im- 
potency  or  imbecility,  or  entire  ab- 
sence from  the  place  where  the  wife 
was  during  such  time,  to  have  had 
access  to  the  wife,  or  to  be  the  father 
of  the  child.  Testimony  of  the  wife 
even  tending  to  show  such  fact,  or  of 
any  fact  from  which  such  non-access 
could  be  inferred,  or  of  any  collateral 
fact  connected  with  this  main  fact,  is 
to  be  most  scrupulously  kept  out  of 
the  case;  and  such  non-access  and  il- 
legitimacy must  be  clearly  proved  by 
other  testimony."  Mink  v.  State,  60 
Wis.  583.  on  page  585,  19  N.  W.  445. 
50  Am.  386. 


528 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


846 


alleged  conception,  and  conld  not  have  had  sexnal  intercourse  at 
that  date,  the  presumption  of  legitimacy  is  overcome.  So  where 
it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  the  husband  has  been  absent 
from  the  country  for  a  period  which  is  longer  than  the  period 
of  gestation  of  the  child,  as  when  the  parties  had  separated  years 
before  and  had  since  resided  in  cities  which  are  widely  separated, 
the  fact  of  non-access  may  be  regarded  as  conclusively  estab- 
lished.-^ 

§  528.  The  relations  of  the  parties. — Evidence  of  all  facts  which 
tend  to  prove  the  intimate  relations  which  existed  between  the 
accused  and  the  prosecutrix,  including  an  engagement  and  mutual 


"'Rex  V.  Luffe,  8  East  193;  State  v. 
Lavin,  80  Iowa  555,  562,  46  N.  W. 
55,3,  citing  cases  fully;  Haworth  v. 
Gill,  30  Ohio  St.  627,  628;  Common- 
wealth V.  Shepherd,  6  Binn.  (Pa.)  283, 
286,  6  Am.  Dec.  449;  Watts  v.  Owens, 
62  Wis.  512,  22  N.  W.  720;  Chamber- 
lain V.  People,  23  N.  Y.  85,  80  Am. 
Dec.  255 ;  Herring  v.  Goodson,  43 
]\Iiss.  392,  396;  Dean  v.  State,  29  Ind. 
483,  485 ;  Boykin  v.  Boykin,  70  N. 
Car.  262,  264,  16  Am.  'J^^•,  Pittsford 
V.  Chittenden,  58  Vt.  49;  Cross  v. 
Cross,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  139,  22,  Am. 
Dec.  778;  Rex  v.  Maidstone,  12  East 
550.  In  a  bastardy  case  if  the  husband 
had  access  his  impotence  must  be 
clearly  proved.  Commonwealth  v. 
Shepherd,  6  Binney  (Pa.)  283,  286,  6 
Am.  Dec.  449 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Wentz,  I  Ashmead  (Pa.)  269,  270. 
"Non-access  cannot  be  proved  by 
either  the  husband  or  the  wife, 
whether  the  action  be  civil  or  crim- 
inal, or  whether  the  proceeding  is  one 
of  settlement  or  bastardy,  or  to  re- 
cover property  claimed  as  heir  at  law." 
By  the  court  in  Dennison  v.  Page,  29 
Pa.  St.  420,  12.  Am.  Dec.  644n ;  Rex 
v.  Book,  I  Wils.  340 ;  Egbert  v.  Green- 


wait,  44  Mich.  245,  6  N.  W.  654,  38 
Am.  260 ;  Corson  v.  Corson,  44  N.  H. 
587.  "That  issue  born  in  wedlock, 
though  begotten  before,  is  presump- 
tively legitimate  is  an  axiom  of  law 
so  well  established,  that  to  cite  au- 
thorities in  support  of  it,  would  be  a 
mere  waste  of  time.  So  the  rule  that 
the  parents  will  not  be  permitted  to 
prove  non-access  for  the  purpose  of 
bastardizing  such  issue  is  just  as  well 
settled.  Many  reasons  have  been 
given  for  this  rule.  Prominent  among 
them  is  the  idea  that  the  admission  of 
such  testimony  would  be  unseemly 
and  scandalous,  and  this  not  so  much 
from  the  fact,  that  it  reveals  immoral 
conduct  upon  the  part  of  the  parents, 
as  because  of  the  efifect  it  may  have 
upon  the  child,  who  is  in  no  fault,  but 
who  must  nevertheless  be  the  chief 
sufferer  thereby.  That  the  parents 
should  be  permitted  to  bastardize  the 
child,  is  a  proposition  which  shocks 
our  sense  of  right  and  decency,  and 
hence  the  rule  of  law  which  forbids 
it."  By  the  court  in  Tioga  County  v. 
South  Creek  Township,  75  Pa.  St. 
433,  436. 


847 


EVIDENCE    IN    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


§  5-^8 


promise  to  marry,^*^  is  relevant. ^^  Thus,  acts  of  sexual  inter- 
course, other  than  the  one  alleged  to  have  resulted  in  pregnancv,"- 
and  opportunity  for  the  intercourse  prior  to  the  conception,""  are 
always  relevant. 

Advances  and  attempts  by  the  accused  to  have  sexual  inter- 
course with  prosecutrix  at  other  times,  though  not  successful,  are 
always  relevant  to  show  the  desire  for  such  intercourse.^* 

A  letter  proved  or  admitted  to  have  been  written  by  the  defend- 
ant to  the  prosecutrix,  containing  expressions  showing  the  inti- 
macv  and  affection  between  them,  is  admissible.'^ 


'"'Gemmill  v.  State,  i6  Ind.  App. 
154,  43  N.  E.  909. 

"' Strickler  v.  Grass,  32  Neb.  811, 
814,  49  N.  W.  804. 

^"Ramey  v.  State,  127  Ind.  243,  244; 
26  N.  E.  818;  Gemmill  v.  State,  16 
Ind.  App.  154,  43  N.  E.  909;  State  v. 
Smith,  47  Minn.  475,  476,  50  N.  W. 
605 ;  Harty  v.  Malloy,  67  Conn.  339,  35 
Atl.  259;  People  V.  Schilling,  1 10 
Mich.  412,  68  N.  W.  233. 

^  Goodwine  v.  State,  5  Ind.  App.  6;^, 
68,  31  X.  E.  554;  Harty  v.  ^Malloy,  67 
Conn.  339,  35  Atl.  259;  Thayer  v. 
Davis,  38  Vt.  163 ;  Francis  v.  Rosa, 
151  Alass.  532,  24  N.  E.  1024;  Benton 
V.  Starr,  58  Conn.  285,  20  Atl.  450. 
"The  previous  familiarity  or  intimacy 
existing  between  the  parties  was  a 
circumstance  bearing  on  the  proba- 
bility of  the  alleged  sexual  intercourse 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  prosecu- 
tion. It  tended  to  illustrate  the  rela- 
tion of  the  parties  to  each  other  at 
the  time  when,  as  is  claimed  by  the 
prosecutrix,  the  child  to  which  she 
gave  birth  was  begotten,  and  this  re- 
lation has  always  been  considered 
proper  evidence  as  well  for  one  party 
as  the  other."  Thayer  v.  Davis,  38 
Vt.  163,  on  page  164.  Evidence  that 
both  before  and  after  the  date  of  the 
conception  of  the  child  the  complain- 


ing witness  was  accustomed  to  sleep 
with  a  man  who  could  have  easily 
been  the  father  of  the  child,  has  been 
received  to  impeach  her  credibility. 
State  V.  Read,  45  Iowa  469. 

^  Baker  v.  State,  69  Wis.  32,  38,  33 
N.  W.  52;  Walker  v.  State,  92  Ind. 
474.  The  accused  may  be  compelled 
on  cross-examination  to  answer  sucli 
questions  relating  to  other  acts  of  in- 
tercourse. State  V.  Klitzke,  46  ^linn. 
343,  345,  49  N.  W.  54. 

"'Williams  v.  State,  113  Ala.  58,  21 
So.  463,  464;  Walker  v.  State,  92  Ind. 
474;  Sullivan  v.  Hurley,  147  Mass. 
387,  18  N.  E.  3;  La  Matt  v.  State.  128 
Ind.  123,  27  N.  E.  346;  Beers  v.  Jack- 
man,  103  Alass.  192.  "In  proof  of  un- 
lawful se.xual  intercourse,  the  adulter- 
ous disposition  of  the  parties  at  the 
time  may  be  shown.  To  this  end,  the 
antecedent  and  subsequent  conduct 
and  declaratif)ns  of  the  parties,  if  it 
lias  a  tendency  to  prove  the  fact,  is 
admissible.  It  is  a  matter  of  common 
observation,  that  a  criminal  intimacy 
is  usually  of  gradual  development, 
and,  when  established,  is  likely  to  con- 
tinue between  the  parties.  The  act 
itself  is  the  strongest  evidence  of  the 
existence  of  the  disposition,  and  it 
has  been  recently  held  that  fm'  the 
purpose  of  proving  it,  an  act  of  adul- 


§§    5-9~530  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  848 

It  has  been  held  that  the  accused  cannot  be  permitted  to  prove 
that  the  mother  had  attempted  to  procure  an  abortion,^"  though, 
on  the  other  hand,  she  may  sb.ow  that  he  had  advised  her  to  pro- 
cure an  abortion,"'  and  had  offered  lier  medicine  for  that  pur- 
pose,"'^ as  tending  to  prove  the  intimate  relations  existing  between 
them.^^ 

§  529.  Competency  and  credibility  of  prosecutrix. — The  mother 
is  a  competent,^"  and  perhaps  an  indispensable,  witness.*^  Her 
evidence  is  in  law  no  less  credible  than  that  of  the  accused,'*"  the 
credibility  and  weight  of  the  evidence  of  both  being  for  the  jury. 
But  they  may  consider  the  pecuniary  interest  of  the  accused  in 
denying  the  paternity  of  the  child  as  likely  to  affect  his  credi- 
bility.^" In  the  absence  of  any  statute  requiring  the  testimony  of 
the  prosecutrix  to  be  corroborated,  the  jury  may  find  that  the 
accused  is  the  father  of  the  child  upon  the  testimony  of  the  mother 
alone,  provided  they  shall  believe  it  is  credible.''* 

^  530.  Variance  in  proving  the  date  of  the  conception. — The  pre- 
cise date  of  the  conception  is  not  material  except  so  far  as  a  fail- 
ure to  prove  it  precisely  on  the  part  of  the  mother  may  invalidate 

tery  at  another  time  may  be  shown,  testify  to  the  absence  of  her  husband. 

*     *     *     It  has   long  been    held  that  Evans  v.  State,  165  Ind.  369,  74  N.  E. 

prior   acts  of  familiarity  were  admis-  244,  2  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  6i9n,  rehear- 

sible  to  render  it  not  improbable  that  ing  denied,  75  N.  E.  651. 

the  act  might  have  occurred."    By  the  "Reg.  v.  Armitage,  27  L.  T.  41,  L. 

court  in  Beers  v.  Jackman,  103  Mass.  R.  7  Q.  B.  "JT^. 

192,  p.  193.  ^'  State  V.   Ginger,  80  Iowa  574,  46 

^^  Sweet  V.  Sherman,  21  Vt.  23,  29.  N.  W.  657;  Roberts  v.  State,  84  Wis. 

^'Miller  v.  State,  no  Ala.  69,  20  So.  361,  363,  54  N.  W.  580;  Altschuler  v. 

392.  Algaza,  16  Neb.  631,  21  N.  W.  401. 

'■^Alcllvain  v.  State,  80  Ind.  69,  72;  *' McClellan   v.   State,  66  Wis.   335, 

Nicholson  v.  State,  "72.  Ala.  176.  2>y/>  28  N.  W.  347. 

^°  A  rumor  which  was  prevalent  in  ''*  Olson  v.  Peterson,  33  Neb.  358,  50 

the  neighborhood  that  the  prosecutrix  N.   W.    155;   State  v.   McGlothlen,  56 

had  been  improperly  intimate  with  the  Iowa  544,  545,  9  N.  W.  893 ;  Miller  v. 

accused  is  not  admissible  to  prove  the  State,  no  Ala.  69,  20  So.  392;  Evans 

paternity  of  the  child.    Saint  v.  State,  v.  State,  165  Ind.  369,  74  N.  E.  244. 

68  Ind.  128,  130.  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  6i9n,  rehearing  do- 

*"  Bowers  v.  Wood,   143   Mass.   182,  nied,  75  N.  E.  651;  Matteson  v.  Peo- 

184,  9  N.  E.  534.    If  married  she  may  pie,  122  III.  App.  ^. 


849 


EV'IDENCE    IN    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS.     §§    53I-532 


the  credibility  and  effect  of  her  evidence.'*^  But  the  act  of  inter- 
course must  be  shown  to  have  occurred  on  such  a  date  as  will 
satisfy  the  jury  that  the  infant,  whose  paternity  is  in  question, 
was  the  result  of  it. 

§  531.  The  reputation  of  the  prosecutrix. — The  general  rule  is 
that  the  reputation  of  the  prosecutrix  is  irrelevant.*"  The  respon- 
sibility of  fhe  accused  for  the  support  of  the  bastard  depends  upon 
its  paternity,  not  upon  the  good  or  bad  reputation  of  the  mother. 
Hence,  the  court  should  not  permit  questions  to  be  put  to  her 
tending  to  prove  her  immoral  actions  with  other  men,  merely  for 
the  sake  of  impeaching  her,  by  showing  her  evil  reputation.  Un- 
der some  circumstances,  how^ever,  her  adultery  with  other  men 
may  become  relevant.*^ 

§  532.  Sexual  intercourse  with  other  men  during  the  period  of  ges- 
tation.— The  prosecutrix  may  be  questioned  as  to  acts  of  sexual 
intercourse  with  other  men  when  the  sole  object  of  the  questions 
is  to  ascertain  the  paternity  of  the  child.  Any  question  put  to  her 
for  this  purpose  involving  her  immorality  w^ith  other  men  must 
relate  to  actions  coming  wnthin  a  period  during  which  the  child 
might  have  been  conceived.*® 


*^  Francis  v.  Rosa,  151  Mass.  532,  24 
N.  E.  1024;  Ross  V.  People,  34  111. 
App.  21 ;  Holcomb  v.  People,  79  111. 
409;  Hamilton  v.  People,  46  Mich. 
186,  9  N.  W.  247. 

"  Sidelinger  v.  Bucklin,  64  Maine 
371 ;  Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Neb.  829, 
66  N.  W.  823;  Swisher  v.  Malonc,  31 
W.  Va.  442,  7  S.  E.  439;  People  v. 
Wilson,  136  Mich.  298,  99  N.  W.  6,  10 
Det.  Leg.  N.  1047;  State  v.  O'Rourke 
(Neb.,  1909),  124  N.  W.  138;  Clow  v. 
Smith  (Neb.,  1909),  124  N.  W.  140. 

"  "The  character  for  chastity  of  a 
woman  who  appears  in  court  to  affili- 
ate her  bastard  child  is  pretty  effectu- 
ally impeached  without  further  proof 
on  the  subject;  but  that  has  no  di- 
rect bearing  upon  the  question  to  be 
tried — whether  the  accused  is  the  fa- 
ther of  such  child.  Of  course,  he  may 
54 — Underhii.f.  Ckim.  Kv. 


show  what  her  reputation  is  for  truth 
and  veracity,  and  thus  attack  the  cred- 
ibility of  her  testimony,  but  that  is  as 
far  as  he  can  go  on  questions  of  repu- 
tation." By  the  court  in  Bookhout  v. 
State,  66  Wis.  415,  28  N.  W.  179. 

^*  Humphrey  v.  State,  78  Wis.  569. 
571,  47  N.  W.  836;  Ginn  v.  Common- 
wealth, 5  Lilt.  (Ky.)  300;  Burris  v. 
Court,  34  Neb.  187,  191,  51  N.  W.  745; 
Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Neb.  829,  66  N. 
W.  823;  Goodwine  v.  State,  5  Ind. 
App.  63,  31  N.  E.  554;  Whitman  v. 
State,  34  Ind.  360;  People  v.  Kamin- 
sky,  73  Mich.  637,  639,  41  N.  W.  833 ; 
State  V.  Giles,  103  N.  Car.  391,  9  S.  E. 
433;  State  V.  Britt,  78  N.  Car.  439. 
440;  Scliarf  V.  People,  34  111.  App. 
400;  llolcoml)  V.  People,  79  111.  409; 
Easdale  v.  Reynolds,  143  Mass.  126, 
128,  9  N.  E.   13;  Bowcn  v.  Reed,  103 


§    S3^  CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE.  85O 

The  questions  must  indicate  explicitly  the  time  and  place  of  the 
sexual  intercourse  and  the  name  of  the  person  with  whom  it  is 
alleged  that  it  was  indulged  in." 

If  the  woman  denies  the  sexual  intercourse,  it  may  be  proved 
by  the  testimony  of  a  man  who  can  testify  that  she  has  had  inter- 
course with  him.^"  And  on  the  other  hand  it  is  relevant  to  prove 
that,  prior  to  the  date  of  the  conception,  the  mother  had  received 
no  attention  from  any  man  except  the  accused. ^^ 

The  length  of  the  period  over  which  the  incjuiry  into  the  illicit 
relations  of  the  prosecutrix  wath  other  men  may  extend  is  not 
definitely  fixed  by  the  cases.  A  great  deal  depends  on  the  circum- 
stances of  each  case,  and  particularly  on  the  obstetrical  facts  as 
they  appear  from  the  medical  testimony  or  otherwise.  In  the 
majority  of  cases  it  is  futile  to  extend  the  inquiry  more  than 
three  weeks  later  or  earlier  than  the  probable  date  of  the  concep- 
tion of  the  child.  If  we  assume  that  the  length  of  the  period  of 
gestation  is  about  ten  lunar  months  or  nine  calendar  months,  or 
say  about  two  hundred  and  eighty  days,  a  question  as  to  inter- 
course with  any  other  man  at  a  date  a  month  or  more  prior  or 
subsequent  to  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  gestation  would 
clearly  be  inadmissible,  unless  it  is  also  shown  that  the  illicit  in- 
Mass.  46 ;  Commonwealth  v.  ]\Ioore,  3  1901),  95  N.  W.  1053;  Guthrie  v. 
Pick.  (]\Iass.)  194,  197;  Sabins  v.  State  (Neb.  1901),  96  N.  W.  243.  "In 
Jones,  119  Mass.  167,  171;  Swisher  v.  this  class  of  cases  an  innovation  has 
Malone,  31  W.  Va.  442,  7  S.  E.  439;  been  made  on  the  strict  rules  of  cross- 
State  V.  Karver,  65  Iowa  53,  55.  21  examination,  so  far  as  to  permit  the 
N.  W.  161 ;  Olsen  v.  Peterson,  33  Neb.  defendant  to  ask  the  woman  whether, 
358,  50  N.  W.  155;  Sang  v.  Beers,  20  within  the  period  of  gestation,  she  has 
Neb.  365,  30  N.  W.  258;  Benham  v.  had  intercourse  with  other  men."  By 
State,  91  Ind.  82;  Walker  v.  State,  the  court  in  Holcomb  v.  People,  79  111. 
6  Blackf.    (Ind.)    i;    JNIarks  v.   State,     409. 

loi  Ind.  353;  People  v.  Schildwachter,  ^®  Meyncke  v.  State,  68  Ind.  401. 
,S  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  346,  39  N.  Y.  S.  ""State  v.  Read,  45  Iowa  469;  Peo- 
288;  State  V.  Coatney,  8  Yerg.  pie  v.  Kaminsky,  73  Mich.  637,  639,  41 
(Tenn.)  210;  Short  v.  State,  4  Harr.  N.  W.  833;  McCoy  v.  People,  65  111. 
(Del.)  568;  Kintner  v.  State,  45  Ind.  439;  Williams  v.  State,  113  Ala.  58,  21 
175;  Crawford  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  So.  463,  465;  State  v.  Perkins,  117  N. 
(Tenn.)  41;  Anon,  37  Miss.  54;  Peo-  Car.  698,  23  S.  E.  274,  or  by  her  ad- 
ple  V.  Keefer,  103  ^^lich.  83,  61  N.  W.  missions  in  writing.  Walker  v.  State, 
338;  Zimmerman  v.  People,  117  111.  165  Ind.  94,  74  N.  W.  614. 
App.  54;  Ankeny  v.  Rawhouser  (Neb.        "  Curran  v.  People,  35  111.  App.  275. 


8;i 


EVIDENCE    IX    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


^    533 


timacy  existed  between  the  same  persons  at  or  very  near  to  the 
time  of  conception/ - 

If  the  prosecutrix  is  proved  to  have  inckilged  in  promiscuous 
sexual  intercourse  with  other  men  at  or  about  the  date  she  alleges 
the  child  was  conceived,  she  will  not  be  permitted  to  state  while 
on  the  stand  that  she  became  pregnant  as  the  result  of  any  par- 
ticular act  of  intercourse.  Her  testimony  on  that  point  would  be 
merely  an  inference.  If  she  had  submitted  to  the  embraces  of 
several  men  on  or  about  the  same  date,  it  is  impossible  for  any 
person,  in  view  of  her  physical  organization  and  for  physiological 
reasons,  to  state  positively  who  is  the  father  of  the  child,  how- 
ever readily  paternity  may  be  determined  when  sexual  intercourse 
with  only  one  man  is  in  question. ^^ 

^  533.  Admissibility  of  the  admissions  and  declarations  of  the 
parties. — In  some  of  the  states  the  declarations  of  the  mother  of 
the  child  made  during  her  travail  and  which  are  continued  or 
persisted  in  subsequently,  and  which  charge  a  particular  person 
with  its  paternity,  are  received  as  original  evidence  both  for  and 
against  the  accused. °*  Whether  declarations  of  this  sort  are  re- 
ceivable in  the  absence  of  a  statute  is  an  undecided  point.  Some 
authorities  hold  that  thev  are  not  admissible  either  to  corroborate 


"  State  V.  Phillips,  5  Ind.  App.  122, 
31  X.  E.  476;  Ronan  v.  Dugan,  126 
Mass.  176,  177;  State  v.  Granger,  87 
Iowa  355,  54  N.  W.  79 ;  Duck  v.  State, 
17  Ind.  210;  Olson  v.  Peterson,  33 
Neb.  358,  50  N.  W.  155;  Scharf  v. 
People,  34  111.  App.  400;  Sabins  v. 
Jones,  119  Mass.  167.  In  a  recent  case 
where  the  child  was  born  on  the  8th 
day  of  June,  1888,  the  prosecutrix 
was  required  to  answer  the  question, 
"Did  you  have  se.xual  intercourse  with 
any  other  man  than  the  accused  at 
any  time  between  August  10  and  No- 
vember I,  1887?"  Pike  V.  People,  34 
111.  App.  112;  and  see,  al.so,  Swisher 
V.  Malonc,  31  W.  Va.  442,  7  S.  K. 
439.  It  is  the  exclusive  right  of  the 
jury  to  determine  the  probable  length 


of  the  period  of  gestation  as  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  on  the  circumstances  of 
the  case.  Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Neb. 
829,  66  N.  W.  823. 

"Baker  v.  State,  47  Wis.  in,  2  N. 
W.  110. 

"  Mass.  Public  Stat.,  c.  85,  16  Maine 
Rev.  Stat.,  c.  97,  section  6;  Robl)ins 
V.  Smith,  47  Conn.  182;  Scott  v.  Don- 
ovan, 153  Mass.  378,  26  N.  E.  871. 
Contra,  State  v.  Tipton,  15  Mont.  74, 
38  Pac.  222;  Richmond  v.  State,  19 
Wis,  307.  The  expression  used  in  one 
statute  is,  "having  been  put  to  the  dis- 
covery of  the  truth  of  such  statement 
at  the  time  of  her  travail."  Wilson  v. 
Woodside,  57  Maine  489;  Hums  v. 
Donoghuc,  185  Mass.  71,  69  N.  E. 
1060. 


533 


CRIMINAL    EVIDENCE. 


852 


her  testimony  or  as  evidence  directly  on  the  issue. ^^  But  elsewhere 
it  has  been  held  that  statements  made,  both  before  and  after  the 
birth  of  the  child,  that  the  accused  is  its  father,  should  be  re- 
ceived. ^*^ 

Declarations  are  to  be  regarded  as  made  during  travail,  if  they 
are  proved  to  have  been  uttered  between  the  instant  that  the  pains 
of  labor  begin  and  the  moment  when  the  delivery  of  the  child  is 
completed  by  the  severance  of  the  umbilical  cord.^' 

They  will  be  admitted  though  the  child  is  born  subsequently  to 
the  making  of  the  charge  against  the  defendant.^"* 

The  admission  of  the  prosecutrix  that  another  man  is  the  father 
of  the  child  is  receivable  as  a  contradictory  statement  for  the 
purpose  of  impeachment.^" 

But  the  statements  of  third  persons  as  to  the  paternity  of  the 
child  not  made  in  her  presence  and  constituting  no  part  of  the 
res  gcstcc  of  any.  relevant  act  ^re  never  received."*'  On  the  other 
hand  all  the  utterances  of  the  accused  having  any  bearing  on  his 
relations  Vv'ith  the  prosecutrix,  as,  for  example,  his  promise  to 
marry  her,  are  admissible  against  him.''^ 


"  State  V.  Hussey,  7  Iowa  409 ;  Side- 
linger  V.  Bucklin,  64  Maine  371,  272>'> 
State  V.  Lowell,  123  Iowa  427,  gg  N. 
W.  125 ;  Sidelinger  v.  Bucklin,  64  Me. 
371 ;  Ray  v.  Coffin,  123  Mass.  365 ; 
State  V.  Spencer,  '/2>  ^linn.  lOi,  75 
N.  W.  893,  76  N.  W.  48;  Stoppert  v. 
Nierle,  45  Neb.  105,  63  N.  W.  382; 
Wilkins  v.  ]Metcalf,  71  Vt.  103,  41 
Atl.  1035. 

^  Harty  v.  Malloy,  67  Conn.  339,  35 
Atl.  259;  Benton  v.  Starr,  58  Conn. 
28s,  20  Atl.  450;  Welch  V.  Clark,  50 
Vt.  386 ;  Baxter  v.  Gormley,  186  IMass. 
168,  71  N.  E.  575- 

"  Tacey  v.  Noyes,  143  Mass.  449, 
451,  9  N.  E.  830;  Scott  V.  Donovan, 
153  IMass.  378,  379,  26  N.  E.  871.  For 
other  definitions  of  "travail"  see  Den- 
nett V.  Kneeland,  6  Maine  460;  Bacon 
V.  Harrington,  5  Pick.  (Mass.)  63,  64; 
Drowne  v.  Stimpson,  2  Mass.  441,  443, 
444,  limiting  it  to  the  birth  of  the 
child. 


^  Bowers  v.  Wood,  143  ]\Iass.  182, 
184,  9  N.  E.  534. 

'"^  Houser  v.  State,  93  Ind.  228 ;  E. 
N.  E.  v.  State,  25  Fla.  268,  6  So.  58; 
Johnson  v.  People,  140  111.  350,  29 
N.  E.  895;  Meyncke  v.  State,  68  Ind. 
401 ;  People  v.  White,  53  Mich.  537, 
19  N.  W.  174.  The  admissions  of  the 
prosecutrix  as  to  the  paternity  of  the 
child  ought  to  be  received  with  ex- 
treme caution.  Morris  v.  State,  lOi 
Ind.  560,  562.  A  statement  by  the 
prosecutrix  that  it  is  necessary  for  a 
woman  to  get  in  the  family  way  in 
order  to  procure  a  husband  is  not  ad- 
missible as  impeachment.  Johnson  v. 
People,  140  111.  350,  29  N.  E.  895. 

'^"Prince  v.  Gundaway,  157  Mass. 
417,  418,  22  N.  E.  653;  Benton  v. 
Starr,  58  Conn.  285,  20  Atl.  450. 

"^Laney  v.  State,  109  Ala.  34,  19  So. 
531 ;  Woodward  v.  Shaw,  18  Maine 
304.  307 ;  Sale  v.  Crutchfield,  8  Bush 
(Ky.)   636;   Miller  v.  State,   no  Ala. 


S5: 


EVIDENCE    IX    BASTARDY    PROCEEDINGS. 


§    534 


Some  of  the  statutes  require  that  au  accusation  made  during 
pregnancy  shall  be  continued  in  subsequently.  This  requirement 
that  the  mother  shall  be  constant  refers  only  to  the  name  of  the 
man  who  is  accused.  A  variance  as  regards  the  time,  place  or 
other  circumstance  of  the  intercourse  will  not  render  the  declara- 
tion incompetent,  though  perhaps  affecting  its  credibility.""  In 
conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  the  mother  is  a  competent  witness 
to  prove  her  own  declarations,^^  though  such  evidence  may  be 
more  valuable  and  convincing  if  coming  from  another  witness."^* 

§  534.  Evidence  of  the  preliminary  examination. — When,  prior  to 
the  trial,  a  preliminary  examination  is  had,  the  record  thereof 
may  be  given  in  evidence  in  favor  of  either  party  at  the  trial,  and, 
if  lost,  the  contents  may  be  proved  orally  by  testimony  from  the 
prosecutrix  or  any  other  person  who  was  present.*'^  But  the  judg- 
ment in  an  action,  brought  by  the  mother  to  recover  damages  for 
her  seduction,  is  not  competent  to  prove  the  paternity  of  the  child 
in  a  subsequent  bastardy  proceeding.*"' 


69,  20  So.  392.  Evidence  by  the  phy- 
sician who  attended  the  prosecutrix 
that  she  told  him  who  was  the  father 
of  the  child  is  not  a  communication  of 
information  within  a  statute  forbid- 
ding disclosures  of  information  neces- 
sary to  enable  him  to  act  as  a  surgeon 
or  to  prescribe  as  a  physician.  People 
V.  Cole,  113  Mich.  83.  71  N.  W.  455. 

""  Woodward  v.  Shaw,  18  Maine 
304;  Totman  v.  Forsaith,  55  !Maine 
360. 

•"Reed   v.   Raskins.   116   Mass.    198, 

199- 

"  Murphy  V.  Spcnce.  9  Gray  (Mass.) 
399.  "The  general  object  was  to  give 
competency  to  a  witness,  who,  by  the 
general  rule  of  evidence,  would  be  ex- 
cluded as  interested,  in  a  case  in 
which,  without  such  evidence,  the  mis- 
chief intended  to  be  cured  would  be 
irremediable.  The  danger  of  such  evi- 
dence was  not  overlooked  by  the  leg- 


islature and  was  intended  to  be 
guarded  against  by  placing  the  witness 
in  such  circumstances  at  the  time  of 
her  accusation  as  would  in  all  proba- 
bility insure  her  veracity.  In  the  time 
of  her  utmost  peril,  with  the  fear  of 
death  and  judgment  before  her  eyes, 
it  was  wisely  thought  that  a  false  ac- 
cusation would  rarely  if  ever  be 
made ;  upon  the  same  principle  that 
the  declarations  of  a  person  in  ex- 
tremis which  may  affect  the  life  of  a 
party  accused  of  murder  are  admitted, 
though  not  under  the  sanction  of  an 
oath."  :\Iaxwell  v.  Hardy.  8  Pick. 
(Mass.)  560,  on  p.  561. 

•"Hoff  v.  Fisher,  26  Ohio  St.  7,  8; 
Stoppert  V.  Nierle,  45  Neb.  105,  63 
N.  W.  382;  McLaughlin  v.  Joy,  100 
Me.  517,  62  Atl.  648;  McCalman  v. 
State,  121  Ga.  491,  49  S.  E.  609. 

""Glenn  v.  State.  46  Ind.  368. 


§  535  CRIMINAL  EVIDENCE.  854 

§  535.  Evidence  of  compromise  or  settlement. — Inasmuch  as  a 
proceeding  to  affiliate  a  bastard  child  is  generally  regarded  as  in 
the  nature  of  a  civil  action,  no  objection,  either  in  law  or  upon 
the  ground  of  public  policy,  can  exist  to  prevent  a  compromise 
or  extra-judicial  settlement  between  the  parties.  A  note  given 
to  settle  such  an  action  is  valid  and  based  on  good  consideration, 
and  cannot  be  invalidated  on  the  grounds  that  such  a  compromise 
is  against  public  policy,  or  contrary  to  good  morals.**^  The  pri- 
mary object  of  the  proceeding  is  not  to  determine  the  paternity  of 
the  child,  but  to  compel  its  father  to  provide  for  its  support.  If, 
therefore,  the  defendant  is  willing  to  do  this  voluntarily,  the  pro- 
ceedings ought  to  be  dismissed;  for  if  the  action  is  brought  to  a 
termination,  favorable  to  the  complainant,  the  defendant  cannot 
be  compelled  to  do  any  more.''^ 

Hence,  it  is  always  relevant  to  show  in  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant has  voluntarily  recognized  the  claim  of  the  illegitimate 
child,  and  has  entered  into  an  agreement  by  which  he  is  effectually 
bound  to  provide  for  its  care  and  supjXDrt,  and  for  the  lying-in 
and  nursing  expenses  and  medical  attendance  of  the  mother. 

^  Billingsley  v.  Clelland,  41  W.  Va.        "^  See    People    v.    Wheeler,    60    111. 
234,  23  S.  E.  812.  App.  351. 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 
ABDUCTION, 

definition  of,  339. 

evidence  to  prove  the  enticement,  339. 

amatory  letters  as  admissions,  339. 

necessity  for  corroborating  the  prosecutrix,  339. 

burden  to  show  non-consent  of  guardian,  340. 

presumption  and  burden  of  proving  chastity,  341. 

evidence  to  show  age  of  prosecutrix,  342. 

for  prostitution  or  concubinage,  343. 

ABILITY, 

of  accused  to  commit  assault,  353. 

ABORTION, 

incriminating  articles  may  be  produced  in,  48. 

at  common  law  and  by  statute,  344. 

intention  to  produce,  345. 

evidence  of  similar  crimes,  345. 

victim  of,  is  not  accomplice,  346. 

statutory  corroboration,  when  required,  346. 

evidence  against  one  of  several  indicted  for,  346. 

burden  of  proof  to  show  necessity  for,  347. 

declarations  by  the  victim  of,  347. 

evidence  of  physical  condition  and  illness,  349. 

medical  evidence  and  evidence  of  the  post  mortem,  350. 

exception  to  rule  of  privileged  communications,  351. 

ABSENCE, 

of  lawful  spouse  as  defense  in  bigamy,  401. 

ABSENCE  OF  WITNESS, 

when  intentional,  constitutes  contempt,  225. 
permits  admission  of  testimony  at  former  trial,  260. 
distinction  between  civil  and  criminal  cases,  260. 
mode  of  proving,  266.^ 
procured  by  connivance,  266. 

(855) 


856  '  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ABSENCE  OF  WITNESS— Contimted. 

cross-examining  and  confronting,  265. 
mode  of  proving  testimony  in  case  of,  267. 
continuances  granted  because  of,  268. 
in  extradition,    495. 

ABSENT  WITNESS, 

when  impeachable,  271. 

AB;USIVE  WITNESS, 

judge  may  silence,  215. 

ACCIDENT, 

evidence  to  show,  89. 

burning,  the  result  of,  not  arson,  367. 

ACCOMPLICE, 
who  is,  69. 

court  may  determine  that  witness  is,  69. 
competency  of,  in  general,  69. 
in  bribery,  69. 

competency  of,  when  jointly  indicted,  69. 
when  separately  indicted,  69. 
when  acquittal  of  may  be  directed,  70. 
when  competent  for  the  state,  71. 
immunity  when  testifying  for  the  state,  72. 
separate  trial  of,  when  necessary,  72. 
competency  when  convicted,  72. 
good  character  of,  not  relevant,  72. 
right  of  defense  to  prove  agreement  to  testify,  72. 
credibility  and  corroboration  of,  73. 
when  competent  for  each  other,  70. 
victim  of  abortion  is  not,  346. 

evidence  of,  in  adultery  must  be  corroborated,  382. 
person  involved  in  crime  of  incest  is  an,  397. 
may  be  compelled  to  testify  in  bribery,  453. 
what  constitutes,  in  bribery,  453. 
testimony  of,  to  prove  gambling,  473. 
what  constitutes,  in  gambling,  473. 

ACCOUNTANT, 

may  testify  to  general  result,  45. 

ACCOUNTS  AND  PAPERS, 

seized  by  search  warrant,  58a. 


IXDEX.  857 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
ACCUSED, 

presumption  of  innocence  in  favor  of,  19. 

when  compelled  to  sustain  burden  of  proof,  23. 

requiring  or  permitting  to  testify  before  grand  jury,  26,  27. 

wife  of,  as  witness  before  grand  jury,  27. 

how  prior  arrest  may  be  shown,  40. 

articles  taken  from,  as  evidence  against,  48. 

may  be  identified  by  photograph,  50,  51. 

inspection  of,  by  jury,  53. 

may  be  compelled  to  stand  for  identification,  54. 

identification  of,  by  voice,  56. 

when  may  be  recalled,  62. 

search  of,  58a. 

cannot  be  compelled  to  meet  independent  crimes,  87. 

declarations  of,  will  be  received  in  his  favor,   100. 

dying  declarations  received  in  favor  of,  in. 

demeanor  of,  subsequent  to  crime  may  be  shown,  115-119. 

silence  of,  charged  with  crime,  122. 

insanity  of,  154-168. 

intoxication  of,   164-168. 

his  right  to  examine  and  confront  witness,  221. 

his  right  to  process,  250. 

charged  with  larceny,  may  testify  to  intent  in  taking  goods,  292. 

possession  of  stolen  property  by,  may  be  shown,  299-304. 

affidavit  of  on  application  for  new  trial,  517. 

in  bastardy  proceedings,  523. 

admissions  of  as  to  paternity  of  child,  533. 

presence  of  at  autopsy  not  necessary,  312. 

evidence  to  connect,  with  weapon,  312. 

peaceable  character  of,  327. 

his  presence  near  scene  of  crime,  369. 

cannot  be  compelled  to  make  footprints  for  comparison,  374. 

pecuniary  condition  of,  304. 

right  to  testify  in  extradition,  497. 

fugitive  character  of  in  extradition,  497. 

prior  conviction  of  to  increase  punishment,  506. 

ACCUSED  AS  A  WITNESS, 

statutory  competency  of,  57. 

in  Federal  courts,  57. 

not  compellable  to  testify,  58. 

credibility  of,  58. 

interest  may  be  considered,  58. 

jury  may  not  arbitrarily  reject  evidence  of,  58. 

mode  of  examination,  59. 


858  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ACCUSED  AS  A  WITNESS— Co;;//«»rc/. 
may  testify  to  intent,  59. 
must  be  permitted  to  explain,  59. 
cross-examination  of,  60. 
limiting  cross-examination  of,  60. 

incriminating  and  disgracing  questions  put  to  the,  60. 
prior    arrest,    indictment,    conviction,    imprisonment    and    vagrancy    of, 

may  be  shown,  61. 
is  entitled  to  same  rights  as  other  witness,  62. 

statutory  limitation  of  cross-examination  of,  as  to  relevant  matters,  62. 
mode  of  carrying  on  cross-examination  of,  63. 
statutes  are  strictly  construed,  64. 
recalling,  64. 

privileged  communications  on  cross-examination,  64. 
waiver  of  privilege  to  refuse  to  divulge  confidential  communications,  64. 
conclusiveness  of  answers  by,  65. 
contradicting  the,  65. 
bad  character  of,  for  veracity,  66. 
impeaching,  as  in  case  of  other  witness,  66. 
rights  of,  66. 

commenting  on  failure  to  testify,  67. 
exclusion  of  comment  on  silence  of,  68. 
failure  to  testify  as  to  particular  matters,  67. 

ACQUITTAL, 

best  evidence  of,  40. 

directing,  of  accomplice,  70. 

directing,  of  accused,  279. 

evidence  of,  does  not  exclude  proof  of  other  forgeries,  423. 

of  felon,  cannot  be  proved  under  charge  of  compounding  felony,  458. 

ADMISSIONS, 

receivable  though  involuntary,  137. 

in  connection  with  possession  of  forged  writings,  423. 

by  accused,  to  show  falsity  of  pretenses,  438. 

to  avoid  granting  a  continuance,  272. 

relevancy  of,  in  embezzlement,  290. 

See  Confession. 
ADULTERATION, 

when  proof  of  Ijnowledge  and  intent  is  unnecessary,  480. 

presumption  of  guilty  knowledge,  480. 

inferences  from  possession  of  food,  480. 

presumption  of  fraudulent  purpose,  480. 

variance  in,  480. 

evidence  furnished  by  analysis,  481. 

showing  incompetency  of  chemist,  481. 


INDEX.  859 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
ADULTERY, 

defined  and  distinguished  from  fornication,  380. 
may  be  proved  from  circumstances  of  parties,  380. 
evidence  tending  to  prove  other  adulteries,  380. 
evidence  of  accomplice  to  show,  382. 
evidence  of  character  of  accomplice,  382. 
marriage  must  be  proved,  383. 
marriage  certificate  is  evidence,  383. 
evidence  of  eye-witness  of  ceremony,  383. 
presumption  of  continuance  of  marriage,  383. 
living  in,  383. 

of  prosecutrix  to  impeach  her,  413. 
proof  of  by  prosecutrix  in  bastardy,  531. 

ADVERSE  WITNESS, 

may  be  impeached,  234,  240. 

AFFIDAVITS, 

to  prove  contempt,  461. 

use  and  character  of,  in  extradition,  498. 

form  and  contents  of,  on  motion  for  new  trial,  516-522. 

AFFIRMATIVE, 

burden  of  proof  on  party  alleging,  24. 

AFFIRMATIVE  EVIDENCE, 
weight  of,  i6a. 

AGE, 

competency  of  prosecutrix  or  parent  to  testify  to,  342. 
witness  may  give  opinion  of,  342. 
family  reputation  of,  not  admissible,  342. 
jury  may  determine,  from  inspection,  342. 
ignorance  or  belief  of  accused  as  to,  of  female,  342. 
physician  may  testify  to,  407. 

AGENT  OF  ATTORNEY, 

communication  to  or  by,  when  privileged,  173. 

ALIBI, 

defined,  148. 

plea  of,  how  regarded,   148. 

burden  of  proof  of,  148. 

relevancy  of  distance  and  time  to  travel,  149. 

evidence  of  probability  sufficient,  149. 


860  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ALIBI— Continued. 

testimony  of  witness  who  has  traveled  over  the  route,  150. 

evidence  of  conversations,  dechirations  and  rumors  to  prove,  151. 

impeachment  of,  151. 

evidence  to  show  persons  present,  151. 

conduct  of  witness  as  bearing  on,  151. 

inadmissibilit}^  of  self-serving  declarations  as  to  whereabouts,   151. 

need  not  be  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  152. 

evidence  of,  should  always  be  considered,  152. 

failure  to  prove,   152. 

cautioning  the  jury  on  evidence  to  show,  153. 

ALTERATION, 

of  writing  when  forgery,  419. 

ANALYSIS, 

value  of,  in  case  of  homicide  by  poison,  318. 

ANIMALS, 

variance  in  proving  species  and  genus  of,  34,  297. 
variance  in  proving  species  of,  maliciously  injured,  310. 
evidence  to  show  running  at  large  of,  310. 
presumption  of  malice  toward  owner  of,  310. 

ANIMOSITY, 

between  deceased  and  accused,  324-327. 
between  deceased  and  third  person,  326. 

ANSWER, 

of  witness,  must  be  responsive,  216. 

APPOINTMENT, 

best  evidence  of,  46. 

of  officer,  evidence  to  show,  452. 

invalidity  of,  cannot  be  shown,  452. 

of  officer  in  perjury,  470. 

proof  of,  in  embezzlement,  286. 

APPREHENSION  OF  DANGER, 

as  a  defense  to  charge  of  carrying  concealed  weapons,  485. 

ARREST, 

warrant  for,  oral  proof  of  contents,  40. 
of  accused,  how  shown,  43. 
identification  of  accused  after,  55. 


INDEX.  86l 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ARREST— Continued. 

resistance  to,  as  indicating  consciousness  of  guilt,  120. 

silence  while  under,    122-124. 

confessions  while  under,  128. 

homicide  of  officer  making,  90. 

proof  of,  does  not  impeach,  245. 

privilege  of  witness  from,  258. 

of  witness  for  contempt,  256. 

under  warrant  in  extradition,  494-505. 

ARSON, 

evidence  of  locality  of  building,  366. 
evidence  of  actual  burning  required,  366. 
variance  in  proof  of  premises,  367. 
threats  and  declarations  by  accused,  368. 
remoteness  in  time  of  the  threats,  368. 
circumstantial  evidence  to  show  intent,  369. 
proof  of  other  crimes,  369. 
preparation  to  commit,  370. 

ARTIFICE, 

employed  to  seduce  female,  387. 

confession  obtained  by,  135. 

See  Promise  of  Marriage. 
ASSAULT, 

evidence  of  similar  crimes,  88. 

res  gestae  in,  97. 

evidence  of  intoxication  to  negative  specific  intent,  166. 

though  causing  miscarriage,  not  abortion,  344. 

declarations  of  accused,  356a. 

ASSAULT  AND  BATTERY, 
definition  of,  352. 

relevancy  of  present  ability  of  assailant,  352. 
intention  to  do  bodily  harm,  353. 
intent  in,  may  be  proved  from  circumstances,  353. 
proof  of  other  crimes,  355. 
character  of  weapon  used,  356. 
evidence  of  threats  and  previous  hostility,  356. 

ASSAULTING  OFIICHK,  446. 

ASSUMED  NA.MK. 

crime  committed  un<kT,  91. 


862  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
ATTACHMENT, 

may  be  granted  accused  to  compel  attendance  of  witnesses,  250. 
accused  must  show  he  has  used  due  dihgcnce,  251. 
in  the  absence  of  a  statute  is  discretionary,  254. 

ATTExNDANCE  OF  WITNESSES, 
obtained  by  use  of  subpoena,  249. 
when  necessary  to  pay  witness  fees,  249. 

right  of  accused  to  obtain  compulsory  attendance  of  witness,  250. 
subpcena  duces  tecum,  251. 

validity  of  reason  for  not  producing  papers  called  for,  252. 
service  of  subpoena  and  time  allowed  to  witness,  253. 
recognizance  to  procure,  254. 
obstructing,  254,  446. 
change  of  venue  to  procure,  256. 
intentional  absence  of  witnesses,  257. 
privilege  of  witness,  258. 
when  in  custody  or  military  service,  258. 
in  extradition,  495. 

ATTORNEYS  AT  LAW,  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS  TO, 

may  testify  as  non-expert  to  insanity,  161. 

rule  at  common  law,  172. 

statutory  extension  of  rule,  172. 

doctrine  applicable  in  criminal  as  in  civil  trials,  172. 

payment  of  retainer  not  required,  173. 

when  made  to  agent,  173. 

third  person  may  testify,  173. 

must  have  been  made  while  relation  of  attorney  and  client  existed,  174. 

facts  not  regarded  as,  174. 

statements  intended  to  be  repeated  to  third  parties,  174. 

made  in  contemplation  of  future  crime,  175. 

knowledge  by  attorney  that  crime  is  to  be  committed,  175. 

permanency  of  privilege,  176. 

clients  may  waive  all  rights  under,  176. 

what  acts  of  the  client  constitute  a  waiver,  express  or  implied,  176. 

contained  in  writings,  177. 

when  attorney  is  acting  as  a  conveyancer,  177. 

AUTOPSY, 

presence  of  accused  at,  not  necessary,  313. 

opinion  based  on,  admissible,  313. 

remoteness  of,  in  time,  313. 

expert  may  testify  whether  properly  conducted,  314. 

in  homicide  by  poisoning,  318. 


INDEX.  863 

[Rcfcrou'cs  arc  to  Sections.] 
AUTHENTICATION, 

of  foreign  evidence,  502. 

AVARICE, 

as  motive  for  homicide,  323. 

B 
BAD  CHARACTER, 

See  Character  of  Accused. 
of  accused  for  veracity  may  be  shown,  66. 

BAIL, 

to  procure  attendance  of  witness,  254. 

BALLOTS, 

proof  of,  in  election  case,  44. 

BANK, 

corporate  existence  of,  how  proved,  428. 

BANK  NOTES, 

variance  in  proof  of,  298. 

BANK  OFFICIAL, 

may  testify  to  handwriting,  429. 

BANKRUPT, 

incriminating  questions  answered  by,  247. 

BASTARDY, 

conviction  of,  not  admissible  in  seduction,  386. 

BASTARDY  PROCEEDINGS, 

whether  criminal  or  civil  in  their  character,  523,  524. 

by  whom  begun,  523.  , 

burden  of  proof  in,  524. 

doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  not  applicable,  524. 

inspection  of  the  child  by  the  jury  in,  525,  526. 

presumption  of  legitimacy,  527. 

the  celations  of  the  parties,  528. 

competency  and  credibility  of  the  prosecutrix,  529. 

variance  in  proving  the  date  of  the  conception,  530. 

reputation  of  the  mother,  531. 

sexual  intercourse  of  the  prosecutrix  witli  ollu  r  men,  532. 

declarations  during  travail,  533. 


864  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sectio)is.] 

BASTARDY  PROCEEDIXGS—Confiiiued. 
admissions  of  the  accused,  533. 
evidence  of  the  preliminary  examination,  534. 
evidence  of  compromise  or  settlement,  535. 

BELIEF, 

of  accused  in  genuineness  of  notes,  437. 

BETTING, 

See  Gambling. 
BIAS, 

may  be  rebutted  by  confirmatory  statements  made  out  of  court,  241. 
«       of  witness  may  be  shown  by  cross-examination,  222. 

BIGAMY. 

defined,  398. 

annulment  or  dissolution  of  first  marriage  may  be  shown,  398. 

that  marriage  is  voidable  is  not  relevant,  398. 

belief  of  accused  as  to  death  of  former  spouse,  399. 

absence  of  former  spouse,  399. 

proof  of  marriage,  402-405. 

•BLOODHOUNDS, 

evidence  obtained  by  use  of,  374a. 

BLOOD  STAINS, 

evidence  to  show,  47. 

expert  evidence  to  character  of,  334. 

articles  containing  may  be  introduced  in  evidence,  334. 

evidence  to  show  stains  were  made  by  human  blood,  334. 

size  and  nature  of,  may  indicate  weapon  used,  334. 

clothing  introduced,  to  show,  48. 

non-expert  may  testify  to,  334. 

BODILY  FEELINGS, 

declarations  descriptive  of,  348. 

BOUNDARIES, 

primary  evidence  of,  49. 
judicial  notice  of,  21,  36. 

BRANDS, 

on  cattle  may  be  proved,  297. 


INDEX.  86- 

[References  are  to  Sections.^ 
BREAKING  IN, 

evidence  to  prove,  2)72- 
maj-  be  constructive,  372. 

BRIBERY, 

who  is  accomplice,  69. 

of  witness  as  indicating  guilt,  121. 

defined,  451. 

unsuccessful  attempts  constitute,  451. 

when  proof  of  intent  is  required,  451. 

intent  in,  may  be  inferred  from  language,  451. 

judicial  notice  of  official  character,  452. 

validity  of  official  appointment,  452. 

evidence  of  accomplice,  453. 

immunity  of  accomplice  testifying  in,  453. 

other  similar  acts  of,  454. 

declarations  of  parties  interested,  454. 

of  voters,  455. 

of  jurors,  450. 

BRIBING  WITNESS, 

when  relevant  to  prove,  121. 

BRUISES, 

evidence  of,  on  body  of  woman  raped,  413. 

BUILDINGS, 

photographs  of,  50. 

BULLETS, 

as  evidence,  315. 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF, 

requires  prima  facie  case  made  out,  22. 

how  accused  may  meet,  22. 

general  rule  casts,  on  state,  23. 

how  met  by  presumption  of  innocence,  2^. 

on  accused  to  show  distinct  defense,  24. 

under  negative  allegations,  24. 

in  case  of  rape,  24. 

facts  peculiarly  within  knowledge  of  party  alleging,  24. 

to  show  license  and  nonage,  24. 

to  show  qualifications  under  statute,  457. 

distinguished  from  presumption  of  innocence,  22. 

to  show  venue  is  on  prosecution,  36. 

55 — Underbill  Crim.  Ev. 


S66  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF— Co;;/n;!«-(/. 

to  show  sense  of  approaching  death,  102. 

to  show  confession  was  voUmtary,  125. 

to  show  alibi,  148. 

to  show  insanity,  154. 

to  show  intoxication,  166. 

to  show  malice  in  homicide,  320. 

to  show  self-defense,  338. 

to  show  non-consent  in  case  of  abduction  of  minor,  341. 

to  show  necessity  for  abortion,  347. 

to  show  female  seduced  was  unmarried,  392. 

to  show  chastity  of  female  seduced,  392. 

to  show  that  unchaste  female  had  reformed,  393. 

to  show  material  facts  in  bigamy,  399. 

to  show  validity  of  marriage,  402. 

to  show  falsity  of  pretenses,  439. 

in  extradition,  496. 

to  show  prior  conviction  to  increase  penalty,  512-514. 

to  show  jurisdictional  facts  on  application  for  a  new  trial,  518. 

BURGLARY, 

evidence  of  homicide  in  connection  with,  90. 

breaking  in  and  entering  must  be  in  night-time,  371. 

night-time  defined,  371. 

preparations  to  commit,  371. 

condition  of  premises,  371. 

presence  of  accused  in  building,  371. 

evidence  to  prove  breaking  in  and  entering,  372. 

view  of  the  premises,  372. 

facts  from  which  breaking  in  may  be  inferred,  373. 

evidence  to  show  owner's  consent  to  entrance,  373. 

proving  ownership  of  goods,  373. 

comparison  of  foot-prints,  374. 

inferences  from  possession  of  burglar's  tools  by  accused,  375. 

evidence  of  other  crimes,  376. 

the  criminal  intention,  377. 

presumption  from  possession  of  stolen  goods,  378. 

articles  from  the  premises  as  evidence,  379. 

BURGLAR'S  TOOLS, 

evidence  of  purchase  of,  372,  375. 

finding  of,  near  scene  of  crime  and  possession  of,  by  accused,  375. 

BURNING, 

must  be  proved  in  arson,  367. 


INDEX.  867 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


BY-STANDERS, 

exclamations  and  cries  of,  in  homicide,  lOi,  2^2. 


CAPACITY  FOR  CRIME, 
of  infant,  20. 

CAPITAL  CRIME. 

number  of  witnesses  required,  i6a. 

CARNAL  KNOWLEDGE, 

necessity  and  mode  of  proof  of,  416. 

CARRYING  AWAY  IN  LARCENY, 

must  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  293. 
evidence  to  connect  accused  with  the,  293. 

CARRYING  CONCEALED  WEAPONS, 

See  CONCE.\LED  We.\I'ONS. 

CARTRIDGES, 

as  evidence,  315. 

CATTLE. 

maliciously  injuring,  310. 

CAUSE, 

of  death,  may  be  shown,  312. 

CAUTION, 

as  to  reception  of  dying  declarations,  109. 
as  to  evidence  of  alibi,  153. 
on  use  of  confession,  146. 

CAUTIONING  THE  ACCUSED, 
efifect  of,  129,  130. 
before  grand  jury,  27. 
on  preliminary  examination,  132, 

CEREMONY, 

of  marriage,  evidence  of,  403. 

CERTIFICATE  OF  MARRIAGE, 

not  excluded  Ijy  provision  ccjnfcrring  rij^lit  t<'  In-  cnnfrnntrd   with  wit- 
nesses, 403. 
though  not  properly  authenticated  in.ty  lie  received  as  of  res  ticslic,  403. 


868  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.\ 

CERTIFICATE  OF  ^lARRWG'E.— Continued. 
in  foreign  country,  405. 
presumption  of  validity,  405. 
character  of,  as  evidence,  402. 

CERTIFIED  COPIES, 

as  evidence  in  extradition,  503. 
as  evidence,  405. 

CHALLENGE, 

sending,  mode  of  proof,  483. 

CHANCE,  GAME  OF, 
defined,  471. 

CHARACTER, 

of  woman  seduced,  392. 
of  witness,  3. 

CHARACTER  OF  ACCUSED, 
when  open  to  attack,  66. 
defined,  76. 

presumed  to  be  good,  76. 
traits  of  which  are  relevant,  yy. 
in  case  of  homicide,  yy. 
in  case  of  rape,  yy. 
good  character  of  associates,  yy. 
when  bad,  78. 

state  cannot  attack  in  first  instance,  78. 
rebutting  evidence  to  show  bad,  78. 
for  veracity,  when  admissible,  78. 
eflfect  and  operation  of  evidence  of,  yg. 
evidence  of,  is  never  to  be  disregarded,  79. 
evidence  of,  is  never  conclusive,  80. 
evidence  of,  may  raise  reasonable  doubt,  80. 
mode  of  proving,  81. 
leading  questions,  81. 
reputation  alone  relevant,  81. 
derogatory  rumors  regarding,  81. 
witness  must  know  accused,  81. 
specific  bad  actions  not  admissible  to  prove,  82. 
remoteness  of  evidence  of,  83. 
evidence  of,  subsequent  to  date  of  crime,  83. 
grade  and  moral  nature  of  the  crime,  84. 
evidence  of  disposition  not  relevant  to  prove,  85. 


INDEX.  869 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

CHARACTER  OF  ACCUSED— Continued. 
number  of  witnesses  allowed,  86. 
instructions  as  to,  86a. 
as  an  habitual  criminal,  506. 
in  bastardy,  525. 

CHARACTER  OF  DECEASED, 

not  relevant  for  state  in  first  instance,  324. 

may  be  proved  where  evidence  raises  presumption  of  self-defense,  324. 

mode  of  proving,  325. 

specific  acts  of  violence  not  received  to  prove,  325. 

evidence  of  threats  to  show,  326. 

CHARGE  OF  CRIME, 

in  interstate  extradition,  498. 

CHARGING  ON  EVIDENCE, 

right  and  duty  of  court,  275. 

laying  down  rules  of  law  which  govern  the  application  of  the  evidence, 

276. 
assumption  of  facts  by  court  in,  277. 
necessity  of  some  evidence  to  sustain  charge,  278. 

CHASTITY, 

in  abduction  of  females,  19,  340. 

of  female  seduced,  392. 

presumption  of,  393. 

proof  of,  392. 

reputation  for,  392. 

of  prosecutrix  in  rape,  418. 

of  prosecutrix  in  bastardy,  531. 

CHECK, 

proof  of  details  in  embezzlement,  290. 

CHE.\nCAL   ANALYSIS, 

results  of,  as  evidence,  318. 

precautions  necessary  in,  318. 

proof  of  adulteration  furnished  by,  481. 

discrediting  results  of,  481. 

when  conclusive,  481. 

CHE.MISTS, 

their  competency,  318. 
weight  of  evidence,  318. 


cyO  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
CHILD, 

may  explain  delay  in  complaint  of  rape,  411. 

competency  of,  as  witness,  205. 

credibility  of,  205. 

may  be  asked  leading  questions  on  direct  examination,  212,  213. 

dying  declarations  by,  114. 

confessions  by,  143. 

CIRCUMSTANCES, 

when  corroborating  each  other,  3. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE, 
nature  of,  4,  5. 

corroboration  by  connected  and  concurrent  circumstances,  5. 
amount  of,  required  to  convict,  53. 
jury  must  believe  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  6. 
character  of  instructions  on,  6. 
degree  of  certainty  required,  6. 
must  be  some  direct  evidence  as  basis  for,  62. 
every  reasonable  hypothesis  must  be  excluded,  6. 
corpus  delicti  in  homicide  may  be  proved  by,  7,  312, 
but  proof  must  be  convincing,  7. 

proof  by,  must  be  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  11,  14. 
verdict  of  guilty  on,  5. 
prejudice  against,  5. 
conclusiveness  of,  5. 
duty  of  jury  to  reconcile,  6. 
duty  of  court  to  charge  on,  6. 
admissible  to  prove  venue,  35,  288. 
of  enticement,  339. 
to  prove  intent,  354,  364. 
to  prove  promise  of  marriage,  387. 
to  prove  intent  to  defraud,  358,  437. 
to  show  falsity  of  pretenses  (see  Res  Gestae),  439. 

CLEMENCY, 

confession  made  under  promise  of,  126. 

CLERGYMAN,  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS  TO, 
not  recognized  under  common  law,  178. 
statutory  regulation  of,   177. 
constitutionality  of  statutes  regulating,  178. 

CLOTHING. 

of  victim  of  homicide,  48. 


INDEX.  871 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
COHABITATION, 

as  evidence  of  marriage,  403. 
need  not  be  proved  in  bigamy,  406. 

COLLATERAL  FACTS, 

primary  evidence  of,  44. 

how  far  competent  on  cross-examination,  221. 

bias  and  prejudice  of  witness  are  not,  221. 

COLOR  OF  OFFICE, 

taking  under,  must  be  proved  in  extortion,  456. 

COMITY, 

between  states,  495. 

COMPARISON, 

of  shot  may  be  proved,  314,  315. 

of  articles  of  clothing  worn  by  accused,  374. 

proof  of  handwriting  by,  429. 

standard   of,    must   be    relevant   writing,   429. 

opinion  evidence  on,  430. 

of  foot-prints,  337,  374. 

of  foot-prints  in  burglary,  374. 

cannot  be  made  compulsorily,  374. 

voluntary  is  admissible,  374. 

COMPETENCY  OF  TESTIMONY, 

constitutional  rights  of  the  accused,  55. 

the  accused  as  a  witness,  58. 

judge  may  properly  comment  upon,  214. 

of  newly-discovered  evidence,  520. 

of  dying  declarations,  108,  109. 

of  owner  of  stolen  goods  as  witness,  295. 

of  witness  to  testify  to  age,  342. 

of  husband  or  wife  in  bigamy,  402. 

of  prosecutrix  as  witness  in  rape,  414. 

of  obligor  on  forged  writing,  420. 

of  prosecutrix  in  bastardy,  529. 

of  witness  to  show  non-existence  of  fictitious  person,  427. 

of  proof  in  extradition,  496,  497,  4^9,  450.  ( 

COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES, 

definition  and  formal  requirement  of  oath,  199. 
under  what  circumstances  witness  may  affirm,  200. 
religious  belief  as  afifccling,  201. 


8/2  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES— Continued. 
insanity  of  witness,  202. 
deaf  mutes,  204. 
children  as  witnesses,  205. 

persons  convicted  of  infamous  crimes,  206,  207,  208,  209. 
compounding  offenses,  404. 

COMPROMISE, 

when  offer  maj'  be  shown,  117,  119,  414. 

COMPULSORY  PROCESS, 
right  of  accused  to,  250. 
constitutional  provisions,  250. 
in  extradition,  495. 

CONCEALED  WEAPONS, 
open  carrying,  484. 

intent  of  concealment  may  be  shown,  484. 
mode  of  concealment,  484. 
relevancy  of  purpose  of  concealment,  484. 
apprehension  of  danger,  485. 
character  of  accused  as  officer  or  traveler,  486. 

CONCEALMENT, 

when  relevant,  118,  119,  120. 

of  property  under  charge  of  embezzlement,  287. 

necessity  for  proof  of,  287. 

of  crime  does  not  create  an  accomplice,  69. 

CONCLUSIONS, 

not  admissible  when  contained  in  dying  declarations,  108. 

CONCLUSIVENESS, 

of  circumstantial  evidence,  6. 

of  answers  by  accused,  65. 

of  flight,  118. 

of  replies  on  cross-examination,  222. 

of  answers  as  to  irrelevant  matters,  241. 

of  evidence  furnished  by  lactometer,  481. 

of  executive  determination  that  accused  is  a  fugitive  from  justice,  497. 

of  evidence  by  accused,  517. 

CONCUBINAGE, 
defined,  343. 
abduction  for  purposes  of,  343. 


INDEX.  Sj^ 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
CONDUCT, 

of  parties  to  seduction,  relevancy  of,  to  prove  promise  of  marriage,  387, 

388. 
of  accused  as  a  test  of  perjury,  466. 

CONDUCT  OF  ACCUSED. 

See  CoxsciocsNESs  of  Guilt. 
CONFESSIONS, 

definition  and  classification  of,  125. 

must  be  voluntary,  126. 

question  of  voluntary  character  of,  when  for  judge  and  when  for  jury, 
126. 

burden  of  proof  to  show  voluntary  character  of,  127. 

voluntary  character,  when  presumed,  127. 

cross-examination  as  to  voluntary  character  of,   127. 

under  what  circumstances  involuntary,   128. 

made  under  arrest  are  not  rendered  involuntary  thereby,  129. 

to  prosecuting  attorney,  129. 

effect  of  cautioning  the  accused,  130. 

when  made  after  duress  is  removed,  130. 

when  made  under  oath,  131. 

made  at  coroner's  inquest,  131. 

at  preliminary  examination,  132. 

to  coroner,  133. 

of  conspirators,  134. 

•when  obtained  by  artifice  or  deception,  135. 

made  under  misunderstanding  or  contained  in  privileged  communica- 
tions, 135. 

when  made  under  influence  of  intoxication,  136. 

distinguished  from  admissions,  137. 

when  facts  discovered  admit  parts  of,  138. 

when  procured  by  persons  in  authority,  139. 

need  not  be  spontaneous,  140. 

may  be  obtained  by  questioning,  141. 

procured  by  promise  of  collateral  benefit,  141. 

made  by  signs  or  gestures,  141. 

of  treason,  142. 

by  infants,  143. 

when  made  in  open  court  by  plea  of  guilty,  144. 

by  persons  not  indicted,  145. 

value  of,  as  evidence,  146. 

mode  of  proof  and  corroboration  when  required,  147. 

may  be  rejected  in  part,  by  jury,  146. 

mode  of  proof,  147a. 

interpreting,  147a. 


874  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

CONFESSIONS— Coji/iHHrrf. 

evidence  for  the  accused,  147a. 

how  to  be  considered  by  jury,  147a. 

to  priest  or  clergyman,  not  privileged  at  common  law,  178. 

by  habitual  criminal  of  prior  conviction,  512. 
See  also.  Declarations;  Consciousness  of  Guilt;  Flight  of  the  Accused; 

Silence. 

COXFIRAIATORY  STATEMENTS, 
when  may  be  proved,  241 

CONFLICT, 

of  presumptions,  19,  393. 

CONFRONTING  WITNESS,  265. 

CONGRESS, 

power  of,  to  commit  for  contempt,  226. 

CONNECTED  CRIMES, 

proof  of,  in  homicide,  90,  321,  369. 

CONSCIOUSNESS, 

of  nearness  of  death,  103. 

CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  GUILT, 
facts  showing,  115. 

demeanor,  language,  etc.,  of  accused  indicating,  115. 
falsehoods  and  concealment  indicating,  116. 
how  falsehood  may  be  shown,  116. 

intoxication,  excitement,  fear  and  mental  preoccupation  of  accused  in- 
dicating, 117. 
oflFers  of  compromise,  117. 
flight,  and  attempts  to  escape,  118. 
possession  of  tools  to  break  jail,  118. 
motive  of  flight  must  be  considered,  119. 
"     resistance  to  arrest,  as  indicating,  120. 
fabricating  evidence,  121. 
silence  as  evidence  of,  122,  123. 

CONSENT, 

to  sexual  intercourse,  in  incest,  395. 
reputation  of  woman  to  show,  418. 
physician  cannot  testify  to,  in  rape,  412. 


INDEX.     .  8/5 

[References  are  to  Sectious.] 

CONSENT,  ABSENCE  OF, 

must  be  proved  in  rape,  3. 
resistance  to  show,  407. 
presumption  of  in  case  of  infant,  408. 
statutes  regulating,  407, 

CONSPIRACY, 

definition  of,  490. 

circumstantial  evidence  of,  491. 

details  of,  need  not  be  proved,  491. 

acts  and  declarations  of  fellow-conspirators,  492. 

admissible  declarations  must  be  made  in  furtherance  of,  493. 

order  of  proof,  494. 

CONSULAR  CERTIFICATE, 

of  authentication  in  international  extradition,  502. 

CONTEMPT, 

refusal  to  be  sworn  or  testify  is,  226. 

refusal  to  answer  impertinent  question  is  not,  227. 

refusal  to  obey  subpoena  constitutes,  253. 

failure  to  testify  before  grand  jury  is,  29. 

defined,  459. 

inherent  judicial  power  to  punish  for,  459. 

direct  and  constructive,  distinguished,  460. 

affidavits  to  prove,  461. 

accused  may  introduce  affidavits  and  examine,  461. 

CONTEMPT  PROCEEDINGS, 

compelling  accused  to  testify  in,  58. 

CONTINUANCE, 

presumption  of,  19,  156,  320. 

discretionary  power  of  court  to  grant,  because  of  absence  of  witness, 

268. 
party  asking,  must  show  due  diligence  and  materiality  s^ul  competency 

of  evidence,  269,  270. 
admission  of  facts  to  avoid,  271,  272. 

CON'TRADICTION, 

of  prosecutrix  in  rape,  409. 

of  collateral  matters  brought  out  on  cross-examination,  61,  222. 


876  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

CONTRADICTORY  STATEMENTS, 

of  accused  may  be  shown  on  his  cross-examination,  60. 

may  be  brought  out  on  cross-examination  as  impeachment,  238. 

time  and  place  of,  must  be  stated,  238. 

when  made  at  prior  trial  or  coroner's  inquest,  238. 

when  witness  claims  he  does  not  remember  making,  238. 

contained  in  depositions  or  other  writings,  239. 

writings  containing  must  be  read  and  shown  to  witness,  240. 

CONVERSATION, 

proof  of  part  lets  in  whole,  221. 

CONVERSION, 

of  property,  in  embezzlement,  282,  289. 

CONVEYANCER, 

communications  to  attorney  in  capacity  of,  175. 

CONVICTION, 

best  evidence  of,  40. 

on  circumstantial  evidence,  6. 

plea  of  former,  194. 

mode  of  proof,  207. 

may  be  shown  to  impeach  witness,  245,  246. 

of  felony,  mode  of  proof,  404. 

of  habitual  criminals,  508. 

CORONER'S  INQUEST, 

best  evidence  of  proceedings  at,  40. 
confessions  at,  132,  133. 

CORPORATE  EXISTENCE, 

of  bank  on  which  forged  check  is  drawn,  428. 
may  be  proved  orally,  44,  428. 
evidence  of  reputation,  428. 

CORPUS  DELICTI  OF  HOMICIDE, 

necessity  for  and  relevancy  of  evidence  to  prove,  7,  252. 

declarations  of  deceased  to  show,  312. 

expert  evidence  to  show  manner  of  death,  312. 

relevancy  of  photographs  on,  312. 

evidence  of,  as  disclosed  by  the  autopsy,  313,  318. 

direct  evidence  to  prove,  312. 

in  arson,  defined,  367. 


INDEX.  8/7 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
CORROBORATION, 
in  general,  5. 

when  required  to  confession,  147. 

competency  of  evidence  to  corroborate  accomplice,  73,  74. 
necessity  of,  of  accomplice  as  a  witness,  74. 
detectives  and  decoys  not  within  rule  requiring,  69. 
extent  of,  required,  74. 
when  required  in  abduction,  339. 

required  on  charge  of  abortion  against  physician,  346. 
of  accomplice  in  adultery,  382. 

of  prosecutrix  in  seduction  must  be  of  material  facts,  389. 
of  prosecutrix  in  seduction  may  be  by  circumstances  which  accompany 

marriage  engagement,  391. 
of  prosecutrix  in  rape  by  details  of  complaint,  404- 
necessity  for,  in  perjury,  449,  466. 
by  newly-discovered  evidence,  522. 
of  prosecutrix  in  bastardy  proceeding,  529. 

COUXTERFEITING, 

intent  and  guilty  knowledge,  368,  432. 

presumption  of,  from  possession  of  tools,  433. 

necessity  of  evidence  to  show  resemblance,  434. 

evidence  of  similar  crimes,  432. 

evidence  of  genuineness,  434. 

money  counterfeited  ought  to  be  produced,  434. 

proof  of  signature  of  bank  officer,  434. 

COUNTERPARTS, 

use  and  effect  as  evidence,  39. 

COUNTY  LINES, 

judicial  notice  of,  21. 

COURTS  OF  RECORD, 

power  of  to  punish  for  contempt,  225. 

must  have  jurisdiction  to  exercise  power,  227. 

CREDIBILITY, 

as  affected  by  character  of  witness,  3. 

of  affirmative  and  negative  evidence,  i6a. 

of  accused  as  a  witness,  58. 

of  accused,  jury  is  to  determine,  59. 

of  accused,  how  tested  nn  cross-examinaiimi,  61. 

of  evidence  of  good  character,  79. 

of  dying  declarations,  no. 


878  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

CREDIBILITY— Coil  ti  mi  ed. 
of  confessions,  146,  147a. 
of  alibi,  153. 

of  husband  or  wife,  testifying  against  the  other,  185. 
of  insane  witness,  202. 
of  children  and  deaf  mutes,  204,  205. 

of  witness,  judicial  remarks  on  may  furnish  grounds  for  new  trial,  215. 
as  tested  by  the  cross-examination,  221. 
of  witness  who  is  prejudiced,  248. 
of  detectives  and  experts,  280a. 
of  woman  on  whom  abortion  procured,  346. 
of  prosecutrix  in  bastardy,  529. 
of  defendant's  admissions  of  marriage,  403. 
of  female  affected  by  delay  in  complaining,  409. 
two  witnesses  required  in  false  swearing,  448. 
of  witness  to  prove  concealment  of  weapon,  484. 
of  newly-discovered  evidence,  519-522. 

CRIES, 

of  by-standers,  loi. 

of  woman  raped,  409-411. 

CRIMES, 

See  Other  Crimes. 
CRIMINAL  INTENT, 

absence  of,  presumed  in  case  of  infant,  20. 

evidence  of  other  crimes  admissible  to  show,  87. 

in  arson,  necessity  of  evidence  to  show,  366. 

in  burglary,  may  be  inferred  from  commission  of  felony  or  from  pres- 
ence of  accused  in  house,  375. 

present  in  entering  must  be  shown,  377. 

in  embezzlement,  282. 

in  larceny,  292. 

may  be  inferred  from  the  circumstances,  292. 

in  malicious  mischief,  307. 

presumption  and  burden  of  proof  in  homicide,  320. 

in  forgery,  421. 

may  be  general  in  forgery,  422. 

circumstantial  evidence  of,  in  forgery,  422. 

other  crimes  to  show,  in  forgery,  423. 

in  bigamy,  398. 

in  counterfeiting,  432. 

evidence  of  other  crimes  to  show,  in  counterfeiting,  432. 

to  defraud  in  false  pretenses,  437. 

in  obstructing  justice,  447. 


IXDEX,  8/9 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

CRIMIXAL  l^TE^T— Continued. 
in  embracery,  450. 
in  bribery,  451. 
in  extortion,  456. 
to  screen  felon,  458. 
in  allowing  escape,  463. 
in  aiding  escape,  464. 

CRI.MIXALITY, 

burden  of  proof  to  show  in  extradition,  496. 
legal  proof  of,  496. 
indictment  to  prove,  496. 
copies  as  proof  of,  503. 

CRIMIXAL  LIBEL, 

province  of  jury  to  determine  intent  in,  273. 

defined,  361. 

evidence  to  prove  publication  of,  362. 

meaning  of  the  language  used  in,  363. 

the  intention  in,  364. 

truth  as  a  defense,  365. 

CRIMIXATIXG  QUESTIONS, 

See  Inxrimixatixg  Questions. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION, 

by  accused  before  grand  jury  not  allowed,  25. 

of  accused,  61. 

of  witness  on  character,  82. 

of  insanity  expert,  162. 

as  to  voluntary,  character  of  confession,  127. 

value  and  importance  of,  219. 

of  witness  to  hand-writing,  219. 

waiver  of  right  to,  219. 

evidence  of  witness  should  be  stricken  out  on  refusal  of  right  to,  220. 

confined  to  matters  brought  on  direct,  220. 

value  of,  when  conducted  rapidly,  220. 

to  test  credibility,  221-223. 

questions  on,  to  ascertain  memory,  knowledge,  prejudice  of  witness,  221. 

discretion  of  court  to  limit,  221. 

repetition  of  evidence  given  on  direct  examination  on,  221. 

prolongation  of,  221. 

repetition  of  questions  on,  223. 

collateral   facts,  222. 

impeaching  witness  on,  221. 


880  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sectiotis.] 

CROSS-EXAMINATION— Co»f/"Hf(/. 

irrelevant  facts  brought  out  on,  cannot  be  contradicted,  222. 

hostility  and  bias  of  witness  may  be  shown  on,  221. 

recalling  witness  for,  219. 

of  accomplice  testifying  as  witness,  74. 

of  accused  testifying  as  witness,  58. 

as  to  vagrancy,  60. 

power  of  court  to  exclude  disparaging  questions  during,  62. 

to  ascertain  voluntariness  of  confession,  128. 

of  witness  who  is  absent  at  subsequent  trial,  264. 

as  to  details  of  complaint  in  rape,  409. 

in  extradition,  501. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION  OF  ACCUSED. 

when  limited  to  matter  brought  out  on  direct  examination,  60. 

questions  to  test  credibility,  60. 

limited  by  statute,  62. 

court  may  interfere  to  limit,  62. 

mode  of  conducting,  63. 

privileged  communications  on,  64. 

CRUEL  PUNISHMENT, 

what  is  not,  507. 

CUMULATIVE  EVIDENCE, 

newly  discovered  evidence  must  not  be,  522. 

CUSTODY, 

acts  and  statements  of  accused  while  in,  122-123,  128. 
of  witness  to  identify  accused,  55. 

D 

DANGER, 

apprehension  of,  as  a  defense  to  carrying  concealed  weapon,  485. 

DEAD  BODIES, 

photographs  to  identity,  50. 

DEADLY  WEAPONS, 

when  court  and  when  jury  may  determine  what  are,  356. 

DEAF  MUTE, 

slips  used  in  conversation  with,  how  proved,  45. 


INDEX.  88l 

[References  arc  to  Sections.'] 

DEAF  MUTES  AS  WITNESSES, 

common-law  incompetency  and  present  competency  of,  204. 
may  testify  in  writing  or  by  signs,  204. 

DEATH, 

provable  by  circumstantial  evidence  on  trial  for  homicide,  7. 

burden  of  proof  to  show,  17. 

by  suicide,  presumption  against,  19. 

effect  of,  on  competency  of  husband  or  wife,  187. 

of  witness  testifying  on  former  trial,  261. 

of  witness,  how  proved,  261. 

when  sudden  presumed  to  result  from  natural  causes,  312. 

evidence  to  show  cause,  time  and  means  of,  312,  318. 

cause  of,  may  be  shown  to  be  abortion,  350. 

presumption  of,  from  unexplained  absence,  399. 

DECEASED, 

identification  of,  in  homicide,  316. 

evidence  of  character,  habits  and  disposition  of,  324,  325. 

evidence  to  show  reputation  of,  but  not  specific  acts  of  turbulence,  325. 

evidence  of  threats  by,  326. 

DECEASED  WITNESS, 

testimony  of,  may  be  proved,  263. 
death  of,  how  proved,  263. 

DECEPTION, 

confession  obtained  by,  135. 

DECLARATIONS, 

in  homicide,  97,  98. 

forming  part  of  the  res  gestcc,  93-101,  330. 

self-serving,  119a. 

in  consciousness  of  approaching  death,  102-114. 

by  accused,  inadmissible  to  prove  alibi,  150,  151. 

to  show  flight,  118. 

to  prove  absence  of  material  witness,  263. 

of  deceased  owner  of  goods  stolen,  295. 

explaining  possession  of  stolen  property,  when  admissible,  302. 

of  accused  admissible  to  prove  malicious  intent,  308. 

of  deceased,  312. 

of  third  parties,  331. 

admissibility  of,  in  abortion,  348. 

of  prosecutrix  in  seduction,  when  relevant,  389. 

accompanying  possession  of  burglar's  tools,  375. 

56 — Unijkkmill  Crim.  Ev. 


882  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

DECLARATIONS— Coutiuued. 

of  accused,  in  seduction,  389. 

of  accused,  to  prove  his  marriage,  404. 

of  female  in  rape,  409-411. 

of  accused  to  show  guihy  knowledge,  431. 

in  case  of  poisoning,  319a. 

of  accused  in  assault,  354,  356a. 

of  accused  in  bribery,  454. 

of  accomplice  in  bribery,  454. 

See  Res  Gestae. 

DECLARATIONS  OF  CONSPIRATORS, 
when  admissible,  492. 

must  be  made  during  existence  of  conspiracy,  493. 
order  of  proving,  494. 

DECLARATIONS  DURING  TRAVAIL, 
admissibility  of,  533. 
must  be  persisted  in,  533. 
length  of  period  of  travail,  533. 

DECOY, 

confession  to,  through  trick,   134,   135. 

DECOY  LETTERS, 

use  and  credibility  of,  479. 

DEFILEMENT  OF  FE.MALE  SERVANT, 
character  of  woman  not  material,  394. 

DELAY, 

in  making  complaint  in  rape  may  cause  its  rejection,  411. 
as  determining  credibility  of  complaint,  411. 
may  be  explained,  411. 

DELIVERY, 

of  forged  writing  as  evidence  of  uttering,  424. 

DEMAND, 

in  embezzlement,  284. 
in  larceny,  284. 

DEMEANOR, 

when  indicating  guilt,  1 15-124. 

of  accused,  as  evidence  of  insanity,  160-162. 

of  accused  toward  prosecutrix  in  seduction,  388. 


INDEX.  883 

[Rcferoiccs  arc  to  Sections.] 


DEMONSTRATION, 

distinguished  from  reasonable  doubt,  11. 

DENIAL  OF  GUILT, 

by  accused,  when  competent,  122-124. 

DEPOSITIONS, 

when  receivable  before  grand  jury,  25. 

DESCENDANT, 

insanity  of,  when  relevant,  160. 

DESTRUCTION, 

need  not  be  total  in  malicious  mischief,  309. 

DETECTIVES. 

motives  to  misrepresent,  4. 

is  not  an  accomplice,  69. 

confessions  obtained  by  artifice,  135. 

zeal  of,  may  produce  untrue  confession,  146, 

credibility  of  evidence  of,  280a. 

evidence  of,  in  extradition,  504. 

DEVICE, 

See  Trick. 
DILIGENCE, 

in  application  for  continuation,  269-270. 

burden  of  proving,  in  escape,  462. 

in  case  of  newly-discovered  evidence,  517. 

DIRECT  EVIDENCE, 

when  required  to  prove  corpus  delicti,  6. 

DIRECT  EXAMIN.\TION, 
of  witness,  211. 
as  narrative,  212. 
leading  questions,  when  may  be  put  on,  212,  213. 

DIRECTING  VERDICT, 
when  proper,  279. 

DISAPPEARANCE, 

of  person  supposed  to  have  been  murdered,  6. 

DISCHARGE  FROM  PRISON, 
of  habitual  criminal,  513. 


884  INDEX. 

[References  ore  to  Sections.] 
DISCOVERY, 

of  property  stolen,  inadmissible  confession  leading  up  to,  138,  139,  306 

DISCRETION  OF  COURT, 

to  determine  character  of  confession,   126. 
to  limit  cross-examination,  222. 
to  grant  continuance,  268. 

DISGRACING  QUESTIONS, 

as  to  irrelevant  matters,  61. 

on  cross-examination,  60. 

limitations  upon  the  right  to  ask,  245. 

involving  previous  life,  social  connections,  etc.,  of  witness,  245. 

DISMISSAL, 

of  indictment  not  founded  on  competent  evidence,  26. 

DISPOSITION  OF  ACCUSED, 

not  competent  to  prove  character,  85. 
to  commit  adultery,  384. 

DISQUALIFICATION  OF  JUROR,  6. 

DIVORCE, 

granting  of,  as  evidence  of  prior  marriage,  404. 
effect  of,  on  competency  of  husband  or  wife,  187. 
mode  of  proof  of,  187. 

DOCUMENTARY  EVIDENCE, 

proper  certification  of,  499,  500-502. 

DOG, 

malicious  injury  to,  310. 
evidence  obtained  by  use  of,  in  tracking,  374. 
See  Bloodhounds. 

DOMESTIC  ANIMALS, 

whether  dogs  are  or  not,  310.  ' 

DOMESTIC  RELATIONS, 

evidence  of,  in  incest,  397. 

DOUBT, 

See  Reasonable  Doubt. 
DRAWINGS, 

See  Paintings. 


INDEX.  5(55 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
DRESS, 

articles  of,  when  admissible,  48. 

DROWNED  PERSON, 

identification  of,  by  photograph,  50. 

DRUGS, 

adulteration  of,  480-481. 

DRUXKEXXESS, 

See  Intoxication. 
DUELIXG,  423. 

DURESS, 

effects  of,  in  excluding  confessions,  125-131,  137-140. 

DUTY  OF  COURT, 

to  instruct  on  presumption  of  innocence,  17. 

DUTY  OF  JURY, 

to  consider  evidence  of  good  character,  80. 

DYING  DECLARATIOXS, 
definition,  102. 
religious  element  in,  102. 
motive  present  in,  102. 
may  be  prompted  by  revenge,  102. 

will  be  presumed  to  be  made  under  sense  of  religious  responsibility,  102. 
must  be  made  under  sense  of  approaching  death,  103. 
evidence  of  sense  of  approaching  death,  from  declarant's  own  words, 

103. 
from  sending  for  priest,  104. 
from  sending  for  physician  or  making  will,  104. 
from  character  of  wounds,  104. 
period  intervening,  105. 
expectation  of  recovery  subsequent  to,  106. 
not  admissible  to  prove  all  crimes,  106. 
admissible  in  homicide,  106. 
not  receivable  in  abortion,  106,  348. 
in  cases  of  double  homicide,   107. 

distinguished  from  those  which  are  part  of  the  res  gestcc,  107. 
necessity  for  reception  of,  108. 
fipinions  contained  in,  when  admissil)k',  108. 
absence  of  cross-examination,    107. 
must  refer  to  act  of  killing,  when  inadmissible,  108. 


886  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

DYING  DECLARATIONS— Co;!//««rJ. 

mode  of  proof  and  credibility  of,  Ii2. 

competency  of,  is  for  the  court,  112. 

relevancy  and  weight,  112. 

is  evidence  for  the  accused,  112. 

as  well  as  against  him,  112. 

precise  language  of,  need  not  be  proven,  112, 

admissible  in  its  entirety,  1 12. 

partially  incompetent,  112. 

circumstances  attending  their  utterance,  112. 

taken  down  in  writing,  112. 

may  be  contradicted  or  shown  to  be  untrue,  113. 

formal  examination  not  required,  113. 

persuasion  and  leading  questions,  113. 

made  under  narcotics,  113. 

if  written  writing  must  be  produced,  113. 

by  signs,  113. 

by  children,  90,  114. 

of  wife,  competent  against  husband,  185. 

in  poisoning,  319. 

in  abortion,  348. 

E 
ELECTIONS, 

bribery  at,  455. 

judicial  notice  of  times  of,  455. 

EMBEZZLEMENT, 

definition,  281,  282. 
distinguished  from  larceny,  282. 
essential  facts  constituting,  281. 
intent  to  defraud,  282. 
intent  to  convert,  282. 
proving  other  acts  of,  283. 

proof  of  demand  and  refusal  to  surrender,  284. 
proof  of  trust  relation,  285. 
right  of  trustee,  286. 
ownership,  of  the  property,  286. 

evidence  of  efforts  to  conceal  or  dispose  of  property,  287. 
relevancy  of  false  statements,  288. 
proof  of  venue  in,  by  circumstantial  evidence,  289. 
value  of  the  property  taken,  289. 
confessions  and  admissions  by  the  accused,  290. 

documentary   evidence,   checks   and   entries   in   account  books   by   de- 
fendant, 291. 


INDEX.  887 

[References  are  to  Sectious.l 


EMBRACERY, 

defined,  450. 

attempt  to  bribe  may  constitute,  450. 

criminal  intent  must  be  proved,  451. 

ENTICEMENT, 

in  abduction,  evidence  to  show,  339,  340. 

ENTRIES, 

as  evidence  against  accused,  291. 

ESCAPE, 

distinguished  from  prison  breach,  462. 
proof  of  actual  breaking  not  necessary,  462. 
intention  and  negligence  of  the  accused,  463. 
aiding  prisoner  to,  464. 
presumption  of  legality  of  process,  465. 
burden  of  proof  to  show  legality,  465. 

ESSENTIAL  DESCRIPTION, 

matter  of,  when  must  be  proved,  32. 

EXAMINATION, 

of  accounts,  primary  evidence  of,  44. 
by  jury,  when  may  be  compelled,  53. 
to  ascertain  insanity  of  the  accused,  163. 
communications  made  to  physician  on,  181. 

EXAMINATION  OF  ACCUSED, 

as  witness  must  be  voluntary,  58. 
must  be  regularly  conducted,  58. 
explanation  during  the,  58. 
in  extradition,  501. 

See  Cross-Examination  of  Accused 

EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES, 
direct,  211. 

when  leading  questions  are  permissible,  212,  213. 
by  the  court,  214. 
judicial  remarks  during,  215. 
answers  must  be  responsive,  216. 
memorandum  to  refresh  memory  during,  217-220. 
cross-examination,  221. 
re-direct,  223. 
re-calling  witness,  during,  224. 


888  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

EXAMINATION  OF  WUXESSES— Continued. 
separation  of  witnesses  during,  225. 
refusal  to  testify,  226. 

interpreter  for  witness  unable  to  speak  English,  227. 
view  by  jurj%  229. 
presence  of  accused  during,  231. 
experiments,  233. 

EXCEPTIONS  UNDER  STATUTE, 
burden  of  proof  to  show,  24. 

EXCLAMATIONS, 

by  third  parties,  in  homicide,  loi,  331. 
of  suffering,  when  admissible,  349. 
of  suffering,  received  in  rape,  409. 

EXCLUSION  OF  WITNESSES, 
from  court-room,  225. 

EXECUTIVE  COMMUNICATIONS, 
their  privileged  character,  169. 

EXHIBITION  IN  COURT, 
of  persons,  54. 
of  articles  of  personal  property,  47,  316,  375. 

EXONERATION, 

confessions  of  third  party  in,  of  accused,  145. 

EXPERIMENT, 

with  weapons,  not  allowable,  255. 

presence  of  defendant  while  making,  232. 

expert  may  testify  to,  where  conditions  are  reproduced,  233. 

shooting  bullet  through  clothing,  233. 

may  be  made  in  court  by  witness,  233. 

See  Inspection;  View. 
EXPERTS. 

qualifications  of,  318. 

their  views  on  insanity,  162. 

EXPERT  EVIDENCE, 

to  character  of  wounds,  312. 

to  show  how  wound  was  inflicted,  312. 

to  show  how  wound  was  made,  312. 

not  admissible  to  show  probable  position  of  deceased,  312. 


INDEX.  889 

[References  are  to  Sections.l 

EXPERT  EVlDE}<CE—Co,iiimied. 

as  to  facts  revealed  by  autopsj^  313. 

as  to  use  of  cartridge,  315. 

in  case  of  poisoning,  318. 

to  show  time  and  means  of  abortion,  350. 

results  of  autopsy  may  be  proved  in  abortion  bj%  350. 

as  to  writing  based  on  standard  of  comparison,  429. 

as  to  condition,  age,  etc.,  in  rape,  412,  414. 

form  of  questions  to,  163. 

competency  of,  163. 

character  of  evidence  of,  in  forgery,  429. 

credibility  of  evidence  of,  280a. 

EXPLAIXIXG  SILEXCE  AXD  FLIGHT, 
of  accused,  119. 

EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS, 

statutes  increasing  punishments  for  habitual  criminals  are  not,  507. 

EXPRESSIOXS, 

of  bodily  or  mental  feelings,  93-102, 
during  travail,  533. 

EXTORTIOX, 

defined,  456. 

necessity  for  proof  of  criminal  intent,  in,  456. 

ignorance  of  officer  as  defense,  456. 

taking  under  color  of  office  must  be  shown,  456. 

value  of  thing  taken  in,  457. 

collateral  attack  on  officer's  return,  458. 

EXTRADITIOX, 

treaties  and  statutes,  495. 

international  comity,  495. 

witnesses  and  subpoenas,  495. 

burden  of  proof  to  show  criminality,  496. 

legal  proof  of  criminality,  496. 

fugitive  character  of  the  person  claimed,  497. 

evidence  in  interstate  extradition,  498. 

authentication  of  documentary  evidence  in  interstate  extradition,  499. 

records  of  sister  states  in  interstate  extradition,  500. 

character  and  mode  of  proof  in  foreign,  501. 

authentication  of  diplomatic  certificates,  502. 

certified  copies  as  evidence  of  criminality,  502. 

proof  of  foreign  laws  and  treaties,  504. 


890  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sectious.] 
EVIL  ACTIONS, 

evidence  of,  inadmissible  to  show  character,  82. 


FABRICATION  OF  EVIDENCE, 
indicating  guilt,   121. 

FACTS, 

excluding  evidence  of  absent  witness  by  admitting,  271. 
exclusion  of  secondary  evidence  does  not  apply  to  collateral,  42. 
cross-examination  upon  particular,  8r. 

FAILURE, 

to  prove  alibi,  effect  of,  153. 

FAILURE  OF  ACCUSED  TO  TESTIFY, 

when  new  trial  may  be  granted  for  comment  on,  68. 

no  presumption  from,  67. 

comment  on  not  allowed,  67. 

what  does  not  constitute  comment  on,  68. 

FAILURE  TO  PRODUCE  WITNESS, 
may  be  commented  on,  68. 

FALSE  ENTRIES, 

as  evidence  of  conversion  in  embezzlement,  287. 
intent  to  defraud  may  be  inferred  from,  422. 

FALSEHOODS, 

when  indicating  guilt,  121. 

FALSE  PRETENSES, 

defined  and  distinguished  from  larceny  and  embezzlement,  435. 

evidence  to  show  intent  of  owner,  436. 

wide  range  of  circumstantial  evidence  to  show  intent  to  defraud  owner, 

437- 
evidence  of  similar  crimes  to  prove  intent,  438. 
burden  of  proof  to  show  nature  and  falsity  of  pretenses,  439. 
must  have  been  calculated  to  deceive,  440. 
knowledge  of  falsity  by  accused,  441. 
value  of  property,  441. 

evidence  must  show  belief  and  reliance  of  person  defrauded,  442. 
evidence  of  pecuniary  condition  of  accused,  443. 
not  necessarily  verbal,  444. 
as  to  value  of  property,  439. 


INDEX.  891 

[Rcfcrcuccs  arc  to  Sections.] 

FALSE  STATEMENTS, 

intent  to  defraud  inferred  from,  437,  442. 

FALSE  SWEARING, 

necessity  for  corroboration,  449. 

FALSITY, 

of  evidence  under  charge  of  perjury,  69. 

FEAR, 

confession  under  influence  of,  125-130. 
of  accused  on  arrest  may  be  shown,  118. 

FEELINGS, 

declarations  to  prove,  93-101, 

FEES  OF  WITNESS, 

prosecution  need  not  pay,  249. 
in  extradition,  555. 

FELONY, 

when  conviction  of  renders  one  incompetent  as  witness,  495. 
conviction  of,  may  be  shown  to  discredit,  206. 

FEMALE, 

chastity  of,  when  presumed,  19,  341. 

FICTITIOUS  CRIME, 

confession  to  person  confined  with  accused  on  charge  of,  135. 

FICTITIOUS  PERSONS, 
forging  names  of,  427. 

evidence  of  existence  or  non-existence  of,  427. 
competency  of  witnesses  to  show  search  for,  427. 
accused  may  show  absence  of,  427. 

FIDUCIARY  RELATION, 

necessity  for  proof  of,  in  embezzlement,  285. 

FINANCIAL  CONDITION, 

of  accused,  when  relevant,  304,  431,  443. 

FLAGS, 

inscriptions  on,  may  be  proved  orally,  48. 


Sg2  INDEX. 

[RcfcmiCiS  arc  to  Sections.] 

FLIGHT  OF  ACCUSED. 

presumption  of  guilt  from,  117. 

motives,  means  and  occasion  of,  117. 

may  be  shown  by  questions  to  accused,  117. 

can  not  be  proved  against  accomplice,  117. 

conclusiveness  of,   118. 

of  accomplice  may  be  proved,  118. 

explanation  of,  119. 

jurors  arc  to  determine  weight  of,  119. 

means  of,  may  be  shown,  119. 

motives  for,  need  not  be  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  119. 

when  caused  by  threats,  119. 

FOOD, 

adulteration  of,  480-481. 

FOOT-PRIXTS, 

evidence  of,  303,  374. 

FORCE, 

evidence  to  show  degree  of,  in  rape,  417. 
employed  in  robbery,  358. 

FORCIBLE  ENTRY,  426. 

FOREIGN  EXTRADITION, 

See  Extradition. 
FOREIGN  LAWS, 

how  proved,  504. 

FORGERY, 

evidence  of  similar  crimes,  88. 

consultations  in  contemplation  of,  not  privileged,  175. 

defined,  419. 

fraudulent  alteration  or  insertion  of  words,  419. 

party  bound  is  competent,  420. 

competency  of  witness  to  prove,  420. 

what  constitutes  variance  in  proving  the  writing,  421. 

intent  to  defraud  must  be  proved,  422. 

general  intent  sufficient,  422. 

circumstantial  evidence  to  show  intent  in,  422. 

evidence  of  similar  crimes  to  show  intent,  423. 

possession  of  forged  papers  as  evidence  of  guilty  knowledge,  423. 

proof  of  uttering,  424. 

the  w-riting  involved  in,  43,  425. 


INDEX.  893 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

FORGERY— Co;;  tin  ued. 

evidence  to  show  venue,  ^y,  426. 
of  fictitious  names,  427. 
existence  of  corporation,  428. 

expert  evidence  and  standard  of  comparison  to  prove  handwriting;,  42Q. 
evidence    to   show  writing    forged   could   not   accomplish    purpose    in- 
tended, 430. 
sufficiency  of  evidence,  431. 
pecuniary  condition  of  accused,  431. 

FORGETFUL  WITNESS, 

n-.emory  of  may  be  refreshed  by  consulting  memoranda,  212-220. 

FORMER  JEOPARDY, 

trial  terminated  by  agreement  to  turn  states  evidence  does  not  consti- 
tute, 71. 
plea  of  former  conviction  or  acquittal,  194,  195. 
record  of  former  trial  as  evidence  under  this  defense,  195. 
best  evidence  must  be  produced,  195. 
record  is  conclusive  on  both  parties,  195. 
evidence  to  show  that  previous  trial  was  regular,  final  ami  by  court 

having  competent  jurisdiction,  196. 
evidence  of  identity  of  crime  and  person,  197. 
increased  punishment  of  former  criminal  not  in  violation  of,  506. 

FORMER  TRIAL, 

testimony  of  witness  at,  260-267. 

FORMULA, 

of  oath  as  administered  to  witness,  199. 

FORXICATIOX, 

See  Adultf.ry. 
FRAUD, 

evidence  of  other  frauds,  89. 

evidence  tending  to  prove  another  offense  in  prosecution,  438. 

enticement  of  female  by,  339. 

sexual  intercourse  obtained  by,  407. 

FRAUDULENT  INTENT, 

in  forging  name  of  fictitious  person,  427. 
in  passing  counterfeit  money,  433. 
in  false  pretenses,  437. 

Sec  Criminal  I.ntknt. 


^4  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

FUGITIVES  FROM  JUSTICE, 

See  Extradition. 

FURTHER  TESTIMONY, 
recalling  to  obtain,  224. 

FUTURE  CRIMES, 

communications  in  contemplation  of,  180. 

FUTURE  EVENTS, 

pretenses  regarding,  439. 

G 

GAMBLING, 

what  constitutes,  471. 

non-expert  may  describe  manner  of  playing,  472. 

necessity  to  prove  making  of  the  wager,  473. 

proof  of  playing  in  public,  473. 

conviction  of,  on  evidence  of  accomplice,  474. 

keeping  house  for,  475. 

presumptions  and  burden  of  proof,  476. 

instruments  for,  in  evidence,  477. 

GENERAL  BAD  CHARACTER, 

may  be  shown  for  purposes  of  impeachment,  236. 
credibility  and  weight  of  evidence  of,  236. 

GENERAL  INTENT, 

to  defraud,  sufficient  in  forgery,  422 

GENERAL  RESULT, 

best  evidence  of,  after  examination  of  books,  45,  291. 

GENERAL  VERDICT, 

character  and  analysis  of,  274. 

GENUINENESS, 

of  bank-notes,  must  be  proved  by  parol,  296. 
evidence  to  show,  of  writing,  425,  434. 

GEOGRAPHICAL  FACTS, 
judicial  notice  of,  35. 

GESTATION, 

intercourse  during  period  of,  530-532. 


INDEX.  895 

[References  are  to  Sections.} 
GESTURES, 

dying  declarations  made  by,   113. 

confessions  by.  141. 

testimony  of  deaf  mutes  by,  204. 

GOOD  ACTIONS. 

evidence  of,  inadmissible  to  show  character,  81. 

GOOD  CHARACTER, 

See  Character  of  Accused. 

GOOD  FAITH, 

of  accused  in  larceny,  292. 

of  the  accused  in  robbery,  358. 

accused  may  testify  to,  when  charged  with  malicious  mischief,  292,  307. 

of  accused  may  be  shown  in  forgery  and  trial  for  passing  counterfeit 

money,  432. 
not  material  in  false  pretenses,  437. 
of  accused,  charged  with  permitting  escape,  463. 
in  discharging  prisoner,  464. 

of  accused  in  offering  to  marry  prosecutrix,  391. 
as  a  defense  in  bigamy,  398-401. 
of  officer,  relevancy  to  rebut  extortion,  456. 

GOVERNOR  OF  STATE, 

when  he  may  refuse  to  testify,  170. 
may  issue  warrant  in  extradition,  496. 

GRAND  JUROR.S,  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS  TO, 
required  that  an  impartial  investigation  may  be  had,  191. 
grand  juror  cannot  be  compelled  to  disclose  facts  coming  to  his  knowl- 
edge in  jury  room,  191. 
statutory  regulation  of  the  competency  of  grand  jurors,  192. 
in  prosecutions  for  perjury,  193. 

GRAND  JURY.  EVIDENCE  BEFORE, 
is  ex  parte,  25. 
right  of  accused  to  offer,  26. 
must  be  properly  weighed,  26. 
should  be  competent  and  proper,  26. 
best  evidence  required  to  be  given,  26. 
must  be  under  oath,  26. 
depositions  containing,  26. 
effect  of  receiving  incompetent  cvidince.  26. 
obtained  by  compelling  accuse<l  to  testify,  27. 


896  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

GRAND  JURY,  EVIDENCE  BEFORE— Continued. 

obtained  frcm  wife  of  accused,  27. 
must  be  some,  to  sustain  indictment,  26. 
accused  may  give,  voluntarily,  28. 
given  by  suspected  person,  28. 
given  by  co-defendant,  27. 
sufficiency  of,  28. 
belief  in  guilt  of  accused,  28. 
contempt  in  refusing  to  give.  29. 
incriminating  questions  before,  247. 
confession  before,  132. 

GUILT, 

cross-examining  accused  as  to  acts  indicating  consciousness  of,  59. 
consciousness  of,  1 15-124. 


GUILTY, 


See  Plea  of  Guilty. 


GUILTY  KNOWLEDGE, 
in   extortion,  456. 
of  adulteration,  480. 
in  forgery  may  be  shown  by  proving  other  forgeries,  or  possession  of 

forged  paper,  423. 
necessity  for  proof  of,  in  counterfeiting,  369,  432. 
evidence  of  other  crimes  admissible  to  show,  89. 
evidence  of  intoxication  to  show  absence  of,  165,  166. 


H 
HABEAS  CORPUS, 

to  procure  attendance  of  witness  in  jail,  259. 
in  extradition,  497. 

HABITUAL  CRIMINAL, 

increasing  punishment  of,  506,  515. 

constitutionality  of  statutes,  507. 

date  of  conviction  of  prior  crime,  508. 

effect  of  pardon  of  prior  crime,  509. 

setting  out  former  conviction,  510. 

variance,  510. 

plea  of  not  guilty,  511. 

proof  of  discharge  from  prison,  513. 

proof  of  prior  conviction,  514. 

identity  of  accused,  515. 


INDEX.  897 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
HAXDWRITIXG. 

primary  evidence  to  prove,  39. 

HAXDWRITIXG  OF  FORGED  PAPER, 

for  proof  by  expert  evidence  and  comparison,  429. 
standard  of  comparison  must  be  relevant,  429. 
persons  familiar  with,  may  testifj',  429. 
weight  of  evidence  to  prove,  429. 

HEREDITARY  INSANITY, 

when  it  may  be  shown,  160. 

HIDING, 

See  Flight  of  Accused. 
HOME, 

cross-examining  witness  to  show  he  has  abandoned,  61. 

HOMICIDE, 

corpus  delicti,  circumstantial  evidence  to  prove,  7. 

skull  of  victim  may  be  produced,  48. 

evidence  of  good  character  in  case  of,  78. 

similar  crimes,  90. 

declarations  in,  93. 

res  gestce  of,  93,  97,  98. 

djing  declarations  in,  102-114. 

consultations  in  contemplation  of,  not  privileged,  175. 

relation  of  witness  to  deceased,  248. 

evidence  to  prove  the  corpus  delicti  and  the  manner  and  cause  of  death, 

312. 
expert  evidence  of  physicians,  312. 
photographs  to  identify  the  corpse,  312. 
evidence  resulting  from  the  autopsy,  313. 

evidence  to  prove  weapon  or  other  means  producing  (katli,  314. 
proof  of  finding  of  weapons,  314. 

admissibility  of  clothing  and  weapons  in  evidence,  48,  315. 
necessity  for  proving  the  identity  of  the  deceased,  316. 
doctrine  of  idem  sonans,  316. 
identification  of  the  body  of  the  deceased,  317. 
expert  evidence  in  case  of  poisoning,  318. 
evidence  resulting  from  chemical  analysis,  318. 
relevancy  of  evidence  to  show  poisoning,  318,  319. 
presumption  and  proof  of  malice  in,  320. 
proof  of  other  crimes  which  arc  connected  or  were  the  motive  for.  88. 

32t. 
evidence  of  facts  showing  consciousness  of  guilt,  3JJ. 

57 — Unmikrhill  Chim.  Ev. 


898  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

HO^nClDE— Continued. 

evidence  to  show  possible  motive,  323. 

evidence  of  the  habits,  character  and  disposition  of  deceased,  324. 

nature  of  the  evidence  required  to  show  tiie  character  of  the  deceased, 

324-325. 
evidence  of  threats  made  by  the  deceased,  326. 
evidence  of  the  peaceable  character  of  the  accused,  327. 
general  nature  of  and  mode  of  proving  threats  made  by  the  accused, 

328,  329. 
:   declarations  forming  part  of  the  res  gcstcc  of  the  crime,  328,  329,  330. 
declarations  of  the  accused,  330,  330a. 
declarations  of  the  accused  after  the  crime,  330a. 
declarations  of  third  parties  and  cries  and  exclamations  of  by-standcrs, 

loi,  ZZ^- 
evidence  to  show  threats  against  deceased  made  by  third  persons,  332. 
animosit)^  existing  between  deceased  and  accused,  22iZ- 
evidence  of  blood-stains,  334. 
conspiracy  to  commit,  335. 
preparations  to  commit,  336. 
evidence  of  foot-prints,  2)i7- 
self-defense,  338. 

HOMICIDE  BY  POISON, 
burden  of  proof,  318. 

HOPE, 

confessions  made  under  influence  of,  126-130. 

HORSES, 

maliciously  injuring,  310. 

HOSTILE  WITNESS, 

leading  questions  to,  212. 

feelings  of,  may  be  shown  on  cross-examination,  222. 
his  replies  denying  hostility  may  be  contradicted,  222. 
may  be  impeached,  234. 

HOSTILITY, 

of  deceased,  when  relevant  in  homicide,  323-326. 
relevancy  of,  to  determine  intent  in  assault,  357. 
of  accused  against  owner  of  house  burned,  368-370. 

HUMAN  VOICE, 

identification  by,  56. 


INDEX.  899 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

HUSBAXD  AND  WIFE, 

presumption  of  friendly  relations  between,  19. 

competency  of,  as  witnesses   for  or  against  one  another  at  common 

law,  184. 
either  competent  against  the  other  where  personal  injurv  is  involved, 

185, 
credibility  of,  as  witnesses,  185. 
statutory  competency  of,  186. 
confidential  communications  passing  between,  187. 
as  witnesses  for  or  against  an  accomplice  of  the  other,  188 
existence  of  valid  marriage  must  be  proved,  189. 
competency  of,  in  trial  for  adultery,  381. 
competency  of,  in  bigamy,  400. 
may  not  testify  to  non-access,  527-528. 

HYPOTHESIS  OF  IXNOCENCE, 

must  be  wholly  excluded  by  criminating  circumstances  before  verdict 
of  guilty  can  be  rendered,  6. 

HYPOTHETICAL  QUESTION, 

may  be  put  to  physician  in  rape,  412. 

may  be  put  to  expert  witness  to  testify  to  insanity  of  accused,  163,  165. 

may  be  put  to  expert,  312,  319. 

to  expert  in  abortion,  350. 


IDEM  SONANS. 

what  constitutes,  ss,  316. 

IDENTIFICATION, 

of  body  of  person  murdered,  7. 

of  articles  of  personal  property,  47. 

of  persons  and  premises  by  photographs,  50. 

without  standing  up,  54. 

of  accused,  mode  and  effect  of  evidence,  54,  55. 

opinion  evidence  as  to  the  identity  of  the  accused,  55. 

by  pointing  out  a  person,  55. 

forget  fulness  of  witness  to,  55. 

relevancy  of  evidence  of,  55. 

hearsay  and  evidence  of  by-standcr,  55. 

by  photograph.  55. 

by  circumstantial  evidence,  55. 

by  human  voice,  56. 

of  speaker  at  telephone.  5''>. 

evidence  of,  to  show  habitual  criminality,  515. 


900  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

INDENTIFICATION— Con//»n(7/. 
silence  of  accused,  122. 
of  stolen  property,  variance  in,  296. 
of  stolen  goods  by  hearsay,  inadmissible,  296. 
of  money  or  securities  stolen,  296. 
of  weapon  found  in  possession  of  accused,  315. 
of  the  deceased  in  homicide,  316. 
of  substance  chemically  analyzed,  318. 
of  stolen  goods,  379. 
of  deceased  person,  by  photographs,  312. 

IDENTITY, 

evidence  of  other  crimes  admissible  to  shovir,  91. 

of  offenses  under  plea  of  former  jeopardy,  burden  of  proof,  197. 

of  accused  with  person  before  convicted,  515. 

of  deceased  when  body  destroyed,  316. 

IGNORANCE, 

pleas  of  guilty  made  through,  144. 

may  be  proved  to  rebut  intent  in  extortion,  456. 

IGNORANCE  OF  WITNESS, 

does  not  permit  his  impeachment  by  party  calling  him,  236. 
permits  leading  question,  212. 

ILLEGITIMATE  CHILD, 

See  Bastardy  Proceedings. 

ILLNESS  OF  WITNESS,  260-272. 

lAIMORALITY, 

of  accused,  may  be  shown,  61. 

IMMUNITY, 

under  statute,  as  regards  incrimination,  247. 

IMPEACHMENT, 

of  accused  on  cross-examination,  65. 

of  accused  by  showing  bad  character,  65,  66. 

of  dying  declarations,  88. 

of  alibi,   151. 

of  witness  in  rape  by  showing  details  of  complaint,  410. 

of  prosecutrix  by  showing  adultery,  418. 

by  new  evidence,  521. 


INDEX.  901 

[Refcroiccs  arc  to  Sections.] 

IMPEACHMENT  OF  WITNESSES, 

cannot  be  done  by  party  calling,  234. 

unexpectedly  hostile,  235. 

limits  of  discretionary,  235. 

partj'  must  prove  his  surprise,  235. 

by  showing  bad  reputation  for  veracitj',  236. 

never  by  specific  bad  actions,  236. 

by  showing  disbelief  under  oath,  236. 

by  showing  general  bad  moral  character  aside  from  trutli fulness,  237. 

by  proving  extra-judicial  statements  contradictory  of  testimony,  238. 

by  contradictory  writing,  etc.,  239. 

contradictory  writings  must  be  read  to  witness.  240. 

by  contradiction  of  irrelevant  matters  not  allowable,  241. 

confirmatory  statements,  241. 

by  evidence  of  their  previous  silence  when  it  was  their  duty  to  speak, 

242. 
reputation  for  truthfulness  of  witness  who  has  been  impeached,  243. 
by  asking  disgracing  questions,  244,  247. 
by  asking  incriminating  questions,  247. 
by  showing  interest  and  bias,  248. 

IMPLEMENTS, 

for  gambling  in  evidence,  477. 

IMPRISONMENT, 

of  accused,  best  evidence  of,  46. 

of  accused,  when  may  be  shown,  61,  62. 

of  witness,  as  impeachment,  245. 

best  evidence  of,  247. 

to  show  habitual  criminal,  515. 

IMPRISONMENT  FOR  DEBT, 
in  bastardy  action,  523. 

IMPROB.XRILITY  AND  IMPOSSIRILTTY, 
as  affecting  belief.  5. 

IMPROPER  FAMILI.\RITIES, 

evidence  of,  to  prove  adultery,  ;^S:i,  392. 

INCAPACITY, 

to  commit  crime  because  of  infancy,  20. 

INCEST. 

defined,  395. 

intercourse  must  be  voluntary,  396. 


g02  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sectio}is.] 

IXCEST — Coutiiiucd. 

parties  concerned  are  accomplices,  396. 

evidence  to  prove  the  intercourse,  396. 

other  acts  of,  396. 

kinship  of  the  parties.  397. 

necessary  for  corroboration  of  the  accomplice.  397. 

distinguished  from  rape,  397. 

See  Adultery,  Rape  and  Sexual  Crimes. 

IXCRnilXATING   ARTICLES, 

may  be  introduced  in  evidence,  48,  49. 

admissible  though  forcibly  taken  from  accused,  48. 

IXCRIMIXATING  CIRCUMSTAXCES, 

must  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  7. 

IXCRIMIXATIXG  QUESTIOXS, 

to  accused  on  cross-examination,  60-63. 
waiver  of  rights,  by  the  accused,  247. 
when  witness  may  be  compelled  to  answer,  247. 
witness  may  waive  privilege  for  himself,  247. 
statutory  privilege  against,  247. 

See  Grand  Jury  axd  Bankrupt. 

IXDECEXT  LIBERTIES, 
effect  of,  411. 

IXDEPEXDEXT  CRIMES, 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  prove,  87-91. 

IXDICT^IEXT, 

based  on  incompetent  evidence,  25,  26,  28. 

based  on  admissions  of  accused  examined  as  a  witness,  27, 

is  not  evidence,  but  may  be  read  to  jurors,  30. 

material  variance,  31. 

best  evidence  of  pendency  of,  41,  61. 

when  contents  of  may  be  shown  by  parol,  41. 

of  accused  to  show  identity,  55. 

of  accused,  when  may  be  shown,  61. 

use  of  copies  of  in  extradition.  499. 

when  must  contain  allegation  of  former  conviction,  510. 
See  Grand  Jury. 
IXEBRIETY, 

See  Intoxication. 


INDEX.  903 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
INFAMOUS   CRIME, 

statutorj-  regulations  removing  incompetency  caused  bj-  conviction  of, 

206. 
conviction  of  may  be  shown  to  discredit  witness,  209. 
when  conviction  of  renders  witness  incompetent,  206. 
pardon  restores  competency,  207. 
mode  of  proving  pardon,  208. 

IXFANXY, 

presumption  of  incapacity  to  commit  rape  from,  408. 

IXFAXT, 

presumed  incapable  of  committing  crime,  20. 

when  this  presumption  may  be  rebutted,  20. 
See  Child. 
INFIDELITY, 

as  regulating  the  competency  of  witnesses,  201. 

INFORMER, 

name  of  cannot  be  divulged  b\'  witness,  170. 
See  Decoys. 
INJURING  ANIMALS, 

when  maliciously  done,  310. 

INNOCENCE, 

hj'pothesis  of,  when  excluded,  6. 

explanation  of  incriminating  facts  consistent  witli  innocence,  17. 

right  to  instruction  as  to  presumption  of,  17,  18. 

INSANITY, 

capacity  to  know  right  and  wrong  as  test  of,  154. 

presumption  of  sanity,  154. 

uncontrollable  impulse  and  delusion,  when  amounting  to,  155. 

medical  evidence  of,  156. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  156. 

burden  of  proof  to  show,  157. 

proof  of,  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  15R. 

evidence  of  previous  conduct  and  language  of  accused,  158. 

prior  insanity  may  be  proved,  160. 

declarations  to  show,  160. 

evidence  of  demeanor  and  language  of  accused  subsequent  to  crime,  160. 

character  of  crime  as  evidence  of,  160. 

reputation  not  admissible  as  proof  of,  160. 

evidence  of,  in  family  of  accuscci,  160. 

non-cxpcrt  evidence  to  show,  160,  161. 


904  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sectious.] 

INSANITY— Co;i//»Hrrf. 

facts  forming  basis  of  must  be  stated,  i6t,  162. 

witness  giving  must  have  adequate  knowledge,  162. 

expert  evidence  to  show,  163. 

witness  giving  expert  evidence  of,  must  have  had  some  experience  in 
treating  the  insane,  163. 

opinion  as  to,  may  be  based  on  a  hypothetical  question,  or  on  knowl- 
edge obtained  and  facts  observed  during  medical  examination  of  ac- 
cused, 163. 

examination  of  accused  to  ascertain  sanity,  when  compulsory,  163. 

cannot  be  inquired  into  by  grand  jury,  25. 

simulation,  61. 

INSANITY  OF  WITNESS, 

when  rendering  incompetent,  202. 

mode  of  proving,  203. 

adjournment  may  be  directed  in  case  of,  203. 

INSCRIPTIONS, 

primary  evidence  of,  49. 

INSERTION, 

in  writing,  fraudulent  character  of,  419. 

INSOLVENCY, 

of  accused,  when  relevant,  443. 

INSTRUCTION, 

required  on  circumstantial  evidence,  6. 

on  weight  of  negative  evidence,  i6a. 

on  credibility  of  accused,  57. 

as  to  character  of  accused,  86a. 

as  to  alibi,  149,  I53- 

as  to  credibility  of  detectives,  280a. 

INSPECTION, 

by  jury,  of  persons,  53,  54. 

jury  may  determine  age  from,  53,  342- 

by  jury  of  instruments  causing  abortion,  350. 

of  child  in  filiation  suit,  525. 

INSTRUMENTS  IN  WRITING, 

certified  copies  of,  as  evidence,  43. 

INSURANCE, 

evidence  of,  in  arson,  369. 


INDEX.  905 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
INTEXTIOX, 

to  commit  crime,  when  absence  of,  will  be  presumed  in  case  of  in- 
fant, 20. 
accused  may  testif  j-  to  his,  59. 
of  person  acting  as  decoy,  69. 
necessity  of  evidence  of,  59. 
of  accused  to  convert,  282. 
province  of  jury  to  determine  in  libel,  273. 
of  accused  to  abduct,  345. 
to  do  bodily  harm,  how  proved,  354. 
in  robbery,  358. 

evidence  to  show  in  mayhem,  359. 
to  burn  must  be  proved  in  arson,  ^6. 
present  in  entering,  jurj^  to  determine,  373. 
of  owner  in  false  pretenses,  436. 
in  constructive  contempt,  461. 
in  carrying  concealed  weapon,  484. 

INTEREST, 

of  accused,  may  be  considered  by  jury,  58. 
of  obligor  may  be  proved,  420. 

INTEREST  AND  BIAS, 
of  witness,  248. 

IXTERFERENXE, 

with  witnesses,  448. 

INTERMARRIAGE, 

of  accused  and  female  seduced,  391. 
need  not  be  proved  in  incest,  395. 

INTERMINGLED  CRIMES, 

evidence  of,  when  admissible,  88. 

INTERNATIONAL  COMITY,  495. 

INTERNAL  REVENUE, 

privileged  communications,  170. 

INTERPRETER. 

confessions  by,  133. 

of  sign  language  of  deaf  mute  witnc-ss,  204. 

employment  of,  during  examination  of  witness,  discretionary  at  com- 
mon law,  usually  required  by  statute,  227. 


906  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

i:<TERVRETER— Continued. 

witness  or  juror  may  act  as,  227. 
accuracy  of,  may  be  attacked,  227. 
by-standers  may  assist,  227. 

IXTERROGATORIES, 

tiling  of,  in  case  of  contempt,  461. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION, 
compulsory  testimony  before,  58. 

INTERSTATE  EXTRADITION, 

See  Extradition. 

INTIMIDATING  WITNESS,  256. 

INTONICATING  LIQUORS, 

effect  and  quality  of  may  be  judicially  noticed,  21. 
labels  may  be  proved  orally,  49. 

INTONTCATION, 

of  accused,  as  bearing  on  confession,  136. 

no  excuse  for  crime,  165. 

evidence  of,  when  admissible  to  show  physical  condition  at  instant  of 
crime,  165. 

evidence  of,  to  show  specific  intent,  166. 

evidence  of,  to  show  absence  of  guilty  knowledge,  166. 

evidence  of,  to  show  absence  of  premeditated  design,  166. 

to  show  meaning  of  threats  uttered,  166. 

non-expert  witness  may  testify  to.  166. 

evidence  of  conduct  of  accused  on  previous  occasions  while  in  condi- 
tion of,  166. 

confessions  made  under  influence  of,  136. 

of  witness,  admissibility  of,  to  impeach,  237. 

INVALIDITY. 

of  writing  forged  may  be  shown,  430. 

of  official  appointment  cannot  be  shown,  446. 

of  warrant  may  be  shown  in  escape,  465. 

IRRESISTIBLE  HIPULSE, 
as  test  of  insanity,  155. 

J 
JAIL, 

identification  of  accused  in,  50. 


INDEX.  907 

[References  ere  to  Sections.] 
JAILER, 

may  testify  to  contents  of  letter  by  accused,  42. 
may  testify  to  imprisonment  of  accused,  44. 

JEALOUSY, 

as  motive  for  homicide,  323. 

JEOPARDY, 

See  Former  Jeopardy. 

JOINT  DEFEXDAXTS, 

See  Accomplices. 
JUDGE, 

name  of,  when  judicially  noticed,  21. 

right  of,  to  determine  preliminary  questions  of  competency,  214. 

may  interrogate  witnesses,  214. 

duty  of,  to  silence  abusive  witness,  213. 

remarks  by,  referring  to  credibility  or  weight  of  evidence  are  ground 
for  new  trial,  215. 

province,  273-276. 

power  of,  to  commit  for  contempt,  459,  461. 

right  of  to  charge  on  evidence,  222. 

duty  of,  to  instruct  the  jury  on  questions  of  law,  221,  275. 

may  not  read  from  text-writers  in  charging  jury,  275. 

JUDICIAL  XOTICE, 

of  prior  proceedings  in  the  record,  21. 

of  municipal  ordinances,  21. 

of  the  meaning  of  scientific  language,  21. 

of  character  of  sheriff,  21. 

of  public  streets,  21. 

of  statutes,  21. 

of  value  of  stolen  money,  298. 

of  public  officers,  452. 

of  times  of  election,  455. 

of  meaning  of  words,  471.  . 

of  use  of  billiard  tables,  471. 

of  treaties,  505. 

JURISDICTIOX. 

proof  that  accused  has  fled,  118. 
witnesses  out  of,  260-272. 
presumption  of,  465,  470. 
evidence  to  show  lack  of,  465. 

JURISDICTIOXAL  LI. M ITS, 
judicial  notice  of,  21. 


908  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
JURORS, 

may  question  witness,  214. 

improper  reception  of  evidence  by,  out  of  court,  228. 

unauthorized  view  by,  228. 

must  testify  as  witnesses  if  they  know  the  facts,  228. 

may  not  read  newspapers,  scientific  or  legal  books  in  jury  room,  228. 

duty  of,  to  reconcile  evidence  with  presumption  of  innocence,  17. 

questions  put  to  witness  by  members  of,  214. 

solely  to  determine  credibility,  218. 

power  of,  to  disregard  the  judge's  charge,  275. 

province  of,  273,  274. 

JUSTICE  OF  THE  PEACE, 

may  testify  to  dying  declarations,  112. 


K 


KEEPING  DISORDERLY  HOUSE, 
defined,  482. 

competency  of  witness  to  prove  character  of,  482. 
reputation  of  inmates,  482. 
evidence  of  disorderly  actions,  482. 
character  for  chastity  of  accused,  482. 

KEEPING  GAMBLING  HOUSE, 

proof  of  actual  control  not  essential,  475. 
crime  of,  is  continuance,  475. 

KEROSENE, 

evidence  of  stains  caused  by,  370. 

KINSHIP, 

of  parties  concerned  in  incest,  397. 


LABELS, 

on  bottles,  how  proved,  49. 

LACTOMETER, 

evidence  of,  481. 

LANGUAGE, 

evidence  to  show  meaning  of,  363. 


INDEX.  909 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
LARCENY, 

variance  in  proof  of.  34. 

evidence  of  good  character  in,  77. 

evidence  of  intoxication  to  disprove  intent  to  commit,  166. 

distinguished  from  embezzlement,  282. 

defined,  291a. 

necessity  for  and  mode  of  proving  the  intent,  292. 

accused  must  be  permitted  to  testify  to  explanatory  circumstances  to 

rebut  criminal  intent,  292. 
evidence  of  false  declarations  by  accused,  292. 
presence  of  accused  near  stolen  property,  293. 
carrying  away  of  property  stolen  in,  293. 
character  and  proof  of  ownership,  294. 
competency  of  owner  of  stolen  property  as  a  witness,  295. 
non-consent  of  owner  must  be  proved,  295. 
non-consent  of  owner  may  be  proved  circumstantially,  295. 
identification  of  the  property  stolen,  296. 
variance  in  proof  of  the  stolen  property,  296. 
proof  of  genuineness  of  bank-bills,  296. 
recorded  brands  of  stolen  cattle,  297. 
venue  in,  298. 

value  of  stolen  property,  298. 

presumptions  for  the  jury  from  possession  of  stolen  property,  299. 
possession  must  be  recent  and  exclusive  in  character,  300. 
burden  of  explaining  possession,  301. 
admissibility  of  declarations  by  accused  explanatory  of  possession  of 

stolen  goods,  302. 
evidence  of  foot-prints,  303. 

evidence  to  show  the  financial  standing  and  expenditure  of  accused.  304. 
evidence  of  other  crimes,  305. 

stolen  goods  found  through  inadmissible  confession,  306. 
distinguished  from  false  pretenses,  437. 
distinguished  from  robbery,  358. 

LASCIVIOUS  COHABITATIOX, 

proof  of  circumstances  to  show,  384. 

LAW, 

evidence  to  show  accused  acted  under  mistake  of,  309. 
judicial  notice  of,  505. 

LEADIXG  QUESTION'S. 

when  in  discretion  of  court  to  allow  to  hostile  witness,  212. 

may  be  put  to  children,  205,  212. 

not  permissible  on  direct  examination.  212. 

new  trial  grantfd,  because  of,  212. 

may  be  asked  of  unwilling  witness  on  direct  examination,  212. 


910  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
LEGISLATURE, 

power  of,  to  punish  for  contempt,  58,  226. 

LEGIT nL\CY,  PRESUAIPTION  OF,  524-526. 

LENIEXXY, 

confession  made  under  expectation  of,  127. 

LETTER, 

contents  and  receipt  of,  may  be  sliown  orally,  43. 

used  as  decoys,  479. 

as  evidence  against  accused  charged  witli  cml)czzlemcnt,  291. 

as  evidence  against  accused  charged  with  bastardy,  528. 

suggesting  flight  of  the  accused,  118. 

constituting  a  confession,  133. 

LETTER  PRESS  COPY, 
as  evidence,  38. 

LIBEL, 

See  Criminal  Libel. 
LICENSE. 

production  in  court  may  be  dispensed  with,  49. 

LIE, 

See  Consciousness  of  Guilt. 

LIFE,  PRESUMPTION  OF. 

when  in  conflict  with  presumption  of  innocence,  19. 

LIMITING  EFFECT  OF  EVIDENCE, 
in  proving  other  crimes,  283. 

LIQUOR, 

proof  of  character  of,  by  parol,  47. 

LOST  RECORDS, 

See  Primary  Evidence. 

LOST  WRITING, 

evidence  to  prove  in  forgery,  425. 

LOTTERIES, 

See  Gambling. 


INDEX.  911 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


LUCID  INTERVALS, 

See  IxsAXiTY. 
LUNACY, 

See  Insanity. 


MAILING  OBSCENE  LITERATURE,  478,  479. 

MALICE, 

necessity  for  proof  of,  in  injuring  animal,  308. 
presumption  of  in  homicide,  320. 

MALICIOUS  MISCHIEF, 

proof  of  destruction  necessary,  307. 

at  common  law  and  by  statute,  307. 

malicious  intent  must  be  proved,  308. 

intent  may  be  inferred  from  acts  or  contemporaneous  declarations  of 

accused,  308. 
evidence  of  value  and  ownership  of  property  destroyed,  309. 
good  faith  of  accused,  309. 
injuring  or  killing  animals,  310. 
in  cutting  or  destroying  grain,  trees  or  fruit,  311. 

MAP, 

accuracy  of,  how  proved,  52. 

MARRIAGE, 

primary  evidence  of,  44. 
annuUment  of,  may  be  shown  in  bigamy,  398. 
necessity  for  proof  of,  in  adultery,  3S3. 
strict  proof  of,  required,  383,  404. 
certificate  of,  prima  facie  evidence,  383.  404. 
eye-witness  may  prove  ceremony  of,  3S3. 
of  accused,  provable  by  his  admissions,  3S3. 
presumption  of  continuance  of,  383. 
of  parties  to  adultery  not  presumed,  t^S^. 
evidence  of  cohabitation  and  reputation,  403. 
admissions  of  accused  to  prove,  404. 
certificates  and  copies  of  records  to  prove,  405. 
when  solemnized  in  foreign  country,  405. 

MATERIALITY, 

of  evidence,  necessity  for  in  pirjury.  4^17. 
opinion  t-vidcncc  not  adnnssiblc  t<>  prove,  468. 
of  ncwly-discovcrcd  evidence,  5JO. 


912  INDEX-. 

[References  are  to  Scctions.'\ 
MAYHEM, 

evidence  to  sustain  charge  of,  359. 

MEDICAL  WITNESSES, 

See  Expert  Witnesses. 

MEMORANDA  TO  REFRESH  MEMORY, 
when  copies  may  be  used  as,  218. 
when  evidence,  217. 
must  be  contemporaneous,  218. 

MEMORY, 

of  witness,  3. 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  221,  222. 

MENTAL  CAPACITY, 

of  child  as  witness,  205. 

of  witness,  when  relevant,  202-205. 

may  always  be  considered  by  the  jury,  202. 

MENTAL  CONDITION, 

as  determining  the  admission  of  declarations,  113. 

of  one  making  dying  declaration,  112. 

of  person  making  confession,  136. 

of  accused  or  other  intoxicated  person,  136,  165-167. 

of  child  making  confession,  143. 

of  person  making  incriminating  statements,  123. 

MENTAL  FEELINGS, 

oral  expressions  of,  93-101. 

MILK, 

adulteration  of,  480. 

MINOR, 

abduction  of,  339-342. 

MISDEMEANORS, 

doctrine  of  reasonable  doubt  applicable  to,  trials  of,  516. 
conviction  of,  may  be  shown  to  impeach,  210. 

MISTAKE  OF  LAW, 

accused  may  prove  he  acted  under,  309. 

MOB, 

confession  in  presence  of,  128. 


INDEX.  913 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
MONEY, 

desire  for,  as  motive  for  homicide,  $23. 
variance  in  proof  of  stolen,  296. 
possession  of,  presumption  from,  299-301. 
proof  of  passing,  not  required  in  bribery,  453. 

MORAL  CERTAINTY, 

See  Reasonable  Doubt. 

MORPHINE  HABIT, 

relevancy  of,  as  evidence  to  show  mental  condition  of  accused,  168. 

MOTIVE, 

of  witness  to  misrepresent,  5. 

crimes  united  in,  may  be  proved,  88-92. 

prompting  declarations  which  are  part  of  res  gestcc,  93. 

prompting  dying  declarations,  102. 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  for  homicide,  322-323. 

for  homicide,  need  not  be  proved,  323. 

in  constructive  contempt,  461. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS, 

powers  of,  may  be  judicially  noticed,  21. 

MURDER, 

See,  also.  Homicide. 
MUTES, 

See  Deaf  Mutes  as  Witnesses. 

N 
NAME, 

allegation  and  proof  of,  22- 
variance  in  proof  of,  in  forgery,  421. 
identity  of,  55. 

Sec  Fictitious  Persons. 
NARCOTIC, 

dying  declarations  given  under  influence  of,  112. 

NARRATIVE  DECLARATIONS, 

not  receivable  as  part  of  the  res  gestcc,  96-98. 

NATURAL  DISPOSITION. 

of  accused,  not  competent  in  evidence,  85. 

58 — Underhill  Cki.m.  Ev. 


914  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Scctions.l 

NEARNESS  OF  DEATH, 

as  furnisliing  sanction  for  dying  declarations,  102,  103. 
character  of  wounds  tending  to  show,  104. 

NECESSITY, 

for  producing  abortion,  347. 

NEGATIVE  EVIDENCE, 
weight  of,  i6a. 

NEGATIVE  FACTS, 

burden  of  proof  to  show,  24. 

NEGATIVE  TESTniONY, 

to  prove  good  character,  81. 

NEGLIGENCE, 

in  permitting  escape,  463. 

NEWLY-DISCOVERED   EVIDENCE, 
new  trial,  when  granted  on,  516. 
due  diligence  must  be  shown,  517. 
must  appear  from  the  affidavits,  518. 
credibility  of,  519. 
materiality  and  relevancy  of,  520. 
when  impeaching  only,  521. 
when  cumulative  only,  522. 

NEWSPAPER, 

may  be  used  to  refresh  memory,  217,  218. 

NEW  TRIAL, 

when  granted  for  permitting  comment  on   failure   of  accused  to  tes- 
tify, 67. 

NIGHT-TIME, 

defined,  371. 

evidence  to  show  breaking  in  occurred  during,  371. 

NOLLE  PROSEQUI, 

power  of  court  to  enter,  in  case  of  accomplice,  71. 

NON-ACCESS, 

cannot  be  proved  by  evidence  of  either  party  to  marriage,  527,  528. 
evidence  of  absence  to  show,  528. 


INDEX.  915 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
XOX-COXSENT, 

of  owner  of  goods  stolen,  must  be  proved,  295. 
owner  or  agent  may  testify  to,  295. 
may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence,  295,  sj^. 
burden  of  proof  to  show,  55. 

burden  of  proof  and  competency  of  witness  in  case  of  abduction  of 
minor,  340. 

XOX-EXISTEXCE, 

of  fictitious  person,  427. 

XOX-EXPERT, 

may  testify  to  handwriting,  429. 
ma}'  testify  to  insanity,  160,  161. 
form  of  opinion  as  to  insanity,  161. 
competency  of,  for  court,  162. 
may  testify  to  blood  stains,  334. 

XOX-RESIDENCE, 

when  conferring  privilege  from  arrest  on  witness,  258. 
in  extradition,  497. 

XOTICE, 

judicial,  15. 

XOTICE  TO  PRODUCE, 

when  applicable  in  criminal  proceedings,  41,  42. 
instrument  alleged  to  be  forged  or  stolen,  43. 

XOTORIOUS  FACTS, 

judicial  notice  of,  21. 

NUMBER  OF  WITXESSES, 
to  character,  86. 
generally,  i6a. 


OATH, 

confessions  made  under,  before  and  after  accused  is  indicted,  131. 

definition  and  formal  requirements  of.  190. 

when  taken  by  a  person  not  an  adherent  of  Christianity,  200. 

children  not  understanding  nature  of,  are  incompetent,  205. 

of  interpreter,  227. 

insane  witness  must  understand,  202. 


9l6  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Seetions.] 
OBLIGOR, 

may  testify  to  forgery  of  instrument  by  wliicli  he  is  bound,  419. 

interest  of,  may  be  proved,  420. 

may  be  dispensed  with  as  wUness,  420. 

OBSCENE  LITERATURE, 

statute  against  mailing,  478. 

character  of,  for  jury,  478. 

decoy  letters,  479. 

oral  evidence  to  show  meaning  of  language,  479. 

OBSTRUCTING  JUSTICE, 

necessity  for  proof  of  official  character,  446. 

officer  may  testify  to  character,  446. 

invalidity  of  appointment  cannot  be  shown,  446. 

intention  to  obstruct  may  be  inferred  from  language,  447. 

presumption  and  burden  of  showing  validity  of  warrant,  447. 

preventing  attendance  of  witnesses,  448. 

OFFER, 

of  accused  to  surrender,  118,  465. 

by  accused  of  seduction  to  marry  prosecutrix,  391. 

OFFICER, 

resistance  to,  118. 

confession  made  to,  129. 

furnishing  liquor  to  accused  by,  effect  upon  confession,  136. 

may  carry  concealed  weapon,  486. 

resisting  an,  446,  447. 

may  testify  to  search  for  accused,  118. 

before  whom  oath  is  taken  in  perjury,  470. 

OFFICIAL  CHARACTER, 

provable  by  oral  evidence,  44,  46. 
necessity  to  show,  446,  447. 
proof  of,  in  embezzlement,  286. 

OFFICIAL  COMMUNICATIONS, 
when  privileged,  170-172. 

OMISSION  OF  EVIDENCE, 

supplying  evidence  of  witness  kept  away,  263.  264. 

OPINION  EVIDENCE, 

not  admissible  when  contained  in  dying  declarations,  108. 


INDEX.  917 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

OPIXIOX  EVlDEy:CE— Continued. 

inadmissible  to  show  character,  80,  81. 

of  identity,  55. 

to  show  intoxication,  167. 

as  to  burning,  370. 

inadmissible  to  show  cause  of  fire,  372. 

of  age.  342. 

in  burglary,  as  to  means  of  entrance,  372. 

as  to  character  of  foot-prints,  374. 

OPIXIOX  EVIDEXCE  OF  IXSAXITY, 
by  non-expert  witness  : 

non-expert  must  have  adequate  knowledge  of  facts,  161. 

must  state  facts  with  his  opinion,  162. 

opinion  of,  cannot  be  based  upon  hj-pothetical  question,  162. 

weight  of  evidence  of,  162. 

competency  of,  is  for  court  to  determine,  162. 
by  medical  expert  witness : 

his  opinion  must  be  based  on  hypothetical  question,  163. 

when  his  opinion  may  be  based  on  evidence  given  in  the  case,  163. 

general  qualifications  of,  163. 

must  have  had  some  experience  in  treating  the  insane,  163. 

facts    and    symptoms    observed   in    physical    examination    may    be   de- 
scribed, 163. 

OPPORTUXITY, 

as  evidence  of  sexual  intercourse,  381,  386,  396. 

ORAL  EVIDEXCE. 

testimony  of  deaf  mute  by  signs  is,  204. 

to  prove  official  character,  287.  447. 

to  prove  contract  of  employment  in  embezzlement,  287. 

to  prove  ownership  of  property,  309. 

to  prove  forged  writing,  425,  426. 

of  corporate  existence,  428. 

to  show  use  of  forged  writing,  430. 

to  supply  omitted  details  in  consular  certificate,  502. 

to  contradict  official  return.  456,  437. 

to  show  meaning  of  language  used,  483. 

to  prove  identity  of  accused  alleged  to  be  habitual  criminal,  515. 

ORDER  OF  PROOF. 

each  side  to  exhaust  its  case.  280. 
evidence  in  chief  received  during  rebuttal,  280. 

in  case  of  plea  of  not  guilty   where  accused   is  alleged   to  be   li.ilpitual 
criminal,  511. 


9l8  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

OTHER  CRIMES,  EVIDENCE  OF, 

not  admissible  where  crimes  are  independent,  87. 

receivable  where  crimes  are  connected,  88,  321. 

where  parts  of  a  general  scheme,  87,  88. 

connection  must  be  clearly  shown,  88. 

admissible  to  show  intention  or  guilty  knowledge,  89. 

in  homicide  by  poison,  89. 

when  united  in  motive,  90. 

when  one  crime  is  committed  to  conceal  another,  90,  321. 

admissible  to  show  identity  of  means  or  person,  91. 

admissibility  in  cases  of  adultery,  incest,  etc.,  92,  396. 

admissibility  in  embezzlement,  283. 

under  indictment  for  larceny,  305. 

in  homicide,  89,  321. 

in  abortion,  345. 

to  prove  intent  of  assault,  355. 

in  arson,  89,  369. 

in  burglary,  376. 

in  forgery  to  show  guilty  knowledge,  89,  423,  432. 

fact  of  acquittal  does  not  exclude,  423. 

where  accused  is  alleged  to  be  habitual  criminal,  512. 

not  usually  relevant  in  rape,  415. 

to  show  intent  in  bribery,  451. 

OUTCRIES, 

of  woman  on  whom  rape  is  made,  417. 

OWN  DWELLING, 

when  burning  of,  is  arson,  367. 


OWNER, 


evidence  to  prove  consent  of,  to  entrance,  309. 
intention  of,  as  regards  title  in  false  pretenses,  436. 


OWNERSHIP, 

of  property  injured,  309. 

in  embezzlement,  286. 

of  building  burned,  366,  367. 

OWNERSHIP  OF  STOLEN  GOODS, 
variance  in,  294. 
best  evidence  of,  required,  294. 
by  corporation,  294. 
proving  by  recorded  brands,  297. 


INDEX.  919 

[Ri^fcrciiccs  arc  to  Sections.] 
OWN  WITNESS, 

cannot  be  impeached  by  party  calling,  235. 

P 

PAIX, 

utterances  descriptive  of,  348,  417,  533. 

PAIXTIXGS, 

as  evidence,  52. 

accuracy  must  be  shown,  51,  52. 

PARDOX, 

removes    incompetency   to    testify    caused   b}'   conviction    of    infamous 

crime,  206. 
must  be  full  and  unconditional,  207. 

courts  will  judicially  notice  proclamation  of  general  amnesty,  208. 
primary  evidence  of,  is  required,  208. 
parol  evidence  to  identifj'  person  named  in,  208. 
as  excluding  proof  of  former  conviction,  509,  510. 

PAREXT, 

may  testify  to  age  of  child,  40. 

PAROL  EVIDEXCE, 

to  show  contents  of  warrant  or  indictment,  40,  41. 

to  show  contents  of  letters  received  by  prisoner  in  jail,  43. 

to  show  imprisonment  of  accused,  44. 

of  confessions  taken  at  the  preliminary  examination,   132. 

PARTICULAR  FACTS, 

cross-examination  upon,  of  witness  testifying  to  good  character,  82. 

PASSIXG  COUXTERFEIT  MOXEY,  432-434- 

PASSIXG  WORTHLESS  CHECK, 

false  pretenses  inferred  from,  444. 

PATERXITY, 

inspection  to  determine,  525. 
burden  of  proof,  524. 

PAUPER  DEFEXDAXT. 

service  of  process  for,  249. 

PEACEABLENESS, 

character  of  accused  for,  76,  327. 


920  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
PECULATIOX, 

competencj-  of  evidence  proving  another  offense  under  charge  of,  283. 

PECUNIARY  COXDITIOX, 

of  person  accused  of  forgery  of  receipt,  431. 
false  representations  of,  442. 
evidence  to  show,  443. 

PEDIGREE, 

as  proof  of  age,  342. 

PENETRATION, 

evidence  of  physician  to  show,  412. 

character  of  proof,  412. 

circumstantial  evidence  to  show,  412. 

in  cases  of  child,  412. 

must  be  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  412. 

PERJURY, 

definition  and  intent  to  swear  falsely,  466. 

materiality  of  the  evidence,  467. 

number  of  witnesses  and  corroboration  required,  468. 

falsity  of  the  testimony,  460,  470. 

conviction  of,  disqualifies  witness,  209. 

who  is  accomplice,  69. 

intention  to  be  sworn,  470. 

authority  of  officer  to  administer  oath,  470. 

PERSON, 

variance  in  names  of,  3S- 
exhibiting,  to  show  identity,  53-55. 
photograph  of,  50. 

PERSONAL  IDENTITY, 
evidence  of,  53,  54. 

PERSONAL  PROPERTY, 

primary  evidence  of  its  physical  condition,  47. 

evidence  to  identity,  48. 

weapons  in  evidence,  315. 

desire  to  obtain,  as  motive  for  homicide,  323. 

articles  of,  in  evidence,  481. 

taken  from  accused  on  search,  58a. 

discovered  by  inadmissible  confession,  138. 

used  in  experiment,  233. 

as  evidence  in  malicious  mischief,  308. 


INDEX.  921 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

PERSONS  IX  AUTHORITY, 

when  confessions  made  to,  are  presumed  involuntary,  139. 

PHOTOGRAPHS, 

by  X-Ray  received,  50. 

of  accused  in  prison  clothes,  50. 

as  primary  evidence,  50. 

received  to  identifj^  premises,  persons  and  dead  bodies,  50. 

as  evidence  of  public  records,  50. 

as  evidence  of  disputed  writings,  50. 

accuracy  and  relevancy  of,  51. 

change  in  scene  prior  to  taking,  51. 

stationing  men  about  while  taking,  51. 

by  amateur  is  admissible,  51. 

familiarity  with  locality,  51. 

admissibility  of,  to  identify  deceased  person,  and   show  character  of 

wounds,  312. 
to  prove  language  of  faded  writing,  425. 
as  proof  in  arson,  369. 

PHYSICAL  COXDITIOX, 

primary  evidence  of.  47. 

of  person,  evidence  to  show,  53. 

of  the  accused,  53. 

inspection  by  jury,  53. 

of  deceased  in  homicide,  312. 

of  woman  on  whom  abortion  was  committed,  349. 

evidence  of,  to  rebut  presumption.  413. 

of  prosecutrix  in  rape,  medical  evidence  to  show,  412-414. 

of  accused,  in  rape,  416. 

PHYSICAL  EXAMIXATIOX, 

may  be  dispensed  with  in  rape,  412. 
evidence  ascertained  by,  413,  414. 

PHYSICAL  IXCAPACITY  OF  ACCUSED, 
when  it  may  be  shown,  165. 

PHYSICAL  IXJURIES, 

photographs  to  show,  50,  312. 
of  person  assaulted,  354. 

PHYSICIANS. 

credibility  of,  280a. 

their  competency  as  witnesses,  312. 


922  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

TUYSICIA'^S— Continued. 

testimony  of  as  to  weapons,  312. 

accused  of  abortion,  privileged  communications  to,  351. 
may  testify  to  age,  strength,  physical  and  mental  condition,  of  prosecu- 
trix in  rape,  412-414. 
testimony  of,  as  to  penetration,  412. 
cannot  testify  as  to  consent  in  rape,  412. 

PHYSICIAN,   PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS   TO, 

dying  declarations  not  regarded  as,  180. 

made  in  contemplation  of  crime,  180. 

when  made  during  examination  to  detect  or  ascertain  insanity  of  ac- 
cused, 181. 

not  recognized  at  common  law,  179. 

statutory  regulation  of,  179. 

proof  of  express  hiring  not  required  to  establish  relation,  179. 

when  communication  must  have  been  necessary  to  enable  physician  to 
prescribe,  179. 

waiver  of  privilege  in  civil  cases,  180. 

waiver  in  prosecution  for  rape,  180. 

death  of  the  patient  as  affecting  the  character  of,  180. 

PLACE, 

allegation  and  proof,  variance,  32. 

PLEA  OF  GUILTY, 

when  conclusive,  144. 
may  be  withdrawn  before  judgment,  144. 
discretion  of  court  to  refuse  to  permit  withdrawal  of,  144. 
entered  through  mistake  or  ignorance,  144. 
See  Confession. 

POISONING, 

evidence  of  similar  crimes,  87. 

dying  declarations  in  death  by,  107. 

evidence  of,  afforded  by  autopsy,  258,  313,  318. 

essential  facts  may  be  sustained  by  circumstantial  evidence,  318. 

qualifications  of  expert  in,  318. 

to  what  facts  expert  may  testify  in,  318. 

inference  of  intent,  318. 

death  of  other  persons,  318. 

possession  of  poison  by  accused,  318. 

motive  of  accused,  319. 

declarations  of  the  accused,  319a. 


INDEX.  923 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
POLICE  OFFICIAL, 

best  evidence  of  his  appointment  and  authority,  46. 
when  communications  to,  are  privileged,  170. 
admissibility  of,  confession  made  to,  124,  129,  140. 
unconscious  influence  of,  on  confession,  150. 
may  testify  in  extradition,  502. 
homicide  of,  90. 
credibility  of,  280a. 

POPULATION, 

judicial  notice  of,  21. 

POSSESSION, 

of  weapons,  by  accused,  314,  336. 
of  instruments  to  cause  abortion,  349. 
of  burglar's  tools,  evidence  to  show,  375. 
inference  of  guilty  knowledge  from,  423. 
of  forged  writings  by  accomplice,  423. 
of  poison  by  accused,  319. 

POSSESSION  OF  COUNTERFEIT  NOTES, 

guilty  knowledge  may  be  inferred  from,  43Z 

accused  may  explain,  433. 

must  be  exclusive  and  personal,  433. 

POSSESSION  OF  STOLEN  GOODS, 
may  always  be  proved,  299. 
inferences  from,  299. 
must  be  recent  in  time,  300. 

weight  of,  as  evidence  as  affected  by  intervening  time,  300. 
as  affected  by  portable  character  of  money  or  goods  stolen,  300. 
must  be  personal  and  exclusive,  300. 
not  sufficient  if  constructive  only,  301. 
accused  has  burden  of  explaining,  301. 
presumption  in  case  of  failure  to  explain,  302. 
when  explanation  will  be  accepted  as  satisfactory,  302. 
declarations  accompanj'ing,  may  be  proved  as  a  part  of  res  gestcc,  302. 
revealed  by  an  inadmissible  confession,  306. 
as  supplying  motive  for  homicide,  324. 
presumption  from  in  burglary,  378. 

in  burglary,  must  be  recent,  personal,  and  unexplained,  378. 
in  robbery,  358. 

POSTPONEMENT, 

Sec  Continuance. 


924  INDEX. 

[References  ore  to  Sections.] 
POVERTY, 

of  accused,  relevancy  of,  304,  323,  358,  431,  443. 

PRECAUTION, 

to  prevent  fire,  relevancy  of,  369. 

PREGXANXY, 

in  abortion,  defendant's  knowledge  of,  need  not  be  proved,  349. 
knowledge  of,  to  prove  intent,  349. 

PREJUDICE, 

against  circumstantial  evidence  may  disqualify  juror,  5. 
instruction  as  to,  248. 
of  suspected  witness,  248. 

PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION, 

best  evidence  of  proceedings  at,  40,  41. 

evidence  taken  at,  how  proved,  129. 

testimony  of  witness  at,  admissible  at  subsequent  trial,  260. 

testimony  of  accused  at,  132. 

extradition  proceedings  in  nature  of,  496. 

evidence  of  in  bastardy,  534. 

accused  should  be  cautioned,  132. 

PREMEDITATION, 

evidence  of  intoxication  to  show  absence  of,  166. 
evidence  of  hostility  to  show,  333. 
proof  of,  not  necessary  in  mayhem,  359. 

PREMISES, 

taking  the  view  of,  230,  231. 

condition  of,  where  burglary  committed,  372. 

PREPARATION, 

for  crime,  declarations  made  in,  when  received,  99. 

to  commit  arson,  370. 

to  commit  burglary,  371. 

for  marriage,  may  be  shown  in  seduction,  388. 

PREPONDERANCE  OF  EVIDENCE, 

not  sufficient  for  conviction  in  criminal  trial,  8. 

PRESENCE  OF  ACCUSED, 

while  taking  the  view,  231. 

during  examination  of  witnesses,  232. 


INDEX.  925 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

PRESENCE  OF  ACCUSED— Co»f(««^£/. 

during  argument  as  to  competency,  232. 

record  must  show,  232. 

ma\-  be  dispensed  with  while  stenographer  reads  minutes  of  testimony, 

233- 
near  scene  of  burglary,  ^77' 

PRESENCE  OF  WITNESSES, 

See  Attendance  of  Witnesses  and  Separation  of  Witnesses. 

PRESS  COPY, 

when  admissible,  38. 

PRESUMPTION, 

of  good  character,  76. 

of  incapacity  to  commit  crime  because  of  infancy,  20. 

as  to  accuracy  of  photograph,  51. 

of  voluntary  character  of  confession,  127,  138. 

of  continuance  of  insanity,  156. 

of  sanit}^,  154. 

of  sanity,  when  equivalent  to  proof,  157. 

from  possession  of  stolen  goods,  299,  378. 

of  malice  in  homicide,  320. 

of  chastity  of  female  abducted,  341. 

of  death  from  unexplained  absence,  399. 

of  continuance  of  marriage,  383. 

of  continuance,  19,  392. 

of  valid  marriage,  403. 

of  incapacity  to  commit  rape,  407. 

of  forgery  from  possession  of  forged  writings,  423. 

of  jurisdiction,  463. 

that  owner  knows  what  house  is  used  for,  476. 

of  validity  of  warrant,  465. 

PRESUMPTION  OF  CHASTITY  OF  FEMALE, 
in  seduction,  19. 
when  opposed  by  presumption  of  innocence,  19. 

PRESUMPTION  OF  INNOCENCE, 
always  applicable,  17. 

can  only  be  overcome  by  evidence  of  guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  17. 
accompanies  accused  until  verdict,  18. 
when  conflicting  with  other  presumptions,  19. 
distinguished  from  burden  of  proof,  22.  , 

in  conflict  with  presumption  of  chastity,  393. 


926  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

FRESUMPTIOX  OF  LEGITIMACY, 
when  conclusive,  526. 
rebuttable  by  proving  non-access,  527,  528. 

PRESUMPTIOX  OF  LIFE, 
when  existing,  19. 
when  conflicting  with  presumption  of  innocence,  19. 

PREVIOUS  IMPRISONMENT  OF  WITNESS,  246. 

PRIEST, 

how  sending  for  may  indicate  sense  of  approaching  death,  104. 

privileged  communications  to,  178. 

See  Clergyman, 
PRIMA  FACIE  CASE, 

when  state  must  make  out,  22-24. 

PRIMARY  EVIDENCE, 
defined,  38. 
of  age,  38. 
of  handwriting,  39. 

of  indictment  pending  or  acquittal,  40. 

of  proceedings  at  coroner's  inquest  or  preliminary  examination,  41. 
statutes  regulating,  41. 
loss  of  original  must  be  shown,  41a. 
when  papers  cannot  be  found,  43. 
of  warrant,  43. 
of  indictment,  43. 
of  ofifense  named  in  warrant,  43. 
of  instrument  acknowledged,  43. 
notice  to  produce,  42. 
of  forged  writmg,  43. 

of  writings  whose  existence  or  contents  are  in  issue,  43,  425. 
of  contradictory  writings  and  writings  which  cannot  be  found,  43,  425. 
of  collateral  facts,  44. 
of  lease,  44. 

of  conviction  of  crime,  44. 
of  prior  arrest,  44. 
of  sending  telegram  or  letter,  44. 
of  the  existence  of  the  marriage  relation,  44,  383. 
of  writings  customarily  destroyed,  44. 

of  the  general  result  of  examination  of  books  and  papers,  45- 
of  insolvency,  45. 
of  balance  due,  45. 
of  result  of  examination  of  public  record,  45. 


INDEX.  927 

[References  are  to  Sectiojis.] 

PRIMARY  EVIDENCE— Continued. 
of  records,  46. 
by  certified  copies,  46. 
of  official  appointment,  46. 
of  physical  condition  of  personal  property,  47. 
of  identity,  47. 

of  inscriptions  on  bulky  articles,  49. 
of  labels,  tags,  etc.,  48. 
photographs  as,  48-50. 
drawings  and  sketches  as,  52. 
of  identity  of  persons  and  property,  53-55. 
certified  copies  as,  43. 
of  age,  39. 
of  ownership,  44. 
of  lease,  44. 
of  imprisonment,  44. 
of  public  appointments  and  records,  46. 
of  blood  stains  on  clothing,  47. 
of  character  of  intoxicating  liquors,  47. 
of  identity  of  personal  property,  47. 
of  signboards,  monuments,  boundaries,  etc.,  51. 
of  dying  declarations,  112-114. 

of  judicial  determination  that  witness  is  a  lunatic,  203. 
of  pardon  of  witness,  207. 

of  former  trial  under  plea  of  former  jeopardy,  195. 
of  marriage  ceremony,  402. 
of  marriage,  383. 
of  corporate  existence,  428. 
of  ownership  of  stolen  goods,  294. 

PRIOR  CONVICTION, 

of  accused,  when  may  be  shown,  59. 

evidence  of,  excluded  by  new  trial,  6r. 

issue  and  mode  of  proof  in  case  of  habitual  criminality,  512. 

PRIOR  INCONSISTENT  STATEMENTS, 
may  be  proven,  238. 

PRISONER, 

See  Accused. 

PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS, 

protected  on  cross-examination  of  accused,  62. 

confessions  contained  in,  135. 

the  doctrines  of,  generally  considered,  i6q. 


928  _^  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sectio7ts.] 

PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS— Continued. 
between  executive  ofificials,  170. 
between  attorney  and  client,  172,  178. 
between  priest  and  penitent,  178. 
between  physician  and  patient,  178,  179. 
as  regards  telegrams,  182. 
between  husband  and  wife,  184-189. 
as  relating  to  the  evidence  of  judicial  officers,  190. 
grand  jurors,  191,  192. 
traverse  jurors,  193. 
before  grand  jury,  26. 
between  witness  and  attorney,  172. 
where  hearer  is  not  professional  person,  173. 

PROBABLE  CAUSE, 
of  fire,  370. 

PROCESS, 

to  procure  attendance  of  witness,  250. 

PRODUCTION  OF  WRITINGS, 
by  subpoena  duces  tecum,  251. 
necessar}^  in  trial  for  forgery,  425. 

PROMISE  OF  MARRIAGE, 

must  be  proved  in  seduction,  387. 
may  be  inferred  from  circumstances,  387. 
need  not  be  in  express  language,  21^7. 
prior  conduct  of  the  parties  to  show,  388. 
subsequent  conduct  of  the  parties  to  show,  388. 
prosecutrix  in  seduction  may  testify  to,  389. 
corroboration  as  regards,  389. 
in  bastardy  proceedings,  528. 

PROOF  OF  HANDWRITING, 

by  subscribing  witnesses,  39. 

See  Burden  of  Proof. 

PROPERTY, 

intent  to  convert,  in  embezzlement,  2^:2,  283. 
declarations  of  accused  explaining  possession  of,  300-302. 

PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY, 

must  not  refer  to  failure  of  accused  to  testify,  67. 
confessions  to,  129,  133. 


INDEX.  929 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
PROSECUTION, 

must  sustain  the  burden  of  proof,  23. 

PROSECUTRIX, 

her  examination,  credibility  and  corroboration  in  seduction,  389. 

PROSTITUTION, 

of  female  witness  may  be  shown  to  impeach,  245. 
abduction  for  purpose  of,  343. 
evidence  to  show  use  of  house  for,  482. 

PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY,  273-280. 

PUBLICATION, 
in  libel,  362. 

PUBLICITY, 

as  an  element  of  gambling,  473. 

PUBLIC  OFFICERS, 

best  evidence  of  appointment  of,  46. 

PUBLIC  PLACE, 

what  constitutes,  473. 

PUBLIC  RECORDS, 

primary  evidence  of,  46. 

primary  evidence  of  fact  not  found  in,  46. 

as  evidence  against  the  accused  charged  with  embezzlement,  291. 

as  proof  in  extradition,  500. 

PUBLIC  STREETS  AND  SQUARES, 
judicial  notice  of,  21,  36. 

PUNISHMENT, 

increasing  because  of  repetition  of  crime,  506-514. 

PURCHASE, 

of  weapon  by  accused,  336. 

PURPOSE, 

of  forged  writing  may  be  shown  by  oral  evidence,  430. 

59^Unuerhili,  Ckim.  Ev. 


930  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  S':ciio)is.] 

Q 
QUESTION, 

confession  made  in  answer  to,  140. 

R 

RACE, 

evidence  of,  from  inspection,  53. 

RAPE, 

defined,  407, 

presumption  of  non-consent  in  case  of  infants,  407. 

committed  by  infants,  408. 

evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption  against  capacity  to  commit,  408. 

evidence  of  complaint  by  victim,  409. 

details  of  complaint  in,  may  be  proved  to  impeach  or  corroborate,  409- 

410. 
delay  in  making  complaint,  411. 
testimony  of  physician,  412. 

evidence  of  the  physical  condition  of  prosecutrix,  413. 
competency  and  credibility  of  prosecutrix  as  a  v^^itness,  414. 
infancy  of  prosecutrix,  414. 
evidence  to  show  relations  of  the  parties,  415. 
direct  and  circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  penetration,  416. 
force  or  fraud  must  be  shown,  417. 
failure  of  female  to  make  outcry,  417. 
reputation  of  prosecutrix  in,  for  chastity,  418. 

READING  INDICTMENT, 
effect  of,  30. 

REAL  EVIDENCE, 

to  show  identity  of  personal  property,  46. 
defined,  53. 

REASONABLE  DOUBT, 

guilt  must  be  proved  beyond,  6. 

difficulty  of  defining,  lo-ii,  12. 

not  applicable  in  civil  cases,  8. 

distinction  as  regards  weight  of  evidence,  8. 

doctrine  of,  not  applicable  in  civil  cases,  8,  9. 

distinguished  from  demonstration,  11. 

equivalent  to  "moral  certainty,"  11. 

attempted  definitions,  12. 

precautions  to  be  employed  in  defining,  13. 


INDEX.  931 

[Rcfcrcuccs  arc  to  Sections.] 

REASOXABLE  DOUBT— Co«/n;»r(/. 

doctrine  of,  applicable  to  misdemeanors,  14. 

conviction  beyond,  of  every  material  fact  not  required,  14. 

when  entertained  by  one  juror,  15. 

evidence  of  good  character  not  confined  to  cases  of,  80. 

evidence  of  good  character  may  create,  80. 

doctrine  of  not  invoked  in  bastardy,  524. 

alibi  need  not  be  proved  beyond,  151. 

insanity  not  required  to  be  proved  beyond,  158. 

not  applicable,  in  extradition,  496. 

REASOXABLE  HYPOTHESIS, 

must  be  excluded  when  verdict  of  guilty  is  based  on  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, 6,  7. 

RECALLIXG  WITXESS, 

discretion  of  court  to  permit,  224. 
wholly  in  discretion  of  court,  224. 
after  re-direct  and  re-cross-examination,  224. 

RECEIPT, 

as  evidence  against  accused  when  charged  with  embezzlement,  291. 

RECEIVER, 

is  not  accomplice  of  thief,  69. 

RECEIVIXG  EVIDEXCE  OUT  OF  COURT, 
generally  improper,  228. 
experiments  of  jurors,  228. 

from  private  view  of  premises  or  scene  of  crime,  228.  230. 
from  witnesses  not  sworn  and  from  writings  not  in  evidence,  228. 
from  criminating  articles  in  jury  room,  228. 

RECOGXIZAXCE, 

to  secure  the  attendance  of  witness,  254. 

RECORD, 

photographs  of,  received,  50. 

evidence  from,  to  identify  the  accused,  55. 

copy  of,  to  prove  conviction,  195. 

received  to  prove  former  jeopardy,  195. 

as  conclusive  evidence  of  direct  contempt,  458. 

proof  of,  in  interstate  cxtra<!ition,  499,  501. 

admissible  to  prove  perjury,  470. 

See   PuilLIC  KlXORDS. 


932  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
RECORDED  DEED, 

to  prove  ownership,  23^. 

RECOVERY, 

when  hope  of  excludes  dying  declaration,  103-105. 

RE-DIRECT  EXAMINATION, 
must  not  be  suggestive,  223. 

irrelevant  evidence  received  on  cross-examination,  its  effect  on,  223. 
explaining  contradictory  statements  and  motives  on,  223. 
new  matter,  not  touched  on  in  cross-examining,  cannot  be  brought  in, 
223. 

REFERENCE  TO  THIRD  PERSON  FOR  INFORMATION,  442-445- 

REFRESHING  MEMORY, 

when  witness  is  forgetful,  217. 
what  writings  may  be  used,  217. 
writing  used  is  not  usually  competent,  217. 
opposite  party  may  inspect  writing,  217. 
to  recall  details,  218. 

REFRESHMENTS, 
as  a  wager,  417. 

REFUSAL, 

proof  of,  in  embezzlement,  284. 

REFUSAL  TO  TESTIFY, 

when  a  contempt  of  court,  226. 
how  and  by  whom  punishable,  226. 
before  justice  of  the  peace,  226. 

RELATIONSHIP, 

as  impeachment,  248. 

RELIGIOUS  BELIEF, 

as  sanction  for  dying  declarations,  102. 
witness  may  be  interrogated  as  to  his,  201. 
statutes  regulating  the  subject,  201. 

REMARKS  OF  COURT, 

if  made  during  examination  of  witness  may  furnish  grounds  for  new 
trial,  214. 


INDEX.  933 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
REMOTENESS, 

of  evidence  to  character,  83. 

of  possession  of  stolen  property,  299. 

of  autopsy  from  death.  313. 

of  proof  of  insanity,  160. 

REPETITIOX  OF  CRIME, 

statute  to  prevent,  506-514. 

REPLIES, 

of  witness  must  be  responsive,  216. 

REFUTATION, 

not  admissible  to  prove  insanity,  159. 

evidence  of,  when  bad,  to  impeach  witness,  236,  237. 

must  come  from  acquaintances  of  the  witness,  236. 

must  not  be  too  remote,  236. 

must  be  local,  235. 

to  sustain  witness  who  has  been  impeached,  243. 

for  peace  and  quietness,  of  accused,  324,  325. 

of  accused,  327. 

as  evidence  of  marriage,  403. 

of  prosecuting  witness  in  bastardy,  531. 

of  prosecutrix  in  rape,  for  chastity,  418. 

of  house  as  gambling  house,  475. 

of  person  as  common  gambler,  475. 

of  house  of  ill  fame,  482. 

See  Character  of  Accused. 

REQUISITION  PAPERS, 

form  and  character  of,  in  interstate  extradition,  499. 

RES  GEST^, 

definition  and  scope  and  limit  of  facts  forming  part  of,  93. 

illustrated  in  circumstantial  evidence  in  homicide.  93. 

instinctive  declarations  and  utterances  included  under,  93. 

declarations  must  approximate  in  time,  place  and  motive,  94. 

circumstances  which  may  exclude  declarations,  94. 

declarations  received  to  show  malice  and  premeditation,  94. 

declarations  must  illustrate  main  transaction,  95. 

declarations  must  be  contemporaneous  with  main  transaction,  96. 

length  of  period  intervening,  97. 

narrative  declarations  not  incUulcd  under,  96. 

interval  for  consideration,  97. 

spontaneous  character  of  declarations  rctiuired,  97. 


934  ixDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

RES  GEST^^ — Continued. 

declarations  in  homicide,  97. 

mental  condition  of  declarant,  98. 

admissibility  for  the  accused,  99. 

whole  declaration  must  be  received,  100. 

declarations  accompanying  acts  of  preparation,  100. 

declaration  must  refer  to  some  relevant  act,  100. 

utterances  of  by-standers  and  third  persons,  lOi. 

declarations  which  are  part  of,  distinguished  from  dying  declarations, 

106-107. 
of  homicide,  dying  declarations  must  refer  to,  109. 
declarations  forming  part  of  possession  of  stolen  property,  302. 
declarations  a  part  of  the,  admissibility  in  abortion,  348. 
declarations  a  part  of,  in  arson,  368. 

complaint  of  prosecutrix  in  rape  when  a  part  of,  339,  409. 
declarations  of,  in  poisoning,  319a. 
in  homicide  after  the  crime,  330a. 
in  robbery,  358. 
motive  of  accused,  447. 

See  Declarations  of  By-Staxders. 

RESIDEXXE, 

.  inquiries  at,  to  ascertain  existence  of  fictitious  person,  426,  427. 
proof  of,  in  extradition,  497. 

RESISTANCE, 

to  arrest,  showing  consciousness  of  guilt,  120. 

degree  of,  required  in  rape,  412. 

evidence  of  physical  condition  of  parties  to  show,  413. 

RESISTING  OFFICER, 

See  Obstructing  Justice. 

RESOLUTIONS, 

primary  evidence  of,  50. 

RESPONSIVENESS, 

of  answers  on  the  direct  examination,  216. 

RESWEARING  WITNESS, 
when  necessary,  199. 

RETAINER, 

payment  of  not  required  to  render  communication  passing  between  at- 
torney and  client  privileged,  173. 


ixDEx.  935 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


RETURN, 

of  property  in  larcen}*,  282. 

of  official  may  be  contradicted  by  parol,  401,  463. 

of  fugitive  to  state,  495. 

REVEXGE, 

as  furnishing  motive  for  homicide,  323. 

REVOLVER, 

condition  and  use  of,  when  relevant,  315. 

REWARD, 

for  accused,  118. 

RIGHT  AND  WRONG, 

capacity  to  know,  154. 

RIOT, 

defined,  489. 

declarations  forming  a  part  of  res  gestcr,  489. 

ROBBERY, 

distinguished  from  larceny,  291a,  358. 
evidence  of  other  crimes,  358. 
good  faith  of  the  accused,  358. 

ROGUE'S  GALLERY, 

admissibility  of  photographs  taken  from,  50. 

RUMORS, 

derogatory  to  good  character,  81. 
accused  need  not  deny,  124. 


s 

SANITY, 

presumption  of,  156,  157. 
burden  of  proof  to  show,  157. 

SEARCH, 

for  lost  w-iting,  41a. 

evidence  obtained  by,  58a. 

when  illeRal,  docs  not  exclude  evidence,  58a. 

of  officer  for  accused,  118. 

of  accused  revealing  burglar's  tools,  375. 


93^  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.'] 

SEARCH  WARRANT, 

papers  seized  under,  are  not  competent,  58. 
to  obtain  knowledge  of  letter,  479. 

SECONDARY  EVIDENCE, 

See  Primary  Evidence. 

SECRECY  OF  TELEGRAMS, 

dispatches  are  not  privileged,  182. 
subpoena  to  produce,  182. 

SECRET  BALLOT, 

proving  that  it  was  cast,  455. 

SEDUCTION, 

defined,  385. 

circumstantial  evidence  to  prove  sexual  intercourse,  386. 

proving  the  promise  in,  387. 

promise  need  not  be  express,  387. 

evidence  of  prior  attention,  and  declarations  of  accused, 

reputation  as  engaged,  388. 

credibility  and  corroboration  of  prosecutrix,  389. 

what  facts  must  be  corroborated,  390. 

corroboration  of  prosecutrix  by  circumstances,  390. 

question  of  consent  for  jury,  390. 

marriage  of  accused  to  prosecutrix  as  defense,  391. 

evidence  to  show  chastity  of  female,  392. 

relevancy  of  prior  conduct  to  show  chastity,  392. 

presumption  of  chastity  of  female  in,  393. 

of  female  ward  or  servant,  494. 

SELF-CONTROL, 

See  Insanity. 
SELF-DEFENSE, 

reputation  of  deceased,  when  relevant  under,  324,  325. 

evidence  of  threats  by  deceased,  326. 

proof  of,  in  homicide  and  maj^hem,  326. 

deceased  carrying  weapons,  325. 

SELF-SERVING  DECLARATIONS, 

explanatory  of  possession  of  stolen  goods,  301,  302. 
not  admissible,  99,  119a. 
distinguished  from  res  gestce,  99. 


INDEX.  937 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

SEPARATION  OF  WITXESSES, 

under  what  circumstances  ordered,  225. 

discretion  of  court  to  exclude  testimony  of  witness  refusing  to  go  out, 
225. 
SEX, 

opinion  of,  based  on  examination  of  skeleton,  312. 

SEXUAL  CRIMES,  3S0-406. 

SEXUAL  INTERCOURSE, 

evidence  to  prove,  381,  386,  396. 

by  prosecutrix  in  rape  with  men  other  than  accused,  415. 

SEXUAL  RELATIONS, 

evidence  of,  in  rape,  414. 
evidence  of,  in  abduction,  343. 
as  furnishing  motive  for  crime,  323. 
evidence  of  in  bastardy,  528. 

SHOES, 

comparison  of  tracks  with  those  of  accused,  374. 

SIGNATURE, 

when  required  to  written  confession,  133. 

SIGNBOARDS. 

primary  evidence  of  contents,  50. 

SIGNS, 

dying  declarations  by,  113. 

confessions  by,  141. 

testimony  of  deaf  mutes  by,  204. 

SILENCE, 

of  female  raped,  409,  417. 

as  impeachment  of  witness,  242. 

witness  must  be  permitted  to  explain,  242. 

SILENCE  UNDER  CHARGE  OF  CRIME, 
when  indicating  guilt,  67,  122. 
accused  must  have  heard  charge,  122. 
when  occurring  in  judicial  proceedings,  122. 
weight  of,  as  evidence,  122. 
circumstances  of,  may  be  shown,  123. 
at  coroner's  inquest,  etc.,  123. 


938  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

SILENCE  UNDER  CHARGE  OF  CRIME— Conthmcd. 
motives  of,  may  always  be  explained,  123. 
when  under  arrest,  123. 
assertion  or  question  may  be  proved,  124. 
mode  of  proving  accused  heard  the  charge,  124. 
of  accused,  not  evidence,  where  accusation  was  not  relevant,  124. 

SKETCHES, 

See  Paintings. 

SOCIAL  COXXECTIOXS, 

of  witness,  when  relevant,  247. 

SODOMY, 

essential  facts  and  accomplice  evidence,  360. 

SPECIAL  VERDICT, 

jury  may  render,  274. 

SPECIES, 

variance  in,  34,  310. 

SPECIFIC  FACTS, 

cross-examination  upon,  of  witness  to  character,  82. 

SPECIFIC  TRAITS, 

of  character,  evidence  to  prove,  77. 

SPELLING, 

effect  of  mistake  in,  33. 

SPONTANEOUS  CHARACTER, 
of  res  gcstcE,  96,  97. 
of  confessions,  140. 

STAINS, 

of  blood,  evidence  to  show,  47. 

STATES, 

extradition  among,  46,  498. 

STANDARDS  OF  COMPARISON, 

See  Handwriting;  Comparison. 

STATE'S  EVIDENCE, 

See  Accomplices. 


INDEX.  939 

[Refcroiccs  arc  to  Sections.] 
STATUTES, 

judicial  notice  of,  505. 

STENOGRAPHER, 

may  read  contradictory  statement,  240. 
testimony  read  by,  in  perjury,  470. 

STENOGRAPHER'S  NOTES, 

received  to  prove  testimony  of  deceased  or  absent  witness,  267. 
may  also  be  used  to  refresh  memory,  267. 

STOLEN  PROPERTY, 

may  be  put  in  evidence,  47. 

identification  of,  47. 

carrying  away  of,  293. 

ownership  of,  294. 

non-consent  of  owner  to  carrying  away,  295. 

identification  of,  296. 

production  in  evidence  not  indispensable,  296. 

value  of,  298. 

presumption  from  possession  of,  299-301,  378. 

finding  of,  through  inadmissible  confession  may  be  proved,  138,  306. 

STREETS  AND  SQUARES, 
judicial  notice  of,  21,  38. 

SUBORNING  WITNESS, 

evidence  to  show  attempt  at,  120,  121. 

SUBPOENA, 

definition  of,  249. 

to  procure  papers  and  documents,  251. 

time  and  mode  of  service,  251. 

right  of  accused  to,  250. 

may  be  granted  accused  in  extradition,  495. 

SUBPOENA  DUCES  TECUM, 
to  produce  telegrams,  182. 
when  granted,  251. 

must  describe  papers  with  certainty,  251. 
production  of  articles  of  personal  property  not  obtained  by  means  of, 

251. 
excuse  for  disobedience  to,  252. 


940  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

SUBSCRIBING  WITNESS, 

proof  by,  necessity  for  calling,  39. 

may  be  impeached,  235. 

may  testify  to  forgery  of  his  name,  420. 

SUBSTANCE  OF  CRIME, 

must  be  proved  as  laid  in  indictment,  31. 

SUFFERING, 

declarations  of,  in  poisoning,  319a. 
admissibility  of  declarations  of,  348. 

SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE, 
to  sustain  indictment,  28. 

SUICIDE, 

no  presumption  against,  19. 

possession  of  poison  as  indicating,  319a. 

declarations  of  intention  to  commit,  319a. 

SUMMARY  CONVICTION, 
of  contempt,  459. 

SUPPLEMENTARY  PROCEEDINGS, 
admissions  made  in,  443. 

SUPPRESSION  OF  EVIDENCE, 

absence  of  witness  procured  by  connivance,  264. 
indicating  guilt,  115,  121. 

SURGEON, 

sending  for,  may  indicate  sense  of  approaching  death,  103. 

SURPLUSAGE, 

in  indictment  defined,  31. 
when  may  be  omitted,  31. 

SURPRISE, 

party  may  show,  caused  by  unexpected  hostility  of  his  own  witness.  235. 
of  accused,  when  arrested,  119. 

SURVEYOR, 

may  testify  orally  as  to  boundaries,  50. 


INDEX.  941 

[Refcroiccs  arc  to  Sections.] 
SUSPECT, 

evidence'of,  before  coroner,  132. 

SUSPICIOUS  CIRCUMSTAXXES, 
relevancj-  of,  115. 

SYMPTOMS, 

statements  of  admissible  in  abortion,  348. 

T 
TAKING  CASE  FROM  JURY, 

duty  of  court  to  direct  acquittal,  279. 
court  can  not  direct  conviction,  279. 

TAKING  THE  VIEW, 

power  to  order  discretionary,  229. 

consent  of  parties  must  be  had,  229. 

when  consent  may  be  dispensed  with,  229. 

knowledge  thus  acquired  by  the  jury  is  not  evidence,  230. 

right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  at,  231. 

after  summing  up,  231. 

oral  evidence  inadmissible  while  taking,  231. 

presence  of  presiding  judge  requisite  at,  232. 

of  premises  broken  into,  373. 

TAMPERING, 

with  witness,  effect  of,  121. 

TANGIBLE  EVIDENCE, 

physical  condition  of  personal  property,  47. 

TEETH, 

identification  of  deceased  by  means  of,  312,  316. 

TELEGRAM, 

primary  evidence  of,  44. 

when  may  be  proved  by  type-written  copy,  44. 

privileged  character  of,  182. 

TELEPHONE. 

conversation  over,  56. 

TERMS  OF  COURT. 

when  judicially  noticed,  21. 

TESTIMONY  ON  PRIOR  OCCASIONS,  260-272. 


942  IXDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Scctious.] 
THIRD  PERSONS, 

confessions  of,  in  exoneration  of  accused,  145. 
declarations  of,  loi. 

THREATS, 

against  accused,  when  producing  flight,  119. 

against  witnesses,  120. 

confessions  made  under  influence  of,  128,  139. 

evidence  to  show  meaning  of,  166. 

evidence  of,  by  the  deceased,  in  homicide,  326. 

if  not  communicated  to  accused,  326. 

evidence  of,  by  the  accused,  to  show  premeditation,  328. 

by  co-defendant  in  presence  of  accused.  328. 

not  inadmissible  though  general  in  character,  328. 

remoteness  of  as  regulating  their  weight,  328. 

language  of,  need  not  be  specific,  328. 

competency  of  witness,  329. 

evidence  of,  made  against  deceased  by  third  persons,  332. 

relevancy  of,  to  prove  intent  to  assault,  357,  358. 

against  owner  of  house  burned,  368. 

proof  of,  in  assault,  354. 

though  indefinite,  may  be  proved,  328. 

remoteness  of,  329. 

may  be  proved  to  explain  delay  in  making  complaint,  411. 

employment  of,  in  rape,  417. 

against  officer,  evidence  to  show  intent  in  assaulting,  447. 

TIME. 

allegation  and  proof  of  variance,  32. 
as  element  of  res  gesfcc,  96. 
evidence  of,  to  show  alibi,  149. 

TOOLS, 

possession  of,  used  by  burglars,  375. 
possession  of,  for  counterfeiting,  433. 
for  gambling  as  evidence,  477. 

TRAITS  OF  CHARACTER, 
evidence  to  prove,  76-86. 

TRAMP, 

cross-examining  witness  to  show  he  is  a,  60. 

TRAVELERS, 

may  carry  concealed  weapon,  486. 


INDEX.  943 

[Rcfornccs  arc  to  Sections.] 


TRAVERSE  JURORS. 

when  testimony  of  is  admissible,  193. 

TREASON, 

confessions  of,  142. 

TREATIES. 

judicial  notice  of,  504. 
providing  for  extradition,  495. 

TREES, 

malicious  destruction  of,  307. 

TRESPASS. 

by  animals,  evidence  to  show,  310. 
in  larceny,  282. 

TRICK, 

confession  procured  by,  135. 
sexual  intercourse  obtained  bj',  410. 

TRUTH, 

confession  under  an  exhortation  to  tell,  130. 

in  libel,  362. 

mode  of  proof  in  libel,  365. 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  prove,  365. 


U 

UNXHASTITY, 

evidence  of,  in  adulterj',  381. 

See,  also,  Chastity. 
as  impeachment  of  witness,  396. 

UXCOMMUXICATED  THREATS, 
their  inadmissibility,  326. 

UN'COXTROLLARLE  niPULSE, 

when  amounting  to  insanity,  155. 

UNTRUTHFULNESS, 

evidence  of  reputation  for,  236. 

UNWILLING  WITNESS. 

may  be  plied  with  leading  questions,  213. 


944  INDEX. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
L'SAGE, 

to  ask  illegal  fees,  not  relevant,  457. 

UTTERING  FORGED  PAPER, 

sufficiency  of  evidence,  424. 
declarations  accompanying,  424. 
possession  as  evidence  of,  423. 
venue  of  forgery  from,  426. 

V 

VAGRANXY, 

cross-examination  of  witness  to  show,  60. 

VALIDITY, 

of  warrant  presumed,  447. 

of  marriage,  presumption  and  burden  of  proof,  398. 

VALUE, 

need  not  be  proved  by  direct  evidence,  298. 

of  goods  obtainec  by  false  pretenses,  embezzlement  or  extortion,  309, 

457- 
of  stolen  property,  proof  of,  298. 
of  money  stolen,  judicial  notice  of,  298. 
presumptions  as  to,  298. 
of  article  wagered,  473. 

VARIANXE, 

when  material,  31. 

in  matter  of  substantial  description,  31. 

in  proving  identity  of  defense,  31. 

in  larceny  of  animal,  32. 

in  allegation  of  time  and  place,  32. 

in  allegation  of  person,  32,  33. 

in  spelling,  idem  so)iaus,  33. 

in  species  or  genus  of  animal  stolen,  34. 

in  proving  the  venue,  35. 

in  proving  ownership  of  stolen  goods,  294,  309,  373. 

in  mode  of  killing,  314. 

in  proving  name  in  homicide,  318. 

in  proving  building  burned,  367. 

in  proving  forged  writing,  421. 

in  proving  official  character,  452. 

in  proof  of  adulteration,  480. 

VENEREAL  DISEASE, 

relevance  of,  in  rape,  413. 


INDEX.  945 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
VENUE, 

may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence,  ^6,  298. 

need  not  be  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  36. 

may  be  inferred  from  evidence  of  accused,  36. 

burden  to  prove  on  state,  36,  298. 

must  be  proved  precisely  as  laid,  36,  298. 

proof  of  county  sufficient,  36. 

change  of,  for  convenience  of  witnesses,  256. 

in  bigamy,  405. 

proof  of  in  forgerj',  $7,  426. 

of  false  pretenses,  445. 

court  will  notice  judicially  its  limits,  21. 

evidence  of  on  part  of  defense  supplies  omission  by  prosecution,  35. 

VERACITY, 

bad  character  of  accused  for  may  be  shown.  65,  /S. 
evidence  of  bad  reputation  for,  to  impeach  witness,  236. 

VERDICT, 

essentials  of,  on  plea  of  former  jeopardy,  196. 

VERDICT  OF  GUILTY, 

when  may  be  rendered  on  circumstantial  evidence,  6. 

VERTEBRA, 

exhibition  of,  to  jury  to  explain  evidence,  48. 

VICTIM, 

declarations  of,  in  homicide,  98. 

See  Complaint  of  Victim  in  Rape. 
VIEW, 

Sec  Taking  the  View. 
VOICE. 

identification  by,  56. 

accused  cannot  put  his  own  in  evidence,  57. 

VOLU.VTARIXESS. 

must  be  shown  before  admittinR  confession,  126. 

preliminary  question  of,  to  be  tried  by  court,  126-131. 

presence  of  jury  durinR  argument  on,  127. 

cross-examination  as  to,  127. 

right  of  jury  to  determine,  127. 

not  necessary  in  ca.sc  of  admissions,  137. 

6c>— Underhill  Cbim.  Ev. 


94^  INDEX. 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

W 
WAGER, 

making  of,  must  be  proved,  473. 
circumstantial  evidence  of,  473, 
value  of  thing  involved,  473. 

WAGES, 

of  accused,  relevant  in  larceny,  304. 

WAGON  TRACKS, 

evidence  to  show,  in  larceny,  303. 

WAIVER, 

of  right  to  cross-examine,  220. 

as  to  privileged  communications,  64,  159,  177. 

must  be  express,  64. 

WANTONNESS, 

when  malicious  intent  may  be  inferred  from,  308. 

WARNING  ACCUSED, 

confession  made  without,  127-130. 

WARRANT, 

when  contents  of  may  be  shown  by  parol,  41. 
validity  of,  may  be  inquired  into,  447,  465. 
as  proof  in  extradition,  499. 

WEAPON, 

variance  in  proof  of,  in  homicide,  314. 

purchase,  use  and  possession  of,  by  accused,  314. 

admissibility  of  and  experiments  with  in  evidence,  48,  314. 

inference  of  intent  to  do  bodily  harm  from  use  and  character  of,  354. 

what  is  deadly,  356. 

experiments  with,  233. 

finding  near  place  of  crime,  314. 

possession  of,  by  accused  in  homicide,  336. 

WEIGHT  OF  EVIDENCE, 
before  grand  jury,  25-27. 

rules  in  civil  and  criminal  cases  distinguished,  7-9. 
to  be  determined  exclusively  by  jury,  215. 
Judge  may  not  comment  upon,  215. 
in  extradition,  498. 


INDEX.  947 

[References  are  to  Sectio]ts.] 
WHISKEY, 

judicial  notice  of  its  nature,  21. 

WIFE, 

evidence  of  quarrels  with,  SS3- 

dying  declaration  of,  competent  against  husband,  185. 

confession  of,  competent  against  husband,  185. 

WITHDRAWAL  OF  WITNESSES, 

See  Separatiox  of  Witnesses. 
WITNESS, 

character  and  mental  capacity  of,  3. 

before  the  grand  jury,  25-30. 

primariness  of,  39. 

credibility  of,  in  perjury,  468. 

attendance  in  extradition  procurable  by  subpoena,  495. 

number  required,  i6a. 

contempt  by,  before  the  grand  jury,  29. 

under  suspicion  of  the  crime,  248. 

WOUNDS, 

sense  of  approaching  death  may  be  inferred  from  nature  of,  104, 
witness  may  testify  as  to  time  and  manner,  47. 
relevancy  of  evidence  of,  to  show  locality  and  description,  312. 
photographs  received  to  show,  312. 

WRITING, 

invalidity  of,  when  forged  may  be  shown,  430. 

variance  in  proof  of,  429,  430. 

must  be  produced  in  forgery,  425. 

secondary  evidence  to  prove,  if  lost,  425. 

photographs  to  prove,  425. 

when  loss  or  destruction  may  be  proved,  41a. 

of  accused  to  show  motive,  323,  357. 

WRITTEN  INSTRUMENTS, 

See  Best  Evidence;  Primary  Evidence. 


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LAW  LIF.RARY 


AA    000  847  832    3 


